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PLATO

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
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PLATO

CRATYLUS · PARMENIDES
GREATER HIPPIAS
LESSER HIPPIAS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. N. FOWLER



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PREFACE

IN this volume the Greek text of the *Parmenides* and *Cratylus* is based upon the Codex Bodleianus or Clarkianus (B) and the Codex Venetus Append. Class. 4, cod. 1 (T). Readings not supported by either of these, and occasionally disagreements between these two manuscripts themselves, are noted in the margin. Later hands of these manuscripts are designated by the letters *b* and *t*. Other manuscripts occasionally mentioned are Codex Venetus Append. Class. 4, cod. 54 (G), and Codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. Phil. Gr. 7 (W).

Codex B does not contain the two Hippias dialogues; the text of these is, therefore, based chiefly upon Codex T, with readings from W and Codex Vindobonensis 55, Suppl. Phil. Gr. 39 (F) and occasional use of Codex Vaticanus Palatinus 173 (P) and Codex Venetus Marcianus 189 (S). All readings not supported by T are noted in the margin.

The introductions to the dialogues may, in spite of their extreme brevity, be of some slight service, especially to those who read these dialogues for the first time.

HAROLD N. FOWLER.

LIST OF PLATO'S WORKS showing their division
into volumes in this edition and their place in the
edition of H. Stephanus (vols. I-III, Paris, 1578).

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LIST OF PLATO'S WORKS

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CRATYLUS



INTRODUCTION TO THE *CRATYLUS*

IN the beginning of the *Cratylus* Hermogenes appeals to Socrates to explain what Cratylus means; for Cratylus has just declared to Hermogenes that "Hermogenes" (Born-of-Hermes) is not really his name, even though he be universally called by it. Socrates is further requested to set forth his own opinion concerning the correctness of names or, in other words, the origin of language and linguistic forms. In the dialogue which ensues, Hermogenes maintains the theory that language is purely a matter of convention. Against this Socrates argues that name-giving, like other arts and sciences, demands technical knowledge, and that names, if they are correct, must have been given by law-givers who possess such knowledge. Most names, or words, are formed by derivation or composition from other words, and Socrates gives many examples of such formation. As the discussion progresses, he develops the theory that the original name-givers believed, like Heracleitus, that all things are in perpetual flux, and embodied that belief in the primary words. By comparison with pictures the conclusion is reached that names are imitations of the realities named. Further examination shows that the results heretofore attained are unsatisfactory. At this point Cratylus takes the place of Hermogenes

INTRODUCTION TO THE *CRATYLUS*

as interlocutor and is forced to admit that custom, or convention, plays a part in the formation of words.

The dialogue cannot be satisfactorily translated, because the numerous etymologies cannot be appreciated without some knowledge of Greek; nevertheless it is interesting, even though the etymologies be not thoroughly understood. Some of them are manifestly absurd, and in some cases the absurdity is obviously intentional. Evidently some current theories of language are satirized in these instances; in fact, the dialogue appears to contain many references, the meaning of which can only be guessed, because we do not know the persons to whom reference is made. Even so, however, the wit and humour of the dialogue are apparent.

The *Cratylus* cannot be said to be of great importance in the development of the Platonic system, as it treats of a special subject somewhat apart from general philosophic theory; its interest lies rather in its technical perfection and in the fact that it is the earliest extant attempt to discuss the origin of language. Linguistic science was in Plato's day little more than *a priori* speculation, not a real science based upon wide knowledge of facts; but this dialogue exhibits such speculation conducted with great brilliancy and remarkable common sense.

The position of the *Cratylus* in the sequence of Plato's works is uncertain. Possibly the rejection (404 B) of the derivation of "Αιδης from ἀειδής (invisible), which is accepted in the *Phaedo* (80 D), may indicate that the *Cratylus* is the later of the two dialogues.

Hermogenes was the son of Hipponicus and

INTRODUCTION TO THE *CRATYLUS*

brother of the wealthy Callias. He was a follower of Parmenides, as Cratylus was of Heracleitus. Both are said by Diogenes Laertius (iii. 8) to have been Plato's teachers. Euthyphro, from whom Socrates claimed in jest to derive his inspiration, is the same from whom the dialogue entitled *Euthyphro* derives its name.

ΚΡΑΤΥΛΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΩΝ ΟΡΘΟΤΗΤΟΣ· ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

St. I
p. 383

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΡΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ, ΚΡΑΤΥΛΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

1. ΕΡΜ. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Σωκράτει τῶδε ἀνακοι-
νωσώμεθα τὸν λόγον;

ΚΡΑ. Εἴ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΕΡΜ. Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνό-
ματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων φύσει
πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἂν τινες
ξυθήμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς
μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν
B ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἑλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις
τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν. ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ
αὐτῷ Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομα¹. ὃ δὲ ὁμο-
λογεῖ. “τί δὲ Σωκράτει;” ἔφην. “Σωκρά-
της,” ἢ δ’ ὅς. “οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώ-
ποις πᾶσιν, ὅπερ καλοῦμεν ὄνομα ἕκαστον, τοῦτό
ἐστὶν ἐκάστω ὄνομα;” ὃ δέ. “οὐκοῦν σοί γε,”
ἢ δ’ ὅς, “ὄνομα Ἐρμογένης, οὐδὲ ἂν πάντες
καλῶσιν ἄνθρωποι.” καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος καὶ
384 προθυμουμένου εἰδέναι ὃ τι ποτὲ λέγει, οὔτε ἀπο-

¹ ὄνομα T: ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἢ οὐ B.

CRATYLUS

[OR ON THE CORRECTNESS OF NAMES: LOGICAL]

CHARACTERS

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES

HER. Here is Socrates; shall we take him as a partner in our discussion?

CRA. If you like.

HER. Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says that everything has a right name of its own, which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men, both Greeks and barbarians. So I ask him whether his name is in truth Cratylus, and he agrees that it is. "And what is Socrates' name?" I said. "Socrates," said he. "Then that applies to all men, and the particular name by which we call each person is his name?" And he said, "Well, your name is not Hermogenes,¹ even if all mankind call you so." Now, though I am asking him and am exerting myself to find out what in the world he

¹ *i.e.* you are no son of Hermes. Hermes was the patron deity of traders, bankers, and the like, and Hermogenes, as is suggested below, was not successful as a money-maker.

PLATO

σαφεί οὐδὲν εἰρωνεύεταιί τε πρός με, προσποιού-
μενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς εἰδὼς
περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃ εἰ βούλοιο σαφῶς εἰπεῖν, ποιήσειεν
ἂν καὶ ἐμὲ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει.
εἰ οὖν πῆ ἔχεις συμβαλεῖν τὴν Κρατύλου μαντείαν,
ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι· μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ σοι ὄπη
δοκεῖ περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, ἔτι ἂν ἠῖδιον
πυθοίμην, εἴ σοι βουλομένω ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. ὦ παῖ Ἰππονίκου Ἑρμόγενης, παλαιὰ
B παροιμία, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ ἐστίν ὄπη ἔχει
μαθεῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ
σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὄν μάθημα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἠῖδη
ἠκηκὴ παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον
ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαι-
δεῦσθαι, ὡς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέν σε
αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναί τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων
ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχ-
C μαιίαν· οὐκ οἶδα πῆ ποτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ
τῶν τοιούτων. συζητεῖν μέντοι ἔτοιμός εἰμι καὶ
σοὶ καὶ Κρατύλῳ κοινῇ. ὅτι δὲ οὗ φησί σοι
Ἑρμογένη ὄνομα εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὥσπερ ὑπο-
πτεύω αὐτὸν σκώπτειν· οἶεται γὰρ ἴσως σε χρη-
μάτων ἐφιέμενον κτήσεως ἀποτυγχάνειν ἐκάστοτε.¹
ἀλλ', ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, εἰδέναί μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα
χαλεπὸν, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δὲ καταθέντας χρὴ σκοπεῖν,
εἴτε ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἔχει εἴτε ὡς Κρατύλος.

2. ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις
δὴ καὶ τούτῳ διαλεχθεὶς καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, οὐ
D δύναμαι πεισθῆναι ὡς ἄλλη τις ὀρθότης ὀνόματος
ἢ ξυνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὅ τι ἂν
τίς τῷ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν· καὶ ἂν

¹ ἐκάστοτε om. T.

CRATYLUS

means, he does not explain himself at all ; he meets me with dissimulation, claiming to have some special knowledge of his own about it which would, if he chose to speak it out clearly, make me agree entirely with him. Now if you could interpret Cratylus's oracular speech, I should like to hear you ; or rather, I should like still better to hear, if you please, what you yourself think about the correctness of names.

soc. Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that knowledge of high things is hard to gain ; and surely knowledge of names is no small matter. Now if I had attended Prodicus's fifty-drachma course of lectures, after which, as he himself says, a man has a complete education on this subject, there would be nothing to hinder your learning the truth about the correctness of names at once ; but I have heard only the one-drachma course, and so I do not know what the truth is about such matters. However, I am ready to join you and Cratylus in looking for it. But as for his saying that Hermogenes is not truly your name, I suspect he is making fun of you ; for perhaps he thinks that you want to make money and fail every time. But, as I said, it is difficult to know such things. We must join forces and try to find out whether you are right, or Cratylus.

HER. For my part, Socrates, I have often talked with Cratylus and many others, and cannot come to the conclusion that there is any correctness of names other than convention and agreement. For it seems to me that whatever name you give to a thing is its right name ; and if you give up that

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αὐθὶς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκείνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῆ, οὐδὲν ἦττον τὸ ὑστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου, ὡσπερ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἡμεῖς μετατιθέμεθα¹. οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἐκάστω πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων.

Εἰ δέ πη ἄλλη ἔχει, ἔτοιμος ἔγωγε καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ ἀκούειν οὐ μόνον παρὰ Κρατύλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν.

385 ΣΩ. Ἴσως μέντοι τί λέγεις, ὦ Ἑρμόγευες· σκεψώμεθα δέ. ὃ ἂν θῆ καλεῖν² τις ἕκαστον, τοῦθ' ἐκάστω ὄνομα;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐὰν ἰδιώτης καλῆ καὶ ἐὰν πόλις;

ΕΡΜ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐὰν ἐγὼ καλῶ ὄτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων, οἶον ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἄνθρωπον, ἐὰν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον προσαγορεύω, ὃ δὲ νῦν ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον, ἔσται δημοσία μὲν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος τῷ αὐτῷ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν αὖ ἄνθρωπος, δημοσία δὲ ἵππος; οὕτω λέγεις;

Β ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

3. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ μοι τόδε εἶπέ. καλεῖς τι ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ ψευδῆ;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν λόγος ἀληθῆς, ὃ δὲ ψευδῆς;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθῆς· ὃς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδῆς;

¹ After μετατιθέμεθα B reads οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῦτ' εἶναι ὀρθὸν τὸ μετατεθὲν τοῦ πρότερον κειμένου.

² θῆ καλεῖν B: φῆς καλεῖ T: φῆς καλῆ Hirschig.

CRATYLUS

name and change it for another, the later name is no less correct than the earlier, just as we change the names of our servants; for I think no name belongs to any particular thing by nature, but only by the habit and custom of those who employ it and who established the usage. But if this is not the case, I am ready to hear and to learn from Cratylus or anyone else.

soc. It may be that you are right, Hermogenes; but let us see. Whatever name we decide to give each particular thing is its name?

HER. Yes.

soc. Whether the giver be a private person or a state?

HER. Yes.

soc. Well, then, suppose I give a name to something or other, designating, for instance, that which we now call "man" as "horse" and that which we now call "horse" as "man," will the real name of the same thing be "man" for the public and "horse" for me individually, and in the other case "horse" for the public and "man" for me individually? Is that your meaning?

HER. Yes, that is my opinion.

soc. Now answer this question. Is there anything which you call speaking the truth and speaking falsehood?

HER. Yes.

soc. Then there would be true speech and false speech?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then that speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false?

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ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν ἄρα τοῦτο, λόγῳ λέγειν τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ μὴ;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ λόγος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθῆς πότερον ὅλος C μὲν ἀληθῆς, τὰ μέρη δ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μέρη.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μέρη ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ οὐ ἢ πάντα;

ΕΡΜ. Πάντα, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν οὖν ὅ τι λέγεις λόγου μικρότερον μέρη ἄλλο ἢ ὄνομα;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μικρότατον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἄρα τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγου λέγεται;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθές γε, ὡς φῆς.

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ τοῦ ψευδοῦς μέρη οὐ ψεῦδος;

ΕΡΜ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν ἄρα ὄνομα ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθές λέγειν, εἴπερ καὶ λόγον;

D ΕΡΜ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἂν ἄρα ἕκαστος φῆ τῷ ὄνομα εἶναι, τοῦτό ἐστὶν ἕκαστῷ ὄνομα;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ὅποσα ἂν φῆ τις ἕκαστῷ ὀνόματα εἶναι, τοσαῦτα ἔσται καὶ τότε ὅποταν φῆ;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ἄλλην ὀρθότητα ἢ ταύτην, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἕτερον εἶναι καλεῖν ἕκαστῷ ὄνομα, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐθέμην, σοὶ δὲ

CRATYLUS

HER. Yes.

SOC. It is possible, then, to say in speech that which is and that which is not ?

HER. Certainly.

SOC. But is true speech true only as a whole, and are its parts untrue ?

HER. No, its parts also are true.

SOC. Are the large parts true, but not the small ones, or are all true ?

HER. All, in my opinion.

SOC. Is there, then, anything which you say is a smaller part of speech than a name ?

HER. No, that is the smallest.

SOC. And the name is spoken as a part of the true speech ?

HER. Yes.

SOC. Then it is, according to you, true.

HER. Yes.

SOC. And a part of false speech is false, is it not ?

HER. It is.

SOC. Then it is possible to utter either a false or a true name, since one may utter speech that is either true or false ?

HER. Yes, of course.

SOC. Then whatever each particular person says is the name of anything, that is its name for that person ?

HER. Yes.

SOC. And whatever the number of names anyone says a thing has, it will really have that number at the time when he says it ?

HER. Yes, Socrates, for I cannot conceive of any other kind of correctness in names than this ; I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, and

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ἕτερον, ὃ αὖ σύ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὁρῶ
 Εἰδία ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κείμενα ὀνόματα, καὶ Ἑλλησι
 παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, καὶ Ἑλλησι παρὰ
 βαρβάρους.

4. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγετες, πότερον
 καὶ τὰ ὄντα οὕτως ἔχειν σοι φαίνεται, ἰδία αὐτῶν
 ἢ οὐσία εἶναι ἐκάστω, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν
 386 λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον—
 ὡς ἄρα οἶα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα,
 τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί, οἶα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ
 σοί—ἢ ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν τινα βεβαιό-
 τητα τῆς οὐσίας;

ΕΡΜ. Ἦδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν
 καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας
 λέγει· οὐ πάνυ τι μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐς τόδε ἤδη ἐξηνέχθης, ὥστε μὴ
 Β πάνυ σοι δοκεῖν εἶναι τινα ἄνθρωπον πονηρόν;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ
 πέπονθα, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖν πάνυ πονηροὺς εἶναι
 τινὰς ἀθρώπους, καὶ μάλα συχνοὺς.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πάνυ χρηστοὶ οὕπω σοι ἔδοξαν εἶναι;

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μάλα ὀλίγοι.

ΣΩ. Ἐδοξαν δ' οὖν;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν τοῦτο τίθεσαι; ἄρ' ὦδε· τοὺς μὲν
 πάνυ χρηστοὺς πάνυ φρονίμους, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ
 πονηροὺς πάνυ ἄφρονας;

С ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν, εἰ Πρωταγόρας ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν
 καὶ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἀλήθεια, τὸ οἶα ἂν δοκῆ ἐκάστω
 τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν φρονίμους εἶναι,
 τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας;

CRATYLUS

you by another, which you gave. And in the same way, I see that states have their own different names for the same things, and Greeks differ from other Greeks and from barbarians in their use of names.

soc. Now, Hermogenes, let us see. Do you think this is true of the real things, that their reality is a separate one for each person, as Protagoras said with his doctrine that man is the measure of all things—that things are to me such as they seem to me, and to you such as they seem to you—or do you think things have some fixed reality of their own?

HER. It has sometimes happened to me, Socrates, to be so perplexed that I have been carried away even into this doctrine of Protagoras; but I do not at all believe he is right.

soc. Well, have you ever been carried away so far as not to believe at all that any man is bad?

HER. Lord, no; but I have often been carried away into the belief that certain men, and a good many of them, are very bad.

soc. Well, did you never think any were very good?

HER. Very few.

soc. But you did think them so?

HER. Yes.

soc. And what is your idea about that? Are the very good very wise and the very bad very foolish?

HER. Yes, that is my opinion.

soc. Now if Protagoras is right and the truth is as he says, that all things are to each person as they seem to him, is it possible for some of us to be wise and some foolish?

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, σοὶ πάνυ δοκεῖ, φρονήσεως οὔσης καὶ ἀφροσύνης μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸν εἶναι Πρωταγόραν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου φρονιμώ-
 D τερος εἴη, εἶπερ ἂ ἂν ἐκάστῳ δοκῆ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθῆ ἔσται.

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

5. ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' Εὐθύδημόν γε, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶεν οἱ μὲν χρηστοί, οἱ δὲ πονηροί, εἰ ὁμοίως ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀρετὴ τε καὶ κακία εἴη.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε πᾶσι πάντα ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ, μήτε ἐκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι
 E τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐλκό-
 μενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πέφυκεν.

ΕΡΜ. Δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὰ μὲν ἂν εἴη οὕτω πεφυ-
 κότα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον; ἢ οὐ καὶ αὐταὶ¹ ἐν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων
 εἰσὶν, αἱ πράξεις;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε καὶ αὐταὶ.¹

387 ΣΩ. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις
 πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν. οἷον
 εἴαν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ὄντων τέμνειν,
 πότερον ἡμῖν τμητέον ἕκαστον ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώ-

¹ αὐταὶ Heindorf: αὐταὶ BT.

CRATYLUS

HER. No, it is not.

soc. And you are, I imagine, strongly of the opinion that if wisdom and folly exist, it is quite impossible that Protagoras is right, for one man would not in reality be at all wiser than another if whatever seems to each person is really true to him.

HER. Quite right.

soc. But neither do you believe with Euthydemus that all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually,¹ for on this assumption also some could not be good and others bad, if virtue and its opposite were always equally possessed by all.

HER. True.

soc. Then if neither all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually nor each thing to each man individually, it is clear that things have some fixed reality of their own, not in relation to us nor caused by us ; they do not vary, swaying one way and another in accordance with our fancy, but exist of themselves in relation to their own reality imposed by nature.

HER. I think, Socrates, that is the case.

soc. Can things themselves, then, possess such a nature as this, and that of their actions be different ? Or are not actions also a class of realities ?

HER. Certainly they are.

soc. Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever

¹ The doctrine here attributed to Euthydemus is not expressly enunciated by him in the dialogue which bears his name, but it is little more than a comprehensive statement of the several doctrines there proclaimed by him and his brother Dionysodorus.

PLATO

μεθα καὶ ὧ ἂν βουλευθῶμεν, ἢ ἔαν μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν βουλευθῶμεν ἕκαστον τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ὧ πέφυκε, τεμουμέν τε καὶ πλέον τι ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, ἔαν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἔξαμαρτησόμεθά τε καὶ οὐδὲν πράξομεν;

B EPM. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔαν κάειν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν δόξαν δεῖ κάειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν; αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢ πέφυκεν¹ ἕκαστον κάεσθαι τε καὶ κάειν καὶ ὧ πέφυκεν¹;

EPM. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω;

EPM. Πάνυ γε.

6. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μία τις τῶν πράξεων ἐστίν;

EPM. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἢ ἂν τῷ δοκῇ λεκτέον εἶναι, C ταύτη λέγων ὀρθῶς λέξει, ἢ ἔαν μὲν ἢ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα λέγειν τε καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ ὧ, ταύτη καὶ τούτῳ λέγη, πλέον τέ τι ποιήσει καὶ ἐρεῖ, ἂν δὲ μή, ἔξαμαρτησεταιί τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει;

EPM. Οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ λέγειν μόριον τὸ ὀνομάζειν ὀνομάζοντες γάρ που λέγουσι τοὺς λόγους.

EPM. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πράξις τίς ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πράξις τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα;

EPM. Ναί.

¹ πεφυκεν Hermann: ἐπεφύκει BT.

CRATYLUS

instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing ?

HER. I think the way is as you suggest.

soc. Then, too, if we undertake to burn anything, we must burn not according to every opinion, but according to the right one ? And that is as each thing naturally burns or is burned and with the natural instrument ?

HER. True.

soc. And all other actions are to be performed in like manner ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. And speaking is an action, is it not ?

HER. Yes.

soc. Then if a man speaks as he fancies he ought to speak, will he speak rightly, or will he succeed in speaking if he speaks in the way and with the instrument in which and with which it is natural for us to speak and for things to be spoken, whereas otherwise he will fail and accomplish nothing ?

HER. I think the way you suggest is the right one.

soc. Now naming is a part of speaking, for in naming I suppose people utter speech.

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then is not naming also a kind of action, if speaking is a kind of action concerned with things ?

HER. Yes.

PLATO

D ΣΩ. Αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν ἡμῖν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὔσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι;

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀνομαστέον ἢ πέφυκε τὰ πραγμα-
ματα ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ἀλλ'
οὐχ ἢ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλευθῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπρο-
σθεν μέλλει ὀμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω μὲν
ἂν πλέον τι ποιῶμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοιμεν, ἄλλως δὲ
οὔ;

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται μοι.

7. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ὃ ἔδει τέμνειν, ἔδει τῷ, φαμέν,
τέμνειν;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Καὶ ὃ ἔδει κερκίζειν, ἔδει τῷ κερκίζειν,
καὶ ὃ ἔδει τρυπᾶν, ἔδει τῷ τρυπᾶν;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὃ ἔδει δὴ ὀνομάζειν, ἔδει τῷ ὀνομάζειν;

388 ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἦν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἔδει τρυπᾶν;

ΕΡΜ. Τρύπανον.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ᾧ κερκίζειν;

ΕΡΜ. Κερκίς.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ᾧ ὀνομάζειν;

ΕΡΜ. Ὄνομα.

ΣΩ. Εὐ λέγεις. ὄργανον ἄρα τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ
ὄνομα.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· τί ἦν ὄργανον ἢ κερ-
κίς; οὐχ ᾧ κερκίζομεν;

CRATYLUS

soc. But we saw that actions are not merely relative to us, but possess a separate nature of their own ?

HER. True.

soc. Then in naming also, if we are to be consistent with our previous conclusions, we cannot follow our own will, but the way and the instrument which the nature of things prescribes must be employed, must they not ? And if we pursue this course we shall be successful in our naming, but otherwise we shall fail.

HER. I think you are right.

soc. And again, what has to be cut, we said, has to be cut with something.

HER. Certainly.

soc. And what has to be woven, has to be woven with something, and what has to be bored, has to be bored with something ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. And then what has to be named, has to be named with something ?

HER. True.

soc. And what is that with which we have to bore ?

HER. A borer.

soc. And that with which we weave ?

HER. A shuttle.

soc. And that with which we must name ?

HER. A name.

soc. Right. A name also, then, is a kind of instrument.

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then if I were to ask " What instrument is the shuttle ? " Is it not that with which we weave ?

PLATO

ERM. Ναί.

B ΣΩ. Κερκίζοντες δὲ τί δρῶμεν; οὐ τὴν κρόκην καὶ τοὺς στήμονας συγκεχυμένους διακρίνομεν;

ERM. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τρυπάνου ἕξεις οὕτως εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων;

ERM. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεις δὴ καὶ περὶ ὀνόματος οὕτως εἰπεῖν; ὀργάνῳ ὄντι τῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζοντες τί ποιούμεν;

ERM. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐ¹ διδάσκομέν τι ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακρίνομεν ἢ ἔχει;

ERM. Πάνυ γε.

8. ΣΩ. Ὀνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστὶν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος.

ERM. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὑφαντικὸν δέ γε ἢ κερκίς;

ERM. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ὑφαντικὸς μὲν ἄρα κερκίδι καλῶς χρήσεται· καλῶς δ' ἐστὶν ὑφαντικῶς· διδασκαλικὸς δὲ ὀνόματι, καλῶς δ' ἐστὶ διδασκαλικῶς.

ERM. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τίνος οὖν ἔργῳ ὁ ὑφάντης καλῶς χρήσεται, ὅταν τῇ κερκίδι χρήται;

ERM. Τῷ τοῦ τέκτονος.

ΣΩ. Πᾶς δὲ τέκτων ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;

ERM. Ὁ τὴν τέχνην.

D ΣΩ. Τῷ τίνος δὲ ἔργῳ ὁ τρυπητῆς καλῶς χρήσεται ὅταν τῷ τρυπάνῳ χρήται;

ERM. Τῷ τοῦ χαλκέως.

¹ οὐ Stephanus: οὖν BT.

CRATYLUS

HER. Yes.

soc. And what do we do when we weave? Do we not separate the mingled threads of warp and woof?

HER. Yes.

soc. And you could give a similar answer about the borer and the rest, could you not?

HER. Certainly.

soc. And can you say something of the same kind about a name? The name being an instrument, what do we do with it when we name?

HER. I cannot tell.

soc. Do we not teach one another something, and separate things according to their natures?

HER. Certainly.

soc. A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and of separating reality, as a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web?

HER. Yes.

soc. But the shuttle is an instrument of weaving?

HER. Of course.

soc. The weaver, then, will use the shuttle well, and well means like a weaver; and a teacher will use a name well, and well means like a teacher.

HER. Yes.

soc. Whose work will the weaver use well when he uses the shuttle?

HER. The carpenter's.

soc. Is every one a carpenter, or he who has the skill?

HER. He who has the skill.

soc. And whose work will the hole-maker use when he uses the borer?

HER. The smith's.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν πᾶς χαλκεὺς ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;

ΕΡΜ. Ὁ τὴν τέχνην.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τῷ δὲ τίνος ἔργῳ ὁ διδασκαλικὸς
χρήσεται, ὅταν τῷ ὀνόματι χρήται;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτό γ' ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, τίς παρα-
δίδωσιν ἡμῖν τὰ ὀνόματα οἷς χρώμεθα;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐχὶ ὁ νόμος δοκεῖ σοι ὁ παραδιδούς
αὐτά;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐοικεν.

Ε ΣΩ. Νομοθέτου ἄρα ἔργῳ χρήσεται ὁ διδασκα-
λικός, ὅταν ὀνόματι χρήται;

ΕΡΜ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Νομοθέτης δέ σοι δοκεῖ πᾶς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἢ
ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;

ΕΡΜ. Ὁ τὴν τέχνην.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρός, ὡς Ἐρμόγενης,
389 ὄνομα θέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τίνος ὀνοματουργοῦ· οὗτος
δ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δη-
μιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν¹ ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.

ΕΡΜ. Ἐοικεν.

9. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, ἐπίσκεψαι ποῖ βλέπων ὁ νομο-
θέτης τὰ ὀνόματα τίθεται· ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν δὲ
ἀνάσκεψαι. ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα
ποιεῖ; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἂν καταγῆ αὐτῷ ἢ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι,
B πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν
βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, πρὸς ὃπερ καὶ
ἦν κατέαξεν ἐποίει;

¹ ἐν om. T.

CRATYLUS

soc. And is every one a smith, or he who has the skill ?

HER. He who has the skill.

soc. And whose work will the teacher use when he uses the name ?

HER. I cannot tell that, either.

soc. And can you not tell this, either, who gives us the names we use ?

HER. No.

soc. Do you not think it is the law that gives them to us ?

HER. Very likely.

soc. Then the teacher, when he uses a name, will be using the work of a lawgiver ?

HER. I think so.

soc. Do you think every man is a lawgiver, or only he who has the skill ?

HER. He who has the skill.

soc. Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, to give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker ; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.

HER. So it appears.

soc. See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. Look at it in the light of what has gone before. What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle ? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Well, then, if the shuttle breaks while he is making it, will he make another with his mind fixed on that which is broken, or on that form with reference to which he was making the one which he broke ?

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιοτάτ' ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴν δέη λεπτῷ ἱματίῳ ἢ παχεῖ ἢ λιγῷ ἢ ἑρεῷ ἢ ὅποιωουσιν τινι κερκίδα ποιεῖν, πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος, οἷα δ' C ἐκάστῳ καλλίστην πέφυκε, ταύτην ἀποδιδόναι τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἕκαστον;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ὀργάνων ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· τὸ φύσει ἐκάστῳ πεφυκὸς ὄργανον ἐξευρόντα δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἂν ποιῆ¹, οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουλευθῆ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπεφύκει. τὸ φύσει γὰρ ἐκάστῳ, ὡς ἔοικε, τρύπανον πεφυκὸς εἰς τὸν σίδηρον δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὴν φύσει κερκίδα ἐκάστῳ πεφυκυῖαν εἰς ξύλον.

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

D ΣΩ. Φύσει γὰρ ἦν ἐκάστῳ εἶδει ὑφάσματος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκάστη κερκὶς, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως.

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὸ ἐκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης; εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς συλλαβὰς ἕκαστος ὁ νομοθέτης τίθησιν,

¹ ποιῆ T: ποιῆ τὸ ἔργον B.

CRATYLUS

HER. On that form, in my opinion.

soc. Then we should very properly call that the absolute or real shuttle ?

HER. Yes, I think so.

soc. Then whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light or a thick garment, or for one of linen or of wool or of any kind whatsoever, all of them must contain the form or ideal of shuttle, and in each of his products he must embody the nature which is naturally best for each ?

HER. Yes.

soc. And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose and must embody that in the material of which he makes the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted by nature for each special use.

HER. Certainly.

soc. And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each kind of weaving.

HER. True.

soc. For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments.

HER. Yes.

soc. Then, my dear friend, must not the lawgiver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object ? Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names ? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the



PLATO

οὐδὲν δεῖ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν
 Ε σίδηρον ἅπας χαλκεὺς τίθησιν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα
 ποιῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ὄργανον· ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἕως ἂν τὴν
 390 αὐτὴν ιδέα ἀποδιδῶ, εἴαντε ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ,
 ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον, εἴαντε ἐνθάδε εἴαντε
 ἐν βαρβάροις τις ποιῇ. ἦ γάρ;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιῶσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην
 τὸν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν
 τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῶ τὸ προσήκον
 ἐκάστω ἐν ὁποιασοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χεῖρω
 νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὅπουοῦν ἄλλοθι;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

Β 10. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσήκον
 εἶδος κερκίδος ἐν ὁποιοῦν ξύλῳ κείται; ὁ
 ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ὑφάντης;

ΕΡΜ. Εἰκὸς μὲν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν χρη-
 σόμενον.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τῷ τοῦ λυροποιοῦ ἔργῳ χρησό-
 μενος; ἂρ' οὐχ οὗτος, ὃς ἐπίσταιτο ἂν ἐργαζο-
 μένῳ κάλλιστα ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ εἰργασμένον γνοίη
 εἴτ' εὖ εἰργασται εἴτε μή;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς;

ΕΡΜ. Ὁ κιθαριστής.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ ὁ τῷ τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ;

Ο ΕΡΜ. Κυβερνήτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ τῷ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἔργῳ ἐπιστατήσκει
 τ' ἂν κάλλιστα καὶ εἰργασμένον κρίνειε καὶ ἐνθάδε
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; ἂρ' οὐχ ὅσπερ χρήσεται;

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same syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that account ; for different smiths do not embody the form in the same iron, though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same ideal, though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. On this basis, then, you will judge the lawgiver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood ? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it ?

HER. Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates.

soc. Then who is to use the work of the lyre-maker ? Is not he the man who would know best how to superintend the making of the lyre and would also know whether it is well made or not when it is finished ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Who is he ?

HER. The lyre-player.

soc. And who would know best about the work of the ship-builder ?

HER. The navigator.

soc. And who can best superintend the work of the lawgiver and judge of it when it is finished, both here and in foreign countries ? The user, is it not ?

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ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὁ ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιστάμενος οὗτός ἐστιν;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

D ΣΩ. Τέκτονος μὲν ἄρα ἔργον ἐστὶν ποιῆσαι πηδάλιον ἐπιστατοῦντος κυβερνήτου, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ πηδάλιον.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Νομοθέτου δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ὀνόματα θήσεσθαι.

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

E ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύει ἄρα, ὦ Ἐρμόγετες, εἶναι οὐ φαῦλον, ὡς σὺ οἶει, ἢ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις, οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων. καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκείνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῆ φύσει ὄνομα ὃν ἐκάστω καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἰς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.

ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως χρή πρὸς ἃ λέγεις ἐναντιοῦσθαι. ἴσως μέντοι οὐ ράδιόν ἐστιν οὕτως ἐξαίφνης πεισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι ὡδε ἂν μᾶλλον πιθέσθαι σοι,¹ εἴ μοι δείξειας ἦντινα φῆς εἶναι τὴν φύσει ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ μακάριε Ἐρμόγετες, οὐδε-

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HER. Yes.

soc. And is not this he who knows how to ask questions ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. And the same one knows also how to make replies ?

HER. Yes.

soc. And the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call a dialectician ?

HER. Yes, that is what I call him.

soc. The work of the carpenter, then, is to make a rudder under the supervision of the steersman, if the rudder is to be a good one.

HER. Evidently.

soc. And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given.

HER. True.

soc. Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons : and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature and that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables.

HER. I do not know how to answer you, Socrates ; nevertheless it is not easy to change my conviction so suddenly. I think you would be more likely to convince me, if you were to show me just what it is that you say is the natural correctness of names.

soc. I, my dear Hermogenes, do not say that there

¹ ἀλλὰ . . . πιθέσθαι TG : om. B, Schanz : σοι Burnet after Schanz : τίθεσθαι σε pr. T : πείθεσθαι σε pr. G.

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μίαν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐπελάθου γε ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην, ἀλλὰ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ. νῦν δὲ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί, τοσοῦτον μὲν ἤδη φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ πρότερα, φύσει τέ τινα ὀρθότητα ἔχον εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ οὐ παντὸς
 Β ἀνδρὸς ἐπίστασθαι καλῶς¹ αὐτὸ πράγματι ὄτωϋν θέσθαι· ἢ οὔ;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

11. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο χρή ζητεῖν, εἴπερ ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι, ἥτις ποτ' αὖ ἐστίν αὐτοῦ ἢ ὀρθότης.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιθυμῶ γε εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς οὖν χρή σκοπεῖν;

ΣΩ. Ὀρθοτάτη μὲν τῆς σκέψεως, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων, χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελούντα καὶ χάριτας κατατιθέμενον. εἰσὶ δὲ οὔτοι οἱ σοφισταί,
 C οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τέλεισας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατῆς εἶ τῶν πατρώων, λιπαρεῖν χρή τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ δεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διδάξαι σε τὴν ὀρθότητα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἣν ἔμαθεν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου.

ΕΡΜ. Ἄτοπος μέντ' ἂν εἴη μου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ δέησις, εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῶν ὥς του ἄξια.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρ' Ὀμήρου χρή μανθάνειν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ τί λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ὀμηρος περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ποῦ;

¹ καλῶς om. T.

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is any. You forget what I said a while ago, that I did not know, but would join you in looking for the truth. And now, as we are looking, you and I, we already see one thing we did not know before, that names do possess a certain natural correctness, and that not every man knows how to give a name well to anything whatsoever. Is not that true?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then our next task is to try to find out, if you care to know about it, what kind of correctness that is which belongs to names.

HER. To be sure I care to know.

soc. Then investigate.

HER. How shall I investigate?

soc. The best way to investigate, my friend, is with the help of those who know; and you make sure of their favour by paying them money. They are the sophists, from whom your brother Callias got his reputation for wisdom by paying them a good deal of money. But since you have not the control of your inheritance, you ought to beg and beseech your brother to teach you the correctness which he learned of Protagoras about such matters.

HER. It would be an absurd request for me, Socrates, if I, who reject the *Truth*¹ of Protagoras altogether, should desire what is said in such a *Truth*, as if it were of any value.

soc. Then if you do not like that, you ought to learn from Homer and the other poets.

HER. Why, Socrates, what does Homer say about names, and where?

¹ *Truth* was the title of a book by Protagoras.

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ζω. Πολλαχοῦ· μέγιστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐν οἷς
 διορίζει ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἅ τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὀνόματα
 καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ θεοί. ἢ οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸν μέγα τι
 καὶ θαυμάσιον λέγειν ἐν τούτοις περὶ ὀνομάτων
 ὀρθότητος; δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἷ γε θεοὶ αὐτὰ
 Ε καλοῦσιν πρὸς ὀρθότητα ἅπερ ἐστὶ φύσει ὀνό-
 ματα· ἢ σὺ οὐκ οἶει;

ΕΡΜ. Εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, εἴπερ καλοῦσιν,
 ὅτι ὀρθῶς καλοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα ταῦτα λέγεις;

ζω. Οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν
 τῇ Τροίᾳ, ὃς ἐμονομάχει τῷ Ἡφαίστῳ, ὃν Ξάνθον,
 φησί, καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον;

ΕΡΜ. Ἔγωγε.

392 ζω. Τί οὖν δῆ; οὐκ οἶει τοῦτο σεμνόν τι εἶναι
 γνῶναι, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκείνον τὸν ποταμὸν
 Ξάνθον καλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ Σκάμανδρον; εἰ δὲ
 βούλει, περὶ τῆς ὄρνιθος, ἣν λέγει ὅτι

χαλκίδα κικλήσκουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ κύμινδι,
 φαῦλον ἡγεῖ τὸ μάθημα, ὅσω ὀρθότερόν ἐστι
 καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέῳ; ἢ
 τὴν Βατίειάν τε καὶ Μυρίνην, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
 Β καὶ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ἄλλων; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 μὲν ἴσως μείζω ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἐξευρεῖν·
 ὁ δὲ Σκαμάνδριός¹ τε καὶ ὁ Ἀστυάναξ ἀνθρω-
 πινώτερον διασκέψασθαι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ῥᾶον,
 ἅ φησιν ὀνόματα εἶναι τῷ τοῦ Ἐκτορος υἱεῖ,
 τίνα ποτὲ λέγει τὴν ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν. οἶσθα
 γὰρ δήπου ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη, ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν ἅ ἐγὼ
 λέγω.

¹ Σκαμάνδριός] Σκάμανδρός ΒΤ.

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, xxi. 342-380.

² *Ibid.* xx. 74.

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soc. In many passages ; but chiefly and most admirably in those in which he distinguishes between the names by which gods and men call the same things. Do you not think he gives in those passages great and wonderful information about the correctness of names ? For clearly the gods call things by the names that are naturally right. Do you not think so ?

HER. Of course I know that if they call things, they call them rightly. But what are these instances to which you refer ?

soc. Do you not know that he says about the river in Troyland which had the single combat with Hephaestus,¹ " whom the gods call Xanthus, but men call Scamander " ? ²

HER. Oh yes.

soc. Well, do you not think this is a grand thing to know, that the name of that river is rightly Xanthus, rather than Scamander ? Or, if you like, do you think it is a slight thing to learn about the bird which he says " gods call chalcis, but men call cymindis," ³ that it is much more correct for the same bird to be called chalcis than cymindis ? Or to learn that the hill men call Batieia is called by the gods Myrina's tomb,⁴ and many other such statements by Homer and other poets ? But perhaps these matters are too high for us to understand ; it is, I think, more within human power to investigate the names Scamandrius and Astyanax, and understand what kind of correctness he ascribes to these, which he says are the names of Hector's son. You recall, of course, the lines which contain the words to which I refer.

³ *Ibid.* xiv. 291.

⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 813 f.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν οἶει Ὅμηρον ὀρθότερον ἠγεῖσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδί, τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἢ τὸν Σκαμάνδριον;

C ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

12. ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ σκόπει. εἴ τις ἔροιτό σε, πότερον οἶει ὀρθότερον καλεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους;

ΕΡΜ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, φαίην ἄν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν φρονιμώτεραί σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος;

ΕΡΜ. Οἱ ἄνδρες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ παιδίον τὸ τοῦ Ἐκτορος ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων φησὶν καλεῖσθαι D Ἀστυάνακτα, Σκαμάνδριον δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ γε ἄνδρες αὐτὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἐκάλουν;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Ὅμηρος τοὺς Τρώας σοφωτέρους ἠγεῖτο ἢ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν;

ΕΡΜ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἄρα ὀρθότερον ᾤετο κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδί ἢ τὸν Σκαμάνδριον;

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ διὰ τί ποτε. ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν κάλλιστα ὑφηγεῖται τὸ διότι; φησὶν γάρ·

E οἷος γάρ σφιν ἔρυτο πόλιν καὶ τείχεα μακρά.

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν τὸν τοῦ σωτήρος υἱὸν Ἀστυάνακτα τούτου ὃ ἔσωζεν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος.

CRATYLUS

HER. Certainly.

soc. Which of the names of the boy do you imagine Homer thought was more correct, Astyanax or Scamandrius ?

HER. I cannot say.

soc. Look at it in this way : suppose you were asked, " Do the wise or the unwise give names more correctly ? "

HER. " The wise, obviously," I should say.

soc. And do you think the women or the men of a city, regarded as a class in general, are the wiser ?

HER. The men.

soc. And do you not know that Homer says the child of Hector was called Astyanax by the men of Troy ;¹ so he must have been called Scamandrius by the women, since the men called him Astyanax ?

HER. Yes, probably.

soc. And Homer too thought the Trojan men were wiser than the women ?

HER. I suppose he did.

soc. Then he thought Astyanax was more rightly the boy's name than Scamandrius ?

HER. So it appears.

soc. Let us, then, consider the reason for this. Does he not himself indicate the reason most admirably ? For he says—

He alone defended their city and long walls.²

Therefore, as it seems, it is right to call the son of the defender Astyanax (Lord of the city), ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, defended.

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, xxii. 506.

² *Ibid.* xxii. 507 ; but the verb is in the second person, addressed by Hecuba to Hector after his death.

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ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται μοι.

ΣΩ. Τί δή ποτε; οὐ γάρ πω οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔγωγε
μανθάνω, ὧ Ἑρμόγευες· σὺ δὲ μανθάνεις;

ΕΡΜ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

393 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὠγαθέ, καὶ τῷ Ἑκτορι αὐτὸς
ἔθετο τὸ ὄνομα Ὀμηρος;

ΕΡΜ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παραπλήσιόν τι
εἶναι τῷ Ἀστυνάκτι, καὶ ἔοικεν Ἑλληνικοῖς
ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα. ὁ γὰρ ἄναξ καὶ ὁ ἔκτωρ
σχεδόν τι ταῦτὸν σημαίνει, βασιλικά ἀμφοτέρα
εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τις ἄναξ ἦ, καὶ
ἔκτωρ δήπου ἐστὶν τούτου· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κρατεῖ
B τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει αὐτό. ἢ οὐδέν
σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ λανθάνω καὶ ἑμαυτὸν
οἰόμενός τινος ὥσπερ ἵχνους ἐφάπτεσθαι τῆς
Ὀμήρου δόξης περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος;

ΕΡΜ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ σύ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἀλλὰ
ἴσως του ἐφάπτει.

13. ΣΩ. Δίκαιόν γέ τοί ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνε-
ται, τὸν λέοντος ἔκγονον λέοντα καλεῖν καὶ τὸν
ἵππου ἔκγονον ἵππον. οὐ τι λέγω ἐὰν ὥσπερ
τέρας γένηται ἐξ ἵππου ἄλλο τι ἢ ἵππος, ἀλλ'
C οὐ ἂν ἦ τοῦ γένους ἔκγονον τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο
λέγω· ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν
τέκη μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον ἀλλὰ μόσχον·
οὐδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, οἶμαι, μὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπου
ἔκγονον γένηται, ἄλλο ἂν¹ τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος
κλητέος· καὶ τὰ δένδρα ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰλλα
ἅπαντα· ἢ οὐ ξυνδοκεῖ;

¹ ἄλλο ἂν] ἄλλ' οὐ ἂν BT: secl. Peipers.

CRATYLUS

HER. That is clear to me.

soc. Indeed? I do not yet understand about it myself, Hermogenes. Do you?

HER. No, by Zeus, I do not.

soc. But, my good friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?

HER. Why do you ask that?

soc. Because that name seems to me similar to Astyanax, and both names seem to be Greek. For lord (*ἀναξ*) and holder (*ἔκτωρ*) mean nearly the same thing, indicating that they are names of a king; for surely a man is holder of that of which he is lord; for it is clear that he rules it and possesses it and holds it. Or does it seem to you that there is nothing in what I am saying, and am I wrong in imagining that I have found a clue to Homer's opinion about the correctness of names?

HER. No, by Zeus, you are not wrong, in my opinion; I think perhaps you have found a clue.

soc. It is right, I think, to call a lion's offspring a lion and a horse's offspring a horse. I am not speaking of prodigies, such as the birth of some other kind of creature from a horse, but of the natural offspring of each species after its kind. If a horse, contrary to nature, should bring forth a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not a colt, nor if any offspring that is not human should be born from a human being, should that other offspring be called a human being; and the same applies to trees and all the rest. Do you not agree?

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Ξυνδοκεί.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις· φύλαττε γάρ με, μή πη παρακρούσωμαί σε. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κᾶν ἐκ βασιλέως γίγνηται τι ἔκγονον, βασιλεὺς D κλητέος· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑτέραις συλλαβαῖς ἢ ἐν ἑτέραις τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα· οὐδ' εἰ πρόσκειται τι γράμμα ἢ¹ ἀφήρηται, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν ἐγκρατῆς ἢ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος δηλουμένη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τῶν στοιχείων οἶσθα ὅτι ὀνόματα λέγομεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, πλὴν τεττάρων, τοῦ ε καὶ τοῦ υ καὶ τοῦ ο καὶ τοῦ ω· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις φωνήεσί τε καὶ E ἀφώνοις οἶσθα ὅτι περιτιθέντες ἄλλα γράμματα λέγομεν, ὀνόματα ποιοῦντες· ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ δηλουμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐντιθῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖν ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει. οἶον τὸ βῆτα· ὀρᾶς ὅτι τοῦ η καὶ τοῦ τ καὶ τοῦ α προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν, ὥστε μή οὐχὶ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ στοιχείου φύσιν δηλῶσαι ὅλω τῷ ὀνόματι οὐ ἐβούλετο ὁ νομοθέτης· οὕτως ἠπιστήθη καλῶς θέσθαι τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ὀνόματα.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ βασιλέως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; 394 ἔσται γάρ ποτε ἐκ βασιλέως βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ καλός, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως, ἐξ ἐκάστου γένους ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ἔκγονον, εἰ μὴ τέρας γίγνηται· κλητέον δὴ

¹ ἢ T: οὐδ' B: οὐδ' εἰ al.

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HER. Yes.

soc. Good ; but keep watch of me, and do not let me trick you ; for by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a king ; and whether the same meaning is expressed in one set of syllables or another makes no difference ; and if a letter is added or subtracted, that does not matter either, so long as the essence of the thing named remains in force and is made plain in the name.

HER. What do you mean ?

soc. Something quite simple. For instance, when we speak of the letters of the alphabet, you know, we speak their names, not merely the letters themselves, except in the case of four, ϵ , υ , o , and ω .¹ We make names for all the other vowels and consonants by adding other letters to them ; and so long as we include the letter in question and make its force plain, we may properly call it by that name, and that will designate it for us. Take beta, for instance, The addition of e (η), t (τ), and a (α) does no harm and does not prevent the whole name from making clear the nature of that letter which the lawgiver wished to designate ; he knew so well how to give names to letters.

HER. I think you are right.

soc. Does not the same reasoning apply to a king ? A king's son will probably be a king, a good man's good, a handsome man's handsome, and so forth ; the offspring of each class will be of the same class, unless some unnatural birth takes

¹ In Plato's time the names epsilon, ypsilon, omicron, and omega were not yet in vogue. The names used were $\epsilon\iota$, $\upsilon\acute{\iota}$, $o\upsilon\acute{\iota}$, and $\omega\acute{\iota}$.

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ταῦτὰ ὀνόματα. ποικίλλειν δὲ ἕξεστι ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν ἢ ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δέ γε ἰατρῷ, Β ἄτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπούμεν, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετακείται ἢ ἀφήρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασιν ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις. ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, Ἄστυνάναξ τε καὶ Ἐκτωρ οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ τ, C ἀλλ' ὅμως ταῦτὸν σημαίνει. καὶ Ἀρχέπολις γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστὶν, ἃ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει· καὶ ἄλλα γε αὐτῷ στρατηγόν, οἷον Ἄγρις καὶ Πολέμαρχος καὶ Εὐπόλεμος· καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Ἀκεσίμβροτος· καὶ ἕτερα ἂν ἴσως συχνὰ εὐροιμεν ταῖς μὲν συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς γράμμασι διαφωνούντα, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ταῦτὸν φθειγγόμενα. φαίνεται οὕτως ἢ οὐ;

D EPM. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς μὲν δὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέον ὀνόματα.

EPM. Πάνυ γε.

14. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν, οἷ ἂν ἐν τέρατος εἶδει γένωνται; οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θεοσεβοῦς ἀσεβῆς γένηται, ἂρ' οὐχ ὥσπερ

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place ; so they should be called by the same names. But variety in the syllables is admissible, so that names which are the same appear different to the uninitiated, just as the physicians' drugs, when prepared with various colours and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are the same, but to the physician, who considers only their medicinal value, they seem the same, and he is not confused by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows about names considers their value and is not confused if some letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force of the name is expressed in entirely different letters. So, for instance, in the names we were just discussing, Astyanax and Hector, none of the letters is the same, except *t*, but nevertheless they have the same meaning. And what letters has Archepolis (ruler of the city) in common with them? Yet it means the same thing ; and there are many other names which mean simply "king." Others again mean "general," such as Agis (leader), Polemarchus (war-lord), and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others indicate physicians, as Iatrocles (famous physician) and Acesimbrotus (healer of mortals); and we might perhaps find many others which differ in syllables and letters, but express the same meaning. Do you think that is true, or not?

HER. Certainly.

soc. To those, then, who are born in accordance with nature the same names should be given.

HER. Yes.

soc. And how about those who are born contrary to nature as prodigies? For instance, when an impious son is born to a good and pious man, ought

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ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, κὰν ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκη,
οὐ τοῦ τεκόντος δήπου ἔδει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν,
ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους οὐ εἶη;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἄρα γενομένῳ
ἀσεβεῖ τὸ τοῦ γένους ὄνομα ἀποδοτέον.

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ Θεόφιλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲ Μνησίθεον οὐδὲ
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ὃ τι τὰναντία τούτοις
σημαίνει, εἴηπερ τῆς ὀρθότητος τυγχάνη τὰ ὀνόματα.

ΕΡΜ. Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ γε καὶ ὁ Ὀρέστης, ὦ Ἑρμόγετες,
κινδυνεύει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, εἴτε τις τύχη ἔθετο αὐτῷ
τὸ ὄνομα εἴτε καὶ ποιητῆς τις, τὸ θηριῶδες τῆς
φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἄγριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὀρεινὸν ἐν-
δεικνύμενος τῷ ὀνόματι.

395 ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔοικεν δέ γε καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ
φύσιν τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέ-
μνων, οἷος ἂν δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρ-
τερεῖν, τέλος ἐπιτιθεῖς τοῖς δόξασι δι' ἀρετὴν.
σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ τοῦ πλήθους
τε καὶ καρτερία.¹ ὅτι οὖν ἀγαστὸς κατὰ τὴν
ἐπιμονὴν οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ, ἐνσημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ

Β Ἀγαμέμνων. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀτρεὺς ὀρθῶς ἔχει.
ὃ τε γὰρ τοῦ Χρυσίππου αὐτῷ φόνος καὶ ἂ πρὸς
τὸν Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο, πάντα ταῦτα
ζημιώδη καὶ ἀτηρὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν· ἢ οὖν τοῦ ὀνό-
ματος ἐπωνυμία σμικρὸν παρακλίνει καὶ ἐπι-

¹ καρτερία E Hermann al.: καρτερίας BT.

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he not, as in our former example when a mare brought forth a calf, to have the designation of the class to which he belongs, instead of that of his parent ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then the impious son of a pious father ought to receive the name of his class.

HER. True.

soc. Not Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God) or anything of that sort ; but something of opposite meaning, if names are correct.

HER. Most assuredly, Socrates.

soc. As the name of Orestes (mountain man) is undoubtedly correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given him by chance or by some poet who indicated by the name the fierceness, rudeness, and mountain-wildness of his nature.

HER. So it seems, Socrates.

soc. And his father's name also appears to be in accordance with nature.

HER. It seems so.

soc. Yes, for Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who would resolve to toil to the end and to endure, putting the finish upon his resolution by virtue. And a proof of this is his long retention of the host at Troy and his endurance. So the name Agamemnon denotes that this man is admirable for remaining. And so, too, the name of Atreus is likely to be correct ; for his murder of Chrysippus and the cruelty of his acts to Thyestes are all damaging and ruinous (*ἀτρηρά*) to his virtue. Now the form of his name is slightly deflected and hidden,

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κεκάλυπται, ὥστε μὴ πᾶσι δηλοῦν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός· τοῖς δ' ἐπαῖουσι περὶ ὀνομάτων ἱκανῶς δηλοῖ ὁ βούλεται ὁ Ἄτρεύς. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ
 C ἀτειρὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεστον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρὸν πανταχῇ ὀρθῶς αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα κεῖται. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῷ Πέλοπι τὸ ὄνομα ἐμμέτρως κείσθαι· σημαίνει γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸν τὰ ἐγγὺς ὀρώντα ἄξιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἐπωνυμίας.¹

ERM. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Οἷόν που καὶ κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται τοῦ ἀνδρός ἐν τῷ τοῦ Μυρτίλου φόνῳ οὐδὲν οἷου² τε γενέσθαι προνοηθῆναι οὐδὲ προῖδεῖν τῶν πόρρω τῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν γένος, ὅσης αὐτὸ³ δυστυχίας ἐνεπίμπλη,
 D τὸ ἐγγὺς μόνον ὀρών καὶ τὸ παραχρῆμα—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ πέλας—ἠνίκα προεθυμείτο λαβεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὸν τῆς Ἴπποδαμείας γάμον. τῷ δὲ Ταντάλῳ καὶ πᾶς ἂν ἠγῆσαιτο τοῦνομα ὀρθῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τεθῆναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν λεγόμενα.

ERM. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΣΩ. Ἄ τέ που ἔτι ζῶντι δυστυχήματα ἐγένετο πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ὧν καὶ τέλος ἢ πατρὶς αὐτοῦ ὅλη ἀνετράπετο, καὶ τελευτήσαντι ἐν Ἄιδου ἢ
 E ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου ταλαντεία⁴ θαυμαστικῶς ὡς σύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος ταλάντατον ὀνομάσαι ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἶποι ἀντ' ἐκείνου Τάνταλον, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἔοικεν ἐκπορίσαι ἢ τύχη τῆς φήμης. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένῳ τῷ Διὶ παγκάλως τὸ

¹ ἄξιον . . . ἐπωνυμίας om. by nearly all editors.

² οἷου b: οἷω BT.

³ αὐτὸ b: αὐτῷ BT.

⁴ ταλαντεία Spalding: τανταλεία BT.

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so that it does not make the man's nature plain to every one ; but to those who understand about names it makes the meaning of Atreus plain enough ; for indeed in view of his stubbornness (*ἀτειρές*) and fearlessness (*ἀτρεστον*) and ruinous acts (*ἀτηρόν*) the name is correctly given to him on every ground. And I think Pelops also has a fitting name ; for this name means that he who sees only what is near deserves this designation.

HER. How is that ?

soc. Why it is said of him that in murdering Myrtilus he was quite unable to forecast or foresee the ultimate effects upon his whole race, and all the misery with which it was overwhelmed, because he saw only the near at hand and the immediate—that is to say, *πέλας* (near)—in his eagerness to win by all means the hand of Hippodameia. And anyone would think the name of Tantalus was given rightly and in accordance with nature, if the stories about him are true.

HER. What are the stories ?

soc. The many terrible misfortunes that happened to him both in his life, the last of which was the utter overthrow of his country, and in Hades, after his death, the balancing (*ταλαντεία*) of the stone above his head, in wonderful agreement with his name ; and it seems exactly as if someone who wished to call him most wretched (*ταλάντατον*) disguised the name and said Tantalus instead ; in some such way as that chance seems to have affected his name in the legend. And his father also, who is said to be Zeus, appears to have a very excellent

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ὄνομα κείσθαι· ἔστι δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον κατανοῆσαι.
 396 ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ἐστιν οἶον λόγος τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα·
 διελόντες δὲ αὐτὸ διχῆ οἱ μὲν τῷ ἐτέρῳ μέρει,
 οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρώμεθα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ζῆνα, οἱ
 δὲ Δία καλοῦσιν· συντιθέμενα δ' εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν
 φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμέν ὀνόματι
 οἷω τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον
 τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων.
 Β συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς
 εἶναι, δι' ὃν ζῆν αἰεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει.
 διείληπται δὲ δίχα, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἓν ὃν τὸ ὄνομα,
 τῷ Διὶ καὶ τῷ Ζηνί. τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου υἱὸν
 εἶναι ὑβριστικὸν μὲν ἂν τις δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκού-
 σαντι ἐξαίφνης, εὐλογον δὲ μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας
 ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία· κόρον γὰρ σημαίνει οὐ
 παῖδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ
 νοῦ. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ υἱός, ὡς λόγος· ἡ
 δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα
 C καλεῖσθαι, οὐρανία, ὀρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ
 φασιν, ὧ Ἑρμόγετες, τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν παρα-
 γίνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι, καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὀρ-
 θῶς τὸ ὄνομα κείσθαι· εἰ δ' ἐμεμνήμην τὴν Ἑσιό-
 δου γενεαλογίαν, τίνας ἔτι τοὺς ἀνωτέρω προγό-
 νους λέγει τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυόμην διεξιῶν ὡς
 ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην
 τῆς σοφίας ταυτησὶ τί ποιήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἀπερεῖ ἢ
 οὐ, ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐξαίφνης νῦν οὕτωςι προσπέπτωκεν
 D ἄρτι οὐκ οἶδ' ὀπόθεν.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀτεχνῶς γέ
 μοι δοκεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξαίφνης χρη-
 σμωδεῖν.

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name, but it is not easy to understand; for the name of Zeus is exactly like a sentence; we divide it into two parts, and some of us use one part, others the other; for some call him Zena (*Zḗna*), and others Dia (*Δία*); but the two in combination express the nature of the god, which is just what we said a name should be able to do. For certainly no one is so much the author of life (*ζῆν*) for us and all others as the ruler and king of all. Thus this god is correctly named, through whom (*δι' ὅν*) all living beings have the gift of life (*ζῆν*). But, as I say, the name is divided, though it is one name, into the two parts, Dia and Zena. And it might seem, at first hearing, highly irreverent to call him the son of Cronus and reasonable to say that Zeus is the offspring of some great intellect; and so he is, for *κόρος* (for *Κρόνος*) signifies not child, but the purity (*καθαρόν*) and unblemished nature of his mind. And Cronus, according to tradition, is the son of Uranus; but the upward gaze is rightly called by the name *urania* (*οὐρανία*), looking at the things above (*ὀρῶ τὰ ἄνω*), and the astronomers say, Hermogenes, that from this looking people acquire a pure mind, and Uranus is correctly named. If I remembered the genealogy of Hesiod and the still earlier ancestors of the gods he mentions, I would have gone on examining the correctness of their names until I had made a complete trial whether this wisdom which has suddenly come to me, I know not whence, will fail or not.

HER. Indeed, Socrates, you do seem to me to be uttering oracles, exactly like an inspired prophet.

PLATO

15. ζη. Καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, μάλιστα αὐτὴν ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος τοῦ Προσπαλτίου προσπεπτωκένας μοι. ἔωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ ὦτα. κινδυνεύει οὖν ἐνθουσιῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὦτά μου ἐμπλήσαι τῆς δαιμονίας σοφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπειληφθαι. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι χρῆναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι· τὸ μὲν
 Ε τήμερον εἶναι χρήσασθαι αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψασθαι, αὔριον δέ, ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν ξυνδοκῇ, ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθά τε αὐτὴν καὶ καθαρούμεθα ἐξευρόντες ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινὸς
 397 καθαίρειν, εἴτε τῶν ἱερέων τις εἴτε τῶν σοφιστῶν.

ΕΡΜ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν ξυγχωρῶ· πάνυ γὰρ ἂν ἡδέως τὰ ἐπίλοιπα περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκούσαιμι.

ζη. Ἄλλὰ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν. πόθεν οὖν βούλει ἀρξώμεθα διασκοποῦντες, ἐπειδήπερ εἰς τύπον τινὰ ἐμβεβήκαμεν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα μὴ πάνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὕτως ἕκαστα κείσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ
 Β ὀρθότητα; τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἡρώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὀνόματα ἴσως ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσειεν. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κείται κατὰ προγόνων ἐπωνυμίας, οὐδὲν προσῆκον ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέγομεν, πολλὰ δὲ ὥσπερ εὐχόμενοι τίθενται, οἷον Εὐτυχίδην καὶ Σωσίαν καὶ Θεόφιλον καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι εἶναι· εἰκὸς δὲ μάλιστα ἡμᾶς εὐρεῖν τὰ ὀρθῶς κείμενα περὶ τὰ αἰεὶ ὄντα καὶ πεφυκότα. ἐσπουδάσθαι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα πρέπει τὴν
 C θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων· ἴσως δ' ἓν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ θειοτέρας δυνάμεως ἢ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέθη.

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soc. Yes, Hermogenes, and I am convinced that the inspiration came to me from Euthyphro the Prospaltian. For I was with him and listening to him a long time early this morning. So he must have been inspired, and he not only filled my ears but took possession of my soul with his superhuman wisdom. So I think this is our duty: we ought to-day to make use of this wisdom and finish the investigation of names, but to-morrow, if the rest of you agree, we will conjure it away and purify ourselves, when we have found some one, whether priest or sophist, who is skilled in that kind of purifying.

HER. I agree, for I should be very glad to hear the rest of the talk about names.

soc. Very well. Then since we have outlined a general plan of investigation, where shall we begin, that we may discover whether the names themselves will bear witness that they are not at all distributed at haphazard, but have a certain correctness? Now the names of heroes and men might perhaps prove deceptive; for they are often given because they were names of ancestors, and in some cases, as we said in the beginning, they are quite inappropriate; many, too, are given as the expression of a prayer, such as Eutychemes (fortunate), Sosias (saviour), Theophilus (beloved of God), and many others. I think we had better disregard such as these; but we are most likely to find the correct names in the nature of the eternal and absolute; for there the names ought to have been given with the greatest care, and perhaps some of them were given by a power more divine than is that of men.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Δοκεῖς μοι καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

16. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἄρχεσθαι σκοπούμενους, πῆ ποτε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα οἱ θεοὶ ὀρθῶς ἐκλήθησαν;

ΕΡΜ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τοιόνδε τοίνυν ἔγωγε ὑποπτεύω· φαίνονται μοι οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τούτους μόνους τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι, οὔσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ γῆν καὶ ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανόν· ἅτε οὖν αὐτὰ ὀρῶντες πάντα αἰεὶ ἰόντα δρόμῳ καὶ θέοντα, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως τῆς τοῦ θεῖν θεοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάσαι· ὕστερον δὲ κατανοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους, πάντας ἤδη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύειν. ἔοικέ τι ὃ λέγω τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἢ οὐδέν;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο σκοποῖμεν;

ΕΡΜ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δαίμονας.¹

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης, τί ἂν ποτε νοοῖ τὸ ὄνομα οἱ δαίμονες; σκέψαι, ἂν τί σοι δόξω εἰπεῖν.

ΕΡΜ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν τίνας φησὶν Ἑσίοδος εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ὅτι χρυσοῦν γένος τὸ πρῶτόν φησιν γενέσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

ΕΡΜ. Οἶδα τοῦτό γε.

¹ Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δαίμονας Burnet: δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας καὶ ἀνθρώπους δαίμονας BT (the last word is usually attributed to Socrates).

CRATYLUS

HER. I think you are right, Socrates.

SOC. Then is it not proper to begin with the gods and see how the gods are rightly called by that name ?

HER. That is reasonable.

SOC. Something of this sort, then, is what I suspect : I think the earliest men in Greece believed only in those gods in whom many foreigners believe to-day—sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky. They saw that all these were always moving in their courses and running, and so they called them gods (*θεούς*) from this running (*θεῖν*) nature ; then afterwards, when they gained knowledge of the other gods, they called them all by the same name. Is that likely to be true, or not ?

HER. Yes, very likely.

SOC. What shall we consider next ?

HER. Spirits, obviously.

SOC. Hermogenes, what does the name “ spirits ” really mean ? See if you think there is anything in what I am going to say.

HER. Go on and say it.

SOC. Do you remember who Hesiod says the spirits are ?

HER. I do not recall it.

SOC. Nor that he says a golden race was the first race of men to be born ?

HER. Yes, I do know that.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Λέγει τοίνυν περί αὐτοῦ·

398 αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυψεν,
οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἀγνοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι¹ καλέονται,
ἔσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΡΜ. Τί οὖν δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ λέγειν αὐτὸν τὸ χρυσοῦν
γένος οὐκ ἐκ χρυσοῦ πεφυκός, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸν τε
καὶ καλόν. τεκμήριον δέ μοι ἐστίν ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς
φησιν σιδηροῦν εἶναι γένος.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν νῦν οἶει ἂν φάναι αὐτὸν
B εἴ τις ἀγαθὸς ἐστίν, ἐκείνου τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους
εἶναι;

ΕΡΜ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ φρόνιμοι;

ΕΡΜ. Φρόνιμοι.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν παντὸς μᾶλλον λέγει, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, τοὺς δαίμονας· ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες
ἦσαν, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν· καὶ ἔν γε τῇ
ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρα φωνῇ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τὸ
ὄνομα. λέγει οὖν καλῶς καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἄλλοι ποιη-
C τὰ πολλοὶ ὅσοι λέγουσιν ὡς, ἐπειδὴν τις ἀγαθὸς
ὢν τελευτήσῃ, μεγάλην μοῖραν καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει
καὶ γίγνεται δαίμων κατὰ τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως
ἐπωνυμίαν. ταύτῃ οὖν τίθεμαι καὶ ἐγὼ² πάντ'
ἄνδρα, ὃς ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, δαιμόνιον εἶναι καὶ ζῶντα
καὶ τελευτήσαντα, καὶ ὀρθῶς δαίμονα καλεῖσθαι.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου
πάνυ σοι σύμφηφος εἶναι. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἤρως τί ἂν εἴῃ;

¹ ὑποχθόνιοι BT: ἐπιχθόνιοι vulg.

CRATYLUS

soc. Well, he says of it :

But since Fate has covered up this race,
They are called holy spirits under the earth,
Noble, averters of evil, guardians of mortal men.¹

HER. What of that ?

soc. Why, I think he means that the golden race was not made of gold, but was good and beautiful. And I regard it as a proof of this that he further says we are the iron race.

HER. True.

soc. Don't you suppose that if anyone of our day is good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden race ?

HER. Quite likely.

soc. But the good are the wise, are they not ?

HER. Yes, they are the wise.

soc. This, then, I think, is what he certainly means to say of the spirits : because they were wise and knowing (*δαήμονες*) he called them spirits (*δαίμονες*) ; and in the old form of our language the two words are the same. Now he and all the other poets are right, who say that when a good man dies he has a great portion and honour among the dead, and becomes a spirit, a name which is in accordance with the other name of wisdom. And so I assert that every good man, whether living or dead, is of spiritual nature, and is rightly called a spirit.

HER. And I, Socrates, believe I quite agree with you in that. But what is the word "hero" ?

¹ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 121 ff.

² ἐγὼ Hermann : ἐγὼ τὸν δαήμονα BT.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἐννοῆσαι. σμικρὸν γὰρ παρῆκται αὐτῶν τὸ ὄνομα, δηλοῦν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔρωτος γένεσιν.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἡμίθεοι οἱ ἥρωες;

ΕΡΜ. Τί οὖν;

D ΣΩ. Πάντες δήπου γεγόνασιν ἐρασθέντος ἢ θεοῦ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς.¹ εἰάν οὖν σκοπῆς καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν, μᾶλλον εἴσει· δηλώσει γὰρ σοι ὅτι παρὰ τὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνομα, ὅθεν γεγόνασιν οἱ ἥρωες, σμικρὸν παρηγμένον ἐστὶν ὀνόματος χάριν.² καὶ ἦτοι τοῦτο λέγει τοὺς ἥρωας, ἢ ὅτι σοφοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες δεινοὶ³ καὶ διαλεκτικοί, ἐρωτᾶν ἱκανοὶ ὄντες· τὸ γὰρ εἴρειν λέγειν ἐστίν· ὅπερ οὖν ἄρτι λέγομεν, ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ λεγόμενοι οἱ ἥρωες ῥήτορές τινες
E καὶ ἐρωτητικοὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὥστε ῥητόρων καὶ σοφιστῶν γένος γίνεταί τὸ ἡρωϊκὸν φύλον. ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἐστὶν ἐννοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τί ποτε ἀνθρωποὶ καλοῦνται ἢ⁴ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

17. ΕΡΜ. Πόθεν, ὠγαθέ, ἔχω; οὐδ' εἴ τι οἶός τ' ἂν εἶην εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σέ μᾶλλον εὐρήσειν ἢ ἐμαυτόν.

399 ΣΩ. Τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπιπνοία πιστεύεις, ὡς εἰκας.

¹ ἐρασθέντος ἢ θεοῦ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς] ἐρασθέντες ἢ θεοὶ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοὶ θεᾶς BTG.

² ὀνόματος BT, but probably corrupt.

³ δεινοὶ T (but an erasure precedes): καὶ δεινοὶ B.

⁴ ἢ add. Heindorf: om. BT.

¹ The old Attic alphabet was officially given up in favour of the Ionic alphabet in 404 or 403 B.C. The Attic

CRATYLUS

soc. That is easy to understand ; for the name has been but slightly changed, and indicates their origin from love (ἔρως).

HER. What do you mean ?

soc. Why, they were all born because a god fell in love with a mortal woman, or a mortal man with a goddess. Now if you consider the word "hero" also in the old Attic pronunciation,¹ you will understand better ; for that will show you that it has been only slightly altered from the name of love (Eros), the source from which the heroes spring, to make a name for them. And either this is the reason why they are called heroes, or it is because they were wise and clever orators and dialecticians, able to ask questions (ἔρωτᾶν), for εἶρειν is the same as λέγειν (speak). Therefore, when their name is spoken in the Attic dialect, which I was mentioning just now, the heroes turn out to be orators and askers of questions, so that the heroic race proves to be a race of orators and sophists. That is easy to understand, but the case of men, and the reason why they are called men (ἄνθρωποι), is more difficult. Can you tell me what it is ?

