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<DATE>2014-07-08</DATE>
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<NAME>Renee Mayes</NAME>
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<TEXT LANG="eng">
<FRONT>
<DIV1 TYPE="title page">
<PB REF="1">
<PB REF="2" MS="y">
<PB REF="2">
<P>Reflexions UPON Ancient and Modern PHILOSOPHY, Moral and Natural.</P>
<P>Treating of the <HI>Aegyptians, Arabians, Gre|tians, Romans, &amp;c.</HI> Philo&s;ophers; as <HI>Thales, Zeno, Socrates, Plato, Pytha|goras, Ari&s;totle, Epicurus,</HI> &amp;c.</P>
<P>Al&s;o of the <HI>Engli&s;h, Germans, French, Spani&s;h, Italian,</HI> &amp;c. As <HI>Bacon, Boyle, De&s;cartes, Hobbes, Vanhelmont, Ga&s;&s;endus, Galileus, Harvey, Paracel&s;us, Mar&s;ennus, Digby,</HI> &amp;c.</P>
<P>Together with the USE that is to be made thereof.</P>
<P>Licen&s;ed, <HI>Octob.</HI> 4. 1677. <HI>Ro. L'E&s;trange.</HI></P>
<P><HI>LONDON,</HI> Printed, and are to be &s;old by <HI>William Cademan,</HI> and <HI>William Crooke,</HI> at the <HI>New-Exchange,</HI> and without <HI>Temple-Bar,</HI> and at Mr. <HI>Man</HI>'s Coffee hou&s;e. 1678.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="arms">
<PB REF="3">
<P><FIGURE>
<P> REGINAE ERVNT NVTRICES TVAE </P>
<P>COIL REG OXON </P>
<P> ROBERTVS EGLESFIELD CLERICUS </P>
<FIGDESC>Arms with three griffins</FIGDESC>
</FIGURE></P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="preface">
<PB REF="3">
<HEAD>The PREFACE.</HEAD>
<P>I Do not pretend that the&s;e Reflexi|ons are to be maintained as <HI>The|&s;es:</HI> they are but Remarks that I have made in reading of Authors, and Ob&s;ervations on their Sentiments, which as Conjectures I &s;ubmit to publick examination, and wherein I de&s;ire my &s;elf to be cleared. The chief De&s;ign of this Treati&s;e is, to give vertuous people the true Notion of a Science, which is the Rule of other Sciences; and to de|clare what hath been the u&s;e of it in the fir&s;t and la&s;t Ages, in an hi&s;torical ac|count of the progre&s;s, decay, and of all the revolutions which that Science hath undergone, for above the &s;pace of two thou&s;and years; to the end that in this Abridgment, wherein I have endeavou|red to comprehend &s;o many things, what is &s;trong and weak, &s;olid and frivolous, true and fal&s;e in Philo&s;ophy may be di&s;|cerned.</P>
<P>A De&s;ign, &s;o far above the capacity of
<PB REF="4">a private per&s;on would be ra&s;h, if to prepare me for &s;o great an undertaking, I had not con&s;ulted the Learned of all Ages upon that &s;ubject. This obliges me in the entry to declare, that I &s;ay little or nothing of my own head, and that I &s;peak not of the Ancients and Moderns, but by the &s;entiments of tho&s;e who have known them be&s;t. The intelligent, with|out adverti&s;ement, will by their own eyes ea&s;ily perceive the truth of what I &s;ay: &s;o that I need not burden a Book with Ci|tations, whereof it is but already too full. Nor is it to play the Doctor, that now and then I &s;peak in a &s;train &s;ome|what dogmatical: it is only that I may more plainly repre&s;ent to the Learned, what they already know, and revive their Notions thereof.</P>
<P>But though I might give the learned|e&s;t of the Ancients and Moderns for my vouchers in this particular, yet I pre|tend not that they &s;hould be accountable for all that I &s;ay; for I may have mi&s;taken in citing of them: and there|fore I am willing that men &s;hould know that whatever is good in this Work is theirs, and what is otherways mine own.
<PB REF="4">For be&s;ides that it is ridiculous to pre|tend to Infallibility, I am very &s;en&s;ible that one cannot even be exact when he gra&s;ps &s;o many various matters. If <HI>Stra|bo</HI> and <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> have mi&s;ta|ken in the Hi&s;tory of the ancient Philo|&s;ophers, may not I be deceived in the ac|count of the new? So that I &s;hall &s;ay no|thing as to that for my own ju&s;tification, but what every one may tell him&s;elf in my favour, when he &s;hall be plea&s;ed to reflect thereon.</P>
<P>The greate&s;t difficulty in this Work hath been to give Form to &s;o va&s;t a Mat|ter; &s;eeing the &s;everal Cla&s;&s;es of &s;o many different Sects, after all the Au|thors that have wrote thereon, are not as yet well adju&s;ted. For <HI>Plutarch</HI> doth not di&s;tingui&s;h, and <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> confounds them. <HI>Varro</HI> reckons them up to two hundred and four&s;core, and <HI>The|mi&s;tius</HI> to three hundred. But becau&s;e that &s;cantling alone would be too large, I have reduced them all to &s;even princi|pal Sects. The first is the Sect of <HI>Py|thagoras,</HI> which is much the &s;ame with that of the <HI>Egyptians:</HI> (for there is little or nothing of truth known of the
<PB REF="5">Philo&s;ophy of the <HI>Phenicians</HI> and <HI>Ethio|pians.)</HI> The &s;econd is the Sect of <HI>So|crates</HI> and <HI>Plato,</HI> of the <HI>Ancient</HI> and <HI>new Academicks,</HI> of the <HI>Pyrrhoni&s;ts</HI> and <HI>Scepticks,</HI> which is originally one and the &s;ame. The third is that of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> and the <HI>Peripateticks.</HI> The Fourth that of <HI>Zeno</HI> and the <HI>Stoicks,</HI> which in a right line de&s;cends from <HI>Anti&s;thenes, Dioge|nes, Crates,</HI> and the <HI>Cynicks.</HI> The fifth that of the <HI>Epicureans,</HI> which is deri|ved from <HI>Leucippus, Democritus,</HI> and <HI>Ari&s;tippus.</HI> The &s;ixth that of the <HI>Ec|lecticks,</HI> who&s;e Founder was <HI>Potamon</HI> of <HI>Alexandria.</HI> And the &s;eventh is the Sect of the <HI>Arabians,</HI> the <HI>Averroi&s;ts,</HI> and the Schola&s;ticks, or Schoolmen, which is almo&s;t the &s;ame that at pre|&s;ent reigns in Univer&s;ities. The&s;e are the limits within which I have confined my &s;elf. ANd on the&s;e Sects only I make the&s;e Reflexions, which I have mingled with moral Maxims, and hi&s;torical hints, that I may render &s;o dry a mat|ter as Philo&s;ophy &s;omewhat agreeable.</P>
<P>Now, as to the Stile: I have thought fit to expre&s;s my &s;elf plainly on a &s;ubject that requires no affectation. I have not
<PB REF="5">medled with the di&s;cu&s;&s;ing of the Pre|cepts that are current in the Schools, that I might not flag too low; I &s;tick only to general Maxims, and dive no deeper: wherein I have endeavoured to imitate <HI>Cicero,</HI> who in his Books of Phi|lo&s;ophy never almo&s;t engages in the retail of the Opinions whereof he &s;peaks, but &s;o far as he can do it without the lo&s;s of his u&s;ual politene&s;s. For the reproach which he ca&s;ts upon <HI>Varro</HI> &s;trikes at him|&s;elf <HI>(Philo&s;ophiam multis locis incho|&acirc;&s;ti, ad impellendum &s;atis, ad edocen|dum parum. You have wrote enough of Philo&s;ophy to excite mens minds, but little to in&s;truct them.)</HI> He explains only the Principles and general Maxims of every Sect, which he accompanies with &s;ome Reflexions. This I have done, that I might accommodate my &s;elf to the re|li&s;h of an age, which is more affected with good &s;en&s;e than great learning. And &s;eeing in the &s;tock of the&s;e Reflexi|ons there will be found a Satyr again&s;t fal&s;e Philo&s;ophy, and an Elogie of the true; I am &s;ure thereby not to di&s;plea&s;e the vertuous, which is the mo&s;t con&s;ide|rable Sect of Philo&s;ophers. And it is