HER. No, my friend, I cannot ; and even if I might perhaps find out, I shall not try, because I think you are more likely to find out than I am.

soc. You have faith in the inspiration of Euthyphro, it seems.

form of the word "hero" is **HEPOΣ**, that of "Eros" **EPOΣ**. The Ionic forms are **HPΩΣ** and **EPΩΣ** respectively. Plato seems to think there was a change in pronunciation, as well as in spelling, and indeed that is quite possible. Or Plato may simply be confusing pronunciation with spelling, as he seems to do in several passages of this dialogue (*cf.* especially 410).

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Δῆλα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γε σὺ πιστεύων· ὡς καὶ νῦν γέ μοι φαίνομαι κομψῶς ἐννενοηκέναι, καὶ κινδυνεύσω, εἰ μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι. σκόπει δὴ ὃ λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι περὶ ὀνομάτων, ὅτι πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δ' ἐξαιρούμεν, παρ' ὃ βουλόμεθα ὀνομάζοντες, καὶ τὰς ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλομεν. οἶον Διὶ φίλος· τοῦτο ἵνα ἀντὶ ῥήματος ὄνομα ἡμῖν γένηται, τό τε ἕτερον αὐτόθεν ἰῶτα ἐξείλομεν καὶ ἀντὶ ὀξείας τῆς μέσης συλλαβῆς βαρεῖαν ἐφθειγξάμεθα. ἄλλων δὲ τούναντίον ἐμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα ὀξύτερα¹ φθειγόμεθα.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἓν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνομα πέπονθεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐκ γὰρ ῥήματος ὄνομα γέγονεν, ἐνὸς γράμματος τοῦ ἄλφα ἐξαιρέθentos καὶ βαρυτέρας τῆς τελευτῆς γενομένης.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὡδε. σημαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὄρα οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ἐώρακεν—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ² ὄπωπε—καὶ ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεται τοῦτο ὃ ὄπωπεν. ἐντεῦθεν δὴ μόνον τῶν θηρίων ὀρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε.

ΕΡΜ. Τί οὖν; τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔρωμαί σε, ὃ ἠδέως ἂν πυθοίμην;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

¹ ὀξύτερα add. Buttman: om. BT.

² ἐστὶ Eusebius al.: ἐστὶ τὸ BT.

CRATYLUS

HER. Evidently.

soc. And you are right in having it ; for just at this very moment I think I have had a clever thought, and if I am not careful, before the day is over I am likely to be wiser than I ought to be. So pay attention. First we must remember in regard to names that we often put in or take out letters, making the names different from the meaning we intend, and we change the accent. Take, for instance, *Δὲ φίλος* ; to change this from a phrase to a name, we took out the second iota and pronounced the middle syllable with the grave instead of the acute accent (Diphilus). In other instances, on the contrary, we insert letters and pronounce grave accents as acute.

HER. True.

soc. Now it appears to me that the name of men (*ἄνθρωπος*) underwent a change of that sort. It was a phrase, but became a noun when one letter, alpha, was removed and the accent of the last syllable was dropped.

HER. What do you mean ?

soc. I will tell you. The name " man " (*ἄνθρωπος*) indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider, or look up at (*ἀναθρεῖ*) any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner seen—that is, *ὄπωπε*—than he looks up at and considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man (*ἄνθρωπος*), because he looks up at (*ἀναθρεῖ*) what he has seen (*ὄπωπε*).

HER. Of course. May I ask you about the next word I should like to have explained ?

soc. Certainly.

PLATO

D EPM. Ὡσπερ τοίνυν μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις ἐξῆς εἶναι τι χρῆμα. ψυχὴν γάρ που καὶ σῶμά τι καλοῦμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

EPM. Πειρώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα διελεῖν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν.

ΣΩ. Ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς εἰκότως τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνει, ἔπειτ' αὖ τὸ σῶμα;

EPM. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα λέγεις, οἶμαί τι τοιοῦτον νοεῖν τοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνομάσαντας, ὡς τοῦτο ἄρα, ὅταν παρῆ τῷ σώματι, αἰτιόν
E ἐστὶ τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ, τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψύχον. ἅμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυται τε καὶ τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δὴ μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καλέσαι. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἔχε ἡρέμα· δοκῶ γάρ μοί τι καθορᾶν
400 πιθανώτερον τούτου τοῖς ἀμφὶ Εὐθύφρονα. τούτου μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καταφρονήσαιεν ἂν καὶ ἡγήσαιντο φορτικὸν εἶναι· τόδε δὲ σκόπει, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἀρέσῃ.

EPM. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν φύσιν παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε καὶ ζῆν καὶ περιέμειναι, τί σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὀχεῖν ἄλλο ἢ ψυχὴ;

EPM. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις Ἀναξαγόρα νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν;

EPM. Ἐγωγε.

B ΣΩ. Καλῶς ἄρα ἂν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχοι τῇ δυνάμει ταύτῃ ἢ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει, φυσέχην

CRATYLUS

HER. It seems to me to come naturally next after those you have discussed. We speak of man's soul and body.

soc. Yes, of course.

HER. Let us try to analyse these, as we did the previous words.

soc. You mean consider "soul" ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$) and see why it is properly called by that name, and likewise "body" ($\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$)?

HER. Yes.

soc. To speak on the spur of the moment, I think those who gave the soul its name had something of this sort in mind: they thought when it was present in the body it was the cause of its living, giving it the power to breathe and reviving it ($\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\psi\hat{\upsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$), and when this revivifying force fails, the body perishes and comes to an end; therefore, I think, they called it $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$. But—please keep still a moment. I fancy I see something which will carry more conviction to Euthyphro and his followers; for I think they would despise this attempt and would consider it cheap talk. Now see if you like the new one.

HER. I am listening.

soc. Do you think there is anything which holds and carries the whole nature of the body, so that it lives and moves, except the soul?

HER. No; nothing.

soc. Well, and do you not believe the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that it is mind or soul which orders and holds the nature of all things?

HER. I do.

soc. Then there would be an admirable fitness in calling that power which carries and holds ($\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota$)

PLATO

ἐπονομάζειν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν κομψευόμενον λέγειν.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ δοκεῖ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἐκείνου τεχνικώτερον εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν· γελοῖον μέντοι φαίνεται ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζόμενον ὡς ἐτέθη.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο πῶς φῶμεν ἔχειν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ σῶμα λέγεις;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πολλαχῆ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ σῆμά C τινές φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὐτὸ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἢ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἢ ψυχῆ, καὶ ταύτῃ σῆμα ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα δίδωσιν· τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδὲ¹ γράμμα.

D 18. ΕΡΜ. Ταῦτα μὲν μοι δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρηῆσθαι· περὶ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, ἔχοιμεν ἂν που κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπισκέψασθαι, κατὰ τίνα ποτὲ ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται;

ΣΩ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἴπερ γε νοῦν ἔχοιμεν, ἕνα μὲν τὸν κάλλιστον τρόπον, ὅτι περὶ θεῶν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἅττα ποτὲ ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσιν· δῆλον

¹ οὐδὲ T: οὐδὲν B: οὐδ' ἐν Burnet.

CRATYLUS

nature (*φύσιν*) *φυσέχην* : and this may be refined and pronounced *ψυχή*.

HER. Certainly ; and I think this is a more scientific explanation than the other.

SOC. Yes, it is. But it seems actually absurd that the name was given with such truth.

HER. Now what shall we say about the next word ?

SOC. You mean " body " (*σῶμα*) ?

HER. Yes.

SOC. I think this admits of many explanations, if a little, even very little, change is made ; for some say it is the tomb (*σῆμα*) of the soul, their notion being that the soul is buried in the present life ; and again, because by its means the soul gives any signs which it gives, it is for this reason also properly called " sign " (*σῆμα*). But I think it most likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing punishment for something ; they think it has the body as an enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the safe (*σῶμα*) for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not even a letter needs to be changed.

HER. I think, Socrates, enough has been said about these words ; but might we not consider the names of the gods in the same way in which you were speaking about that of Zeus a few minutes ago, and see what kind of correctness there is in them ?

SOC. By Zeus, Hermogenes, we, if we are sensible, must recognize that there is one most excellent kind, since of the gods we know nothing, neither of them nor of their names, whatever they may be,

PLATO

γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοί γε τὰληθῆ καλοῦσι. δεύτερος δ' αὖ
 Ε τρόπος ὀρθότητος, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος
 ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, οἷτινές τε καὶ ὀπόθεν χαίρουσιν
 ὀνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, ὡς
 401 ἄλλο μηδὲν εἰδότας· καλῶς γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ
 νενομίσθαι. εἰ οὖν βούλει, σκοπῶμεν ὥσπερ προ-
 ειπόντες τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἡμεῖς
 σκεψόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἀξιούμεν οἰοί τ' ἂν εἶναι
 σκοπεῖν—ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἣν ποτέ
 τινα¹ δόξαν ἔχοντες ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα·
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνεμέσητον.

ΕΡΜ. Ἄλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέ-
 γειν, καὶ οὕτω ποιῶμεν.

Β ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἀφ' Ἐστίας ἀρχώμεθα κατὰ
 τὸν νόμον;

ΕΡΜ. Δίκαιον γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν τις φαίη διανοούμενον τὸν ὀνομά-
 σαντα Ἐστίαν ὀνομάσαι;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐδὲ τοῦτο οἶμαι ῥάδιον
 εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν, ὡγαθὲ Ἐρμόγετες, οἱ
 πρῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολέσχαι τινές.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Καταφαίνεται μοι ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων
 τοιούτων τινῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ ἐάν τις τὰ ξενικὰ
 ὀνόματα ἀνασκοπῆ, οὐχ ἥττον ἀνευρίσκεται ὃ
 ἕκαστον βούλεται. οἷον καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὃ ἡμεῖς
 C “οὐσίαν” καλοῦμεν, εἰσὶν οἱ “ἐσσίαν” καλοῦσιν,
 οἱ δ' αὖ “ὠσίαν.” πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ
 ἕτερον ὄνομα τούτων ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσία

¹ ἦν ποτέ τινα ΒΓ: ἦντινά ποτε vulg.

CRATYLUS

by which they call themselves, for it is clear that they use the true names. But there is a second kind of correctness, that we call them, as is customary in prayers, by whatever names and patronymics are pleasing to them, since we know no other. Now I think that is an excellent custom. So, if you like, let us first make a kind of announcement to the gods, saying that we are not going to investigate about them—for we do not claim to be able to do that—but about men, and let us inquire what thought men had in giving them their names; for in that there is no impiety.

HER. I think, Socrates, you are right; let us do as you say.

SOC. Shall we, then, begin with Hestia, according to custom?

HER. That is the proper thing.

SOC. Then what would you say the man had in mind who gave Hestia her name?

HER. By Zeus, I think that is no more easy question than the other.

SOC. At any rate, my dear Hermogenes, the first men who gave names were no ordinary persons, but high thinkers and great talkers.

HER. What then?

SOC. I am sure the names were given by men of that kind; and if foreign names are examined, the meaning of each of them is equally evident. Take, for instance, that which we call *οὐσία* (reality, essence); some people call it *ἔσσία*, and still others *ὠσία*. First, then, in connexion with the second of these forms, it is reasonable that the essence of

PLATO

“ Ἔστία ” καλεῖσθαι ἔχει λόγον· καὶ ὅτι γε αὐ
 ἡμεῖς τὸ τῆς οὐσίας μετέχον “ ἔστιν ”¹ φαμέν, καὶ
 κατὰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖτο Ἔστία· εἰκόκαμεν
 γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ παλαιὸν “ ἐσσίαν ” καλεῖν τὴν
 οὐσίαν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς θυσίας ἂν τις ἐννοήσας
 D ἡγήσαιτο οὕτω νοεῖν ταῦτα τοὺς τιθεμένους· τὸ
 γὰρ πρὸ πάντων θεῶν τῇ Ἔστια πρώτη προθύειν
 εἰκὸς ἐκείνους οἴτινες τὴν πάντων οὐσίαν “ ἐσσίαν ”²
 ἐπωνόμασαν. ὅσοι δ’ αὐ “ ὠσίαν,” σχεδόν τι αὐ
 οὔτοι καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον ἂν ἡγοῖντο τὰ ὄντα ἴεναί τε
 πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν· τὸ οὖν αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἀρχη-
 γὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὠθοῦν, ὅθεν δὴ καλῶς ἔχειν
 αὐτὸ “ ὠσίαν ” ὠνομάσθαι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ
 E ταύτη ὡς παρὰ μηδὲν εἰδότην εἰρήσθω· μετὰ δ’
 Ἔστίαν δίκαιον Ῥεάν καὶ Κρόνον ἐπισκέψασθαι.
 καίτοι τό γε τοῦ Κρόνου ὄνομα ἤδη διήλθομεν. ἴσως
 μέντοι οὐδέν λέγω.

19. EPM. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὀγαθέ, ἐννεόηκά τι σμῆνος σοφίας.

EPM. Ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

402 ΣΩ. Γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ
 πιθανότητα ἔχον.

EPM. Τίνα ταύτην;

ΣΩ. Τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαί’
 ἅπτα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ
 Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὀμηρος ἔλεγεν.

EPM. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ
 οὐδέν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα
 λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβραίης.

¹ ἔστιν Burnet: ἔστι Badham: ἐστίαν B: ἐστίαν T.

² ἐσσίαν Burnet: ἐστίαν T: ἐστίαν B.

CRATYLUS

things be called Hestia ; and moreover, because we ourselves say of that which partakes of reality " it is " (ἔστιν), the name Hestia would be correct in this connexion also ; for apparently we also called οὐσία (reality) ἑσσία in ancient times. And besides, if you consider it in connexion with sacrifices, you would come to the conclusion that those who established them understood the name in that way ; for those who called the essence of things ἑσσία would naturally sacrifice to Hestia first of all the gods. Those on the other hand, who say ὠσία would agree well enough with Heracleitus that all things move and nothing remains still. So they would say the cause and ruler of things was the pushing power (ὠθοῦν), wherefore it had been rightly named ὠσία. But enough of this, considering that we know nothing. After Hestia it is right to consider Rhea and Cronus. The name of Cronus, however, has already been discussed. But perhaps I am talking nonsense.

HER. Why, Socrates ?

SOC. My friend, I have thought of a swarm of wisdom.

HER. What is it ?

SOC. It sounds absurd, but I think there is some probability in it.

HER. What is this probability ?

SOC. I seem to have a vision of Heracleitus saying some ancient words of wisdom as old as the reign of Cronus and Rhea, which Homer said too.

HER. What do you mean by that ?

SOC. Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. "Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Β ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκεῖ σοι ἀλλοιότερον Ἡρακλείτου νοεῖν ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις "Ῥέα" τε καὶ "Κρόνον"; ἄρα οἶει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέροις ρευμάτων ὀνόματα θέσθαι; ὥσπερ αὖ Ὀμηρος "Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν" φησιν "καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν". οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ὅτι

Ὠκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρροος¹ ἦρξε γάμοιο,
 C ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθύν ὄπυιεν.
 ταῦτ' οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνει τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· τὸ μέντοι τῆς Τηθύος οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὄνομα τί βούλεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ διατ-
 D τώμενον καὶ τὸ ἠθούμενον πηγῆς ἀπείκασμά ἐστιν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ Τηθύς τὸ ὄνομα ξύγκειται.

ΕΡΜ. Τοῦτο μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κόμψόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει²; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; τὸν μὲν Δία εἶπομεν.

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγωμεν, τὸν τε Ποσειδῶ καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα ὃ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτόν.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ποσειδῶνός μοι φαίνεται ὠνομάσθαι ὑπὸ³ τοῦ πρώτου ὀνομάσαντος, ὅτι

¹ καλλίρροος] καλλιρόους Β: καλλιρρόους Τ.

² μέλλει] μέλλω ΒΤ.

³ ὑπὸ cod. Gudianus: om. ΒΤ

CRATYLUS

HER. True.

soc. Well, don't you think he who gave to the ancestors of the other gods the names "Rhea" and "Cronus" had the same thought as Heracleitus? Do you think he gave both of them the names of streams merely by chance? Just so Homer, too, says—

Ocean the origin of the gods, and their mother Tethys; ¹ and I believe Hesiod says that also. Orpheus, too, says—

Fair-flowing Ocean was the first to marry, and he wedded his sister Tethys, daughter of his mother.

See how they agree with each other and all tend towards the doctrine of Heracleitus.

HER. I think there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do not know what the name of Tethys means.

soc. Why, the name itself almost tells that it is the name of a spring somewhat disguised; for that which is strained (*διαττώμενον*) and filtered (*ἡθούμενον*) represents a spring, and the name Tethys is compounded of those two words.

HER. That is very neat, Socrates.

soc. Of course it is. But what comes next? Zeus we discussed before.

HER. Yes.

soc. Let us, then, speak of his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, including also the other name of the latter.

HER. By all means.

soc. I think Poseidon's name was given by him who first applied it, because the power of the sea

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, xiv. 201, 302.

PLATO

Ε αὐτὸν βαδίζοντα ἐπέσχεν ἢ τῆς θαλάττης φύσις καὶ οὐκέτι εἶασεν προελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ δεσμὸς τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο. τὸν οὖν ἄρχοντα τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης θεὸν ὠνόμασεν Ποσειδῶνα, ὡς ποσίδεσμον ὄντα· τὸ δὲ εἶς ἔγκειται ἴσως εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκα. τάχα δὲ οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο λέγοι, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ σίγμα δύο λάβδα τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγετο, 403 ὡς πολλὰ εἰδότης τοῦ θεοῦ. ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν ὁ σείων ὠνόμασται· πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ πῖ καὶ τὸ δέλτα. τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος, τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πλούτου δόσιν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς κάτωθεν ἀνίεται ὁ πλοῦτος, ἐπωνομάσθη· ὁ δὲ Ἄιδης, οἱ πολλοὶ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἀειδὲς προσειρηῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, καὶ φοβούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα Πλούτωνα καλοῦσιν αὐτόν.

Β ΕΡΜ. Σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες;

20. ΣΩ. Πολλαχῆ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι διημαρτηκένοι περὶ τούτου τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν.¹ ὅτι τε γάρ, ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ τις ἡμῶν ἀποθάνῃ, αἰεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστίν, φοβοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ γυμνὴ τοῦ σώματος παρ' ἐκείνον ἀπέρχεται, καὶ τοῦτο πεφόβηνται· τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πάντα ἐς ταῦτόν τι συντείνειν, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δῆ;

Γ ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐρῶ ἃ γέ μοι φαίνεται. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, δεσμὸς ζῶν ὄτω οὖν ὥστε μένειν ὅπου οὖν, πότερος ἰσχυρότερός ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπιθυμία;

ΕΡΜ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιθυμία.

ΣΩ. Οἶει οὖν τὸν Ἄιδην οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς ἐκφεύγειν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἰσχυροτάτῳ δεσμῷ ἔδει τοὺς ἐκείσε ἰόντας;

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restrained him as he was walking and hindered his advance ; it acted as a bond ($\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$) of his feet ($\pi\omicron\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$). So he called the lord of this power Poseidon, regarding him as a foot-bond ($\pi\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}-\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\nu$). The ϵ is inserted perhaps for euphony. But possibly that may not be right ; possibly two lambdas were originally pronounced instead of the sigma, because the god knew ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{o}\tau\omicron\varsigma$) many ($\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$) things. Or it may be that from his shaking he was called the Shaker ($\acute{o}\ \sigma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$), and the pi and delta are additions. As for Pluto, he was so named as the giver of wealth ($\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$), because wealth comes up from below out of the earth. And Hades—I fancy most people think that this is a name of the Invisible ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$), so they are afraid and call him Pluto.

HER. And what do you think yourself, Socrates ?

SOC. I think people have many false notions about the power of this god, and are unduly afraid of him. They are afraid because when we are once dead we remain in his realm for ever, and they are also terrified because the soul goes to him without the covering of the body. But I think all these facts, and the office and the name of the god, point in the same direction.

HER. How so ?

SOC. I will tell you my own view. Please answer this question : Which is the stronger bond upon any living being to keep him in any one place, desire, or compulsion ?

HER. Desire, Socrates, is much stronger.

SOC. Then do you not believe there would be many fugitives from Hades, if he did not bind with the strongest bond those who go to him there ?

¹ $\delta\nu$ add. Baiter: om. BT.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Δῆλα δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμία ἄρα τινί αὐτούς, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ, εἴπερ τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ δεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιθυμῖαι αὐ πολλαί εἰσιν;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

Δ ΣΩ. Τῇ μεγίστῃ ἄρα ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν δεῖ αὐτούς, εἴπερ μέλλει τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ κατέχειν.

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν τις μείζων ἐπιθυμία ἢ ὅταν τίς τῶν συνῶν οἴηται δι' ἐκείνον ἔσεσθαι ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ;

ΕΡΜ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φῶμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης, οὐδένα δεῦρο ἐθελῆσαι ἀπελθεῖν τῶν ἐκείθεν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰς τὰς Σειρήνας, ἀλλὰ κατακεκληθῆσθαι ἐκείνας
 Ε τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας· οὕτω καλοῦς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὁ "Αἰδης, καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς γ' ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, ὁ θεὸς οὗτος τέλος σοφιστῆς τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ, ὅς γε καὶ τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀνίστησιν· οὕτω πολλὰ αὐτῷ τὰ περιόντα ἐκεῖ ἔστιν, καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα ἀπὸ τούτου ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐθέλειν συνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ τότε συγγίνεσθαι,
 404 ἐπειδὰν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρὰ ἢ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐ φιλοσόφου δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ εὖ ἐντεθυμημένου¹ ὅτι οὕτω μὲν ἂν κατέχοι αὐτούς δήσας τῇ περὶ ἀρετὴν ἐπιθυμίᾳ,

¹ φιλοσόφου . . . ἐντεθυμημένου Heusde: φιλόσοφον . . . ἐντεθυμημένον BT.

CRATYLUS

HER. Of course there would.

soc. Apparently, then, if he binds them with the strongest bond, he binds them by some kind of desire, not by compulsion.

HER. Yes, that is plain.

soc. There are many desires, are there not ?

HER. Yes.

soc. Then he binds with the desire which is the strongest of all, if he is to restrain them with the strongest bond.

HER. Yes.

soc. And is there any desire stronger than the thought of being made a better man by association with some one ?

HER. No, by Zeus, Socrates, there certainly is not.

soc. Then, Hermogenes, we must believe that this is the reason why no one has been willing to come away from that other world, not even the Sirens, but they and all others have been overcome by his enchantments, so beautiful, as it appears, are the words which Hades has the power to speak ; and from this point of view this god is a perfect sophist and a great benefactor of those in his realm, he who also bestows such great blessings upon us who are on earth ; such abundance surrounds him there below, and for this reason he is called Pluto. Then, too, he refuses to consort with men while they have bodies, but only accepts their society when the soul is pure of all the evils and desires of the body. Do you not think this shows him to be a philosopher and to understand perfectly that under these conditions he could restrain them by binding them with the desire of virtue, but that so long as they

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ἔχοντας δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτοίησιν καὶ μανίαν οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Κρόνος δύναίτο ὁ πατήρ συγκατέχειν αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς δῆσας τοῖς αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις;

ΕΡΜ. Κινδυνεύεις τί λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

B ζη. Καὶ τό γε ὄνομα ὁ Ἄιδης, ὦ Ἑρμόγευες, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς¹ ἐπωνομάσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ εἰδέειν, ἀπὸ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου Ἄιδης ἐκλήθη.

21. ΕΡΜ. Εἶεν· τί δὲ Δημήτρά τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω καὶ Ἀθηναίαν καὶ Ἥφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, πῶς λέγομεν;

ζη. Δημήτηρ μὲν φαίνεται κατὰ τὴν δόσιν τῆς ἐδωδῆς διδοῦσα ὡς μήτηρ Δημήτηρ κεκληῆσθαι, C Ἥρα δὲ ἐρατή τις, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ λέγεται ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτῆς ἐρασθεὶς ἔχειν.² ἴσως δὲ μετεωρολογῶν ὁ νομοθέτης τὸν ἄερα Ἥραν ὠνόμασεν ἐπικρυπτόμενος, θεὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τελευτήν· γνοίης δ' ἂν, εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ὄνομα. Φερρέφαττα δέ, πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο φοβοῦνται τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος. καὶ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντες σκοποῦνται τὴν Φερσεφόνην, καὶ δεινὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ μηνύει σοφὴν εἶναι D τὴν θεόν· ἅτε γὰρ φερομένων τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ ἐπαφῶν καὶ δυνάμενον ἐπακολουθεῖν σοφία ἂν εἴη. Φερέπαφα οὖν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαφὴν τοῦ φερομένου ἢ θεοῦ ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι—δι' ὅπερ καὶ σύν-

¹ ἀειδοῦς P: αἰδοῦς BT.

² ἐρασθεὶς ἔχειν liber Bessarionis: ὁ ἐρασθεὶς ἔχει BT.

CRATYLUS

are infected with the unrest and madness of the body, not even his father Cronus could hold them to himself, though he bound them with his famous chains ?

HER. There seems to be something in that, Socrates.

soc. And the name "Hades" is not in the least derived from the invisible (*ἀειδής*), but far more probably from knowing (*εἰδέναι*) all noble things, and for that reason he was called Hades by the lawgiver.

HER. Very well ; what shall we say of Demeter, Hera, Apollo, Athena, Hephaestus, Ares, and the other gods ?

soc. Demeter appears to have been called Demeter, because like a mother (*μήτηρ*) she gives the gift of food, and Hera is a lovely one (*ἑρατή*), as indeed, Zeus is said to have married her for love. But perhaps the lawgiver had natural phenomena in mind, and called her Hera (*Ἥρα*) as a disguise for *ἀήρ* (air), putting the beginning at the end. You would understand, if you were to repeat the name Hera over and over. And Pherephatta !—How many people fear this name, and also Apollo ! I imagine it is because they do not know about correctness of names. You see they change the name to Phersephone and its aspect frightens them. But really the name indicates that the goddess is wise ; for since things are in motion (*φερόμενα*), that which grasps (*ἐφαπτόμενον*) and touches (*ἐπαφῶν*) and is able to follow them is wisdom. Pherepapha, or something of that sort, would therefore be the correct name of the goddess, because she is wise and touches that which is in motion (*ἐπαφή τοῦ φερομένου*)

PLATO

εστιν αὐτῇ ὁ "Αιδης σοφὸς ὢν, διότι τοιαύτη ἐστίν—
 νῦν δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ ὄνομα εὐστομίαν περὶ
 πλείονος ποιούμενοι τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε Φερρέ-
 φατταν αὐτὴν καλεῖν. ταῦτὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν
 Ε Ἀπόλλω, ὅπερ λέγω, πολλοὶ πεφόβηνται περὶ τὸ
 ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς τι δεινὸν μηνύοντος· ἢ οὐκ
 ἤσθησαι;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, κάλλιστα
 κείμενον πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται.
 405 οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν ὃ τι ἂν μᾶλλον ὄνομα ἤρμοσεν ἐν
 ὄν τέτταρσι δυνάμεσι ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥστε πασῶν
 ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ δηλοῦν τρόπον τινὰ μουσικὴν τε
 καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ τοξικὴν.

ΕΡΜ. Λέγε δῆ· ἄτοπον γάρ τί μοι λέγεις τὸ
 ὄνομα εἶναι.

22. ΣΩ. Εὐάρμοστον μὲν οὖν, ἅτε μουσικοῦ
 ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἢ κάθαρσις καὶ
 οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν
 μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ
 Β αἱ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιθειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ
 τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ αἱ περιρράνσεις, πάντα
 ἐν τι ταῦτα δύναιτ' ἄν, καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν·
 ἢ οὐ;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ καθαίρων θεὸς καὶ ὁ ἀπολούων
 τε καὶ ἀπολύων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οὗτος ἂν
 εἴη;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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—and this is the reason why Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise—but people have altered her name, attaching more importance to euphony than to truth, and they call her Pherephatta. Likewise in the case of Apollo, as I say, many people are afraid because of the name of the god, thinking that it has some terrible meaning. Have you not noticed that?

HER. Certainly; what you say is true.

SOC. But really the name is admirably appropriate to the power of the god.

HER. How is that?

SOC. I will try to tell you what I think about it; for no single name could more aptly indicate the four functions of the god, touching upon them all and in a manner declaring his power in music, prophecy, medicine, and archery.

HER. Go on; you seem to imply that it is a remarkable name.

SOC. His name and nature are in harmony; you see he is a musical god. For in the first place, purification and purgations used in medicine and in soothsaying, and fumigations with medicinal and magic drugs, and the baths and sprinklings connected with that sort of thing all have the single function of making a man pure in body and soul, do they not?

HER. Certainly.

SOC. But this is the god who purifies and washes away (*ἀπολούων*) and delivers (*ἀπολύων*) from such evils, is he not?

HER. Certainly.

PLATO

ζω. Κατὰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰς ἀπολύσεις τε καὶ
 C ἀπολούσεις, ὡς ἰατρὸς ὢν τῶν τοιούτων, Ἀπο-
 λούων ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· κατὰ δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν
 καὶ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν—ταῦτόν γάρ
 ἐστίν—, ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Θετταλοὶ καλοῦσιν αὐτόν,
 ὀρθότατ' ἂν καλοῖτο· Ἄπλου¹ γάρ φασι πάντες
 Θετταλοὶ τοῦτον τὸν θεόν. διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰεὶ βολῶν
 ἐγκρατῆς εἶναι τοξικῆ Ἀειβάλλων ἐστίν. κατὰ
 δὲ τὴν μουσικὴν δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν² ὅτι τὸ ἄλφα ση-
 μαίνει πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὄμοῦ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὄμοῦ
 πόλησιν καὶ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, οὓς δὴ πόλους
 καλοῦσιν, καὶ³ περὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ᾠδῇ ἄρμονίαν, ἣ
 D δὴ συμφωνία καλεῖται, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα, ὡς φασιν
 οἱ κομψοὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἄρμονία
 τινὶ πολεῖ ἅμα πάντα· ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ οὗτος ὁ
 θεὸς τῇ ἄρμονίᾳ ὁμοπολῶν αὐτὰ πάντα καὶ κατὰ
 θεοὺς καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους· ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ὄμο-
 κέλευθον καὶ ὄμοκοιτιν ἀκόλουθον καὶ ἄκοιτιν
 ἐκαλέσαμεν, μεταβαλόντες ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄμο ἄλφα,⁴
 οὕτω καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα ἐκαλέσαμεν, ὃς ἦν Ὀμοπο-
 E λῶν, ἕτερον λάβδα ἐμβαλόντες,⁵ ὅτι ὁμώνυμον
 ἐγίγνετο τῷ χαλεπῷ ὀνόματι. ὅπερ καὶ νῦν
 ὑποπτεύοντές τινες διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖσθαι
 τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ὀνόματος φοβοῦνται αὐτὸ ὡς
 σημαῖνον φθοράν τινα· τὸ δέ,⁶ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο,
 406 πασῶν ἐφαπτόμενον κείται τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεων,
 ἀπλοῦ, αἰεὶ βάλλοντος, ἀπολούοντος, ὁμοπολῶν-
 τος. τὰς δὲ Μούσας τε καὶ ὅλως τὴν μουσικὴν

¹ Ἄπλου Boeckh: ἀπλῶν B: ἀπλόν Γ.

² After ὑπολαβεῖν, the words ὥσπερ τὸν ἀκόλουθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἄκοιτιν of the mss. were bracketed by Ast.

³ καὶ t: καὶ τὴν BT.

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soc. With reference, then, to his acts of delivering and his washings, as being the physician of such diseases, he might properly be called Apoluon (*ἀπολούων*, the washer), and with reference to soothsaying and truth and simplicity—for the two are identical—he might most properly be called by the name the Thessalians use ; for all Thessalians call the god Aplun. And because he is always by his archery controller of darts (*βολῶν*) he is ever darting (*ἀεὶ βάλλων*). And with reference to music we have to understand that *alpha* often signifies “together,” and here it denotes moving together in the heavens about the poles, as we call them, and harmony in song, which is called concord ; for, as the ingenious musicians and astronomers tell us, all these things move together by a kind of harmony. And this god directs the harmony, making them all move together, among both gods and men ; and so, just as we call the *ὁμοκέλευθον* (him who accompanies), and *ὁμόκοιτιν* (bedfellow), by changing the *ὁμο* to *alpha*, *ἀκόλουθον* and *ἄκοιτιν*, so also we called him Apollo who was Homopolo, and the second lambda was inserted, because without it the name sounded of disaster (*ἀπολῶ*, *ἀπόλωλα*, etc.). Even as it is, some have a suspicion of this, because they do not properly regard the force of the name, and therefore they fear it, thinking that it denotes some kind of ruin. But in fact, as was said, the name touches upon all the qualities of the god, as simple, ever-darting, purifying, and accompanying. The Muses and music in general are named, ap-

⁴ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμο ἄλφα Hermann : ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄλφα B : ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἄ T.

⁵ ἐμβαλόντες G : ἐμβάλλοντες BT.

⁶ τὸ δέ codex Gudianus : τὸ δὲ πολὺ BT.

PLATO

ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐπωνόμασεν. Ληθὼ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πραότητος τῆς θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ ἐβελήμονα εἶναι ὧν ἂν τις δέηται. ἴσως δὲ ὡς οἱ ξένοι καλοῦσιν—πολλοὶ γὰρ Ληθὼ καλοῦσιν—ἔοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἥθους ἀλλ' B ἡμερόν τε καὶ λείον Ληθὼ κεκλήσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦτο καλούντων. Ἄρτεμις δὲ διὰ τὸ¹ ἄρτεμὲς φαίνεται καὶ τὸ κόσμιον, διὰ τὴν τῆς παρθενίας ἐπιθυμίαν· ἴσως δὲ ἀρετῆς ἱστορα τὴν θεὸν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ καλέσας, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ὡς τὸν ἄροτον μισησάσης τὸν ἀνδρὸς ἐν γυναικί· ἢ διὰ τούτων τι ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ὁ τιθέμενος ἔθετο τῇ θεῷ.

23. EPM. Τί δὲ ὁ Διόνυσός τε καὶ ἡ Ἄφροδίτη; ΣΩ. Μεγάλα, ὦ παῖ Ἰππονίκου, ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ ἔστι γὰρ καὶ σπουδαίως εἰρημένος ὁ τρόπος τῶν C ὀνομάτων τούτοις τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς. τὸν μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖον ἄλλους τινὰς ἐρώτα, τὸν δὲ παιδικὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει διελθεῖν· φιλοπαίσμονες γὰρ καὶ οἱ θεοί. ὃ τε γὰρ Διόνυσος εἶη ἂν ὁ διδοὺς τὸν οἶνον Διδοίνυσος ἐν παιδιᾷ καλούμενος, οἶνος δ', ὅτι οἶεσθαι νοῦν ἔχειν ποιεῖ τῶν πινόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔχοντας, οἴονους δικαιοτάτ' ἂν καλούμενος. περὶ δὲ Ἄφροδίτης οὐκ ἄξιον D ἐκ² τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν Ἄφροδίτη ἐκλήθη.

EPM. Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' Ἀθηναῖς Ἀθηναῖός γ' ὦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιλήσει, οὐδ' Ἡφαίστου τε καὶ Ἄρεως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ εἰκός γε.

¹ δὲ διὰ τὸ Stephanus: δὲ τὸ BT.

² ἐκ add. Hermann.

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parently, from *μῶσθαι*, searching, and philosophy ; and Leto from her gentleness, because whatever is asked of her, she is willing (*ἔθελήμων*). But perhaps her name is Letho, as she is called by many foreigners ; and those who call her by that name seem to do so on account of the mild and gentle (*λείον*, *Ληθώ*) kindness of her character. Artemis appears to get her name from her healthy (*ἀρτεμές*) and well-ordered nature, and her love of virginity ; or perhaps he who named her meant that she is learned in virtue (*ἀρετή*), or possibly, too, that she hates sexual intercourse (*ἄροτον μισεῖ*) of man and woman ; or he who gave the goddess her name may have given it for any or all of these reasons.

HER. What of Dionysus and Aphrodite ?

SOC. You ask great things of me, son of Hipponicus. You see there is both a serious and a facetious account of the form of the name of these deities. You will have to ask others for the serious one ; but there is nothing to hinder my giving you the facetious account, for the gods also have a sense of humour. Dionysus, the giver (*διδούς*) of wine (*οἶνος*), might be called in jest Didoinsus, and wine, because it makes most drinkers think (*οἷεσθαι*) they have wit (*νοῦς*) when they have not, might very justly be called Oeonus (*οἰόνους*). As for Aphrodite, we need not oppose Hesiod ; we can accept his derivation of the name from her birth out of the foam (*ἀφροῦ*).

HER. But surely you, as an Athenian, will not forget Athena, nor Hephaestus and Ares.

SOC. That is not likely.

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ΕΡΜ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὄνομα αὐτῆς οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν δι' ὃ κείται.

ΕΡΜ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Παλλάδα που αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις
Ε ὀρχήσεως ἠγούμενοι τεθῆναι ὀρθῶς ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,
ἠγοίμεθα· τὸ γάρ που ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τι ἄλλο μετεω-
407 ρίζειν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν πάλλειν τε καὶ
πάλλεσθαι καὶ ὀρχεῖν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καλοῦμεν.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Παλλάδα μὲν τοίνυν ταύτη.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ἕτερον πῶς
λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἐμβριθέστερον, ὦ φίλε. εἰοίκασι δὴ
καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν νομίζειν ὡςπερ οἱ νῦν
B περὶ Ὅμηρον δεινοί. καὶ γὰρ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ
ἐξηγούμενοι τὸν ποιητὴν φασὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτὸν
νοῦν τε καὶ διάνοιαν πεποιηκέναι, καὶ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα
ποιῶν εἰοικε τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι,
ἔτι δὲ μειζόνως λέγων θεοῦ νόησιν ὡςπερ εἰ λέγει
ὅτι ἁ θεονόα¹ ἐστὶν αὕτη, τῷ ἄλφα ξενικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἦτα χρησάμενος καὶ τὸ ἰῶτα καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἀφελών.
ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτη, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ θεία νοούσης
αὐτῆς διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Θεονόην ἐκάλεσεν.
οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπέχει καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἦθει νόησιν ὡς οὔσαν
C τὴν θεὸν ταύτην Ἡθονόην μὲν βούλεσθαι προσ-

¹ ἁ θεονόα Buttmann : ἡ θεονόη B : ἡ θονόη T.

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HER. No.

soc. It is easy to tell the reason of one of her two names.

HER. What name?

soc. We call her Pallas, you know.

HER. Yes, of course.

soc. Those of us are right, I fancy, who think this name is derived from armed dances, for lifting oneself or anything else from the ground or in the hands is called shaking (*πάλλειν*) and being shaken, or dancing and being danced.

HER. Yes, certainly.

soc. So that is the reason she is called Pallas.

HER. And rightly called so. But what can you say of her other name?

soc. You mean Athena?

HER. Yes.

soc. That is a weightier matter, my friend. The ancients seem to have had the same belief about Athena as the interpreters of Homer have now; for most of these, in commenting on the poet, say that he represents Athena as mind (*νοῦς*) and intellect (*διάνοια*); and the maker of her name seems to have had a similar conception of her, but he gives her the still grander title of "mind of God" (*ἡ θεοῦ νόησις*), seeming to say that she is *ἁ θεονόα*; here he used the alpha in foreign fashion instead of eta, and dropped out the iota and sigma. But perhaps that was not his reason; he may have called her Theonoë because she has unequalled knowledge of divine things (*τὰ θεῖα νοοῦσα*). Perhaps, too, he may have wished to identify the goddess with wisdom of character (*ἐν ἡθει νόησις*) by calling her Ethonoë; and then he himself or others after-

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ειπεῖν· παραγαγὼν δὲ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τινες ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον, ὡς ᾤοντο, Ἀθηναίαν ἐκάλεσαν.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὸν Ἡφαιστον, πῆ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τὸν γενναῖον τὸν φάεος ἱστορα ἐρωτᾶς;

ΕΡΜ. Ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος μὲν παντὶ δῆλος Φαῖστος ὢν, τὸ ἦτα προσελκυσάμενος;

ΕΡΜ. Κινδυνεύει, ἐὰν μὴ πῆ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτι ἄλλη δόξη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ δόξη, τὸν Ἀρη ἐρώτα.

ΕΡΜ. Ἐρωτῶ.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν βούλει, κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τε καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον Ἀρης ἂν εἴη· εἰ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον, ὃ δὴ ἄρρατον καλεῖται, καὶ ταύτη ἂν πανταχῆ πολεμικῶ θεῶ πρέποι Ἀρη καλεῖσθαι.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν θεῶν πρὸς θεῶν ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ δέδοικα περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγεσθαι· περὶ δὲ ἄλλων ὄντινων¹ βούλει πρόβαλλέ μοι, ὄφρα ἴδῃαι οἷοι Εὐθύφρονος ἵπποι.

E ΕΡΜ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἔτι γε ἐν ἐρόμενός σε περὶ Ἑρμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ με καὶ οὐ φησιν Κρατύλος Ἑρμογένη εἶναι. πειρώμεθα οὖν τὸν Ἑρμῆν σκέψασθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν εἰ τί ὅδε λέγει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὃ Ἑρμῆς, καὶ τὸ ἐρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον
408 καὶ τὸ κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ ἀγοραστικόν, περὶ λόγου δύναμιν ἐστὶν πᾶσα

¹ ἄλλων ὄντινων codex Parisinus 1813: ἄλλων τινῶν B: ἄλλων εἴ τινων Γ.

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wards improved the name, as they thought, and called her Athenaa.

HER. And how do you explain Hephaestus ?

SOC. You ask about "the noble master of light" ?

HER. To be sure.

SOC. Hephaestus is Phaestus, with the eta added by attraction ; anyone could see that, I should think.

HER. Very likely, unless some other explanation occurs to you, as it probably will.

SOC. To prevent that, ask about Ares.

HER. I do ask.

SOC. Ares, then, if you like, would be named for his virility and courage, or for his hard and unbending nature, which is called ἄρρατον ; so Ares would be in every way a fitting name for the god of war.

HER. Certainly.

SOC. For God's sake, let us leave the gods, as I am afraid to talk about them ; but ask me about any others you please, "that you may see what" Euthyphro's "horses are."¹

HER. I will do so, but first one more god. I want to ask you about Hermes, since Cratylus says I am not Hermogenes (son of Hermes). Let us investigate the name of Hermes, to find out whether there is anything in what he says.

SOC. Well then, this name "Hermes" seems to me to have to do with speech ; he is an interpreter (ἑρμηνεύς) and a messenger, is wily and deceptive in speech, and is oratorical. All this activity is

¹ Cf. Homer, *Iliad*, v. 221, viii. 105.

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αὕτη ἢ πραγματεία· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, τὸ εἶρειν λόγου χρεία ἐστί, τὸ δέ, οἶον καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, ἐμήσατό φησιν, τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαι ἐστίν. ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν τούτων τὸν τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ τὸν λόγον μησάμενον—τὸ δὲ λέγειν δὴ ἐστίν εἶρειν—τούτον τὸν θεὸν ὡσπερεὶ
 B ἐπιτάττει ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης· ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὅς τὸ εἶρειν ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Εἰρέμης· νῦν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὡς οἴομεθα, καλλωπίζοντες τὸ ὄνομα Ἐρμῆν καλοῦμεν· καὶ ἢ γε Ἴρις ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶρειν ἔοικεν κεκλημένη, ὅτι ἄγγελος ἦν.¹

ΕΡΜ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, εὖ ἄρα μοι δοκεῖ Κρατύλος λέγειν τὸ ἐμὲ μὴ εἶναι Ἐρμογένη· οὐκ οὐκ εὐμήχανός γέ εἰμι λόγου.

24. ΣΩ. Καὶ τό γε τὸν Πᾶνα τοῦ Ἐρμοῦ εἶναι υἱὸν διφυῆ ἔχει τὸ εἰκός, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

C ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει καὶ κυκλεῖ καὶ πολεῖ αἰεὶ, καὶ ἔστι διπλοῦς, ἀληθῆς τε καὶ ψευδής.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ λεῖον καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος κάτω ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλείστοι οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἐστίν, περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ἄρ' ἂν² ὁ πᾶν μηνύων καὶ αἰεὶ πολῶν

¹ καὶ ἢ γε Ἴρις . . . ἄγγελος ἦν bracketed by Heindorf and others.

² ἂν add. Stallbaum.

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concerned with the power of speech. Now, as I said before, εἶρειν denotes the use of speech; moreover, Homer often uses the word ἐμήσατο, which means "contrive." From these two words, then, the lawgiver imposes upon us the name of this god who contrived speech and the use of speech—εἶρειν means "speak"—and tells us: "Ye human beings, he who contrived speech (εἶρειν ἐμήσατο) ought to be called Eiremes by you." We, however, have beautified the name, as we imagine, and call him Hermes. Iris also seems to have got her name from εἶρειν, because she is a messenger.

HER. By Zeus, I believe Cratylus was right in saying I was not Hermogenes; I certainly am no good contriver of speech.

soc. And it is reasonable, my friend, that Pan is the double-natured son of Hermes.

HER. How is that?

soc. You know that speech makes all things (πάν) known and always makes them circulate and move about, and is twofold, true and false.

HER. Certainly.

soc. Well, the true part is smooth and divine and dwells aloft among the gods, but falsehood dwells below among common men, is rough and like the tragic goat¹; for tales and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life.

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then Pan, who declares and always moves (ἀεὶ πολλῶν) all, is rightly called goat-herd (αἰπόλος),

¹ The chorus of the primitive performances from which tragedy developed appeared as satyrs, clad in goat-skins. Hence the name τραγωδία (goat-song). The adjective τραγικός may mean either "goat-like" or "tragic." In this passage it has both meanings.

PLATO

D Πάν αἰπόλος εἶη, διφυῆς Ἑρμοῦ υἱός, τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν λείος, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής. καὶ ἔστιν ἤτοι λόγος ἢ λόγου ἀδελφὸς ὁ Πάν, εἶπερ Ἑρμοῦ υἱός ἐστιν· ἀδελφῶ δὲ εἰκέναι ἀδελφὸν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὦ μακάριε, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν.

ΕΡΜ. Τῶν γε τοιούτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει. περὶ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε¹ τί σε κωλύει διελθεῖν, οἷον ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρον καὶ γῆς καὶ αἰθέρος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ὠρῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ;

ΣΩ. Συχνὰ μὲν μοι προστάτεις, ὅμως δέ, εἶπερ σοι κεχαρισμένον ἔσται, ἐθέλω.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μὴν χαριεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ οὖν πρῶτον βούλει; ἢ ὥσπερ εἶπες, τὸν ἡλίον διέλθωμεν;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐοικε τοίνυν κατάδηλον γενόμενον ἂν μάλλον, εἰ τῷ Δωρικῶ τις ὀνόματι χρῶτο· ἄλιον γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ Δωριῆς· ἄλιος οὖν εἶη μὲν ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἀλίξειν εἰς ταῦτὸ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐπειδὴν ἀνατείλη, εἶη δ' ἂν καὶ τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ εἰλεῖν ἰών, εἰκοί δ' ἂν καὶ ὅτι ποικίλλει ἰών τὰ γινόμενα ἐκ τῆς γῆς· τὸ δὲ ποικίλλειν καὶ αἰολεῖν ταῦτόν.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δὲ ἢ σελήνη;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναξ-αγόραν πιέζειν.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἐοικε δηλοῦντι² παλαιότερον ὃ ἐκεῖνος

¹ περὶ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε b: περὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε B: περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δὲ T: περὶ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων G.

² δηλοῦντι Heusde: δηλοῦν τι BT.

CRATYLUS

being the double-natured son of Hermes, smooth in his upper parts, rough and goat-like in his lower parts. And Pan, if he is the son of Hermes, is either speech or the brother of speech, and that brother resembles brother is not at all surprising. But, as I said, my friend, let us get away from the gods.

HER. From such gods as those, if you like, Socrates; but why should you not tell of another kind of gods, such as sun, moon, stars, earth, ether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

SOC. You are imposing a good many tasks upon me; however, if it will give you pleasure, I am willing.

HER. It will give me pleasure.

SOC. What, then, do you wish first? Shall we discuss the sun (*Ἡλιος*), as you mentioned it first?

HER. By all means.

SOC. I think it would be clearer if we were to use the Doric form of the name. The Dorians call it *Ἄλιος*. Now *ἄλιος* might be derived from collecting (*ἀλίζειν*) men when he rises, or because he always turns (*ἀεὶ εἰλεῖν*) about the earth in his course, or because he variegates the products of the earth, for variegate is identical with *αἰολεῖν*.

HER. And what of the moon, Selene?

SOC. That name appears to put Anaxagoras in an uncomfortable position.

HER. How so?

SOC. Why, it seems to have anticipated by many

PLATO

Β νεωστὶ ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν που σέλας καὶ τὸ φῶς ταῦτόν.

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Νέον δέ που καὶ ἕνον αἰεὶ ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν σελήνην τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν· κύκλω γάρ που αἰεὶ αὐτὴν περιῶν νέον αἰεὶ ἐπιβάλλει, ἕνον δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸ τοῦ προτέρου μηνός.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Σελαναίαν δέ γε καλοῦσιν αὐτὴν πολλοί.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι δὲ σέλας νέον τε καὶ ἕνον ἔχει αἰεὶ, **Σ** Σελαενοεοάεια¹ μὲν δικαιοτάτ' ἂν τῶν ὀνομάτων καλοῖτο, συγκεκριμένον δὲ σελαναία κέκληται.

ΕΡΜ. Διθυραμβῶδές γε τοῦτο τοῦνομα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὰ ἄστρα πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὁ μὲν μεις ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι εἶη ἂν μείης ὀρθῶς κεκλημένος, τὰ δ' ἄστρα ἔοικε τῆς ἀστραπῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ ἀστραπή, ὅτι τὰ ὦπα ἀναστρέφει, ἀναστρωπὴ ἂν εἶη, νῦν δὲ ἀστραπή καλλωπισθεῖσα κέκληται.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ;

Δ ΣΩ. Τὸ πῦρ ἀπορῶ· καὶ κινδυνεύει ἥτοι ἡ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονός με μούσα ἐπιλελοιπέναι, ἢ τοῦτό τι παγχάλεπον εἶναι· σκέψαι οὖν ἦν εἰσάγω μηχανὴν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἃ ἂν ἀπορῶ.

¹ Σελαενοεοάεια Heindorf: σελαενεοάεια Β: σέλλαενοεοάεια Τ.

CRATYLUS

years the recent doctrine of Anaxagoras, that the moon receives its light from the sun.

HER. How is that ?

SOC. Σέλας (gleam) and φῶς (light) are the same thing.

HER. Yes.

SOC. Now the light is always new and old about the moon, if the Anaxagoreans are right ; for they say the sun, in its continuous course about the moon, always sheds new light upon it, and the light of the previous month persists.

HER. Certainly.

SOC. The moon is often called Σελαναία.

HER. Certainly.

SOC. Because it has always a new and old gleam (σέλας νέον τε καὶ ἔνον) the very most fitting name for it would be Σελαενονεοάεια, which has been compressed into Σελαναία.

HER. That is a regular *opéra bouffe* name, Socrates. But what have you to say of the month (μήν) and the stars ?

SOC. The word " month " (μείς) would be properly pronounced μείης, from μειοῦσθαι, " to grow less," and I think the stars (ἄστρα) get their name from ἀστραπή (lightning). But ἀστραπή, because it turns our eyes upwards (τὰ ὄψα ἀναστρέφει), would be called ἀναστρωπή, which is now pronounced more prettily ἀστραπή.

HER. And what of πῦρ (fire) and ὕδωρ (water) ?

SOC. Πῦρ is too much for me. It must be that either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me or this is a very difficult word. Now just note the contrivance I introduce in all cases like this which are too much for me.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Τίνα δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. ἀπόκριται γάρ μοι· ἔχουσ ἂν εἰπεῖν πῦρ κατὰ τίνα τρόπον καλεῖται;

ΕΡΜ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

25. ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ὃ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύω περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ ὅτι πολλὰ οἱ Ἑλληνες ὀνόματα
Ε ἄλλως τε καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων εἰλήφασιν.

ΕΡΜ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ζητοῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνὴν ὡς εἰκότως κεῖται, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνην ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὄνομα τυγχάνει ὄν, οἶσθα ὅτι ἀποροῖ ἄν.

ΕΡΜ. Εἰκότως γε.

410 ΣΩ. Ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸ πῦρ μὴ τι βαρβαρικὸν ἦ. τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε ῥάδιον προσάψαι ἐστὶν Ἑλληνικῇ φωνῇ, φανεροί τ' εἰσὶν οὕτως αὐτὸ καλοῦντες Φρύγες, σμικρόν τι παρακλίνοντες· καὶ τό γε ὕδωρ καὶ τὰς κύνας καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ταῦτα προσβιάζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἔχοι γ' ἂν τις εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ
B καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ταύτῃ ἀπωθοῦμαι· ὁ δὲ δὴ¹ ἀήρ ἀρά γε, ὦ Ἐρμόγετες, ὅτι αἶρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ἀήρ κέκληται; ἢ ὅτι αἰεὶ ρεῖ; ἢ ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεταί ῥέοντος; οἱ γὰρ ποιηταί που τὰ πνεύματα ἀήτας καλοῦσιν· ἴσως οὖν λέγει, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι πνευματόρρου, ἀητόρρου.² τὸν δὲ αἰθέρα τῆδέ πη ὑπολαμβάνω, ὅτι αἰεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων αἰεθεῆρ δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο. γῆ δὲ μᾶλλον

¹ δὴ G : om. BT.

² After ἀητόρρου the mss. read ὅθεν δὴ βούλεται αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀήρ, "whence he means that he says it is air." Bracketed by Heindorf.

CRATYLUS

HER. What contrivance ?

SOC. I will tell you. Answer me ; can you tell the reason of the word $\pi\hat{\upsilon}\rho$?

HER. Not I, by Zeus.

SOC. See what I suspect about it. I know that many Greeks, especially those who are subject to the barbarians, have adopted many foreign words.

HER. What of that ?

SOC. If we should try to demonstrate the fitness of those words in accordance with the Greek language, and not in accordance with the language from which they are derived, you know we should get into trouble.

HER. Naturally.

SOC. Well, this word $\pi\hat{\upsilon}\rho$ is probably foreign ; for it is difficult to connect it with the Greek language, and besides, the Phrygians have the same word, only slightly altered. The same is the case with $\acute{\upsilon}\delta\omega\rho$ (water), $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\omega\nu$ (dog), and many other words.

HER. Yes, that is true.

SOC. So we must not propose forced explanations of these words, though something might be said about them. I therefore set aside $\pi\hat{\upsilon}\rho$ and $\acute{\upsilon}\delta\omega\rho$ in this way. But is air called $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$ because it raises ($\acute{\alpha}\lambda\rho\epsilon\iota$) things from the earth, or because it is always flowing ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\grave{\iota}$ $\acute{\rho}\acute{\epsilon}\hat{\iota}$), or because wind arises from its flow ? The poets call the winds $\acute{\alpha}\eta\tau\alpha\varsigma$, "blasts." Perhaps the poet means to say "air-flow" ($\acute{\alpha}\eta\tau\acute{o}\rho\rho\upsilon\nu$), as he might say "wind-flow" ($\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\acute{o}\rho\rho\upsilon\nu$). The word $\acute{\alpha}\hat{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$ (ether) I understand in this way : because it always runs and flows about the air ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\grave{\iota}$ $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\hat{\iota}$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\grave{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\rho\alpha$ $\acute{\rho}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$), it may properly be called $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\hat{\iota}\theta\acute{\epsilon}\eta\rho$. The word $\gamma\hat{\eta}$ (earth) shows the meaning

PLATO

C σημαίνει ὃ βούλεται εἶναι τις γαῖαν ὀνομάσῃ· γαῖα γὰρ γεννήτειρα ἂν εἴη ὀρθῶς κεκλημένη, ὡς φησιν Ὀμηρος· τὸ γὰρ γεγάασιν γεγεννηῆσθαι λέγει. εἶεν· τί οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ΕΡΜ. ὦραιο, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ ἔτος.

ΣΩ. Αἶ μὲν δὴ ὦραιο Ἀπτικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ῥητέον, εἴπερ βούλει τὸ εἰκὸς εἰδέναί· ὦραιο γὰρ εἰσι διὰ τὸ ὀρίζειν χειμῶνάς τε καὶ θέρη καὶ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς· ὀρίζουσαι δὲ δικαίως ἂν ὦραιο καλοῖντο. ἐνιαυ-

D τὸς δὲ καὶ ἔτος κινδυνεύει εἶναι τι εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τὰ φύομενα καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον προάγον εἰς φῶς καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξετάζον, τοῦτο, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα δίχα διηρημένον οἱ μὲν Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία ἐκάλουν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ ἔτος, ὅτι ἐτάζει· ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτάζον τοῦτο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἐν ὄν δίχα, ὡστε δύο ὀνόματα γεγονέναι, ἐνιαυτόν τε

E καὶ ἔτος, ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀλλὰ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολὺ ἐπιδίδως.

ΣΩ. Πόρρω ἤδη, οἶμαι, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις.

411 26. ΕΡΜ. Ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἔγωγε ἠδέως ἂν θεασαίμην ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα τίνι ποτὲ ὀρθότητι κείται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἷον φρόνησίς τε καὶ σύνεσις καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα.

CRATYLUS

better in the form *γαῖα* ; for *γαῖα* is a correct word for "mother," as Homer says, for he uses *γεγάασιν* to mean *γεγενῆσθαι* (be born). Well, now what came next ?

HER. The seasons, Socrates, and the two words for year.

SOC. The word *ὄραι* (seasons) should be pronounced in the old Attic fashion, *ὄραι*, if you wish to know the probable meaning ; *ὄραι* exist to divide winters and summers and winds and the fruits of the earth ; and since they divide (*ὀρίζουσι*), they would rightly be called *ὄραι*. The two words for year, *ἐνιαυτός* and *ἔτος*, are really one. For that which brings to light within itself the plants and animals, each in its turn, and examines them, is called by some *ἐνιαυτός*, because of its activity within itself (*ἐν ἑαυτῷ*), and by others *ἔτος*, because it examines (*ἐτάζει*), just as we saw before that the name of Zeus was divided and some said *Δία* and others *Ζῆνα*. The whole phrase is "that which examines within itself (*τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτάζον*), and this one phrase is divided in speech so that the two words *ἐνιαυτός* and *ἔτος* are formed from one phrase.

HER. Truly, Socrates, you are going ahead at a great rate.

SOC. Yes, I fancy I am already far along on the road of wisdom.

HER. I am sure you are.

SOC. You will be surer presently.

HER. Now after the class of words you have explained, I should like to examine the correctness of the noble words that relate to virtue, such as wisdom, intelligence, justice, and all the others of that sort.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Ἐγείρεις μὲν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐ φαῦλον γένος ὀνομάτων· ὅμως δὲ ἐπειδήπερ τὴν λεοντὴν ἐνδέδουκα, οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικε, φρόνησιν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ γνώμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ ἅ φῆς πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ
 Β ὀνόματα.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς προαποστήναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν, νῆ τὸν κύνα, δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς μαντεύεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐνενόησα, ὅτι οἱ πάνυ παλαιοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ τιθέμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν, ὑπὸ τοῦ πυκνὰ περιστρέφεσθαι ζητοῦντες ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα ἀεὶ¹ εἰλιγγιῶσιν, κᾶπειτα αὐτοῖς φαίνεται περιφέρεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ πάντως
 C φέρεσθαι. αἰτιῶνται δὴ οὐ τὸ ἔνδον τὸ παρά σφίσιν πάθος αἴτιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὕτω πεφυκέναι, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μόνιμον εἶναι οὐδὲ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ ρεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι καὶ μεστὰ εἶναι πάσης φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως ἀεὶ. λέγω δὲ ἐννοήσας πρὸς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ὀνόματα.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐ κατενόησας ἴσως τὰ ἄρτι λεγόμενα, ὅτι παντάπασιν ὡς φερομένοις τε καὶ ρέουσι καὶ γιγνομένοις τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίκειται.

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ πάνυ ἐνεθυμήθην.

D ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ πρῶτον εἶπομεν παντάπασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τοιούτων ἐστίν.

ΕΡΜ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἡ φρόνησις· φορᾶς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ροῦ νόησις. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς.

¹ ἀεὶ T : om. B.

CRATYLUS

soc. You are stirring up a mighty tribe of words, my friend ; however, since I have put on the lion helmet, I must not play the coward, but must, it seems, examine wisdom, intelligence, thought, knowledge, and all the other noble words of which you speak.

HER. Certainly we must not stop until that is done.

soc. By the dog, I believe I have a fine intuition which has just come to me, that the very ancient men who invented names were quite like most of the present philosophers who always get dizzy as they turn round and round in their search for the nature of things, and then the things seem to them to turn round and round and be in motion. They think the cause of this belief is not an affection within themselves, but that the nature of things really is such that nothing is at rest or stable, but everything is flowing and moving and always full of constant motion and generation. I say this because I thought of it with reference to all these words we are now considering.

HER. How is that, Socrates ?

soc. Perhaps you did not observe that the names we just mentioned are given under the assumption that the things named are moving and flowing and being generated.

HER. No, I did not notice that at all.

soc. Surely the first one we mentioned is subject to such assumptions.

HER. What is the word ?

soc. Wisdom (*φρόνησις*) ; for it is perception (*νόησις*) of motion (*φορᾶς*) and flowing (*ῥοῦ*) ; or it might be understood as benefit (*ὄνησις*) of motion

PLATO

ἀλλ' οὖν περί γε τὸ φέρεσθαι ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει,
 ἢ γνώμη παντάπασιν δηλοῖ γονῆς σκέψιν καὶ
 νώμησιν· τὸ γὰρ νωμᾶν καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν ταυτόν.
 εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἢ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἔστιν ἔσις·
 τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα σημαίνει γιγνόμενα αἰεὶ
 Ε εἶναι· τούτου οὖν ἐφίεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μηνύει τὸ
 ὄνομα ὃ θέμενος τὴν νεόεσιν. οὐ γὰρ νόησις τὸ
 ἀρχαῖον ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα εἰ ἔδει λέγειν
 δύο, νεόεσιν. σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ νῦν δὴ
 412 ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως. καὶ μὴν ἢ γε ἐπιστήμη
 μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασι ἐπομένης
 τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀξίας λόγου, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολειπο-
 μένης οὔτε προθεούσης· διὸ δὴ ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ
 τὸ εἰ ἐπιείστημην¹ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν. σύνεσις δ'
 αὐτῷ οὕτω μὲν δόξειεν ἂν ὥσπερ συλλογισμὸς εἶναι·
 ὅταν δὲ συνιέναι λέγη, ταυτόν παντάπασιν τῷ
 ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει λεγόμενον· συμπορεύεσθαι
 Β γὰρ λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ συνιέναι.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε σοφία φορᾶς ἐφάπτεσθαι σημαίνει.
 σκοτωδέστερον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξενικώτερον· ἀλλὰ
 δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὅτι πολ-
 λαχοῦ λέγουσιν περὶ ὅτου ἂν τύχωσιν τῶν ἀρ-
 χομένων ταχὺ προιέναι ἐσύθη φασίν. Λακωνικῶ
 δὲ ἀνδρὶ τῶν εὐδοκίμων καὶ ὄνομα ἦν Σοῦς· τὴν
 γὰρ ταχεῖαν ὄρμην οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦτο κα-
 λοῦσιν. ταύτης οὖν τῆς φορᾶς ἐπαφὴν σημαίνει
 ἢ σοφία, ὡς φερομένων τῶν ὄντων. καὶ μὴν τό
 C γε ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο τῆς φύσεως πάσης τῷ ἀγαστῷ
 βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πο-
 ρεύεται τὰ ὄντα, ἓν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοῖς τάχος, ἓν δὲ

¹ ἐπιείστημην Heindorf : ἐπιστήμην ΒΓ.

CRATYLUS

(φορᾶς); in either case it has to do with motion. And γνώμη (thought), if you please, certainly denotes contemplation and consideration of generation (γονῆς νόμησις); for to consider is the same as to contemplate. Or, if you please, νόησις (intelligence) is merely ἔσις (desire) τοῦ νεοῦ (of the new); but that things are new shows that they are always being generated; therefore the soul's desire for generation is declared by the giver of the name νεόεσις; for in antiquity the name was not νόησις, but two epsilons had to be spoken instead of the eta. Σωφροσύνη (self-restraint) is σωτηρία (salvation) of φρόνησις (wisdom), which we have just been discussing. And ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) indicates that the soul which is of any account accompanies (ἔπεται) things in their motion, neither falling behind them nor running in front of them; therefore we ought to insert an epsilon and call it ἐπειστήμη. Σύνεσις (intelligence) in its turn is a kind of reckoning together; when one says συνιέναι (understand), the same thing as ἐπίστασθαι is said; for συνιέναι means that the soul goes with things. Certainly σοφία (wisdom) denotes the touching of motion. This word is very obscure and of foreign origin; but we must remember that the poets often say of something which begins to advance rapidly ἐσύθη (it rushed). There was a famous Laconian whose name was Σοῦς (Rush), for this is the Laconian word for rapid motion. Now σοφία signifies the touching (ἐπαφή) of this rapid motion, the assumption being that things are in motion. And the word ἀγαθόν (good) is intended to denote the admirable (ἀγαστόν) in all nature. For since all things are in motion, they possess quickness and slowness; now

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βραδυτής. ἔστιν οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχύ, ἀλλὰ τι αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν. τοῦ θεοῦ¹ δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὕτη ἢ ἐπωνυμία ἐστίν, τὰγαθόν.

27. Δικαιοσύνη δέ, ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει τοῦτο κείται τὸ ὄνομα, ῥάδιον συμβαλεῖν· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον χαλεπόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔοικε μέχρι μὲν του ὁμολογεῖσθαι παρὰ πολλῶν, ἔπειτα
 D δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι. ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγούνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ,² τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἐστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
 E διαῖόν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κάππα δύναμιν προσλαβόν. μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον.
 413 ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγετες, ἄτε λιπαρῆς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—δι' ὃ γὰρ γίννεται, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ Δία³ καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα· ἐπειδὴν δ' ἡρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἦπτον, “ Τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; ” δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ

¹ τοῦ θεοῦ Baiter : τοῦτο οὐ ΒΤ.

² ἐν πορείᾳ liber Bessarionis : εὐπορία Β : εὐπορία Τ.

³ Δία Hermann : ἰδία ΒΤ.

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not all that is swift, but only part of it, is admirable ; this name ἀγαθόν is therefore given to the admirable (ἀγαστόν) part of the swift (θοοῦ). It is easy to conjecture that the word δικαιοσύνη applies to the understanding (σύνεσις) of the just (τοῦ δικαίου) ; but the word δίκαιον (just) is itself difficult. Up to a certain point, you see, many men seem to agree about it, but beyond that they differ. For those who think the universe is in motion believe that the greater part of it is of such a nature as to be a mere receptacle, and that there is some element which passes through all this, by means of which all created things are generated. And this element must be very rapid and very subtle ; for it could not pass through all the universe unless it were very subtle, so that nothing could keep it out, and it must be very swift, so that all other things are relatively at rest. Since, then, it superintends and passes through (διαίόν) all other things, this is rightly called by the name δίκαιον, the sound of the kappa being added merely for the sake of euphony. Up to this point, as I said just now, many men agree about justice (δίκαιον) ; and I, Hermogenes, being very much in earnest about it, have persistently asked questions and have been told in secret teachings that this is justice, or the cause—for that through which creation takes place is a cause—and some one told me that it was for this reason rightly called Zeus (Δία). But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless ask them quietly, “ What then, my most excellent friend, if this is true, is justice ? ” they

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προσῆκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἄλ-
 Β λεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γάρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι¹ καὶ ἐπι-
 χειροῦσιν βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με ἄλλος ἄλλα
 ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 τίς φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον
 γὰρ μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ
 ὄντα. ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῷ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς
 καλὸν τι ἀκηκοῶς, καταγελαῖ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας
 καὶ ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἥλιος δύη. λιπαροῦντος οὖν
 C ἐμοῦ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος λέγει αὐτό, τὸ πῦρ φησιν·
 τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ράδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι· ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ
 τὸ πῦρ φησιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ
 ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελαῖ φησιν.
 εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν
 εἶναι τοῦτο· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ
 οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ
 πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγώ,
 ὦ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορία εἰμι ἢ πρὶν ἐπι-
 χειρῆσαι μανθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὅ τι ποτ'
 D ἔστιν. ἀλλ' οὖν οὐπὲρ ἔνεκα ἐσκοποῦμεν, τό γε
 ὄνομα τοῦτο φαίνεται αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα κείσθαι.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνει μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα μὲν ἀκη-
 κοέναι του καὶ οὐκ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τᾶλλα;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐ πάνυ.

28. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν σε καὶ τὰ
 ἐπίλοιπα ἐξαπατήσῃμι ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοῶς λέγω.
 μετὰ γὰρ δικαιοσύνην τί ἡμῖν λείπεται; ἀνδρείαν,
 Ε οἶμαι, οὐπω διήλθομεν. ἀδικία μὲν γὰρ δῆλον
 ὅτι ἐστὶν ὄντως ἐμπόδισμα τοῦ διαϊόντος, ἀνδρεία

¹ πεπύσθαι Schanz: πεπύσθαι ἀκηκοέναι ΒΤ.

CRATYLUS

think I am asking too many questions and am leaping over the trenches.¹ They say I have been told enough; they try to satisfy me by saying all sorts of different things, and they no longer agree. For one says the sun is justice, for the sun alone superintends all things, passing through and burning (*διαίοντα καὶ καίοντα*) them. Then when I am pleased and tell this to some one, thinking it is a fine answer, he laughs at me and asks if I think there is no justice among men when the sun has set. So I beg him to tell me what he thinks it is, and he says "Fire." But this is not easy to understand. He says it is not actual fire, but heat in the abstract that is in the fire. Another man says he laughs at all these notions, and that justice is what Anaxagoras says it is, mind; for mind, he says, is ruled only by itself, is mixed with nothing, orders all things, and passes through them. Then, my friend, I am far more perplexed than before I undertook to learn about the nature of justice. But I think the name—and that was the subject of our investigation—was given for the reasons I have mentioned.

HER. I think, Socrates, you must have heard this from some one and are not inventing it yourself.

SOC. And how about the rest of my talk?

HER. I do not at all think you had heard that.

SOC. Listen then; perhaps I may deceive you into thinking that all I am going to say is my own. What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. It is plain enough that injustice (*ἀδικία*) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (*τοῦ διαίοντος*),

¹ A trench was the limit of the leap for the pentathletes.

PLATO

δὲ σημαίνει ὡς ἐν μάχῃ ἐπονομαζομένης τῆς ἀνδρείας· μάχην δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἶπερ ῥεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ῥοήν· εἰάν οὖν τις ἐξέλῃ τὸ δέλτα τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἀνδρείας, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ἔργον τὸ ὄνομα ἢ ἀνρεία. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάσῃ ῥοῇ ἢ ἐναντία ῥοῇ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ
 414 τῇ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ῥεούσῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπηρεῖτο ἢ ἀνδρεία. καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ τινὶ τούτῳ ἐστί, τῇ ἄνω ῥοῇ. γυνὴ δὲ γονὴ μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι εἶναι. τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς τι φαίνεται ἐπωνομάσθαι· ἢ δὲ θηλὴ ἄρα γε, ὦ Ἐρμόγευες, ὅτι τεθηλέναι ποιεῖ ὡσπερ τὰ ἀρδόμενα;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐοικέν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ θάλλειν τὴν αὔξην μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων, ὅτι ταχεῖα καὶ
 Β ἐξαιφνιδία γίγνεται. οἷόνπερ οὖν μεμίμηται τῷ ὀνόματι, συναρμόσας ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν καὶ ἄλλεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖς με ὡσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον, ἐπειδὴν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι· ἐπίλοιπα δὲ ἡμῖν ἔτι συχνά¹ τῶν δοκούντων σπουδαίων εἶναι.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡν γ' ἔστιν ἐν καὶ τέχνην ἰδεῖν ὅ τι ποτὲ βούλεται εἶναι.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε ἕξιν νοῦ σημαίνει, τὸ μὲν ταῦ ἀφελόντι, ἐμβalόντι δὲ τὸ οὐ μεταξὺ τοῦ χι
 C καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ² τοῦ ἦτα;

¹ ἐπίλοιπα . . . συχνά Burnet: λοιπὰ . . . συχνὰ ἐπὶ ΒΤ (ἔστι vulg.).

² τοῦ νῦ καὶ add. Stephanus.

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but the word *ἀνδρεία* (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (*ῥοή*). Now if we remove the *delta* from the word *ἀνδρεία*, the word *ἀνρεία* signifies exactly that activity. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice ; for otherwise courage would not be praised. The words *ἄρρεν* (male) and *ἀνῆρ* (man) refer, like *ἀνδρεία*, to the upward (*ἄνω*) current or flow. The word *γυνή* (woman) seems to me to be much the same as *γονή* (birth). I think *θηλυ* (female) is derived from *θηλή* (teat) ; and is not *θηλή*, Hermogenes, so called because it makes things flourish (*τεθηλέναι*), like plants wet with showers ?

HER. Very likely, Socrates.

SOC. And again, the word *θάλλειν* (flourish) seems to me to figure the rapid and sudden growth of the young. Something of that sort the name-giver has reproduced in the name, which he compounded of *θεῖν* (run) and *ἄλλεσθαι* (jump). You do not seem to notice how I rush along outside of the race-course, when I get on smooth ground. But we still have plenty of subjects left which seem to be serious.

HER. True.

SOC. One of which is to see what the word *τέχνη* (art, science) means.

HER. Certainly.

SOC. Does not this denote possession of mind, if you remove the tau and insert omicron between the chi and the nu and the nu and the eta (making *ἐχονόη*) ?

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μάλα γε γλίσχρως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγωδεῖν αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἔξαιρούντων εὐστομίας ἔνεκα καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων καὶ ὑπὸ καλλωπισμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνου. ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ ἐμβεβληθῆσθαι τὸ ῥῶ; ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα, οἶμαι, ποιούσιν οἱ τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα πλάττοντες, ὥστ' ἐπεμβάλλοντες πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιούσιν μηδ' ἂν ἓνα ἀνθρώπων συνεῖναι ὅ τι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν σφίγγα ἀντὶ φικὸς¹ σφίγγα καλοῦσιν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΕΡΜ. Ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἐάσει καὶ ἐντιθέναι καὶ ἔξαιρεῖν ἅττ' ἂν βούληται τις εἰς τὰ ὀνόματα, πολλὴ εὐπορία ἔσται καὶ πᾶν ἂν παντί τις ὄνομα πράγματι προσαρμόσειεν.

Ε ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέτριον, οἶμαι, δεῖ φυλάττειν καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς σὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιστάτην.

ΕΡΜ. Βουλοίμην ἄν.

29. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ σοι συμβούλομαι, ὦ Ἑρμό-
415 γενες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀκριβολογοῦ, μὴ με ἀπογυιώσης μένεος. ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἶρηκα, ἐπειδὴν μετὰ τέχνην μηχανὴν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. μηχανὴ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἀνεῖν ἐπὶ πολὺ σημεῖον εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ μῆκός πως τὸ πολὺ σημαίνει· ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖν τούτοις σύγ-

¹ φικὸς after Hesiod, *Theog.* 326 : σφιγγὸς B : φηγὸς T.

CRATYLUS

HER. It does it very poorly, Socrates.

SOC. My friend, you do not bear in mind that the original words have before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them up, for they have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and have distorted the words in every way for ornamentation or merely in the lapse of time. Do you not, for instance, think it absurd that the letter rho is inserted in the word *κάτοπτρον* (mirror)? I think that sort of thing is the work of people who care nothing for truth, but only for the shape of their mouths; so they keep adding to the original words until finally no human being can understand what in the world the word means. So the sphinx, for instance, is called sphinx, instead of phix, and there are many other examples.

HER. Yes, that is true, Socrates.

SOC. And if we are permitted to insert and remove any letters we please in words, it will be perfectly easy to fit any name to anything.

HER. True.

SOC. Yes, quite true. But I think you, as a wise director, must observe the rule of moderation and probability.

HER. I should like to do so.

SOC. And I, too, Hermogenes. But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest you "enfeeble me of my might."¹ For now that *τέχνη* (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated *μηχανή* (contrivance). For I think *μηχανή* signifies *ἀνεῖν ἐπὶ πολὺ* (much accomplishment); for *μῆκος* (length) has about the same meaning as *τὸ πολὺ* (much),

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, vi. 265.

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κείται, μήκους τε καὶ τοῦ ἄνευ, τὸ ὄνομα ἢ μη-
 χανή. ἀλλ', ὅπερ νῦν δὴ¹ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν
 δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν· ἀρετὴ γὰρ καὶ κακία
 ὅτι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ζητητέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν
 Β ἕτερον οὐπω καθορῶ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον δοκεῖ μοι κατά-
 δηλον εἶναι. συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πᾶσιν.
 ἄτε γὰρ ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, πᾶν τὸ κακῶς
 ἰὸν κακία ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ τὸ
 κακῶς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ
 ὄλου ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει τῆς κακίας. τὸ δὲ κακῶς
 ἰέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ
 δειλίᾳ, ὃ οὐπω διήλθομεν ἀλλ' ὑπερέβημεν, δέον
 C αὐτὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν σκέψασθαι· δοκοῦμεν δέ
 μοι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπερβεβηκέναι. ἢ δ' οὖν
 δειλία τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνει δεσμὸν εἶναι ἰσχυρόν·
 τὸ γὰρ λίαν ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν· δεσμὸς οὖν ὁ λίαν
 καὶ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ δειλία ἂν εἴη· ὥσπερ
 γε καὶ ἡ ἀπορία κακόν, καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι
 ἂν ἐμποδῶν ἢ τῷ ἰέναι² καὶ πορεύεσθαι. τοῦτ'
 οὖν φαίνεται τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι δηλοῦν, τὸ ἰσχομένως
 τε καὶ ἐμποδιζομένως πορεύεσθαι, ὃ δὴ ψυχὴ
 ὅταν ἔχη, κακία μεστὴ γίγνεται. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοιού-
 τοις ἢ κακία ἐστὶν τοῦνομα, τοῦναντίον τούτου
 ἢ ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, σημαῖνον πρῶτον μὲν εὐπορίαν,
 D ἔπειτα δὲ λελυμένην τὴν ῥοὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ψυχῆς
 εἶναι αἰεί, ὥστε τὸ ἀσχέτως καὶ τὸ ἀκωλύτως
 αἰεὶ ῥέον ἐπωνυμίαν εἴληφεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο

¹ νῦν δὴ] δὴ νῦν ΒΤ.

² ἰέναι b; εἶναι ΒΤ.

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and the name *μηχανή* is composed of these two, *μηκος* and *ἄνειν*. But, as I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words *ἀρετή* (virtue) and *κακία* (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see; but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly (*κακῶς ἰόν*) would be evil (*κακία*); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name *κακία* (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. But the nature of evil motion (*κακῶς ἰέναι*) is made clear, I think, also in the word *δειλία* (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by, when we ought to have examined it after *ἀνδρεία* (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of *δειλία* is "a strong bond of the soul"; for *λίαν* (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so *δειλία* would be the excessive or greatest bond (*δεσμός, δείν*) of the soul; and so, too, *ἀπορία* (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress (*πορεύεσθαι*). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion (*κακῶς ἰέναι*), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness (*κακία*). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue (*ἀρετή*) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion, and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows (*ἀεὶ ῥέον*) without let or hindrance.

PLATO

τοῦνομα. ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔχει ἀειρείτην καλεῖν, ἴσως δὲ αἰρετὴν λέγει, ὡς οὔσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως αἰρετωτάτης· συγκεκρότητα δὲ καὶ καλεῖται ἀρετή. καὶ ἴσως με αὖ φήσεις πλάττειν· ἐγὼ δὲ φημι, εἴπερ ὁ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ κακία,

Ε καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

416 ΕΡΜ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κακόν, δι' οὗ πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηκας, τί ἂν νοοῖ τοῦνομα;

ΣΩ. "Ατοπόν τι νῆ Δία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ χαλεπὸν συμβαλεῖν. ἐπάγω οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνην τὴν μηχανήν.

ΕΡΜ. Ποίαν ταύτην;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι καὶ τοῦτο φάναι εἶναι.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ ἔοικας γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα μὲν ἐῷμεν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν πειρώμεθα ἰδεῖν πῆ εὐλόγως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχρὸν καὶ δὴ κατάδηλόν Β μοι φαίνεται ὁ νοεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται. τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα λαιδορεῖν μοι φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς ὅ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθεῖς, καὶ νῦν τῷ αἰεῖ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔθετο ἀεισχορῶν· νῦν δὲ συγκροτήσαντες αἰσχρὸν καλοῦσιν.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δὲ τὸ καλόν;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο χαλεπώτερον κατανοῆσαι· καίτοι λέγει¹ γε αὐτό· ἀρμονία μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ οὗ παρῆκται.

С ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τῆς διανοίας τις ἔοικεν ἐπωνυμία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς λέγεις;

¹ λέγει ΒΤ : λέγουσι G.

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It is properly called *ἀειρειτή*, or perhaps also *αἰρετή*, indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced *ἀρετή*. Perhaps you will say this is another invention of mine; but I say if what I said just now about *κακία* is right, this about the name of *ἀρετή* is right too.

HER. But what is the meaning of the word *κακόν* which you used in many of your derivations?

SOC. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine.

HER. What contrivance?

SOC. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others.

HER. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words *καλόν* (beautiful, noble) and *αἰσχρόν* (base).

SOC. I think the meaning of *αἰσχρόν* is clear, and this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow (*ἀεὶ ἰσχει τὸν ῥοῦν*) this name *ἀεισχοροῦν*, which is now compressed and pronounced *αἰσχρόν*.

HER. What about *καλόν*?

SOC. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the *ο*.

HER. How is that?

SOC. I think this word denotes intellect.

HER. What do you mean?

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ΣΩ. Φέρε, τί οἶει σὺ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον κληθῆναι ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα θέμενον;

ΕΡΜ. Πάντως που.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διάνοια ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἥτοι θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀμφότερα;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ καλέσαν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ καλοῦν¹ ταῦτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο, διάνοια;

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια ἐργάσῃται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ² δὲ μή, ψεκτά;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

D ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν ἰατρικὸν ἰατρικὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν τεκτονικά; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΕΡΜ. Οὕτως ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἄρα καλά;

ΕΡΜ. Δεῖ γέ τοι.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δέ γε τοῦτο, ὡς φαμεν, διάνοια;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ἄρα φρονήσεως αὕτη ἢ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ καλὸν τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

E 30. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἔτι ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῶν τοιούτων;

ΕΡΜ. Ταῦτα τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλόν, 417 συμφέροντά τε καὶ λυσιτελοῦντα καὶ ὠφέλιμα καὶ κερδαλέα καὶ τὰναντία τούτων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν συμφέρον ἤδη που κὰν σὺ

¹ καλοῦν Badham: καλὸν ΒΤ.

² ἃ Heindorf: τὰ ΒΤ.

CRATYLUS

soc. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name?

HER. Why, certainly.

soc. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both?

HER. Yes.

soc. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name (τὸ καλοῦν) the same thing, namely intellect?

HER. Yes, clearly.

soc. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that?

HER. I agree.

soc. And the beautiful performs beautiful works?

HER. It must do so.

soc. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight.

HER. Evidently.

soc. What further words of this sort are left for us?

HER. Those that are related to the good and the beautiful, such as *συμφέροντα* (advantageous), *λυσιτελοῦντα* (profitable), *ὠφέλιμα* (useful), *κερδαλέα* (gainful), and their opposites.

soc. You might by this time be able to find the

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εὔροις ἐκ τῶν πρότερον ἐπισκοπῶν· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἀδελφόν τι φαίνεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο δηλοῖ ἢ τὴν ἅμα φορὰν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου πραττόμενα συμφέροντά τε καὶ σύμφορα κεκλήσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι ἔοικε. τὸ δέ γε κερδαλέον ἀπὸ
 B τοῦ κέρδους. κέρδος δὲ νῦ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέλτα ἀπο-
 διδόντι ἐς τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ὀνομάζει. ὅτι γὰρ κεράννυται ἐς πάντα διεξιόν, ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπονομάζων ἔθετο τοῦνομα· δέλτα δ'¹ ἐνθεὶς ἀντὶ τοῦ νῦ κέρδος ἐφθέγγετο.

ERM. Λυσιτελοῦν δὲ τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ἐοικεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ χρῶνται, ἐὰν τὸ ἀνάλωμα ἀπολύῃ,
 C οὐ ταύτη λέγειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστον ὄν τοῦ ὄντος ἴστασθαι οὐκ ἔα τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲ τέλος λαβοῦσαν τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι στηναί τε καὶ παύσασθαι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λύει αὐτῆς, ἂν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ παρέχει ἀπαιστος καὶ ἀθάνατος αὐτήν· ταύτη μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιφημίσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν λυσιτελοῦν· τὸ γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος λυσιτελοῦν καλέσαι. ὠφέλιμον δὲ ξενικὸν τοῦνομα, ὦ καὶ Ὀμηρος πολλοῦ κέχρηται, τῷ ὀφέλλειν· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ αὔξειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπωνυμία.

D 31. ERM. Τὰ δὲ δὴ τούτων ἐναντία πῶς ἔχει ἡμῖν;

ΣΩ. Ὅσα μὲν ἀπόφησιν αὐτῶν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτα διεξιέναι.

¹ δ' add. Becker: om. BT.

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meaning of *συμφέρον* by yourself in the light of the previous explanations, for it appears to be own brother to *ἐπιστήμη*. It means nothing else but the motion (*φορά*) of the soul in company with the world, and naturally things which are done by such a power are called *συμφέροντα* and *σύμφορα* because they are carried round with (*συμπεριφέρεσθαι*) the world. But *κερδαλέον* is from *κέρδος* (gain). If you restore nu in the word *κέρδος* in place of the delta, the meaning is plain ; it signifies good, but in another way. Because it passes through and is mingled (*κεράννυται*) with all things, he who named it gave it this name which indicates that function ; but he inserted a delta instead of nu and said *κέρδος*.

HER. And what is *λυσιτελοῦν* ?

SOC. I do not think, Hermogenes, the name-giver gives the meaning to *λυσιτελοῦν* which it has in the language of tradesfolk, when profit sets free (*ἀπολύει*) the sum invested, but he means that because it is the swiftest thing in the world it does not allow things to remain at rest and does not allow the motion to come to any end (*τέλος*) of movement or to stop or pause, but always, if any end of the motion is attempted, it sets it free, making it unceasing and immortal. It is in this sense, I think, that the good is dubbed *λυσιτελοῦν*, for it frees (*λύει*) the end (*τέλος*) of the motion. But the word *ὠφέλιμον* is a foreign one, which Homer often uses in the verbal form *ὀφέλλειν*. This is a synonym of "increase" and "create."

HER. What shall be our explanations of the opposites of these ?

SOC. Those of them that are mere negatives, need, I think, no discussion.

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ΕΡΜ. Ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΣΩ. Ἀσύμφορον καὶ ἀνωφελές καὶ ἀλυσυτελές καὶ ἀκερδές.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βλαβερὸν γε καὶ ζημιῶδες.

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν γε βλαβερὸν τὸ βλάπτον τὸν ἑρῶν εἶναι λέγει· τὸ δὲ βλάπτον αὖ σημαίνει βουλόμενον ἄπτειν· τὸ δὲ ἄπτειν καὶ δεῖν ταῦτόν ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ πανταχοῦ ψέγει. τὸ βουλόμενον οὖν ἄπτειν ῥῶν ὀρθότατα μὲν ἂν εἶη βουλαπτεροῦν, καλλωπισθὲν δὲ καλεῖσθαι μοι φαίνεται βλαβερὸν.

ΕΡΜ. Ποικίλα γέ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκβαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα. καὶ γὰρ νῦν μοι ἔδοξας ὥσπερ τοῦ τῆς Ἀθηναίας νόμου προαύλιον στομαυλῆσαι, τοῦτο
418 τὸ ὄνομα προειπὼν τὸ βουλαπτεροῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Ἑρμόγευες, αἴτιος, ἀλλ' οἱ θέμενοι τὸ ὄνομα.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ζημιῶδες τί ἂν εἶη;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν εἶη ποτὲ ζημιῶδες; θέασαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγευες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω λέγων ὅτι προστιθέντες γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιροῦντες σφόδρα ἀλλοιοῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων διανοίας, οὕτως ὥστε σμικρὰ πάνυ παραστρέφοντες ἐνίοτε τὰναντία
B ποιεῖν σημαίνειν· οἷον καὶ ἐν τῷ δέοντι· ἐνενόησα γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνεμνήσθην ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦδε, ὃ ἐμελλόν σοι ἐρεῖν, ὅτι ἢ μὲν νέα φωνὴ ἡμῖν ἢ καλὴ αὕτη καὶ τοῦναντίον περιέτρεψε μηνύειν τὸ

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HER. Which are those ?

SOC. Disadvantageous, useless, unprofitable, and ungainful.

HER. True.

SOC. But βλαβερόν (harmful) and ζημιῶδες (hurtful) do need it.

HER. Yes.

SOC. And βλαβερόν means that which harms (βλάπτων) the flow (ροῦν); but βλάπτων means "wishing to fasten" (ἄπτειν), and ἄπτειν is the same thing as δεῖν (bind), which the name-giver constantly finds fault with. Now τὸ βουλόμενον ἄπτειν ροῦν (that which wishes to fasten the flow) would most correctly be called βουλαπτεροῦν, but is called βλαβερόν merely, as I think, to make it prettier.

HER. Elaborate names these are, Socrates, that result from your method. Just now, when you pronounced βουλαπτεροῦν, you looked as if you had made up your mouth to whistle the flute-prelude of the hymn to Athena.

SOC. Not I, Hermogenes, am responsible, but those who gave the name.

HER. True. Well, what is the origin of ζημιῶδες ?

SOC. What can the origin of ζημιῶδες be? See, Hermogenes, how true my words are when I say that by adding and taking away letters people alter the sense of words so that even by very slight changes they sometimes make them mean the opposite of what they meant before; as, for instance, in the case of the word δέον (obligation, right), for that just occurred to me and I was reminded of it by what I was going to say to you, that this fine modern language of ours has turned δέον and also ζημιῶδες round, so that each has the

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δέον καὶ τὸ ζημιῶδες, ἀφανίζουσα ὃ τι νοεῖ, ἢ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀμφότερον δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται τοῦνομα.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι τῷ ἰῶτα καὶ τῷ δέλτα εὖ μάλα ἐχρῶντο, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα αἱ γυναῖκες, αἵπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σώζουσι. νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἰῶτα ἢ εἰ ἢ ἦτα μεταστρέφουσιν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ δέλτα ζῆτα, ὡς δὴ μεγαλοπρεπέστερα ὄντα.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότατοι ἱμέραν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ ἑμέραν, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἡμέραν.

ΕΡΜ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι μόνον τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄνομα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου; ὅτι γὰρ ἀσμένοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἱμείρουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτόυ τὸ φῶς ἐγίγνετο, ταύτῃ ὠνόμασαν ἱμέραν.¹

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε τετραγωδημένον οὐδ' ἂν κατανοήσαις ὃ τι βούλεται ἢ ἡμέρα. καίτοι τινὲς οἴονται, ὡς δὴ ἢ ἡμέρα ἡμερα ποιεῖ, διὰ ταῦτα ὠνομάσθαι αὐτὴν οὕτως.

ΕΡΜ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τό γε ζυγὸν οἶσθα ὅτι δυογὸν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκάλουν.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν γε ζυγὸν οὐδὲν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ἔνεκα τῆς δέσεως ἐς τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπωνόμασται δυογὸν δικαίως· νῦν δὲ ζυγόν. καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα οὕτως ἔχει.

¹ ἱμέραν dt: ἡμέραν BT.

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opposite of its original meaning, whereas the ancient language shows clearly the real sense of both words.

HER. What do you mean ?

SOC. I will tell you. You know that our ancestors made good use of the sounds of iota and delta, and that is especially true of the women, who are most addicted to preserving old forms of speech. But nowadays people change iota to eta or epsilon, and delta to zeta, thinking they have a grander sound.

HER. How is that ?

SOC. For instance, in the earliest times they called day *ἰμέρα*, others said *έμέρα*, and now they say *ήμέρα*.

HER. That is true.

SOC. Only the ancient word discloses the intention of the name-giver, don't you know ? For day comes out of darkness to men ; they welcome it and long (*ἰμείρουσι*) for it, and so they called it *ἰμέρα*.

HER. That is clear.

SOC. But now *ήμέρα* is masquerading so that you could not guess its meaning. Why, some people think day is called *ήμέρα* because it makes things gentle (*ήμερα*).

HER. I believe they do.

SOC. And you know the ancients called *ζυγόν* (yoke) *δυογόν*.

HER. Certainly.

SOC. And *ζυγόν* conveys no clear meaning, but the name *δυογόν* is quite properly given to that which binds two together for the purpose of draught ; now, however, we say *ζυγόν*. There are a great many other such instances.

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ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δέον οὕτω λεγόμενον τούναντίον σημαίνει πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀνόμασιν· ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὕσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸν ὄν τοῦ βλαβεροῦ.

ΕΡΜ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔαν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ὀνόματι χρῆ, ὃ
419 πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἔστιν ὀρθῶς κείσθαι ἢ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὁμολογήσει τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀγαθοῖς, ἔαν ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶ τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῶς, ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν· διὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, ἀλλ' οὐ δέον, τ' ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ δὴ ἐπαιεῖ. καὶ οὕτω οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ δέον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν καὶ κερδαλέον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ εὖπορον τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται, ἑτέροις ὀνόμασι σημαῖνον τὸ διακοσμοῦν καὶ ἰόν¹ πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκω-
B μιασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἴσχον καὶ δοῦν ψεγόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ζημιῶδες, ἔαν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν ἀποδῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆτα δέλτα, φανεῖται σοι κείσθαι τὸ ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν, ἐπονομασθὲν δημι-
ῶδες.

32. ΕΡΜ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐ πάνυ χαλεπά μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγευες. ἢ τε γὰρ ἡδονή, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν ἔοικε τείνουσα πράξις τοῦτο ἔχειν τὸ ὄνομα—τὸ δέλτα δὲ ἔγκειται, ὥστε ἡδονὴ ἀντὶ ἡονῆς καλεῖται—· ἢ τε λύπη ἀπὸ

¹ ἰόν Bekker: ὄν BT.

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HER. Yes, that is plain.

soc. Similarly the word *δέον* (obligation) at first, when spoken in this way, denotes the opposite of all words connected with the good; for although it is a form of good, *δέον* seems to be a bond (*δεσμός*) and hindrance of motion, own brother, as it were, to *βλαβερόν*.

HER. Yes, Socrates, it certainly does seem so.

soc. But it does not, if you employ the ancient word, which is more likely to be right than the present one. You will find that it agrees with the previous words for "good," if instead of the epsilon you restore the iota, as it was in old times; for *διόν* (going through), not *δέον*, signifies good, which the name-giver praises. And so the giver of names does not contradict himself, but *δέον* (obligation, right), *ὠφέλιμον* (useful), *λυσitteλοῦν* (profitable), *κερδαλέον* (gainful), *ἀγαθόν* (good), *ξυμφέρον* (advantageous), and *εὔπορον* (prosperous), are plainly identical, signifying under different names the principle of arrangement and motion which has constantly been praised, whereas the principle of constraint and bondage is found fault with. And likewise in the case of *ζημιῶδες*, if you restore the ancient delta in place of the zeta, you will see that the name, pronounced *δημιῶδες*, was given to that which binds motion (*δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν*).

HER. What of *ἡδονή* (pleasure) and *λύπη* (pain) and *ἐπιθυμία* (desire), and the like, Socrates?

soc. I do not think they are at all difficult, Hermogenes, for *ἡδονή* appears to have this name because it is the action that tends towards advantage (*ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν τείνουσα*); the delta is inserted, so that we say *ἡδονή* instead of *ἡονή*. *Λύπη* appears to

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- C τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν ἐπωνομάσθαι, ἦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ γε ἀνία τὸ ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι. ἡ δὲ ἀλγηδὼν ξενικόν τι φαίνεται μοι, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὠνομασμένον. ὀδύνη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένη¹ ἔοικεν. ἀχθηδὼν δέ, καὶ παντὶ δῆλον ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει. χαρὰ δὲ τῇ διαχύσει καὶ εὐπορίᾳ τῆς ῥοῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικε κεκλημένη.¹
- D τέρψις δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τερπνοῦ· τὸ δὲ τερπνὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρψεως πνοῇ ἀπεικασθὲν κέκληται, ἐν δίκῃ μὲν ἂν ἔρπνουν καλούμενον, ὑπὸ χρόνου δὲ τερπνὸν παρηγμένον. εὐφροσύνη δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι· παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, εὐφεροσύνην,² τό γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν εὐφροσύνην. οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία
- E χαλεπὸν· τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούση δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα· θυμὸς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἱμερός γε τῷ μάλιστα ἔλκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν ῥῶ ἐπωνομάσθη· ὅτι γὰρ ἰέμενος ῥεῖ
 420 καὶ ἐφιέμενος τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπισπᾶ σφόδρα τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν ἔσιν τῆς ῥοῆς, ἀπὸ ταύτης οὖν πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἱμερος ἐκλήθη. καὶ μὴν πόθος αὖ καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι,³ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθί που ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος, ὅθεν πόθος ἐπωνόμασται, ὃς τότε, ὅταν

¹ κεκλημένη Stallbaum : κεκλημένη BT.

² εὐφεροσύνην Bekker : εὐφροσύνην B : ἐφερωσυνην T.

³ After εἶναι the words ἱμέρου καὶ ῥεύματος (longing and stream) of the mss. are bracketed by Ast and others.

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have received its name from the dissolution (*διάλυσις*) of the body which takes place through pain. *Ἄνία* (sorrow) is that which hinders motion (*ἴεναι*). *Ἄλγηδών* (distress) is, I think, a foreign word, derived from *ἀλγεινός* (distressing). *Ὀδύνη* (grief) appears to be so called from the putting on of pain (*τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης*). *Ἀχθηδών* (vexation) has a name, as anyone can see, made in the likeness of the weight (*ἄχθος*, burden) which vexation imposes upon motion. *Χαρά* (joy) seems to have its name from the plenteous diffusion (*διάχυσις*) of the flow of the soul. *Τέρψις* (delight) is from *τερπνόν* (delightful); and *τερπνόν* is called from the creeping (*ἔρψις*) of the soul, which is likened to a breath (*πνοή*), and would properly be called *ἔρπνουν*, but the name has been changed in course of time to *τερπνόν*. *Εὐφροσύνη* (mirth) needs no explanation, for it is clear to anyone that from the motion of the soul in harmony (*εὖ*) with the universe, it received the name *εὐφεροσύνη*, as it rightfully is; but we call it *εὐφροσύνη*. Nor is there any difficulty about *ἐπιθυμία* (desire), for this name was evidently given to the power that goes (*ἰούσα*) into the soul (*θυμός*). And *θυμός* has its name from the raging (*θύσις*) and boiling of the soul. The name *ἕμερος* (longing) was given to the stream (*ροῦς*) which most draws the soul; for because it flows with a rush (*ἰέμενος*) and with a desire for things and thus draws the soul on through the impulse of its flowing, all this power gives it the name of *ἕμερος*. And the word *πόθος* (yearning) signifies that it pertains not to that which is present, but to that which is elsewhere (*ἄλλοθί που*) or absent, and therefore the same feeling which is called *ἕμερος* when its

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παρῆ οὐ τις ἐφίετο, ἴμερος ἐκαλεῖτο· ἀπογενο-
 μένου δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος πόθος ἐκλήθη. ἔρως δέ,
 ὅτι ἐσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἢ ῥοή αὕτη
 B τῷ ἔχοντι, ἀλλ' ἐπίσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων,
 διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσρεῖν ἔσρος τό γε παλαιὸν
 ἐκαλεῖτο—τῷ γὰρ οὐ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἐχρώμεθα—, νῦν
 δ' ἔρως κέκληται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐ μεταλ-
 λαγήν. ἀλλὰ τί ἔτι σὺ¹ λέγεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν;

ERM. Δόξα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πῆ σοι φαίνεται;

ΣΩ. Δόξα δὴ ἦτοι² τῇ διώξει ἐπωνόμασται, ἦν ἢ
 ψυχὴ διώκουσα τὸ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα
 πορεύεται, ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολῇ. εἴκει δὲ
 τούτῳ μᾶλλον. ἢ γοῦν οἴησις τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ.
 C οἴσιν γὰρ³ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν⁴ πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν
 ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, δηλούση προσέοικεν, ὥσπερ
 γε καὶ ἡ βουλή πως⁵ τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι
 τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ⁶ βουλευέσθαι· πάντα
 ταῦτα δόξῃ ἐπόμεν' ἅττα φαίνεται τῆς βολῆς
 ἀπεικᾶσματα, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τοῦναντίον ἢ ἀβουλία
 ἀτυχία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὡς οὐ βαλόντος οὐδὲ τυχόντος
 οὐ τ'⁷ ἔβαλλε⁸ καὶ ὁ ἐβούλετο καὶ περὶ οὐ ἐβου-
 λεύετο καὶ οὐ ἐφίετο.

D ERM. Ταῦτα ἤδη μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 πυκνότερα ἐπάγειν.

ΣΩ. Τέλος γὰρ ἤδη θέω.⁹ ἀνάγκην δ' οὖν ἔτι
 βούλομαι διαπερᾶναι, ὅτι τούτοις ἐξῆς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ
 ἐκούσιον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκούσιον, τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ

¹ σὺ Heindorf: οὐ BT.

² δὴ ἦτοι cod. Laurentinus 85. 17: δὲ ἦτοι BT: δὴτοι Schanz.

³ οἴσιν γὰρ t in marg.: οἴσειν· ἴσως γὰρ B: εἰσιν γὰρ T:
 οἴσιν· ἴσως γὰρ W.

⁴ πᾶν T: τὸ B.

⁵ πως Hermann: πρὸς BT.

⁶ τὸ add. Heindorf.

⁷ οὐ τ' Burnet: οὐτ' B: οὐτ' b: οὐ T.

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object is present, is called *πόθος* when it is absent. And *ἔρως* (love) is so called because it flows in (*ἔσρει*) from without, and this flowing is not inherent in him who has it, but is introduced through the eyes ; for this reason it was in ancient times called *ἔσρος*, from *ἔσρειν*—for we used to employ omicron instead of omega—but now it is called *ἔρως* through the change of omicron to omega. Well, what more is there that you want to examine ?

HER. What is your view about *δόξα* (opinion) and the like ?

soc. *Δόξα* is derived either from the pursuit (*δίωξις*) which the soul carries on as it pursues the knowledge of the nature of things, or from the shooting of the bow (*τόξον*) ; the latter is more likely ; at any rate *οἴησις* (belief) supports this view, for it appears to mean the motion (*οἴσις*) of the soul towards the essential nature of every individual thing, just as *βουλή* (intention) denotes shooting (*βολή*) and *βούλεσθαι* (wish), as well as *βουλεύεσθαι* (plan), denotes aiming at something. All these words seem to follow *δόξα* and to express the idea of shooting, just as *ἄβουλία* (ill-advisedness), on the other hand, appears to be a failure to hit, as if a person did not shoot or hit that which he shot at or wished or planned or desired.

HER. I think you are hurrying things a bit, Socrates.

soc. Yes, for I am running the last lap now. But I think I must still explain *ἀνάγκη* (compulsion) and *ἐκούσιον* (voluntary) because they naturally come next. Now by the word *ἐκούσιον* is expressed

⁸ *ἔβαλλε* Heindorf: *ἐβάλλετο* BT.

⁹ *τέω* Adam: *θεῶ* T: *θεω* B: *θεῶ* vulg.

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ἀντιτυποῦν, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἶη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένῳ· τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀντίτυπον, παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν ὄν, τὸ περὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἂν εἶη καὶ ἁμαθίαν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τῇ

Ε κατὰ τὰ ἄγκη¹ πορεία, ὅτι δύσπορα καὶ τραχέα καὶ λάσια ὄντα ἴσχει τοῦ ἰέναι. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἴσως ἐκλήθη ἀναγκαῖον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἄγκους ἀπεικασθὲν πορεία. ἕως δὲ πάρεστιν ἢ ῥώμη, μὴ ἀνιῶμεν αὐτήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ μὴ ἀνίει, ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα.

33. **ΕΡΜ.** Ἐρωτῶ δὴ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλ-
 421 λιστα, τὴν τε ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὄνομα, δι' ὃ τι τὸ ὄνομα ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Μαίεσθαι οὖν καλεῖς τι;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐγωγε, τό γε ζητεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὄν, οὐ τυγχάνει ζήτημα ὄν,² τὸ ὄνομα. μᾶλλον δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γνοίης ἐν ᾧ λέγομεν τὸ ὀνομαστόν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς

Β λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὄν οὐ μᾶσμα ἐστίν.³ ἢ δ' ἀλήθεια, καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε.⁴ ἢ γὰρ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορὰ ἔοικε προσειρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς θεία οὐσα ἄλη. τὸ δὲ⁵ ψεῦδος τούναντίον τῇ φορᾷ· πάλιν γὰρ αὐτὸ λαιδορούμενον ἤκει τὸ ἰσχύμενον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἡσυχάζειν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τοῖς καθεύδουσι· τὸ ψῖ δὲ προσγενόμενον ἐπικρύπτει τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ ὀνόματος· τὸ

¹ τὰ ἄγκη **b**: ἀνάγκην **BT**.

² ὄν *add.* Burnet.

³ ὄν οὐ μαῖσμα ἐστίν Heusde (μάσμα Buttman): ὀνομασμά ἐστίν **BT**.

⁴ ἔοικε Hermann: ἔοικε συγκεκροτῆσθαι **BT**.

⁵ δὲ *om.* **BT**.

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the yielding (*εἶκον*) and not opposing, but, as I say, yielding to the motion which is in accordance with the will; but the compulsory (*τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*) and resistant, being contrary to the will, is associated with error and ignorance; so it is likened to walking through ravines (*ἄγκη*), because they are hard to traverse, rough, and rugged, and retard motion; the word *ἀναγκαῖον* may, then, originate in a comparison with progress through a ravine. But let us not cease to use my strength, so long as it lasts; and do not you cease from asking questions.

HER. I ask, then, about the greatest and noblest words, truth (*ἀλήθεια*), falsehood (*ψεῦδος*), being (*τὸ ὄν*), and why name, the subject of our whole discourse, has the name *ὄνομα*.

SOC. Does the word *μαίεσθαι* (search) mean anything to you?

HER. Yes, it means "seek."

SOC. The word *ὄνομα* seems to be a word composed from a sentence signifying "this is a being about which our search is." You can recognize that more readily in the adjective *ὀνομαστόν*, for that says clearly that this is *ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν* (being of which the search is). And *ἀλήθεια* (truth) is like the others; for the divine motion of the universe is, I think, called by this name, *ἀλήθεια*, because it is a divine wandering (*θεία ἄλη*). But *ψεῦδος* (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; for once more that which is held back and forced to be quiet is found fault with, and it is compared to slumberers (*εὐδουσι*); but the addition of the psi conceals the meaning of the word. The words *τὸ ὄν* (being) and

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δὲ ὄν καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὁμολογεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν· ἰὸν γὰρ σημαίνει· καὶ τὸ οὐκ ὄν αὖ,
 C ὡς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτὸ οὐκ ἰόν.

ERM. Ταῦτα μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τις σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ ἰόν καὶ τὸ ρέον καὶ τὸ δοῦν, τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα—

ΣΩ. Τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα, λέγεις; ἢ γάρ;

ERM. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τοίνυν ἄρτι που ἐπορισάμεθα ὥστε δοκεῖν τί λέγειν ἀποκρινόμενοι.

ERM. Τὸ ποῖον τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Φάναι, ὃ ἂν μὴ γιγνώσκωμεν, βαρβαρικόν
 D τι τοῦτ' εἶναι. εἴη μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἂν τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν, εἴη δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ παλαιότητος τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνεύρετα εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πανταχῇ στρέφεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἢ¹ παλαιὰ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν νυνὶ βαρβαρικῆς μηδὲν διαφέρει.²

ERM. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Λέγω γὰρ οὖν εἰκότα. οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ προφάσεις ἁγῶν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προθυμητέον ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δέ, εἴ τις αἰεί,
 E δι' ὧν ἂν λέγεται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐκεῖνα ἀνερήσεται³ τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ αὐθις αὖ, δι' ὧν ἂν τὰ ῥήματα λεχθῆ, ἐκεῖνα πεύσεται, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ παύσεται ποιῶν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα ἀπειπεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον;

ERM. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

¹ εἴη εἰ ἢ bt: εἴη BT.

² διαφέρει bt: διαφέρειν BT.

³ ἀνερήσεται Bekker: ἐρήσεται B: ἂν ἐρήσεται T.

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οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀληθείης, with the loss of iota, for they mean "going" (ἰόν). And οὐκ ὄν (not being) means οὐκ ἰόν (not going), and indeed some people pronounce it so.

HER. I think you have knocked these words to pieces manfully, Socrates; but if anyone should ask you what propriety or correctness there was in these words that you have employed—ἰόν and ῥέον and δοῦν——

soc. What answer should I make? Is that your meaning?

HER. Yes, exactly.

soc. We acquired just now one way of making an answer with a semblance of sense in it.

HER. What way was that?

soc. Saying, if there is a word we do not know about, that it is of foreign origin. Now this may be true of some of them, and also on account of the lapse of time it may be impossible to find out about the earliest words; for since words get twisted in all sorts of ways, it would not be in the least wonderful if the ancient Greek word should be identical with the modern foreign one.

HER. That is not unlikely.

soc. It is indeed quite probable. However, we must play the game¹ and investigate these questions vigorously. But let us bear in mind that if a person asks about the words by means of which names are formed, and again about those by means of which those words were formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, he who answers his questions will at last give up; will he not?

HER. Yes, I think so.

¹ A proverbial expression.

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422 ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν ἀπειπὼν ὁ ἀπαγορεύων δικαίως παύοιτ' ἄν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐπειδὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις γένηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἃ ὡσπερὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ λόγων καὶ ὀνομάτων; ταῦτα γάρ που οὐκέτι δίκαιον φανῆναι ἐξ ἄλλων ὀνομάτων ξυγκείμενα, ἂν οὕτως ἔχη. οἷον νῦν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ξυγκεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ θεὸν ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν ἐξ ἐτέρων, ἐκεῖνα B δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων· ἀλλ' ἐάν ποτέ γε λάβωμεν ὃ οὐκέτι ἐκ τινων ἐτέρων ξύγκειται ὀνομάτων, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ τε ἤδη εἶναι καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν.

ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νῦν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς τὰ ὀνόματα στοιχεῖα ὄντα τυγχάνει, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῶν ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ ἤδη τὴν ὀρθότητα ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἥτις ἐστίν;

ΕΡΜ. Εἰκὸς γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς δῆτα, ὧ Ἐρμόγενης· πάντα γοῦν φαίνεται τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνεληλυθέναι. C εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετ' ἐμοῦ, μή τι παραληρήσω λέγων οἷαν δεῖ τὴν τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα εἶναι.

ΕΡΜ. Λέγε μόνον, ὡς ὅσον γε δυνάμεως παρ' ἐμοί ἐστιν συνεπισκέψομαι.

34. ΣΩ. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μία γέ τις ἡ ὀρθότης παντὸς ὀνόματος καὶ πρώτου καὶ ὑστάτου, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῷ ὀνομα εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

D ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὧν γε νῦν δὴ¹ διεληλύθαμεν

¹ δὴ add. Heindorf.

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soc. Now at what point will he be right in giving up and stopping? Will it not be when he reaches the names which are the elements of the other names and words? For these, if they are the elements, can no longer rightly appear to be composed of other names. For instance, we said just now that *ἀγαθόν* was composed of *ἀγαστόν* and *θοόν*; and perhaps we might say that *θοόν* was composed of other words, and those of still others; but if we ever get hold of a word which is no longer composed of other words, we should be right in saying that we had at last reached an element, and that we must no longer refer to other words for its derivation.

HER. I think you are right.

soc. Are, then, these words about which you are now asking elements, and must we henceforth investigate their correctness by some other method?

HER. Probably.

soc. Yes, probably, Hermogenes; at any rate, all the previous words were traced back to these. But if this be true, as I think it is, come to my aid again and help me in the investigation, that I may not say anything foolish in declaring what principle must underlie the correctness of the earliest names.

HER. Go on, and I will help you to the best of my ability.

soc. I think you agree with me that there is but one principle of correctness in all names, the earliest as well as the latest, and that none of them is any more a name than the rest.

HER. Certainly.

soc. Now the correctness of all the names we

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τῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἷα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων.

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴπερ ὀνόματα ἔσται.

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τῶν προτέρων οἷά τε ἦν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

ΕΡΜ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὰ δὲ δὴ πρῶτα, οἷς οὐπω ἕτερα ὑπόκειται, τίνι τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὅτι μάλιστα
Ε φανερά ἡμῖν ποιήσει τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ μέλλει ὀνόματα εἶναι; ἀπόκριναι δέ μοι τόδε· εἰ φωνὴν μὴ εἶχομεν μηδὲ γλῶτταν, ἐβουλόμεθα δὲ δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν, ὥσπερ νῦν οἱ ἐνεοί, ἐπεχειροῦμεν ἂν σημαίνειν ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι;

ΕΡΜ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως, ὦ Σώκρατες;

423 ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν γ', οἶμαι, τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἤρομεν ἂν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν χεῖρα, μιμούμενοι αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ δὲ τὰ¹ κάτω καὶ τὰ βαρέα, πρὸς τὴν γῆν· καὶ εἰ ἵππον θέοντα ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν ζώων ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, οἶσθα ὅτι ὡς ὁμοιότατ' ἂν τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν σώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐποιουῦμεν ἐκείνοις.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν, οἶμαι, δήλωμά του² ἐγίγνετο,
Β μιμησαμένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνο ὃ ἐβούλετο δηλωῆσαι.

¹ τὰ G: om. BT.

² δήλωμα τοῦ σώματος BT: σώματος bracketed by Schanz.

CRATYLUS

have discussed was based upon the intention of showing the nature of the things named.

HER. Yes, of course.

SOC. And this principle of correctness must be present in all names, the earliest as well as the later ones, if they are really to be names.

HER. Certainly.

SOC. But the later ones, apparently, were able to accomplish this by means of the earlier ones.

HER. Evidently.

SOC. Well, then, how can the earliest names, which are not as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is possible, which they must do if they are to be names at all? Answer me this question: If we had no voice or tongue, and wished to make things clear to one another, should we not try, as dumb people actually do, to make signs with our hands and head and person generally?

HER. Yes. What other method is there, Socrates?

SOC. If we wished to designate that which is above and is light, we should, I fancy, raise our hand towards heaven in imitation of the nature of the thing in question; but if the things to be designated were below or heavy, we should extend our hands towards the ground; and if we wished to mention a galloping horse or any other animal, we should, of course, make our bodily attitudes as much like theirs as possible.

HER. I think you are quite right; there is no other way.

SOC. For the expression of anything, I fancy, would be accomplished by bodily imitation of that which was to be expressed.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῇ τε καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ στόματι βουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἄρ' οὐ τότε ἐκάστου δῆλωμα ἡμῖν ἔσται τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων γινόμενον, ὅταν μίμημα γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ ὅτιούν; .[†]

ΕΡΜ. Ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ὄνομα ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὃ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται.

ΕΡΜ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' ἄλλ' οὐκ¹ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

ΕΡΜ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναγκαζοίμεθ' ἂν ὀμολογεῖν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἄπερ μιμοῦνται.

ΕΡΜ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς οὖν ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις εἶη τὸ ὄνομα;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἐμοί δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἔάν καθ-
 ἄπερ τῇ μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω
 Δ μιμώμεθα, καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα.
 ἔπειτα οὐκ ἔάν ἄπερ ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται² καὶ
 ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν ὀνομάσειν.
 λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο³ ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνῇ καὶ
 σχῆμα ἐκάστω, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἔάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται,

¹ ἄλλ' οὐκ Hermann (γρ. T): οὐκ ἄλλ' B: οὐκ ἄλλ' T.

² μιμεῖται g: μιμῆται BGT.

³ δέ τοι τοῦτο G: δέ τι τοῦτο BT.

CRATYLUS

HER. Yes.

soc. And when we wish to express anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will not our expression by these means be accomplished in any given instance when an imitation of something is accomplished by them ?

HER. I think that is inevitable.

soc. A name, then, it appears, is a vocal imitation of that which is imitated, and he who imitates with his voice names that which he imitates.

HER. I think that is correct.

soc. By Zeus, I do not think it is quite correct, yet, my friend.

HER. Why not ?

soc. We should be obliged to agree that people who imitate sheep and cocks and other animals were naming those which they imitate.

HER. Yes, so we should.

soc. And do you think that is correct ?

HER. No, I do not ; but, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name ?

soc. In the first place we shall not, in my opinion, be making names, if we imitate things as we do in music, although musical imitation also is vocal ; and secondly we shall make no names by imitating that which music imitates. What I mean is this : all objects have sound and shape, and many have colour, have they not ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Well then, the art of naming is not employed

PLATO

οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἢ τέχνη ἢ ὀνομαστική εἶναι. αὐταὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἢ μὲν μουσική, ἢ δὲ γραφική· ἢ γάρ;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

Ε ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τότε; οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἅ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἐκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἠξιώται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι;

ΕΡΜ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμῆσθαι δύναται ἐκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; ἢ οὐ;

424 ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον, ὥσπερ τοὺς προτέρους τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν ἔφησθα, τὸν δὲ γραφικόν. τοῦτον δὲ τίνα;

ΕΡΜ. Τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν,¹ οὗτος ἂν εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός.

35. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἤδη ἔοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ὀνομάτων ὧν σὺ ἤρου, περὶ ῥοῆς τε καὶ τοῦ ἰέναι καὶ σχέσεως, εἰ τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ ταῖς συλλαβαῖς τοῦ ὄντος Β ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε ἀπομιμῆσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, εἴτε καὶ οὐ;

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἴδωμεν, πότερον ἄρα ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΕΡΜ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς γάρ. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος τῆς

¹ ζητοῦμεν cod. Vindobonensis 31 : ἐζητοῦμεν ΒΤ.

CRATYLUS

in the imitation of those qualities, and has nothing to do with them. The arts which are concerned with them are music and design, are they not ?

HER. Yes.

soc. Here is another point. Has not each thing an essential nature, just as it has a colour and the other qualities we just mentioned ? Indeed, in the first place, have not colour and sound and all other things which may properly be said to exist, each and all an essential nature ?

HER. I think so.

soc. Well, then, if anyone could imitate this essential nature of each thing by means of letters and syllables, he would show what each thing really is, would he not ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. And what will you call him who can do this, as you called the others musician and painter ? What will you call this man ?

HER. I think, Socrates, he is what we have been looking for all along, the name-maker.

soc. If that is the case, is it our next duty to consider whether in these names about which you were asking—flow, motion, and restraint—the name-maker grasps with his letters and syllables the reality of the things named and imitates their essential nature, or not ?

HER. Certainly.

soc. Well now, let us see whether those are the only primary names, or there are others.

HER. I think there are others.

soc. Yes, most likely there are. Now what is

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διαίρεσεως ὅθεν ἄρχεται μιμείσθαι ὁ μιμούμενος; ἄρα οὐκ ἐπέιπερ συλλαβαῖς τε καὶ γράμμασιν ἢ μίμησις τυγχάνει οὐσα τῆς οὐσίας, ὀρθότατόν ἐστι διελέσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τῶν στοιχείων πρῶτον τὰς δυνάμεις διείλοντο, ἔπειτα τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς σκεψόμενοι, πρότερον δ' οὐ;

ΕΡΜ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ εἶδη τὰ τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα—οὕτωςί γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων—καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα; καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν φωνηέντων ὅσα διάφορα εἶδη ἔχει ἀλλήλων; D καὶ ἐπειδὴν ταῦτα διελώμεθα εὖ πάντα¹ αὐτοῖς² δεῖ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι, εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτὰ τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἶδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις· ταῦτα πάντα καλῶς διαθεασαμένους ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιφέρειν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα, εἴαντε ἐν ἐνὶ δέῃ ἐπιφέρειν, εἴαντε συγκεραννύντα πολλά,³ ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι βουλόμενοι ἀφομοιοῦν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄστρεον μόνον E ἐπήνεγκαν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν φαρμάκων, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε πολλὰ συγκεράσαντες, οἷον ὅταν ἀνδρείκελον σκευάζωσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἂν, οἶμαι, δοκῇ ἐκάστη ἢ εἰκὼν δεῖσθαι ἐκάστου φαρμάκου· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐποίσομεν, καὶ ἐν ἐπὶ ἓν, οὐ

¹ εὖ πάντα Beck: τὰ ὄντα εὖ πάντα BT.

² αὐτοῖς Badham: αὐθις BT.

³ πολλά T: πολλὰ ἐνὶ B.

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the method of division with which the imitator begins his imitation? Since the imitation of the essential nature is made with letters and syllables, would not the most correct way be for us to separate the letters first, just as those who undertake the practice of rhythms separate first the qualities of the letters, then those of the syllables, and then, but not till then, come to the study of rhythms?

HER. Yes.

SOC. Must not we, too, separate first the vowels, then in their several classes the consonants or mutes, as they are called by those who specialize in phonetics, and also the letters which are neither vowels nor mutes, as well as the various classes that exist among the vowels themselves? And when we have made all these divisions properly, we must in turn give names to the things which ought to have them, if there are any names to which they can all, like the letters, be referred, from which it is possible to see what their nature is and whether there are any classes among them, as there are among letters. When we have properly examined all these points, we must know how to apply each letter with reference to its fitness, whether one letter is to be applied to one thing or many are to be combined; just as painters, when they wish to produce an imitation, sometimes use only red, sometimes some other colour, and sometimes mix many colours, as when they are making a picture of a man or something of that sort, employing each colour, I suppose, as they think the particular picture demands it. In just this way we, too, shall apply letters to things, using one

PLATO

ἂν δοκῇ δεῖν, καὶ σύμπολλα, ποιοῦντες δὲ δὴ
 συλλαβὰς καλοῦσιν, καὶ συλλαβὰς αὖ συντιθέντες,
 425 ἔξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται·
 καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα
 ἤδη τι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὄλον συστήσομεν, ὥσπερ
 ἐκεῖ τὸ ζῶον τῇ γραφικῇ, ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον τῇ
 ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ῥητορικῇ ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.
 μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ λέγων ἐξηγέσθην. συν-
 ἔθεσαν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἡπερ¹ σύγκειται οἱ παλαιοί·
 ἡμᾶς δὲ δεῖ, εἴπερ τεχνικῶς ἐπιστησόμεθα σκο-
 B πείσθαι αὐτὰ πάντα, οὕτω διελομένους, εἴτε κατὰ
 τρόπον τά τε πρῶτα ὀνόματα κείται καὶ τὰ ὕστερα,
 εἴτε μή, οὕτω θεᾶσθαι· ἄλλως δὲ συνείρειν μὴ
 φαῦλον ἢ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὁδόν, ὧ φίλε Ἑρμόγευες.

ERM. Ἴσως νῆ Δί', ὧ Σώκρατες.

36. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; σὺ πιστεύεις σαυτῶ οἴός τ'
 ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω διελέσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ
 οὐ.

ERM. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δέω ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐάσομεν οὖν, ἢ βούλει οὕτως ὅπως ἂν
 δυνώμεθα, καὶ ἂν σμικρόν τι αὐτῶν οἴοί τ' ὦμεν
 C κατιδεῖν, ἐπιχειρῶμεν, προειπόντες, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον
 πρότερον τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀλη-
 θείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν
 εἰκάζομεν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ νῦν αὖ εἰπόντες ἡμῖν
 αὐτοῖς ἴωμεν, ὅτι εἰ μὲν τι χρῆν² αὐτὰ διελέσθαι
 εἴτε ἄλλον ὄντιν οὖν εἴτε ἡμᾶς, οὕτως ἔδει αὐτὰ
 διαιρεῖσθαι, νῦν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ δύναμιν
 δεήσει ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματεύεσθαι; δοκεῖ
 ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

¹ ἡπερ] εἴπερ ΒΤ.

² χρῆν Ast: χρηστὸν ἔδει ΒΤ.

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letter for one thing, when that seems to be required, or many letters together, forming syllables, as they are called, and in turn combining syllables, and by their combination forming nouns and verbs. And from nouns and verbs again we shall finally construct something great and fair and complete. Just as in our comparison we made the picture by the art of painting, so now we shall make language by the art of naming, or of rhetoric, or whatever it be. No, not we; I said that too hastily. For the ancients gave language its existing composite character; and we, if we are to examine all these matters with scientific ability, must take it to pieces as they put it together and see whether the words, both the earliest and the later, are given systematically or not; for if they are strung together at haphazard, it is a poor, unmethodical performance, my dear Hermogenes.

HER. By Zeus, Socrates, may be it is.

SOC. Well, do you believe you could take them to pieces in that way? I do not believe I could.

HER. Then I am sure I could not.

SOC. Shall we give up then? Or shall we do the best we can and try to see if we are able to understand even a little about them, and, just as we said to the gods a while ago that we knew nothing about the truth but were guessing at human opinion about them, so now, before we proceed, shall we say to ourselves that if anyone, whether we or some one else, is to make any analysis of names, he will have to analyse them in the way we have described, and we shall have to study them, as the saying is, with all our might? Do you agree, or not?

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Δ ΣΩ. Γελοῖα μὲν οἶμαι φανείσθαι, ὦ Ἐρμόγευες, γράμμασι καὶ συλλαβαῖς τὰ πράγματα μεμιμημένα κατάδηλα γιγνόμενα· ὅμως δὲ ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν τούτου βέλτιον, εἰς ὃ τι ἐπανεπέγκωμεν περὶ ἀληθείας τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων, εἰ μὴ ἄρα βούλει,¹ ὥσπερ οἱ τραγωδιοποιοὶ ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορώσιν ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι θεοὺς αἴροντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως εἰπόντες ἀπαλλαγῶμεν, ὅτι τὰ πρώτα ὀνόματα οἱ θεοὶ ἔθεσαν

Ε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἔχει. ἄρα καὶ ἡμῖν κράτιστος οὗτος τῶν λόγων; ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι παρὰ βαρβάρων τινῶν αὐτὰ παρειλήφαμεν, εἰσὶ δὲ ἡμῶν
 426 ἀρχαιότεροι βάρβαροι; ἢ ὅτι ὑπὸ παλαιότητος ἀδύνατον αὐτὰ ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ βαρβαρικά; αὐταὶ γὰρ ἂν πᾶσαι ἐκδύσεις εἶεν καὶ μάλα κομψαὶ τῷ μὴ ἐθέλοντι λόγον διδόναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὡς ὀρθῶς κεῖται. καίτοι ὅτῳ τις τρόπῳ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων τὴν ὀρθότητα μὴ οἶδεν, ἀδύνατόν ποῦ τῶν γε ὑστέρων εἰδέναί, ἃ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀνάγκη δηλοῦσθαι ὧν τις πέρι μηδὲν οἶδεν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν φάσκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν τεχνικὸν εἶναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων μάλιστα τε

Β καὶ καθαρῶτατα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀποδείξαι, ἢ εὖ εἰδέναί ὅτι τά γε ὑστερα ἤδη φλυαρήσει. ἢ σοὶ ἄλλως δοκεῖ;

ΕΡΜ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Ἄ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγὼ ἤσθημαι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὑβριστικὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα. τούτων οὖν σοι μεταδώσω, ἂν βούλη· σὺ δ' ἂν τι ἔχῃς βέλτιόν ποθεν λαβεῖν, πειραῖσθαι καὶ ἐμοὶ μεταδιδόναι.

¹ βούλει Hermann: δεῖ ΒΤ.

CRATYLUS

HER. Yes, I agree most heartily.

SOC. It will, I imagine, seem ridiculous that things are made manifest through imitation in letters and syllables; nevertheless it cannot be otherwise. For there is no better theory upon which we can base the truth of the earliest names, unless you think we had better follow the example of the tragic poets, who, when they are in a dilemma, have recourse to the introduction of gods on machines. So we may get out of trouble by saying that the gods gave the earliest names, and therefore they are right. Is that the best theory for us? Or perhaps this one, that we got the earliest names from some foreign folk and the foreigners are more ancient than we are? Or that it is impossible to investigate them because of their antiquity, as is also the case with the foreign words? All these are merely very clever evasions on the part of those who refuse to offer any rational theory of the correctness of the earliest names. And yet if anyone is, no matter why, ignorant of the correctness of the earliest names, he cannot know about that of the later, since they can be explained only by means of the earliest, about which he is ignorant. No, it is clear that anyone who claims to have scientific knowledge of names must be able first of all to explain the earliest names perfectly, or he can be sure that what he says about the later will be nonsense. Or do you disagree?

HER. No, Socrates, not in the least.

SOC. Now I think my notions about the earliest names are quite outrageous and ridiculous. I will impart them to you, if you like; if you can find anything better, please try to impart it to me.

PLATO

ΕΡΜ. Ποιήσω ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν λέγε.

- C** 37. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ῥῶ ἔμοιγε φαίνεται ὡσπερ ὄργανον εἶναι πάσης τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν οὐδ' εἶπομεν δι' ὃ τι ἔχει τοῦτο τοῦνομα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἴεσις βούλεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἦτα ἐχρώμεθα ἀλλὰ εἰ τὸ παλαιόν. ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ κίειν—ξενικὸν δὲ τοῦνομα—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ παλαιὸν αὐτῆς εὖροι ὄνομα εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν φωνὴν συμβαῖνον, ἴεσις ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· νῦν δὲ ἀπὸ τε τοῦ ξενικοῦ τοῦ κίειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἦτα μεταβολῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ νῦ ἐνθέσεως κινήσεις κέκληται, ἔδει δὲ κειίνησιν
- D** καλεῖσθαι ἢ εἶσιν. ἡ δὲ στάσις ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἰέναι βούλεται εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸν καλλωπισμὸν στάσις ὠνόμασται. τὸ δὲ οὖν ῥῶ τὸ στοιχεῖον, ὡσπερ λέγω, καλὸν ἔδοξεν ὄργανον εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως τῷ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ ἀφ-ομοιοῦν τῇ φορᾷ· πολλαχοῦ γοῦν χρῆται αὐτῷ εἰς αὐτήν· πρῶτον μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ῥεῖν καὶ ῥοῆ διὰ τούτου τοῦ γράμματος τὴν φορὰν μιμεῖται,
- E** εἶτα ἐν τῷ τρόμῳ, εἶτα ἐν τῷ τρέχειν,¹ ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ῥήμασιν, οἷον κρούειν, θραύειν, ἐρείκειν, θρύπτειν, κερματίζειν, ῥυμβεῖν· πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ· ἑώρα² γάρ, οἶμαι, τὴν γλῶτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἠκιστα μένουσαν, μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην· διὸ φαίνεται μοι τούτῳ πρὸς ταῦτα κατακεχρησθαι. τῷ δὲ αὖ ἰῶτα πρὸς τὰ λεπτὰ πάντα, ἃ δὴ μάλιστα διὰ πάντων ἴοι ἂν.
- 427 διὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἰέναι καὶ τὸ ἴεσθαι³ διὰ τοῦ ἰῶτα

¹ τρέχειν codex Parisinus 1813: τραχεῖ ΒΤ.

² ἑώρα Heindorf: ἑῶ ΒΤ.

³ ἴεσθαι Schanz: ἰενέσθαι Β: ἴεσθαι Τ.

CRATYLUS

HER. I will do so. Go on, and do not be afraid.

SOC. First, then, the letter rho seems to me to be an instrument expressing all motion. We have not as yet said why motion has the name *κίνησις*; but it evidently should be *ἕσις*, for in old times we did not employ eta, but epsilon. And the beginning of *κίνησις* is from *κίειν*, a foreign word equivalent to *ἵεναι* (go). So we should find that the ancient word corresponding to our modern form would be *ἕσις*; but now by the employment of the foreign word *κίειν*, change of epsilon to eta, and the insertion of nu it has become *κίνησις*, though it ought to be *κείνεσις* or *εἴσις*. And *στάσις* (rest) signifies the negation of motion, but is called *στάσις* for euphony. Well, the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to be a fine instrument expressive of motion to the name-giver who wished to imitate rapidity, and he often applies it to motion. In the first place, in the words *ῥεῖν* (flow) and *ῥοή* (current) he imitates their rapidity by this letter, then in *τρόμος* (trembling) and in *τρέχειν* (run), and also in such words as *κρούειν* (strike), *θραύειν* (break), *ἑρείκειν* (rend), *θρύπτειν* (crush), *κερματίζειν* (crumble), *ῥυμβεῖν* (whirl), he expresses the action of them all chiefly by means of the letter rho; for he observed, I suppose, that the tongue is least at rest and most agitated in pronouncing this letter, and that is probably the reason why he employed it for these words. Iota again, he employs for everything subtle, which can most readily pass through all things. Therefore he imitates the nature of *ἵεναι* (go) and *ἵεσθαι* (hasten) by means of iota, just as he has imitated

PLATO

ἀπομιμείται, ὡσπερ γε διὰ τοῦ φῖ καὶ τοῦ ψῖ καὶ τοῦ σῖγμα καὶ τοῦ ζῆτα, ὅτι πνευματώδη τὰ γράμματα, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμίμηται αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζων, οἷον τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ζέον καὶ τὸ σείεσθαι καὶ ὅλως σεισμόν. καὶ ὅταν που τὸ φυσῶδες μιμῆται, πανταχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράμματα ἐπιφέρειν φαίνεται ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος. τῆς δ' αὖ τοῦ δέλτα συμπίεσεως καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης

B τὴν δύναμιν χρήσιμον φαίνεται ἠγήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσμοῦ καὶ τῆς στάσεως. ὅτι δὲ ὀλισθάνει μάλιστα ἐν τῷ λάβδα ἢ γλώττα κατιδῶν, ἀφομοιωῶν ὠνόμασε τά τε λεία καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀλισθάνειν καὶ τὸ λιπαρὸν καὶ τὸ κολλῶδες καὶ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἧ δὲ ὀλισθανούσης τῆς γλώττης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἢ τοῦ γάμμα δύναμις, τὸ γλίσχρον ἀπεμιμήσατο καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ γλοιῶδες.

C τοῦ δ' αὖ νῦ τὸ εἶσω αἰσθόμενος τῆς φωνῆς, τὸ ἔνδον καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς ὠνόμασεν, ὡς ἀφομοιωῶν τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ἔργα. τὸ δ' αὖ ἄλφα τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀπέδωκε, καὶ τῷ μήκει τὸ ἦτα, ὅτι μεγάλα τὰ γράμματα. εἰς δὲ τὸ γογγύλον τοῦ οὔ δεόμενος σημείου, τοῦτο πλείστον αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα ἐνεκέρασεν. καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν καὶ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων σημείον τε καὶ ὄνομα ποιῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη¹ αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομιμούμενος. αὕτη μοι φαίνεται, ὦ

D Ἐρμόγενης, βούλεσθαι εἶναι ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης, εἰ μὴ τι ἄλλο Κρατύλος ὅδε λέγει.

38. EPM. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλά γέ μοι

¹ ἤδη cod. Parisinus 1813: ἡδεῖ BT.

CRATYLUS

all such notions as ψυχρόν (cold, shivering), ζέον (seething), σείεσθαι (shake), and σεισμός (shock) by means of phi, psi, sigma, and zeta, because those letters are pronounced with much breath. Whenever he imitates that which resembles blowing, the giver of names always appears to use for the most part such letters. And again he appears to have thought that the compression and pressure of the tongue in the pronunciation of delta and tau was naturally fitted to imitate the notion of binding and rest. And perceiving that the tongue has a gliding movement most in the pronunciation of lambda, he made the words λεία (level), ὀλισθάνειν (glide) itself, λιπαρόν (sleek), κολλῶδες (glutinous), and the like to conform to it. Where the gliding of the tongue is stopped by the sound of gamma he reproduced the nature of γλισχρόν (glutinous), γλυκύ (sweet), and γλοιῶδες (gluey). And again, perceiving that nu is an internal sound, he made the words ἔνδον (inside) and ἐντός (within), assimilating the meanings to the letters, and alpha again he assigned to greatness, and eta to length, because the letters are large. He needed the sign O for the expression of γόγγυλον (round), and made it the chief element of the word. And in this way the lawgiver appears to apply the other letters, making by letters and syllables a name for each and every thing, and from these names he compounds all the rest by imitation. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the theory of the correctness of names, unless, indeed, Cratylus has some other view.

HER. Truly, Socrates, as I said in the beginning,

PLATO

πολλάκις πράγματα παρέχει Κρατύλος, ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, φάσκων μὲν εἶναι ὀρθότητα ὀνομάτων, ἣτις δ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲν σαφὲς λέγων, ὥστε με μὴ δύνασθαι εἰδέναι πότερον ἐκῶν ἢ ἄκων οὕτως ἀσαφῶς ἐκάστοτε περὶ αὐτῶν λέγει. νῦν οὖν μοι, Ε ὦ Κρατύλε, ἐναντίον Σωκράτους εἶπέ πότερον ἀρέσκει σοι ἢ λέγει Σωκράτης περὶ ὀνομάτων, ἢ ἔχεις πῃ ἄλλη κάλλιον λέγειν; καὶ εἰ ἔχεις, λέγε, ἵνα ἦτοι μάθῃς παρὰ Σωκράτους ἢ διδάξῃς ἡμᾶς ἀμφοτέρους.

ΚΡΑ. Τί δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενης; δοκεῖ σοι ῥάδιον εἶναι οὕτω ταχὺ μαθεῖν τε καὶ διδάξαι ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον, ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μέγιστον¹ εἶναι;

428 ΕΡΜ. Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου καλῶς μοι φαίνεται ἔχειν, τὸ εἰ καὶ τις σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθείῃ, προὔργου εἶναι. εἰ οὖν καὶ σμικρὸν τι οἶός τ' εἰ πλέον ποιῆσαι, μὴ ἀπόκαμνε, ἀλλ' εὐεργέτει καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε—δίκαιος δ' εἶ—καὶ ἐμέ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὐδὲν ἂν ἰσχυρισάμην ὦν εἴρηκα, ἢ δέ μοι ἐφαίνετο μεθ' Ἑρμογένους ἐπεσκεψάμην, ὥστε τούτου γε Β ἔνεκα θαρρῶν λέγε, εἴ τι ἔχεις βέλτιον, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἐνδεξομένου. εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι αὐτός τε ἐσκέφθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ παρ' ἄλλων μεμαθηκέναι. εἴαν οὖν λέγῃς τι κάλλιον, ἕνα τῶν μαθητῶν περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐμὲ γράφου.

ΚΡΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σὺ

¹ ἐν τοῖς μέγιστον liber Bessarionis: ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις μέγιστον ΒΤ.

CRATYLUS

Cratylus often troubles me a good deal ; he declares that there is such a thing as correctness of names, but does not say clearly what it is ; and so I cannot tell whether he speaks so obscurely about it on any given occasion intentionally or unintentionally. So now, Cratylus, tell me, in the presence of Socrates, do you like what Socrates says about names, or have you a better theory to propose ? And if you have, tell us about it ; then you will either learn from Socrates or instruct both him and me.

CRA. But, Hermogenes, do you think it is an easy matter to learn or teach any subject so quickly, especially so important an one as this, which appears to me to be one of the most important ?

HER. No, by Zeus, I do not. But I think Hesiod is right in saying :

If you can only add little to little, it is worth while.¹

So now if you can make even a little progress, do not shirk the trouble, but oblige Socrates—you owe it to him—and me.

SOC. For that matter, Cratylus, I would not positively affirm any of the things I have said. I merely expressed the opinions which I reached with the help of Hermogenes. So far as I am concerned, you need not hesitate, and if your view is better than mine, I will accept it. And I should not be at all surprised if it were better ; for I think you have not only investigated such matters yourself but have been taught about them by others. So if you have any better theory to propound, put me down as one of your pupils in the course on the correctness of names.

CRA. Yes, Socrates, I have, as you say, paid

¹ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 359.

ΠΛΑΤΟ

λέγεις, μεμέληκέν τέ μοι περιῖ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴσως ἄν
 σε ποιησαίμην μαθητήν. φοβοῦμαι μέντοι μὴ
 C τούτου πᾶν τούναντίον ἦ, ὅτι μοί πως ἐπέρχεται
 λέγειν πρὸς σέ τὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἐν
 Λιταῖς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα λέγει. φησὶ δὲ

Αἴαν Διογενὲς Τελαμώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν,
 πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν εἰίσω μυθήσασθαι.

καὶ ἐμοὶ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς φαίνει κατὰ
 νοῦν χρησιμωδεῖν, εἴτε παρ' Εὐθύφρονος ἐπίπνου
 γενόμενος, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις Μοῦσα πάλαι σε
 ἐνοῦσα ἐλελήθει.

D ΣΩ. Ὁγαθὲ Κρατύλε, θαυμάζω καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι
 τὴν ἐμαντοῦ σοφίαν καὶ ἀπιστῶ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι
 χρῆναι ἐπανασκέψασθαι τί καὶ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ
 ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ πάντων χαλεπώ-
 τατον· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῆ, ἀλλ'
 αἰεὶ παρῆ ὃ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς οὐ δεινόν; δεῖ δὴ,
 ὡς ἔοικε, θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προ-
 ειρημένα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκεῖνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ,
 βλέπειν ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω. καὶ δὴ καὶ
 E νυνὶ ἡμεῖς ἴδωμεν τί ἡμῖν εἴρηται. ὀνόματος,
 φαμέν, ὀρθότης ἐστὶν αὕτη, ἣτις ἐνδείξεται οἷόν ἐστι
 τὸ πρᾶγμα· καὶ τοῦτο φῶμεν ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ πάνυ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Διδασκαλίας ἄρα ἔνεκα τὰ ὀνόματα λέγεται;

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῶμεν καὶ ταύτην τέχνην εἶναι καὶ
 δημιουργοὺς αὐτῆς;

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ γε.