<PB REF="6">indeed only for their &s;akes that I have &s;et upon this De&s;ign, that I may give them the knowledg which rea&s;onable men ought to have of Philo&s;ophy, and whereof many times men have but fal&s;e Ideas. I have concluded this Treati&s;e with the U&s;e that &s;hould be made of it in matters of Religion, which men often|times but little regard, when they af|fect too much to be Philo&s;ophers. And &s;eeing men take not always the care they &s;hould, to publi&s;h nothing but what de|&s;erves publick view; I confe&s;s that I have not perhaps taken time enough, to give this Treati&s;e its utmo&s;t perfection. But I hope, as I am ready to make u&s;e of the advices that are given me, &s;o I &s;hall remedy that in a &s;econd Edition: to the end that I may make an exact Collection of &s;ix Volumes which I have written on Poetry, Eloquence, and Philo&s;ophy.</P>
</DIV1>
</FRONT>
<BODY>
<DIV1 TYPE="chapter">
<PB N="1" REF="6">
<HEAD>Reflexions ON PHILOSOPHY in General.</HEAD>
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="section">
<P>_THE Name of Philo&s;o|pher, how &s;imple and mode&s;t &s;oever it be, &s;eemed heretofore &s;o glorious and lovely to the Learned of ancient Times, that they preferr'd it to the mo&s;t &s;plendid and lofty Titles. That love of Wi&s;dom and &s;tudy of Vertue, whereof they made Profe&s;&s;ion, rai&s;ed them to &s;uch Authority over the minds of men, that their Example &s;erved for in&s;truction, and their Maxims were re|ceived
<PB N="2" REF="7">as Oracles by the publick. Great men asked them Coun&s;el in the Af|fairs of weightie&s;t importance: Cities and Provinces &s;ubmitted to their con|duct; and Kings them&s;elves reckoned it their glory to be their Di&s;ciples. It is true Philo&s;ophy taught <HI>Pythago|ras</HI> the integrity of manners and au|&s;terity of life, which gained him &s;o many Followers. It was Philo&s;ophy that made <HI>Empedocles</HI> refu&s;e a Crown, and prefer a private and quiet life to all the magnificence of Grandeur. By Philo&s;ophy <HI>Democritus</HI> was rai&s;ed to the contemplation of Nature, and re|nounced bodily plea&s;ures, that he might more peaceably enjoy the de|lights of the Soul. Philo&s;ophy taught <HI>Socrates</HI> to dye without haughtine&s;s or weakne&s;s: and though in the death of <HI>Cato,</HI> who affected too much the Philo|&s;opher, there appeared le&s;s mode&s;ty and tranquillity; yet therein are al&s;o to be &s;een the lineaments of a greatne&s;s of mind, which made him de&s;pi&s;e life. So that there being hardly any action of con&s;tancy and &s;tedfa&s;tne&s;s in Pagani&s;m,
<PB N="3" REF="7">which was not animated by Philo&s;o|phy: It may be &s;aid, that it was in &s;ome manner the principle and &s;ource of the pure&s;t vertue of Heathens.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>II.</HEAD>
<P>The <HI>Egyptians,</HI> who were the fir&s;t Philo&s;ophers in the world, gave &s;o my|&s;terious a garb to their Philo&s;ophy, that they made it pa&s;s with the People for a part of their Religion: Nor did any thing advance it more in authority with the publick, or give it greater credit among the Learned. But their Prie&s;ts had no other end in &s;hrowding their Ob&s;ervations of Nature, under the Veil of their Hieroglyphicks, but to keep them from the knowledge of the people, and thereby to di&s;tingui&s;h them&s;elves from the vulgar. As they propagated their Philo&s;ophy only by Tradition, and did not willingly com|municate their knowledge to other people; &s;o (as <HI>Strabo</HI> ob&s;erves) there is but little known of their true Doctrine. The truth is, all that is &s;aid of Philo|&s;ophy, before it became to be known in <HI>Greece,</HI> hath &s;o little foundation;
<PB N="4" REF="8">and all the di&s;cour&s;es that are found of it in the Fragments of <HI>Sotion, Hermippus</HI> and <HI>Hermodorus,</HI> whereof <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> makes mention, a&s;well as in the Dialogue of <HI>Lucian</HI>'s Fugitives, are &s;o fabulous, that I intend only, as to what concerns the beginning thereof, to adhere to that which is to be found in Hi&s;tory, that I may give a more cer|tain account of the &s;ame. Be&s;ides, that my&s;terious Philo&s;ophy of the <HI>E|gyptians,</HI> is &s;o little different from that of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> that the method and principles of both are almo&s;t the &s;ame; as appears by what <HI>Plutarch</HI> tells us in &s;everal of his works, <HI>Jamblicus</HI> in the life of <HI>Pythagoras, Selden,</HI> and &s;ome others who have treated on that &s;ub|ject.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>III.</HEAD>
<P>The <HI>Grecians,</HI> who &s;hewed greater pa&s;&s;ion for the di&s;covery of truth, than other Nations, gave them&s;elves &s;o ear|ne&s;tly to the ob&s;ervation of Nature, that from <HI>Thales</HI> to <HI>Plato</HI> there were more Truths concerning Natural Phi|lo&s;ophy di&s;covered, than in the Ages
<PB N="5" REF="8">following. It mu&s;t be acknowledged likewi&s;e, that Philo&s;ophy in its infan|cy began to produce &s;o great wits, and that it &s;hewed &s;o much rea&s;on in its primitive famblings, that its fir&s;t rudiments &s;erved for principles, and even for models to the following Ages. By long and con&s;tant &s;tudy men ob|&s;erved the motion of the Heavens, di|&s;tingui&s;hed their revolutions, framed the fir&s;t Ideas of a Coele&s;tial Sy&s;teme, di&s;covered the obliquity of the Zodi|ack, unfolded the mo&s;t hidden things of Nature, and drew that Curtain wherewith Providence had hid the greate&s;t part of its &s;ecrets, to pre&s;ent them to men as a matter of meditati|on and enquiry. And among&s;t tho&s;e that laboured in the &s;earch of the&s;e Ve|rities, <HI>Thales, Anaximander, Anaxa|goras, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Demo|critus, Empedocles,</HI> and <HI>Archelaus,</HI> ob|tained the greate&s;t reputation. <HI>Plu|tarch,</HI> who in the &s;econd Tome of his Works gives the Hi&s;tory of their Opi|nions, does indeed &s;how the contradicti|ons and ab&s;urdities whereinto for mo&s;t