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, ix. 644 f.

² *Ibid.* i. 343, iii. 109.

CRATYLUS

attention to these matters, and perhaps I might make you my pupil. However, I am afraid the opposite is the case, and I am impelled to say to you what Achilles says in the "Prayers" to Ajax. He says :¹

Ajax, descendant of Zeus, son of Telamon, chief of thy
people,
All thou hast uttered is good in my sight and pleases my
spirit.

And so, Socrates, your oracular utterances seem to me to be much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro or some other Muse has dwelt within you all along without our knowing it.

soc. My excellent Cratylus, I myself have been marvelling at my own wisdom all along, and I cannot believe in it. So I think we ought to re-examine my utterances. For the worst of all deceptions is self-deception. How can it help being terrible, when the deceiver is always present and never stirs from the spot? So I think we must turn back repeatedly to what we have said and must try, as the poet says, to look "both forwards and backwards."² Then let us now see what we have said. Correctness of a name, we say, is the quality of showing the nature of the thing named. Shall we call that a satisfactory statement?

cra. I am perfectly satisfied with it, Socrates.

soc. Names, then, are given with a view to instruction?

cra. Certainly.

soc. Shall we, then, say that this instruction is an art and has its artisans?

cra. Certainly.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Τίνας;

429 ΚΡΑ. Οὕσπερ σὺ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγες, τοὺς νομοθέτας.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ ταύτην φῶμεν τὴν τέχνην ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὡσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἢ μή; βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. ζωγράφοι εἰσὶν πού οἱ μὲν χεῖρους, οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους;

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα καλλίω παρέχονται, τὰ ζῶα, οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα; καὶ οἰκοδόμοι ὡσαύτως οἱ μὲν καλλίους τὰς οἰκίας ἐργάζονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίους;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

Β ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νομοθέται οἱ μὲν καλλίω τὰ ἔργα τὰ αὐτῶν παρέχονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίω;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἔτι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι νόμοι οἱ μὲν βελτίους, οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι εἶναι;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ δὴ ὄνομα, ὡς ἔοικε, δοκεῖ σοι κείσθαι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ἀμεινον;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κείται;

ΚΡΑ. Ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, Ἐρμογένει
C τῷδε πότερον μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κείσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἐρμοῦ γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κείσθαι μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐδὲ κείσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κείσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοῦνομα, οὕπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἢ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδὲ ψεύδεται, ὅταν τις φῆ Ἐρμο-

CRATYLUS

soc. Who are they ?

cra. The lawgivers, as you said in the beginning.

soc. Shall we declare that this art arises in men like the other arts, or not ? What I mean is this : Some painters are better, and others worse, are they not ?

cra. Certainly.

soc. And the better produce better works—that is, their paintings—and the others worse works ? And likewise some builders build better houses and others worse ?

cra. Yes.

soc. Then do some lawgivers produce better, and others worse works ?

cra. No ; at that point I cease to agree.

soc. Then you do not think that some laws are better, and some worse ?

cra. No, I do not.

soc. And you do not, it appears, think that one name is better, and another worse ?

cra. No, I do not.

soc. Then all names are correct ?

cra. All that are really names.

soc. How about the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned a while ago ? Shall we say that it is not his name at all, unless he belongs to the race of Hermes, or that it is his name, but is incorrect ?

cra. I think, Socrates, that it is not his name at all ; it appears to be his, but is really the name of some one else who possesses the nature that makes the name clear.

soc. And when anyone says that our friend is Hermogenes, is he not even speaking falsely ? For

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γένη αὐτὸν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ἤ, τὸ τοῦτον φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν;

ΚΡΑ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν,
 Δ ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.

ΚΡΑ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὄν λέγοι; ἢ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ὅμως μέντοι εἶπέ μοι τοσόνδε· πότερον λέγειν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ
 Ε σοι εἶναι ψευδῆ, φάναι δέ;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ φάναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ προσειπεῖν; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας, λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι· χαῖρε, ὦ ξέने Ἀθηναῖε, υἱὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενης, οὗτος λέξειεν ἂν ταῦτα ἢ φαίη ἂν ταῦτα ἢ εἴποι ἂν ταῦτα ἢ προσείποι ἂν οὕτω σὲ μὲν οὐ, Ἑρμογένη δὲ τόνδε; ἢ οὐδένα;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πότερον γὰρ
 430 ἀληθῆ ἂν φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ; ἢ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος; καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοίη.

ΚΡΑ. Ὑοφεῖν ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κινουῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τι χαλκεῖον κινήσειε κρούσας.

39. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐάν πη διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε· ἄρ' οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκείνο οὐ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν;

CRATYLUS

perhaps it is not even possible to say that he is Hermogenes, if he is not.

CRA. What do you mean ?

SOC. Do you mean to say that it is impossible to speak falsehood at all ? For there are, my dear Cratylus, many who do so, and who have done so in the past.

CRA. Why, Socrates, how could anyone who says that which he says, say that which is not ? Is not falsehood saying that which is not ?

SOC. Your reasoning is too clever for me at my age, my friend. However, tell me this : Do you think it is possible to speak falsehood, but not to say it ?

CRA. Neither to speak nor to say it.

SOC. Nor utter it or use it as a form of address ? For instance, if some one should meet you in hospitable fashion, should grasp your hand and say, " Well met, my friend from Athens, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes," would he be saying or speaking or uttering or addressing these words not to you, but to Hermogenes—or to nobody ?

CRA. I think, Socrates, the man would be producing sounds without sense.

SOC. Even that reply is welcome ; for I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice.

CRA. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.

SOC. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another ?

PLATO

ΚΡΑ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι
B εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος;

ΚΡΑ. Πάντων μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινα
ἄλλον λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ—ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα
ποτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις
—ἔστι διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρα
τὰ μιμήματα, τὰ τε ζωγραφήματα καὶ κείνα τὰ
ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὐ;

C ΚΡΑ. Ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε. ἄρ' ἂν τις
τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ
τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως;

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς
τῇ γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρὶ;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν αὐταὶ αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφοτέρα
ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ ἑτέρα;

ΚΡΑ. Ἡ ἑτέρα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἂν ἐκάστω, οἶμαι, τὸ προσήκόν τε καὶ
τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδῶ.

ΚΡΑ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἴνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
D ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ, φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω.
τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἐγωγε διανομὴν
ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζώοις
καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι
πρὸς τῷ ὀρθῇ καὶ ἀληθῇ· τὴν δ' ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ

CRATYLUS

CRA. Yes, I should.

SOC. And you agree that the name is an imitation of the thing named ?

CRA. Most assuredly.

SOC. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things ?

CRA. Yes.

SOC. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not ?

CRA. They can.

SOC. First, then, consider this question : Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth ?

CRA. Certainly.

SOC. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman's to the man ?

CRA. That is also possible.

SOC. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former ?

CRA. The former.

SOC. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.

CRA. That is my view.

SOC. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations—paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true ; and the other kind, which gives and

PLATO

ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπ' ὀνόμασιν ᾗ.

ΚΡΑ. Ἄλλ' ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ᾗ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, Ε ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ᾗ αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρὶ τῷ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “τουτί ἐστι σὸν γράμμα,” καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχη, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχη, γυναικός; τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστήσαι.

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “τουτί ἐστὶν σὸν ὄνομα”; ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα, ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα. 431 τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “τουτί ἐστὶ σὸν ὄνομα,” καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὐτῆς αἴσθησιν καταστήσαι, ἂν μὲν τύχη, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνὴρ, ἂν δὲ τύχη, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι γυνή; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐνίοτε;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυγχωρῆσαι, καὶ ἔστω οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ Β αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ' οὖν ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστω, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα

CRATYLUS

applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.

CRA. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, which must be always correctly assigned.

SOC. What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, "This is your portrait," and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by "show" I mean bring before the sense of sight.

CRA. Certainly.

SOC. Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, "This is your name"? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is. Very well; can I not say to him, "This is your name," and then bring before his sense of hearing perhaps the imitation of himself, saying that it is a man, or perhaps the imitation of the female of the human species, saying that it is a woman? Do you not believe that this is possible and sometimes happens?

CRA. I am willing to concede it, Socrates, and grant that you are right.

SOC. That is a good thing for you to do, my friend, if I am right; for now we need no longer argue about the matter. If, then, some such assignment of names takes place, we will call one kind speaking truth, and the other speaking falsehood. But if this is accepted, and if it is possible to assign names incorrectly and to give to objects not the names that befit them, but sometimes those that are unfitting, it would be possible to treat verbs in the same way.

PLATO

ταῦτόν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα
ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι
γάρ που, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἢ τούτων ξύνθεσις ἔστιν.
C ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε;

ΚΡΑ. Οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα
ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν
καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχή-
ματα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλ' ἔνια ἐλ-
λείπειν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ
μείζω· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΡΑ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδούς πάντα καλὰ τὰ
γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ ἢ
προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας
ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς;

D ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμά-
των τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος;
ἄρα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῶ
τὰ προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἢ εἰκὼν ἔσται—τοῦτο δ'
ἔστιν ὄνομα—ἂν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπη ἢ προστιθῇ
ἐνίοτε, εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὐ; ὥστε
τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ
δὲ κακῶς;

ΚΡΑ. Ἴσως.

E ΣΩ. Ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς
ὀνομάτων, ὁ δὲ κακός;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ νομοθέτης ἦν ὄνομα.

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως ἄρα νῆ Δί' ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις

CRATYLUS

And if verbs and nouns can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of sentences ; for sentences are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns. What do you say to that, Cratylus ?

CRA. I agree ; I think you are right.

SOC. If, then, we compare the earliest words to sketches, it is possible in them, as in pictures, to reproduce all the appropriate colours and shapes, or not all ; some may be wanting, and some may be added, and they may be too many or too large. Is not that true ?

CRA. Yes, it is.

SOC. Then he who reproduces all, produces good sketches and pictures, and he who adds or takes away produces also sketches and pictures, but bad ones ?

CRA. Yes.

SOC. And how about him who imitates the nature of things by means of letters and syllables ? By the same principle, if he gives all that is appropriate, the image—that is to say, the name—will be good, and if he sometimes omits or adds a little, it will be an image, but not a good one ; and therefore some names are well and others badly made. Is that not true ?

CRA. Perhaps.

SOC. Perhaps, then, one artisan of names will be good, and another bad ?

CRA. Yes.

SOC. The name of such an artisan was lawgiver ?

CRA. Yes.

SOC. Perhaps, then, by Zeus, as is the case in

PLATO

τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός, εἴανπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῆ ἡμῖν.

ΚΡΑ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀπο-
 432 διδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ, εἴαν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν τι, οὐ¹ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἕτερόν ἐστιν, εἴαν τι τούτων πάθῃ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ Κρατύλε.

ΚΡΑ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως ὅσα ἕκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, Β εἴαν ἀφέλῃς τι ἢ προσθῆς, ἕτερος εὐθύς γέγονε τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ ξυμπάσης εἰκόνας μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ² ἢ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι, οἷόν ἐστιν ὦ³ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. σκόπει δέ, εἰ τί λέγω. ἄρ' ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιαῦδε, οἷον Κρατύλος καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκὼν, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικασίειν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ μαλακότητος C καὶ θερμότητος τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίῃ, καὶ κίνησιν καὶ ψυχῆν καὶ φρόνησιν οἷαπερ ἢ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείῃ αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου; πότερον Κρατύ-

¹ οὐ add. Bekker.

² ἢ add. Heindorf

³ ὦ Burnet: δ BT.

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CRATYLUS

the other arts, one lawgiver may be good and another bad, if we accept our previous conclusions.

CRA. That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, if we take away or add or transpose any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it.

SOC. Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way.

CRA. Why not?

SOC. It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you like, if you add or subtract anything is immediately another number; but this is not the kind of correctness which applies to quality or to images in general; on the contrary, the image must not by any means reproduce all the qualities of that which it imitates, if it is to be an image. See if I am not right. Would there be two things, Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if some god should not merely imitate your colour and form, as painters do, but should also make all the inner parts like yours, should reproduce the same flexibility and warmth, should put into them motion, life, and intellect, such as exist in you, and in short, should place beside you a duplicate of all your qualities? Would there be in such an

PLATO

λος ἂν καὶ εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότε εἶη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι;

ΚΡΑ. Δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι.

40. ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρῆ εἰκόνας ὀρθότητα ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, εἴαν τι ἀπῆ ἢ προσῆ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν;

ΚΡΑ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ πάντα πανταχῆ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθεῖη. διττὰ γὰρ ἂν που πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐδεὶς¹ οὐδέτερον ὀπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.

ΚΡΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ ἐμὲν εὔκεισθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῆ ἢ τοιοῦτον οἶόνπερ οὗ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα ἐπιφέρειν. εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσῆκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἡττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῆ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος
433 ἦ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν, εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἐρμογένης ἐλέγομεν.

ΚΡΑ. Ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς τοίνυν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνῆ, κἂν

¹ οὐδεὶς add. Burnet.

CRATYLUS

event Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses ?

CRA. I should say, Socrates, two Cratyluses.

SOC. Then don't you see, my friend, that we must look for some other principle of correctness in images and in names, of which we were speaking, and must not insist that they are no longer images if anything be wanting or be added ? Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate ?

CRA. Yes, I do.

SOC. Surely, Cratylus, the effect produced by the names upon the things of which they are the names would be ridiculous, if they were to be entirely like them in every respect. For everything would be duplicated, and no one could tell in any case which was the real thing and which the name.

CRA. Quite true.

SOC. Then do not be faint-hearted, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given ; do not insist that it must have all the letters and be exactly the same as the thing named, but grant that an inappropriate letter may be employed. But if a letter, then grant that also a noun in a clause, and if a noun, then also a clause in a sentence may be employed which is not appropriate to the things in question, and the thing may none the less be named and described, so long as the intrinsic quality of the thing named is retained, as is the case in the names of the letters of the alphabet, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were saying a while ago.

CRA. Yes, I remember.

SOC. Very well, then. So long as this intrinsic

PLATO

μὴ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἔχη, λέξεταιί γε τὸ πρᾶγμα, καλῶς, ὅταν πάντα, κακῶς δέ, ὅταν ὀλίγα· λέγεσθαι δ' οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐῷμεν, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιούντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον
 Β τοῦ δέοντος, ἢ ζήτηι τινὰ ἄλλην ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα, καὶ μὴ ὀμολόγει δῆλωμα συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασι πρᾶγματος ὀνομα εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει συμφωνεῖν σαιτῶ.

ΚΡΑ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω τίθεμαι.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἡμῖν ξυνδοκεῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα τάδε σκοπῶμεν· εἰ μέλλει, φαιμέν, καλῶς κείσθαι τὸ ὀνομα, τὰ προσήκοντα δεῖ αὐτὸ γράμματα ἔχειν;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

Ο ΣΩ. Προσῆκει δὲ τὰ ὀμοια τοῖς πρᾶγμασιν;

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄρα καλῶς κείμενα οὕτω κείται· εἰ δὲ μή τι καλῶς ἐτέθη, τὸ μὲν ἂν πολὺ ἴσως ἐκ προσηκόντων εἶη γραμμάτων καὶ ὀμοίων, εἶπερ ἔσαι εἰκῶν, ἔχοι δ' ἂν τι καὶ οὐ προσῆκον, δι' ὃ οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἶη οὐδὲ καλῶς εἰργασμένον τὸ ὀνομα. οὕτω φαιμέν ἢ ἄλλως;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐδὲν δεῖ, οἶμαι, διαμάχεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀρέσκει γέ με τὸ φάναι ὀνομα μὲν εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι καλῶς γε κείσθαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρέσκει σε, τὸ εἶναι τὸ
 D ὀνομα δῆλωμα τοῦ πρᾶγματος;

CRATYLUS

quality is present, even though the name have not all the proper letters, the thing will still be named ; well, when it has all the proper letters ; badly, when it has only a few of them. Let us, then, grant this, my friend, or we shall get into trouble, like the belated night wanderers in the road at Aegina,¹ and in very truth we shall be found to have arrived too late ; otherwise you must look for some other principle of correctness in names, and must not admit that a name is the representation of a thing in syllables and letters. For if you maintain both positions, you cannot help contradicting yourself.

CRA. Well, Socrates, I think what you say is reasonable, and I accept it.

soc. Then since we are agreed about this, let us consider the next point. If a name, we say, is to be a good one, it must have the proper letters ?

CRA. Yes.

soc. And the proper letters are those which are like the things named ?

CRA. Yes, certainly.

soc. That is, then, the method by which well-given names are given. But if any name is not well given, the greater part of it may perhaps, if it is to be an image at all, be made up of proper and like letters, but it may contain some inappropriate element, and is on that account not good or well made. Is that our view ?

CRA. I suppose, Socrates, there is no use in keeping up my contention ; but I am not satisfied that it can be a name and not be well given.

soc. Are you not satisfied that the name is the representation of a thing ?

¹ This seems to refer to some story unknown to us.

ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΚΡΑ. Ἐμέ γε.¹

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκ προτέρων ξυγκείμενα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα, οὐ καλῶς² σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ πρῶτα εἰ μέλλει δηλώματά τινων γίνεσθαι, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον τοῦ δηλώματα αὐτὰ γενέσθαι ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι ὅτι μάλιστα
 Ε τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐκεῖνα ἃ δεῖ δηλοῦν αὐτά; ἢ³ ὅδε μᾶλλον σε ἀρέσκει ὁ τρόπος ὃν Ἐρμογένης λέγει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, τὸ ξυνθήματα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ δηλοῦν τοῖς ξυνθεμένοις, προειδόσι δὲ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, ξυνθήκην, διαφέρειν δὲ οὐδέν, ἐάντε τις ξυνθῆται ὥσπερ νῦν ξύγκειται, ἐάντε καὶ τούναντίον ἐπὶ μὲν ὦ⁴ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ὦ μέγα, σμικρόν; πότερός σε ὁ τρόπος ἀρέσκει;

434 ΚΡΑ. Ὅλω καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὁμοιώματι δηλοῦν ὅ τι ἂν τις δηλοῖ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα ὁμοιον τῷ πράγματι, ἀναγκαῖον πεφυκέναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματά τις ξυνθήσει; ὦδε δὲ λέγω· ἀρά ποτ' ἂν⁵ τις ξυνέθηκεν ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ζωγράφημα ὁμοίον τῷ τῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ φύσει ὑπῆρχε φαρμακεία ὅμοια ὄντα, ἐξ ὧν ξυντίθεται τὰ ζωγραφούμενα, ἐκείνοις ἃ μιμεῖται ἢ γραφικῆ· ἢ ἀδύνατον;

ΚΡΑ. Ἀδύνατον.

¹ ἐμέ γε Bekker: ἔμοιγε B: ἔμοι T.

² οὐ καλῶς t: οὐκ ἄλλως B (om. T γε ἀλλὰ . . . ἔμοι).

³ ἢ] ἢ T: καὶ ἢ B: καὶ ἢ b.

CRATYLUS

CRA. Yes.

soc. And do you not think it is true that some names are composed of earlier ones and others are primary?

CRA. Yes.

soc. But if the primary names are to be representations of any things, can you suggest any better way of making them representations than by making them as much as possible like the things which they are to represent? Or do you prefer the theory advanced by Hermogenes and many others, who claim that names are conventional and represent things to those who established the convention and knew the things beforehand, and that convention is the sole principle of correctness in names, and it makes no difference whether we accept the existing convention or adopt an opposite one according to which small would be called great and great small? Which of these two theories do you prefer?

CRA. Representing by likeness the thing represented is absolutely and entirely superior to representation by chance signs.

soc. You are right. Then if the name is like the thing, the letters of which the primary names are to be formed must be by their very nature like the things, must they not? Let me explain. Could a painting, to revert to our previous comparison, ever be made like any real thing, if there were no pigments out of which the painting is composed, which were by their nature like the objects which the painter's art imitates? Is not that impossible?

CRA. Yes, it is impossible.

⁴ ᾠ V : ὀ BT (but by emendation in B).

⁵ ἀρά ποτ' ἄν vulg. : ἀρα ὀπὸτ' ἄν BT.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως καὶ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὅμοια γένοιτο οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ὁμοιότητά τινα ἔχοντα, ἐξ ὧν ξυντίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα μιμήματα; ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν συνθετέον, στοιχεῖα;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

41. ΣΩ. Ἦδη τοίνυν καὶ σὺ κοινώνει τοῦ λόγου οὐπερ ἄρτι Ἑρμογένης. φέρε, καλῶς σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ῥῶ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν, ἢ οὐ καλῶς;

ΚΡΑ. Καλῶς ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ λάβδα τῷ λείῳ καὶ μαλακῷ καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μέν φαμεν σκληρότης, Ἑρετριῆς δὲ σκληρότηρ;

ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τό τε ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σίγμα ἔοικεν ἀμφοτέρα τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ δηλοῖ ἐκείνοις τε τὸ αὐτὸ τελευτῶντος τοῦ ῥῶ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ σίγμα, ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡμῶν οὐ δηλοῖ;

D ΚΡΑ. Δηλοῖ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέροις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἢ ὅμοια τυγχάνει ὄντα τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σίγμα, ἢ ἢ μή;

ΚΡΑ. Ἦ ὅμοια.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ὅμοιά ἐστι πανταχῇ;

ΚΡΑ. Πρὸς γε τὸ ἴσως φορὰν δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τὸ λάβδα ἐγκείμενον; οὐ τὰ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ σκληρότητος;

ΚΡΑ. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγκειται, ὦ Σώκρατες·

CRATYLUS

soc. In the same way, names can never be like anything unless those elements of which the names are composed exist in the first place and possess some kind of likeness to the things which the names imitate ; and the elements of which they are composed are the letters, are they not ?

cra. Yes.

soc. Then I must now ask you to consider with me the subject which Hermogenes and I discussed a while ago. Do you think I am right in saying that rho is expressive of speed, motion, and hardness, or not ?

cra. You are right.

soc. And lambda is like smoothness, softness, and the other qualities we mentioned ?

cra. Yes.

soc. You know, of course, that we call the same thing *σκληρότης* (hardness) which the Eretrians call *σκληρότηρ* ?

cra. Certainly.

soc. Have rho and sigma both a likeness to the same thing, and does the final rho mean to them just what the sigma means to us, or is there to one of us no meaning ?

cra. They mean the same to both.

soc. In so far as rho and sigma are alike, or in so far as they are not ?

cra. In so far as they are alike.

soc. And are they alike in all respects ?

cra. Yes ; at least for the purpose of expressing motion equally.

soc. But how about the lambda in *σκληρότης* ? Does it not express the opposite of hardness ?

cra. Well, perhaps it has no right to be there,

PLATO

ὡσπερ καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ σὺ πρὸς Ἑρμογένη ἔλεγες ἔξαιρῶν τε καὶ ἐντιθεὶς γράμματα οὐδέοι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκεις ἔμοιγε. καὶ νῦν ἴσως ἀντὶ τοῦ λάβδα ῥῶ δεῖ λέγειν.

Ε ΣΩ. Εὐ λέγεις. τί οὖν; νῦν ὡς λέγομεν, οὐδὲν μανθάνομεν ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδάν τις φῆ σκληρόν, οὐδὲ οἶσθα σὺ νῦν ὅ τι ἐγὼ λέγω;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐγώ γε, διὰ γε τὸ ἔθος, ὦ φίλτατε.

ΣΩ. Ἐθος δὲ λέγων οἶει τι διάφορον λέγειν ξυνθήκης; ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ γινώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι; οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;

435 ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ γινώσκεις ἐμοῦ φθειγγομένου, δήλωμά σοι γίνεται παρ' ἐμοῦ;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγωμαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι τῆ ἢ φῆς σὺ σκληρότητι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς σαυτῷ ξυνέθου καὶ σοι γίνεται ἢ ὀρθότης τοῦ ὀνόματος ξυνθήκη, ἐπειδὴ γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ ξυνθήκης τυχόντα; εἰ δ' ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι Β τὸ ἔθος ξυνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα ξυγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε—τὴν γὰρ σιγὴν σου ξυγχώρησιν θήσω—ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ ξυνθήκην τι καὶ ἔθος ξυμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι λέγομεν· ἐπεὶ, ὦ βέλ-

CRATYLUS

Socrates ; it may be like the cases that came up in your talk with Hermogenes, when you removed or inserted letters where that was necessary. I think you did right ; and in this case perhaps we ought to put a rho in place of the lambda.

soc. Excellent. However, do we not understand one another when anyone says *σκληρόν*, using the present pronunciation, and do you not now know what I mean ?

cra. Yes, but that is by custom, my friend.

soc. In saying " custom " do you think you are saying anything different from convention ? Do you not mean by " convention " that when I speak I have a definite meaning and you recognize that I have that meaning ? Is not that what you mean ?

cra. Yes.

soc. Then if you recognize my meaning when I speak, that is an indication given to you by me.

cra. Yes.

soc. The indication comes from something which is unlike my meaning when I speak, if in your example *σκληρότης* the lambda is unlike hardness ; and if this is true, did you not make a convention with yourself, since both like and unlike letters, by the influence of custom and convention, produce indication ? And even if custom is entirely distinct from convention, we should henceforth be obliged to say that custom, not likeness, is the principle of indication, since custom, it appears, indicates both by the like and by the unlike. And since we grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that your silence gives consent—both convention and custom must contribute something towards the indication of our meaning when we speak. For, my friend, if you

PLATO

τιστε, εἰ θέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔλθειν, πόθεν οἶει ἔξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 C ἐπενεγκεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔᾶς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ
 ξυνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος
 πέρι; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ
 τὸ δυνατόν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν·
 ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα
 ἢ ἢ ὀλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἢ
 καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ,
 εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα. ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατὰ γε τὸ
 δυνατόν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς
 πλείστοις ὁμοίοις¹ λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσ-
 D ἤκουσιν, αἰσχίστα δὲ τούναντίον. τότε δέ μοι
 ἔτι εἶπέ μετὰ ταῦτα, τίνα ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἔχει τὰ
 ὀνόματα καὶ τί φῶμεν αὐτὰ καλὸν ἀπεργάζεσθαι;

42. ΚΡΑ. Διδάσκειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 καὶ τοῦτο πάνυ ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὅς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα
 ἐπίστηται, ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Κρατύλε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις,
 ὡς ἐπειδὴν τις εἰδῆ τὸ ὄνομα οἷόν ἐστιν — ἔστι δὲ
 οἷόνπερ τὸ πρᾶγμα—εἴσεται δὴ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα,
 E ἐπεὶπερ ὅμοιον τυγχάνει ὃν τῷ ὀνόματι, τέχνη δὲ
 μία ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἢ αὕτη πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων.
 κατὰ τοῦτο δὴ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὡς ὅς ἂν τὰ
 ὀνόματα εἰδῆ εἴσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα.

ΚΡΑ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτ' ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος
 οὗτος τῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν ὄντων ὃν σὺ λέγεις νῦν,
 καὶ πότερον ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ ἄλλος, οὗτος μέντοι
 βελτίων, ἢ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἄλλος ἢ οὗτος. ποτέρως
 οἶει;

¹ ὁμοίοις Heindorf: ὁμοίως BT.

CRATYLUS

will just turn your attention to numbers, where do you think you can possibly get names to apply to each individual number on the principle of likeness, unless you allow agreement and convention on your part to control the correctness of names? I myself prefer the theory that names are, so far as is possible, like the things named; but really this attractive force of likeness is, as Hermogenes says, a poor thing, and we are compelled to employ in addition this commonplace expedient, convention, to establish the correctness of names. Probably language would be, within the bounds of possibility, most excellent when all its terms, or as many as possible, were based on likeness, that is to say, were appropriate, and most deficient under opposite conditions. But now answer the next question. What is the function of names, and what good do they accomplish?

CRA. I think, Socrates, their function is to instruct, and this is the simple truth, that he who knows the names knows also the things named.

SOC. I suppose, Cratylus, you mean that when anyone knows the nature of the name—and its nature is that of the thing—he will know the thing also, since it is like the name, and the science of all things which are like each other is one and the same. It is, I fancy, on this ground that you say whoever knows names will know things also.

CRA. You are perfectly right.

SOC. Now let us see what this manner of giving instruction is, to which you refer, and whether there is another method, but inferior to this, or there is no other at all. What do you think?

PLATO

436 ΚΡΑ. Οὕτως ἔγωγε, οὐ πάνυ τι εἶναι ἄλλον, τοῦτον δὲ καὶ μόνον καὶ βέλτιστον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ καὶ εὔρεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην εἶναι, τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα εὐρόντα καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἠύρηκένα ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ ζητεῖν μὲν καὶ εὐρίσκειν ἕτερον δεῖν τρόπον, μαθάνειν δὲ τοῦτον;

ΚΡΑ. Πάντων μάλιστα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ εὐρίσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον κατὰ ταῦτά.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐννοήσωμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἴ τις ζητῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, Β σκοπῶν οἷον ἕκαστον βούλεται εἶναι, ἄρ' ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐ σμικρὸς κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι;

ΚΡΑ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἠγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὧς φαμεν. ἢ γάρ;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ὀρθῶς ἠγεῖτο, ἔθετο δὲ οἷα ἠγεῖτο, τί οἷει ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ πείσεσθαι; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι;

ΚΡΑ. Ἄλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχη,¹ ὦ Σώκρατες, C ἄλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἂν ὀνόματα εἶη. μέγιστον δέ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε οὕτω ξύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα· ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὧς πάντα κατὰ ταῦτόν² καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, ὦγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδέν

¹ ἔχη Β: ἔχει Τ.

² κατὰ ταῦτόν cod. Gudianus: κατ' αὐτό Β: om. Τ.

CRATYLUS

CRA. I think there is no other at all ; this is both the best and the only method.

soc. Do you think this is also the method of discovering realities, and that he who has discovered the names has discovered also the things named ; or do you think inquiry and discovery demand another method, and this belongs to instruction ?

CRA. I most certainly think inquiry and discovery follow this same method and in the same way.

soc. Let us consider the matter, Cratylus. Do you not see that he who in his inquiry after things follows names and examines into the meaning of each one runs great risks of being deceived ?

CRA. How so ?

soc. Clearly he who first gave names, gave such names as agreed with his conception of the nature of things. That is our view, is it not ?

CRA. Yes.

soc. Then if his conception was incorrect, and he gave the names according to his conception, what do you suppose will happen to us who follow him ? Can we help being deceived ?

CRA. But, Socrates, surely that is not the case. He who gave the names must necessarily have known ; otherwise, as I have been saying all along, they would not be names at all. And there is a decisive proof that the name-giver did not miss the truth, one which you must accept ; for otherwise his names would not be so universally consistent. Have you not yourself noticed in speaking that all names were formed by the same method and with the same end in view ?

soc. But that, Cratylus, is no counter argument.

PLATO

ἐστὶν ἀπολόγημα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλῆς ὁ
 D τιθέμενος τὰλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὐτῷ
 συμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν
 διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ
 ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα
 ἤδη ὄντα ἐπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις. δεῖ δὴ
 περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ
 τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε
 ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης
 ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἐπόμενα. οὐ

E μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμ-
 φωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. πάλιν γὰρ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἃ τὸ
 πρότερον διήλθομεν. ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ
 φερομένου καὶ ρέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν
 οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα. ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν;

437 ΚΡΑ. Πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶ-
 τον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἀμφί-
 βολόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνοντι ὅτι ἴστησιν
 ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συμ-
 περιφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ
 τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμβάλλοντας¹ τὸ εἰ
 ἐπειστήμην,² ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ
 τῆς ἐν τῷ εἰ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ βέβαιον, ὅτι
 βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως μίμημα, ἀλλ' οὐ
 B φορᾶς. ἔπειτα ἡ ἱστορία αὐτό που σημαίνει, ὅτι
 ἴστησιν τὸν ῥοῦν. καὶ τὸ πιστὸν ἴσταν παντάπασιν
 σημαίνει. ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ μνήμη παντὶ που μηνύει,
 ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' οὐ φορά. εἰ δὲ
 βούλει, ἢ ἀμαρτία καὶ ἢ συμφορά, εἰ κατὰ τὸ

¹ ἐμβάλλοντας T: ἐκβάλλοντας B.

² ἐπειστήμην Heindorf: ἐπιστήμην BT: πιστήμην al.

CRATYLUS

For if the giver of names erred in the beginning and thenceforth forced all other names into agreement with his own initial error, there is nothing strange about that. It is just so sometimes in geometrical diagrams; the initial error is small and unnoticed, but all the numerous deductions are wrong, though consistent. Every one must therefore give great care and great attention to the beginning of any undertaking, to see whether his foundation is right or not. If that has been considered with proper care, everything else will follow. However, I should be surprised if names are really consistent. Let us review our previous discussion. Names, we said, indicate nature to us, assuming that all things are in motion and flux. Do you not think they do so?

CRA. Yes, and they indicate it correctly.

SOC. Let us first take up again the word *ἐπιστήμη* (knowledge) and see how ambiguous it is, seeming to indicate that it makes our soul stand still (*ἴσθησιν*) at things, rather than that it is carried round with them, so it is better to speak the beginning of it as we now do than to insert the epsilon and say *ἐπεῖσθήμη*; we should insert an iota rather than an epsilon. Then take *βέβαιον* (firm), which expresses position and rest, not motion. And *ἱστορία* (inquiry) means much the same, that it stops (*ἴσθησι*) the flow. And *πιστόν* (faithful) most certainly means that which stops (*ἱστών*) motion. Then again, anyone can see that *μνήμη* (memory) expresses rest (*μονή*) in the soul, not motion. On the other hand, *ἁμαρτία* (error) and *ξυμφορά* (misfortune), if you consider

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ὄνομά τις ἀκολουθήσει, φανεῖται ταῦτόν τῇ ξυνέσει ταύτῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ὀνόμασιν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἡ ἀμαθία καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία παραπλησία τούτοις φαίνεται· ἢ C μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἅμα θεῶ ἰόντος πορεία φαίνεται, ἢ ἀμαθία, ἢ δ' ἀκολασία παντάπασιν ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται. καὶ οὕτως, ἃ νομίζομεν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακίστοις ὀνόματα εἶναι, ὁμοιώτατ' ἂν φαίνοιο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πόλλ' ἂν τις εὖροι εἰ πραγματεύοιο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα οὐδὲ φερόμενα ἀλλὰ μένοντα τὰ πράγματα σημαίνειν.

KPA. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾶς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ D ἐκείνως ἐσήμαινεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε; ὥσπερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης; ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα, ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τάληθῆ;

KPA. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε.

438 ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γε αὐτοῦ ἐάσωμεν,¹ ἐπανέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν

¹ After ἐάσωμεν d adds in the margin τάδε δὲ ἐπισκεψώμεθα, εἰ ἡμῖν καὶ τῆδε ὁμολογεῖς εἶτε καὶ οὐ. φέρε, τοὺς τὰ ὀνόματα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιθεμένους ἐκάστοτε, ἐν τε ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς καὶ βαρβαρικαῖς, οὐκ ἀρτίως ὁμολογοῦμεν νομοθέτας εἶναι καὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν τοῦτο δυναμένην νομοθετικὴν; KPA. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ, οἱ πρῶτοι νομοθέται τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα πότερον γινώσκοντες τὰ πράγματα, οἷς ἐτίθεντο, ἐτίθεντο ἢ ἀγνοοῦντες; KPA. Οἶμαι μὲν ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, γινώσκοντες. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ πω (l. που), ὦ ἐταῖρε Κρατύλε, ἀγνοοῦντές γε. KPA. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. “And let us consider whether you agree with me in this also. Have we not just now been agreeing that those who make the names in the various cities, whether Greek or barbarian, are lawgivers and possess the science of lawgiving which

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merely the form of the names, will appear to be the same as *σύνεσις* (intellect) and *ἐπιστήμη* and all the other names of good significance. Moreover, *ἀμαθία* (ignorance) and *ἀκολασία* (unrestraint) also appear to be like them; for the former, *ἀμαθία*, seems to be *τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία* (the progress of one who goes with God), and *ἀκολασία* seems to be exactly *ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν* (movement in company with things). And so names which we believe have the very worst meanings appear to be very like those which have the best. And I think we could, if we took pains, find many other words which would lead us to reverse our judgement and believe that the giver of names meant that things were not in progress or in motion, but were at rest.

CRA. But, Socrates, you see that most of the names indicate motion.

SOC. What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count names like votes, and shall correctness rest with the majority? Are those to be the true names which are found to have that one of the two meanings which is expressed by the greater number?

CRA. That is not reasonable.

SOC. No, not in the least, my friend. Now let us drop this and return to the point at which we

has the power of giving names? CRA. Certainly. SOC. Well then, did the first lawgivers give the first names with knowledge of the things to which they gave them, or in ignorance? CRA. With knowledge of them, I think, Socrates. SOC. Yes, for they certainly did not give them in ignorance. CRA. No, I do not think they did."

The same late hand adds *ἐκ ποίων δέ*, indicating that *ἐπανέλθωμεν . . . ΚΡΑ. εἰδόμενα* (below) are to be omitted.

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ὄθεν δεῦρο μετέβημεν. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγκαῖον ἔφησθα εἶναι εἰδότα τίθεσθαι οἷς ἐτίθετο. πότερον οὖν ἔτι σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡΑ. Ἔτι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸν τὰ πρῶτα τιθέμενον εἰδότα φῆς τίθεσθαι;

ΚΡΑ. Εἰδότα.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ ποίων οὖν ὀνομάτων ἢ μεμαθηκῶς ἢ Β εὐρηκῶς ἦν τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ τά γε πρῶτα μὴ πω ἔκειτο, μαθεῖν δ' αὖ φαμεν τὰ πράγματα καὶ εὐρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλως ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας οἷά ἐστι;

ΚΡΑ. Δοκεῖς τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίνα οὖν τρόπον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς εἰδότας θέσθαι ἢ νομοθέτας εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ὄνομα κείσθαι τε καὶ ἐκείνους εἰδέναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα μαθεῖν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων;

ΚΡΑ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἀληθέστατον λόγον περὶ τούτων εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα, οἶει, ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ θεός, ὦν¹ δαίμων τις ἢ θεός; ἢ οὐδέν σοι ἐδοκῶμεν ἄρτι λέγειν;

ΚΡΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦ² τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ὀνόματα.

ΣΩ. Πότερα, ὦ ἄριστε, τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν στάσιν

¹ ὁ θεός ὦν t: ὁ θήσων BT.

² ἦ vulg.: ἦν BT.

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digressed. A little while ago, you may remember, you said he who gave names must have known the things to which he gave them. Do you still hold that opinion, or not ? ”

CRA. I do.

SOC. And you say that he who gave the first names also knew the things which he named ?

CRA. Yes, he knew them.

SOC. But from what names had he learned or discovered the things, if the first names had not yet been given, and if we declare that it is impossible to learn or discover things except by learning or ourselves discovering the names ?

CRA. I think there is something in what you say, Socrates.

SOC. How can we assert that they gave names or were lawgivers with knowledge, before any name whatsoever had been given, and before they knew any names, if things cannot be learned except through their names ?

CRA. I think the truest theory of the matter, Socrates, is that the power which gave the first names to things is more than human, and therefore the names must necessarily be correct.

SOC. Then, in your opinion, he who gave the names, though he was a spirit or a god, would have given names which made him contradict himself ? Or do you think there is no sense in what we were saying just now ?

CRA. But, Socrates, those that make up one of the two classes are not really names.

SOC. Which of the two, my excellent friend ; the class of those which point towards rest or of those

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ἄγοντα ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν φορὰν; οὐ γάρ που κατὰ τὸ ἄρτι λεχθὲν πλήθει κριθήσεται.

D ΚΡΑ. Οὗτοι¹ δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὀνομάτων οὖν στασιασάντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τὰ ὅμοια τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῶν δ' ἑαυτά, τίνι ἔτι διακρινούμεν, ἢ ἐπὶ τί ἐλθόντες; οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλ' ἄττα ζητητέα πλὴν ὀνομάτων, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐμφανιεῖ ἄνευ ὀνομάτων ὀπότερα τούτων ἐστὶ τὰληθῆ, δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι

E τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων.

ΚΡΑ. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, δυνατόν μαθεῖν ἄνευ ὀνομάτων τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.

ΚΡΑ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὖν ἔτι προσδοκᾶς ἂν αὐτὰ μαθεῖν; ἄρα δι' ἄλλου του ἢ οὐπὲρ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον, δι' ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πη ξυγγενῆ ἐστίν, καὶ αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν; τὸ γάρ που ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἀλλοῖον ἕτερον ἂν τι καὶ ἀλλοῖον² σημαῖνοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα.

ΚΡΑ. Ἀληθῆ μοι φαίνει λέγειν.

439 ΣΩ. Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὰ καλῶς κείμενα εἰκότα εἶναι ἐκείνοις ὧν ὀνόματα κεῖται, καὶ εἶναι εἰκόνας τῶν πραγμάτων;

ΚΡΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα δι' ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μαθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτῶν,

¹ οὗτοι Heindorf: οὕτω ΒΤ.

² ἀλλοῖον Heusde: ἄλλο ὄν ΒΓ.

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that point towards motion? We agreed just now that the matter is not to be determined by mere numbers.

CRA. No ; that would not be right, Socrates.

SOC. Then since the names are in conflict, and some of them claim that *they* are like the truth, and others that *they* are, how can we decide, and upon what shall we base our decision? Certainly not upon other names differing from these, for there are none. No, it is plain that we must look for something else, not names, which shall show us which of these two kinds are the true names, which of them, that is to say, show the truth of things.

CRA. That is my opinion.

SOC. Then if that is true, Cratylus, it seems that things may be learned without names.

CRA. So it appears.

SOC. What other way is left by which you could expect to know them? What other than the natural and the straightest way, through each other, if they are akin, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them would signify not them, but something other and different.

CRA. I think that is true.

SOC. Stop for Heaven's sake! Did we not more than once agree that names which are rightly given are like the things named and are images of them?

CRA. Yes.

SOC. Then if it be really true that things can be learned either through names or through themselves

PLATO

ποτέρα ἂν εἶη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἢ μάθησις; ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνοσ· μαθάνειν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὴν, εἰ καλῶσ εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἧσ ἦν εἰκόν, B ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτὴν τε αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆσ, εἰ πρεπόντωσ εἴργασται;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐκ τῆσ ἀληθείασ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Ὅντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μαθάνειν ἢ εὐρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, μείζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

ΚΡΑ. Φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.

44. ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπωσ μὴ ἡμᾶσ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐσ ταῦτὸν τείνοντα C ἐξαπατᾶ, εἰ¹ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντεσ γε² ἔθεντο ὡσ ἰόντων ἀπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ρεόντων—φαίνονταί γάρ ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ³ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—, τὸ δ', εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτωσ ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὡσπερ εἰσ τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντεσ κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶσ ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν. σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκισ ὄνειρώττω. πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστων τῶν D ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;

ΚΡΑ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκείνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τι ἐστὶν καλὸν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ρεῖν· ἀλλ' αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιούτων ἀεὶ ἐστὶν οἷόν ἐστιν;

¹ ἐξαπατᾶ, εἰ Wytttenbach: ἐξαπατᾶται καὶ B: ἐξαπατᾶ καὶ Γ. ² γε Ast: τε ΒΤ. ³ αὐτῷ Heindorf: αὐτοί ΒΤ.

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which would be the better and surer way of learning ? To learn from the image whether it is itself a good imitation and also to learn the truth which it imitates, or to learn from the truth both the truth itself and whether the image is properly made ?

CRA. I think it is certainly better to learn from the truth.

SOC. How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you or me to determine ; but it is worth while to have reached even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names.

CRA. That is clear, Socrates.

SOC. Then let us examine one further point to avoid being deceived by the fact that most of these names tend in the same direction. Suppose it should prove that although those who gave the names gave them in the belief that all things are in motion and flux—I myself think they did have that belief—still in reality that is not the case, and the name-givers themselves, having fallen into a kind of vortex, are whirled about, dragging us along with them. Consider, my worthy Cratylus, a question about which I often dream. Shall we assert that there is any absolute beauty, or good, or any other absolute existence, or not ?

CRA. I think there is, Socrates.

SOC. Then let us consider the absolute, not whether a particular face, or something of that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not, in our opinion, absolute beauty always such as it is ?

PLATO

ΚΡΑ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οἶόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθύς γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξίεναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΡΑ. Ἀνάγκη.

Ε ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἔν γ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ ιδέας;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθεῖη γε ὑπ' οὐδε-
440 νόσ. ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθεῖη ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον· γνώσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.

ΚΡΑ. Ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνώσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἢ γνώσις, τοῦ γνώσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει,¹ μένοι τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἢ γνώσις καὶ εἴη γνώσις· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος
B μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τ' ἂν μεταπίπτει εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνώσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνώσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ

¹ μεταπίπτει PD: μεταπίπτει B (by correction): μεταπίπτει T.

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CRA. That is inevitable.

soc. Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this, then that it is that, or must it inevitably, in the very instant while we are speaking, become something else and pass away and no longer be what it is ?

CRA. That is inevitable.

soc. How, then, can that which is never in the same state be anything ? For if it is ever in the same state, then obviously at that time it is not changing ; and if it is always in the same state and is always the same, how can it ever change or move without relinquishing its own form ?

CRA. It cannot do so at all.

soc. No, nor can it be known by anyone. For at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different, so that its nature and state can no longer be known ; and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state.

CRA. It is as you say.

soc. But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed ; for if knowledge itself does not change and cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there would be knowledge ; but if the very essence of knowledge changes, at the moment of the change to another essence of knowledge there would be no knowledge, and if it is always changing, there will always be no knowledge, and by this reasoning there will be neither any-

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γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἶη· εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν αἰεὶ τὸ γιγνώσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν Ὁ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῆ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾶ. ταῦτ' οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥάδιον ἢ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, δισχυρίζεσθαι ὡς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρω

Δ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ρεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν δῆ, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὐ. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι—ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν ἔχεις—, σκεψάμενον δέ, εἰ ἐὺ ῥησ, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί.

ΚΡΑ. Ἄλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλὰ μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον Ἐ ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει.

ΣΩ. Εἰς αὐθις τοίνυν με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διδάξεις, ἐπειδὴν ἤκησ· νῦν δέ, ὥσπερ παρεσκεύασαι, πορεύου εἰς ἀγρόν· προπέμψει δέ σε καὶ Ἑρμογένης ὄδε.

ΚΡΑ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.

CRATYLUS


one to know nor anything to be known. But if there is always that which knows and that which is known—if the beautiful, the good, and all the other verities exist—I do not see how there is any likeness between these conditions of which I am now speaking and flux or motion. Now whether this is the nature of things, or the doctrine of Heracleitus and many others is true, is another question; but surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names, and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots, or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time. Perhaps, Cratylus, this theory is true, but perhaps it is not. Therefore you must consider courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything carelessly—for you are still young and in your prime; then, if after investigation you find the truth, impart it to me.

CRA. I will do so. However, I assure you, Socrates, that I have already considered the matter, and after toilsome consideration I think the doctrine of Heracleitus is much more likely to be true.


SOC. Some other time, then, my friend, you will teach me, when you come back; but now go into the country as you have made ready to do; and Hermogenes here will go with you a bit.

CRA. Very well, Socrates, and I hope you also will continue to think of these matters.

—



PARMENIDES



INTRODUCTION TO THE *PARMENIDES*

THIS dialogue is narrated by Cephalus of Clazomenae, who tells how it was repeated to him by Antiphon. The latter had himself heard it from Pythodorus, who was present as a listener when Parmenides conversed with Socrates and others.

Parmenides, the great Eleatic philosopher, is described as a man of about sixty-five years of age, and Socrates is said to have been at the time a young man. If we assume twenty years as the age of Socrates, the imaginary date of the dialogue would be about 449 B.C., from which it results that Parmenides was born not far from 514 B.C., some twenty-five years later than the date frequently given on the authority of Diogenes Laertius (ix. 23). Zeno of Elea is described as a man of about forty years, and probably he really was not far from twenty-five years younger than Parmenides. The other persons of the dialogue are Adeimantus and Glaucon, Plato's brothers, both of whom appear also in the *Republic* and the *Symposium*, Antiphon, their half-brother, Aristoteles, who was one of the Thirty Tyrants, and Pythodorus, son of Isolochus. This Pythodorus was a general in the Peloponnesian War.

The introduction (126 A to 137 B) gives the dramatic setting, introduces the speakers, and

INTRODUCTION TO THE *PARMENIDES*

exhibits the futility of some of Zeno's paradoxes, which the youthful Socrates shows to be no paradoxes at all (to 130 A). Then (to 137 B), in a brief discussion carried on by Parmenides and Socrates, some of the chief difficulties of the doctrine of ideas, at least in its extreme form, are set forth. The objections to this doctrine are not answered, and the dialogue proceeds in the form of a lecture by Parmenides, interrupted only by brief questions or expressions of assent on the part of Aristoteles who, being the youngest man present, serves as interlocutor.

To show his method, Parmenides chooses to discuss first the hypothesis that one is or exists, and then the hypothesis that one is not or does not exist. As the principle of dichotomy is elaborately illustrated by the Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophist*, so here the method of division by contradictories or opposites is illustrated by Parmenides. The conclusion reached is: Whether the one is or is not, the one and the others, in relation to themselves and to each other, all in every way are and are not, and appear and do not appear. This seems to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Eleatic doctrines and methods, put into the mouth of the chief of the Eleatic school. Yet this is the school of thought for which Plato appears to have had the greatest respect, and he always speaks of Parmenides as a thinker to be revered.

It is hardly to be supposed that the whole purpose of this dialogue is to show the difficulties inherent in the doctrine of ideas and in the Eleatic doctrine of being, since these are the doctrines which Plato elsewhere advocates or, at least, treats with most

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profound respect. Yet this negative result is all that appears with any clearness. There can be no doubt that Plato's contemporaries, living in the atmosphere of philosophical discussion which pervaded the Athens of those days, understood many allusions which are lost to us, and were able to appreciate Plato's point of view more fully than any modern scholar can hope to do, but even for them the result of this dialogue must have been chiefly, if not entirely, negative. In greater or less degree the same is true of several other dialogues which appear to belong to nearly the same date as the *Parmenides*. Such are the *Theaetetus*, the *Cratylus*, the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus*. These all seem to be more or less polemical, and in most of them the interest in method is evident. It may be that more positive results were reached by Plato in his oral teaching, or that these dialogues were to be followed by a series of more positively constructive treatises which were never actually written. The *Parmenides*, like other dialogues of nearly the same date, may be regarded rather as a preparatory exercise than as a definitive presentation of Platonic doctrine.

There are special annotated editions of the *Parmenides* by Thomas Maguire (Dublin, 1882) and W. W. Waddell (Glasgow, 1894).

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ· ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

St. III
p. 126

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ,
ΠΥΘΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΖΗΝΩΝ, ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ,
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1. ΚΕΦ. Ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδεϊμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκῳ· καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδεϊμάντος· “χαῖρ’,” ἔφη, “ὦ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἴ του δέει τῶν τῆδε ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε.”

“Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ,” εἶπον ἐγώ, “πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.”

“Λέγοις ἄν,” ἔφη, “τὴν δέησιν.”

B Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· “τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα.”

“Πάνυ γε,” ἔφη.

“Αὐτῷ δέ γε;”

“Ἀντιφῶν.¹ ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει;”

¹ αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν B: αὐτῷ δέ γε ἀντιφῶν (spoken by Adeimantus) T.

PARMENIDES

[OR ON IDEAS : LOGICAL]

CHARACTERS

CEPHALUS, ADEIMANTUS, ANTIPHON, GLAUCON,
PYTHODORUS, SOCRATES, ZENO, PARMENIDES,
ARISTOTELES

CEPH. When we came from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the market-place. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said, "Welcome, Cephalus ; if there is anything we can do for you here, let us know."

"Why," said I, "that is just why I am here, to ask a favour of you."

"Tell us," said he, "what it is."

And I said, "What was your half-brother's name ? I don't remember. He was only a boy when I came here from Clazomenae before ; and that is now a long time ago. His father's name, I believe, was Pylilampes."

"Yes," said he.

"And what is his own name ?"

"Antiphon. But why do you ask ?"

PLATO

“ Οἶδ’,” εἶπον ἐγώ, “ πολῖταί τ’ ἐμοί¹ εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἄντιφῶν Πυθοδώρω τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἐταίρω πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε, C καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει.”

“ Ἄληθῆ,” ἔφη, “ λέγεις.”

“ Τούτων τοίνυν,” εἶπον, “ δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι.”

“ Ἄλλ’ οὐ χαλεπόν,” ἔφη· “ μειράκιον γὰρ ὦν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἵππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ’ εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ’ αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.”

127 Ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἄντιφῶντα οἴκοι χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἷ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὦν ἔνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέ τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ ἡσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὠκνει—πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο. ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἄντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιντό ποτε εἰς B Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολίον, καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν· καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγονέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς C ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κερα-

¹ τ’ ἐμοί Stephanus: τέ μοί T: μοί B.

PARMENIDES

“These gentlemen,” I said, “are fellow-citizens of mine, who are very fond of philosophy. They have heard that this Antiphon had a good deal to do with a friend of Zeno’s named Pythodorus, that Pythodorus often repeated to him the conversation which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once had together, and that he remembers it.”

“That is true,” said he.

“Well,” I said, “we should like to hear it.”

“There is no difficulty about that,” said he; “for when he was a youth he studied it with great care; though now he devotes most of his time to horses, like his grandfather Antiphon. If that is what you want, let us go to him. He has just gone home from here, and he lives close by in Melite.”

Thereupon we started, and we found Antiphon at home, giving a smith an order to make a bridle. When he had got rid of the smith and his brothers told him what we were there for, he remembered me from my former visit and greeted me cordially, and when we asked him to repeat the conversation, he was at first unwilling—for he said it was a good deal of trouble—but afterwards he did so. Antiphon, then, said that Pythodorus told him that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea; that Parmenides was already quite elderly, about sixty-five years old, very white-haired, and of handsome and noble countenance; Zeno was at that time about forty years of age; he was tall and good-looking, and there was a story that Parmenides had been in love with him. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus outside of the wall, in Cerameicus,

PLATO

μεικῶ· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κοιμισθῆναι· Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον· ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, ἤνικα αὐτός τε
 D ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ' ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὲν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.

2. Τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης·

E “ Πῶς,” φάναι, “ ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἶόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;”

“ Οὕτω,” φάναι τὸν Ζήωνα.

“ Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἶη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα· ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστὶ; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἶει σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσουςπερ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; 128 οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω;”

PARMENIDES

and that Socrates and many others with him went there because they wanted to hear Zeno's writings, which had been brought to Athens for the first time by them. Socrates was then very young. So Zeno himself read aloud to them, and Parmenides was not in the house. Pythodorus said the reading of the treatises was nearly finished when he came in himself with Parmenides and Aristoteles (the one who was afterwards one of the thirty), so they heard only a little that remained of the written works. He himself, however, had heard Zeno read them before.

Socrates listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said :

“ Zeno, what do you mean by this ? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible ; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike ? Is not that your meaning ? ”

“ Yes,” said Zeno.

“ Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many ; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible. Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many ? And you think each of your treatises is a proof of this very thing, and therefore you believe that the proofs you offer that existences are not many are as many as the treatises you have written ? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood ? ”

PLATO

“ Οὐκ, ἀλλά,” φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, “ καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.”

“ Μανθάνω,” εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, “ ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλία βούλεται ὠκειῶσθαι,¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι. ταῦτόν γάρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ² σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φῆσι
B εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς παμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρησθαι.”

“ Ναί,” φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, “ ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ’ οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ἤσθησαι· καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι
C σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τι μέγα διαπραπτόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας
D αὐτὸν κωμωδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἐν ἔστι, πολλά καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ

¹ οἰκειῶσθαι BT: corr. B²t.

² ὅπερ Proclus: ὄνπερ B: ὄ*περ T.

PARMENIDES

“ No,” said Zeno, “ you have grasped perfectly the general intent of the work.”

“ I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “ that Zeno here wishes to be very close to you not only in his friendship, but also in his writing. For he has written much the same thing as you, but by reversing the process he tries to cheat us into the belief that he is saying something new. For you, in your poems, say that the all is one, and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion ; and he, on the other hand, says it is not many, and he also furnishes very numerous and weighty proofs. That one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each of you expresses himself so that although you say much the same you seem not to have said the same things at all, appears to the rest of us a feat of expression quite beyond our power.”

“ Yes, Socrates,” said Zeno, “ but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings. You follow the arguments with a scent as keen as a Laconian hound’s, but you do not observe that my treatise is not by any means so pretentious that it could have been written with the intention you ascribe to it, of disguising itself as a great performance in the eyes of men. What you mentioned is a mere accident, but in truth these writings are meant to support the argument of Parmenides against those who attempt to jeer at him and assert that if the all is one many absurd results follow which contradict his theory. Now this treatise opposes

PLATO

πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτ᾽¹ καὶ πλείω τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοϊότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστίν, ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίῳι. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ E ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἶτε μῆ. ταῦτη οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἶει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεὶ, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπέικασας."

3. "Ἄλλ' ἀποδέχομαι," φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, "καὶ ἠγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὐ' ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἐστίν 129 ἀνόμοιον· τούτοιον δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίνεσθαι ταύτη τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά B τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαινε ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδέ γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ταῦτ᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα

¹ ταῦτ᾽ Schleiermacher: ταῦτα B: om. T.

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the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one. It was in such a spirit of controversy that I wrote it when I was young, and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not. So, Socrates, you are not aware of this and you think that the cause of its composition was not the controversial spirit of a young man, but the ambition of an old one. In other respects, as I said, you guessed its meaning pretty well."

"I see," said Socrates, "and I accept your explanation. But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, and those which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation? And even if all things partake of both opposites, and are enabled by their participation to be both like and unlike themselves, what is there wonderful about that? For if anyone showed that the absolute like becomes unlike, or the unlike like, that would, in my opinion, be a wonder; but if he shows that things which partake of both become both like and unlike, that seems to me, Zeno, not at all strange, not even if he shows that all things are one by participation in unity and that the same are also

PLATO

πολλά τῷ πλήθους αὐτὸ μετέχειν· ἀλλ' εἰ δ' ἔστιν
 ἓν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλά ἀποδείξει καὶ αὐτὸ τὰ πολλά
 C δὴ ἓν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη
 τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τὰναντία ταῦτα
 πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἓν
 τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν,
 λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλά ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς
 ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ μου ἔστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ
 ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα
 D δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· πλή-
 θους γάρ, οἶμαι, μετέχω· ὅταν δὲ ἓν, ἐρεῖ ὡς
 ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς ἐγὼ εἶμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων
 καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα.
 εἰ οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῆ πολλά καὶ ἓν ταῦτα
 ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
 φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλά καὶ ἓν ἀποδεικνύειν, οὐ τὸ
 ἓν πολλά οὐδὲ τὰ πολλά ἓν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστόν
 λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν· εἰ δέ
 τις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται
 E τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλήθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ
 στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα
 ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ
 διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνει, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη,
 "θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν
 πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν
 ὦδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν
 αὐτὴν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι
 130 παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὄρω-
 μένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῶ λαμ-
 βανομένοις ἐπιδείξει."

PARMENIDES

many by participation in multitude; but if he shows that absolute unity is also many and the absolute many again are one, then I shall be amazed. The same applies to all other things. If he shows that the kinds and ideas in and by themselves possess these opposite qualities, it is marvellous; but if he shows that I am both one and many, what marvel is there in that? He will say, when he wishes to show that I am many, that there are my right parts and my left parts, my front parts and my back parts, likewise upper and lower, all different; for I do, I suppose, partake of multitude; and when he wishes to show that I am one, he will say that we here are seven persons, of whom I am one, a man, partaking also of unity; and so he shows that both assertions are true. If anyone then undertakes to show that the same things are both many and one—I mean such things as stones, sticks, and the like—we shall say that he shows that they are many and one, but not that the one is many or the many one; he says nothing wonderful, but only what we should all accept. If, however, as I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should," said he, "be filled with amazement, Zeno. Now I think this has been very manfully discussed by you; but I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects."

PLATO

4. Λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν ἂν¹ οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην. “ὦ Σώκρατες,”
 B φάναι, “ὡς ἄξιός εἰ ἀγασθαι τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καὶ μοι εἶπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτὸ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῇ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες;”

“Ἐμοιγε,” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

“Ἡ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε,” εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, “οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν τῶν τοιούτων;”

“Ναί,” φάναι.

C “Τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοῖ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος;”

“Ἐν ἀπορίᾳ,” φάναι, “πολλάκις δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως.”

“Ἡ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θριξὶ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ρύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἶτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι
 D χωρὶς, ὃν ἄλλο αὐτῶν ὧν² ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἶτε καὶ μή;”

¹ ἂν add. Burnet. ² αὐτῶν ὧν Heindorf: αὐτῶν ἢ ὧν BT.

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Pythodorus said that he thought at every word, while Socrates was saying this, Parmenides and Zeno would be angry, but they paid close attention to him and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates, and when he stopped speaking Parmenides expressed their approval. "Socrates," he said, "what an admirable talent for argument you have! Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?"

"Yes, I do," said Socrates.

"And also," said Parmenides, "abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good, and all such conceptions?"

"Yes," he replied.

"And is there an abstract idea of man, apart from us and all others such as we are, or of fire or water?"

"I have often," he replied, "been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not."

"And are you undecided about certain other things, which you might think rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else particularly vile and worthless? Would you say that there is an idea of each of these distinct and different from the things with which we have to do, or not?"

PLATO

“ Οὐδαμῶς,” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, “ ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε ἄπερ ὀρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μὴ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταῦτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτη στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μὴ ποτε εἰς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας¹ ἔμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ’ οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.”

Ε “ Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι,” φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, “ ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

131 5. Τόδε οὖν μοι εἶπέ· δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἶδη ἅττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι;”

“ Πάνυ γε,” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

“ Οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο;”

“ Καὶ πῶς ἂν;” εἶπεν.

“ Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὄν, ἢ πῶς;”

“ Τί γὰρ κωλύει,” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, “ ὦ Παρμενίδην, ἐνεῖναι²;”

Β “ Ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ ταῦτόν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν

¹ φλυαρίας Par. 1836, Proclus (CD), Syenesius, *Origines*: φλυαρίαν BT.

² ἐνεῖναι Schleiermacher: ἐν εἶναι BT: secl. Burnet.

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“By no means,” said Socrates. “No, I think these things are such as they appear to us, and it would be quite absurd to believe that there is an idea of them; and yet I am sometimes disturbed by the thought that perhaps what is true of one thing is true of all. Then when I have taken up this position, I run away for fear of falling into some abyss of nonsense and perishing; so when I come to those things which we were just saying do have ideas, I stay and busy myself with them.”

“Yes, for you are still young,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not yet taken hold upon you, Socrates, as I think it will later. Then you will not despise them; but now you still consider people’s opinions, on account of your youth. Well, tell me; do you think that, as you say, there are ideas, and that these other things which partake of them are named from them, as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”

“Certainly,” said Socrates.

“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?”

“How could there be?” said he.

“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?”

“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

“Then while it is one and the same, the whole

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ὄλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἶη.”

“ Οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε,” φάναι, “ οἶον¹ ἡμέρα² μία καὶ ἢ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταυτὸν εἶη.”

“ Ἡδέως γε,” φάναι, “ ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταυτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἶον εἰ ἰστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι C ὄλον. ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖ λέγειν; ”

“ Ἰσως,” φάναι.

“ Ἡ οὖν ὄλον ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ τὸ ἰστίον εἶη ἂν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ; ”

“ Μέρος.”

“ Μεριστὰ ἄρα,” φάναι, “ ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστίν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὄλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου ἂν εἶη.”

“ Φαίνεται οὕτω γε.”

“ Ἡ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; ”

“ Οὐδαμῶς,” εἰπεῖν.

“ Ὅρα γάρ,” φάναι. “ εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος D μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται; ”

“ Πάνυ γ’,” ἔφη.

“ Τί δέ; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος³ ἕκαστον σμικρὸν

¹ οἶον εἰ BT : οἶον Proclus.

² ἡμέρα εἶη BT : εἶη secl. Heindorf.

³ μέρος Proclus : μέρους BT (corr. t).

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of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself."

"No," he replied, "for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once."

"That," said he, "is very neat, Socrates; you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over many. Is not that about what you mean?"

"Perhaps it is," said Socrates.

"Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?"

"A part over each."

"Then," said he, "the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea."

"So it appears."

"Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?"

"By no means," he replied.

"No," said Parmenides, "for if you divide absolute greatness, and each of the many great things is great by a part of greatness smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Or again, will anything be taken away a

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ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ὧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῷ ἔσται;”

“ Ἀδύνατον.”

“ Ἄλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται· ὧ δ’ ἂν προστεθῆ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο
E σμικρότερον ἔσται ἄλλ’ οὐ μείζον ἢ πρίν.”

“ Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,” φάναι, “ τοῦτό γε.”

“ Τίνα οὖν τρόπον,” εἰπεῖν, “ ὧ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;”

“ Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία,” φάναι, “ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.”

“ Τί δὲ δὴ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις;”

“ Τὸ ποῖον;”

132 “ Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκάστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ’ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι.”

“ Ἀληθῆ λέγεις,” φάναι.

“ Τί δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἄλλα τὰ μεγάλα, εἰάν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτὸ μέγα φανείται, ὧ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη¹ μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;”

“ Ἐοικεν.”

“ Ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ’ αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα
B αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ὧ ταῦτα

¹ ἀνάγκη om. B.

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particular small part of equality possess something by means of which, when it is less than absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else ? ”

“ That is impossible. ”

“ Or let one of us have a part of the small ; the small will be greater than this, since this is a part of it, and therefore the absolute small will be greater ; but that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller, not greater, than before. ”

“ That, ” said he, “ is impossible. ”

“ How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes ? ”

“ By Zeus, ” he replied, “ I think that is a very hard question to determine. ”

“ Well, what do you think of this ? ”

“ Of what ? ”

“ I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this ; when there is a number of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one. ”

“ That is true, ” he said.

“ But if with your mind’s eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great ? ”

“ So it seems. ”

“ That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it ; and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great ;

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πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.”

6. “ Ἄλλά,” φάναι, “ ὦ Παρμενίδη,” τὸν Σωκράτη, “ μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη¹ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐν γε ἕκαστον εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἅ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.”

“ Τί οὖν; ” φάναι, “ ἐν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ”

“ Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον,” εἰπεῖν.

“ Ἄλλὰ τινός; ”

“ Ναί.”

C “ ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; ”

“ ὄντος.”

“ Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ,² μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; ”

“ Ναί.”

“ Εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὄν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ”

“ Ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται.”

“ Τί δὲ δὴ; ” εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, “ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ³ τᾶλλα φῆς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ”

D “ Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο,” φάναι, “ ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἢ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς

¹ προσήκη Proclus: προσήκει BΓ.

² ἐπὸν νοεῖ Proclus (cod. B): ἐπὸν νοεῖν Γ: εἶπον νοεῖν B.

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and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite."

"But, Parmenides," said Socrates, "each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds; then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned."

"But," he said, "is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?"

"That is impossible," he replied.

"But of something?"

"Yes."

"Of something that is, or that is not?"

"Of something that is."

"A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?"

"Yes."

"Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?"

"That, again, seems inevitable."

"Well then," said Parmenides, "does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?"

"That is quite unreasonable, too," he said, "but Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them;

³ ἀνάγκη ἦ Waddell: ἀνάγκη ἦ B: ἀναγκη ἦ T: ἀνάγκη εἰ Proclus.

PLATO

ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.”

“Εἰ οὖν τι,” ἔφη, “ἔοικε τῷ εἶδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ’ ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι;”

“Οὐκ ἔστι.”

“Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ’ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἔνός τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν;”

“Ἀνάγκη.”

“Οὐ δ’ ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾗ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος;”

“Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.”

133 “Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλω· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τω ὅμοιον ᾗ,¹ ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.”

“Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.”

“Οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τὰλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.”

“Ἐοικεν.”

“Ὅρας οὖν,” φάναι, “ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄση ἢ ἀπορία, ἐάν τις ὡς εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ διορίζηται;”

“Καὶ μάλα.”

B “Εὐ τοίνυν ἴσθι,” φάναι, “ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπτει αὐτῆς ὄση ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις.”

¹ ᾗ] ἢ BT.

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their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing else."

"Then if anything," he said, "resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?"

"No, there is none."

"And must not necessarily the like partake of the same idea as its like?"

"It must."

"That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?"

"Certainly."

"Then it is impossible that anything be like the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they are alike, some further idea, in addition to the first, will always appear, and if that is like anything, still another, and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it."

"Very true."

"Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas; we must seek some other method of participation."

"So it seems."

"Do you see, then, Socrates, how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?"

"Yes, certainly."

"You may be sure," he said, "that you do not yet, if I may say so, grasp the greatness of the difficulty involved in your assumption that each idea is one and is something distinct from concrete things."

PLATO

“ Πῶς δὴ; ” εἰπεῖν.

“ Πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, ” φάναι, “ μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γινώσκεισθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἶδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. ”

“ Πῆ δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη; ” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

“ Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. ”

“ Πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; ” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

“ Καλῶς λέγεις, ” εἰπεῖν. “ οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἷ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπη δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὢν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως. ”

“ Πῶς λέγεις; ” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

“ Οἶον, ” φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, “ εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δούλος ἐστίν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότης Ε δὴ που, ὁ ἐστὶ δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δούλος ἐστίν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὁ ἐστὶ δούλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα

PARMENIDES

“ How is that ? ” said he.

“ There are many reasons,” he said, “ but the greatest is this : if anyone should say that the ideas cannot even be known if they are such as we say they must be, no one could prove to him that he was wrong, unless he who argued that they could be known were a man of wide education and ability and were willing to follow the proof through many long and elaborate details ; he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.”

“ Why is that, Parmenides ? ” said Socrates.

“ Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”

“ No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said Socrates.

“ You are right,” he said. “ Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses, or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.”

“ What do you mean ? ” said Socrates.

“ For instance,” said Parmenides, “ if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, nor is the master the master of slave in the abstract ; each is a man and is master

PLATO

ταῦτά ἐστιν· αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας
 ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία
 αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα
 τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ',
 134 ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι,
 καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἑαυτά. ἢ οὐ
 μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

“ Πάνυ γ’,” εἶπεν τὸν Σωκράτη, “ μανθάνω.”

7. “ Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη,” φάναι, “ αὐτὴ
 μὲν ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς
 ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;

“ Πάνυ γε.”

“ Ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἣ ἐστὶν,
 ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἐστὶν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ
 οὔ;”

“ Ναί.”

“ Ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν
 ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἣ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπι-
 Β στήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη
 συμβαίνοι εἶναι;

“ Ἀνάγκη.”

“ Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς,
 οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι.”

“ Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.”

“ Γινώσκεται δέ γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους
 τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστα;”

“ Ναί.”

“ Ὁ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.”

“ Οὐ γάρ.”

“ Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γινώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν
 οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.”

“ Οὐκ ἔοικεν.”