<PB N="6" REF="9">part they fell: Neverthele&s;s they &s;till de&s;erve the prai&s;e to have been the fir&s;t that ventured upon that &s;o difficult an attempt, and by unknown Paths traced the way to tho&s;e that followed them, rendring them&s;elves con&s;ide|rable to Po&s;terity, by the founda|tion they laid to Sciences. <HI>Ju&s;tin</HI> in his Hi&s;tory ob&s;erves, that whil&s;t &s;tudy and meditation made Philo&s;ophers in <HI>Greece,</HI> Nature alone without any a&s;|&s;i&s;tance made the like among&s;t the Bar|barians in the middle of <HI>Scythia;</HI> as appears in <HI>Abaris</HI> and <HI>Anacar&s;is,</HI> of whom <HI>Apuleius</HI> &s;peaks, who without precepts and di&s;cipline attained to Wi&s;dom.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IV.</HEAD>
<P>To &s;peak then properly, <HI>Thales</HI> and <HI>Pythagoras</HI> were the two Founders of the ancient Philo&s;ophy; the one in <HI>Greece,</HI> and the other in <HI>Italy.</HI> There appeared in the School of <HI>Pythagoras</HI> &s;omewhat more regular and better e&s;tabli&s;hed, than in that of <HI>Thales</HI> and his Succe&s;&s;ors. As in the Do|ctrine of <HI>Pythagoras</HI> every thing was
<PB N="7" REF="9">made my&s;terious; &s;o &s;ubmi&s;&s;ion was its principal Character: that religious &s;ilence which with &s;o much rigour he made his Di&s;ciples ob&s;erve, was an art to procure him&s;elf a more re&s;pect|ful attention. The life of that Philo|&s;opher, as well as his Doctrine, is at this day &s;till a great &s;ubject of contro|ver&s;ie: he was indeed a man of a deep reach, a quick and penetrating appre|hen&s;ion, and of indefatigable indu&s;try and application. His u&s;ual way of teaching, was by Geometry and Num|bers: he explained material and &s;en&s;i|ble things by Geometry, and intelle|ctual by Mu&s;ick and Numbers. He was of too &s;olid a judgment, to imagine any reality in Numbers, which are but only intentional Beings, as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> proves in his Metaphy&s;icks. It is true he found &s;o great a facility in explaining the perfection of every thing by har|mony and proportion, after the man|ner of the <HI>Egyptians,</HI> that he expre&s;&s;ed him&s;elf no other way: and that he made u&s;e of Numbers as of Symbols and Signs to teach with: and all that
<PB N="8" REF="10">Science of Numbers, which was &s;o fa|miliar to <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> is to this day &s;till a kind of my&s;tery, whereof the &s;ecret is not very well known. <HI>Jamblicus</HI> in the life of that Philo&s;opher &s;ays, that he invented a mu&s;ick proper for the cure and quieting of the Pa&s;&s;ions. In his Moral Philo&s;ophy there is nothing regular; only fair Maxims without Principles: his Natural Philo&s;ophy is the &s;ame almo&s;t with that of the <HI>Pla|toni&s;ts.</HI> His Doctrine of two Princi|ples, the one of good and the other of evil, on which the <HI>Manichees</HI> built their belief, is fal&s;e; for of real Beings there is but one real Principle. <HI>Pytha|goras</HI> in <HI>Plutarch</HI> boa&s;ts, that the great|e&s;t fruit which he had reaped from Phi|lo&s;ophy was, not to wonder at any thing: becau&s;e that Philo&s;ophy di&s;co|vered to him the cau&s;e of every thing, as <HI>Horace</HI> expre&s;&s;es it to <HI>Numicius,</HI>
<Q>Nil admirari prope res e&s;t una Numici.</Q> In fine, <HI>Pythagoras</HI> had &s;o extraordi|nary a genius for Philo&s;ophy, that all
<PB N="9" REF="10">the other Philo&s;ophers have gloried to &s;tick to his &s;entiments: <HI>Socrates</HI> and <HI>Plato</HI> have hardly any thing that is good but from him. And if we con|&s;ider more narrowly, we &s;hall even find, that among&s;t all other Sects almo&s;t, there is &s;omewhat of the Spirit of <HI>Py|thagoras</HI> that bears rule.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>V. <HI>SOCRATES.</HI></HEAD>
<P><HI>Socrates</HI> was the fir&s;t that began to reduce into method the confu&s;ed Ideas of tho&s;e that went before him, by ranking the Ob&s;ervations which he had made of Nature, in a more regular order, that he might &s;hape them into Arts and Sciences. Though he had all the charms of wit, which flow from a pregnant genius and happy di&s;po&s;iti|on, yet he wanted not depth, and all imaginable &s;olidity. And that height of knowledge and under&s;tanding was accompanied with the true &s;implicity of a Child: When he applyed him&s;elf to every thing, he &s;eemed not employ|ed in any thing: He handled ob&s;cure&s;t
<PB N="10" REF="11">matters in a plea&s;ing &s;train; and his mo&s;t &s;erious meditations deprived him not of his good humour. As he ne|ver affected to talk like a wit, but as a vertuous man, &s;o his ordinary je&s;ts were noble. He was capable of every thing, and proud of nothing. His no|tices, that gave in&s;truction to others, and made them of Scholars become learned men, &s;erved only to puzle and entangle him&s;elf, by the doubts and uncertainties which they rai&s;ed in him: And for all he was &s;o rational, yet he too much di&s;tru&s;ted his Rea&s;on. The fertility of his wit &s;o choaked his di&s;cerning, that his different views led him into irre&s;olution. By his ingenui|ty in declaring on all occa&s;ions, that he knew nothing, he rendred the other Philo&s;ophers of his time ridiculous, who brag'd that they knew every thing: And the ignorance he made profe&s;&s;ion of, acquired him greater re|putation than all his knowledge. He &s;uffered tho&s;e that di&s;puted with him to take all the advantage over him they plea&s;ed, that he might refute
<PB N="11" REF="11">them with &s;o much the more authority, as he took the le&s;s. He procured an ab&s;o|lute power over their &s;entiments, by the deference that he yielded to them: it was only by hiding his Opinion, that he forced others to follow it: And the Empire that he exerci&s;ed over mens minds, was but an effect of the skill he had not to u&s;urp any, by the indif|ferency which he made appear for his own &s;entiments: as <HI>Cicero</HI> &s;ays, <HI>Socra|tes ip&s;e &s;ibi detrahens, in di&s;putatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere.</HI> But as he was the head of all the Sects that followed him; &s;o was he al&s;o in &s;ome manner the Founder of all the doubts that aro&s;e among&s;t them. For his Rea&s;onings tended commonly to the baffling of Rea&s;on: And as he e&s;ta|bli&s;hed Sciences, &s;o he left occa&s;ion to overthrow them; becau&s;e he taught his Scholars not &s;o much to know, as to doubt of things. Not, but that for all this he much contributed to give Philo&s;ophy the Form it hath taken &s;ince: For he it was that drew the fir&s;t draught of Logick and Moral Philo|&s;ophy,
<PB N="12" REF="12">and gave Principles to Natu|ral Philo&s;ophy: But by prying into this, according to the quality of his wit, with too much quaintne&s;s, he re|fined every thing &s;o much, that he handled the&s;e matters with le&s;s &s;olidity than his Succe&s;&s;ors. Not, but that his judgment is al&s;o of great authority, when he affirms any thing; but his Sentiments are rather Principles than Deci&s;ions: and all things rightly con|&s;idered, his Philo&s;ophy is more proper to overthrow than e&s;tabli&s;h. He had moreover with his &s;implicity a great Soul; for <HI>Ly&s;ias</HI> having read to him in his Pri&s;on a Di&s;cour&s;e that he had made in his defence, he cho&s;e rather to dye than make u&s;e of it; becau&s;e it de|fended him not with dignity enough: and &s;o he dyed &s;edately and in cold blood, which amazed his Judges.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="6" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VI. <HI>PLATO.</HI></HEAD>