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or slave of a man ; but mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract, but our slaves and masters are not relative to them, nor they to us ; they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves. You understand what I mean, do you not ? ”

“ Certainly,” said Socrates, “ I understand.”

“ Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth ? ”

“ Certainly.”

“ And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not ? ”

“ Yes.”

“ And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and each kind of our knowledge be the knowledge of each kind of truth that exists among us ? ”

“ Yes, that is inevitable.”

“ But the ideas themselves, as you agree, we have not, neither can they be among us ”

“ No, they cannot.”

“ And the various classes of ideas are known by the absolute idea of knowledge ? ”

“ Yes.”

“ Which we do not possess.”

“ No, we do not.”

“ Then none of the ideas is known by us, since we do not partake of absolute knowledge.”

“ Apparently not.”

PLATO

C “ “Αγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ
ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς
οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.”

“ Κινδυνεύει.”

“ “Ορα δὴ ἔτι τοῦτου δεινότερον τόδε.”

“ Τὸ ποῖον;”

“ Φαίης ἂν που,¹ εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὐτό τι γένος
ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν
παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα
οὕτως.”

“ Ναί.”

“ Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετ-
έχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν
ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;”

“ Ἀνάγκη.”

D “ “Ἄρ’ οὖν οἷός τε αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν
γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;”

“ Τί γὰρ οὐ;”

“ “Ὅτι,” ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, “ ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν,
ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ’
ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν
πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα.”

“ Ὁμολόγηται γάρ.”

E “ Οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβε-
στάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη,
οὐτ’ ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἢ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δε-
σπόσειεν, οὐτ’ ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίῃ οὐδέ τι
ἄλλο τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ’ ἐκείνων
οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν
τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε
αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπότηται ἡμῶν

¹ που Γ: ἢ οὐ Β.

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“ Then the absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.”

“ I am afraid they are.”

“ Now we come to a still more fearful consequence.”

“ What is it ? ”

“ You would say, no doubt, that if there is an absolute kind of knowledge, it is far more accurate than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and all the rest ? ”

“ Yes.”

“ And if anything partakes of absolute knowledge, you would say that there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge ? ”

“ Of course.”

“ Then will it be possible for God to know human things, if he has absolute knowledge ? ”

“ Why not ? ”

“ Because,” said Parmenides, “ we have agreed that those ideas are not relative to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to themselves.”

“ Yes, we have agreed to that.”

“ Then if this most perfect mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, his mastership can never rule us, nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world ; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not

ΠΛΑΤΟ

εἰσὶν οὐτε γινώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.”

“ Ἄλλὰ μὴ λίσαν,” ἔφη, “ θαυμαστός ὁ λόγος ἦ,¹ εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει² τοῦ εἰδέναί.”

135 “ Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες,” ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, “ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἶη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τι λέγειν, καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτῇ B καθ’ αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον.”

“ Συγχωρῶ σοι,” ἔφη, “ ὦ Παρμενίδη,” ὁ Σωκράτης· “ πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις.”

“ Ἄλλὰ μέντοι,” εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, “ εἴ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸ μὴ εἰσείη³ εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δῆ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι⁴ ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅπῃ τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν C τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασιν διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιοῦτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθησθαι.”

“ Ἀληθῆ λέγεις,” φάναι.

¹ ἦ add. Heindorf.

² ἀποστερήσει Stephanus : ἀποστερήσειε BΓ.

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our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs."

"But surely this," said he, "is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge."

"And yet, Socrates," said Parmenides, "these difficulties and many more besides are inseparable from the ideas, if these ideas of things exist and we declare that each of them is an absolute idea. Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the ideas do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and, as I was saying just now, he is amazingly hard to convince. Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and only a still more wonderful man can find out all these facts and teach anyone else to analyse them properly and understand them."

"I agree with you, Parmenides," said Socrates, "for what you say is very much to my mind."

"But on the other hand," said Parmenides, "if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of ideas of things, and does not assume an idea under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss, since he denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. You seem to have been well aware of this."

"Quite true," he said.

³ *εἰσση* BT.

⁴ *μὴ δέτι* B : *μηδ' ὅτι* T.

PLATO

8. “ Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῆ τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; ”

“ Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι. ”

“ Πρῶ γάρ, ” εἰπεῖν, “ πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.
D ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῶην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὐ ἴσθι, ἡ ὄρμη, ἢ ὄρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. ”

“ Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, ” φάναι, “ ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; ”

“ Οὗτος, ” εἰπεῖν, “ ὄνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος.
E πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐκ εἶας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἠγήσαιο εἶναι. ”

“ Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ” ἔφη, “ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι οὖν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν. ”

“ Καὶ καλῶς γ, ” ἔφη. “ χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον
136 ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι. ”

“ Πῶς λέγεις; ” φάναι.

“ Οἶον, ” ἔφη, “ εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἢν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἔστι, τί χρὴ

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“Then what will become of philosophy? To what can you turn, if these things are unknown?”

“I do not see at all, at least not at present.”

“No, Socrates,” he said, “for you try too soon, before you are properly trained, to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all the other ideas. You see I noticed it when I heard you talking yesterday with Aristoteles here. Your impulse towards dialectic is noble and divine, you may be assured of that; but exercise and train yourself while you are still young in an art which seems to be useless and is called by most people mere loquacity; otherwise the truth will escape you.”

“What, then, Parmenides,” he said, “is the method of training?”

“That which you heard Zeno practising,” said he. “However, even when you were speaking to him I was pleased with you, because you would not discuss the doubtful question in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to what we conceive most entirely by the intellect and may call ideas.”

“Yes,” he said, “that is because I think that in that way it is quite easy to show that things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.”

“Quite right,” said he, “but if you wish to get better training, you must do something more than that; you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.”

“What do you mean?” he said.

“Take, for instance,” he replied, “that hypothesis of Zeno’s; if the many exist, you should inquire what

PLATO

ξυμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ
 πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν,
 τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ
 B πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἔαν
 ὑποθῆ, εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέ-
 ρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς
 ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς
 ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ
 περὶ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ
 φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι·
 καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ
 ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος,
 C δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς
 ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅ τι ἂν προέλη, καὶ πρὸς
 πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τὰλλα αὖ
 πρὸς αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν προαιρῆ αἰεὶ,
 ἔαντε ὡς ὄν ὑποθῆ ὁ ὑπετίθεσο, ἔαντε ὡς μὴ ὄν,
 εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι
 τὸ ἀληθές."

"Ἀμήχανον," ἔφη, "λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη,
 πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω. ἀλλά μοι
 τί οὐ διῆλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μάλλον
 καταμάθω;"

D "Πολὺν ἔργον," φάναι, "ὦ Σώκρατες, προσ-
 τάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε."

"Ἀλλὰ σύ," εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, "Ζήνων,
 τί οὐ διῆλθες ἡμῖν;"

Καὶ τὸν Ζήωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι· "αὐτοῦ,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου. μὴ γὰρ οὐ
 φαῦλον ἢ ὁ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾶς ὅσον ἔργον προσ-

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will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and to the many, and also what will happen to the one and the many in relation to themselves and to each other, if the many do not exist. And likewise if you suppose the existence or non-existence of likeness, what will happen to the things supposed and to other things in relation to themselves and to each other under each of the two hypotheses. The same applies to unlikeness and to motion and rest, creation and destruction, and even to being and not being. In brief, whatever the subject of your hypothesis, if you suppose that it is or is not, or that it experiences any other affection, you must consider what happens to it and to any other particular things you may choose, and to a greater number and to all in the same way ; and you must consider other things in relation to themselves and to anything else you may choose in any instance, whether you suppose that the subject of your hypothesis exists or does not exist, if you are to train yourself completely to see the truth perfectly."

"Parmenides," he said, "it is a stupendous amount of study which you propose, and I do not understand very well. Why do you not yourself frame an hypothesis and discuss it, to make me understand better ?"

"That is a great task, Socrates," he said, "to impose upon a man of my age."

"But you, Zeno," said Socrates, "why do not you do it for us ?"

Pythodorus said that Zeno answered with a smile : "Let us ask it of Parmenides himself, Socrates ; for there is a great deal in what he says,

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τάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἤμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτω· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθείνουν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.”

9. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην· “ἀνάγκη,” φάναι, “πείθεσθαι.
 137 καὶ τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἴβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ὦ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῆ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ’ ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι’ ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἵεναι· καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος¹ λόγων· ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὃ² Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀρξώμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἐν ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;”

“ Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” φάναι τὸν Ζήωνα.

“ Τίς οὖν;” εἰπεῖν, “ μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ

¹ πέλαγος Stephanus (fr. Ficinus), and Proclus seems to have had this reading: πλῆθος BΓ.

² ὁ Bekker: ὁ BΓ.

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and perhaps you do not see how heavy a task you are imposing upon him. If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him ; for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age ; for the many do not know that except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain to the truth. So I, Parmenides, join Socrates in his request, that I myself may hear the method, which I have not heard for a long time."

Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when Zeno said this he himself and Antisthenes and the rest begged Parmenides to show his meaning by an example and not to refuse. And Parmenides said : " I must perforce do as you ask. And yet I feel very much like the horse in the poem of Ibycus¹—an old race-horse who was entered for a chariot race and was trembling with fear of what was before him, because he knew it by experience. Ibycus says he is compelled to fall in love against his will in his old age, and compares himself to the horse. So I am filled with terror when I remember through what a fearful ocean of words I must swim, old man that I am. However, I will do it, for I must be obliging, especially since we are, as Zeno says, alone. Well, how shall we begin? What shall be our first hypothesis? Or, since you are determined that I must engage in a laborious pastime, shall I begin with myself, taking my own hypothesis and discussing the consequences of the supposition that the one exists or that it does not exist? "

" By all means," said Zeno.

" Who then," said he, " is to answer my questions? "

¹ Ibycus, fragm. 2 Bergk.

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νεώτατος; ἤκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἂ οἶεται μάλιστ' ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἶη ἢ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.”

C “Ἐτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη,” φάναι, “τοῦτο,” τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· “ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων· ἀλλ' ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.”

10. “Εἶεν δὴ,” φάναι· “εἰ ἓν ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἶη πολλὰ τὸ ἓν;” “πῶς γὰρ ἂν;” “οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.” “τί δὴ;” “τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος¹ ἐστίν.” “Ναί.” “Τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὐδ' ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῆ, ὅλον ἂν εἶη;” “πάνυ γε.” “ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἶη, ὅλον τε ὄν καὶ μέρη ἔχον.”

D “ἀνάγκη.” “ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν.” “ἀληθῆ.” “δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ' ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι.” “δεῖ.” “οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἓν.” “οὐ γάρ.”

“Οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶη.” “ὀρθῶς.” “καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου.” “πῶς δ' οὐ;” “ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἓν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει.” “ἄπειρον.” “καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα·

E οὔτε γὰρ² ἂν στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει.³” “πῶς;” “στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχη.” “ναί.” “καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἔσχατοι ἐπίπροσθεν ᾗ.” “οὕτως.” “οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἓν καὶ πόλλ' ἂν

¹ ὅλου μέρος B: μέρος ὅλου T.

² γὰρ BT: γὰρ ἂν vulg.

³ μετέχει Proclus: μετέχοι BT.

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Shall we say the youngest? He would be least likely to be over-curious and most likely to say what he thinks; and moreover his replies would give me a chance to rest."

"I am ready, Parmenides, to do that," said Aristoteles, "for I am the youngest, so you mean me. Ask your questions and I will answer."

"Well then," said he, "if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?" "No, of course not." "Then there can be no parts of it, nor can it be a whole." "How is that?" "The part surely is part of a whole." "Yes." "And what is the whole? Is not a whole that of which no part is wanting?" "Certainly." "Then in both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole and having parts." "Inevitably." "Then in both cases the one would be many, not one." "True." "Yet it must be not many, but one." "Yes." "Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts." "No."

"And if it has no parts, it can have no beginning, or middle, or end, for those would be parts of it?" "Quite right." "Beginning and end are, however, the limits of everything." "Of course." "Then the one, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited." "Yes, it is unlimited." "And it is without form, for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight." "How so?" "The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the centre." "Yes." "And the straight, again, is that of which the middle is in the nearest line between the two extremes." "It is." "Then the one would have parts and would

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εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι.”
 “ πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “ οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές
 138 ἐστίν, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει.” “ ὀρθῶς.”

“ Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.” “ πῶς δὴ;”
 “ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὄν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη,¹ καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῆ κύκλῳ ἄπτεσθαι.” “ ἀδύνατον.” “ ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν κἂν ἑαυτῷ² εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο
 B ἢ αὐτό,³ εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἐν τῷ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον.” “ ἀδύνατον γάρ.”
 “ οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἀμφω ταῦτόν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσεται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.”
 “ οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἐν, μήτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.” “ οὐκ ἔστιν.”

11. “ Ὅρα δὴ, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἶόν τέ ἐστίν ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι.” “ τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ;” “ ὅτι
 C κινούμενόν γε⁴ ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν· αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.” “ ναί.” “ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι.” “ ἀδύνατον.” “ οὐκ ἄρα κατ’ ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται.” “ οὐ φαίνεται.” “ ἀλλ’ ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι;” “ ἴσως.” “ καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας.” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ

¹ ἐνείη Heindorf: ἂν ἐν εἴη B: ἂν εἴη T.

² ἑαυτῷ B: ἑαυτὸ T, Proclus.

³ αὐτὸ Diels: αὐτὸ BT, Proclus.

⁴ γε b, Proclus al.: τε BT, Stobaeus.

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be many, whether it partook of straight or of round form." "Certainly." "Then it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts." "Right."

"Moreover, being of such a nature, it cannot be anywhere, for it could not be either in anything else or in itself." "How is that?" "If it were in something else, it would be encircled by that in which it would be and would be touched in many places by many parts of it; but that which is one and without parts and does not partake of the circular nature cannot be touched by a circle in many places." "No, it cannot." "But, furthermore, being in itself it would also be surrounding with itself naught other than itself, if it were in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not surround it." "No, it cannot." "Then that which surrounds would be other than that which is surrounded; for a whole cannot be both active and passive in the same action; and thus one would be no longer one, but two." "True." "Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in something else." "No, it is not."

"This being the case, see whether it can be either at rest or in motion." "Why not?" "Because if in motion it would be either moving in place or changing; for those are the only kinds of motion." "Yes." "But the one, if changing to something other than itself, cannot any longer be one." "It cannot." "Then it is not in motion by the method of change." "Apparently not." "But by moving in place?" "Perhaps." "But if the one moved in place, it would either revolve in the same spot or pass from one place to another." "Yes, it must do so." "And that which revolves

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μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν
 D ἑαυτοῦ. ὧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι;" "οὐδεμία." "ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;" "εἶπερ γε δὴ." "οὐκοῦν εἶναι μὲν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ¹ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη;" "ναί." "ἂρ' οὖν γίνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον;" "οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπη." "εἰ ἔν τῷ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πῶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἶπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται;" "ἀνάγκη."

E "εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὗ μέρη εἶη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἶη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε ἔξω." "ἀληθῆ." "οὐ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήθ' ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;" "φαίνε-
 139 ται." "οὐτ' ἄρα ποι ἰὸν καὶ ἔν τῷ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον." "οὐκ ἔοικεν." "κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον." "ἀκίνητον." "ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί γέ φαμεν ἔν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον." "φαμέν γάρ." "οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν." "τί δὴ;" "ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶη, ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν." "πάνυ μὲν οὖν." "ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι.²" "οὐ γὰρ οὖν." "οὐδέποτε ἄρα
 B ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ." "οὐκ ἔοικεν." "ἀλλὰ

¹ αὐτῷ BT: αὐτὸ vulg.

² ἐνεῖναι b: ἐν εἶναι BT.

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must rest upon a centre and have other parts which turn about the centre ; but what possible way is there for that which has no centre and no parts to revolve upon a centre ? ” “ There is none.” “ But does it change its place by coming into one place at one time and another at another, and move in that way ? ” “ Yes, if it moves at all.” “ Did we not find that it could not be in anything ? ” “ Yes.” “ And is it not still more impossible for it to come into anything ? ” “ I do not understand why.” “ If anything comes into anything, it must be not yet in it, while it is still coming in, nor still entirely outside of it, if it is already coming in, must it not ? ” “ It must.” “ Now if anything goes through this process, it can be only that which has parts ; for a part of it could be already in the other, and the rest outside ; but that which has no parts cannot by any possibility be entirely neither inside nor outside of anything at the same time.” “ True.” “ But is it not still more impossible for that which has no parts and is not a whole to come into anything, since it comes in neither in parts nor as a whole ? ” “ Clearly.” “ Then it does not change its place by going anywhere or into anything, nor does it revolve in a circle, nor change.” “ Apparently not.” “ Then the one is without any kind of motion.” “ It is motionless.” “ Furthermore, we say that it cannot be in anything.” “ We do.” “ Then it is never in the same.” “ Why is that ? ” “ Because it would then be in that with which the same is identical.” “ Certainly.” “ But we saw that it cannot be either in itself or in anything else.” “ No, it cannot.” “ Then the one is never in the same.” “ Apparently not.” “ But that which is

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μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν οὔθ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἕστηκεν." "οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε." "τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔθ' ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται." "οὔκουν δὴ φαίνεται γέ."

"Οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτόν γε οὔθ' ἐτέρω οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἂν εἶη." "πῆ δὴ;" "ἕτερον μὲν που ἑαυτοῦ ὄν ἐνὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἓν." "ἀληθῆ." "καὶ μὴν ταυτόν γε ἐτέρω ὄν ἐκείνο ἂν εἶη, αὐτὸ C δ' οὐκ ἂν εἶη· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἶη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἓν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐνός." "οὐ γὰρ οὖν." "ταυτόν μὲν ἄρα ἐτέρω ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται." "οὐ γάρ." "ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ἦ ἓν. οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἐτέρω τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνω ἐτέρω ἑτέρου, ἀλλῶ δὲ οὐδενί." "ὀρθῶς." "τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἶει;" "οὐ δῆτα." "ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ D δὲ μηδαμῆ ὄν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον." "ὀρθῶς." "οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτόν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται." "πῶς δ' οὔ;" "οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις, αὐτῆ¹ δῆπου καὶ τοῦ ταύτου." "τί δὴ;" "ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὴν ταυτόν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται." "ἀλλὰ τί μὴν;" "τοῖς πολλοῖς ταυτόν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν." "ἀληθῆ." "ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ταυτόν μηδαμῆ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι ταυτόν ἐγίγνετο, αἰεὶ ἂν ἓν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὅποτε ἓν, ταυτόν." "πάνυ γε." "εἰ ἄρα τὸ E ἓν ἑαυτῷ ταυτόν ἔσται, οὐχ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται.

¹ αὐτῆ Proclus: αὐτῆ B: αὐτῆ T.

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never in the same is neither motionless nor at rest.”
“ No, it cannot be so.” “ The one, then, it appears,
is neither in motion nor at rest.” “ No, apparently
not.”

“ Neither, surely, can it be the same with another
or with itself; nor again other than itself or
another.” “ Why not ? ” “ If it were other than
itself, it would be other than one and would not be
one.” “ True.” “ And, surely, if it were the same
with another, it would be that other, and would
not be itself; therefore in this case also it would
not be that which it is, namely one, but other than
one.” “ Quite so.” “ Then it will not be the same
as another, nor other than itself.” “ No.” “ But
it will not be other than another, so long as it is
one. For one cannot be other than anything;
only other, and nothing else, can be other than
another.” “ Right.” “ Then it will not be other
by reason of being one, will it ? ” “ Certainly not.”
“ And if not for this reason, not by reason of itself;
and if not by reason of itself, not itself; but since
itself is not other at all, it will not be other than
anything.” “ Right.” “ And yet one will not be
the same with itself.” “ Why not ? ” “ The nature
of one is surely not the same as that of the same.”
“ Why ? ” “ Because when a thing becomes the
same as anything, it does not thereby become one.”
“ But why not ? ” “ That which becomes the same
as many, becomes necessarily many, not one.”
“ True.” “ But if the one and the same were
identical, whenever anything became the same it
would always become one, and when it became one,
the same.” “ Certainly.” “ Then if the one is the
same with itself, it will not be one with itself; and

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καὶ οὕτω ἓν ὄν οὐχ ἓν ἔσται· ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἡ ἑτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν.” “ἀδύνατον.” “οὕτω δὴ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταῦτόν τὸ ἓν οὐτ’ ἂν αὐτῷ οὐτ’ ἂν ἑτέρῳ εἴη.” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.”

“Οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίον τι εἶναι οὐδ’ ἀνόμοιον οὐθ’ ἑαυτῷ οὐθ’ ἑτέρῳ.” “τί δή;” “ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν που πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον.” “ναί.” “τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταῦτόν.” “ἐφάνη 140 γάρ.” “ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἓν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἓν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.” “ναί.” “οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ’ ἑαυτῷ.” “οὐ φαίνεται.” “οὐδὲ ὁμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ’ ἑαυτῷ.” “οὐκ ἔοικεν.” “οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἓν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἓν.” “πλείω γάρ.” “τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ B ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον.” “ὀρθῶς.” “τὸ δέ γε ἓν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἔστιν οὐθ’ ἑαυτῷ οὐθ’ ἑτέρῳ.” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὐθ’ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν.” “οὐ φαίνεται.”

“Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.” “πῆ;” “ἴσον μὲν ὄν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾗ.” “ναί.” “μείζον δέ που ἢ ἕλαττον ὄν, C οἷς μὲν ἂν ξύμμετρον ᾗ, τῶν μὲν ἕλαττόνων πλείω

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thus, being one, it will not be one; this, however, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for one to be either the other of other or the same with itself."

"Impossible." "Thus the one cannot be either other or the same to itself or another." "No, it cannot." "And again it will not be like or unlike anything, either itself or another." "Why not?" "Because the like is that which is affected in the same way." "Yes." "But we saw that the same was of a nature distinct from that of the one." "Yes, so we did." "But if the one were affected in any way apart from being one, it would be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible." "Yes." "Then the one cannot possibly be affected in the same way as another or as itself." "Evidently not." "Then it cannot be like another or itself." "No, so it appears." "Nor can the one be so affected as to be other; for in that case it would be so affected as to be more than one." "Yes, it would be more." "But that which is affected in a way other than itself or other, would be unlike itself or other, if that which is affected in the same way is like." "Right." "But the one, as it appears, being never affected in a way other than itself or other, is never unlike either itself or other." "Evidently not." "Then the one will be neither like nor unlike either other or itself." "So it seems."

"Since, then, it is of such a nature, it can be neither equal nor unequal to itself or other." "Why not?" "If it is equal, it is of the same measures as that to which it is equal." "Yes." "And if it is greater or less than things with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the

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- μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω.” “ναί.”
 “οἷς δ’ ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν μικροτέρων,
 τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται.” “πῶς γὰρ οὐ;”
 “οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ
 μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὄντινωνοῦν
 τῶν αὐτῶν;” “ἀδύνατον.” “ἴσον μὲν ἄρα
 οὔτ’ ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων
 ὄν.” “οὐκουν φαίνεται γέ.” “ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειό-
 νων γέ μέτρων ὄν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων,
 D τοσοῦτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὕτως αὖ οὐκέτι
 ἐν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.”
 “ὀρθῶς.” “εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν
 γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη,
 ἴσον τῷ¹ αὐτὸ εἶναι.” “ἐφάνη γάρ.” “οὔτε
 ἄρα ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων,
 οὔτε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ
 ποτε, ὡς εἴκειν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὐδ’ αὖ
 μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου.”
 “παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω.”
- E 12. “Τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν
 αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ² δυνατὸν
 εἶναι;” “τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ;” “ὅτι που ἡλικίαν
 μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος
 χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ
 μετεῖναι τῷ ἐνί, οὔθ’ ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος.”
 “ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν.” “καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀν-
 ὁμοιότητος τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ
 τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν.” “πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “πῶς οὖν οἶόν
 141 τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῷ² τοιοῦτον ὄν;” “οὐ-
 δαμῶς.” “οὐκ ἄρ’ ἂν εἴη νεώτερον γέ οὐδὲ

¹ τῷ] αὐτῷ B: τῷ T.

² τῷ] τῷ BT.

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things which are less and less measures than the things which are greater." "Yes." "And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will have smaller measures than some and greater measures than others." "Of course." "Is it not impossible for that which does not participate in sameness to have either the same measures or anything else the same?" "Impossible." "Then not having the same measures, it cannot be equal either to itself or to anything else." "No, apparently not." "But whether it have more measures or less, it will have as many parts as measures; and thus one will be no longer one, but will be as many as are its measures." "Right." "But if it were of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; but we have seen that it cannot be equal to anything." "Yes, so we have." "Then it will partake neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor will it partake at all of the same, nor will it ever, apparently, be equal to itself or to anything else; nor will it be greater or less than itself or another." "Perfectly true."

"Well, does anyone believe that the one can be older or younger or of the same age?" "Why not?" "Because if it has the same age as itself or as anything else, it will partake of equality and likeness of time, and we said the one had no part in likeness or equality." "Yes, we said that." "And we said also that it does not partake of unlikeness or inequality." "Certainly." "How, then, being of such a nature, can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything?" "In no way." "Then the one cannot be younger or

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πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν
 οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.” “οὐ φαίνεται.” “ἄρ’
 οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναται ἂν εἶναι
 τὸ ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴαν τι ἦ
 ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνε-
 σθαι;” “ἀνάγκη.” “οὐκοῦν τό γε πρεσβύτερον
 ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;” “τί μὴν;” “τὸ
 Β πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον
 ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται.” “πῶς λέγεις;” “ὧδε·
 διάφορον ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη
 ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι,
 τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος
 μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε
 μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι
 καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι.” “ἀνάγκη γάρ.” “ἀλλὰ
 C μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶ
 καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.” “ἔστι γάρ.” “τὸ ἄρα
 πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώ-
 τερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι.” “ἔοικεν.” “ἀλλὰ
 μὴν καὶ μῆτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον
 μῆτ’ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι
 ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσε-
 σθαι.” “ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα.” “ἀνάγκη
 ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ καὶ
 D μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν
 τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε
 αὐτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι.” “κινδυ-
 νεύει.” “ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἐνὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν.” “οὐ γὰρ μετῆν.”

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older or of the same age as anything.” “No, evidently not.” “And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself?” “It must.” “And the older is always older than something younger?” “Certainly.” “Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows older.” “What do you mean?” “This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does not have to become different from that which is already different, but it must be different from that which is already different, it must have become different from that which has become so, it will have to be different from that which will be so, but from that which is becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be, nor can it already be different; it must become different, and that is all.” “There is no denying that.” “But surely the notion ‘older’ is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else.” “Yes, so it is.” “But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself.” “So it appears.” “But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself.” “That also is inevitable.” “Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself.” “I see no escape from that.” “But the one had nothing to do with such affections.” “No, it had not.” “It has nothing

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“ οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ’ ἔστιν ἐν
 τινι χρόνῳ.” “ οὐκ οὖν δὴ, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.”
 “ Τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο
 οὐ χρόνου μέθεξις δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγο-
 Ε νότος;” “ καὶ μάλα.” “ τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ
 τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά
 που¹ μέλλοντος;” “ ναί.” “ τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ
 τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;” “ πάννυ μὲν
 οὖν.” “ εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει
 χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ’ ἐγίγνετο οὔτ’ ἦν
 ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ’ ἔστιν,
 οὔτ’ ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτ’ ἔσται.”
 “ ἀληθέστατα.” “ ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι
 μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;” “ οὐκ
 ἔστιν.” “ οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει.”
 “ οὐκ ἔοικεν.” “ οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν.” “ οὐ
 φαίνεται.” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν
 εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὄν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ’
 ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ
 142 τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.” “ κινδυνεύει.” “ ὃ δὲ
 μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἂν τι αὐτῷ ἢ
 αὐτοῦ;” “ καὶ πῶς;” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν
 αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις
 οὐδέ δόξα.” “ οὐ φαίνεται.” “ οὐδ’ ὀνομάζεται
 ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται,
 οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.” “ οὐκ
 ἔοικεν.” “ ἢ δυνατόν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦθ’ οὕτως
 ἔχειν;” “ οὐκ οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.”

13. “ Βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ
 Β ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἄλ-
 λοῖον φανῆ;” “ πάννυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.” “ οὐκ-

¹ ἔπειτά που G. Hermann: ἔπειτα τοῦ ΒΓ.

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to do with time, and does not exist in time." "No, that is the result of the argument."

"Well, and do not the words 'was,' 'has become,' and 'was becoming' appear to denote participation in past time?" "Certainly." "And 'will be,' 'will become,' and 'will be made to become,' in future time?" "Yes." "And 'is' and 'is becoming' in the present?" "Certainly." "Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future." "Very true." "Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?" "It cannot." "Then the one has no share in being at all." "Apparently not." "Then the one is not at all." "Evidently not." "Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted." "That seems to be true." "But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?" "Of course not." "Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it." "Evidently not." "And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it." "Apparently not." "Is it possible that all this is true about the one?" "I do not think so."

"Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?" "By all means." "We say, then,

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οὐν ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτω;” “ναί.” “ὄρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν;” “οὐχ οἷόν τε.” “οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταῦτὸν οὐσα τῶ ἐνί· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐκείνο

C τὸ ἐν ἐκείνης μετείχεν, ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί¹ χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτω;” “πάνυ μὲν οὐν.” “οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν;” “ἀνάγκη.” “ἄρα οὐν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλλήβδην εἶπη ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν;” “πάνυ γε.” “πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστι, τί συμβήσεται. σκόπει οὐν, εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὄν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν;” “πῶς;” “ὦδε·

D εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνὸς, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὐ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἐν ὄν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι;” “ἀνάγκη.” “πότερον οὐν ἐκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσερούμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον;” “τοῦ ὅλου.” “καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἦ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.” “πάνυ γε.” “τί οὐν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος, τό τε

E ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνὸς μορίου;” “οὐκ ἂν εἴη.”

¹ ἐν ἐν, τί] ἐν εντι B: ἐν τι T.

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that if the one exists, we must come to an agreement about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not?" "Yes." "Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being?" "No, it cannot." "Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it, but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree?" "Certainly." "In the belief that 'one' and 'being' differ in meaning?" "Most assuredly." "Then if we say concisely 'one is,' it is equivalent to saying that one partakes of being?" "Certainly." "Let us again say what will follow if one is; and consider whether this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a nature as to have parts." "How does that come about?" "In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?" "Inevitably." "And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?" "A part of the whole." "Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part." "Certainly." "Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity?" "No." "And again each of the parts

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“ πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τό τε ἔν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοις τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως αἰεὶ, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὸ μορίω¹ αἰεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἔν τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ ἴσχει
 143 καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἔν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἔν εἶναι.” “ παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.”
 “ οὐκοῦν ἀπείρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἔν ὄν εἶη; ” “ ἔοικεν.”

“ Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῆδε ἔτι.” “ πῆ; ” “ οὐσίας φαμέν μετέχειν τὸ ἔν, διὸ ἔστιν; ” “ ναί.” “ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἔν ὄν πολλὰ ἐφάνη.” “ οὕτως.”
 “ τί δέ; αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν, ὃ δὴ φαμέν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἔάν αὐτὸ τῆ διανοία μόνον καθ’ αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμέν μετέχειν, ἀρά γε ἔν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τούτου; ” “ ἔν,
 B οἶμαι ἔγωγε.” “ ἴδωμεν² δὴ· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἔν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔν οὐσίας μετέσχευ; ”
 “ ἀνάγκη.” “ οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἢ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔν, οὔτε τῷ ἔν τὸ ἔν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἢ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.” “ πάντων μὲν οὖν.” “ ὥστε οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῆ οὐσία τὸ ἕτερον.” “ πῶς γάρ; ”

“ Τί οὖν; ἔάν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει
 C τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἔν εἴτε τὸ ἔν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀρ’ οὐκ ἔν ἐκάστη τῆ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τινα ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω; ” “ πῶς; ” “ ὡς· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; ” “ ἔστιν.” “ καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν

¹ τούτω τῷ μορίῳ B pr. T.

² ἴδωμεν] εἰδῶμεν BT.

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possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts ; for always unity has being and being has unity ; and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one." " Certainly." " Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number ? " " Apparently."

" Let us make another fresh start." " In what direction ? " " We say that the one partakes of being, because it is ? " " Yes." " And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be many." " Yes." " Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many ? " " One, I should say." " Just let us see ; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being ? " " Yes, that must be so." " Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being, but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different." " Certainly." " Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being." " Certainly not." " Well, then, if we make a selection among them, whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both ? " " What do you mean ? " " I will explain. We can speak of being ? " " Yes." " And we can

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ἔν;” “καὶ τοῦτο.” “ἄρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον
 αὐτοῖν εἴρηται;” “ναί.” “τί δ’ ὅταν εἶπω
 οὐσία τε καὶ ἔν, ἄρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω;” “πάνυ
 γε.” “οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ
 ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἔν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ’ ἑκάστου
 D ἀμφω λέγω;” “ναί.” “ὦ δ’ ἂν ἀμφω ὀρθῶς
 προσαγορεύησθον, ἄρα οἷόν τε ἀμφω μὲν αὐτὸ
 εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή;” “οὐχ οἷόν τε.” “ὦ¹ δ’ ἂν
 δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν
 ἔν εἶναι;” “οὐδεμία.” “τούτων ἄρα ἐπεὶ περ
 σύνδυο² ἕκαστα ξυμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἔν ἂν εἴη
 ἕκαστον.” “φαίνεται.” “εἰ δὲ ἔν ἕκαστον αὐ-
 τῶν ἐστί, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιοῦν ἡτινιοῦν
 συζυγία οὐ τρία γίνεταί τὰ πάντα;” “ναί.”
 E δ’ οὐ;” “τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι
 καὶ δῖς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει
 τῷ τε δύο τὸ δῖς ἔν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς ἔν;”
 “ἀνάγκη.” “δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δῖς οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 δύο δῖς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 αὐτῷ τρία τρίς εἶναι;” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “τί δέ;
 τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δῖς ὄντων καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ
 τρίς ὄντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δῖς εἶναι καὶ δύο
 τρίς³;” “πολλή γε.” “ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκῖς
 144 ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκῖς καὶ ἄρτια περιτ-
 τάκῖς καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκῖς.” “ἔστιν οὕτω.”
 “εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἶει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν
 ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι;” “οὐδαμῶς
 γε.” “εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἔν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.”
 “ἀνάγκη.” “ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πόλλ’
 ἂν εἴη καὶ πλήθος ἀπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ
 ἀπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γί-
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also speak of one ? ” “ Yes, that too. ” “ Then have we not spoken of each of them ? ” “ Yes. ” “ And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both ? ” “ Certainly. ” “ And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both ? ” “ Yes. ” “ If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two ? ” “ They cannot. ” “ And if things are two, must not each of them be one ? ” “ Certainly. ” “ Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one. ” “ That is clear. ” “ But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three ? ” “ Yes. ” “ And three is an odd number, and two is even ? ” “ Of course. ” “ Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is thrice one ? ” “ There must. ” “ But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two ? And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice three ? ” “ Of course. ” “ Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two ? ” “ Inevitably. ” “ Then there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd. ” “ Yes. ” “ Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left out, which does not necessarily exist ? ” “ By no means. ” “ Then if one exists, number must also exist. ” “ It must. ” “ But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude, of existences ; or is not number infinite in multitude

¹ ω] ω̄ B : ω̄ T. ² σύνδυο Stephanus : οὐδὲν δύο B : σύν δύο T.

³ δύο τρίς in marg. b, Proclus suppl. : τρία δις B : δις τρία T.

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γνεται;” “καὶ πάνυ γε.” “οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόνιον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἂν αὐτῆς;” “ναί.”

- B 14. “Ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία νε-
νέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε
τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο
μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία
γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ¹;” “οὐδαμῶς.”
“κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα
καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται
C πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας.”
“ἔχει οὕτω.” “πλείστα ἄρα ἔστι τὰ μέρη
αὐτῆς.” “πλείστα μέντοι.” “τί οὖν; ἔστι τι
αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι
μέρος;” “καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο² γένοιτο;” “ἀλλ’
εἶπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ, ἕως-
περ ἂν ἦ, ἔν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.”
“ἀνάγκη.” “πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστῳ τῷ τῆς
οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστι τὸ ἔν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον
οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου
D οὐδενός.” “οὕτω.” “ἄρα οὖν ἔν ὄν πολλαχοῦ
ἅμα ὄλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει.” “ἀλλ’ ἀθρῶ καὶ
ὄρῳ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.” “μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἶπερ μὴ
ὄλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασιν τοῖς
τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον.”
“ναί.” “καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη
εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη.” “ἀνάγκη.” “οὐκ
ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα
μέρη ἢ οὐσία νενεμημένα εἶη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω
E τοῦ ἐνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ’ ἴσα, ὡς εἴκει, τῷ ἐνί.

¹ ἀποστατοῖ corr. T: ἀποστατοῖη Stobaeus: ἀποστατεῖ B
pr. T. ² τοῦτο] τοι τοῦτο BT.

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and participant of existence ? ” “ Certainly it is.”
“ Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number will partake of it ? ” “ Yes.”

“ Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the smallest ? Indeed, is it not absurd even to ask that question ? For how can existence be wanting in any existing thing ? ”

“ It cannot by any means.” “ Then it is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existences ; nothing else is so much divided, and in short the parts of existence are infinite.” “ That is true.” “ Its parts are the most numerous of all.”

“ Yes, they are the most numerous.” “ Well, is there any one of them which is a part of existence, but is no part ? ” “ How could that be ? ” “ But if there is, it must, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing ; it cannot be nothing.” “ That is inevitable.” “ Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.” “ True.”

“ Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole ? Consider that question.” “ I am considering and I see that it is impossible.” “ Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole ; for it cannot be attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided.” “ I agree.” “ And that which is divided into parts must certainly be as numerous as its parts.” “ It must.” “ Then what we said just now—that existence was divided into the greatest number of parts—was not true ; for it is not divided, you see, into any more parts than one, but, as it seems, into the same number

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οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα." "παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται." "τὸ ἐν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλήθος ἐστίν." "φαίνεται." "οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἐν πολλά ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενομημένον πολλά ἀνάγκη εἶναι." "παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν."

145 15. "Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἶη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;" "ἀνάγκη." "ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἶη." "πῶς δ' οὐ;" "τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὄν ἐν τέ ἐστὶ που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει." "φαίνεται." "ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπεὶ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον;" "ἀνάγκη." "τί δ'; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἂν τοῦ¹ ἐν ὀτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι;" "οὐκ ἐθελήσει." "καὶ B ἀρχὴν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν." "ἔχοι." "ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἶη." "οὐ γάρ." "καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὄν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι εὐ-θέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν." "μετέχοι γὰρ ἂν."

"Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ;" "πῶς;" "τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου." "οὕτως." "πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ C ὅλου περιέχεται;" "ναί." "καὶ μὴν τά γε

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as one ; for existence is not wanting to the one, nor the one to existence, but being two they are equal throughout." "That is perfectly clear." "The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in number." "Clearly." "Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one divided by existence, must be many." "Certainly."

"And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole ; or are not the parts included by the whole ?" "They must be so." "But surely that which includes is a limit." "Of course." "Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number." "So it appears." "Then if limited it has also extremes ?" "Certainly." "Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end ? Or can there be any whole without these three ? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole ?" "It will not." "Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end." "It will." "But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes ; for otherwise it would not be a middle." "No." "And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two." "Yes, it will."

"This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other ?" "How is that ?" "Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole." "True." "And all the parts are included in the whole ?" "Yes." "And

¹ τὸν Schleiermacher : τοῦ ΒΤ.

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πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἓν ἐστὶ, καὶ οὔτε τι πλεόν οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα.” “οὐ γάρ.” “οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἓν ἐστίν;” “πῶς δ’ οὔ;” “εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἓν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη.” “φαίνεται.” “ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐν

D πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐνί,¹ πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται²;

“οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶη, τὸ πλεόν ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἶη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.” “ἀδύνατον γάρ.” “μὴ ὄν δ’ ἐν πλέοσι μηδ’ ἐν ἐνὶ μηδ’ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσιν τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι;” “ἀνάγκη.” “οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὄν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι;” “πάνυ γε.”

“ἢ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ. καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ.” “ἀνάγκη.”

“Οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι;” “πῆ;” “ἔστηκε μὲν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν. ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὄν
146 καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαίνειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἶη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ.” “ἐστὶ γάρ.” “τὸ δὲ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὄν ἐστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι.” “πάνυ

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surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all." "Certainly." "But the whole is the one, is it not?" "Of course." "Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself." "Evidently." "But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?" "It cannot in any way." "Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible." "Yes, it is impossible." "But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in something else or cease to be anywhere at all?" "It must." "And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not?" "Certainly." "Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other; and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other." "It must."

"This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?" "How is that?" "It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself." "It is." "But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest." "Certainly." "Well, then, must not, on

¹ ἐνι corr. Ven. 189: ἐνὶ B: ἐνὶ T.

² ἐνέσται Par. 1836: ἐν ἔσται BT.

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γε.” “ τί δέ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰεὶ ὄν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὄν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; ” “ οὕτως. ” “ ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, αἰεὶ κινεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἐστάναι. ” “ φαίνεται. ”

“ Καὶ μὴν ταυτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ
 B ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταυτόν
 τε καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπον-
 θεν. ” “ πῶς; ” “ πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει.
 ἢ ταυτόν ἐστίν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταυτόν ἢ μηδ’
 ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει,
 ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη. ” “ φαίνεται. ”

“ ἄρ’ οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν; ” “ οὐ-
 δαμῶς. ” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ
 ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν. ” “ οὐ γὰρ
 οἰόν τε. ” “ ἀλλ’ ἄρα ἕτερόν ἐστίν ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν; ”
 C “ οὐ δῆτα. ” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη. ”
 “ οὐ μέντοι. ” “ εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήθ’ ὅλον
 μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 ἤδη ταυτόν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ” “ ἀνάγκη. ”

“ τί δέ; τὸ ἐτέρῳθι ὄν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον
 εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρῳθι ἔσται; ” “ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ”
 “ οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 ὄν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ” “ ἐφάνη γάρ. ” “ ἕτερον
 ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτη ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐν. ”
 D “ ἔοικεν. ” “ τί οὖν; εἰ τού τι¹ ἕτερόν ἐστίν,
 οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται; ” “ ἀνάγκη. ”

16. “ Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἐν ἐστίν, ἅπανθ’ ἕτερα
 τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν; ” “ πῶς δ’ οὐ; ”

¹ εἰ τού τι G : εἰ του τι BT.

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the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?" "True."
"Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest." "That is clear."

"And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true." "How is that?" "Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part." "Obviously."
"Now is the one a part of itself?" "By no means."
"Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself." "No, that is impossible." "Nor can it be other than itself." "Certainly not." "Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?" "It must." "Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?" "I think so."
"Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time."
"Yes, we saw that it was so." "Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself."
"So it appears." "Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?" "Certainly." "Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?" "Of course."

PLATO

“ ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἶη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων.” “ ἕτερον.”
 “ ὄρα δὴ αὐτό τε ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἄρ’ οὐκ
 ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις;” “ πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “ ἦ οὖν
 ἐθελήσει ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταῦτῳ
 ποτὲ εἶναι;” “ οὐκ ἐθελήσει.” “ εἰ ἄρα τὸ
 ἕτερον ἐν ταῦτῳ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν
Ε ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ
 γὰρ ὄντιν οὖν εἶη ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν
 ταῦτῳ εἶη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως;” “ οὕτως.”
 “ ἐπειδὴ δ’ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔστιν, οὐδέποτε
 ἐν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἶη τὸ ἕτερον.” “ ἀληθῆ.”
 “ οὐτ’ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐνείῃ¹ ἂν
 τὸ ἕτερον.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ οὐκ ἄρα τῷ
 ἐτέρῳ γ’ ἂν εἶη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ οὐδὲ μὴν ἐαυ-
 τοῖς γε ἕτερ’ ἂν εἶη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ
 147 ἐτέρου.” “ πῶς γάρ;” “ εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς
 ἕτερα ἔστι μήτε τῷ ἐτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκ-
 φεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων;” “ ἐκ-
 φεύγοι.” “ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς γε μετέχει
 τὰ μὴ ἐν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἐν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πῃ ἂν ἐν ἦν.”
 “ ἀληθῆ.” “ οὐδ’ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ
 ἐν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἐν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀρι-
 θμόν γε ἔχοντα.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ τί δέ; τὰ
 μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ καὶν οὕτω
 μετεῖχε τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν;” “ μετεῖχεν.” “ εἰ
Β ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἔστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὐτ’ ἂν
 μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐν εἶη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων.²

¹ ἐνείῃ] ἐν εἶη B : εἶη T.

² μορίων corr. Ven. 189 : μορίου BT.

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"Then the one would be other than the others."
"Yes, it is other." "Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?" "Of course." "Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?"
"No." "Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?" "Yes, it would." "But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing." "True." "Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one." "No, it cannot." "Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one." "No." "And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other." "Of course not." "But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?" "Quite impossible." "But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one." "True." "Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all." "No, they would not." "Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?"
"Yes, they would partake of it." "If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the

PLATO

οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ενός μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς
μορίῳ τῷ ἐνί." "οὐ γάρ." "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν
τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων
ταῦτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις." "ἔφαμεν γάρ." "φῶμεν
ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ
εἶναι αὐτοῖς;" "φῶμεν." "τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ
καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ." "κινδυνεύει
C φαίνεσθαι ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου."

"Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;" "ἴσως." "ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτε-
ρον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τᾶλλά που ἕτερον ἂν
ἐκείνου εἶη." "τί μὴν;" "οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτε-
ρον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ
οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἡττον;" "τί γὰρ ἂν;" "εἰ
ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἡττον, ὁμοίως." "ναί."
"οὐκοῦν ἢ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ
τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη ταῦτὸν ἂν πεπον-
D θότα εἶεν τό τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τᾶλλα τῷ ἐνί."
"πῶς λέγεις;" "ὧδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων
οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι καλεῖς;" "ἔγωγε." "τί οὖν; τὸ
αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκεις ἢ ἅπαξ;" "ἔγω-
γε." "πότερον οὖν εἴαν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκείνο
προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ ἐστὶ τοῦνομα, εἴαν δὲ πολ-
λάκεις, οὐκ ἐκείνο; ἢ εἴαντε ἅπαξ εἴαντε πολλάκεις
ταῦτὸν ὄνομα φθέγγῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταῦτὸν καὶ
λέγειν αἰεὶ;" "τί μὴν;" "οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτε-
ρον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινι;" "πάνυ γε." "ὅταν
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not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part." "No." "But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another." "Yes, we did." "Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?" "Yes, let us say that." "The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself." "That appears to be the result of our argument."

"Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?" "Perhaps." "At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it." "Of course." "Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?" "Certainly." "And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?" "Yes." "In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one." "What do you mean?" "I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?" "Yes." "Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?" "Yes." "And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?" "The same thing, of course." "The word 'other' is the name of something, is it not?" "Certainly."

PLATO

Ε ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγη, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλω οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ ἦν ὄνομα." "ἀνάγκη." "ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, δις τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν, ἥσπερ ἦν τοῦνομα." "πάνυ μὲν οὖν." "ἦ¹
 148 ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ² ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἶη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον· οὐχί;" "ναί." "ἦ δὴ τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἶη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν." "ἔοικεν."

17. "Ἄλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίω³ ἐναντίον." "ναί." "οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταυτῷ.⁴" "καὶ τοῦτο." "ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταυτόν." B "ἐφάνη γάρ." "τοῦναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταυτόν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων." "πάνυ γε." "ἦ γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη." "ναί." "ἦ ἄρα ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοῦναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὁμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον;" "ναί." "ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταυτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἐτέρω." C "ἔοικεν." "ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἦ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ἦ δὲ ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον." "ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον." "καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει." "τίνα;"

¹ ἦ] ἦ B: ἦ T: ei vulg.

² κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ Thomson: κατὰ ταυτὸ BT.

³ τῷ ἀνομοίω] τῷ ὁμοίω B: τῶν ἀνομοίων T.

⁴ ταυτῷ in marg. T: αὐτῷ BT.

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"Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name."

"Assuredly." "Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word 'other' twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name."

"Certainly." "In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?" "Yes."

"Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things." "So it appears." "But the like is opposed to the unlike." "Yes."

"And the other to the same." "That is also true." "But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others." "Yes, it was."

"And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others." "Certainly." "In so far as it was other it was shown to be like." "Yes."

"Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like." "Yes."

"Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other."

"So it appears." "Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same." "Yes,

that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable." "But there is another besides" "What is it?" "In

PLATO

“ ἢ ταῦτόν πέπονθε, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι· ἢ δ’ ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ ὄν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι.” “ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.”
 “ ταῦτόν τε ἄρα ὄν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ’ ἀμφοτέρα καὶ καθ’ ἑκάτερον, ὁμοίον
 D τε ἂν εἶη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.” “ πάνυ γε.”
 “ οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτόν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ’ ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται;” “ ἀνάγκη.”

“ Τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι πέρα πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει.” “ σκοπῶ.” “ αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄλω τὸ ἐν ἐφάνη ὄν.” “ ὀρθῶς.” “ οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἐν;” “ ναί.” “ ἢ μὲν ἄρα ἐν
 E τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτοιτο ἂν· ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν.” “ φαίνονται.” “ οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἄπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.” “ ἄπτοιτο.” “ τί δὲ τῆδε; ἄρ’ οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἂν μετ’ ἐκείνην ἢ¹ ἢ² ἂν κέηται, ἄπτεται;” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθύς μεθ’ ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν³ ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν.” “ δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.” “ οὐκοῦν
 149 δύο μὲν ὄν τὸ ἐν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ’ ἂν ἢ ἐν, οὐκ ἐθε-

¹ ἢ ἔδρα BT: ἔδρα om. Bekker: ἔδραν Heindorf.

² ἢ B: ἢ T.

³ ἐν T: om. B.

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so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like ; but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike." " True." " Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others." " Certainly." " And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself." " That is inevitable."

" Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things." " I am considering." " The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself." " Right." " And the one is also in other things ?" " Yes." " Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself." " That is clear." " Thus the one would touch itself and the other things." " It would." " But how about this ? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it ?" " It must." " Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is." " Yes, it must." " The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once ; but so long as it

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λήσει;” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ἢ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ.” “ἢ αὐτὴ.” “ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄψεται.” “τί δή;” “ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι χωρὶς ὃν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνω εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.” “ἀληθῆ.” “δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι.” “δεῖ.” “ἐὰν δὲ

B τοῖν δυοῖν ὄρουν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο.” “ναί.” “καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰὲν ἐνὸς προσγινομένου μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ᾧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησε τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεον-

C εκτεῖ. ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἐν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ταῖς ἄψεσιν.” “ὀρθῶς.” “ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, αἰὲν μιᾷ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν.” “ἀληθῆ.” “εἰ δέ γε ἐν μόνον ἐστί, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.” “πῶς γάρ;” “οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν.” “οὐ γάρ.” “οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν¹ ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνότος² ἐν αὐτοῖς.” “πῶς γάρ;” “οὔτ’ ἄρα ἐν ἔστι

D τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν.” “οὔ.” “τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστίν ἐν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη.” “οὐ φαίνεται.” “ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι δυοῖν μὴ ὄντων.” “οὐκ ἔστιν.” “οὔτ’ ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα

¹ ἔνεστιν b: ἐν ἔστιν BT. ² ἐνότος b: ἐν ὄντος B: ὄντος T.

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is one, it will not?" "No, it will not." "The one can no more touch itself than it can be two." "No." "Nor, again, will it touch the others." "Why not?" "Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next it, and there must be no third between them." "True." "Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact." "There must." "And if to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts." "Yes." "And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts. For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts." "Right." "Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less." "True." "But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact." "Of course not." "We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other." "They do not." "Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them." "Of course not." "Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have they the name of any other number." "No." "The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two." "That is clear." "There is no contact if there are no two terms." "No, there is none." "Then the one does not touch the others, nor the

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τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶπερ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν.” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται.” “ἔοικεν.”

18. “Ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὐτῶ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;” “πῶς;” “εἰ μείζον εἶη E τὸ ἐν ἢ τᾶλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῶ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἶη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἶη πρὸς ἀλληλα· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ¹ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν, σμικρότητα δὲ τᾶλλα, ὅποτέρω μὲν τῶ εἶδει μέγεθος προσείη, μείζον ἂν εἶη, ᾧ δὲ σμικρότης, ἔλαττον;” “ἀνάγκη.” “οὐκοῦν ἐστὸν γέ² τινε τούτῳ εἶδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὔσι ἐγγιγνοίσθην.” “πῶς γὰρ 150 ἂν;” “εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῶ ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἦτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη.” “ἀνάγκη.” “τί δ’ εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῶ ἐνὶ δι’ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἶη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό;” “δῆλον δὴ.” “ἄρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὔσα ἢ σμικρότης τῶ ἐνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῶ εἶη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων;” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῶ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν γε τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ B μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς;” “ἀδύνατον.” “ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῶ

¹ τὸ Par. 1810: τὰ BT.

² γέ al.: τέ BT.

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others the one, since there is no contact." "No, certainly not." "Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others." "So it appears."

"And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?" "How is that?" "If the one were greater or less than the others, or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another; or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or *vice versa*, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?" "Certainly." "These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things." "That is obvious." "Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it." "Necessarily." "What if it be in the whole of one? Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?" "Clearly." "And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?" "Of course." "But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?" "No, it cannot." "Then smallness

ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν μέρει.”
 “ναί.” “οὐδέ¹ γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ
 μή, ταῦτα ποιήσει ἄπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται
 ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐνῆ.” “ἀνάγκη.”
 “οὐδενὶ ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης,
 μήτ' ἐν μέρει μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι
 ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος.” “οὐκ
 ἔοικεν.” “οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ.
 C μείζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἶη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους,
 ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ
 αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐδ' ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, εἴανπερ
 ἦ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης
 οὐδαμοῦ ἐνι.” “ἀληθῆ.” “ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγε-
 θος οὐκ ἄλλου μείζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδέ
 σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους.”
 “οὐ γάρ.” “οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ
 ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα
 D ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτῶ τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἔχον τὴν
 δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ, οὔτε αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οὐδέ τῶν
 ἄλλων μείζον ἂν οὐδ' ἔλαττον εἶη, μήτε μέγεθος
 μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.” “οὔκουν φαίνεται γε.”
 “ἂρ' οὖν, εἰ μήτε μείζον μήτε ἔλαττον τὸ ἐν τῶν
 ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε
 ὑπερέχεσθαι;” “ἀνάγκη.” “οὔκουν τό γε μήτε
 ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ
 ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὄν ἴσον εἶναι.” “πῶς γὰρ
 E οὔ;” “καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ
 οὔτως ἂν ἔχοι· μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε
 σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ' ἂν

¹ οὐδέ Hermann: οὔτε B: οὔτι Γ.

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cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it." "Yes." "And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist." "Inevitably." "Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness." "So it appears." "Nor will greatness exist in the one. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere." "True." "But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness." "No." "Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness." "Evidently not." "Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?" "Certainly not." "Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal." "Of course." "And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed

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ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὄν ἴσον ἂν εἶη
 ἑαυτῷ." "πάνυ μὲν οὖν." "τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ
 τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἶη." "φαίνεται."
 "καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ
 ἂν εἶη ἕξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μείζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ
 151 εἶη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἕλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μείζον ἂν
 καὶ ἕλαττον εἶη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐν." "εἶη γὰρ
 ἂν." "οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι
 ἕκτος τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων;" "πῶς γὰρ
 οὐ;" "ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὄν αἰεί."
 "ναί." "οὐκοῦν τό γε ἐν τῷ ὄν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται
 ἕλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἶη."
 "οὐ γάρ." "ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς
 τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἐνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ εἶναι,
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν
 Β τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι;"
 "φαίνεται." "ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἶη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, περιέχοντα
 αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἕλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον·
 ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ
 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μείζον ἂν εἶη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ
 ἐνός ἕλάττω." "ἔοικεν." "τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἴσον τε
 καὶ μείζον καὶ ἕλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων." "φαίνεται." "καὶ μὴν εἶπερ μείζον
 καὶ ἕλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἶη μέτρων καὶ
 C πλειόνων καὶ ἕλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις,
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν." "πῶς δ' οὐ;"
 "ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ
 ἕλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἕλαττον ἂν καὶ πλεόν εἶη
 αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε

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itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself." "Certainly." "The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others." "Evidently." "But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself, and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; thus the one would be both greater and less than itself." "Yes, it would." "And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others?" "Of course." "But that which exists must always exist somewhere." "Yes." "And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it?" "No, it cannot." "But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all?" "Clearly." "And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one." "So it appears." "Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others." "Evidently." "And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts." "Of course." "And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in

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καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταῦτά.” “ πῶς; ” “ ὦν-
 περ μείζον ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη
 αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὦν
 ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταῦτά.”
 “ οὕτως.” “ οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον
 D ὄν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ
 ἔλαττόνων αὐτῶ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν; ”
 “ πῶς δ’ οὐ; ” “ ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὄν αὐτῶ
 ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλεόν,
 ἔλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ.” “ φαί-
 νεται.” “ οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει
 τὸ ἓν; ὅτι μὲν μείζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη
 πλεόν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμι-
 κρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ
 τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις; ” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ οὕτω
 E δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλεόν καὶ
 ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων.” “ ἔσται.”

19. “ Ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν, καὶ
 ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον
 αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον
 οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων,
 χρόνου μετέχον; ” “ πῶς; ” “ εἶναι μὲν που
 αὐτῶ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἓν ἔστιν.” “ ναί.” “ τὸ
 δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου
 152 τοῦ παρόντος, ὡςπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυ-
 θότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας
 ἐστὶ κοινωνία; ” “ ἐστὶ γάρ.” “ μετέχει μὲν
 ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.” “ πάνυ γε.”
 “ οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ” “ ναί.”

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number to itself and the others.” “How is that?”

“If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.” “True.” “Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?” “Of course.” “And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.” “Clearly.”

“And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they; and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also equal in number to the others?”

“Yes, it must.” “And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.” “Yes, it will.”

“And does the one partake of time; and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?”

“What do you mean?” “If one is, it is thereby shown to be.” “Yes.” “But is ‘to be’ anything else than participation in existence together with present time, just as ‘was’ denotes participation in existence together with past time, and ‘will be’ similar participation together with future time?” “True.”

“Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.” “Certainly.” “And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?” “Yes.”

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“ αἰεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ
 προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ ἄρ’ οὖν
 μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρε-
 σβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; ” “ μεμνήμεθα.”
 “ οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ
 B ἔν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον
 γίγνοιτο; ” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώ-
 τερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτως.” “ ναί.”
 “ ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἄρ’ οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν
 χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ
 ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτέ
 εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν.” “ οὐ γάρ.”
 “ ἄρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρε-
 C σβύτερον, ἐπειδὴν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχη καὶ οὐ γίγνεται,
 ἀλλ’ ἔστι τότε ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προῖόν γάρ οὐκ
 ἂν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖόν
 οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν
 καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ’
 ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γι-
 γνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν.” “ ἀληθῆ.”
 “ εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ
 γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἢ, ἐπίσχει αἰεὶ
 D τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχη
 γιγνόμενον.” “ φαίνεται.” “ καὶ τὸ ἔν ἄρα, ὅταν
 πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν
 τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον.” “ πάνυ
 μὲν οὖν.” “ οὐκοῦν οὐπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον,
 τούτου καὶ ἔστιν ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; ” “ ναί.”
 “ ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; ”
 “ ἔστιν.” “ καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἔστι
 τὸ ἔν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ
 E νῦν.” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰεὶ πάρεστι

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“Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.” “Certainly.” “Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it?” “Yes, we do.” “Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, would become older than a self which becomes younger?” “There is no doubt of it.” “Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself.” “Yes.” “And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present.” “No, it cannot.” “Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.” “True.” “But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.” “Clearly.” “The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.” “Certainly.” “It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.” “Yes.” “And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not?” “It is.” “Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.” “Undoubtedly.” “But the present is

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τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ αἰεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ἦ.” “ πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ” “ αἰεὶ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἐν.” “ ἔοικεν.” “ πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον; ” “ τὸν ἴσον.” “ ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὄν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.” “ πῶς δ’ οὐ; ” “ τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ τὸ ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὄν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν οὐδὲ¹ γίγνεται.” “ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.” “ τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων; ” “ οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.” “ τότε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἕτερα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἐνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν ἐν ἂν ἦν· ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἐνός ἐστὶ καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι.” “ ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν.” “ πλῆθος δὲ ὄν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἐνός.” “ πῶς δ’ οὐ; ” “ τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; ” “ τὰ ἐλάττω.” “ τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι τὸ ἐν. ἢ γάρ; ” “ ναί.” “ πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν.” “ ἔχει γάρ.” “ πρῶτον δέ γε, οἶμαι, γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον· τὰ δ’ ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τὰλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἐνός,

¹ οὐδὲ Heindorf: οὔτε B.

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inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence ; for it always is now whenever it is." "Of course." "Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself." "So it appears." "And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?" "For an equal time." "But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age." "Of course." "But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger." "No." "Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself." "I agree." "Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?" "I cannot tell." "But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one ; for if they were an other, they would be one ; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude." "Yes, they have." "And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one." "Of course." "Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers?" "The smaller." Then the smallest comes into being first ; and that is the one, is it not?" "Yes." "The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number ; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other." "They have." "And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later ; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them ; and thus the other things would be younger than the one,

PLATO

τὸ δὲ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων.” “εἶη γὰρ ἄν.”

20. “Τί δὲ τόδε; ἄρ’ ἂν εἶη τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον;” “ἀδύνατον.”

C “ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἐν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.” “ναί.”

“οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;”

“τί μὴν;” “καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ’ εἶναι πάντα τᾶλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον.”

“φήσομεν γάρ.” “τελευτὴ δέ γε, οἶμαι, ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ’ ἅμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γί-
D γνεσθαι· ὥστ’ εἶπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονός ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκός εἶη γίγνεσθαι.” “φαίνεται.”

“νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός πρεσβύτερα.” “οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται.”

“τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτιοῦν τοῦ ἐνός ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ἢ ἄλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;” “ἀνάγκη.”

“οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ἅμα τε τῷ
E πρῶτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ’ ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενός ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὅτωοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἐν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρῶτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει.” “ἀληθῆ.”

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and the one older than the other things.” “ Yes, they would.”

“ Here is another question : Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible ? ” “ It is impossible.” “ But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.” “ Yes.” “ And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not ? ” “ Certainly.” “ And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.” “ Yes, we shall say that.” “ The end, I imagine, comes into being last ; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being ; so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.” “ That is clear.” “ Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.” “ I think that is clear, too.” “ Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part ? ” “ It must.” “ Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one ; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into

PLATO

“ πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει
 τὸ ἔν. ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ
 ἔν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονός
 154 ἂν εἶη, ἀλλ’ ἅμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ
 ἔν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν
 εἶη, οὐδὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν
 πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκείνου
 ὡσαύτως.” “ πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “ ἔστι μὲν δὴ
 οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ
 γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν
 ἄλλων καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον
 μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἄρα ὡσπερ περὶ
 τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ
 B ἑτέρως;” “ οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.” “ ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τοσόν-
 δε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον
 ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ ὡς
 τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ
 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναίτο, οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὄν ἔτι
 νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστι-
 θέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὄτωϋν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ
 διαφέρειν αἰεὶ ὅσῳπερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ.”
 “ πῶς γὰρ οὔ;” “ οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν τοῦ¹ ὄντος
 C γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον,
 εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει αἰεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ
 γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ’
 οὔ.” “ ἀληθῆ.” “ καὶ τὸ ἔν ἄρα ὄν τῶν ἄλλων
 ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον
 γίγνεται.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ ὄρα δέ, εἰ τῆδε
 πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται.” “ πῆ δῆ;”

¹ τοῦ ἐνός B1: ἐνός secl. Schleiermacher.

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being." "True." "Then one has the same age as all the others; so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them. And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one." "Certainly." "In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?" "I cannot say." "But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first." "Yes, of course." "Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so." "True." "And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things." "No, it does not." "But see whether they become older and younger in this way" "In what way?" "Because the one was

PLATO

“ ἦ τό τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ
 τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός.” “ τί οὖν; ” “ ὅταν τὸ ἐν τῶν
 D ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ἦ, πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν
 ἢ τὰ ἄλλα.” “ ναί.” “ πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν
 πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον
 χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλεόν τοῦ
 ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ; ” “ σμικροτέρῳ.” “ οὐκ
 ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τᾶλλα
 ἡλικία διαφέρον τὸ ἐν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα,
 ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐλαττον
 αἰεὶ τῇ ἡλικία διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον· ἢ οὐ; ”
 E “ ναί.” “ οὐκοῦν τό γε ἐλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικία
 πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ
 πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ᾧ ἦν πρεσβύτερον
 πρότερον; ” “ νεώτερον.” “ εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτε-
 ρον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερα
 ἢ πρότερον; ” “ πάνυ γε.” “ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον
 ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότε-
 ρον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέ-
 ποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται αἰεὶ ἐκείνου
 πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον
 155 ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ’ αὖ
 πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται
 ὡσαύτως· ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ
 ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιον γίνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον
 πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον
 νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω
 τε εἶτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο,
 ἀλλ’ εἶεν ἂν. νῦν δὲ γίνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα
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found to be older than the others, and the others than the one." "What then?" "When the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others." "Yes." "Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction?" "By a smaller fraction." "Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?" "Yes." "And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older?" "Yes, it becomes younger." "But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?" "Certainly." "Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older; for the latter always tends towards being younger, and the former towards being older. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another

PLATO

ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων
 νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὄν καὶ
 Β πρότερον γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός πρε-
 σβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν
 λόγον καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ
 αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα.”
 “ φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.” “ οὐκοῦν ἦ μὲν
 οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ
 νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσω ἀριθμῶ ἀλλήλων αἰεὶ
 διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον
 γίγνοιτ’ ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός·
 ἦ δὲ ἄλλω αἰεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα
 C τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προ-
 τέρων, ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέρα τε καὶ
 νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίνεσθαι τὰ τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός
 καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων; ” “ πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “ κατὰ
 δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ
 γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον
 οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν
 ἄλλων.” “ παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.” “ ἐπειδὴ δὲ
 χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτερόν τε καὶ
 D νεώτερον γίνεσθαι, ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ
 μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου
 μετέχει; ” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστι
 καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.”
 “ τί μήν; ” “ καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου,
 καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.” “ πάνυ γε.” “ καὶ
 ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις,
 εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα
 πράττομεν.” “ ὀρθῶς λέγεις.” “ καὶ ὄνομα δὴ

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--the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier, and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier." "Yes, that is clear." "Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, and *vice versa*—from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?" "Certainly." "For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others." "Perfectly true." "But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?" "It must." "Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become." "Certainly." "And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?" "Certainly." "And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it." "You are right." "And it has a

PLATO

καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται.
 E καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγ-
 χάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν.” “ παντελῶς
 μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.”

21. “ Ἐπι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἓν εἶ
 ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό,
 ἓν τε ὄν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ
 μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἓν, οὐσίας μετέχειν
 ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὐ ποτέ οὐσίας; ”
 “ ἀνάγκη.” “ ἄρ' οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται
 τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; ”
 “ οὐχ οἷόν τε.” “ ἓν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει
 καὶ ἓν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ
 156 αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.” “ ὀρθῶς.”
 “ οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμ-
 βάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ
 πῶς οἷόν τε ἔσται τοτέ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτέ
 δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ
 ἀφή; ” “ οὐδαμῶς.” “ τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμ-
 βάνειν ἄρα γε οὐ γίνεσθαι καλεῖς; ” “ ἔγωγε.”
 “ τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἄρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυ-
 σθαι; ” “ καὶ πάνυ γε.” “ τὸ ἓν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε,
 λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιέν οὐσίαν γίνεταί τε καὶ
 B ἀπόλλυται.” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν
 καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν
 μὲν γίγνηται ἓν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν
 δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἓν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; ” “ πάνυ γε.”
 “ ἓν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; ” “ πολλή γε.”
 “ καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται,
 ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ” “ ναί.” “ καὶ
 ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε
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name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one." "That is perfectly true."

"Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?" "Yes, it must." "And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?" "No, it cannot." "Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing." "True." "And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it?" "There is no other way at all." "But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming?" "Yes." "And losing existence is destruction?" "Certainly." "The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is generated and destroyed." "Inevitably." "And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?" "Certainly." "And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined?" "Inevitably." "And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and dissimilated?" "Yes." "And when it becomes greater and

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Ο καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι;” “οὕτως.” “ὅταν δὲ κινούμενον τε ἴσθηται καὶ ὅταν ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δὴ πού αὐτό γε μηδ’ ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι.” “πῶς δὴ;” “ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν.” “πῶς γάρ;” “χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἶόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐστάναι.” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.” “οὐκ εἰκός.” “πότ’ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ὄν¹ οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν.” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ἄρ’ οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότε ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει;” “τὸ ποῖον δὴ;” “τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἐκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι ἐστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξύ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.” “κινδυνεύει.” “καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ· μεταβάλλον δ’ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἂν τότε, οὐδ’ ἂν σταίῃ.” “οὐ γάρ.” “ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι

¹ ὄν B : ἂν T.

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smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and equalized?" "Yes." "And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must itself be in no time at all." "How is that?" "It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without changing." "Of course." "And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest." "No, there is none." "And certainly it cannot change without changing." "I should say not." "Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time." "No, it does not." "Does this strange thing, then, exist, in which it would be at the moment when it changes?" "What sort of thing is that?" "The instant. For the instant seems to indicate a something from which there is a change in one direction or the other. For it does not change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving; but there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed between motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into motion." "Yes, that must be so." "Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, must change in each direction; for that is the only way in which it can do both. But in changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it can be in no time, and at that instant it will be neither in motion nor at rest." "No." "And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes? When it changes from being

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157 μεταβάλλη ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται;” “ ἔοικε γοῦν.”

“ κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ’ ἓν οὔτε ἓν ἔστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε Β ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ μικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν.” “ οὐκ ἔοικε.” “ ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ’ ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἓν, εἰ ἔστιν.” “ πῶς δ’ οὔ;”

22. “ Τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οὐ σκεπτέον;” “ σκεπτέον.” “ λέγωμεν δὴ, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι;” “ λέγωμεν.” “ οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν ἔστι τᾶλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν.” “ ὀρθῶς.” “ οὐδὲ C μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πη.” “ πῆ δὴ;” “ ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη.” “ ὀρθῶς.” “ μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστίν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾗ.” “ φαμέν γάρ.” “ ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι,

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to destruction or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?" "Yes, so it appears." "And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimilation; and in passing from small to great and to equal and *vice versa*, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality." "Apparently not." "All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists." "Yes, certainly."

"Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?" "We must." "Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists?" "Let us do so." "Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one; for if they were, they would not be other than the one." "True." "And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way." "In what way?" "Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one." "True." "But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole." "Yes, we affirm that they do." "But the whole must be one composed of many; and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not

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ἀλλὰ ὄλου.” “ πῶς τοῦτο; ” “ εἴ τι πολλῶν
 μόριον εἶη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἶη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δὴ που
 D μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ
 ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, εἶπερ καὶ πάντων. ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν
 μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως
 ἑνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὄν δὲ μόριον
 ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ
 ὄν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι,
 καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἀδύνατον.¹ ” “ φαί-
 νεταιί γε δὴ. ” “ οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάν-
 των τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ
 E ἑνὸς τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὄλον, ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον
 γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἶη. ” “ παν-
 τάπασι μὲν οὖν. ” “ εἴ ἄρα τᾶλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν
 τοῦ ὄλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς μετέχοι. ” “ πάνυ γε. ” “ ἐν
 ἄρα ὄλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τᾶλλα
 τοῦ ἑνός. ” “ ἀνάγκη. ” “ καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ
 μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
 ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
 158 μόριόν ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἐν δὴπου ση-
 μαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ’ αὐτὸ δὲ
 ὄν, εἶπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται. ” “ ὀρθῶς. ” “ μετέχοι
 δέ γε ἂν τοῦ ἑνός δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὄν ἢ ἔν. οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἔν. νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν
 εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν που. ” “ ἀδύ-
 νατον. ” “ μετέχειν δέ γε τοῦ ἑνός ἀνάγκη τῷ τε
 ὄλω καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὄλον ἔσται, οὗ
 μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ δ’ αὖ ἕκαστον ἐν μόριον τοῦ

¹ ἀδύνατον εἶναι B'Γ : εἶναι secl. Heindorf.

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of many, but of a whole.” “How is that?” “If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.” “That is clear.” “Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all; this it is of which the part is a part.” “Certainly.” “If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.” “True.” “Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.” “Yes, they must.” “And the same reasoning applies to each part; for the part must partake of the one. For if each of the parts is a part, the word ‘each’ implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be ‘each.’” “True.” “But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one.” “Yes, it is impossible.” “And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the

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ὄλου, ὃ ἂν ἦ μόριον ὄλου.” “ οὕτως.” “ οὐκοῦν
 Β ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἐνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; ”
 “ πῶς δ’ οὐ; ” “ τὰ δ’ ἕτερα τοῦ ἐνὸς πολλά που
 ἂν εἶη. εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐν μήτε ἐνὸς πλείω εἶη τᾶλλα
 τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.”

“ Ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἐνός ἐστι τά τε τοῦ ἐνός
 μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐνός ὄλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα
 τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἐνός; ” “ πῶς; ” “ ὦδε
 ἴδωμεν.¹ ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ
 ἐνός τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμ-
 Β βάνει; ” “ δῆλα δῆ.” “ οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν
 οἷς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐνι; ” “ πλήθη μέντοι.” “ τί οὖν;
 εἰ ἐθέλοισιν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς
 οἰοί τέ ἐσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ
 ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἐνός μὴ μετέχοι,
 πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἐν; ” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ οὐκοῦν
 οὕτως αἰεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐτέ-
 ραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰεὶ ὀρώμεν
 ἄπειρον ἐσται πλήθει; ” “ παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.”
 “ καὶ μὴν ἐπειδὴν γε ἐν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον
 D γένηται, πέρασ ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ
 ὄλον, καὶ τὸ ὄλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια.” “ κομιδῇ μὲν
 οὖν.” “ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἐνός ξυμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν
 τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς εἰκεν,
 ἕτερόν τι γίνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὲ πέρασ παρ-
 ἔσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἢ δ’ ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ’ ἑαυτὰ
 ἀπειρίαν.” “ φαίνεται.” “ οὕτω δὲ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ

¹ ἴδωμεν] εἰδῶμεν BT.

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whole." "Yes." "And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it?" "Of course." "But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything." "No."

"But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number?" "How so?" "Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one?" "Clearly." "Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not?" "Yes, they are multitudes." "Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one?" "It must." "And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not?" "Certainly." "And, further, when each part becomes a part, straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts." "Undoubtedly." "The result, then, to the things which are other than one is, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits." "So it appears." "Then the things which

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ένος καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ
πέρατος μετέχει.” “πάνυ γε.”

Ε “Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε
καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;” “πῆ δῆ;” “ἦ μὲν που ἄπειρά
ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταῦτὸν πεπον-
θότα ἂν εἶη ταύτη.” “πάνυ γε.” “καὶ μὴν ἦ
γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ’ ἂν
εἶη ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα.” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “ἦ δέ
γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν,
ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέπον-
159 θεν.” “ναί.” “τὰ δ’ ἐναντία γε ὡς οἶόν τε ἀν-
ομοιότατα.” “τί μὴν;” “κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκά-
τερον τὸ πάθος ὁμοια ἂν εἶη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ
ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ’ ἀμφοτέρα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώ-
τατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα.” “κινδυνεύει.” “οὐ-
τω δῆ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὁμοιά
τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἶη.” “οὕτως.” “καὶ ταῦτα
δῆ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα,
καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὐρή-
Β σομεν πεπονθότα τᾶλλα τοῦ ενός, ἐπεὶπερ καὶ ταῦ-
τα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα.” “ὀρθῶς λέγεις.”

23. “Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῶμεν¹ ὡς φανε-
ρά, ἐπισκοποῖμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα καὶ
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ενός ἢ οὕτω μόνον;”
“πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “λέγωμεν δῆ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ
ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ενός πεπονθέναι.” “λέ-
γωμεν γάρ.” “ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν
ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ενός εἶναι;” “τί

¹ ἐῶμεν] ἐῶμεν ΒΓ.

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are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation.”

“Certainly.”

“And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves?” “How is that?”

“Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way.” “Certainly.”

“And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also.”

“Obviously.” “And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.”

“Yes.” “But opposites are as unlike as possible.” “To be sure.”

“Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.”

“Yes, that must be true.” “Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.” “So they are.”

“And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.”

“You are right.”

“Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative.”

“Certainly.” “Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one.”

“By all means.” “Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from

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δή;” “ ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ
 C ἄλλο μὲν ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. πάντα
 γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῆ τό τε ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα.”
 “ πάντα γάρ.” “ οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ’ ἔστιν ἕτερον τού-
 των, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἐν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τᾶλλα.”
 “ οὐ γάρ.” “ οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταύτῳ ἔστι τὸ ἐν
 καὶ τᾶλλα.” “ οὐκ ἔοικεν.” “ χωρὶς ἄρα;”
 “ ναί.” “ οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς ἐν.” “ πῶς γάρ;” “ οὐτ’ ἄρα ὅλον εἴη
 ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρὶς
 τέ ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.¹” “ πῶς
 D γάρ;” “ οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τᾶλλα τοῦ
 ἐνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον
 μετέχοντα.” “ οὐκ ἔοικεν.” “ οὐδαμῆ ἄρα ἐν
 τᾶλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν.” “ οὐ
 γὰρ οὖν.” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τᾶλλα. ἐν γὰρ
 ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλά ἦν·
 νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐν οὔτε πολλά οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά
 ἐστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῆ μετ-
 ἔχει.” “ ὀρθῶς.” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε
 αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν² ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ
 E τοῦ ἐνός πανταχῆ στέρεται.” “ οὕτως.”

“ Οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι
 τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν² ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης
 καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτά
 εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα,
 δύο που εἶδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς
 τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός.” “ φαίνεται.” “ ἦν δέ γε ἀ-
 δύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἢ μὴδ’ ἐνός μετέχοι.”

¹ ἔχει] ἔχη ΒΤ.

² ἔνεστιν] ἐν ἔστιν ΒΓ.

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the one ? ” “ Why is that ? ” “ Because there is nothing else besides these, which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said ‘ one and the others ’ we have included all things. ” “ Yes, all things. ” “ Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be. ” “ No. ” “ Then the one and the others can never be in the same. ” “ Apparently not. ” “ Then they are separate ? ” “ Yes. ” “ And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts. ” “ How can it have parts ? ” “ Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts. ” “ Of course not. ” “ Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way ; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole. ” “ No, apparently not. ” “ The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity. ” “ No. ” “ But neither are the others many ; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole ; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way. ” “ Right. ” “ Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity. ” “ True. ”

“ Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them ; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another. ” “ That is clear. ” “ But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one. ” “ Impossible. ”

PLATO

“ ἀδύνατον.” “ οὐτ’ ἄρα ὁμοια οὐτ’ ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν
 160 οὐτ’ ἀμφοτέρα τᾶλλα. ὁμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ
 ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἀμφο-
 τερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοι· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύ-
 νατα ἐφάνη.” “ ἀληθῆ.”

“ Οὐδ’ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ’ ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα
 οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα,
 οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν
 πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπον-
 θέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ
 τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς
 B ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντη πάν-
 τως στερομένοις.” “ ἀληθέστατα.” “ οὕτω δὴ ἔν
 εἰ ἐστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἔν καὶ οὐδὲ ἔν¹ ἐστι καὶ
 πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.” “ παν-
 τελῶς μὲν οὖν.”

24. “ Εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἐστι τὸ ἔν, τί χρὴ συμ-
 βαίνειν, ἄρ’ οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο²;” “ σκε-
 πτέον γάρ.” “ τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ
 ἔν μὴ ἐστιν; ἄρα τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ
 ἐστιν;” “ διαφέρει μέντοι.” “ διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ
 C καὶ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ ἐστι
 τοῦ εἰ ἔν μὴ ἐστιν;” “ πᾶν τοῦναντίον.” “ τί δ’
 εἰ τις λέγοι, εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἐστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ
 ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ’ ἐκάστου ἂν
 δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν;” “ πάνυ γε.”
 “ οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλ-
 λων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπη ἔν εἰ μὴ ἐστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ
 λέγει;” “ ἴσμεν.” “ πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν

¹ οὐδὲ ἔν T : οὐδὲν B.

² τοῦτο T : ταῦτα B.

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“The others are, then, not like nor unlike nor both. For if they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two elements, and if they were both, of the two opposites; and that was shown to be impossible.” “True.”

“They are, then, neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor equal, and they experience no similar affections; for if the others are subject to such affections, they will participate in one and two and three and odd and even, in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.” “Very true.” “Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.” “Perfectly true.”

“Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happen if one does not exist?” “Yes, we ought.” “What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist? Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?” “Certainly it is different.” “Is it merely different, or are the two expressions—if not one does not exist and if one does not exist—complete opposites?” “They are complete opposites.” “Now if a person should say ‘if greatness does not exist,’ ‘if smallness does not exist,’ or anything of that sort, would he not make it clear that in each case the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?” “Certainly.” “And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says ‘if one is not,’ that the thing which is not is different from other things, and do we not know what he means?” “Yes, we do know.” “In the first place, then,

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τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπη ἔν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι. D οὐδὲν γὰρ¹ ἦττον γινώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ;” “ἀνάγκη.” “ὦδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γινώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπη ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.” “ἀληθῆ.” “οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι;” “πάνυ γε.” “καὶ ἑτεροῖότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν E ἄλλων ἑτεροῖότητα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἔν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγη, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.” “φαίνεται.” “καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἔν ἐλέγετο οὐδ’ ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ’ ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ’ ἐκείνου, οὐδ’ ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.” “ὀρθῶς.” “εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, 161 μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἔν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἔν μήτ’ ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν·

¹ γὰρ apogr.: om. Tb (οὐδὲν γὰρ . . . μὴ εἶναι om. B: add. b in marg.)

¹ i.e. if non-existence cannot be predicated either of the one (*unitas*) or of that (*illuditas*), but that of which we predicate non-existence is something else, then we may as well stop talking. It has just been affirmed that if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not, then the one must partake of numerous attributes.

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he speaks of something which is known, and secondly of something different from other things, when he says 'one,' whether he adds to it that it is or that it is not; for that which is said to be non-existent is known none the less, and is known to be different from other things, is it not?" "Certainly." "Then we should begin at the beginning by asking: if one is not, what must follow? In the first place this must be true of the one, that there is knowledge of it, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known." "True." "And is it not also true that the others differ from the one, or it cannot be said to differ from the others?" "Certainly." "Then a difference belongs to the one in addition to knowledge; for when we say that the one differs from the others, we speak of a difference in the one, not in the others." "That is clear." "And the non-existent one partakes of 'that' and 'some' and 'this' and 'relation to this' and 'these' and all notions of that sort; for the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things which are other than one, nor could anything in relation to the one or belonging to it be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of the notion 'some' or of those other notions." "True." "It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor 'that,' is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all;¹ but if non-existence is

Now it is affirmed that if the converse is true, further discussion is futile.

PLATO

εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι.” “καὶ πάνυ γε.”

“Καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἕτεροῖα καὶ εἶη ἄν.” “ναί.” “τὰ δ’ ἕτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοῖα;” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “τὰ δ’ ἄλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια;”
 Β “ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν.” “οὐκοῦν εἶπερ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἶη.” “δῆλον.” “εἶη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστίν.” “ἔοικεν.” “εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι;” “πῶς;” “εἰ ἐνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἐστὶ τῷ ἐνί, οὐκ ἂν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἶη οἷου τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἶη περὶ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐνός.”
 C “πάνυ γε.” “οὐ δεῖ δέ γε.” “οὐ δῆτα.” “δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι.” “δεῖ.”

“Καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ αὖ ἴσον γ’ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἶη ἴσον, εἶη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἶη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ταῦτα δ’ ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἶπερ μὴ ἐστὶν ἓν.” “ἀδύνατα.” “ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι;” “ἀνάγκη.” “τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα;” “ναί.” “τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα;” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἓν, πρὸς ἣν τὰλλα

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the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of 'that' and of many other attributes." "Yes, certainly."

"And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things: for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind."

"Yes." "And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?" "Of course."

"And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?" "Yes, they are unlike." "Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it." "Evidently."

"Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike." "So it appears."

"But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?" "How is that?"

"If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one." "Certainly." "But that is inadmissible."

"It certainly is." "Then the one must possess likeness to itself." "It must."

"And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist." "Yes, they are impossible." "And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they?"

"Certainly not." "And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?" "Yes." "And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them?" "Of course." "Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which

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D αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἄνισα;” “ μετέχει.” “ ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γ’ ἐστὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης.” “ ἐστὶ γάρ.” “ ἐστὶν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί;” “ κινδυνεύει.” “ μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.” “ πάνυ γε.” “ μεταξύ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεὶ ἐστὶν.” “ ἐστὶν.” “ ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξύ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;” “ οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.” “ ὅτῳ ἄρα ἐστὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἐστὶ καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξύ τούτων οὐσα.” “ φαίνεται.”

E “ τῷ δὴ¹ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.” “ ἔοικεν.” “ Καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη.” “ πῶς δὴ;” “ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοι,² οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;” “ οὕτω μὲν οὖν.” “ ἐπειδὴ δὲ φάμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, 162 ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν.” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθύς ἔσται ὄν.” “ παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.” “ δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τέλεως αὐτῷ ᾗ.³ οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἶη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἶη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν,

¹ δὴ Par. 1810, Heindorf from Ficinus : δὲ BΓ.

² ἔχοι Coisl. : ἔχη BΓ.

³ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἢ BΓ : αὐτῷ ᾗ (or αὐτῷ ὄν ᾗ) Shorey.

¹ i.e. if it ceases to be non-existent, gives up something of *being* (as applied to non-existence) to not-being, so that it no longer *is* non-existent, but *is not* non-existent.

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the others are unequal to it?" "Yes, it does."
"But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality." "Yes." "Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?" "So it appears." "Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another." "Certainly." "Then there is always something between them." "There is." "Can you think of anything between them except equality?" "No, only equality." "Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two." "That is clear." "Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness." "So it appears."

"And it must also, in a way, partake of existence."
"How is that?" "It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?" "You are." "Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, we necessarily assert that we say that which is." "Necessarily." "Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being,¹ then it will be existent." "Certainly." "Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-

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B μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ¹ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ὄν,² οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτῷ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.” “ἀληθέστατα.” “οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι.” “ἀνάγκη.” “καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.” “φαίνεται.” “καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν.” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;”

“Οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πῶς μὴ ἔχειν αὐτῷ, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως;” “οὐχ οἷόν τε.” “πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει,
C ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχη.” “πῶς δ’ οὐ;” “μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις· ἢ τί φήσομεν;” “κίνησις.” “οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη;” “ναί.” “οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται.” “ἔοικεν.” “καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπεὶπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον.” “κινδυνεύει.” “ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ’ ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι.” “πῶς γάρ;” “οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ’ ἂν.” “οὐ γάρ.” “οὐδὲ μὴν
D ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταύτου γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται. ὄν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταυτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι.” “ἀδύνατον γάρ.” “οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐν γε μὴ ὄν στρέφεται ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν.” “οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε

¹ μὴ add. Shorey.

² ὄν Shorey : μὴ ὄν B.T.

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existence of not being non-existent, thus assuring its own perfect existence, and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence." "Very true." "Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence." "Yes, necessarily." "Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence." "Clearly." "And non-existence also, if it does not exist." "Of course."

"Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it?" "No, it cannot." "Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change." "Of course." "But change is motion; we agree to that?" "It is motion." "And did we not see that the one is and is not?" "Yes." "Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition." "So it appears." "And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being." "There is not much doubt of that." "But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another." "Of course not." "Then its motion cannot be change of place." "No, it cannot." "Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same; for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing." "No, it is impossible." "Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not." "No." "And the one, whether existent or non-existent,

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τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τινός.” “ ὀρθῶς.” “ εἰ δὲ μήτ’ ἡλλοιοῦται μήτε **Ε** ἐν ταυτῷ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ’ ἂν πη ἔτι κινοῖτο;” “ πῶς γάρ;” “ τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι.” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἐστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται.” “ ἔοικεν.” “ καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἡλλοιοῦσθαι. **163** ὅπη γὰρ ἂν τι κινήθῃ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ’ ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρως.” “ οὕτως.” “ κινούμενον δὴ¹ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡλλοιοῦται.” “ ναί.” “ καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἡλλοιοῖτο.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ ἡ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν, ἡλλοιοῦται· ἡ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἡλλοιοῦται.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἡλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἡλλοιοῦται.” “ φαίνεται.” “ τὸ δ’ ἡλλοιούμενον ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς **Β** προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἡλλοιούμενον μήτε γίνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι;” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἡλλοιούμενον μὲν γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἡλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίνεταί οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν μὴ ὄν γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίνεταί οὔτ’ ἀπόλλυται.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.”

25. “ Αὐθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταυτὰ ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ

¹ δὴ Heindorf from Ficinus : δὲ BT.

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cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else." "Quite right." "But if it neither changes into something else, nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?" "No; how can it?" "But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest." "Yes, it must." "Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion." "So it appears." "And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one." "True." "Then in moving, the one changes in nature." "Yes." "And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way." "No." "Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change." "True." "Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change." "So it appears." "And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?" "That is inevitable." "Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes; and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes." "Quite true."

"Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the

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ἕτερα.” “ ἀλλὰ χρή.” “ οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι,
 C φημέν, τί χρή περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν;” “ ναί.”
 “ τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο
 σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν
 μὴ εἶναι;” “ οὐδὲν ἄλλο.” “ πότερον οὖν, ὅταν
 φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναι φημεν αὐτό,
 πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον
 ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν οὐδέ
 πη μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν;” “ ἀπλούστατα
 μὲν οὖν.” “ οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναίτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν
 D οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν.” “ οὐ
 γάρ.” “ τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ
 τι ἄλλο ἢν¹ ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ'
 ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν;” “ οὐδὲν ἄλλο.” “ ᾧ δέ γε
 μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ'
 ἀπολλύοι αὐτό.” “ πῶς γάρ;” “ τῷ ἐνὶ ἄρα,
 ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλ-
 λακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς.”
 “ εἰκός.” “ οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν
 οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδαμῆ μετέχει οὐσίας.”
 “ οὐ φαίνεται.” “ οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῆ.
 E ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο
 πάσχον.” “ ἀληθῆ.” “ εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι;” “ ἀνάγκη.” “ οὐδὲ
 μὴν ἐστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ
 ἐστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ αἰεὶ εἶναι. “ τῷ αὐτῷ.²
 πῶς γὰρ οὔ;” “ οὔτω δὴ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε
 ποτὲ ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.” “ μὴ
 γὰρ οὖν.” “ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν

¹ ἢν Heindorf: ἢ BT.

² τῷ αὐτῷ BT (B gives it to the other speaker): τὸ αὐτό al.

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same as at present, or different." "Yes, we should do that." "We ask, then, if the one is not, what will be the consequences in regard to it?" "Yes." "Does the expression 'is not' denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?" "No, nothing else." "And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression 'is not' mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?" "Without any qualifications whatsoever." "Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence." "No." "But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence?" "No, nothing else." "But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it." "Of course not." "Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all." "That is reasonable." "Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence." "No; that is clear." "Then it is not changed in nature at all; for such change involves coming into being and perishing." "True." "And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?" "Certainly not." "And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same." "Yes, of course, the same place." "Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion." "No, neither." "Nor can anything which exists pertain to it; for

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164 ὄντων. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν του μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας
 μετέχοι.” “ δῆλον.” “ οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε
 σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν.” “ οὐ γάρ.”
 “ οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιοότης οὔτε πρὸς
 αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς τᾶλλα εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ.” “ οὐ φαί-
 νεται.” “ τί δέ; τᾶλλα ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ,
 εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;” “ οὐκ ἔστιν.” “ οὔτε
 ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια οὔτε ταῦτά οὔθ’ ἑτερά
 ἔστιν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ τί δέ; τὸ
 ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου
 Β ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτέ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη
 ἢ δόξα ἢ αἰσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν
 τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται;” “ οὐκ ἔσται.”
 “ οὔτω δὴ ἔν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῆ.”
 “ οὔκουν δὴ εἰκέν γε οὐδαμῆ ἔχειν.”

26. “ Ἐτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τᾶλλα τί
 χρή πεπονθέναι.” “ λέγωμεν γάρ.” “ ἄλλα μὲν
 που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἔστιν, οὐκ
 ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.” “ οὔτω.” “ εἰ δὲ
 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τὰ γε ἄλλα ἑτερά ἔστιν.
 ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τὸ τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ
 C ἕτερον;” “ ἔγωγε.” “ ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν
 τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι
 ἄλλου;” “ ναί.” “ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλ-
 λει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται.” “ ἀνάγκη.”
 “ τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται
 ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ ἀλλήλων ἄρα
 ἐστί· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς
 εἶναι ἄλλοις.” “ ὀρθῶς.” “ κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα
 ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί. κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ
 ἂν οἰά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός· ἀλλ’ ἕκαστος, ὡς

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the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence." "That is plain." "Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it." "No." "Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things." "Clearly not." "And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?" "Impossible." "Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different." "No." "Well, then, will the notions 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some,' or 'this' or 'of this' or 'of another' or 'to another' or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?" "No." "Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever." "It appears to have none whatsoever." "Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist." "Let us do so." "Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others." "True." "But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?" "Yes, I do." "And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other?" "Yes." "Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others." "Yes, there must be." "Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist." "No." "Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing." "True." "They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one

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D ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κὰν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὑπνω φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἐνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ." "ὀρθότατα." "τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τᾶλλα, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν." "κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν." "οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται;" "οὐ-

E τω." "καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων." "πάνυ γε." "καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται." "οὐ γὰρ οὖν." "καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν¹ αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι.² φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν
 165 ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων." "πῶς δ' οὐ;" "καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἕλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν³ ἐλθεῖν· τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος." "εἰκός." "οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε⁴ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων;" "πῆ δὴ;" "ὅτι αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβη τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰεὶ φαίνεται

B ἀρχή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευταίαν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευταίη, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ

¹ δόξει ἐν Heindorf: δόξειεν BT. ² ἐνεῖναι] ἐν εἶναι B: εἶναι T.

³ δόξειεν T: δόξειεν B.

⁴ γε Hermann: τε BT.

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does not exist. But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream; that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it." "Very true." "Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist." "Certainly." "There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?" "Yes." "And they will seem to possess number, if each seems to be one and they are many." "Certainly." "And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist." "True." "And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them; but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions." "Of course." "And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions; for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality." "That is reasonable." "And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?" "Why is that?" "Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does

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ένός.” “ ἀληθέστατα.” “ θρύπτεσθαι δῆ,¹ οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἐνὸς αἰεὶ² λαμβάνοιτο ἂν.” “ πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “ οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν ὄρωντι καὶ ἀμβλῦ ἐν φαίνεσθαι³ ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὄξυ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἕκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος;” “ ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.” “ οὕτω δῆ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα τᾶλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τᾶλλα⁴ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός.” “ δεῖ γάρ.” “ οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι;” “ πῆ δῆ;” “ οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὁμοια εἶναι.” “ πάνυ γε.” “ προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἐτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς.” “ οὕτω.” “ καὶ ὁμοίους δῆ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτοῦς τε ἑαυτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις.” “ πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “ οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετέες ἦδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν.” “ ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.”

27. “ Ἐτι δῆ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τᾶλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι.” “ εἴπωμεν γάρ οὖν.” “ οὐκοῦν

¹ δῆ B: δὲ T.

² αἰεὶ T: om. B.

³ ἐν φαίνεσθαι b: ἐμφαίνεσθαι BT.

⁴ τᾶλλα corr. Ven. 189: ἄλλα B: ἀλλὰ T.

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not exist." "Very true." "So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one." "Certainly." "Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?" "That is perfectly conclusive." "Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not." "Yes, they must." "And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?" "Why?" "Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike." "Certainly." "But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other." "Yes." "And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other." "Certainly." "And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, if the many exist and the one does not." "Very true."

"Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not." "Let us do so." "Well, the

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ἐν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τᾶλλα.” “ πῶς γάρ; ” “ οὐδὲ
 μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη¹ ἂν καὶ
 ἓν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἓν, ἅπαντα οὐδὲν
 ἐστίν, ὥστε οὐδ’ ἂν πολλά εἶη.” “ ἀληθῆ.”
 “ μὴ ἐνόητος δὲ ἐνός ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλά
 166 οὔτε ἓν ἐστὶ τᾶλλα.” “ οὐ γάρ.” “ οὐδέ γε
 φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά.” “ τί δή; ” “ ὅτι τᾶλλα
 τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν
 κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ
 οὖσιν.” “ ἀληθῆ.” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ
 ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα,
 οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ²
 τῶν ἄλλων.” “ οὐ γὰρ οὖν.” “ ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ
 B ἔστιν, οὐδέ δοξάζεται τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδέ
 πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνός πολλά δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον.”
 “ ἀδύνατον γάρ.” “ ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τᾶλλα
 οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά.” “ οὐκ
 ἔοικεν.” “ οὐδ’ ἄρα ὁμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια.” “ οὐ
 γάρ.” “ οὐδέ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ’ ἕτερα, οὐδέ
 ἀπτόμενα οὐδέ χωρίς, οὐδέ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς
 πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων
 οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τᾶλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.”
 C “ ἀληθῆ.” “ οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἵπομεν,
 ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἵπομεν; ”
 “ παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.” “ εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό
 τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν εἴτ’ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν,
 αὐτό τε καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα
 πάντα πάντως ἐστὶ τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται
 τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.” “ ἀληθέστατα.”

¹ ἐνείη] ἐν εἶη B : εἶη T.

² ἐπὶ Schleiermacher : ὑπὸ BT.

PARMENIDES

others will not be one?" "Of course not." "Nor will they be many; for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many." "True." "If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one." "No." "And they do not even appear to be one or many." "Why is that?" "Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts." "True." "Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connexion with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others." "No." "Then if one does not exist, none of the others will be conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is impossible to conceive of many without one. "True, it is impossible." "Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many." "No; so it seems." "Nor like nor unlike." "No." "Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not exist." "True." "Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the one is not, nothing is,' should we be right?" "Most assuredly." "Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear." "Very true."

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GREATER HIPPIAS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *GREATER HIPPIAS*

THE *Greater Hippias* presents the great sophist of Elis as a distinguished representative of his profession, thoroughly imbued with self-confidence and self-importance, and utterly unable to meet the questionings of Socrates. The ostensible subject of the dialogue is The Beautiful, which Socrates asks Hippias to define. Every definition is found to be unsatisfactory, so that the final result is negative. The real purpose of the dialogue seems to be to portray the personality of Hippias and the pertinacity of Socrates in pursuing every question—or rather every answer—until the discomfiture of his interlocutor is complete.

The dialogue is generally (and, in my opinion, rightly) regarded as not the work of Plato. The somewhat frigid humour of Socrates, in pretending that he persists in his interrogations because a “certain man” is sure to find the faults in the definitions proposed, does not necessarily preclude Plato as the author, though nothing closely resembling it is to be found in the dialogues universally accepted. The style resembles that of Plato, though in some particulars it is peculiar. In the *Phaedrus* Plato himself imitates the style of Lysias so closely that the discourse on the lover and the

INTRODUCTION TO THE *GREATER HIPPIAS*

non-lover has sometimes been regarded as a genuine work of Lysias, and it would not be very difficult for another to write in a style as similar to Plato's as is that of this dialogue. The apparent reference (286 B) to the *Lesser Hippias* proves nothing as to the genuineness of either this dialogue or that. On the whole, there is little probability that this is Plato's work. If it is his, it must be one of his earlier dialogues.

The Greek word *καλός* has a broader field of application than the English word "beautiful," and it is, therefore, occasionally difficult to render a passage satisfactorily; for though we may speak of a beautiful act, we can hardly apply the word "beautiful" to laws and constitutions, for example. Then, too, there is no English opposite of "beautiful" which has, even approximately, the widely extended signification of the Greek *αἰσχροός*. Occasionally, therefore, the direct opposition of *καλός* and *αἰσχροός* fails to appear adequately in the English version.

ΙΠΠΙΑΣ ΜΕΙΖΩΝ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΥ· ΑΝΑΤΡΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ

St. III
p. 281

1. ΣΩ. Ἴππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός, ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

ΙΠ. Οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ γὰρ Ἥλις ὅταν τι δέηται διαπράξασθαι πρὸς τινα τῶν πόλεων, αἰεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἴρουμένη πρεσβευτήν, ἡγουμένη δικαστήν καὶ ἄγγελον ἰκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων, οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα, πλείστα δὲ καὶ περὶ πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων εἰς Λακεδαίμονα· διὸ δὴ, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, οὐ θαμίζω εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους.

ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι, ὦ Ἴππία, ἔστι τὸ τῆ ἀληθείᾳ σοφόν τε καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα εἶναι. σὺ γὰρ καὶ ἰδία ἰκανὸς εἶ παρὰ τῶν νέων πολλὰ χρήματα λαμβάνων ἔτι πλείω ὠφελεῖν ὧν λαμβάνεις, καὶ αὐτὴ δημοσίᾳ τὴν σαυτοῦ πόλιν ἰκανὸς εὐεργετεῖν, ὥσπερ χρεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα μὴ καταφρονήσεσθαι ἄλλ'

GREATER HIPPIAS

[OR ON THE BEAUTIFUL : REFUTATIVE]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, HIPPIAS

soc. Hippias, beautiful and wise, what a long time it is since you have put in at the port of Athens !

hipp. I am too busy, Socrates. For whenever Elis needs to have any business transacted with any of the states, she always comes to me first of her citizens and chooses me as envoy, thinking that I am the ablest judge and messenger of the words that are spoken by the several states. So I have often gone as envoy to other states, but most often and concerning the most numerous and important matters to Lacedaemon. For that reason, then, since you ask me, I do not often come to this neighbourhood.

soc. That's what it is, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect man ! For you are both in your private capacity able to earn much money from the young and to confer upon them still greater benefits than you receive, and in public affairs you are able to benefit your own state, as a man must who is to be not despised but held in high repute among

PLATO

εὐδοκιμήσειεν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἀτάρ, ὦ Ἰππία, τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιπτακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου, ὡς ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων;

ΙΠ. Τί δ' οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν καὶ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ἐξικνεῖσθαι φρονήσει ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, τά τε κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια;

Ζ. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἐπιδεδώκασιν καὶ εἰσὶ παρὰ τοὺς νῦν δημιουργοὺς οἱ παλαιοὶ φαῦλοι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην ἐπιδεδωκέναί φῶμεν καὶ εἶναι τῶν ἀρχαίων τοὺς περὶ τὴν σοφίαν φαύλους πρὸς ὑμᾶς;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

Ζ. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἰππία, ὁ Βίας ἀναβιώη, 282 γέλωτ' ἂν ὄφλοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Δαίδαλόν φασιν οἱ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαῦτ' ἐργάζοιτο οἷα ἦν ἀφ' ὧν τοῦνομ' ἔσχεν, καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.

ΙΠ. Ἔστι μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὡς σὺ λέγεις· εἴωθα μέντοι ἔγωγε τοὺς παλαιούς τε καὶ προτέρους ἡμῶν προτέρους τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγκωμιάζειν ἢ τοὺς νῦν, εὐλαβούμενος μὲν φθόνον τῶν ζώντων, φοβούμενος δὲ μῆνιν τῶν τετελευτηκότων.

Β. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε σύ, ὦ Ἰππία, ὀνομάζων τε καὶ διανοούμενος, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς. συμμαρτυρῆσαι δέ σοι ἔχω ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ὑμῶν

¹ Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, and Thales of Miletus were among the traditional seven wise men.

GREATER HIPPIAS

the many. And yet, Hippias, what in the world is the reason why those men of old whose names are called great in respect to wisdom—Pittacus, and Bias, and the Milesian Thales¹ with his followers—and also the later ones, down to Anaxagoras, are all, or most of them, found to refrain from affairs of state?

HIPP. What else do you suppose, Socrates, than that they were not able to compass by their wisdom both public and private matters?

SOC. Then for Heaven's sake, just as the other arts have progressed, and the ancients are of no account in comparison with the artisans of to-day, shall we say that your art also has progressed and those of the ancients who were concerned with wisdom are of no account in comparison with you?

HIPP. Yes, you are quite right.

SOC. Then, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life again now, he would be a laughing-stock in comparison with you, just as the sculptors say that Daedalus,² if he were to be born now and were to create such works as those from which he got his reputation, would be ridiculous.

HIPP. That, Socrates, is exactly as you say. I, however, am in the habit of praising the ancients and our predecessors rather than the men of the present day, and more greatly, as a precaution against the envy of the living and through fear of the wrath of those who are dead.

SOC. Yours, Hippias, is a most excellent way, at any rate, of speaking about them and of thinking, it seems to me; and I can bear you witness that you speak the truth, and that your art really has

² Daedalus, the traditional inventor of sculpture.

PLATO

ἐπιδέδωκεν ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὰ δημόσια πράττειν δύνασθαι μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων. Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντίνος σοφιστῆς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἴκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἔν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδία ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ συνῶν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ εἰργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος Πρόδικος οὗτος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ Κέω λέγων τ' ἐν τῇ βουλῇ πάνυ εὐδοκίμησεν καὶ ἰδία ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνῶν χρήματα ἔλαβεν θαυμαστὰ ὅσα. τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας· οὕτως ἦσαν εὐήθεις καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ ἀξίον εἶη. τούτων δ' ἑκάτερος πλεον ἀργύριον¹ ἀπὸ σοφίας εἰργασται ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' ἧστινος τέχνης· καὶ ἔτι πρότερος τούτων Πρωταγόρας.

3. III. Οὐδὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ εἰδείης ὅσον ἀργύριον εἰργασμαι ἐγώ, θαυμάσαις ἄν· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐῶ, ἀφικόμενος δέ ποτε εἰς Σικελίαν, Πρωταγόρου αὐτόθι ἐπιδημοῦντος καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ὄντος πολὺ² νεώτερος ὢν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ

¹ ἀργύριον F: ἀργυρίου TW.

² πολὺ F: καὶ πολὺ TW.

¹ The word οὗτος does not indicate that Gorgias was among those present at the moment, but only that he was at the time much talked of at Athens. The imaginary, or

GREATER HIPPIAS

progressed in the direction of ability to carry on public together with private affairs. For this man¹ Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public capacity of envoy, as being best able of all the citizens of Leontini to attend to the interests of the community, and it was the general opinion that he spoke excellently in the public assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he earned and received a great deal of money from this city ; or, if you like, our friend here, Prodicus, often went to other places in a public capacity, and the last time, just lately, when he came here in a public capacity from Ceos, he gained great reputation by his speaking before the Council, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he received a marvellous sum of money ; but none of those ancients ever thought fit to exact money as payment for his wisdom or to give exhibitions among people of various places ; so simple-minded were they, and so unconscious of the fact that money is of greatest value. But either of these two has earned more money from his wisdom than any artisan from his art. And even before these Protagoras did so.

HIPP. Why, Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties of this. For if you were to know how much money I have made, you would be amazed. I won't mention the rest, but once, when I went to Sicily, although Protagoras was staying there and had a great reputation and was the older, I, who was much younger, made in a very short

dramatic, date of this dialogue, would, then, be shortly after the time of Gorgias' activity at Athens.

PLATO

πάνυ πλέον ἢ πενήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς εἰργασάμην, καὶ ἐξ ἑνός γε χωρίου πάνυ μικροῦ, Ἴνυκοῦ, πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μνᾶς· καὶ τοῦτο ἔλθων οἴκαδε φέρων τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα, ὥστε ἐκείνον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας θαυμάζειν τε καὶ ἐκπεπληῆχθαι. καὶ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ ἄλλους σύνδυο οὔστινας βούλει τῶν σοφιστῶν.

283 **σ**ω. Καλὸν γε, ὦ Ἴππία, λέγεις καὶ μέγα τεκμήριον σοφίας τῆς τε σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους ὅσον διαφέρουσι. τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται¹ πολλὴ ἀμαθία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· τούναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρα φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι πάντα· οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καλὸν τεκμήριον ἀποφαίνε**ν** περὶ σοφίας τῶν νῦν πρὸς τοὺς προτέρους, καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ ὅτι τὸν σοφὸν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ μάλιστα δεῖ σοφὸν εἶναι· τούτου δ' ὄρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὅς ἂν πλείστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσῃται.

4. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τόδε δέ μοι εἶπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς πόθεν πλείστον ἀργύριον εἰργάσω τῶν πόλεων εἰς ἃς ἀφικνεῖ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος, οἵπερ² καὶ πλειστάκις ἀφίξαι;

ιπ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

σω. Πῶς φής; ἀλλ' ἐλάχιστον;

σ **ι**π. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν τὸ παράπαν πώποτε

¹ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται bracketed by Stallbaum.

² οἵπερ Heindorf: οὔπερ TWF.

GREATER HIPPIAS

timé more than one hundred and fifty minas, and in one very small place, Inycus, more than twenty minas; and when I came home, I took this and gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were overwhelmed with amazement. And I pretty well think I have made more money than any other two sophists together.

soc. That's a fine thing you say, Hippias, and strong testimony to your wisdom and that of the men of to-day and to their great superiority to the ancients. For the earlier sophists of the school of Anaxagoras must have been very ignorant to judge from what is said, according to your view; for they say that what happened to Anaxagoras was the opposite of what happens to you; for though much money was left him, he neglected it and lost it all; so senseless was his wisdom. And they tell similar tales about others among the ancients. So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of to-day as compared with the earlier men, and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially¹; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that. But tell me this: at which of the cities that you go to did you make the most money? Or are we to take it that it was at Lacedaemon, where your visits have been most frequent?

HIPP. No, by Zeus, it was not, Socrates.

soc. What's that you say? But did you make least there?

HIPP. Why, I never made anything at all.

¹ Apparently a proverbial expression, like "physician, heal thyself" or "look out for number one."

PLATO

ΣΩ. Τέρας λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ Ἴππία. καί μοι εἶπέ· ἢ σοφία ἢ σὴ οὐχ οἷα τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ καὶ μαθάνοντας εἰς ἀρετὴν βελτίους ποιεῖν;

ΙΠ. Καὶ πολὺ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τοὺς μὲν Ἴνυκίνων¹ υἱεῖς οἷός τε ἦσθα ἀμείνους ποιῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν ἡδυνάτεις;

ΙΠ. Πολλοῦ γε δέω.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ δῆτα Σικελιωῦται μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ' οὔ;

D ΙΠ. Πάντως γέ² που, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν χρημάτων ἐνδεία ἔφευγον τὴν σὴν ὁμιλίαν;

ΙΠ. Οὐ δῆτα, ἐπεὶ ἱκανὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτ' ἂν εἶη ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ ἔχοντες χρήματα, καὶ σοῦ δυναμένου τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, οὐ πλήρη σε ἀργυρίου ἀπέπεμψαν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, μὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σοῦ βέλτιον ἂν παιδεύσειαν τοὺς αὐτῶν παῖδας; ἢ τοῦτο φῶμεν οὔτω, καὶ σὺ συγχωρεῖς;

E ΙΠ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τοὺς νέους οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦσθα πείθειν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὡς σοὶ συνόντες πλέον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδοῖεν ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων πατέρας ἡδυνάτεις πείθειν ὅτι σοὶ χρὴ παραδιδόναι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἴπερ τι τῶν υἱῶν κήδονται; οὐ γάρ που ἐφθόνουν γε τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶν ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.

ΙΠ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε φθονεῖν.

¹ Ἴνυκίνων Bekker: Ἴνυκινῶν Γ: Ἴνυκηνῶν W.

² γέ F: om. TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. That is a prodigious marvel that you tell, Hippias ; and say now : is not your wisdom such as to make those who are in contact with it and learn it, better men in respect to virtue ?

HIPP. Yes, much better, Socrates.

soc. But you were able to make the sons of the Inycenes better, and had no power to improve the sons of the Spartans ?

HIPP. That is far from true.

soc. Well, then, the Siceliotas desire to become better, and the Lacedaemonians do not ?

HIPP. No certainly, Socrates, the Lacedaemonians also desire it.

soc. Then it was for lack of money that they avoided intercourse with you ?

HIPP. Not at all, since they have plenty of money

soc. What, then, could be the reason, that when they desired it and had money, and you had power to confer upon them the greatest benefits, they did not send you away loaded with money ? But I see ; perhaps the Lacedaemonians might educate their own children better than you ? Shall we state it so, and do you agree ?

HIPP. Not in the least.

soc. Then were you not able to persuade the young men at Lacedaemon that they would make more progress towards virtue by associating with you than with their own people, or were you powerless to persuade their fathers that they ought rather to hand them over to you than to care for them themselves, if they are at all concerned for their sons ? For surely they did not begrudge it to their children to become as good as possible.

HIPP. I do not think they begrudged it.

PLATO

284 ζη. Ἄλλὰ μὴν εὐνομός γ' ἢ Λακεδαίμων.

ιη. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

284 ζη. Ἐν δέ γε ταῖς εὐνόμοις πόλεσι τιμιώτατον ἢ ἀρετή.

ιη. Πάνυ γε.

ζη. Σὺ δὲ ταύτην παραδιδόναι ἄλλῳ κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπίστασαι.

ιη. Καὶ πολὺ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5. ζη. Ὁ οὖν κάλλιστ' ἐπιστάμενος ἵππικὴν παραδιδόναι ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα τιμῶτο καὶ πλείστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι, καὶ ἄλλοθι ὅπου τοῦτο σπουδάζοιτο;

ιη. Εἰκός γε.

ζη. Ὁ δὴ δυνάμενος παραδιδόναι τὰ πλείστου
B ἄξια μαθήματα εἰς ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι μάλιστα τιμῆσεται καὶ πλείστα ἐργάσεται χρήματα, ἂν βούληται, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἢ τις τῶν Ἑλληνίδων εὐνομεῖται; ἀλλ' ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἷοι μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν Ἰνυκῶ; ταῦτα πειθώμεθα, ὦ Ἰππία; εἰάν γὰρ σὺ κελεύῃς, πειστέον.

ιη. Οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λακεδαιμονίοις κινεῖν τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα παιδεύειν τοὺς νέους.

ζη. Πῶς λέγεις; Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐ πάτριον
C ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἀλλ' ἑξαμαρτάνειν;

ιη. Οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἂν πράττοιεν βέλτιον ἀλλὰ μὴ χεῖρον παιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους;

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. But certainly Lacedaemon is well governed.

HIPP. Of course it is.

soc. And in well-governed states virtue is most highly honoured.

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. And you know best of all men how to transmit that to another.

HIPP. Much best, Socrates.

soc. Well, he who knows best how to transmit horsemanship would be most honoured in Thessaly of all parts of Greece and would receive most money—and anywhere else where horsemanship is a serious interest, would he not?

HIPP. Very likely.

soc. Then will not he who is able to transmit the doctrines that are of most value for the acquisition of virtue be most highly honoured in Lacedaemon and make most money, if he so wishes, and in any other of the Greek states that is well governed? But do you, my friend, think he will fare better in Sicily and at Inycus? Are we to believe that, Hippias? For if you tell us to do so, we must believe it.

HIPP. Yes, for it is not the inherited usage of the Lacedaemonians to change their laws or to educate their children differently from what is customary.

soc. What? For the Lacedaemonians is it the hereditary usage not to act rightly, but to commit errors?

HIPP. I wouldn't say so, Socrates.

soc. Would they, then, not act rightly in educating the young men better, but not in educating them worse?

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ΙΠ. Ὁρθῶς· ἀλλὰ ξενικὴν παιδείωσιν οὐ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς παιδεύειν, ἐπεὶ εὖ ἴσθι, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἐκεῖθεν χρήματα ἔλαβεν πώποτε ἐπὶ παιδεύσει, καὶ ἐμὲ ἂν λαβεῖν πολὺ μάλιστα· χαίρουσι γοῦν ἀκούοντες ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, οὐ νόμος.

ΣΩ. Νόμον δὲ λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία, βλάβην πόλεως
D εἶναι ἢ ὠφέλειαν;

ΙΠ. Τίθεται μὲν, οἶμαι, ὠφελείας ἔνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῆ ὁ νόμος.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον πόλει τίθενται τὸν νόμον οἱ τιθέμενοι; καὶ ἄνευ τούτου μετὰ εὐνομίας¹ ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖν;

ΙΠ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ ἀμάρτωσιν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι, νομίμου τε καὶ νόμου ἡμαρτήκασιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

E ΙΠ. Τῷ μὲν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ μέντοι εἰώθασιν ἄνθρωποι ὀνομάζειν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Πότερον, ὦ Ἰππία, οἱ εἰδότες ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες;

ΙΠ. Οἱ πολλοί.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δ' οὗτοι οἱ εἰδότες τάληθές, οἱ πολλοί;

ΙΠ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν που οἱ γ' εἰδότες τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώτερον ἡγοῦνται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς;

ΙΠ. Ναί, συγχωρῶ, ὅτι γε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

¹ εὐνομίας] ἀνομίας T (but εὐ above the line) WF.

GREATER HIPPIAS

HIPP. Yes, they would ; but it is not lawful for them to give them a foreign education ; for you may be sure that if anybody had ever received money there in payment for education, I should have received by far the most ; they certainly enjoy hearing me and they applaud me ; but, as I say, it is not the law.

soc. But, Hippias, do you say that law is an injury to the state, or a benefit ?

HIPP. It is made, I think, with benefit in view, but sometimes, if the law is badly made, it is injurious.

soc. Well, then, is it not true that those who make the law make it as the greatest good to the state, and that without this it is impossible to enjoy good government ?

HIPP. What you say is true.

soc. Then, when those who make the laws miss the good, they have missed the lawful and the law ; or what do you say ?

HIPP. Speaking accurately, Socrates, that is true ; however, men are not accustomed to think so.

soc. The men who know, Hippias, or those who do not know ?

HIPP. The many.

soc. Are these, the many, those who know the truth ?

HIPP. Certainly not.

soc. But surely those who know, think that in truth for all men that which is more beneficial is more lawful than that which is less beneficial ; or do you not agree ?

HIPP. Yes, I agree that they think it is so in truth.

PLATO

ζω. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως, ὡς οἱ εἰδότες ἠγοῦνται;

ιπ. Πάνυ γε.

β. ζω. Ἔστι δέ γε Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὡς σὺ φῆς, 285 ὠφελιμώτερον τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ παιδευσιν, ξενικὴν οὔσαν, παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἐπιχωρίαν.

ιπ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω.

ζω. Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ὠφελιμώτερα νομιμώτερά¹ ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία;

ιπ. Εἶπον γάρ.

ζω. Κατὰ τὸν σὸν ἄρα λόγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων υἱέσιν ὑπὸ Ἰππίου παιδεύεσθαι νομιμώτερόν ἐστιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πατέρων ἀνομώτερον, εἶπερ τῷ ὄντι ὑπὸ σοῦ πλείω ὠφεληθήσονται.

ιπ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὠφεληθήσονται, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Β ζω. Παρανομοῦσιν ἄρα Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ διδόντες σοι χρυσίον καὶ ἐπιτρέποντες τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς.

ιπ. Συγχωρῶ ταῦτα· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὸν λόγον πρὸς ἐμοῦ λέγειν, καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι.

ζω. Παρανόμους μὲν δὴ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, τοὺς Λάκωνας εὐρίσκομεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς τὰ μέγιστα, τοὺς νομιμωτάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι. ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δὴ σε πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες 3 ποῖα; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα ἅ σὺ κάλλιστα ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη;

ιπ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν· ταῦτά γε οὐδ' ἀνέχονται.

¹ νομιμώτερα F: νομικώτερα TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. Well, it actually is as those who know think it is, is it not ?

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. But for the Lacedaemonians, as you say, it is more beneficial to be educated in your education, which is foreign, than in the local education.

HIPP. Yes, and what I say is true.

soc. And do you say this also, Hippias, that beneficial things are more lawful ?

HIPP. Yes, I said so.

soc. Then, according to what you say, it is more lawful for the sons of the Lacedaemonians to be educated by Hippias and less lawful for them to be educated by their fathers, if in reality they will be more benefited by you.

HIPP. But certainly they will be benefited, Socrates.

soc. Then the Lacedaemonians in not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you, act contrary to law.

HIPP. I agree to that ; for you seem to be making your argument in my favour, and there is no need of my opposing it.

soc. Then, my friends, we find that the Lacedaemonians are law-breakers, and that too in the most important affairs—they who are regarded as the most law-abiding of men. But then, for Heaven's sake, Hippias, what sort of discourses are those for which they applaud you and which they enjoy hearing ? Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens ?

HIPP. Not in the least ; they won't even endure those.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ περὶ γεωμετρίας τι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες;

ΙΠ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀριθμεῖν ἐκείνων γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πολλοὶ ἐπίστανται.

ΣΩ. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν περὶ γε λογισμῶν ἀνέχεσθαί σου ἐπιδεικνυμένου.

ΙΠ. Πολλοῦ μέντοι νῆ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ δῆτα ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ ἀκριβέστατα
 Δ ἐπίστασαι ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν, περὶ τε γραμμάτων
 δυνάμεως καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἀρμονιῶν;

ΙΠ. Περὶ ποίων, ὦ ἄγαθέ, ἀρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τίνα μὲν ἐστὶν ἃ ἠδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν; αὐτὸς μοι εἰπέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγὼ οὐχ εὐρίσκω.

ΙΠ. Περὶ τῶν γενῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικήσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἠδιστα ἀκροῶνται, ὥστ' ἔγωγε δι' αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκασμαι ἐκμεμαθηκέναι τε
 Ε καὶ ἐκμεμελετηκέναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Ἰππία, εὐτύχηκάς γε, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ χαίρουσιν ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἡμετέρους καταλέγη· εἰ δὲ μή, πράγματ' ἂν εἶχες ἐκμανθάνων.

ΙΠ. Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἅπαξ ἀκούσας πεντήκοντα ὀνόματα ἀπομνημονεύσω.

7. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐνενόησα ὅτι τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔχεις· ὥστ' ἐννοῶ ὅτι εἰκότως σοι χαίρουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἅτε πολλὰ εἰδότες, 286 καὶ χρῶνται ὥσπερ ταῖς πρεσβύτισιν οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸ ἠδέως μυθολογῆσαι.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. But they enjoy hearing about geometry ?

HIPP. Not at all, since one might say that many of them do not even know how to count.

soc. Then they are far from enduring a lecture by you on the processes of thought.

HIPP. Far from it indeed, by Zeus.

soc. Well, then, those matters which you of all men know best how to discuss, concerning the value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies ?

HIPP. Harmonies indeed, my good fellow, and letters !

soc. But then what are the things about which they like to listen to you and which they applaud ? Tell me yourself, for I cannot discover them.

HIPP. They are very fond of hearing about the genealogies of heroes and men, Socrates, and the foundations of cities in ancient times and, in short, about antiquity in general, so that for their sake I have been obliged to learn all that sort of thing by heart and practise it thoroughly.

soc. By Zeus, Hippias, it is lucky for you that the Lacedaemonians do not enjoy hearing one recite the list of our archons from Solon's time ; if they did, you would have trouble in learning it by heart.

HIPP. How so, Socrates ? After hearing them once, I can remember fifty names.

soc. True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of memory ; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you as children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably.

¹ ὅτι Ε' : ὅτι γε ΤΨ.

PLATO

ΙΠ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε ἐπι-
 τηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ ἔναγχος αὐτόθι εὐδοκίμησα
 διεξιῶν ἃ χρὴ τὸν νέον ἐπιτηδεύειν. ἔστι γάρ μοι
 περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος συγκεείμενος, καὶ
 ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι· πρόσχημα
 δέ μοί ἐστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις τοῦ λόγου. ἐπειδὴ
 ἢ Τροία ἦλω, λέγει ὁ λόγος ὅτι Νεοπτόλεμος
 Β Νέστορα ἔροιτο, ποῖά ἐστι καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ
 ἂν τις ἐπιτηδεύσας νέος ὦν εὐδοκιμώτατος γένοιτο·
 μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Νέστωρ καὶ ὑπο-
 τιθέμενος αὐτῷ πάμπολλα νόμιμα καὶ πάγκαλα.
 τοῦτον δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδειξάμην καὶ ἐνθάδε μέλλω
 ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν, ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτου
 διδασκαλείῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια ἀκοῆς·
 ἐδεήθη γάρ μου Εὐδίκος ὁ Ἀπημάντου. ἀλλ'
 ὅπως παρέσει καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξεις, οἵτινες
 C ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρίναι τὰ λεγόμενα.

8. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὦ
 Ἰππία. νυνὶ μέντοι βραχὺ τί μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ
 ἀπόκρισαι· καὶ γάρ με εἰς καλὸν ὑπέμνησας.
 ἔναγχος γάρ τις, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰς ἀπορίαν με κατ-
 έβαλεν ἐν λόγοις τισὶ τὰ μὲν ψέγοντα ὡς αἰσχρά,
 τὰ δ' ἐπαινοῦντα ὡς καλά, οὕτω πως ἐρόμενος καὶ
 μάλα ὑβριστικῶς· “ πόθεν δέ μοι σύ,” ἔφη, “ ὦ
 D Σώκρατες, οἶσθα ὅποια καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά; ἐπεὶ
 φέρε, ἔχῃς ἂν εἰπεῖν τί ἔστι τὸ καλόν; ” καὶ ἐγὼ
 διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν φαυλότητα ἠπορούμην τε καὶ οὐκ
 εἶχον αὐτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀπιῶν οὖν
 ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐμαυτῷ τε ὠργιζόμεν καὶ ὠνεί-
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HIPP. And by Zeus, Socrates, I have just lately gained reputation there by telling about noble or beautiful pursuits, recounting what those of a young man should be. For I have a very beautiful discourse composed about them, well arranged in its words and also in other respects. And the plan of the discourse, and its beginning, is something like this: After the fall of Troy, the story goes that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what the noble and beautiful pursuits were, by following which a young man would become most famous; so after that we have Nestor speaking and suggesting to him very many lawful and most beautiful pursuits. That discourse, then, I delivered there and intend to deliver here the day after to-morrow in Pheidostratus's schoolroom, with many other things worth hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, asked me to do so. Now be sure to be there yourself and to bring others who are able to judge of discourses that they hear.

soc. Well, that shall be done, God willing, Hippias. Now, however, give me a brief answer to a question about your discourse, for you reminded me of the beautiful just at the right moment. For recently, my most excellent friend, as I was finding fault with some things in certain speeches as ugly and praising other things as beautiful, a man threw me into confusion by questioning me very insolently somewhat after this fashion: "How, if you please, do you know, Socrates," said he, "what sort of things are beautiful and ugly? For, come now, could you tell me what the beautiful is?" And I, being of no account, was at a loss and could not answer him properly; and so, as I was going away from the company, I was angry with myself and

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διζον, καὶ ἠπειλουν, ὅποτε πρῶτον ὑμῶν τῶ τῶν σοφῶν ἐντύχοιμι, ἀκούσας καὶ μαθῶν καὶ ἐκμελετήσας ἰέναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐρωτήσαντα, ἀναμαχοῦμενος τὸν λόγον. νῦν οὖν, ὃ λέγω, εἰς καλὸν ἦκεις, E καὶ με δίδαξον ἰκανῶς αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ τι ἔστι, καὶ πειρῶ μοι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκριβῶς εἰπεῖν ἀποκρινοῦμενος, μὴ ἐξελεγχθεῖς τὸ δεύτερον αὐθις γέλωτα ὄφλω. οἶσθα γὰρ δὴ που σαφῶς, καὶ σμικρὸν που τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μάθημα ὦν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι.

ΙΠ. Σμικρὸν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ῥαδίως ἄρα μαθήσομαι καὶ οὐδεὶς με ἐξελέγξει ἔτι.

287 ΙΠ. Οὐδεὶς μέντοι φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία, εἰ χειρωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνδρα. ἀτὰρ μή τι κωλύω μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον, εἰ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι τῶν λόγων, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα με ἐκμελετήσης; σχεδὸν γὰρ τι ἔμπειρός εἰμι τῶν ἀντιλήψεων. εἰ οὖν μή τί σοι διαφέρει, βούλομαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἵν' ἐρρωμενέστερον μάθω.

Β ΙΠ. Ἄλλ' ἀντιλαμβάνου. καὶ γάρ, ὃ νῦν δὴ εἶπον, οὐ μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγὼ σε διδάξαιμι, ὥστε μηδέν' ἀνθρώπων δύνασθαι σε ἐξελέγχειν.

Θ. ΣΩ. Φεῦ ὡς εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἄγ',¹ ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ κελεύεις, φέρε ὅτι μάλιστ' ἐκεῖνος γενόμενος πειρῶμαι σε ἐρωτᾶν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ αὐτῶ τὸν λόγον

¹ ἀλλ' ἄγ' later hands: ἀλλά γ' TWF.

GREATER HIPPIAS

reproached myself, and threatened that the first time I met one of you wise men, I would hear and learn and practise and then go back to the man who questioned me to renew the wordy strife. So now, as I say, you have come at the right moment ; just teach me satisfactorily what the absolute beautiful is, and try in replying to speak as accurately as possible, that I may not be confuted a second time and be made ridiculous again. For you doubtless know clearly, and this would doubtless be but a small example of your wide learning.

HIPP. Yes, surely, by Zeus, a small one, Socrates, and, I may say, of no value.

SOC. Then I shall learn it easily, and nobody will confute me any more.

HIPP. Nobody, surely ; for in that case my profession would be worthless and ordinary.

SOC. That is good, by Hera, Hippias, if we are to worst the fellow. But may I without hindering you imitate him, and when you answer, take exception to what you say, in order that you may give me as much practice as possible ? For I am more or less experienced in taking exceptions. So, if it is all the same to you, I wish to take exceptions, that I may learn more vigorously.

HIPP. Oh yes, take exceptions. For, as I said just now, the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer much harder ones than this, so that nobody in the world could confute you.

SOC. Oh how good that is ! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man's part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For

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τοῦτον ἐπιδείξαι οὖν φήσ, τὸν περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἀκούσας, ἐπειδὴ παύσαιο λέγων, ἔροιτ' ἂν οὐ περὶ ἄλλου πρότερον ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, C ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτ' ἔχει, καὶ εἴποι ἄν· “ὦ ξένε Ἥλειε, ἄρ' οὐ δικαιοσύνη δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι;” ἀπόκριναί δὴ, ὦ Ἴππία, ὡς ἐκείνου ἐρωτῶντος.

ΙΠ. Ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι δικαιοσύνη.

ΣΩ. “Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι τοῦτο, ἢ δικαιοσύνη;”

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. “Οὐκοῦν καὶ σοφία οἱ σοφοί εἰσι σοφοί καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ πάντα τὰγαθὰ ἀγαθὰ;”

ΙΠ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. “Οὔσί γέ τισι τούτοις· οὐ γὰρ δὴ που μὴ οὔσί γε.”

ΙΠ. Οὔσι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. “Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ ἔστι καλά;”

D ΙΠ. Ναί, τῷ καλῷ.

ΣΩ. “Ὀντι γέ τινι τούτῳ;”

ΙΠ. Ὀντι· ἀλλὰ τί γὰρ μέλλει;

ΣΩ. “Εἰπέ δὴ, ὦ ξένε,” φήσει, “τί ἐστι τοῦτο, τὸ καλόν;”

ΙΠ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν δεῖται πυθέσθαι ἢ τί ἐστι καλόν;

ΣΩ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ἔστι τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἴππία.

ΙΠ. Καὶ τί διαφέρει τοῦτ' ἐκείνου;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ;

ΙΠ. Οὐδέν γὰρ διαφέρει.

GREATER HIPPIAS

if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful; for he has that sort of habit, and he would say, "Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just?" So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question.

HIPP. I shall answer that it is by justice.

SOC. "Then this—I mean justice—is something?"

HIPP. Certainly.

SOC. "Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the good all things are good, are they not?"

HIPP. Of course.

SOC. "And justice, wisdom, and so forth are something; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something."

HIPP. To be sure, they are something.

SOC. "Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?"

HIPP. Yes, by the beautiful.

SOC. "By the beautiful, which is something?"

HIPP. Yes, for what alternative is there?

SOC. "Tell me, then, stranger," he will say, "what is this, the beautiful?"

HIPP. Well, Socrates, does he who asks this question want to find out anything else than what is beautiful?

SOC. I do not think that is what he wants to find out, but what the beautiful is.

HIPP. And what difference is there between the two?

SOC. Do you think there is none?

HIPP. Yes, for there is no difference.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι συ κάλλιον οἶσθα. ὅμως δέ, ὦ ἄγαθέ, ἄθρει· ἐρωτᾷ γάρ σε οὐ τί ἐστι **E** καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅ τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν.

ΙΠ. Μανθάνω, ὦ ἄγαθέ, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι γε αὐτῷ ὅ τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε¹ ἐλεγχθῶ. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ ἴσθι, εἰ δεῖ τάληθές λέγειν, παρθένος καλὴ καλόν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Ἰππία, νῆ τὸν κύνα καὶ εὐδόξως ἀπεκρίνω. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, τὸ ἐρωτώμενόν τε ἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι **288** καὶ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε¹ ἐλεγχθῶ;

ΙΠ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐλεγχθείης, ὅ γε πᾶσι δοκεῖ καὶ πάντες σοι μαρτυρήσουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· πάνυ μὲν οὖν. φέρε δὴ, ὦ Ἰππία, πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἀναλάβω ὃ λέγεις. ὁ μὲν ἐρήσεται με οὕτωςί πως· “ἴθι μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φῆς καλὰ εἶναι, εἰ τί² ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη καλὰ;” ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν, ἔστι³ δι' ὃ⁴ ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη καλὰ.

B ΙΠ. Οἶει οὖν ἔτι αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν σε ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ καλόν ἐστὶν ὃ λέγεις, ἢ ἔαν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἔσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει, ὦ θαυμάσιε, εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δ' ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. ἃ μέντοι ἐρεῖ, ἐθέλω σοι λέγειν.

ΙΠ. Λέγε δὴ.

10. ΣΩ. “Ὡς γλυκὺς εἶ,” φήσει, “ὦ Σώκρατες.

¹ ποτε F: om. TW.

² εἰ τί F: εἶ τι TW.

³ καλόν, ἔστι Hoenebeek Hissink: καλόν ἐστι TW: καλόν . . . καλὰ bracketed by Hermann: καλόν, ἔστι τι Schanz.

⁴ δι' δ] διὸ TW: διότι F.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. Well, surely it is plain that you know best ; but still, my good friend, consider ; for he asked you, not what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.

HIPP. I understand, my good friend, and I will answer and tell him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, a beautiful maiden is beautiful.

soc. Beautifully answered, Hippias, by the dog, and notably ! Then if I give this answer, I shall have answered the question that was asked, and shall have answered it correctly, and shall never be confuted ?

HIPP. Yes, for how could you, Socrates, be confuted, when you say what everybody thinks, and when all who hear it will bear witness that what you say is correct ?

soc. Very well ; certainly. Come, then, Hippias, let me rehearse to myself what you say. The man will question me in some such fashion as this : “ Come Socrates, answer me. All these things which you say are beautiful, if the absolute beautiful is anything, would be beautiful ? ” And I shall say that if a beautiful maiden is beautiful, there is something by reason of which these things would be beautiful.

HIPP. Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous ?

soc. That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure ; but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.

HIPP. Do so.

soc. “ How charming you are, Socrates ! ” he will

PLATO

θήλεια δ' ἵππος καλή οὐ καλόν, ἦν καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν
 C τῷ χρησμῷ ἐπήνεσε;" τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία;
 ἄλλο τι ἢ φῶμεν καὶ τὴν ἵππον καλόν¹ εἶναι, τὴν
 γε καλήν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν τολμῶμεν² ἕξαρνοι εἶναι τὸ
 καλόν μὴ καλόν εἶναι;

ΙΠ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ
 ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν· πάγκαλαι γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν
 ἵπποι γίνονται.

ΣΩ. "Εἶεν," φήσει δὴ· "τί δὲ λύρα καλή; οὐ
 καλόν;" φῶμεν, ὦ Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐρεῖ τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐκείνος, σχεδόν τι εὖ
 οἶδα ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου τεκμαιρόμενος· "ᾠ βέλτιστε
 σύ, τί δὲ χύτρα καλή; οὐ καλόν ἄρα;"

D ΙΠ. ᾠ Σώκρατες, τίς δ' ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ὡς
 ἀπαίδευτός τις, ὃς οὕτω φαῦλα ὀνόματα ὀνομάζειν
 τολμᾷ ἐν σεμνῷ πράγματι.

ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτός τις, ὦ Ἰππία, οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ
 συρφετός, οὐδὲν ἄλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές.
 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀποκριτέον τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ ἔγωγε προαπο-
 φαίνομαι· εἶπερ ἢ χύτρα κεκεραμευμένη εἴη ὑπ'
 ἀγαθοῦ κεραμέως λεία καὶ στρογγύλη καὶ καλῶς
 ὠπτημένη, οἶαι τῶν καλῶν χυτρῶν εἰσὶ τινες
 δίωτοι, τῶν ἕξ χόας χωρουσῶν, πάγκαλαι, εἰ

¹ καλόν perhaps F: καλήν TW.

² τολμῶμεν F: τολμῶμεν TW.

¹ Heindorf and other commentators connect this reference with an oracle quoted by a scholiast on Theocritus, *Idyl* xiv. 48. The Megarians, being filled with pride, asked the god who were better than they. The first lines of the reply they received are:

Γαίης μὲν πάσης τὸ Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος ἄμεινον,
 ἵπποι Θρηϊκίαι, Λακεδαιμόνιαι δὲ γυναῖκες.

GREATER HIPPIAS

say. "But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle?"¹ What shall we say, Hippias? Shall we not say that the mare is beautiful, I mean the beautiful mare? For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful thing is beautiful?

HIPP. Quite true, Socrates; for what the god said is quite correct, too; for very beautiful mares are bred in our country.

SOC. "Very well," he will say, "and how about a beautiful lyre? Is it not beautiful?" Shall we agree, Hippias?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. After this, then, the man will ask, I am sure, judging by his character: "You most excellent man, how about a beautiful pot? Is it, then, not beautiful?"

HIPP. Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!

SOC. That's the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes,² very beautiful ones—

"Better than all other land is the land of Pelasgian Argos,
Thracian mares are the best, and the Lacedaemonian
women."

To be sure, nothing is said about the beauty of the mares, and the reference to Elis contained in *παρ' ἡμῶν* just below is hard to reconcile with the Thracian mares of the oracle.

² The *χοῦς* was 5.76 pints.

PLATO

Ε τοιαύτην ἐρωτῶν χύτραν, καλὴν ὁμολογητέον εἶναι.
 πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίμεν καλὸν ὄν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;

ΙΠ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. “ Οὐκοῦν καὶ χύτρα,” φήσει, “ καλὴ καλόν;
 ἀποκρίνου.”

ΙΠ. Ἄλλ’ οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχει, οἶμαι
 καλὸν μὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ¹ σκευὸς ἐστὶ καλῶς εἰργα-
 σμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄξιον κρίνειν
 ὡς ὄν καλὸν πρὸς ἵππον τε καὶ παρθένον καὶ τὰλλα
 πάντα τὰ καλά.

289 ΣΩ. Εἶεν· μανθάνω, ὦ Ἰππία, ὡς ἄρα χρή
 ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὸν ταῦτα ἐρωτῶντα τάδε· ὦ
 ἄνθρωπε, ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου εὖ ἔχει,
 ὡς ἄρα “ πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχροὺς ἀνθρώπων²
 γένει συμβάλλειν,” καὶ χυτρῶν ἢ καλλίστη αἰσχροὺς
 παρθένων γένει συμβάλλειν, ὡς φησὶν Ἰππίας ὁ
 σοφός. οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω.

11. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ. μετὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι
 φήσει· “ τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸ τῶν παρθένων
 Β γένος θεῶν γένει ἂν τις συμβάλλῃ, οὐ ταῦτὸν
 πείσεται ὅπερ τὸ τῶν χυτρῶν τῶ τῶν παρθένων
 συμβαλλόμενον; οὐχ ἢ καλλίστη παρθένος αἰσχροὺς
 φανεῖται; ἢ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος αὐτὸ³ τοῦτο
 λέγει, ὄν σὺ ἐπάγει, ὅτι ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος
 πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφία καὶ κάλλει
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν;” ὁμολογήσωμεν,⁴ ὦ⁵ Ἰππία,
 τὴν καλλίστην παρθένον πρὸς θεῶν γένος αἰσχροὺς
 εἶναι;

ΙΠ. Τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀντεῖποι τούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες;

¹ τοῦτο τὸ F: τοῦτο TW.

² ἀνθρώπων Bekker: ἄλλῳ TWF.

GREATER HIPPIAS

if that were the kind of pot he asked about, we must agree that it is beautiful ; for how could we say that being beautiful it is not beautiful ?

HIPP. We could not at all, Socrates.

SOC. " Then," he will say, " a beautiful pot also is beautiful, is it not ? Answer."

HIPP. Well, Socrates, it is like this, I think. This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but absolutely considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and a maiden and all the beautiful things.