<P><HI>Plato</HI> has the &s;moothe&s;t tongue of Antiquity, and takes plea&s;ure to make men hear him attentively, though
<PB N="13" REF="12">he is not much concerned whether they believe him or not: he is always florid, but not always &s;olid. The fal&s;e reli&s;h that was then in vogue, through the credit of the Sophi&s;ts, obliged him to that flouri&s;h of expre&s;&s;ion which he u&s;ed. He is witty, quick, and elegant, and as ingenious as man can be; and with little coherence and method, he ob&s;erves in his di&s;cour&s;e a &s;ecret oeco|nomy which fails not to hit the mark. And &s;eeing he teaches only by way of Dialogue, that he may follow a free and di&s;engaged &s;tile, which has the air of Conver&s;ation; he is rich in Prefa|ces, and magnificent in his entry on Di&s;cour&s;es; but he decides but little, no more than <HI>Socrates,</HI> and e&s;tabli&s;hes almo&s;t nothing at all. However what he &s;ays is &s;o naturally expre&s;t, that no|thing can be imagined more taking. The &s;light matters which he mingles with great in his di&s;cour&s;es, and the trifles wherewith he circum&s;tantiates what is e&s;&s;ential and weighty in the &s;ubjects he treats of, render him allu|ring; and it is by that way alone that he
<PB N="14" REF="13">amu&s;es. But through the great de&s;ire he hath to be plea&s;ing, he is too much for telling of wonders: mo&s;t part of his di&s;cour&s;es are nothing el&s;e but Fa|bles, Metaphors, and continual Alle|gories; he affects often to be my&s;terious in what he &s;ays, that he may keep him|&s;elf the more within the verge of his Character; and it is commonly by ly|ing that he undertakes to per&s;wade truth. <HI>Rhodiginus</HI> pretends that his &s;en&s;e is more to be minded than his words, which are often allegorical. Moreover he was too much a Politici|an for a Philo&s;opher: For in one of his Letters to <HI>Diony&s;ius</HI> of <HI>Siracu&s;a</HI> he ac|knowledges, that he publi&s;hed none of his Maxims, but under the name of <HI>Socrates,</HI> that he might not be account|able for his own Doctrine, in a time when the nicety of the People of <HI>Athens</HI> was offended at every thing. The condemnation of <HI>Socrates</HI> made him &s;o cautious, that to be in good terms with the Publick, and to di&s;po&s;|&s;e&s;s the People of the opinion, that he was addicted to the Sentiments of his
<PB N="15" REF="13">Ma&s;ter, he turned <HI>Pythagorean.</HI> Though he was a man of va&s;t capacity, (for, <HI>what did he not know,</HI> &s;ays <HI>Quinti|lian?</HI>) and had a wonderful Ge|nius for Sciences, whereof he &s;peaks always better than others did; yet it mu&s;t be acknowledged, that he gave greater reputation to Philo&s;ophy, by the conduct of his Life and Vertue, than by his Doctrine: For he it was that fir&s;t taught, that true Philo&s;ophy con&s;i&s;ted more in Fidelity, Con&s;tancy, Ju&s;tice, Sincerity, and in the love of ones Duty, than in a great Capacity. After his death his Di&s;ciples &s;o altered his Doctrine, and filled his School with &s;uch rigid Opinions, that &s;carcely could there be known among&s;t them the lea&s;t print of the true Doctrine of <HI>Plato:</HI> which was divided into &s;o ma|ny Sects, as there &s;tarted up Philo&s;o|phers in the Ages following.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="7" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VII. <HI>ARISTOTLE.</HI></HEAD>
<P><HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> is a Wit &s;o far above others, that few know him: For by an unpa|rallel'd
<PB N="16" REF="14">reach of under&s;tanding he &s;oars above the highe&s;t: He is an Eagle that mounts &s;o high, that men ea&s;ily lo&s;e &s;ight of him; and there is &s;o much force in his thoughts, &s;o great eleva|tion in his &s;entiments, that he cannot be followed. He it was who fir&s;t col|lected the &s;everal parts of Philo&s;ophy, that he might unite them into one bo|dy, and reduce them to a compleat Sy|&s;teme. No man had ever &s;o great a di&s;cerning of truth and fal&s;hood, as that Philo&s;opher; for he not only di|ved into Rea&s;on, that he might di&s;co|ver it, under what cloud &s;oever it hid it &s;elf; but upon di&s;covery thereof, had the art to make it even perceptible to others in all its force, and intelligi|ble in its full extent: &s;o happy and pe|netrating was his genius. By that qua|lity of mind he became &s;o exact an ob|&s;erver of the Works of Nature, that <HI>Plato</HI> called him, <HI>the Genius of Nature,</HI> as if Nature had made u&s;e of his Spi|rit as an in&s;trument to di&s;cover her Se|crets. In all his &s;entiments there &s;par|kles a &s;age and judicious Character,
<PB N="17" REF="14">which always &s;atisfies the mind; &s;o regular and &s;olid he is: and there is hardly ever any thing &s;aid rea&s;onably in Philo&s;ophy, which bears not &s;ome &s;ignature and impre&s;&s;ion of the &s;pirit of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> So that all the Judg|ments that have been made on his Do|ctrine in &s;ucceeding Ages, have only differed according to the greatne&s;s and mediocrity of light and knowledge, that have &s;wayed them: For in a word, none have given greater weight to hu|mane Rea&s;on, nor carried it farther than <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> His method is more &s;o|lid than that of all others, becau&s;e his principles are better founded on Rea|&s;on, and his Rea&s;on more grounded on Experience. But when he &s;peaks, one cannot tell whether it be to hide his doubts, or to make him&s;elf reve|renced, that he is ob&s;cure. It &s;eems he writes only that he may not be un|der&s;tood; and that his Works are not &s;o much to in&s;truct his own Age, as to give exerci&s;e to the following: There|fore it is, that <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> com|pares him to that Fi&s;h that troubles the
<PB N="18" REF="15">Water for fear of being taken. But there is &s;ome Ju&s;tice due to <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> as to that reproach which is ca&s;t up|on him: His ob&s;curity is not &s;o much the defect of his under&s;tanding, as of his &s;ubject matter; and in the manner how he fathoms things, it is not very ea&s;ie to pierce the darke&s;t clouds of Nature, to unfold her mo&s;t hidden &s;e|crets, to dig into nothing but aby&s;&s;es, to walk only on precipices, not to pur|&s;ue truth but by ways unknown to all other heads, and to be intelligible to all men: And that is the rea&s;on that the di&s;cour&s;es of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> have always more politene&s;s and force than per&s;pi|cuity; becau&s;e he confines him&s;elf to a &s;hort and conci&s;e &s;tile, the con&s;traint whereof will not allow but a perplex|ed elocution: And that is al&s;o the rea|&s;on that he writes in a manner more apt to amaze than per&s;wade his Rea|ders. One mu&s;t have heard him, &s;ays <HI>P&s;ellus,</HI> to be able to comprehend his Doctrine. He masked &s;ometimes with an affected ob&s;curity, what <HI>Pythagor as</HI> di&s;gui&s;ed under Symbols, and <HI>Plato</HI>
<PB N="19" REF="15">under Allegories. But in fine, there is &s;o great a depth of judgment to be found in all that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;aid, when one can penetrate into it, that he is not to be found fault with, if he have not always the art to make him&s;elf be under&s;tood. It is in vain therefore, that a brood of &s;tinted &s;pirits have let flye again&s;t the reputation of that great man, under the conduct of <HI>Tele&s;ius, Patricius, Bacon, Campanella,</HI> and &s;ome others, to di&s;credit his Doctrine in the&s;e la&s;t Ages; who by cen&s;uring <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> have pretended to be wi&s;er than all the Ages and Nations that have e&s;teem|ed him.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="8" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VIII.</HEAD>
<P>Philo&s;ophy did &s;hortly after degene|rate from the Nobility of its Extracti|on, there being none in the following Ages that came near the knowledge of tho&s;e great men who were its Foun|ders; and that purity which it pre&s;er|ved in its beginning, was quickly &s;ul|lied by the multitude of Sects that &s;prang up &s;ince. Then began Philo&s;o|phy to put on all the &s;hapes and figures
<PB N="20" REF="16">which the pa&s;&s;ions of men gave it, ac|cording to the different inclinations and various intere&s;ts that prevailed in &s;ucceeding Ages. For be&s;ides that the School of <HI>Zeno</HI> was full of counterfeit Vertues, and that of <HI>Epicurus</HI> &s;tuffed with real Vices, Philo&s;ophy became impious under <HI>Diagoras,</HI> impudent un|der <HI>Diogenes,</HI> &s;elfi&s;h under <HI>Demochares,</HI> cen&s;orious under <HI>Lyco,</HI> voluptuous un|der <HI>Metrodorus,</HI> fanta&s;tical under <HI>Cra|tes,</HI> licentious under <HI>Pyrrho,</HI> litigious under <HI>Cleantes,</HI> turbulent under <HI>Arce|&s;ilas,</HI> and took the humour of a Buf|foon under <HI>Menippus,</HI> and &s;pirit of contradiction under <HI>Lacydes:</HI> In a word, it was abandoned to all the ramblings that the mind of man is capable of. The Philo&s;ophers them&s;elves became jealous, envious, fickle, ra&s;h, unju&s;t, pa&s;&s;ionate, and &s;ubject to the infirmi|ties of the re&s;t of Mankind. Then be|gan men only to rea&s;on with reference to their humours, ambition, and in|trigues: and in a &s;hort time, there was no foppery nor extravagancy, &s;ays <HI>Cicero,</HI> which had not &s;ome Philo&s;o|pher
<PB N="21" REF="16">for Author and Patron. Men fol|lowed no more Rea&s;on but Pa&s;&s;ion; and made it their bu&s;ine&s;s more to maintain their Opinions with heats, than to defend the Truth with &s;inceri|ty. The different intere&s;ts of Sects who at that time laboured to over|throw one another, by the oppo&s;ition that was among&s;t their Ring-leaders, did not a little contribute to that di&s;|order. The ancient School of <HI>Plato</HI> degenerated by the Sentiments of the new, into the Sect of <HI>Scepticks</HI> and <HI>Pyrrhoni&s;ts,</HI> who doubted of every thing. And after the death of <HI>Theo|phra&s;tus,</HI> the School of the Peripate|ticks remitted much of their applica|tion to Natural Philo&s;ophy, that they might &s;tudy Eloquence. And this was the revolution in Philo&s;ophy, which followed that of <HI>Greece:</HI> for &s;ince that it lo&s;t its liberty, under the Succe&s;&s;ors of <HI>Alexander,</HI> there aro&s;e but a few heads fit for the &s;tudy of Nature, un|der the Reign of the <HI>Ptolomies,</HI> who called the Learned to <HI>Alexandria,</HI> and obliged them to leave <HI>Greece.</HI> Nei|ther
<PB N="22" REF="17">was there almo&s;t any other Philo|&s;opher of note in any other part of the world, except &s;ome followers of <HI>Plato, Ari&s;totle, Zeno,</HI> and <HI>Epicurus,</HI> who were in &s;ome vogue at <HI>Athens.</HI> The Learn|ed that got greate&s;t name el&s;ewhere, were <HI>Athenodorus</HI> Keeper of the Libra|ry of the Kings of <HI>Pergamus,</HI> who cor|rected the Books of <HI>Zeno; Strato</HI> the Preceptor of <HI>Ptolomy Philadelphus; Ari|&s;teas</HI> that was &s;ent by <HI>Ptolomy</HI> the Son of <HI>Lagus</HI> to <HI>Eleazar</HI> High Prie&s;t of <HI>Je|ru&s;alem; Zoilus,</HI> who made him&s;elf fa|mous by his Critici&s;mes on the Poems of <HI>Homer; Nicander</HI> the Phy&s;ician of young <HI>Attalus,</HI> who&s;e capacity <HI>Quin|tilian</HI> admires; <HI>Erato&s;thenes,</HI> who&s;e Fragments are cited by <HI>Plutarch, Athe|naeus, Diogenes Laertius,</HI> and <HI>Clement</HI> of <HI>Alexandria; Apollonius</HI> of <HI>Rhodes,</HI> Li|brary-Keeper to <HI>Ptolomy Evergetes; Ze|nodotus</HI> who flouri&s;hed under <HI>Ptolomy Soter,</HI> and &s;ome others. The jealou&s;ie it &s;elf which aro&s;e between the Kings of <HI>Alexandria</HI> and <HI>Pergamus,</HI> upon the fan&s;ie they took of rai&s;ing Libraries, &s;erved only to di&s;credit the Philo&s;ophy
<PB N="23" REF="17">of <HI>Ari&s;totle;</HI> for the fooli&s;h emulation that the&s;e Princes had to make great Collections of Books, made them with|out di&s;tinction give con&s;iderable re|wards to all who brought them in the Books of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> as <HI>Galen</HI> a&s;&s;ures us; and upon that account, &s;uch was the indu&s;try of Book&s;ellers, that forty Vo|lumes of Analyticks bearing the name of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> were collected, though he never compo&s;ed but four: And that confu&s;ion was the cau&s;e that the inter|preters of that Philo&s;opher were &s;o puzled about the true di&s;tinction of his Books.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="9" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IX.</HEAD>
<P>Philo&s;ophy was not known at <HI>Rome,</HI> till Civility had poli&s;hed it. The three fir&s;t Ages of that &s;tate were &s;pent in the Conque&s;t of <HI>Italy.</HI> Philo&s;ophy was then lookt upon as the Mother of lazi|ne&s;s, which became odious in a Re|publick where every one was u&s;efully employed, as appears in a Fragment of <HI>Pacuvius.</HI> The love of Letters came to <HI>Rome</HI> by the Commerce which they had with the <HI>Grecians.</HI> Then it was