SOC. Very well ; I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this : " Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that ' the most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man,' and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says." Is it not so, Hippias ?

HIPP. Certainly, Socrates ; you replied rightly.

SOC. Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say : " Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods, will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens ? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly ? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else ? Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods ?

HIPP. Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates ?

³ αὐτὸ F : ταὐτὸ TW.

⁴ ὁμολογήσωμεν W : ὁμολογήσομεν TF.

⁵ ᾧ add. Coisl. : om. TWF.

PLATO

C
ΣΩ.
 "Αν τοίνυν ταῦτα ὁμολογήσωμεν, γελάσεταιί τε καὶ ἐρεῖ· "ὦ Σώκρατες, μέμνησαι οὖν ὃ τι ἠρωτήθης;" "Ἔγωγε," φήσω, "ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν." "Ἐπειτα," φήσει, "ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνει ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, ὡς αὐτὸς φῆς, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν;" "Ἐοικε, φήσω· ἢ τί μοι συμβουλεύεις, ὦ φίλε, φάναι;

D
III.
 Τοῦτ' ἔγωγε· καὶ γὰρ¹ δὴ πρὸς γε θεοὺς ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖ.

D
ΣΩ.
 "Εἰ δέ σε ἠρόμην," φήσει, "ἐξ ἀρχῆς τι ἔστι καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἄπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο; ἔτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ὦ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν τῷ προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτ' εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα;"

E
III.
 Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ τοῦτό γε ζητεῖ, πάντων ῥᾶστον ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτῷ τί ἔστι τὸ καλόν ὦ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται. εὐηθέστατος οὖν ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαῖει περὶ καλῶν κτημάτων. ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀποκρίνη ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐρωτᾶς τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χρυσός, ἀπορήσει καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσει σε ἐλέγχειν. ἴσμεν γάρ που πάντες ὅτι ὅπου ἂν τοῦτο προσγένηται, κἂν² πρότερον αἰσχρόν φαίνεται, καλὸν φανεῖται χρυσῷ γε κοσμηθέν.

ΣΩ.
 Ἄπειρος εἶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἴππία, ὡς σχέτλιός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ῥαδίως ἀποδεχόμενος.

¹ γὰρ F: om. TW.

² κἂν F: καὶ TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say : “ Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked ? ” “ I do,” I shall say, “ the question was what the absolute beautiful is.” “ Then,” he will say, “ when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly ? ” “ So it seems,” I shall say ; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say ?

HIPP. That is what I advise ; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.

soc. “ But if I had asked you,” he will say, “ in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly, if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly ? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre ? ”

HIPP. Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful. So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him : “ This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold,” he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.

soc. You don't know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.

PLATO

290 **Π.** Τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸ γὰρ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢ μὴ ἀποδεχομένῳ καταγελάστω εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ ταύτην γε τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ με τωθάσεται, καὶ ἐρεῖ· “ὦ τετυφωμένε σύ, Φειδίαν οἶει κακὸν εἶναι δημιουργόν;” καὶ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, ἐρῶ ὅτι Οὐδ’ ὅπωςτιοῦν.

Π. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ’ ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς μέντοι. τοιγάρτοι ἐκεῖνος, ἐπειδὴν ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δημιουργὸν τὸν Φειδίαν, **Β** “Εἶτα,” φήσκει, “οἶει, τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ὃ σὺ λέγεις ἠγνόει Φειδίας;” καὶ ἐγώ· Τί μάλιστα; φήσω. “Ὅτι, ἐρεῖ, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρόσωπον οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, εἶπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὄν κάλλιστον ἔμελλε φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐλεφάντινον· δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξήμαρτεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι χρυσὸς ἄρ’ ἐστὶν ὁ πάντα καλὰ ποιῶν, ὅπου ἂν προσγένηται.” ταῦτα οὖν λέγοντι τί ἀποκρινώμεθα, ὦ Ἰππία;

Κ **Π.** Οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν· ἐρουῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὀρθῶς ἐποίησε. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλεφάντινον, οἶμαι, καλὸν ἐστίν.

ΣΩ. “Τοῦ οὖν ἔνεκα,” φήσκει, “οὐ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλεφάντινα εἰργάσατο, ἀλλὰ λίθινα, ὡς οἶόν τ’ ἦν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ λίθου τῷ ἐλέφαντι ἐξευρών; ἢ καὶ ὁ λίθος ὁ καλὸς καλὸν ἐστι;” φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία;

Π. Φήσομέν τοι, ὅταν γε πρέπων ἦ.

ΣΩ. “Ὅταν δὲ μὴ πρέπων, αἰσχρόν;” ὁμολογῶ ἢ μή;

GREATER HIPPIAS

HIPP. What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct, or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.

SOC. This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: "You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman?" And I shall say, "Not in the least."

HIPP. And you will be right, Socrates.

SOC. Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman, "Well, then," he will say, "do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of?" "Why do you ask that?" I shall say. "Because," he will say, "he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added." When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?

HIPP. That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.

SOC. "Why, then," he will say, "did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful?" Shall we say that it is, Hippias?

HIPP. Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.

SOC. "But ugly when not appropriate?" Shall I agree, or not?

¹ & WF: om. T.

PLATO

ΙΠ. Ὁμολόγει, ὅταν γε μὴ πρέπη.
 D ΣΩ. “Τί δὲ δὴ; ὁ ἐλέφας καὶ ὁ χρυσός,” φήσει,
 “ὦ σοφὲ σύ, οὐχ ὅταν μὲν πρέπη, καλὰ ποιεῖ
 φαίνεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ μή, αἰσχροί;” ἔξαρνοι ἐσόμεθα
 ἢ ὁμολογήσομεν αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτόν;

ΙΠ. Ὁμολογήσομεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ὁ ἂν πρέπη
 ἐκάστω, τοῦτο¹ καλὸν ποιεῖ ἕκαστον.

ΣΩ. “Πότερον οὖν² πρέπει,” φήσει, “ὅταν τις
 τὴν χύτραν ἢν ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὴν καλήν, ἔψη
 ἔτνος καλοῦ μεστήν, χρυσῆ τορύνῃ αὐτῇ ἢ συκίνη;”

13. ΙΠ. Ἡράκλεις, οἷον λέγεις ἄνθρωπον, ὦ
 E Σώκρατες. οὐ βούλει μοι εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνοίης, εἴ σοι εἶπομι τοῦνομα.

ΙΠ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε γιγνώσκω ὅτι ἀμαθὴς
 τίς ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἰππία· ἀλλ’ ὅμως
 τί φήσομεν; ποτέραν πρέπειν τοῖν τορύναι τῷ
 ἔτνει καὶ τῇ χύτρᾳ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὴν συκίνην;
 εὐωδέστερον γάρ που τὸ ἔτνος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἅμα, ὦ
 ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα ἡμῖν τὴν χύτραν ἐκχέαι
 τὸ ἔτνος καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀποσβέσειεν καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας
 ἐστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου ἂν³ πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν·
 ἢ δὲ χρυσῆ ἐκείνη πάντ’ ἂν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ὥστ’
 291 ἔμοι γε δοκεῖν⁴ τὴν συκίνην ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι
 πρέπειν ἢ τὴν χρυσῆν, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ΙΠ. Πρέπει μὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον· οὐ
 μέντ’ ἂν ἔγωγε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοιαῦτ’ ἐρωτῶντι
 διαλεγοίμην.

¹ τοῦτο F: τοῦτον TW.

² οὖν F: om. TW.

³ ὄψου ἂν W: ὄψου TF.

⁴ ὥστ’ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν F: ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖ TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

HIPP. Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.

soc. "What then? Do not gold and ivory," he will say, "when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly?" Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?

HIPP. We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.

soc. "Well, then," he will say, "when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?"

HIPP. Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of! Won't you tell me who he is?

soc. You would not know him if I should tell you his name.

HIPP. But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.

soc. He is a great nuisance, Hippias; but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things, so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.

HIPP. No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.

PLATO

ζα. Ὅρθως γε, ὦ φίλε· σοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν
 πρέποι τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ἀναπίμπλασθαι, καλῶς
 μὲν οὕτως ἀμπεχομένῳ, καλῶς δὲ ὑποδεδεμένῳ,
 εὐδοκιμοῦντι δὲ ἐπὶ σοφία ἐν πάσι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν·
 ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα φύρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρω-
 Β πον· ἐμὲ οὖν προδίδασκε καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν ἀποκρί-
 νου. “ Εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρέπει γε μᾶλλον ἢ συκίνη τῆς
 χρυσῆς,” φήσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, “ ἄλλο τι ἢ καὶ καλ-
 λίων ἂν εἶη, ἐπειδήπερ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 κάλλιον ὁμολόγησας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ πρέποντος;”
 ἄλλο τι ὁμολογῶμεν, ὦ Ἴππία, τὴν συκίνη καλλίω
 τῆς χρυσῆς εἶναι;

ιπ. Βούλει σοι εἶπω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ εἰπὼν εἶναι
 τὸ καλὸν ἀπαλλάξεις σαυτὸν¹ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων;
 C ζα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· μὴ μέντοι πρότερόν γε πρὶν
 ἂν μοι εἴπῃς ποτέραν ἀποκρίνωμαι οἷν ἄρτι ἔλεγον
 τοῖν τορύναιν πρέπουσάν τε καὶ καλλίω εἶναι.

ιπ. Ἄλλ', εἰ βούλει, αὐτῷ ἀπόκριναι, ὅτι ἢ ἐκ
 τῆς συκῆς εἰργασμένη.

ζα. Λέγε δὴ νυνὶ ὃ ἄρτι ἔμελλες λέγειν. ταύτη
 μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἂν² φῶ τὸ καλὸν χρυσὸν
 εἶναι, οὐδὲν ὡς ἔοικέ μοι ἀναφανήσεται κάλλιον ὄν
 χρυσοῦ ἢ ξύλον σύκινον· τὸ δὲ νῦν τί αὖ λέγεις τὸ
 καλὸν εἶναι;

D ιπ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. ζητεῖν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς
 τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ μηδέποτε
 αἰσχρὸν μηδαμοῦ μηδενὶ φανεῖται.

ζα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἴππία· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν
 ὑπολαμβάνεις.

¹ σαυτὸν corr. Coisl. : αὐτὸν W : αὐτὸν TF.

² ἂν Hermann : ἢ ἂν TW : ἢ ἂν F.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. Quite right, my friend ; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks ; but for me it doesn't matter if I do associate with the fellow ; so instruct me and for my sake answer him. " For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one," the fellow will say, " would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate ? " Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden ?

HIPP. Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion ?

soc. Certainly ; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.

HIPP. Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.

soc. Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood ; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is ?

HIPP. I will tell you ; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.

soc. Certainly, Hippias ; now you understand beautifully.

PLATO

ΙΠ. "Ακουε δὴ· πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσθι, εἴαν τις ἔχη ὅ τι ἀντεῖπη, φάναι ἐμὲ μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἐπαΐειν.¹

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ ὡς τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν.

ΙΠ. Λέγω τοίνυν αἰεὶ καὶ παντὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ κάλλιστον εἶναι ἀνδρὶ, πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, τιμωμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀφικομένῳ εἰς γῆρας, τοὺς αὐτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας καλῶς περιστεί-
 Ε λαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλο-
 πρεπῶς ταφῆναι.

14. ΣΩ. Ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Ἰππία, ἡ θαυμασίως τε καὶ μεγάλως καὶ ἀξίως σαυτοῦ εἶρηκας· καὶ νῆ τὴν Ἥραν ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοϊκῶς, καθ' ὅσον οἶός τ' εἶ, βοηθεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν δὴ νῦν καὶ πλείστον καταγελάσεται, εὖ ἴσθι.

ΙΠ. Πονηρόν γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, γέλωτα· ὅταν γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχη μὲν μηδὲν ὅ τι λέγῃ, γελᾷ δέ, αὐτοῦ
 292 καταγελάσεται καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων αὐτὸς ἔσται καταγέλαστος.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως οὕτως ἔχει· ἴσως μέντοι ἐπὶ γε ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ὡς ἐγὼ μαντεύομαι, κινδυνεύσει οὐ μόνον μου καταγελᾶν.

ΙΠ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ἂν τύχῃ βακτηρίαν ἔχων, ἂν μὴ ἐκφύγῃ φεύγων αὐτόν, εὖ μάλα μου ἐφικέσθαι πειράσεται.

ΙΠ. Πῶς λέγεις; δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχθήσεται² καὶ δίκας ὀφλήσει; ἢ οὐκ ἔνδικος ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις ἐστίν, ἀλλ'
 Β εἶ ἀδίκως τύπτειν ἀλλήλους τοὺς πολίτας;

¹ ἐπαΐειν F : ἐπαινεῖν TW.

² ἀχθήσεται F : ἀχθέσεται TW : ἀπαχθήσεται Naber.

GREATER HIPPIAS

HIPP. Listen, then ; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.

soc. Then for Heaven's sake, speak as quickly as you can.

HIPP. I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honoured by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents, to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.

soc. Bravo, bravo, Hippias ! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you ; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man ; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.

HIPP. A wretched laugh, Socrates ; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself and will himself be laughed at by those present.

soc. Perhaps that is so ; perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than laugh at me.

HIPP. Why do you say that, pray ?

soc. Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.

HIPP. What ? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it ? Or does your city disregard justice and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly ?

PLATO

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἐᾶ.

ΙΠ. Οὐκοῦν δώσει δίκην ἀδίκως γέ σε τύπτων.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἰππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταῦτά γε ἀποκριναίμην, ἀλλὰ δικαίως, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΙΠ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ γε αὐτὸς ταῦτα οἶει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπω σοι καὶ ἢ αὐτὸς οἶομαι δικαίως ἂν τύπτεσθαι ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; ἢ καὶ σύ με ἄκριτον τυπτήσεις; ἢ δέξει λόγον;

ΙΠ. Δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἶη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ δεχοίμην· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;

15. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὄνπερ νῦν δὴ μιμούμενος ἐκείνων, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς σέ λέγω ῥήματα, οἷα ἐκείνος εἰς ἐμέ ἐρεῖ, χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, “Εἶπέ μοι,” φήσει, “ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶει ἂν ἀδίκως πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ὅστις διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ἄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως πολὺ ἀπῆσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος;” Πῶς δὴ; φήσω ἐγώ. “Ὅπως;” φήσει· “οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ μεμνησθαι ὅτι τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ ἡρώτων, ὃ παντὶ ὦ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῶ εἶναι, καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ καὶ πάσῃ¹ πράξει καὶ παντὶ μαθήματι; αὐτὸ γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὦ ἀνθρωπε, κάλλος ἐρωτῶ ὃ τι ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέν σοι μᾶλλον γεγωνεῖν δύναμαι ἢ εἰ μοι παρεκάθησο λίθος, καὶ οὗτος μυλίας, μήτε ὦτα μήτ' ἐγκέφαλον ἔχων.” εἰ οὖν φοβηθεῖς εἵπομι ἐγὼ ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν ἄχθοιο, ὦ Ἰππία; “Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τόδε τὸ καλὸν εἶναι Ἰππίας ἔφη· καίτοι ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἡρώτων

¹ πάση F: ἀπάση TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. Oh no ; that is not allowed at all.

HIPP. Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.

soc. I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.

HIPP. Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.

soc. Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply ? Or will you also beat me without trial ? Or will you listen to what I have to say ?

HIPP. It would be shocking if I would not listen ; but what have you to say ?

soc. I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, "Tell me, Socrates," he will say, "do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question ?" "How so ?" I shall say. "How so ?" he will say ; "are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful, by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge ? For what I am asking is this, man : what is absolute beauty ? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain." Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias, if I should be frightened and should reply in this way ? "Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful ; and

PLATO

οὕτως ὡσπερ σὺ ἐμέ, ὃ πᾶσι καλὸν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐστι.”
 πῶς οὖν φῆς; οὐκ ἀχθέσει, ἂν εἴπω ταῦτα;

ΙΠ. Εὐ γ’ οὖν οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πᾶσι καλὸν
 τοῦτ’ ἐστίν ὃ ἐγὼ εἶπον καὶ δόξει.

ΣΩ. “Ἦ καὶ ἔσται;” φήσει· “αἰεὶ γάρ που
 καλὸν τό γε καλόν.”¹

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. “Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἦν;” φήσει.

ΙΠ. Καὶ ἦν.

ΣΩ. “Ἦ καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ,” φήσει, “ὁ ξένος ὃ
 Ἡλείος ἔφη καλὸν εἶναι ὑστέρω τῶν προγόνων
 ταφῆναι, καὶ τῷ πάππῳ αὐτοῦ Αἰακῷ, καὶ τοῖς
 293 ἄλλοις ὅσοι ἐκ θεῶν γεγόνασι, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς
 θεοῖς;”

16. ΙΠ. Τί τοῦτο; βάλλ’ ἐς μακαρίαν! τοῦ ἀν-
 θρώπου οὐδ’ εὐφημα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτά γε τὰ
 ἐρωτήματα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὸ ἐρομένου² ἑτέρου φάναι ταῦθ’
 οὕτως ἔχειν οὐ πάνυ δύσφημον;

ΙΠ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. “Ἴσως τοίνυν σὺ εἶ οὗτος,” φήσει, “ὅς
 παντὶ φῆς καὶ αἰεὶ καλὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐκγόνων
 ταφῆναι, τοὺς δὲ γονέας θάψαι· ἢ οὐχ εἰς τῶν
 ἀπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν καὶ οὐς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν
 πάντες;”

ΙΠ. Ἄλλ’ οὐ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔγωγε ἔλεγον.

B ΣΩ. “Οὐδὲ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὡς ἔοικας.”

ΙΠ. Οὐχ ὅσοι γε θεῶν παῖδες ἦσαν.

ΣΩ. “Ἄλλ’ ὅσοι μή;”

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

¹ καλὸν τό γε καλόν W : τό γε καλὸν καλόν F : τό γε καλὸν TP.

² ἐρομένου Bipontina : ἐρωμένου F : ἐρωτωμένου TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always." What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?

HIPP. I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.

soc. "And will it be so, too?" he will say; "for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?"

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. "Then was it so, too?" he will say.

HIPP. It was so, too.

soc. "And," he will say, "did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods, and for the gods themselves?"

HIPP. What's that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow's are not even respectful to religion.

soc. Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?

HIPP. Perhaps.

soc. "Perhaps, then, you are the man," he will say, "who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one's offspring, and to bury one's parents; or was not Heracles included in 'every one,' he and all those whom we just now mentioned?"

HIPP. But I did not say it was so for the gods.

soc. "Nor for the heroes either, apparently."

HIPP. Not those who were children of gods.

soc. "But those who were not?"

HIPP. Certainly.

PLATO

ΣΩ. “ Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν αὖ λόγον, ὡς φαίνεται, τῶν ἡρώων τῶ μὲν Ταντάλῳ καὶ τῶ Δαρδάνῳ καὶ τῶ Ζήθῳ δεινὸν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔστι, Πέλοπι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς οὕτω γεγονόσι καλόν.”

ΙΠ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. “ Σοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ,” φήσει, “ ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα, τὸ θάψαντι τοὺς προγόνους ταφῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγόνων ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐνίοις αἰσχρὸν εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀδύνατον πᾶσι τοῦτο γενέσθαι καὶ εἶναι καλόν, ὥστε τοῦτό γε ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα,¹ ἢ τε παρθένος καὶ ἢ χύτρα, ταῦτὸν πέπονθε, καὶ ἔτι γελοιοτέρως τοῖς μὲν ἔστι καλόν, τοῖς δ' οὐ καλόν. καὶ οὐδέπω καὶ τήμερον,” φήσει, “ οἴός τ' εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὃ τι ἔστι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι.” ταῦτά μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ὄνειδιεῖ δικαίως, ἐὰν αὐτῷ οὕτως ἀποκρίνωμαι.

D 17. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Ἰππία, σχεδὸν τί μοι οὕτω διαλέγεται· ἐνίοτε δ' ὥσπερ ἐλεήσας μου τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν αὐτός μοι προβάλλει ἐρωτῶν εἰ τοιόνδε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ἂν τύχη πυνθανόμενος καὶ περὶ οὗ ἂν λόγος ᾗ.

ΙΠ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι φράσω. “ ὦ δαιμόνιε,” φησί, “ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ οὕτω παῦσαι—λίαν γὰρ εὐήθη τε καὶ εὐεξέλεγκτά ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκεῖ καλόν E εἶναι, οὐ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐπελαβόμεθα ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει,

¹ ἐκεῖνα F : κεῖνα TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. "Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops¹ and the others who were born as he was?"

HIPP. I think so.

soc. "You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one's parents and be buried by one's offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful; and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even to-day, Socrates," he will say, "to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is." With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way. For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that; but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so—or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.

HIPP. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

soc. I will tell you. "Oh, my dear Socrates," he says, "stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful, which we got hold of just now in

¹ Pelops as the son of a mortal (Tantalus); the others mentioned were sons of gods.

PLATO

ἤνικ' ἔφαμεν τὸν χρυσὸν οἷς μὲν πρέπει καλὸν εἶναι, οἷς δὲ μή, οὐ, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οἷς ἂν τοῦτο προσῆ· αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρέποντος σκοπεῖ εἰ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὄν τὸ καλόν." ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εἶωθα συμφάναι τὰ τοιαῦθ' ἐκάστοτε· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω· σοὶ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν εἶναι;

III. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σκοπώμεθα, μή πη ἄρ' ἐξαπατώμεθα.

III. Ἄλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. "Ορα τοίνυν· τὸ πρέπον ἄρα τοῦτο λέγομεν, 294 ὃ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ τούτων οἷς ἂν παρῆ, ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων ;

III. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Πότερα;

III. "Ὁ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι καλά· ὥσπερ γε ἐπειδὴν ἱμάτιά τις λάβῃ ἢ ὑποδήματα ἀρμόττοντα, κἂν ἢ γελοῖος, καλλίων φαίνεται.¹

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλλίω ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστι τὸ πρέπον, ἀπάτη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ πρέπον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὦ Β Ἰππία; ἡμεῖς γάρ που ἐκεῖνο ἐζητοῦμεν, ὦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ πράγματα καλά ἐστίν· ὥσπερ ὦ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι· τούτῳ γὰρ πάντα μεγάλα ἐστί. καὶ ἐὰν² μὴ φαίνηται, ὑπερέχῃ δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι· οὕτω δὴ, φαμέν, καὶ τὸ καλόν, ὦ καλὰ πάντα ἐστίν, ἂν τ' οὖν

¹ Πότερα . . . ζητοῦμεν (294 c) all given to Socrates in the mss. : πότερα om. Baumann; the arrangement given above is due to Apelt.

² καὶ ἐὰν W : καὶ ἂν T : κἂν F.

GREATER HIPPIAS

our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful." Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time; for I don't know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?

HIPP. Yes, certainly, Socrates.

SOC. Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.

HIPP. Yes, we must consider.

SOC. See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which, when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?

HIPP. I think so.

SOC. Which?

HIPP. That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.

SOC. Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias? For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or

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φαίνεται ἂν τε μή, τί ἂν εἴη; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καλλίω γὰρ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ¹ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, οἷα δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἐᾷ φαίνεσθαι. τὸ C δὲ ποιοῦν εἶναι καλά, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ εἶπον, εἰάν τε φαίνεται εἰάν τε μή, πειρατέον λέγειν τί ἐστι· τοῦτο γὰρ ζητοῦμεν, εἴπερ τὸ καλὸν ζητοῦμεν.

III. Ἄλλὰ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ καλά παρόν.

ΣΩ. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα τῷ ὄντι καλά ὄντα μὴ φαίνεσθαι καλά εἶναι, παρόντος γε τοῦ ποιοῦντος φαίνεσθαι;

III. Ἀδύνατον.

18. ΣΩ. Ὁμολογήσομεν οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Ἰππία, πάντα τὰ τῷ ὄντι καλά καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ δοξάζεσθαι καλά εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι D αἰεὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἔριν καὶ μάχην περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ ταῖς πόλεσιν;

III. Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀγνοεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῆν· προσῆν δ' ἂν, εἴπερ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν ἦν καὶ μὴ μόνον καλά ἐποίει εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ πρέπον, εἰ μὲν τὸ καλά ποιοῦν ἐστὶν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἂν εἴη ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ποιοῦν φαίνεσθαι· εἰ δ' αὖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι

¹ ἢ F : ἢ TW.

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not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are. But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.

HIPP. But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.

SOC. Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?

HIPP. It is impossible.

SOC. Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them, or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?

HIPP. The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.

SOC. They would not be so, if the appearance of beauty were added to them; and it would be added, if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only to be beautiful, but also to appear so. So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful which we are looking for, but would not be that which makes things appear beautiful; but if, on the other hand, the appropriate is that which makes

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Ε ποιούν ἐστὶ τὸ πρέπον, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν. εἶναι γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε ποιεῖ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ εἶναι ποιεῖν¹ οὐ μόνον καλὰ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν. ἐλώμεθα δὴ πότερα δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον εἶναι τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ ποιούν, ἢ τὸ εἶναι.

III. Τὸ φαίνεσθαι, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Βαβαί, οἴχεται ἄρ' ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγός, ὦ Ἰππία, τὸ καλὸν γνῶναι ὃ τί ποτ'² ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ γε τὸ πρέπον ἄλλο τι ἐφάνη ὄν ἢ καλόν.

III. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε ἀτόπως.

295 ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μήπω γε ἀνώμεν αὐτό· ἔτι γάρ τινα ἐλπίδα ἔχω ἐκφανήσεσθαι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ καλόν.

III. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὅτι, εἰ ὀλίγον χρόνον εἰς ἐρημίαν ἐλθὼν σκεψαίμην πρὸς ἑμαυτόν, ἀκριβέστερον ἂν³ αὐτό σοι εἶποιμι τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

19. ΣΩ. Ἄ μὴ μέγα, ὦ Ἰππία, λέγε, ὅρας ὅσα πράγματα ἡμῖν ἤδη παρέσχηκε· μὴ καὶ ὀργισθὲν ἡμῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀποδρᾶ. καίτοι οὐδὲν λέγω· σὺ μὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, ραδίως αὐτὸ εὐρήσεις, ἐπειδὴ μόνος γένῃ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν ἐμοῦ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἔξευρε, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐμοὶ συζήτει· καὶ εἰ μὲν εὕρωμεν, κάλλιστα ἔξει· εἰ δὲ μὴ, στέρξω, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ τῇ ἐμῇ τύχῃ, σὺ δ' ἀπελθὼν ραδίως εὐρήσεις. καὶ εἰ μὲν νῦν εὕρωμεν, ἀμέλει οὐκ ὀχληρὸς

¹ καὶ εἶναι ποιεῖν Heindorf: ποιεῖν καὶ εἶναι Hirschig: καὶ ποιεῖν εἶναι TWF: Burnet brackets ποιεῖν.

² ὃ τί ποτ' F: ὃ τί ποτέ T.

³ ἂν F: om. TW.

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things appear beautiful, it would not be the beautiful for which we are looking. For that makes things be beautiful, but the same element could not make things both appear and be beautiful, nor could it make them both appear and be anything else whatsoever. Let us choose, then, whether we think that the appropriate is that which makes things appear or be beautiful.

HIPP. That which makes them appear so, in my opinion, Socrates.

SOC. Whew! Our perception of what the beautiful is has fled away and gone, Hippias, since the appropriate has been found to be something other than the beautiful.

HIPP. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and to me that is very queer

SOC. However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.

HIPP. Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.

SOC. Ah, don't boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I'm afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever. And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven's sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to

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ἔσομαί σοι πυνθανόμενος, ὅ τι ἦν ἐκείνο ὃ κατὰ
 C σαυτὸν ἐξεύρες· νῦν δὲ θέασαι αὐτό τόδ' εἶ¹ σοι δοκεῖ
 εἶναι τὸ καλόν· λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ εἶναι—ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 ἐπισκόπει μοι πάνυ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν, μὴ παρα-
 ληρήσω—τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ἡμῖν καλόν, ὃ ἂν
 χρήσιμον ᾗ. εἶπον δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐννοούμενος· καλοί,
 φασί, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ εἰσιν, οὐχ οἱ ἂν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι
 εἶναι οἷοι μὴ δυνατοὶ ὄραν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν δυνατοὶ τε
 καὶ χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν. ἦ γάρ,

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον σῶμα οὕτω λέγομεν
 καλόν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην,
 D καὶ αὐτὰ ζῶα πάντα, ἵππον καλόν καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνα
 καὶ ὄρνυγα, καὶ τὰ σκεύη πάντα καὶ τὰ ὀχήματα
 τά τε πεζὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ πλοῖά τε καὶ
 τριήρεις, καὶ τά γε ὄργανα πάντα τά τε ὑπὸ τῇ
 μουσικῇ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, εἰ δὲ
 βούλει, τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους, σχεδόν
 τι πάντα ταῦτα καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ αὐτῷ
 τρόπῳ· ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἦ
 πέφυκεν, ἦ εἴργασται, ἦ κείται, τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον
 καὶ ἦ χρήσιμον καὶ πρὸς ὃ χρήσιμον καὶ ὁπότε
 E χρήσιμον καλόν φασί εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ πάντῃ
 ἀχρηστον αἰσχρόν· ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως,
 ὦ Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. Ἐμοιγε.

20. ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς ἄρα νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι τυγχάνει
 παντὸς ὃν μᾶλλον καλόν τὸ χρήσιμον;

ΙΠ. Ὅρθῶς μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δυνατόν ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι,

¹ αὐτό τόδ' εἶ Hermann: αὐτὸ εἶ TW: αὐτὸ ὅ F.

GREATER HIPPIAS

you by asking what that was which you found by yourself; but now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful: I say, then, that it is—but consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense—for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running, part for wrestling; and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail; and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way; looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful; and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?

HIPP. It is.

SOC. Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?

HIPP. We are right, surely, Socrates.

SOC. Now that which has power to accomplish

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εἰς ὅπερ δυνατόν, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ χρήσιμον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἄχρηστον;

ιπ. Πάνυ γε.

σν. Δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν;

ιπ. Σφόδρα γε. τά τε οὖν¹ ἄλλα, ὦ Σώκρατες,
296 μαρτυρεῖ ἡμῖν ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ
τὰ πολιτικά· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τε καὶ τῇ
αὐτοῦ πόλει τὸ μὲν δυνατόν εἶναι πάντων κάλλιστον,
τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντων αἰσχιστον.

σν. Εὖ λέγεις. ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Ἰππία,²
διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ σοφία πάντων κάλλιστον, ἡ δὲ
ἀμαθία πάντων αἰσχιστον;

ιπ. Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

σν. Ἐχε δὴ ἡρέμα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε· ὡς φοβοῦμαι,
τί ποτ' αὖ λέγομεν.

B ιπ. Τί δ' αὖ φοβεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ νῦν γέ σοι
ὁ λόγος παγκάλως προβέβηκεν;

σν. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ἀλλά μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι·
ἄρ' ἄν τις τι ποιήσειεν ὃ μήτ' ἐπίσταιτο μήτε τὸ
παράπαν δύναιτο;

ιπ. Οὐδαμῶς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε μὴ δύναιτο;

σν. Οἱ οὖν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργαζό-
μενοί τε καὶ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες, ἄλλο τι οὔτοι, εἰ
μὴ ἐδύναντο ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐποίουν;

C ιπ. Δῆλον δὴ.

σν. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι δυνάμει γε δύνανται οἱ δυνάμε-
νοι· οὐ γὰρ που ἀδυναμία γε.

¹ οὖν TW: γοῦν F.

² ὦ ἰππία W: ἰππία TF.

GREATER HIPPIAS

anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not ?

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.

HIPP. Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates, testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs ; for in political affairs and in one's own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.

soc. Good ! Then, for Heaven's sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things ?

HIPP. Well, what do you suppose, Socrates ?

soc. Just keep quiet, my dear friend ; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.

HIPP. What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully ?

soc. I wish that might be the case ; but consider this point with me : could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do ?

HIPP. By no means ; for how could he do what he was powerless to do ?

soc. Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them ?

HIPP. Evidently not.

soc. But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful ; for surely it is not by powerlessness.

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ΙΠ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Δύνανται δέ γε πάντες ποιεῖν οἱ ποιούντες ἃ ποιούσιν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὰ δέ γε πολὺ πλείω ποιούσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ παίδων, καὶ ἐξάμαρ-
τάνουσιν ἄκοῦτες.

ΙΠ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, ἃ ἂν ἦ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν τι ἐργάζεσθαι χρήσιμα, ἄρα φήσομεν ταῦτα εἶναι καλὰ, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;

Δ ΙΠ. Πολλοῦ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Ἴππία, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.

ΙΠ. Ἐάν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγαθὰ δύνηται καὶ ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμον ἦ.

ΖΙ. ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοίνυν οἴχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἀπλῶς εἶναι καλόν· ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτ' ἦν ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ἴππία, ὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατόν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν;

Ε ΙΠ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ καλὰ νόμιμα καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα καλὰ ἐστιν ὅτι ὠφέλιμα.

ΙΠ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἄρα ἔοικεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἴππία.

ΙΠ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

GREATER HIPPIAS

HIPP. Certainly not.

SOC. And all who do, have power to do what they do ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.

HIPP. That is true.

SOC. Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it ?

HIPP. Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

SOC. Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.

HIPP. They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.

SOC. Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone ; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful ?

HIPP. Yes, in my opinion.

SOC. But surely this is beneficial ; or is it not ?

HIPP. Certainly.

SOC. So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.

HIPP. Evidently.

SOC. Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.

HIPP. Yes, certainly, Socrates.

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ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν.

ΙΠ. Ἔστι γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποιοῦν δέ γ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αἴτιον· ἢ γάρ;

ΙΠ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα αἰτιὸν ἔστιν τὸ καλόν.

297 ΙΠ. Ἔστι γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τό γε αἴτιον, ὧ Ἰππία, καὶ οὐ ἂν αἴτιον ἢ τὸ αἴτιον, ἄλλο ἔστιν· οὐ γάρ που τό γε αἴτιον αἰτίου αἴτιον ἂν εἴη. ὦδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐ τὸ αἴτιον ποιοῦν ἐφάνη;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποιεῖται οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΙΠ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο τι τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τό γ' αἴτιον αἴτιον αἰτίου ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ.

B ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλόν ἔστιν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικε, σπουδάζομεν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ καλά, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἔκγονον σπουδαστόν ἐστι, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐξ ὧν εὐρίσκομεν ἐν¹ πατρός τινος ἰδέα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ΙΠ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

¹ ἐν F: om. TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. But the beneficial is that which creates good.

HIPP. Yes, it is.

soc. But that which creates is nothing else than the cause ; am I right ?

HIPP. It is so.

soc. Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.

HIPP. Yes, it is.

soc. But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different ; for the cause could not well be the cause of the cause. But look at it in this way : was not the cause seen to be creating ?

HIPP. Yes, certainly.

soc. By that which creates, then, only that is created which comes into being, but not that which creates.¹ Is not that true ?

HIPP. That is true.

soc. The cause, then, is not the cause of the cause, but of that which comes into being through it.

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. If, then, the beautiful is the cause of good, the good would come into being through the beautiful ; and this is why we are eager for wisdom and all the other beautiful things, because their offspring, the good, is worthy of eagerness, and, from what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.

HIPP. Certainly ; for what you say is well said, Socrates.

¹ *i.e.* the creative force creates the thing created, not the creative force.

PLATO

σν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καλῶς λέγω, ὅτι οὔτε ὁ πατήρ υἱὸς ἐστίν, οὔθ' ὁ υἱὸς πατήρ;

C ιπ. Καλῶς μέντοι.

σν. Οὐδέ γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενόν ἐστίν, οὐδέ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτὸ αἴτιον.

ιπ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

σν. Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄριστε, οὐδέ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὐδέ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν· ἢ¹ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων;

ιπ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ μοι φαίνεται.

σν. Ἀρέσκει οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλομεν ἂν λέγειν, ὡς τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδέ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν;

ιπ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει.

σν. Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Ἰππία· ἐμοὶ δέ γε πάντων

D ἤκιστ' ἀρέσκει ὧν εἰρήκαμεν λόγων.

ιπ. Ἐοικε γὰρ οὕτως.

22. σν. Κινδυνεύει ἄρα ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐφαίνετο κάλλιστος εἶναι τῶν λόγων τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατόν ἀγαθὸν τι ποιεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ', εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, ἐκείνων εἶναι γελοϊότερος τῶν πρώτων, ἐν οἷς τήν τε παρθένον ὠόμεθα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων.

ιπ. Ἐοικεν.

σν. Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν γε οὐκ ἔτι ἔχω, ὦ Ἰππία, ὅποι τράπωμαι, ἀλλ' ἀπορῶ· σὺ δὲ ἔχεις τι λέγειν;

E ιπ. Οὐκ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, σκεψάμενος εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι εὐρήσω.

σν. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ εἰδέναι οὐχ οἷός τε σὲ εἶναι περιμένειν μέλλοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὖν δῆ τι καὶ οἶμαι ἄρτι ἠὲ ὑπορηκέναί.

¹ καλόν· ἢ corr. Coisl.: ἢ καλόν· ἢ T: ἢ καλόν W: καλόν F.

GREATER HIPPIAS

soc. Then is this well said, too, that the father is not the son, and the son not father ?

HIPP. To be sure it is well said.

soc. And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.

HIPP. True.

soc. By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful ; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said ?

HIPP. No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.

soc. Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful ?

HIPP. No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.

soc. Right, by Zeus, Hippias ! And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.

HIPP. Yes, that is likely.

soc. Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of our statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.

HIPP. That is likely.

soc. And Hippias, I no longer know where to turn ; I am at a loss ; but have you anything to say ?

HIPP. Not at the moment, but, as I said just now, I am sure I shall find it after meditation.

soc. But it seems to me that I am so eager to know that I cannot wait for you while you delay ; for I believe I have just now found a way out. Just see ;

PLATO

ὄρα γάρ· εἰ δ' ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῆ, μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, τοῦτο φαίμεν εἶναι καλόν, πῶς τι ἄρ' ἂν ἀγωνιζοί-
 298 μεθα; οἳ τέ γέ που καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ τὰ ποικίλματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα καὶ τὰ πλάσματα τέρπει ἡμᾶς ὀρῶντας, ἃ ἂν καλὰ ᾦ· καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ ξύμπασα καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ μυθολογίαι ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐργάζονται, ὥστ' εἰ ἀποκριναιόμεθα τῷ θρασεῖ ἐκείνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι “ ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ καλόν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡδύ,” οὐκ ἂν, οἶει, αὐτὸν τοῦ θράσους ἐπίσχοιμεν;

ΙΠ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν¹ δοκεῖ νῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ λέγε-
 Β σθαι τὸ καλόν ὃ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἄρα; τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ καλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὦ Ἰππία, δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ δι' ὄψεως φήσομεν ἡδέα ὄντα καλὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἔχει;

ΙΠ. Ταῦτα δ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν παραλάθοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Ἰππία, οὐχ ὄν γ' ἂν ἐγὼ
 C μάλιστα αἰσχυνοίμην ληρῶν καὶ προσποιούμενός τι λέγειν μηδὲν λέγων.

ΙΠ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

ΣΩ. Σωκράτῃ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου, ὃς ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον ταῦτα ἐπιτρέποι ἀνερεύνητα ὄντα ῥαδίως λέγειν ἢ ὡς εἰδότα ἃ μὴ οἶδα.

ΙΠ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ σὺ εἶπες, δοκεῖ τι ἄλλο εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοὺς νόμους.

23. ΣΩ. Ἐχ' ἡσυχῆ, ὦ Ἰππία· κινδυνεύομεν γάρ

¹ ἐμοιγοῦν Γ : ἐμοιγε οὖν ΤW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy ; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight ? For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them ; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, " My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight," don't you think that we should put a stop to his impudence ?

HIPP. To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems that the nature of the beautiful is now well stated.

SOC. But what then ? Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they are pleasing through hearing and sight, or that they have some other form of beauty ?

HIPP. Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the man unnoticed.

SOC. No, by the dog, Hippias—not past the man before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense and pretending that I was talking sense when I was not.

HIPP. What man is that ?

SOC. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things carelessly without investigation than to say that I know what I do not know.

HIPP. But certainly I also, now that you have mentioned it, think that this about the laws is something different.

SOC. Not too fast, Hippias ; for very likely we have

PLATO

τοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκότες ἀπορία περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν ἧπερ νῦν δῆ,¹ οἶεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορία εἶναι.

III. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι φράσω ὃ γ' ἐμοὶ² καταφαίνεται, εἰ
D ἄρα τί λέγω. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους
τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τάχ' ἂν φανείη οὐκ ἐκτὸς
ὄντα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως
ἡμῖν οὕσα τυγχάνει· ἀλλ' ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν
λόγον, τὸ διὰ τούτων ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, μηδὲν τὸ
τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παράγοντες. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡμᾶς
ἔροιτο εἴτε οὗτος ὃν λέγω, εἴτε ἄλλος ὅστισούν·

“ Τί δῆ, ὦ Ἰππία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀφωρίσατε τοῦ
ἡδέος τὸ ταύτη ἡδὺ ἢ λέγετε³ καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
E κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθησεις σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ
τῶν περὶ τὰ φροδίσια καὶ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
οὐ φατε καλὰ εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ἡδέα, οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς τὸ
παράπαν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φατέ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ
ἢ τῷ ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀκούσαι;” τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία;

III. Πάντως δήπου φήσομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγάλας πάνυ ἡδονὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. “ Τί οὖν,” φήσει, “ ἡδονὰς οὕσας οὐδὲν
299 ἦττον ἢ καὶ ἐκείνας ἀφαιρεῖσθε τοῦτο τοῦνομα καὶ
ἀποστερεῖτε τοῦ καλὰς εἶναι;” “ Ὅτι, φήσομεν,
καταγελώη⁴ ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ, εἰ φαίμεν μὴ
ἡδὺ εἶναι φαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ καλόν, καὶ ὄξειν ἡδὺ μὴ
ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καλόν· τὰ δέ που περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια
πάντες ἂν ἡμῖν μάχοιντο ὡς ἡδιστον ὄν, δεῖν⁵ δὲ

¹ νῦν δῆ later hands: δῆ νῦν TWF.

² γ' ἐμοὶ F: γέ μοι TW.

³ λέγετε scr. Laurent. vii. 85: λέγεται TWF.

⁴ καταγελώη F: καταγελωῶ TW.

⁵ δεῖν Heindorf: δεῖ TWF.

GREATER HIPPIAS

fallen into the same perplexity about the beautiful in which we were a while ago, although we think we have found another way out.

HIPP. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you what presents itself to me, if perhaps there may be some sense in it. For perhaps these matters of laws and customs might be shown to be not outside of the perception which we have through hearing and sight; but let us stick to the statement that that which is pleasing through the senses is beautiful, without interjecting the matter of the laws. But if this man of whom I speak, or anyone else whosoever, should ask us: "Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of 'the pleasing' that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses—those concerned with food and drink and sexual love and all such things—is not beautiful? Or do you say that such things are not even pleasing and that there is no pleasure at all in them, nor in anything else except sight and hearing?" What shall we say, Hippias?

HIPP. Certainly, by all means, Socrates, we shall say that there are very great pleasures in the other things also.

SOC. "Why, then," he will say, "if they are pleasures no less than the others, do you take from them this designation and deprive them of being beautiful?" "Because," we shall say, "everybody would laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but is beautiful, and that a pleasant odour is not pleasant but is beautiful; and as to the act of sexual love, we should all, no doubt, contend

PLATO

αὐτό, εἴαν τις καὶ πράττη, οὕτω πράττειν, ὥστε μηδένα ὄραν, ὡς αἰσχιστον ὄν ὀράσθαι.” ταῦτα ἡμῶν λεγόντων, ὦ Ἰππία, “Μανθάνω,” ἂν ἴσως φαίη, “καὶ ἐγὼ ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς
B ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἠρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὃ τι ἔστιν.” ἐροῦμεν δὴ, οἶμαι, ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα, ὅτι “Τοῦθ’ ἡμεῖς γέ φαμεν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδέος, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιγνόμενον, καλὸν εἶναι.” ἀλλὰ ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἢ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Ἰππία;

ΙΠ. Ἀνάγκη πρὸς γε τὰ εἰρημένα, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ ἄλλ’ ἅπτα ἢ ταῦτα λέγειν.

24. ΣΩ. “Καλῶς δὴ λέγετε,” φήσει. “οὐκοῦν
C εἶπερ τὸ δι’ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλὸν ἐστίν, ὃ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὄν τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἶη;” ὁμολογήσομεν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. “Ἡ οὖν τὸ δι’ ὄψεως ἡδύ,” φήσει, “δι’ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἐστὶν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ δι’ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ δι’ ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως ἐστὶν ἡδύ;” “Οὐδαμῶς,” φήσομεν, “τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὄν τοῦτο δι’ ἀμφοτέρων εἶη ἂν—τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν λέγειν—ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς
D ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἑκάτερον τούτων αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν ἡδέων καλὸν εἶη, καὶ ἀμφότερα.” οὐχ οὕτως ἀποκρινοῦμεθα;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. “Ἄρ’ οὖν,” φήσει, “ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὅτιοῦν

GREATER HIPPIAS

that it is most pleasant, but that one must, if he perform it, do it so that no one else shall see, because it is most repulsive to see." If we say this, Hippias, "I too understand," he will perhaps say, "that you have all along been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to people; but that is not what I asked, what seems to most people to be beautiful, but what is so." We shall, then, I fancy, say, as we suggested, "We say that that part of the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful." Do you think the statement is of any use, Hippias, or shall we say something else?

HIPP. Inevitably, in view of what has been said, Socrates, we must say just that.

SOC. "Excellent!" he will say. "Then if that which is pleasant through sight and hearing is beautiful, that among pleasant things which does not happen to be of that sort would evidently not be beautiful?" Shall we agree?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. "Is, then, that which is pleasant through sight," he will say, "pleasant through sight and hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing pleasant through hearing and sight?" "No," we shall say, "that which is pleasant through each of these would not in the least be pleasant through both—for that is what you appear to us to mean—but we said that either of these pleasant things was beautiful alone by itself, and both together." Is not that the reply we shall make?

HIPP. Certainly.

SOC. "Does, then," he will say, "any pleasant thing whatsoever differ from any pleasant thing

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ὅπου οὖν διαφέρει τούτῳ, τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ μάλλον ἢ ἡττόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὐτῷ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ ἢ μὲν ἡδονὴ εἶναι, ἢ δὲ μὴ ἡδονή, τῶν ἡδονῶν;" "Οὐχ ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖ." οὐ γάρ;

ΙΠ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. "Οὐκοῦν," φήσει, "δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι ἡδοναί εἰσι προείλεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, τοιοῦτόν τι ὁρῶντες ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι ἔχουσί τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέποντες καλὰς φατε αὐτὰς εἶναι; οὐ γάρ που¹ διὰ τοῦτο καλὴ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ ἢ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, ὅτι δι' ὄψεώς ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἦν τὸ αἴτιον καλῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἦν ἢ ἑτέρα, ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καλὴ· οὐκοῦν ἔστι γε δι' ὄψεως ἡδονή." "Ἀληθῆ λέγεις," φήσομεν;

ΙΠ. Φήσομεν γάρ.

300 ΣΩ. "Οὐδέ γ' αὖ ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅτι δι' ἀκοῆς ἐστί, διὰ ταῦτα τυγχάνει καλὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὖ ἢ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καλὴ ἦν· οὐκοῦν ἔστι γε δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή." ἀληθῆ φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία, λέγειν τὸν ἄνδρα ταῦτα λέγοντα;

ΙΠ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. "Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφοτέραί γ' εἰσὶ καλαί, ὡς φατέ." φαμέν γάρ;

ΙΠ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. "Ἐχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις

¹ που F: πω TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

whatsoever by this, by being pleasant? I ask not whether any pleasure is greater or smaller or more or less, but whether it differs by just this very thing, by the fact that one of the pleasures is a pleasure and the other is not a pleasure." "We do not think so." Do we?

HIPP. No, we do not.

SOC. "Is it not, then," he will say, "for some other reason than because they are pleasures that you chose these pleasures out from the other pleasures—it was because you saw some quality in both, since they have something different from the others, in view of which you say that they are beautiful? For the reason why that which is pleasant through sight is beautiful, is not, I imagine, because it is through sight; for if that were the cause of its being beautiful, the other pleasure, that through hearing, would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through sight." Shall we say "What you say is true?"

HIPP. Yes, we shall.

SOC. "Nor, again, is the pleasure through hearing beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through hearing." Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says that speaks the truth?

HIPP. Yes, he speaks the truth.

SOC. "But yet both are beautiful, as you say." We do say that, do we not?

HIPP. We do.

SOC. "They have, then, something identical which makes them to be beautiful, this common quality which pertains to both of them in common and to

PLATO

Β αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρα ἰδίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ἄλλως ἀμφοτέραί τε καλαὶ ἦσαν καὶ ἑκατέρα.” ἀποκρίνου ἔμοι ὡς ἐκείνω.

ΙΠ. Ἀποκρίνομαι, καὶ ἔμοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι αὐται αἰ ἠδοναὶ ἀμφοτέραι πεπόνθασιν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν τούτω γε τῷ παθήματι εἶεν καλαί.

ΙΠ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, μηδετέρας πεπονθυίας τι τῶν ὄντων ὄτιοῦν, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ μηδετέρα πέπονθεν, ἀμφοτέρας πεπονθέναι;

Ο ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΙΠ. Πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν μ' ἔχοι ἀπειρία καὶ τῆς τούτων φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν παρόντων λέξεως λόγων.

25. ΣΩ. Ἡδέως γε, ὦ Ἰππία. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἴσως κινδυνεύω δοκεῖν μὲν τι ὄραν οὕτως ἔχον ὡς σὺ φῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ὄρω δ' οὐδέν.

ΙΠ. Οὐ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἐτοίμως παρορᾷς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν πολλὰ γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστῶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι σοὶ μὲν οὐ φαντάζεται, ἀνδρὶ πλείστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφία, ἔμοι δέ, ὃς οὐδὲν πώποτε ἠργασάμην· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ παίζης πρὸς με καὶ ἐκὼν ἐξαπατᾷς οὕτω μοι σφόδρα καὶ πολλὰ καταφαίνεται.

ΙΠ. Οὐδεὶς σοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον εἴσεται εἴτε παίζω εἴτε μή, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσης λέγειν τὰ προφανόμενά σοι ταῦτα· φανήσκει γὰρ οὐδὲν λέγων.

GREATER HIPPIAS

each individually ; for otherwise they would not both collectively and each individually be beautiful." Answer me, as if you were answering him.

HIPP. I answer, and I think it is as you say.

soc. If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this affection that they would be beautiful.

HIPP. And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some affection or other, that then both are affected by that affection by which neither is affected ?

soc. You think it cannot be ?

HIPP. I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.

soc. Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.

HIPP. There's no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.

soc. And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you, a man who has made more money by wisdom than anyone now living, but to me who never made any money at all ; and the thought disturbs me, my friend, that you are playing with me and purposely deceiving me, they appear to me in such numbers and with such force.

HIPP. Nobody, Socrates, will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, if you proceed to tell these things that appear to you ; for it will be apparent to you that you are talking

PLATO

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε εὐρησ, ὃ μήτ'¹ ἐγὼ πέπονθα μήτε σύ, τοῦτ' ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς πεπονθότας.

Ε ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία; ἴσως μὲν τι² λέγεις, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ μανθάνω· ἀλλὰ μου σαφέστερον ἄκουσον ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὃ μήτ' ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτ' εἰμὶ μηδ' αὐτὸ σὺ εἶ, τοῦτ' ἀμφοτέρους πεπονθέναι ἡμᾶς οἷόν τ' εἶναι· ἕτερα δ' αὐτῶν, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδέτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν.

ΙΠ. Τέρατα αὐτὸ ἀποκρινομένω ἔοικας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι μείζω ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἀπεκρίνω. σκόπει γὰρ· πότερον εἰ ἀμφότεροι δίκαιοί ἐσμεν, 301 οὐ καὶ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη ἄν, ἢ εἰ ἄδικος ἐκάτερος, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι αὐτῶν, ἢ εἰ ὑγιαίνοντες, οὐ καὶ ἐκάτερος; ἢ εἰ κεκμηκῶς τι ἢ τετρωμένος ἢ πεπληγμένος ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν πεπονθὼς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι ἂν τοῦτο πεπόνθοιμεν; ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ χρυσοῖ ἢ ἀργυροῖ ἢ ἐλεφάντινοι, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γενναῖοι ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ τίμιοι ἢ γέροντές γε ἢ νέοι ἢ ἄλλο ὅ τι βούλει τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμφότεροι τύχοιμεν ὄντες, ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐκάτερον ἡμῶν τοῦτ' εἶναι;

Β ΣΩ. Πάντως γε δήπου.

ΙΠ. Ἄλλα γὰρ δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι, κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἶει εἶναί τι ἢ

¹ μήτ' F: μήποτ' TW.

² μεν τι F: μέντοι τί TW.

GREATER HIPPIAS

nonsense. For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an affection by which neither of us is affected.

soc. What are you saying, Hippias? Perhaps you are talking sense, and I fail to understand; but let me tell more clearly what I wish to say. For it appears to me that it is possible for us both to be so affected as to be something which I am not so affected as to be, and which I am not and you are not either; and again for neither of us to be so affected as to be other things which we both are.

HIPP. Your reply, Socrates, seems to involve miracles again even greater than those of your previous reply. For consider: if we are both just, would not each of us be just also, and if each is unjust, would not both again also be unjust, or if both are healthy, each of us also? Or if each of us were to be tired or wounded or struck or affected in any other way whatsoever, should we not both of us be affected in the same way? Then, too, if we were to be golden or of silver or of ivory, or, if you please, noble or wise or honoured or old or young or whatever else you like of all that flesh is heir to, is it not quite inevitable that each of us be that also?

soc. Absolutely.

HIPP. But you see, Socrates, you do not consider the entirety of things, nor do they with whom you are in the habit of conversing, but you all test the beautiful and each individual entity by taking them separately and cutting them to pieces. For this reason you fail to observe that embodiments of reality are by nature so great and undivided. And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some affection or reality

PLATO

πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἢ περὶ μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα ἔστιν
 C ἅμα, περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὐ, ἢ αὖ περὶ μὲν ἑκάτερον,
 περὶ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα οὐ· οὕτως ἀλογίστως καὶ ἀ-
 σκέπτως καὶ εὐήθως καὶ ἀδιανοήτως διάκεισθε.

26. ΣΩ. Τοιαῦτα, ὦ Ἰππία, τὰ ἡμέτερά ἐστιν,
 οὐχ οἷα βούλεται τις, φασὶν ἄνθρωποι ἑκάστοτε
 παροιμιαζόμενοι, ἀλλ' οἷα δύναται· ἀλλὰ σὺ ἡμᾶς
 ὀνίνης ἀεὶ νουθετῶν. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ
 ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὡς εὐήθως διεκείμεθα—ἔτι
 σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω εἰπὼν ἃ διανοούμεθα¹
 περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ μὴ εἶπω;

D ΠΙ. Εἰδότι μὲν ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶδα γὰρ
 ἑκάστους τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὡς διάκεινται·
 ὅμως δ' εἴ τι σοὶ ἥδιον, λέγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἥδιόν γε. ἡμεῖς γάρ, ὦ βέλτιστε,
 οὕτως ἀβέλτεροι ἡμεν, πρὶν σε ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν, ὥστε
 δόξαν εἶχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ ὡς ἑκάτερος
 ἡμῶν εἰς ἐστί, τοῦτο δὲ ὁ ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἶη οὐκ
 ἄρα εἶημεν ἀμφοτέροι—οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἐσμέν, ἀλλὰ
 E δύο—οὕτως εὐηθικῶς εἶχομεν· νῦν δὲ παρὰ σοῦ
 ἤδη ἀνεδιδάχθημεν ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο ἀμφοτέροί ἐσμεν,
 δύο καὶ ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δὲ εἰς
 ἑκάτερος, ἓνα καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ
 οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἰππίαν
 ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν ἀμφοτέρα ἦ,² τοῦτο καὶ
 ἑκάτερον, καὶ ὁ ἑκάτερον, ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι. πε-
 πεισμένος δὴ νῦν ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐνθάδε κάθημαι·
 πρότερον μέντοι, ὦ Ἰππία, ὑπόμνησόν με· πότερον
 εἰς ἐσμέν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ἢ σύ τε δύο εἰ καὶ γὰρ δύο;

¹ διανοούμεθα F: διανοοούμεθα TW.

² ἦ W: ἢ F: ἦν Tf.

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which pertains to both of these together, but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.

soc. Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can,¹ as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?

HIPP. You will speak to one who knows, Socrates, for I know the state of mind of all who are concerned with discussions; but nevertheless, if you prefer, speak.

soc. Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was—for we are not one, but two—so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my memory: Are you and I one, or are you two and I two?

¹ Suidas gives the proverb in the form: ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὡς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνάμεθα. "Man proposes, but God disposes" would be an English equivalent.

PLATO

III. Τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

302 ΣΩ. Ταῦτα ἄπερ λέγω· φοβοῦμαι γάρ σε σαφῶς λέγειν, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνεις, ἐπειδὴν τί δόξης σαυτῷ λέγειν· ὅμως δ' ἔτι μοι εἶπέ· οὐχ εἰς ἡμῶν ἐκάτερός ἐστι καὶ πέπονθε τοῦτο, εἰς εἶναι;

III. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ εἰς, καὶ περιττός ἂν εἴη ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν· ἢ οὐ τὸ ἐν περιττὸν ἡγεῖ;

III. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀμφοτέροι οὖν περιττοὶ ἐσμεν δύο ὄντες;

III. Οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρτιοί γε ἀμφοτέροι· ἢ γάρ;

III. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν, ὅτι ἀμφοτέροι ἄρτιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα καὶ ἐκάτερος ἄρτιος ἡμῶν ἐστίν;

III. Οὐ δῆτα.

B ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὡς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, ἃ ἂν ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ ἐκάτερον, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐκάτερος, καὶ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι.

III. Οὐ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷα ἐγὼ πρότερον ἔλεγον.

27. ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ, ὦ Ἰππία· ἀγαπητὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, τὰ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, εἰ μέμνησαι ὅθεν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐλέχθη,¹ ὅτι ἢ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως C καὶ δι'² ἀκοῆς ἡδονὴ οὐ τούτῳ εἶεν καλαί, ὅ τι τυγχάνοιεν ἐκατέρα μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι πεπονθυῖα, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ μή, ἢ ἀμφοτέραι μὲν, ἐκατέρα δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ, ὦ ἀμφοτέραί τε καὶ ἐκατέρα, διότι συνεχώρεις ἀμφοτέρας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι καλὰς καὶ ἐκατέραν. τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπ'

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HIPP. What do you mean, Socrates ?

SOC. Just what I say ; for I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are vexed with me, when you think you are talking sensibly ; however, tell me further : Is not each of us one and affected in such a way as to be one ?

HIPP. Certainly.

SOC. Then each of us, if one, would be an odd number ; or do you not consider one an odd number ?

HIPP. I do.

SOC. Then are we both an odd number, being two ?

HIPP. That could not be, Socrates.

SOC. But we are both an even number, are we not ?

HIPP. Certainly.

SOC. Then because we are both even, is each of us on that account even ?

HIPP. No, surely not.

SOC. Then it is not absolutely inevitable, as you said just now, that what both are, each is, and what each is, both are.

HIPP. Not things of this sort, but such as I mentioned before.

SOC. That suffices, Hippias ; for even this is welcome, since it appears that some things are so and some are not so. For I said, if you remember the beginning of this discussion, that pleasures through sight and through hearing were beautiful, not by that by which each of them was so affected as to be beautiful, but not both, nor both but not each, but by that by which both and each were so affected, because you conceded that both and each were beautiful. For this reason I thought that if both

¹ ἐλέχθη f : ἐδέχθη F : ἐλέγχθη T : ἠλέγχθη W (?).

² καὶ δι' TW : καὶ F.

PLATO

ἀμφοτέρα ἐπομένη ὤμην, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἐστὶ καλὰ, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένη μή· καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἶομαι. ἀλλὰ μοι λέγε, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἢ δι' ὄψεως ἡδονὴ καὶ ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέραί τ' εἰσὶ καλαὶ καὶ **D** ἑκατέρα, ἄρα ὁ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις γε αὐταῖς ἔπεται καὶ ἑκατέρα;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἑκατέρα τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραι, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἶεν καλαί; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἂν οὐδὲν τούτων ἤττον εἶεν καλαί; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἤττον ἡδοναὶ ἐφάνησαν οὔσαι, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΙΠ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὅτι γέ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς αὐταὶ εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο καλὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι.

E ΙΠ. Καὶ ἐρρήθη οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δέ, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἐλέγετο γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ μνήμης ἔχω, τοῦτ' εἶναι καλὸν τὸ ἡδύ, οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ᾗ.

ΙΠ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε τὸ πάθος ἀμφοτέραις μὲν ἔπεται, ἑκατέρα δ' οὔ; οὐ γάρ που ἑκάτερόν γε αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο, δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα μὲν δι' ἀμφοῖν, ἑκάτερον δ' οὔ· ἐστὶ ταῦτα;

ΙΠ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τούτῳ γε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ καλόν, ὃ μὴ ἔπεται ἑκατέρῳ· τὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρον ἑκατέρῳ οὐχ ἔπεται· ὥστε ἀμφοτέρα μὲν αὐτὰ

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are beautiful they must be beautiful by that essence which belongs to both, but not by that which is lacking in each; and I still think so. But tell me, as in the beginning: If pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing are both and each beautiful, does not that which makes them beautiful belong to both and to each?

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. Is it, then, for this reason, because each is a pleasure and both are pleasures, that they would be beautiful? Or would all other pleasures be for this reason no less beautiful than they? For we saw, if you remember, that they were no less pleasures.

HIPP. Yes, I remember.

soc. But for this reason, because these pleasures were through sight and hearing, it was said that they are beautiful.

HIPP. Yes, that is what was said.

soc. See if what I say is true. For it was said, if my memory serves me, that *this* "pleasant" was beautiful, not *all* "pleasant," but that which is through sight and hearing.

HIPP. True.

soc. Now this quality belongs to both, but not to each, does it not? For surely each of them, as was said before, is not through both senses, but both are through both, and each is not. Is that true?

HIPP. It is.

soc. Then it is not by that which does not belong to each that each of them is beautiful; for "both" does not belong to each; so that it is possible,

PLATO

φάναι καλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔξεστιν, ἐκάτερον
 303 δὲ οὐκ ἔξεστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν¹; οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

28. ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν ἀμφοτέρα μὲν καλὰ εἶναι,
 ἐκάτερον δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΙΠ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει;

ΣΩ. Τόδε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ φίλε, κωλύειν, ὅτι ἦν
 που ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἐπιγιγνώμενα ἐκάστοις,
 εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροις ἐπιγίγνοιτο, καὶ ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ
 εἴπερ ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροις, ἅπαντα ὅσα σὺ
 διήλθες· ἢ γάρ;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄ δέ γε αὖ ἐγὼ διήλθον, οὐ· ὦν δὴ ἦν καὶ
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρον. ἔστιν οὕτως;

ΙΠ. Ἔστιν.

B ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, δοκεῖ σοι τὸ καλὸν
 εἶναι; πότερον ὦν σὺ ἔλεγες; εἴπερ ἐγὼ ἰσχυρὸς
 καὶ σὺ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ δίκαιος καὶ
 σὺ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ
 ἐκάτερος· οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ καλὸς καὶ σὺ, καὶ
 ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροι, καὶ ἐκάτερος; ἢ
 οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἄρτίων ὄντων τινῶν ἀμφο-
 τέρων τάχα μὲν ἐκάτερα περιττὰ εἶναι, τάχα δ'
 ἄρτια, καὶ αὖ ἄρρητων ἐκατέρων ὄντων τάχα μὲν
 ὀητὰ τὰ συναμφοτέρα εἶναι, τάχα δ' ἄρρητα, καὶ
C ἴλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἐμοὶ
 προφαίνεσθαι; ποτέρων δὴ τιθεῖς² τὸ καλόν; ἢ

¹ λέγομεν WF: λέγωμεν T.

² τιθεῖς F: τίθης T: τιθῆς W.

¹ See 300 E, 301 A.

² See 301 E, 302 A.

³ See 300 c.

GREATER HIPPIAS

according to our hypothesis, to say that they both are beautiful, but not to say that each is so; or what shall we say? Is that not inevitable?

HIPP. It appears so.

SOC. Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but that each is not?

HIPP. What is to prevent?

SOC. This seems to me, my friend, to prevent, that there were some attributes thus belonging to individual things, which belonged, we thought, to each, if they belonged to both, and to both, if they belonged to each—I mean all those attributes which you specified.¹ Am I right?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. But those again which I specified² did not; and among those were precisely “each” and “both.” Is that so?

HIPP. It is.

SOC. To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually; so, too, if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational, and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind?³ To which group do

PLATO

ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καταφαίνεται, καὶ σοί; πολλή γὰρ ἀλογία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι καλοῦς, ἐκάτερον δὲ μή, ἢ ἐκάτερον μὲν, ἀμφοτέρους δὲ μή, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. οὕτως αἰρεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἢ κείνως¹;

III. Οὕτως ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ Ἴππία, ἵνα καὶ ἀπαλα-
D λαγῶμεν πλείονος ζητήσεως· εἰ γὰρ τούτων γ' ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν. ἀμφότερα μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ καλὰ τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς, ἐκάτερον δ' οὐ· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὦ Ἴππία.

III. Ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε καλὸν γιγνόμενον τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι παρέχεται.

III. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

29. ΣΩ. “Λέγετε δὴ πάλιν,” φήσει, “ἐξ ἀρχῆς, E ἐπειδὴ τούτου διημάρτετε· τί φατε εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐπ' ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, δι' ὃ τι ταύτας πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τιμήσαντες καλὰς ὠνομάσατε;” ἀνάγκη δὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι,² ὦ Ἴππία, λέγειν ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὐταὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ ἐκατέρα· ἢ σὺ τι ἔχεις λέγειν ἄλλο, ὦ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων;

III. Οὐδαμῶς· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ βέλτισταί εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. “Τοῦτ' ἄρα,” φήσει, “λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον;” Ἐοίκαμεν, φήσω ἔγωγε· σὺ δέ;

III. Καὶ ἐγώ.

¹ κείνως T: ἐκείνως WF.

² εἶναι TF: om. W.

GREATER HIPPIAS

you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?

HIPP. In this way, Socrates.

SOC. You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search; for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression "through sight and hearing" makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.

HIPP. Yes, we agree.

SOC. It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.

HIPP. That is true.

SOC. "Then tell us again," he will say, "from the beginning, since you failed this time; what do you say that this 'beautiful,' belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honoured them before the rest and called them beautiful?" It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?

HIPP. Not at all; for really they are the best.

SOC. "This, then," he will say, "you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure?" "It seems that we do," I shall say; and you?

HIPP. I also.

PLATO

304 ζω. “ Οὐκοῦν ὠφέλιμον,” φήσει, “ τὸ ποιοῦν τὰγαθόν,¹ τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον ἕτερον νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἤκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη καλὸν οὔτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἐκάτερόν ἐστι.” Παντός γε μᾶλλον, φήσομεν, ὦ Ἰππία, ἂν σωφρονῶμεν· οὐ γάρ που θέμις τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι μὴ συγχωρεῖν.

305 ιπ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τί οἶει ταῦτ' εἶναι ξυνάπαντα; κνήσματα² τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διηρημένα· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ καλὸν καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, οἷόν τ' εἶναι εὖ καὶ καλῶς λόγον καταστησάμενον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ ἢ ἐπ' ἄλλη τινὶ ἀρχῇ, B πρὸς ἣν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ, πείσαντα οἴχεσθαι φέροντα οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀθλῶν, σωτηρίαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων. τούτων οὖν χρὴ ἀντέχεσθαι, χαίρειν ἔασαντα τὰς σμικρολογίας ταύτας, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ λίαν ἀνόητος εἶναι λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας ὥσπερ νῦν μεταχειριζόμενος.

306 ζω. ὦ Ἰππία φίλε, σὺ μὲν μακάριος εἶ, ὅτι τε οἶσθα ἂν χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐπιτετή-
C δευκας ἱκανῶς, ὡς φῆς· ἐμὲ δὲ δαιμονία τις τύχη, ὡς ἔοικε, κατέχει, ὅστις πλανῶμαι μὲν καὶ ἀπορῶ ἀεὶ, ἐπιδεικνὺς δὲ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπορίαν ὑμῖν τοῖς σοφοῖς λόγῳ αὖ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν προπηλακίζομαι, ἐπειδὴν ἐπιδείξω. λέγετε γάρ με, ἄπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, ὡς ἡλίθιά τε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πραγμα-

¹ ποιοῦν τὰγαθόν F: ποιοῦντ' ἀγαθόν TW.

² κνήσματα F (and Cobet): κνίσματα TW.

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soc. "Well, then," he will say, "beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good, if each of them is different from the other." "Absolutely true," we shall say, if we are reasonable; for it is inadmissible to disagree with him who says what is right.

HIPP. But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to? It is mere scrapings and shavings of discourse, as I said a while ago,¹ divided into bits; but that other ability is beautiful and of great worth, the ability to produce a discourse well and beautifully in a court of law or a council-house or before any other public body before which the discourse may be delivered, to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one's property, and one's friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.

soc. My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune, so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters

¹ See 301 B.

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τεύομαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ αὐτὸ ἀναπεισθεῖς ὑφ' ὑμῶν λέγω ἄπερ ὑμεῖς, ὡς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οἷόν τ' εἶναι λόγον εὖ καὶ καλῶς καταστησάμενον περαίνειν ἐν
D δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὑπὸ τε ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀεὶ με ἐλέγχοντος πάντα κακὰ ἀκούω. καὶ γὰρ μοι τυγχάνει ἐγγύτατα γένους ὧν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκῶν· ἐπειδὴν οὖν εἰσέλθω οἴκαδε εἰς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ μου ἀκούσῃ ταῦτα λέγοντος, ἐρωτᾶ, εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τολμῶν περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω φανερώς ἐξελεγχόμενος περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστιν οἶδα. “Καίτοι πῶς σὺ εἶσαι,” φησὶν, “ἢ λόγον ὅστις
E καλῶς κατεστήσατο ἢ μῆ, ἢ ἄλλην πράξιν ἠντινοῦν, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν; καὶ ὅποτε οὕτω διάκεισαι, οἶε σοι¹ κρεῖττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι;” συμβέβηκε δὴ μοι, ὅπερ λέγω, κακῶς μὲν ὑπὸ ὑμῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὀνειδίζεσθαι, κακῶς δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνου· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν ταῦτα πάντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὠφελοίμην.² ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ, ὡς Ἰππία, ὠφελῆσθαι³ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν ὁμιλίας· τὴν γὰρ παροιμίαν ὃ τί ποτε λέγει, τὸ “χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά,” δοκῶ μοι εἰδέναί.

¹ οἶε σοι f: οἶσεῖ σοι W(T?): ὅς εἰ σοι F.