<PB N="24" REF="18">that the <HI>Romans</HI> became the Scholars of tho&s;e who&s;e Ma&s;ters they were. For the Study of Philo&s;ophy was revived again even in <HI>Greece,</HI> by the per&s;ecu|tion of one of the <HI>Ptolomy</HI>'s, who ba|ni&s;hed from <HI>Alexandria</HI> the Philo&s;o|phers whom his Predecc&s;&s;ors had call|ed thither: The greate&s;t part of whom returned to <HI>Athens,</HI> where the con|cour&s;e of the Learned gave new heat to Studies by a flight of Wits that there &s;ignalized their Capacitie: Among&s;t whom the chief were <HI>Panetius</HI> the Tu|tor of <HI>Lelius</HI> and <HI>Scipio, Polybius, Car|neades, Clitomachus, Apollonius Molo</HI> Preceptor to <HI>Julius Cae&s;ar</HI> and <HI>Cicero,</HI> who by the noi&s;e of their fame drew to <HI>Athens</HI> the mo&s;t flouri&s;hing Youth of <HI>Rome,</HI> for the &s;tudy of Philo&s;ophy; and they occa&s;ioned even emulation among the <HI>Romans,</HI> who began to ap|ply them&s;elves thereto with earne&s;t|ne&s;s. <HI>Lucretius</HI> was the fir&s;t that wrote there of Philo&s;ophy, as he him&s;elf af|firms. <HI>Quintilian</HI> makes mention of one <HI>Varro</HI> of <HI>Gallia Narbonen&s;is,</HI> that wrote on that &s;ubject. <HI>Terentius Varro,</HI>
<PB N="25" REF="18">whom <HI>Salu&s;t</HI> calls the learnede&s;t of the <HI>Romans,</HI> was a great Philo&s;opher. <HI>Vir|gil</HI> was al&s;o one of the fir&s;t that was delighted with the &s;tudy of the works of Nature. But no man in that time expre&s;t &s;o great love for Philo&s;ophy as <HI>Cicero;</HI> for he wrote &s;everal Treati&s;es thereon, he explained to <HI>Terentius Var|ro</HI> the Doctrine of <HI>Plato</HI> and other Phi|lo&s;ophers in his Academicks: he wrote of the Moral Philo&s;ophy of the Stoicks and <HI>Epicureans</HI> to <HI>Brutus:</HI> he made a Di&s;cour&s;e to <HI>Horten&s;ius</HI> to excite him to the love of Philo&s;ophy, whereof St. <HI>Augu&s;tine</HI> makes mention. He wrote to <HI>Trebatius</HI> the Book of Topicks, which is a kind of Logick. In fine, the troubles of the Republick encrea|&s;ing daily, and Tyranny beginning to take rooting there, he retired into the Country, where he applyed him&s;elf &s;o &s;trenuou&s;ly to the &s;tudy of Philo&s;ophy, that in the opinion of <HI>Plutarch,</HI> he was prouder of being a Philo&s;opher, than an Orator. <HI>Brutus</HI> likewi&s;e in imitation of <HI>Cicero</HI> wrote &s;ome Trea|ti&s;es of Philo&s;ophy, which are lo&s;t:
<PB N="26" REF="19">And in this &s;tate was Philo&s;ophy at that time in <HI>Rome.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="10" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>X.</HEAD>
<P>Furthermore the <HI>Romans,</HI> who made appear great &s;olidity of wit in what they undertook, adhered to the Philo|&s;ophy of the <HI>Grecians,</HI> and attempted not the invention of any new one; probably al&s;o, becau&s;e their genius inclined them to Eloquence. How|ever it be no partiality divided their minds into different Opinions: Gravity, which was the Character of their Nation, allowed not the weakne&s;|&s;es which &s;pring from di&s;pute and pa&s;|&s;ion. Old <HI>Cato</HI> who naturally de&s;pi&s;ed every thing that was not truly <HI>Roman,</HI> could not endure that they &s;hould learn any thing from the <HI>Grecians:</HI> That made him give his vote, that with all po&s;&s;ible diligence the three <HI>Grecian</HI> Phi|lo&s;ophers, <HI>Carneades, Diogenes,</HI> and <HI>Critolaus,</HI> deputed from <HI>Greece</HI> to the Senate, &s;hould be &s;ent back again, for fear that the <HI>Roman</HI> Wits might be in|fected with their Opinions. And it is to this al&s;o, that the Oracle in the &s;ixth
<PB N="27" REF="19">Book of the <HI>Aeneides</HI> has a reference; which &s;ays, that the <HI>Grecians</HI> were to be greater Orators and Philo&s;ophers than the <HI>Romans:</HI>
<Q><L>Orabunt cau&s;as melius, coeli&abque; meatus</L>
<L>De&s;cribent radio, &amp; &s;urgentia &s;idera dicent.</L></Q> As if Philo&s;ophy had not been altoge|ther worthy of the Maje&s;ty of the Em|pire. This al&s;o <HI>Horace</HI> in&s;inuates after his manner, by the biting raillery which he jeers all the Sects with in his Satyrs: And by the Character of <HI>Offellus,</HI> in whom he repre&s;ents the mark of a <HI>Ro|man</HI> Philo&s;opher, by prai&s;ing in his per&s;on that grave, au&s;tere, and &s;olid wi&s;dom, which was perfected without any dependence on the Rules and Pre|cepts which the <HI>Grecians</HI> &s;o much e|&s;teemed.</P>
<Q>Offellus abnormis &s;apiens cra&s;&s;a&abque; mi|nerva.</Q>
<P>The <HI>Grecians</HI> were indeed more poli&s;h|ed
<PB N="28" REF="20">and formal in all their ways of car|riage than the <HI>Romans:</HI> but their man|ners were not altogether &s;o pure. This is the Idea that <HI>Quintilian</HI> formed of both. <HI>Cicero</HI> who under&s;tood the Opi|nions of all the Philo&s;ophers, addict|ed not him&s;elf to any. Young <HI>Cato</HI> was a Stoick meerly by Con&s;titution. <HI>Cae&s;ar</HI> was a great Dialectician, eager in the pur&s;uit of the knowledge of Nature, as he is repre&s;ented by <HI>Lucan;</HI> but <HI>Epicurean</HI> as to his Morals, a&s;well as <HI>Pomponius Atticus. Horace</HI> was one of the Libertines in Philo&s;ophy, who agreed with all Sects, and was of none, That was commonly his Sect which &s;uted be&s;t with his Affairs: For he changed and altered them as men change their humour: And &s;o much he profe&s;&s;ed him&s;elf.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="11" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XI.</HEAD>
<P>That &s;mack of Philo&s;ophy, which common &s;en&s;e and &s;ound judgment that then reigned &s;ea&s;oned <HI>Rome</HI> with, continued &s;till under <HI>Augu&s;tus,</HI> a Prince of an even and &s;olid wit. He had able Ma&s;ters, as <HI>Suetonius</HI> &s;aith; and by
<PB N="29" REF="20">his Philo&s;ophy he reigned with tran|quillity enough, con&s;idering the vio|lent Revolution that the Empire &s;uf|fered at that time. There was hatch|ed at <HI>Rome</HI> during his Reign a new Sect of Philo&s;ophers, whereof <HI>Potamon</HI> of <HI>Alexandria</HI> was the Founder. That Phi|lo&s;opher picked out all that was ratio|nal in the Doctrine of the other Philo|&s;ophers, that he might compile it in|to a Sy&s;teme; and therefore he called his Sect, the Sect of <HI>Eclecticks.</HI> It had &s;carcely any followers but among&s;t the Chri&s;tians, as <HI>Clemens Alexandri|nus</HI> a&s;&s;ures us. The Tyranny that un|der <HI>Tiberius</HI> and his Succe&s;&s;ors, began to domineer even over the minds and &s;entiments of men, changed the coun|tenance of Philo&s;ophy, a&s;well as of the Government and Affairs. Mo&s;t part of the per&s;ons of Quality became Stoicks, that they might have a Cha|racter of &s;tedfa&s;tne&s;s again&s;t the vio|lences of <HI>Tiberius.</HI> So that bad for|tune and di&s;grace made more Philo&s;o|phers, than the School or Clo&s;et; and men by being unfortunate became wi&s;e.
<PB N="30" REF="21"><HI>Caligula, Nero,</HI> and <HI>Domitian</HI> bani&s;h|ed the Philo&s;ophers from <HI>Rome:</HI> and <HI>Nero</HI> by a fanta&s;tical appetite to Philo|&s;ophy, &s;ent for Magician Philo&s;ophers from <HI>Arabia,</HI> to refine what he had learnt from <HI>Seneca. Seneca</HI> him&s;elf was a better Courtier than Philo&s;o|pher; his Morality was &s;evere, but his Doctrine not very exact, as <HI>Quintilian</HI> ob&s;erves. The truth is, Philo&s;ophy was in no great e&s;teem in that time, wherein all things went by favour and complai&s;ance; mens care was only how to plea&s;e and flatter the Empe|rours, and true merit being &s;hut up in &s;ecret and in &s;ilence &s;tirred not a|broad. Philo&s;ophers were not now di&s;tingui&s;hed by Vertue and Doctrine, but by Habit and Grimaces; which were made u&s;e of to impo&s;e on the Publick, by di&s;gui&s;ing their real Con|duct. In fine, men became Philo&s;o|phers by the Beard, when they left off to be &s;o by Manners. As it appears by the accident that &s;ome time after hap|pened to <HI>Herodes Atticus;</HI> A thing like a man wrapped up in a Cloak, with a
<PB N="31" REF="21">long Beard, pre&s;ented it &s;elf to him: What ar't, &s;aid he? A Philo&s;opher, re|ply'd arrogantly the Fellow. <HI>I &s;ee,</HI> (&s;aid <HI>Herodes) the Cloak and Beard of a Phi|lo&s;opher; but the Philo&s;opher I &s;ee not yet.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="12" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XII.</HEAD>
<P>The Study of Philo&s;ophy, which was grown contemptible under the fir&s;t Emperours, through intrigue and policy which the Revolution of the State, and the weakne&s;s of new Go|vernment produced, began to reflou|ri&s;h under the Emperour <HI>Adrian,</HI> and his Succe&s;&s;ors, in &s;uch a manner, that the&s;e Princes them&s;elves were proud of being Philo&s;ophers; and were plea&s;ed when they were flattered to be com|plemented with that new Title. As it happened to <HI>Marcus Aurelius</HI> and <HI>Com|modus,</HI> when <HI>Athenagoras</HI> and St. <HI>Ju|&s;tin,</HI> who were deputed by the <HI>Grecian</HI> Churches, to inform them of the Chri|&s;tian Religion, made their Harangues to them. <HI>Trajan</HI> who by his wit and inclination was already become favou|rable to Learning; the Natural Hi&s;tory
<PB N="32" REF="22">of <HI>Pliny,</HI> which was publi&s;hed in the time of <HI>Ve&s;pa&s;ian,</HI> and the Di&s;cour&s;es of <HI>Dion Chri&s;o&s;tom,</HI> who compo&s;ed Treati&s;es of Moral and Natural Philo|&s;ophy, contributed to the reviving of that Spirit; which <HI>Plutarch,</HI> one of the wi&s;e&s;t and mo&s;t judicious Philo&s;ophers that ever was, in&s;pired into the Em|perour <HI>Adrian,</HI> who&s;e Preceptor he was, as he had before done to <HI>Trajan;</HI> and his Works which were at the &s;ame time &s;o favourably received of the pub|lick, renewed in men a reli&s;h of Phi|lo&s;ophy: Wherein he was well &s;econd|ed by <HI>Favorinus,</HI> Secretary to the Em|perour, who by his Writings gave his Ma&s;ter jealou&s;ie; of whom <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> &s;peaks &s;o often, with an ho|nourable Character. That love of Phi|lo&s;ophy which <HI>Adrian</HI> re-e&s;tabli&s;hed at <HI>Alexandria,</HI> by the Learned whom he &s;ent thither, continued under his Suc|ce&s;&s;ors, by the cares of <HI>Epictetus;</HI> who having withdrawn from <HI>Rome,</HI> for the horrour which he conceived of <HI>Domi|tian</HI>'s Reign, returned again in the time of <HI>Antonine,</HI> to whom he was Pre|ceptor;
<PB N="33" REF="22">by the Writings of <HI>Arrianus</HI> his Scholar, Preceptor to <HI>Antoninus Pius;</HI> by the Works of <HI>Galen,</HI> Phy&s;i|cian to the Emperours, and the fine&s;t Wit of tho&s;e times; by tho&s;e of <HI>Dio|genes Laertius, Herodes Atticus</HI> the Di|&s;ciple of <HI>Favorinus, Pau&s;anias, Aulus Gellius, Ptolomy</HI> that famous A&s;trono|mer, <HI>Maximus</HI> of <HI>Tyre,</HI> one of the Preceptors of <HI>Marcus Aurelius,</HI> and of many other Learned men that followed them; as of <HI>Taurus</HI> of <HI>Berytus, Athe|naeus, Alexander Aphrodi&s;eus, Philo&s;tra|tus, Plotinus, Apuleius</HI> and <HI>Porphyrius;</HI> who being encouraged by the Exam|ple of Emperours, in the&s;e and the fol|lowing Ages, revived the love of Phi|lo&s;ophy by their learned Works. In fine, it &s;eems that the &s;tudy of Truth began to be more valuable in a time, when the Oracles them&s;elves began to lye. And Philo&s;ophy was &s;o much in fa&s;hion in the time of <HI>Lucian,</HI> that he undertook in &s;everal parts of his Works to render Philo&s;ophers ridiculous, and chiefly in the Dialogues of the Battel of the <HI>Lapithes,</HI> the <HI>Sycophant &mdash;,
<PB N="34" REF="23">Icaromenippus,</HI> the <HI>Cynick</HI> and <HI>Fugi|tives;</HI> the nipping Je&s;ts that he puts upon them on all occa&s;ions in imitation of <HI>Cratinus</HI> and <HI>Ari&s;tophanes,</HI> who play upon <HI>Pythagoras</HI> and <HI>Socrates,</HI> do &s;uf|ficiently evidence, that the opinion wherein they were held at that time, gave ground to raillery. The truth is, there was &s;o counterfeit an out&s;ide in that Profe&s;&s;ion, and the name of <HI>Phi|lo&s;opher</HI> was &s;o horribly abu&s;ed, that that Author who &s;et up for the publick Cen&s;urer of the Manners of his time, had rea&s;on to make it one of the prin|cipal &s;ubjects of his Satyr.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="13" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XIII.</HEAD>
<P>But that Divine Philo&s;ophy which de&s;cended from Heaven, by the birth of JESUS CHRIST, being &s;pread abroad in the world by the Doctrine and exemplary life of Chri&s;tians, Pa|gan Philo&s;ophy began to appear to men very frivolous; e&s;pecially when they came to under&s;tand what was that Supreme Good, about which men had for &s;o many Ages di&s;puted in vain: and after that all-coele&s;tial Mora|lity
<PB N="35" REF="23">of the Go&s;pel, wherein all the Wi&s;|dom of God appeared to be com|pri&s;ed, had been publi&s;hed in the world, it filled the minds of the Pagans with jealou&s;ie. For S. <HI>Paul</HI> having been de&s;irous to &s;peak before the <HI>Areopage</HI> of the Immortality of the Soul, and the re&s;urrection of the Body, as of an indubitable truth, he was treated there with &s;corn and contempt, by the Philo&s;ophers who were then at <HI>Athens,</HI> who endeavoured to make him pa&s;s for a Babler. The &s;pirit of Vani|ty and Pride, which reigned mo&s;t in the Heathen Philo&s;ophy, obliged that A|po&s;tle to di&s;credit it, by the advice he gave the <HI>Colo&s;&s;ians,</HI> to take heed le&s;t they &s;hould be mi&s;led by the vain rea|&s;onings of Philo&s;ophers. Emulation encrea&s;ed &s;till more in &s;ucceeding times: For S. <HI>Au&s;tin, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian,</HI> and <HI>Eu&s;ebius</HI> employed all the force of their Eloquence, and all the ardour of their Zeal, to decry the fooli&s;h wi&s;dom of Pagani&s;m: As the Heathens on the other hand began to declaim again&s;t our Religion, whereof