² ὠφελοίμην later copyists: ὠφελούμην TW: ὠφελούμεν F.

³ ὠφελῆσθαι W: ὠφελείσθαι TF.

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of no account ; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one's end in a court of law or in any other assemblage, I am called everything that is bad by some other men here and especially by that man who is continually refuting me ; for he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same house. So whenever I go home to my own house, and he hears me saying these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed that I have the face to talk about beautiful practices, when it is so plainly shown, to my confusion, that I do not even know what the beautiful itself is. " And yet how are you to know," he will say, " either who produced a discourse, or anything else whatsoever, beautifully, or not, when you are ignorant of the beautiful ? And when you are in such a condition, do you think it is better for you to be alive than dead ? " So it has come about, as I say, that I am abused and reviled by you and by him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure all this, for it is quite reasonable that I might be benefited by it. So I think, Hippias, that I have been benefited by conversation with both of you ; for I think I know the meaning of the proverb : " beautiful things are difficult."



LESSER HIPPIAS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *LESSER HIPPIAS*

IN the *Lesser Hippias* the eminent sophist from Elis appears in much the same light as in the *Greater Hippias*. He has, as we are informed by the opening words of Eudicus, just finished a discourse conceived as an exhibition of his proficiency. Eudicus—who is mentioned in the *Greater Hippias*, but of whom nothing further is known than that his father's name was Apemantus—calls upon Socrates to ask the sophist some questions, and Socrates proceeds to ask what Hippias thinks of the relative merits of Achilles and Odysseus. This leads to a discussion of the true and the wily, or false, man, the conclusion of which is that he who best knows the truth is most able to tell falsehoods, and that therefore the true man is most false. Similar paradoxical conclusions are reached concerning various forms of physical excellence and of virtue, even of justice and of goodness itself. The success of Socrates in defeating the sophist is complete, but the final result of the dialogue is negative and unsatisfactory. The whole seems almost a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Socratic method.

Whether the dialogue is a genuine work of Plato, or not, is an open question. If it is Plato's, it must belong to the earlier years of his literary activity. There is, perhaps, nothing in it which Plato might not have written, but it may equally well be the work of

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an imitator. The discourse which Hippias is supposed to have just finished may be the discourse on the beautiful pursuits proper for a young man, which the sophist says (*Gr. Hipp.* 286 B) he intends to deliver on the next day but one at the request of Eudicus. If there really is a reference here to the *Greater Hippias*, the *Lesser Hippias* cannot be genuine unless the other dialogue is also a work of Plato. But it is quite possible that the passage in the *Greater Hippias* was invented for the express purpose of making that dialogue appear to be the work of the author of the *Lesser Hippias*. It is, then, possible that the two dialogues may be by different authors, whether one or the other is by Plato, or not.

ΙΠΠΙΑΣ ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΨΕΥΔΟΥΣ · ΑΝΑΤΡΕΠΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΥΔΙΚΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ

St. I
p. 363

1. ΕΥ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ἰππίου τοσαῦτα ἐπιδειξαμένου, καὶ οὐχὶ ἢ συνεπαινέεις τι τῶν εἰρημένων ἢ καὶ ἐλέγχεις, εἴ τί σοι μὴ καλῶς δοκεῖ εἰρηκέναι; ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ λελείμεθα, οἳ μάλιστ' ἂν ἀντιποιησαίμεθα μετεῖναι ἡμῖν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Εὐδিকে, ἔστι γε ἂ ἠδέως ἂν
B πυθοίμην Ἰππίου ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγεν περὶ Ὀμήρου. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπημάντου ἤκουον ὅτι ἢ Ἰλιάς κάλλιον εἶη ποίημα τῷ Ὀμήρῳ ἢ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, τοσοῦτῳ δὲ κάλλιον, ὅσῳ¹ ἀμείνων Ἀχιλλεὺς Ὀδυσσέως εἶη· ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων² τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὀδυσσέα ἔφη πεποιῆσθαι, τὸ δ' εἰς Ἀχιλλέα. περὶ ἐκείνου οὖν ἠδέως ἂν, εἰ βουλομένῳ ἔστιν Ἰππία, ἀναπυθοίμην ὅπως αὐτῷ δοκεῖ περὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τούτων, πότερον ἀμείνω φησὶν εἶναι,

¹ ὅσῳ W: ὅσον TF.

² τούτων F: τῶν ποιημάτων TW.

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[OR ON FALSEHOOD : REFUTATIVE]

CHARACTERS

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS

EUD. Why, then, are you silent, Socrates, when Hippias has been delivering such a fine display? Why do you not join us in praising some part of his speech, or else, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, refute him—especially now that we who might best claim to have a share in philosophical discussion have been left to ourselves?

SOC. Indeed, Eudicus, there are some points in what Hippias was just now saying of Homer, about which I should like to question him. For I used to hear your father Apemantus say that Homer's *Iliad* was a finer poem than the *Odyssey*, and just as much finer as Achilles was finer than Odysseus; for he said that one of these poems was made with Odysseus, the other with Achilles as its subject. So that is a point about which, if it is agreeable to Hippias, I should like to ask—what he thinks about these two men, which of them he says is the better;

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C ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡμῖν ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου.

2. ετ. Ἄλλα δῆλον ὅτι οὐ φθονήσει Ἰππίας, εἴαν τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶς, ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἰππία, εἴαν τι ἐρωτᾷ σε Σωκράτης, ἀποκρινεῖ; ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

ιπ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὰ ποιοίην, ὦ Εὐδিকে, εἰ Ὀλυμπίαζε μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανήγυριν, ὅταν τὰ Ολύμπια ἦ, ἀεὶ ἐπανιῶν οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἥλιδος εἰς τὸ ἱερόν παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι ἂν

D τις βούληται ὦν ἂν μοι¹ εἰς ἐπίδειξιν παρεσκευασμένον ἦ, καὶ ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἂν τις ἐρωτᾷ, νῦν δὲ τὴν Σωκράτους ἐρώτησιν φύγοιμι.

364 ζη. Μακάριόν γε; ὦ Ἰππία, πάθος πέπονθας, εἰ ἐκάστης Ὀλυμπιάδος οὕτως εὐέλπις ὦν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν ἀφικνεῖ εἰς τὸ ἱερόν· καὶ θαυμάσαιμ' ἂν εἴ τις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀθλητῶν οὕτως ἀφόβως τε καὶ πιστευτικῶς ἔχων τῷ σώματι ἔρχεται αὐτόσε ἀγωνιούμενος, ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς τῇ διανοίᾳ.

ιπ. Εἰκότως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοῦτο πέπονθα· ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἤργμαι Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι, οὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονι εἰς οὐδὲν ἑμαυτοῦ ἐνέτυχον.

3. ζη. Καλόν γε λέγεις, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ τῇ Ἥλείων πόλει τῆς σοφίας ἀνάθημα τὴν δόξαν **B** εἶναι τὴν σὴν καὶ τοῖς γονεῦσι τοῖς σοῖς. ἀτὰρ τί δὴ λέγεις ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τε καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως; πότερον ἀμείνω καὶ κατὰ τί φῆς εἶναι; ἠνίκα μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ ἔνδον ἦμεν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἐποιοῦ, ἀπελείφθην σου τῶν λεγο-

¹ μοι TW: ἐμοὶ F.

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for he has told us in his exhibition many other things of all sorts about Homer and other poets.

EUD. It is plain enough that Hippias will not object to answering if you ask him a question. Oh, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer? or what will you do?

HIPP. Why, Eudicus, it would be strange conduct on my part, if I, who always go up to Olympia to the festival of the Greeks from my home at Elis, and entering the sacred precinct, offer to speak on anything that anyone chooses of those subjects which I have prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions that anyone asks—should now avoid being questioned by Socrates.

SOC. You are in a state of blessedness, Hippias, if at every Olympiad you come to the sanctuary with such fair hopes concerning your soul and its wisdom; and I should be surprised if any of the physical athletes when he goes to that same place to take part in the contests, has such fearless confidence in his body as you have in your intellect.

HIPP. Naturally, Socrates, I am in this state: for since I began to contend at the Olympic games, I have never yet met anyone better than myself in anything.

SOC. That is splendid, Hippias! Your reputation will be a monument of wisdom for the city of Elis and for your parents. But now what do you say about Achilles and Odysseus? Which do you say is the better and in what respect? For when there were many of us in the room, and you were making your exhibition, I could not keep up with what you were

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μένων· ὠκνοῦν γὰρ ἐπανερέσθαι, διότι ὄχλος τε πολὺς ἔνδον ἦν, καὶ μή σοι ἐμποδῶν εἶην ἐρωτῶν τῇ ἐπιδείξει· νυνὶ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐλάττους τέ ἐσμεν καὶ Εὐδίκος ὅδε κελεύει ἐρέσθαι, εἶπέ τε καὶ δίδαξον C ἡμᾶς σαφῶς, τί ἔλεγες περὶ τούτοις τοῖν ἀνδρῶν; πῶς διέκρινες αὐτούς;

III. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐθέλω ἔτι σαφέστερον ἢ τότε διελθεῖν ἃ λέγω καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ ἄλλων.¹ φημὶ γὰρ Ὀμηρον πεποιηκέναι ἄριστον μὲν ἄνδρα Ἀχιλλέα τῶν εἰς Τροίαν ἀφικομένων, σοφώτατον δὲ Νέστορα, πολυτροπώτατον δὲ Ὀδυσσεά.

ΣΩ. Βαβαί, ὦ Ἰππία· ἄρ' ἂν τί μοι χαρίσαιο τοιόνδε, μή μου καταγελαῖν, ἐὰν μόγις² μαθάνω τὰ D λεγόμενα καὶ πολλάκις ἀνερωτῶ; ἀλλά μοι πειρῶ πρᾶως τε καὶ εὐκόλως ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

III. Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἂν εἶη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄλλους μὲν αὐτὰ ταῦτα παιδεύω καὶ ἀξιῶ διὰ ταῦτα χρήματα λαμβάνειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτώμενος μὴ συγγνώμην τ' ἔχοιμι καὶ πρᾶως ἀποκρινοίμην.

4. ΣΩ. Πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, ἡνίκα μὲν ἄριστον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἔφησθα πεποιηῆσθαι, ἐδόκουν σου μαθάνειν ὅ τι ἔλεγες, καὶ ἡνίκα τὸν E Νέστορα σοφώτατον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά εἶπες ὅτι πεποιηκὼς εἶη ὁ ποιητῆς πολυτροπώτατον, τοῦτο δ', ὡς γε πρὸς σέ τ' ἀληθῆ εἰρήσθαι, παντάπασιν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις. καί μοι εἶπέ, ἂν τι ἐνθένδε μᾶλλον μάθω· ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐ πολύτροπος τῷ Ὀμήρῳ πεποιήται;

III. Ἦκιστα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἀπλούστατος,³ ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν Λιταῖς, ἡνίκα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιεῖ

¹ ἄλλων TW: περὶ ἄλλον F.

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saying : for I hesitated to ask questions, because there was a great crowd in the room, also for fear of hindering your exhibition by doing so ; but now, since we are fewer and Eudicus here urges me to question you, speak and tell us clearly what you said about these two men ; how did you distinguish them ?

HIPP. Why I am glad, Socrates, to explain to you still more clearly what I say about these and others also. For I say that Homer made Achilles the bravest man of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.

SOC. Oh dear, Hippias ! Would you do me the favour not to laugh at me if I find it hard to understand what you say, and keep asking questions over and over ? Please try to answer me gently and courteously.

HIPP. Of course ; for it would be a disgrace, Socrates, if I, who teach others good manners and charge them money for it, should not myself, when questioned by you, be considerate and reply gently.

SOC. That is excellent. For when you said that the poet made Achilles the bravest of men, and Nestor the wisest, I thought I understood what you meant ; but when you said that he made Odysseus the wiliest, to tell you the truth, I do not in the least know what you mean by that. Now tell me, and perhaps it may result in my understanding better. Has not Homer made Achilles wily ?

HIPP. Not at all, Socrates ; he made him most simple ; for in " The Prayers," when he depicts them

² μόγῃς F : μόλις TW.

³ ἀπλούστατω TW : ἀπλούστατος καὶ ἀληθέστατος F.

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αὐτοὺς διαλεγομένους, λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς
πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά,·

- 365 Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν,
ὥσπερ¹ δὴ κρανέω τε καὶ ὡς τελέεσθαι² οἴω,
[ὡς μὴ μοι τρύζητε παρήμενοι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος.]
ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀἴδαο πύλησιν,
B ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθη ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπη.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται.

ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσι τὸν τρόπον ἑκατέρου τοῦ
ἀνδρός, ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἶη ἀληθής τε καὶ
ἀπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής·
ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά λέγοντα
ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν ἤδη, ὦ Ἰππία, κινδυνεύω μανθάνειν
ὃ λέγεις· τὸν πολύτροπον ψευδῆ λέγεις, ὡς γε
φαίνεται.

- C Π. Μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες· τοιοῦτον γὰρ πε-
ποίηκε τὸν Ὀδυσσεά Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν
Ἰλιάδι καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα.

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερος μὲν
εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀληθής, ἕτερος δὲ ψευδής, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ
αὐτός.

Π. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἢ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἰππία;

Π. Πάντων μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἶη, εἰ
μὴ.

5. ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον τοίνυν ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ
D καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα

¹ ὥσπερ TWF: ἦπερ S and mss. of Homer.

² τελέεσθαι T: τετελέεσθαι W: τετελέσθαι F (for τελέεσθαι οἴω

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talking with one another, he makes Achilles say to Odysseus.¹

Zeus-born son of Laertes, wily Odysseus, I must speak out the word without refraining, as I shall act and think will be accomplished [and pray do not mutter in discord sitting here beside me]. For hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another. But I shall speak that which shall be accomplished.

In these lines he makes plain the character of each of the men, that Achilles is true and simple, and Odysseus wily and false; for he represents Achilles as saying these lines to Odysseus,

soc. Now at last, Hippias, I think I understand what you mean; you mean that the wily man is false, apparently.

HIPP. Certainly, Socrates; for Homer represents Odysseus as that sort of a man in many passages of both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

soc. Homer, then, as it seems, thought that a true man was one man and a false man another, but not the same.

HIPP. Of course he did, Socrates.

soc. And do you think so yourself, Hippias?

HIPP. Most assuredly; for it would be strange if I did not.

soc. Then let us drop Homer, since it is impossible to ask him what he meant when he made those

¹ *Iliad*, ix. 308 ff. The division into twenty-four books was made in Alexandrian times. Before that division was made (and even after) references were made to parts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by descriptive titles, "The Prayers," "The Catalogue of Ships," and the like.

S and the mss. of Homer read τετελεσμένον ἔσται, after which follows *Il.* ix. 311, ὡς μή μοι τρύζητε παρήμενοι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος, which the other mss. of Plato omit).

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ἔποίησε τὰ ἔπη· σὺ δ' ἐπειδὴ φαίνει ἀναδεχόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ ταῦτα ἄπερ φῆς Ὅμηρον λέγειν, ἀπόκριναι κοινῇ ὑπὲρ Ὁμήρου τε καὶ σαντοῦ.

ΙΠ. Ἔσται ταῦτα· ἀλλ' ἐρώτα ἔμβραχυν ὃ τι βούλει.

ΣΩ. Τοὺς ψευδεῖς λέγεις οἷον ἀδυνάτους τι ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντας, ἢ δυνατοὺς τι ποιεῖν;

ΙΠ. Δυνατοὺς ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν ἀνθρώπους.

Ε ΣΩ. Δυνατοὶ μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰσὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον καὶ πολύτροποι· ἦ γάρ;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πολύτροποι δ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπατεῶνες ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητος καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἢ ὑπὸ πανουργίας καὶ φρονήσεώς τινος;

ΙΠ. Ὑπὸ πανουργίας πάντων μάλιστα καὶ φρονήσεως.

ΣΩ. Φρόνιμοι μὲν ἄρα εἰσὶν, ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΙΠ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, λίαν γε.

ΣΩ. Φρόνιμοι δὲ ὄντες οὐκ ἐπίστανται ὃ τι ποιούσιν, ἢ ἐπίστανται¹;

ΙΠ. Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ἐπίστανται· διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κακουργοῦσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ἂ ἐπίστανται πότερον ἀμαθεῖς εἰσὶν ἢ σοφοί;

366 ΙΠ. Σοφοὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτά γε ταῦτα, ἐξαπατᾶν.

6. ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· ἀναμνησθῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ὃ λέγεις. τοὺς ψευδεῖς φῆς εἶναι δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονίμους καὶ ἐπιστήμονας καὶ σοφοὺς εἰς ἄπερ ψευδεῖς;

ΙΠ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

¹ ὃ τι ποιούσιν ἢ ἐπίστανται F: om. TW.

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verses ; but since you come forward to take up his cause, and agree in this which you say is his meaning, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.

HIPP. Very well ; ask briefly whatever you like.

SOC. Do you say that the false are, like the sick, without power to do anything, or that they have power to do something ?

HIPP. I say that they have great power to do many things, and especially to deceive people.

SOC. They are, then, powerful, according to you, and wily, are they not ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. But are they wily and deceivers by reason of simplicity and folly, or by reason of shrewdness and a sort of intelligence ?

HIPP. By shrewdness, most assuredly, and intelligence.

SOC. They are intelligent, then, as it seems.

HIPP. Yes, by Zeus, too much so.

SOC. And being intelligent, do they know what they are doing, or do they not know ?

HIPP. Yes, they know very well ; that is why they do harm.

SOC. And knowing these things which they know, are they ignorant, or wise ?

HIPP. Wise, surely, in just this, deception.

SOC. Stop. Let us recall what you say. You say that the false are powerful and intelligent, and knowing and wise in those things in which they are false ?

HIPP. Yes, I do.

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ΣΩ. Ἄλλους δὲ τοὺς ἀληθεῖς τε καὶ ψευδεῖς, καὶ ἐναντιωτάτους ἀλλήλοις;

ΙΠ. Λέγω ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ τῶν μὲν δυνατῶν τινὲς καὶ σοφῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰσὶν οἱ ψευδεῖς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΙΠ. Μάλιστα γε.

Β ΣΩ. Ὄταν δὲ λέγῃς δυνατοὺς καὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ψευδεῖς εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πότερον λέγεις δυνατοὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἂν βούλωνται, ἢ ἀδυνάτους εἰς ταῦτα ἄπερ ψεύδονται;

ΙΠ. Δυνατοὺς ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἄρα εἰρήσθαι, οἱ ψευδεῖς εἰσὶν οἱ¹ σοφοί τε καὶ δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι.

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀδύνατος ἄρα ψεύδεσθαι ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀμαθὴς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψευδής.

ΙΠ. Ἔχει οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Δυνατὸς δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα, ὅς ἂν ποιῇ
C τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται· οὐχ ὑπὸ νόσου λέγω ἐξειργόμενον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ σὺ δυνατὸς εἶ γράψαι τοῦμόν ὄνομα ὅταν βούλη, οὕτω λέγω. ἢ² οὐχ, ὅς ἂν οὕτως ἔχη, καλεῖς σὺ δυνατόν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

7. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ὦ Ἰππία, οὐ σὺ μέντοι ἔμπειρος εἶ λογισμῶν καὶ λογιστικῆς;

ΙΠ. Πάντων μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τίς σε ἔροιτο, τὰ τρὶς ἑπτακόσια ὅπόσος ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς, εἰ βούλοιο, πάντων
D τάχιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν εἴποις τ' ἀληθῆ περι τούτου;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

¹ οἱ F: om. TW.

² ἢ TW: ἀρ' F.

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soc. And that the true and the false are different and complete opposites of one another ?

HIPP. I do.

soc. Well, then, the false are among the powerful and the wise, according to your statement.

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. And when you say that the false are powerful and wise for falsehood, do you mean that they have power to utter falsehoods if they like, or that they are powerless in respect to the falsehoods which they utter ?

HIPP. That they have power.

soc. In short, then, the false are those who are wise and powerful in uttering falsehoods.

HIPP. Yes.

soc. A man, then, who has not the power to utter falsehoods and is ignorant would not be false.

HIPP. That is true.

soc. Well, but every man has power who does what he wishes at the time when he wishes ; I am not speaking of one who is prevented by disease or that sort of thing, but as I might say of you that you have power to write my name when you wish ; or do you not say that a man has power who is in such a condition ?

HIPP. Yes, I do.

soc. Tell me, then, Hippias, are you not skilful in arithmetical calculations ?

HIPP. Most assuredly, Socrates.

soc. Then if some one were to ask you what the product of three times seven hundred is, you could, if you wished, tell him the truth about that more quickly and better than anyone else ?

HIPP. Certainly.

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ΣΩ. Ἐὰν ὅτι δυνατώτατός τε εἶ καὶ σοφώτατος κατὰ ταῦτα;

Π. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοφώτατός τε εἶ καὶ δυνατώτατος μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἄριστος ταῦτα ἄπερ δυνατώτατός τε καὶ σοφώτατος, τὰ λογιστικά;

Π. Καὶ ἄριστος δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀληθῆ σὺ ἂν δυνατώτατα εἶποις περὶ τούτων· ἢ γάρ;

Π. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Ε ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὰ ψευδῆ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων; καί μοι, ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, γενναίως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀπόκρισαι, ὦ Ἰππία· εἴ τίς σε ἔροιτο τὰ τρεῖς ἑπτακόσια πόσα ἐστί, πότερον σὺ ἂν μάλιστα ψεύδοιο καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ψευδῆ λέγοις περὶ τούτων, βουλόμενος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μηδέποτε ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ ὁ ἀμαθῆς εἰς λογισμοὺς δύναιτ' ἂν 367 σοῦ μᾶλλον ψεύδεσθαι βουλομένου; ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθῆς πολλάκις ἂν βουλόμενος ψευδῆ λέγειν τὰληθῆ ἂν εἶποι ἄκων, εἰ τύχοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, σὺ δὲ ὁ σοφός, εἶπερ βούλοιο ψεύδεσθαι, αἰεὶ ἂν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ψεύδαι;

Π. Ναί, οὕτως ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ψευδῆς οὖν πότερον περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα ψευδῆς ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι περὶ ἀριθμόν,¹ οὐδὲ ἀριθμῶν² ἂν ψεύσαιτο;

Π. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία περὶ ἀριθμόν.

8. ΣΩ. Θῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Ἰππία, περὶ Β λογισμὸν τε καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον ψευδῆ;

¹ ἀριθμόν corr. Ven. 185: ἀριθμῶν TWF.

² ἀριθμῶν scr. Ven. 185: ἀριθμόν TWF.

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soc. Because you are the most powerful and wisest of men in these matters ?

hipp. Yes.

soc. Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best in those matters in which you are most powerful and wisest, namely calculations ?

hipp. Best also, to be sure, Socrates.

soc. Then you would have the greatest power to tell the truth about these things, would you not ?

hipp. I think so.

soc. But what of falsehoods about these same things ? And please answer this with the same splendid frankness as my previous questions, Hippias. If some one were to ask you how much three times seven hundred is, would you have the most power to tell falsehoods and always uniformly to say false things about these matters, if you wished to tell falsehoods and never to reply truly ; or would he who is ignorant of calculations have more power to tell falsehoods than you, if you wished to do so ? Or would the ignorant man often, when he wished to tell falsehoods, involuntarily tell the truth, if it so happened, because he did not know, whereas you, the wise man, if you wished to tell falsehoods, would tell them always and uniformly ?

hipp. Yes, it is as you say.

soc. Is the false man, then, false about other things, but not about number, and would he not tell falsehoods when dealing with number ?

hipp. He is false about number also, by Zeus.

soc. Shall we, then, assume this also, that there is such a person as a man who is false about calculation and number ?

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III. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη οὗτος; οὐχὶ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ,¹ εἴπερ μέλλει ψευδῆς ἔσεσθαι, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ὠμολόγεις, δυνατόν εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι; ὁ γὰρ ἀδύνατος ψεύδεσθαι, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέγετο ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ψευδῆς γένοιτο.

III. Ἄλλὰ μέμνημαι, καὶ ἐλέχθη οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄρτι ἐφάνης σὺ δυνατότατος ὢν ψεύδεσθαι περὶ λογισμῶν²;

III. Ναί, ἐλέχθη γέ τοι καὶ τοῦτο.

C ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ δυνατότατος εἶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ λογισμῶν;

III. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ λογισμῶν δυνατότατος.³ οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τούτων, ὁ λογιστικός.

III. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ψευδῆς περὶ λογισμῶν⁴ γίγνεται, ὦ Ἰππία, ἄλλος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός; ὁ αὐτὸς⁵ γὰρ καὶ δυνατός· οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἀληθής.

III. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδῆς τε καὶ ἀληθῆς περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀμείνων ὁ ἀληθῆς τοῦ ψευδοῦς; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ δήπου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐναντιώ-

D τατα ἔχει, ὥσπερ σὺ ὦου ἄρτι.

III. Οὐ φαίνεται ἐνταῦθά γε.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν σκεψώμεθα καὶ ἄλλοθι;

III. Εἴ⁶ γε σὺ βούλει.

¹ αὐτῷ F: αὐτὸν TWf.

² λογισμῶν corr. Coisl.: λογισμὸν TWF.

³ δυνατότατος F: δυνατὸς TWf.

⁴ λογισμὸν F: λογισμῶν TW.

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HIPP. Yes.

soc. Now who would that man be? Must he not, as you just now agreed, have power to tell falsehoods, if he is to be false? For it was said by you, if you recollect, that he who has not the power to tell falsehoods would never be false.

HIPP. Yes, I recollect, that was said.

soc. And just now you were found to have most power to tell falsehoods about calculations, were you not?

HIPP. Yes, that also was said.

soc. Have you, then, also most power to tell the truth about calculations?

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. Then the same man has most power to speak both falsehood and truth about calculations; and this man is the one who is good in respect to them, namely the calculator.

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Who, then, becomes false in respect to calculation, Hippias, other than the good man? For the same man is also powerful; and he is also true.

HIPP. So it appears.

soc. You see, then, that the same man is both false and true in respect to these matters, and the true is in no wise better than the false? For he is indeed the same man, and the two are not utter opposites, as you thought just now.

HIPP. Apparently not, at least in this field.

soc. Shall we, then, investigate elsewhere?

HIPP. If you like

⁵ ὁ αὐτὸς F: οὗτος TW.
⁶ εἰ Bekker: εἰ ἄλλως TWF.

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9. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειρος εἶ;
- ΙΠ.** Ἐγώ γε.
- ΣΩ.** Τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίας οὕτως ἔχει· ὁ αὐτὸς δυνατώτατος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων, ὁ γεωμετρικός;
- ΙΠ.** Ναί.
- ΣΩ.** Περὶ ταῦτα οὖν ἀγαθὸς ἄλλος τις ἢ οὗτος;
- Ε** **ΙΠ.** Οὐκ ἄλλος.
- ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς γεωμέτρης δυνατώτατός γε ἀμφοτέρω; καὶ εἶπερ τις ἄλλος ψευδῆς περὶ διαγράμματα, οὗτος ἂν εἴη, ὁ ἀγαθός; οὗτος γὰρ δυνατός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀδύνατος ἦν ψεύδεσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι, ὡς ὠμολόγηται.
- ΙΠ.** Ἔστι ταῦτα.
- ΣΩ.** Ἐπι τοίνυν καὶ τὸν τρίτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τὸν ἀστρονόμον· ἥς αὖ σὺ τέχνης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἶε εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν· ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἰππία;
- ΙΠ.** Ναί.
- ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ταῦτά ταῦτά¹ ἐστίν;
- ΙΠ.** Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
- ΣΩ.** Καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἄρα εἶπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ψευδῆς, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀστρονόμος ψευδῆς ἔσται, ὁ δυνατὸς ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ὁ γε ἀδύνατος· ἀμαθὴς γάρ.
- ΙΠ.** Φαίνεται οὕτως.
- ΣΩ.** Ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἀληθῆς τε καὶ ψευδῆς ἔσται.
- ΙΠ.** Ἐοικεν.
10. **ΣΩ.** Ἴθι δὴ, ὦ Ἰππία, ἀνέδην οὕτως ἐπί-

¹ ταῦτά ταῦτα Tf: ταυτα WF.

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soc. Well, then, are you expert in geometry also ?

HIPP. I am.

soc. Well, has not the same man most power to speak falsehood and truth about geometry, namely the geometrician ?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. In respect to that, then, is any other good than he ?

HIPP. No, no other.

soc. The good and wise geometrician, then, has the most power in both respects, has he not ? And if anyone is false in respect to diagrams, it would be this man, the good geometrician ? For he has the power, and the bad one was powerless, to speak falsehood ; so that he who has no power to speak falsehood would not become false, as has been agreed.

HIPP. That is true.

soc. Let us, then, investigate also the third man, the astronomer, whose art you think you know even better than those of the previous ones ; do you not, Hippias ?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Are not the same things true in astronomy also ?

HIPP. Probably, Socrates.

soc. Then in astronomy also, if anyone is false, the good astronomer will be false, he who has power to speak falsehood. For he who has not power will not ; for he is ignorant.

HIPP. So it appears.

soc. The same man, then, in astronomy will be true and false.

HIPP. So it seems.

soc. Come now, Hippias, consider generally in

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B σκεψαι κατὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, εἴ ποῦ ἐστὶν ἄλλως ἔχον ἢ οὕτως. πάντως δὲ πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος εἶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ σου ἤκουον μεγαλαυχουμένου, πολλὴν σοφίαν καὶ ζηλωτὴν σαυτοῦ διεξιόντος ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις. ἔφησθα δὲ ἀφικέσθαι ποτέ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἃ εἶχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἅπαντα σαυτοῦ ἔργα ἔχων· πρῶτον μὲν δακτύλιον—ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἦρχου—ὃν **C** εἶχες σαυτοῦ ἔχειν ἔργον, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος δακτυλίουσ γλύφειν, καὶ ἄλλην σφραγίδα σὸν ἔργον; καὶ στλεγγίδα¹ καὶ λήκυθον, ἃ αὐτὸς ἠργάσω· ἔπειτα ὑποδήματα ἃ εἶχες ἔφησθα αὐτὸς σκυτοτομῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον ὑφῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτωνίσκον· καὶ ὃ γε πᾶσιν ἔδοξεν ἀτοπώτατον καὶ σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ζώνην ἔφησθα τοῦ χιτωνίσκου, ἣν εἶχες, εἶναι μὲν οἶαι αἱ Περσικαὶ τῶν πολυτελῶν, ταύτην δὲ αὐτὸς πλέξαι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ διθυράμβους, καὶ καταλογάδην πολλοὺς λόγους **D** καὶ παντοδαποὺς συγκειμένους· καὶ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν δὴ ὧν ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ἐπιστήμων² ἀφικέσθαι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἀρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ὀρθότητος, καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλά, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μνημονεύειν· καίτοι τό γε μνημονικὸν ἐπελαθόμην σου, ὡς ἔοικε, τέχνημα, ἐν ᾧ σὺ οἶει λαμπρότατος εἶναι· **E** οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα ἐπιλεληῆσθαι. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ εἰς τὰς σαυτοῦ τέχνας βλέψας—ἱκαναὶ δέ—καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄλλων εἶπέ μοι, εἴαν που εὐρῆς ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί,

¹ στλεγγίδα Wt: σλεγγίδα T: στεγγίδα F.

² ἐπιστήμων f: ἐπιστήμην F: ἐπιστημῶν TW.

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this way concerning all the sciences, whether this is the case, or not. Certainly you are the wisest of men in the greatest number of arts, as I once heard you boast, recounting your great and enviable wisdom in the market-place at the tables of the money-changers. You said that once, when you went to Olympia, everything you had on your person was your own work ; first the ring—for you began with that—which you had was your own work, showing that you knew how to engrave rings, and another seal was your work, and a strigil and an oil-flask were your works ; then you said that you yourself had made the sandals you had on, and had woven your cloak and tunic ; and, what seemed to every one most unusual and proof of the most wisdom, was when you said that the girdle you wore about your tunic was like the Persian girdles of the costliest kind, and that you had made it yourself. And in addition you said that you brought with you poems, both epics and tragedies and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts composed in prose ; and that you were there excelling all others in knowledge of the arts of which I was speaking just now, and of the correctness of rhythms and harmonies and letters, and many other things besides, as I seem to remember ; and yet I forgot your art of memory, as it seems, in which you think you are most brilliant ; and I fancy I have forgotten a great many other things. But, as I say, look both at your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and at those of others, and tell me if you find, in accordance with the agreements you and I have reached, any point where

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369 ὅπου ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής, χωρὶς καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός; ἐν ἧτινι βούλει σοφία τοῦτο σκέψαι ἢ πανουργία ἢ ὀτιοῦν χαίρεις ὀνομάζων· ἀλλ' οὐχ εὐρήσεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ σὺ εἶπέ.

11. ιπ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτως.

ζη. Οὐδέ γε ἔξεις, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· εἰ δ' ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μέμνησαι ὃ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ὦ Ἰππία.

ιπ. Οὐ πάνυ τι ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ λέγεις.

ζη. Νυνὶ γὰρ ἴσως οὐ χρῆ¹ τῷ μνημονικῷ τεχνήματι· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἶει δεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σε ὑπομνήσω. οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὲν Ἀχιλλέα ἔφησθα Β ἀληθῆ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσεά ψευδῆ καὶ πολύτροπον;

ιπ. Ναί.

ζη. Νῦν οὖν αἰσθάνει ὅτι ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτός ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής, ὥστε εἰ ψευδής ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἦν, καὶ ἀληθής γίγνεται, καὶ εἰ ἀληθής ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, καὶ ψευδής, καὶ οὐ διάφοροι ἀλλήλων οἱ ἄνδρες οὐδ' ἐναντίοι, ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι;

ιπ. ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰεὶ σύ τινες τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ἦ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχει κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, C καὶ οὐχ ὅλῳ ἀγωνίζει τῷ πράγματι περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ἦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, εἴαν βούλη, ἐπὶ πολλῶν τεκμηρίων ἀποδείξω σοι ἰκανῶ λόγῳ Ὅμηρον Ἀχιλλέα πεποιηκέναι ἀμείνω Ὀδυσσεώς καὶ ἀψευδῆ, τὸν δὲ δολερόν τε καὶ πολλὰ ψευδόμενον καὶ χείρω Ἀχιλλεύς. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σὺ αὖ ἀντιπαρά-

¹ χρῆ t: χρῆ TF: χρῆ W.

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one man is true and another false, where they are separate and not the same. Look for this in any branch whatsoever of wisdom or shrewdness or whatever you choose to call it; but you will not find it, my friend, for it does not exist; just tell me.

HIPP. But I cannot, Socrates, at least, not now offhand.

soc. And you never will be able to tell me, I fancy; but if what I say is true, Hippias, you remember what results from our argument.

HIPP. I do not at all understand what you mean, Socrates.

soc. No, for perhaps you are not using your art of memory; for you evidently think it is not necessary; but I will remind you. Do you remember that you said that Achilles was true and Odysseus was false and wily?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Do you now, then, perceive that the same man has been found to be false and true, so that if Odysseus was false, he becomes also true, and if Achilles was true, he becomes also false, and the two men are not different from one another, nor opposites, but alike?

HIPP. Socrates, you are always making intricate arguments of this sort, and, picking out the most difficult part of the argument, you stick to it in detail, and you do not discuss the whole subject with which the argument deals; for now, if you like, I will prove to you by satisfactory argument based on many pieces of evidence, that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus and free from falsehood, and Odysseus crafty and a teller of many falsehoods and inferior to Achilles. And, if you

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βαλλε λόγον παρά λόγον, ὡς ὁ ἕτερος ἀμείνων ἐστί·
καὶ μάλλον εἴσονται οὗτοι, ὁπότερος ἀμεινον λέγει.

D 12. **ΣΩ.** ὦ Ἰππία, ἐγὼ τοι οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ μὴ
οὐχὶ σὲ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἢ ἐμέ· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ εἶωθα,
ἐπειδάν τις λέγη τι, προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἄλλως τε
καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι δοκῇ σοφὸς εἶναι ὁ λέγων, καὶ
ἐπιθυμῶν μαθεῖν ὃ τι λέγει διαπυνθάνομαι καὶ
ἐπανασκοπῶ καὶ συμβιβάζω τὰ λεγόμενα, ἵνα
μάθω· ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος δοκῇ μοι εἶναι ὁ λέγων, οὔτε
ἐπανερωτῶ οὔτε μοι μέλει ὧν λέγει. καὶ γνώ-
σει τούτῳ οὓς ἂν ἐγὼ ἠγῶμαι σοφοὺς εἶναι·
εὐρήσεις γάρ με λιπαρῇ ὄντα περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ

E τούτου καὶ πυνθανόμενον παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μαθῶν τι
ὠφεληθῶ. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐννεόηκα σοῦ λέγοντος,
ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν οἷς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἐνδεικνύμενος
τὸν Ἀχιλλέα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά λέγειν ὡς ἀλαζόνα
ὄντα, ἀτοπὸν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις,
370 ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται ψευδάμενος,
ὁ πολύτροπος, ὁ δὲ Ἀχιλλεὺς πολύτροπός τις
φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· ψεύδεται γοῦν.
προειπὼν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη, ἅπερ καὶ σὺ εἶπες
ἄρτι,

ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλησιν,
ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθη ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἶπη,

B ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγει ὡς οὗτ' ἂν ἀναπεισθεῖη ὑπὸ
τοῦ Ὀδυσσεῶς τε καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος οὔτε
μένοι τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ, ἀλλ'

αὔριον ἰρὰ Διὸς ῥέξας, φησί, καὶ πᾶσι θεοῖσιν,
νηήσας εὖ νῆας, ἐπὴν ἄλαδε προερύσσω,
ὄψεται, αἶ κ' ἐθέλησθα καὶ αἶ κέν τοι τὰ μεμήλη,
ἦρι μάλ' Ἑλλήσποντον ἐπ' ἰχθυόεντα πλεύσας

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like, do you oppose argument to argument, maintaining that the other is better ; and these gentlemen here will determine which of us speaks better.

soc. Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I ; but it is always my custom to pay attention when anyone is speaking, especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise ; and because I desire to learn what he means, I question him thoroughly and examine and compare the things he says, in order that I may learn. But if the speaker seems to me to be worthless, I neither ask questions nor care what he says. And by this you will recognize whom I regard as wise ; for you will find me persistently asking such a man questions about what he says, in order that I may profit by learning something. And so now I noticed when you were speaking, that in the lines which you repeated just now to show that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as to a deceiver, it seems to me very strange, if what you say is true, that Odysseus the wily is nowhere found to have spoken falsely, but Achilles is found to be a wily sort of person, according to your argument ; at any rate, he speaks falsely. For he begins by speaking these lines which you just quoted : “ For hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another,” and a little later says that he would not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon and would not stay at Troy at all, but, he says—

To-morrow, after sacrificing to Zeus and all the gods, I will load my ships well and drag them into the sea ; then you shall see, if you like and if it interests you, early in the morning my ships sailing the fishy Hellespont and

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C νῆας ἐμάς, ἐν δ' ἄνδρας ἐρεσσέμεναι μεμαῶτας·
εἰ δέ κεν εὐπλοῖην δώῃ κλυτὸς Ἐννοσίγαιος,
ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην.

ἔτι δὲ πρότερον τούτων πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα
λοιδορούμενος εἶπε·

νῦν δ' εἶμι Φθίηνδ', ἐπειὴ πολὺ λωΐόν¹ ἐστὶν
οἴκαδ' ἴμεν σὺν νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὐδέ σ' οἴω
D ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμος ἐὼν ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν.

ταῦτα εἰπὼν τοτὲ μὲν ἐναντίον τῆς στρατιᾶς
ἀπάσης,² τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἑταίρους
οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται οὔτε παρασκευασάμενος οὔτ'
ἐπιχειρήσας καθέλκειν τὰς ναῦς ὡς ἀποπλευσού-
μενος οἴκαδε, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίως ὀλιγωρῶν τοῦ
τάληθῆ λέγειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς σε ἠρόμην ἀπορῶν ὀπότερος τούτοις τοῖν
E ἀνδροῖν ἀμείνων πεποιήται τῷ ποιητῇ, καὶ ἠγού-
μενος ἀμφοτέρω ἀρίστῳ εἶναι καὶ δύσκριτον ὀπό-
τερος ἀμείνων εἶη καὶ περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας
καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ καὶ κατὰ
τοῦτο παραπλησίω ἐστόν.

13. III. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς σκοπεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ἂ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ψεύδεται, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλής
φαίνεται ψευδόμενος ἀλλ' ἄκων, διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν
τὴν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀναγκασθεὶς καταμεῖναι καὶ
βοηθῆσαι· ἂ δὲ ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, ἐκὼν τε καὶ ἐξ
ἐπιβουλής.

ζη. Ἐξαπατᾶς με, ὦ φίλτατε Ἰππία, καὶ αὐτὸς
τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα μιμεί.

¹ λωΐόν TW: λῶόν F: φέρτερον MSS. of Homer.

² ἀπάσης F: πάσης TW.

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my men eagerly rowing in them ; and if the glorious Earth-shaker should grant me a fair voyage, on the third day I should come to fertile Phthia.¹

And even before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said :

And now I shall go to Phthia, since it is far better to go home with my beaked ships, and I do not intend to stay here without honour, and heap up wealth and riches for you.²

After he has said these things, at one time in the presence of the whole army and at another before his own comrades, he is nowhere found to have either prepared or attempted to drag down his ships to sail home, but he shows quite superb disregard of truth-speaking. Now I, Hippias, asked my question in the first place because I was perplexed as to which of the two men is represented as better by the poet, and because I thought both were very good, and it was hard to decide which was better, both in regard to falsehood and truth and to virtue in general ; for both are similar in this matter.

HIPP. That is because you do not look at it aright, Socrates. For the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he utters evidently not by design, but against his will, since he is forced by the misfortune of the army to remain and give assistance ; but Odysseus utters his falsehoods voluntarily and by design.

SOC. You are deceiving me, beloved Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus.

¹ *Iliad* ix. 357 ff.

² *Ibid.* i. 169 ff.

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371 ιπ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες· λέγεις δὴ τί καὶ πρὸς τί;

ζη. "Ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φῆς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ψεύδεσθαι, ὅς ἦν οὕτω γόης καὶ ἐπίβουλος πρὸς τῇ ἀλαζονείᾳ,¹ ὡς πεποίηκεν Ὀμηρος, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως τοσοῦτον φαίνεται φρονεῖν πλεόν πρὸς τὸ ραδίως λανθάνειν αὐτὸν ἀλαζονευόμενος, ὥστε ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐτόλμα ἐναντία λέγειν καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν Ὀδυσσεά· οὐδὲν γοῦν φαίνεται εἰπὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοῦ ψευδομένου ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς.

ιπ. Ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ζη. Οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι λέγων ὕστερον ἢ ὡς² πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά ἔφη ἅμα τῇ ἡοῖ ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα οὐκ αὖ φησὶν ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα λέγει;

ιπ. Ποῦ δὴ;

ζη. Ἐν οἷς λέγει

οὐ γὰρ πρὶν πολέμοιο μεδήσομαι αἱματόεντος,
 C πρὶν γ' υἱὸν Πριάμοιο δαΐφρονος, Ἐκτορα δῖον,
 Μυρμιδόνων ἐπὶ τε κλισίας καὶ νῆας ἰκέσθαι
 κτείνοντ' Ἀργείους, κατὰ τε φλέξαι³ πυρὶ νῆας·
 ἀμφὶ δέ μιν⁴ τῇ μῆ κλισίῃ καὶ νηῖ μελαίνῃ
 Ἐκτορα καὶ μεμαῶτα μάχης σχήσεσθαι οἴω.

οὐ δὴ οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, πότερον οὕτως ἐπιλήσιμονα
 D οἶει εἶναι τὸν τῆς Θέτιδός τε καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτάτου
 Χείρωνος πεπαιδευμένον, ὥστε ὀλίγον πρότερον
 λαιδοροῦντα τοὺς ἀλαζόνας τῇ ἐσχάτῃ λαιδορίᾳ

¹ τῇ ἀλαζονείᾳ Bekker: τὴν ἀλαζονείαν TWF.

² ἢ ὡς WF: πως T.

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HIPP. Not at all, Socrates. What do you mean and to what do you refer?

SOC. That you say Achilles did not speak falsely by design, he who was not only a deceiver, but was also such a cheat and plotter, as Homer has represented him, that he is seen to be so much more clever than Odysseus in deceiving him unnoticed without difficulty, that he dared to contradict himself in his presence, and Odysseus did not notice it; at any rate Odysseus does not appear to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood.

HIPP. What is this that you say, Socrates?

SOC. Don't you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at day-break, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different?

HIPP. Where, pray?

SOC. Where he says:

For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam's son, the glorious Hector, shall reach the tents and ships of the Myrmidons through slaughter of Argives and shall burn the ships with fire. But at my tent and my black ship I think Hector, though eager for battle, will come to a halt.¹

Now, Hippias, do you think the son of Thetis and pupil of the most wise Cheiron was so forgetful, that, although a little earlier he had reviled deceivers in the most extreme terms, he himself immediately

¹ *Iliad*, ix. 360 ff.

³ κατά τε φλέξαι TWf (but σμυ above, W): κατέφλεξε F: κατά τε σμύξαι S and vulg. of Homer.

⁴ μιν TW: μὴν F: τοι MSS. of Homer.

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αὐτὸν παραχρῆμα πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ὀδυσσεά φάναι ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Αἴαντα μενεῖν,¹ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπιβουλεύοντά τε καὶ ἡγούμενον ἀρχαῖον εἶναι τὸν Ὀδυσσεά καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐτῶ τούτῳ τῷ τεχνάζειν τε καὶ ψεύδεσθαι περιέσεσθαι;

14. ιπ. Οὐκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ **Ε** καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑπὸ εὐνοίας² ἀναπεισθεὶς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα ἄλλα εἶπεν ἢ πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά· ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἅ τε ἀληθῆ λέγει, ἐπιβουλεύσας ἀεὶ λέγει, καὶ ὅσα ψεύδεται, ὡσαύτως.

ζη. Ἀμείνων ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀχιλλέως.

ιπ. Ἦκιστά γε δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζη. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἄρτι ἐφάνησαν οἱ ἐκόντες ψευδόμενοι βελτίους ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες;

ιπ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ ἐκόντες ἀδικοῦν-
372 **Τ**ες καὶ ἐκόντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργασά-
μενοι βελτίους ἂν εἶεν τῶν ἀκόντων, οἷς πολλὴ δοκεῖ συγγνώμη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἰδῶς τις ἀδικήσῃ ἢ ψεύσῃται ἢ ἄλλο τι³ κακὸν ποιήσῃ; καὶ οἱ νόμοι δήπου πολὺ χαλεπώτεροί εἰσι τοῖς ἐκοῦσι κακὰ ἐργαζομένοις καὶ ψευδομένοις ἢ τοῖς ἄκουσιν.

15. ζη. Ὅρας, ὦ Ἰππία, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, **Β** λέγων ὡς λιπαρῆς εἰμι πρὸς τὰς ἐρωτήσεις τῶν σοφῶν; καὶ κινδυνεύω ἐν μόνον ἔχειν τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, τὰλλα ἔχων πάνυ γε φαῦλα· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἧ ἔχει ἔσθλαμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπη ἐστὶ τεκμήριον δέ μοι τούτου ἰκανόν, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν συγ-

¹ μενεῖν] μένειν TWF.

² εὐνοίας F: εὐηθείας TWf.

³ τί WF: om. T.

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said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away and to Ajax that he was going to stay, and was not acting by design and in the belief that Odysseus was behind the times and that he himself would get the better of him in just this matter of contrivance and falsehood ?

HIPP. No, I do not agree, Socrates ; but in this case also Achilles was induced by the goodness of his heart to say to Ajax something different from what he had said to Odysseus ; whereas Odysseus, when he speaks the truth always speaks with design, and when he speaks falsehood likewise.

SOC. Then Odysseus, as it seems, is better than Achilles.

HIPP. Not in the least, Socrates.

SOC. How is that ? Were not those who utter falsehoods voluntarily found to be better than those who do so involuntarily ?

HIPP. And how, Socrates, could those who voluntarily do wrong and voluntarily and designedly do harm be better than those who do so involuntarily ? And there seems to be good reason to forgive a man who unwittingly does wrong or speaks falsehood or does any other evil. And the laws surely are much more severe towards those who do evil and tell falsehoods voluntarily, than towards those who do so involuntarily.

SOC. Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth when I say that I am persistent in questioning wise men ? And this is probably the only good thing about me, as I am otherwise quite worthless ; for I am all wrong about facts, and do not know the truth about them. And it is to me sufficient proof of the truth of this, that when I come into contact

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γένωμαι τῶ ὑμῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ οἷς οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες μάρτυρές εἰσι τῆς σοφίας, φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς· οὐδὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν
C αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμῖν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· καίτοι τί μείζον ἀμαθίας τεκμήριον ἢ ἐπειδάν τις σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι διαφέρηται; ἐν δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάσιον ἔχω ἀγαθόν, ὃ με σώζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ πυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐρωτῶ καὶ χάριν πολλὴν ἔχω τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε ἀπεστέρησα χάριτος· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἔξαρνος ἐγενόμην μαθόντι, ἐμαυτοῦ ποιούμενος τὸ μάθημα εἶναι ὡς εὖρημα· ἀλλ' ἐγκωμιάζω τὸν διδάξαντά με ὡς σοφὸν ὄντα, ἀποφαίνων ἃ ἔμαθον παρ' αὐτοῦ· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν
D ἃ σὺ λέγεις οὐχ ὁμολογῶ σοι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρομαι πάννυ σφόδρα· καὶ τούτ' εὖ οἶδα ὅτι δι' ἐμὲ γίγνεται, ὅτι τοιοῦτός εἰμι οἷόσπερ εἰμί, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμαυτὸν μείζον εἴπω· ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὦ Ἰππία, πᾶν τούναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις· οἱ βλάπτοντες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀδικοῦντες καὶ ψευδόμενοι καὶ ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἐκόντες, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντες, βελτίους εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες· ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ τούναντίον δοκεῖ μοι τούτων καὶ πλανῶμαι περὶ
E ταῦτα, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι· νυνὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι μοι ὥσπερ κατηβολὴ περιελήλυθε, καὶ δοκοῦσί μοι οἱ ἐκόντες ἐξαμαρτάνοντες περὶ τι βελτίους εἶναι τῶν ἀκόντων· αἰτιῶμαι δὲ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος παθήματος τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λόγους αἰτίους εἶναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς ἄκοντας τούτων ἕκαστα ποιούντας πονηροτέρους ἢ

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with one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I am found to know nothing ; for there is hardly a single thing about which you and I have the same opinion ; and yet what greater proof of ignorance is there than when one disagrees with a wise man ? But I have this one remarkable good quality, which is my salvation ; for I am not afraid to learn, but I inquire and ask questions and am very grateful to him who answers, and I never failed in gratitude to anyone ; for when I have learned anything I have never denied it, pretending that the information was a discovery of my own ; but I praise the wisdom of him who instructed me and proclaim what I learned from him. And so now I do not agree with what you say, but disagree very strongly ; and I know very well that this is my own fault, because I am the sort of man I am—not to give myself any greater title. For my opinion, Hippias, is the exact opposite of what you say ; I think that those who injure people and do wrong and speak falsehood and cheat and err voluntarily, not involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. Sometimes, however, the opposite of this seems to me to be the case, and I am all astray about these matters, evidently because I am ignorant ; but now at the present moment a sort of paroxysm of my disease has come upon me, and those who err in respect to anything voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. And I lay the blame for my present condition upon our previous argument, which causes those who do any of these things involuntarily to appear to me at this moment worse than those who do them volun-

PLATO

τοὺς ἐκόντας. σὺ οὖν χάρισαι καὶ μὴ φθονήσης
 ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μου· πολὺ γάρ τοι μείζον με
 ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει ἀμαθίας παύσας τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ νόσου
 373 τὸ σῶμα. μακρὸν μὲν οὖν λόγον εἰ θέλεις λέγειν,
 προλέγω σοι ὅτι οὐκ ἂν με ἰάσαιο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 ἀκολουθήσαιμι—ὥσπερ δὲ ἄρτι εἰ θέλεις μοι ἀπο-
 κρίνεσθαι, πάνυ ὀνήσεις, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' αὐτὸν σὲ
 βλαβήσεσθαι. δικαίως δ' ἂν καὶ σὲ παρακαλοίην,
 ὦ παῖ Ἀπημάντου· σὺ γάρ με ἐπήρας¹ Ἰππία δια-
 λέγεσθαι· καὶ νῦν, εἰ μὴ μοι ἐθέλη Ἰππίας ἀπο-
 κρίνεσθαι δέου αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ² ἐμοῦ.

ΕΥ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι οὐδὲν δεήσεσθαι
 Β Ἰππίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας δεήσεως· οὐ γὰρ τοιαῦτα
 αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὰ προειρημένα, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἂν
 φύγοι ἀνδρὸς ἐρώτησιν. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἰππία; οὐ
 ταῦτα ἦν ἃ ἔλεγες;

ΙΠ. Ἐγωγε· ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ὦ Εὐδিকে, αἰεὶ
 ταραττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ κακουρ-
 γοῦντι.

ΣΩ. ὦ βέλτιστε Ἰππία, οὐτι ἐκὼν γε ταῦτα
 ἐγὼ ποιῶ—σοφὸς γὰρ ἂν ἦ³ καὶ δεινὸς κατὰ τὸν σὸν
 λόγον—ἀλλὰ ἄκων, ὥστε μοι συγγνώμην ἔχε· φῆς
 γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖν, ὅς ἂν κακουργῆ ἄκων, συγγνώμην
 ἔχειν.

С ΕΥ. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γε, ὦ Ἰππία, ἄλλως ποίει,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῶν ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν προειρημένων σοι
 λόγων ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν σε ἐρωτᾷ Σωκράτης.

ΙΠ. Ἄλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, σοῦ γε δεομένου. ἀλλ'
 ἐρώτα ὅ τι βούλει.

16. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σφόδρα γε ἐπιθυμῶ, ὦ Ἰππία,

¹ ἐπήρας F: ἐπήρας T: ἀπήρας W.

² ὑπὲρ F: περὶ TW.

³ ἦ F: ἦν TW.

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tarily. So please do me a favour and do not refuse to cure my soul ; for you will be doing me much more good if you cure my soul of ignorance, than if you were to cure my body of disease. Now if you choose to deliver a long speech, I tell you beforehand that you would not cure me—for I could not follow you—but if you are willing to answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I think you yourself will not be injured, either. And I might fairly call upon you also, son of Apemantus, for help ; for you stirred me up to converse with Hippias ; so now, if Hippias is unwilling to answer me, ask him in my behalf to do so.

EUD. Well, Socrates, I imagine Hippias will need no asking from us ; for that is not what he announced ; he announced that he would not avoid the questioning of any man. How is that, Hippias ? Is not that what you said ?

HIPP. Yes, I did ; but Socrates, Eudicus, always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to want to make trouble.

SOC. Most excellent Hippias, I do not do these voluntarily at all—for then I should be wise and clever, according to you—but involuntarily, so forgive me ; for you say,¹ too, that he who does evil involuntarily ought to be forgiven.

EUD. And do not refuse, Hippias ; but for our sake, and also because of your previous announcements, answer any questions Socrates asks you.

HIPP. Well, I will answer since you request it. Ask whatever questions you like.

SOC. I certainly have a great desire, Hippias, to

¹ See 372.

PLATO

διασκέψασθαι τὸ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενον, πότεροί ποτε ἀμείνους, οἱ ἐκόντες ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνοντες. οἶμαι οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν ὀρθότατ' ἂν ὧδε ἐλθεῖν. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· καλεῖς τινὰ δρομέα ἀγαθόν;

D Π. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ κακόν;

Π. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὁ εὖ θέων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ κακῶς;

Π. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ βραδέως θέων κακῶς θεῖ, ὁ δὲ ταχέως εὖ;

Π. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα καὶ τῷ θεῖν τάχος μὲν ἀγαθόν, βραδυτῆς δὲ κακόν;

Π. Ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει;

ΣΩ. Πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων δρομεύς, ὁ ἐκὼν βραδέως θέων ἢ ὁ ἄκων;

Π. Ὁ ἐκὼν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ποιεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ θεῖν;

Π. Ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν.

E ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ποιεῖν, οὐ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι τι;

Π. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ κακῶς ἄρα θέων κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐν δρόμῳ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται;

Π. Κακόν· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Κακῶς δὲ θεῖ ὁ βραδέως θέων;

Π. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς ἐκὼν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων;

Π. Ἐοικέν γε.

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investigate what we are just at present talking about, namely which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily. Now I think the best way to go at the investigation is this. Just answer. Do you call some one a good runner ?

HIPP. I do.

SOC. And a bad one ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. Now, he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs badly a bad one ; is it not so ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. Then does not he who runs slowly run badly, and he who runs fast run well ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. In a race, then, and in running, rapidity is a good thing, and slowness an evil.

HIPP. Why, of course.

SOC. Which, then, is the better runner, he who runs slowly voluntarily or he who does so involuntarily ?

HIPP. He who does it voluntarily.

SOC. Well, then, is not running doing something ?

HIPP. Yes, it is doing.

SOC. And if doing, is it not also performing some act ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. Then he who runs badly performs a bad and disgraceful act in a race ?

HIPP. Yes, a bad act of course.

SOC. But he runs badly who runs slowly ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. Then the good runner performs this bad and disgraceful act voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily ?

HIPP. So it seems.

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ΣΩ. Ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα πονηρότερος ὁ ἄκων
κακὰ ἐργαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐκών;

ΙΠ. Ἐν δρόμῳ γε.

374 ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν πάλῃ; πότερος παλαιστῆς ἀμεί-
νων, ὁ ἐκὼν πίπτων ἢ ὁ ἄκων;

ΙΠ. Ὁ ἐκών, ὡς ἔοικεν.¹

ΣΩ. Πονηρότερον δὲ καὶ αἰσχίον ἐν πάλῃ τὸ
πίπτειν ἢ τὸ καταβάλλειν;

ΙΠ. Τὸ πίπτειν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν πάλῃ ἄρα ὁ ἐκὼν τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ
αἰσχρὰ ἐργαζόμενος βελτίων παλαιστῆς ἢ ὁ ἄκων.

ΙΠ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ τῇ τοῦ σώματος
χρεία; οὐχ ὁ βελτίων τὸ σῶμα δύναται ἀμφοτέρα
ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ, καὶ τὰ
Β αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ καλά· ὥστε ὅταν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
πονηρὰ ἐργάζεται, ἐκὼν ἐργάζεται ὁ βελτίων τὸ
σῶμα, ὁ δὲ πονηρότερος ἄκων;

ΙΠ. Ἐοικεν καὶ τὰ² κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ κατ' εὐσχημοσύνην, ὧ Ἰππία; οὐ τοῦ
βελτίονος σώματός ἐστιν ἐκόντος τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ
πονηρὰ σχήματα σχηματίζειν, τοῦ δὲ πονηροτέρου
ἄκοντος; ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;

ΙΠ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀσχημοσύνη ἄρα ἢ μὲν ἐκούσιος πρὸς
C ἀρετῆς ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀκούσιος πρὸς πονηρίας σώματος.

¹ ὡς ἔοικε F: ἔοικεν TW.

² καὶ τὰ TWF: om. edd.

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soc. In running, then, he who does bad acts involuntarily is worse than he who does them voluntarily ?

HIPP. Yes, in running.

soc. And how is it in wrestling ? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily ?

HIPP. He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems.

soc. But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one's opponent ?

HIPP. To be thrown.

soc. In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily.

HIPP. So it seems.

soc. And how is it in every other bodily exercise ? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine, so that whenever he performs bad acts of a bodily kind, he who is the better man in respect to his body does them voluntarily, but he who is worse does them involuntarily ?

HIPP. That seems to be the case in matters of strength also.

soc. And how about grace, Hippias ? Does not the better body take ugly and bad postures voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily ? Or what is your opinion ?

HIPP. That is my opinion.

soc. Then ungracefulness when voluntary is associated with excellence of the body, but when involuntary with faultiness.

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ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ φωνῆς πέρι λέγεις; ποτέραν φῆς εἶναι βελτίω, τὴν ἐκουσίως ἀπάδουσαν ἢ τὴν ἀκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Τὴν ἐκουσίως.

ΣΩ. Μοχθηροτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δέξαιο δ' ἂν πότερον τὰγαθὰ κεκτήσθαι ἢ τὰ κακά;

ΙΠ. Τὰγαθὰ.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἂν δέξαιο πόδας κεκτήσθαι ἐκουσίως χωλαίνοντας ἢ ἀκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Ἐκουσίως.

D ΣΩ. Χωλεία δὲ ποδῶν οὐχὶ πονηρία καὶ ἀσχημοσύνη ἐστίν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀμβλυωπία οὐ πονηρία ὀφθαλμῶν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρους οὖν ἂν βούλοιο ὀφθαλμοὺς κεκτήσθαι καὶ ποτέροις συνεῖναι; οἷς ἐκὼν ἂν τις ἀμβλυώττοι καὶ παρορώη ἢ οἷς ἄκων;

ΙΠ. Οἷς ἐκὼν.

ΣΩ. Βελτίω ἄρα ἤγησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ τὰ ἐκουσίως πονηρὰ ἐργαζόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Τὰ γοῦν τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πάντα, οἷον καὶ ὦτα καὶ ῥίνας καὶ στόμα καὶ πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις, εἰς λόγος συνέχει, **E** τὰς μὲν ἀκόντως κακὰ ἐργαζόμενας ἀκτήτους εἶναι

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HIPP. Apparently.

soc. And what do you say about the voice? Which do you say is the better? That which sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily?

HIPP. That which does it voluntarily.

soc. And that which does it involuntarily is the worse?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Would you choose to possess good or bad things?

HIPP. Good ones.

soc. Would you, then, choose to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily?

HIPP. Voluntarily.

soc. But is not a limp faultiness and ungracefulness of the feet?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Which eyes, then, would you choose to possess and live with? Those with which one would see dimly and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

HIPP. Those with which one would do so voluntarily.

soc. Those parts, then, of yourself which voluntarily act badly you consider better than those which do so involuntarily?

HIPP. Yes; that is, in matters of that sort.

soc. Well, then, one statement embraces all alike, such as ears and nose and mouth and all the senses—that those which act badly involuntarily are undesirable because they are bad, and those

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ὡς πονηρὰς οὐσας, τὰς δὲ ἐκουσίως κτητὰς ὡς ἀγαθὰς οὐσας.

ΙΠ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

17. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὀργάνων ποτέρων βελτίων ἢ κοινωνία, οἷς ἐκῶν τις κακὰ ἐργάζεται ἢ οἷς ἄκων; οἷον πηδάλιον, ᾧ ἄκων κακῶς τις κυβερνήσει, βέλτιον, ἢ ᾧ ἐκῶν;

ΙΠ. Ὡς ἐκῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τόξον ὡσαύτως καὶ λύρα καὶ αὐλοὶ καὶ τὰλλα ξύμπαντα;

ΙΠ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

375 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ψυχὴν κεκτηῖσθαι ἵππου, ἢ ἐκῶν τις κακῶς ἵππεύσει, ἀμεινον¹ ἢ ἢ² ἄκων;

ΙΠ. Ἢ ἐκῶν.

ΣΩ. Ἀμείνων ἄρα ἐστίν.

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τῇ ἀμείνονι ἄρα ψυχῇ ἵππου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης τὰ πονηρὰ ἐκουσίως ἂν ποιῶι, τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρᾶς³ ἀκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κυνὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων πάντων;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν ἐκτεῖσθαι τοξότου ἀμεινόν⁴ ἐστίν, ἢ τις ἐκουσίως ἀμαρτάνει τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἢ ἢ τις ἀκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Ἢ τις ἐκουσίως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ⁵ αὕτη ἀμείνων εἰς τοξικὴν ἐστίν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

¹ ἀμεινον f: ἀμινον F: ἀμείνων TW. ² ἢ add. corr. Coisl.

³ τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρᾶς W: τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρίας Tf: τη δὲ τῇ πονηρᾶ F.

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which do so voluntarily are desirable because they are good.

HIPP. I think so.

soc. Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those with which a man does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily? For instance, is a rudder better with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily?

HIPP. One with which he will do so voluntarily.

soc. And is not the same true of a bow and a lyre and flutes and all the rest?

HIPP. Quite true.

soc. Well now, would you choose to possess a horse of such spirit that you would ride him badly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

HIPP. Voluntarily.

soc. Then that spirit is better.

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Then with the horse of better spirit one would do voluntarily the bad acts of that spirit, but with the one of worse spirit involuntarily?

HIPP. Certainly.

soc. And is not that true of a dog, and all other animals?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Well now, then, in the case of an archer is it better to possess the mind which voluntarily misses the mark, or that which does so involuntarily?

HIPP. That which does so voluntarily.

soc. Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery?

HIPP. Yes.

⁴ ἀμεινον F: ἀμείνονος TW.

⁵ καὶ F: om. TW.

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ΣΩ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀκουσίως ἀμαρτάνουσα
πονηροτέρα ἢ ἐκουσίως;

ΙΠ. Ἐν τοξικῇ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐκοῦσα κακὰ
ἐργαζομένη περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατρικωτέρα;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀμείνων ἄρα αὕτη ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς
μῆ.¹

ΙΠ. Ἀμείνων.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἢ κιθαριστικωτέρα καὶ αὐλητικω-
C τέρα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας τε καὶ
τὰς ἐπιστήμας, οὐχὶ ἢ ἀμείνων ἐκοῦσα τὰ κακὰ
ἐργάζεται καὶ τὰ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνει, ἢ δὲ
πονηροτέρα ἄκουσα;

ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που τὰς γε τῶν δούλων ψυχὰς
κεκτῆσθαι δεξαίμεθ' ἂν μᾶλλον τὰς ἐκουσίως ἢ τὰς
ἀκουσίως ἀμαρτανούσας τε καὶ κακουργούσας, ὡς
ἀμείνους οὔσας εἰς ταῦτα.

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν οὐ βουλοίμεθ'
ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν βελτιων ἔσται, εἰ ἂν ἐκοῦσα κακουρ-
γῇ τε καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃ, ἢ εἰ ἂν ἄκουσα;

ΙΠ. Δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ οἱ
ἐκόντες ἀδικοῦντες βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνονται² γε ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένω·.

ΙΠ. Οὐκουν ἔμοιγε.

¹ μῆ Schleiermacher: μῆ ἰατρικῆς TWF.

² φαίνονται F: φαίνεται TW.

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soc. Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily ?

HIPP. Yes, in the case of archery.

soc. And how is it in the art of medicine ? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients' bodies voluntarily the more scientific ?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. In this art, then, this mind is better than the other.

HIPP. It is better.

soc. Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute, and in everything else that concerns all the other arts and sciences—is not that mind better which voluntarily does bad and disgraceful things and commits errors, whereas that which does so involuntarily is worse ?

HIPP. Apparently.

soc. And surely we should prefer to possess slaves of such minds that they voluntarily commit errors and do mischief, rather than such as do so involuntarily ; we should think them better fitted for their duties.

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Well now, should we not wish to possess our own mind in the best possible condition ?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Will it, then, be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily, or involuntarily ?

HIPP. But it would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if those who do wrong voluntarily are to be better than those who do so involuntarily.

soc. But surely they appear, at least, to be so, from what has been said.

HIPP. Not to me.

PLATO

18. **ΣΩ.** Ἐγὼ δ' ὤμην, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ σοὶ φανῆναι. πάλιν δ' ἀποκρίναι· ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐχὶ ἢ δύναμις τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀμφότερα; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔν γέ τι τούτων εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην;

Ε **ΙΠ.** Ναί.¹

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δύναμις ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δυνατωτέρα ψυχὴ δικαιοτέρα ἐστὶ; βελτίων γάρ που ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ὦ ἄριστε, ἢ τοιαύτη.

ΙΠ. Ἐφάνη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ἐπιστήμη; οὐχ ἢ σοφωτέρα ψυχὴ δικαιοτέρα, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ἀμφότερα; οὐχ ἢ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δύναμιν, δικαιοτέρα, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα; οὐχ οὕτως ἀνάγκη ἔχειν;

ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ δυνατωτέρα καὶ σοφωτέρα αὕτη ἀμείνων οὐσα ἐφάνη καὶ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχροῦ, περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν;

376 **ΙΠ.** Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὄταν ἄρα τὰ αἰσχροῦ ἐργάζηται, ἐκούσα ἐργάζεται διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην· ταῦτα δὲ δικαιοσύνης φαίνεται, ἤτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον.

ΙΠ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν γε ἀδικεῖν κακὰ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καλά.

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ δυνατωτέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ψυχῆ,

¹ ναί add. recc.: om. TWF.

LESSER HIPPIAS

soc. I thought, Hippias, they appeared to be so to you also. But now once more answer me: Is not justice either a sort of power or knowledge, or both? Or must not justice inevitably be one or other of these?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Then if justice is a power of the soul, the more powerful soul is the more just, is it not? For we found, my friend, that such a soul was better.

HIPP. Yes, we did.

soc. And what if it be knowledge? Is not the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant more unjust?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. And what if it be both? Is not the soul which has both, power and knowledge, more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Is that not inevitably the case?

HIPP. It appears to be.

soc. This more powerful and wiser soul, then, was found to be better and to have more power to do both good and disgraceful acts in every kind of action was it not?

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Whenever, then, it does disgraceful acts, it does them voluntarily, by reason of power and art; and these, either one or both of them, are attributes of justice.

HIPP. So it seems.

soc. And doing injustice is doing evil acts, and not doing injustice is doing good acts.

HIPP. Yes.

soc. Will not, then, the more powerful and better

PLATO

ὅταν περὶ ἀδικῆ, ἐκούσα ἀδικήσει, ἢ δὲ πονηρὰ ἄκουσα;

ΙΠ. Φαίνεται.

Β ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὁ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ τὴν κακὴν;

ΙΠ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοῦ μὲν ἄρα ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖν, κακοῦ δὲ ἄκοντα, εἴπερ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει.

ΙΠ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔχει γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄδικα ποιῶν, ὧ Ἰππία, εἴπερ τίς ἐστὶν οὗτος, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος εἴη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός.

ΙΠ. Οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι συγχωρήσω, ὧ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὧ Ἰππία· ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οὕτω φαίνεσθαι νῦν γε ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. ὅπερ μέντοι πάλαι ἔλεγον, ἐγὼ περὶ ταῦτα ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανῶμαι καὶ οὐδέποτε ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ· καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πλανᾶσθαι οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἰδιώτην· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς πλανήσεσθε οἱ σοφοί, τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ ἡμῖν δεινόν, εἰ μηδὲ παρ' ὑμᾶς ἀφικόμενοι παυσόμεθα τῆς πλάνης.

LESSER HIPPIAS

soul, when it does injustice, do it voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily ?

HIPP. Apparently.

SOC. Is not, then, a good man he who has a good soul, and a bad man he who has a bad one ?

HIPP. Yes.

SOC. It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good soul.

HIPP. But surely he has.

SOC. Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man.

HIPP. I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that.

SOC. Nor I with myself, Hippias ; but that appears at the moment to be the inevitable result of our argument ; however, as I was saying all along, in respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same opinion ; and that I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising ; but if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us also, if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our straying.



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