<PB N="36" REF="24"><HI>Lucian</HI> had the impudence to call the Author a Sophi&s;t, and Chri&s;tians ig|norant People; and <HI>Octavian</HI> in <HI>Mi|nutius Felix</HI> reproached them for being wholly de&s;titute of Learning. S. <HI>Au|gu&s;tine</HI> in one of his Works refutes the&s;e Calumnies with all the vehe|mence he could. But becau&s;e at that time the Miracles wrought by Chri&s;ti|ans did much authori&s;e their Doctrine, the Pagans had their recour&s;e to Ma|gick and Enchantments, to keep up their credit by &s;uch wicked Practices, when the u&s;ual ways failed them. That abominable fancy to Magick, had be|fore that its beginning in tho&s;e who made profe&s;&s;ion of Philo&s;ophy, under the fir&s;t Emperours, by means of <HI>Anaxilaus</HI> and <HI>Nigidius Figulus,</HI> both <HI>Pythagoreans,</HI> whom <HI>Augu&s;tus</HI> bani&s;h|ed, and of the Magician Philo&s;ophers whom <HI>Nero</HI> &s;ent for from <HI>Arabia.</HI> It redoubled under <HI>Domitian</HI> by the im|po&s;tures of <HI>Apollonius Thyanaeus,</HI> of whom <HI>Hierocles</HI> compo&s;ed a Book, comparing his Miracles to the Miracles of JESUS CHRIST; and who&s;e
<PB N="37" REF="24">Life <HI>Philo&s;tratus</HI> wrote on the &s;ame de|&s;ign; as <HI>Eunapius</HI> wrote the Lives of the Sophi&s;ts, who were almo&s;t all Ma|gicians, that he might oppo&s;e them to the life of Chri&s;tians; becau&s;e they gained the admiration of people, by their Vertue and Miracles which they wrought. The fancy to &s;o dete&s;table a Philo&s;ophy was encrea&s;ed by the Do|ctrine of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> which was at that time in fa&s;hion, and whereof the followers became Necromancers, as appears by the reproach that <HI>Lucian</HI> ca&s;ts on them in one of his Dialogues. But nothing gave &s;o great a current to &s;o idle a Philo&s;ophy, as the freaki&s;hne&s;s of the Emperour <HI>Julian,</HI> who giving his mind to all the horrid ab&s;urdities which the extravagance of his curio&s;i|ty &s;ugge&s;ted to him, made an execra|ble mixture of what was holy in our Religion with the impieties of Paga|ni&s;m, that he might &s;hape to him&s;elf an abominable Philo&s;ophy. And mo&s;t part of the Philo&s;ophers of that time were Magicians, to plea&s;e the Empe|rour: Which appeared &s;ince in <HI>Apu|leius</HI>
<PB N="38" REF="25">a <HI>Platonick</HI> Philo&s;opher, who be|ing accu&s;ed of Magick by the Magi|&s;trates, defended him&s;elf no otherwi&s;e, than by a pretended connexion, which he alledged, of Philo&s;ophy with natural Magick. That abomination, which continued in the &s;tudy of Philo&s;ophy until the time of <HI>Boetius,</HI> and whereof he purges him&s;elf, gave ground to the fir&s;t beginnings of Cabali&s;tick Philo|&s;ophy and Chymi&s;try, as <HI>Delrio</HI> a&s;|&s;ures us.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="14" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XIV.</HEAD>
<P>By how much the Heathen Philo&s;o|phy fell into extravagancy, by all the&s;e exce&s;&s;es; &s;o much that of Chri&s;tians continued to advance to perfection in the &s;earch of Truth, a&s;well by the pu|rity of its Doctrine, as the integrity of their Manners. It is reported, that <HI>Solon</HI> travelling in <HI>Egypt</HI> found there a Philo&s;opher of the Country, who told him with a certain air of Authority, <HI>The Grecians,</HI> Solon, <HI>are but Children.</HI> Which happened to be but too true, in regard of the Heathens, when Chri|&s;tian Philo&s;ophy began to &s;pread abroad
<PB N="39" REF="25">its light into the world: becau&s;e hu|mane Rea&s;on appeared in all its weak|ne&s;s, before the beams of that divine brightne&s;s of Faith. But they who brought Philo&s;ophy in greate&s;t vogue among the Chri&s;tians, whether by their works, or the publick profe&s;&s;ion they made thereof, were <HI>Ari&s;tides,</HI> one of the mo&s;t learned of tho&s;e that flouri&s;h|ed at <HI>Alexandria</HI> under the Emperour <HI>Adrian, Ju&s;tin Martyr, Tatian, Athe|nagoras, Barde&s;anes, Athenogenes, Apol|linaris</HI> Bi&s;hop of <HI>Hieropolis, Melito</HI> Bi|&s;hop of <HI>Sardis,</HI> S. <HI>Irenaeus</HI> whom <HI>Ter|tullian</HI> calls a man ver&s;ed in all Sciences; <HI>Tertullian</HI> him&s;elf, who was obliged to &s;tudy Philo&s;ophy to de|fend Religion, which in the minds of the Pagans pa&s;&s;ed for a Sect of Philo|&s;ophy; <HI>Panthenus,</HI> who explained the Catechi&s;m to Chri&s;tians in the School of <HI>Alexandria; Clement</HI> his Scholar, who having, through <HI>Greece</HI> and <HI>Egypt,</HI> in vain &s;ought the wi&s;dom of this world, learnt the wi&s;dom of Heaven, in the School of ble&s;&s;ed <HI>Panthenus;</HI> to who&s;e place he &s;ucceeded in that fa|mous
<PB N="40" REF="26">Chair of the Chri&s;tian Schools; <HI>Origen,</HI> who &s;ucceeded to <HI>Clement,</HI> and who, that he might refute the Philo&s;o|pher <HI>Cel&s;us,</HI> learned all the Opinions that were taught at that time; <HI>Lactan|tius,</HI> who was ignorant of nothing of all the Sects of Philo&s;ophers; <HI>Arno|bius,</HI> who with &s;o great judgment wrote again&s;t the Gentiles; S. <HI>Gregory Nazi|anzen,</HI> of whom <HI>Eu&s;ebius</HI> &s;peaks with &s;o many Elogies; <HI>Ammonius,</HI> who was e&s;teemed by the Pagan Philo&s;ophers, and who was the fir&s;t that taught Chri&s;tians the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> To the&s;e great men, may be added S. <HI>Ba&s;il,</HI> who was the greate&s;t Dialecti|cian of his time, in the opinion of <HI>Gre|gory Thaumaturgus;</HI> S. <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tom,</HI> who became as great a Philo&s;opher as he was an Orator; S. <HI>Augu&s;tine,</HI> who, be|&s;ides the three Books he wrote again&s;t the <HI>Platonicks,</HI> made a Treati&s;e of Dia|lectick, which is to be found in the fir&s;t Volume of his Works. I could name a great many more, who adorn|ed that time with the lu&s;tre of their knowledge, authori&s;ing the Religion
<PB N="41" REF="26">which they preached by the purity of their lives; and making the drye&s;t Thorns of Philo&s;ophy fructifie by the &s;acred &s;treams of their Doctrine.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="15" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XV.</HEAD>
<P>From this Sun-&s;hine of Philo&s;ophy which at that time appeared, by the emulation of the Chri&s;tians and Pa|gans, men fell &s;ince into a gro&s;s air of barbarity and ignorance, which can|not be &s;ufficiently lamented. It was in tho&s;e wretched times, when the <HI>Huns, Vandals, Goths,</HI> and <HI>Longobards</HI> broke in upon <HI>Italy.</HI> That di&s;order began by the burning of the Biblio|theck of the Emperours, which hap|pened at <HI>Con&s;tantinople,</HI> under the Em|pire of <HI>Zeno;</HI> wherein Philo&s;ophy and the other Sciences were much concern|ed, by the lo&s;s of more than &s;ix&s;core thou&s;and Volumes. The <HI>Arabians</HI> ha|ving rendred them&s;elves Ma&s;ters of the world, by their Conque&s;ts in the fol|lowing Ages, made a kind of revolu|tion in Learning a&s;well as in the Em|pire. The nature of their genius, which was &s;ubtil, plodding, and profound,
<PB N="42" REF="27">and tied them too literally to the Text of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> made them follow a kind of ab&s;tract rea&s;oning, which did &s;omewhat deviate from the &s;olidity of the <HI>Greeks</HI> and <HI>Latines;</HI> and though there ap|peared much &s;ubtilty in that way, yet it mu&s;t be acknowledged, that that new &s;train of Rea&s;on &s;eemed fal&s;e, by the mi&s;takes whereinto <HI>Avicenna, Al|kindus, Algazel, Averroes, Alpharabius, Alboha&s;en,</HI> and &s;ome others fell, of whom <HI>Po&s;&s;evin</HI> in the third Book of his Bibliotheck relates the Errours to an enormous number. <HI>Ludovicus Vives</HI> &s;peaking of the Metaphy&s;icks of <HI>Avi|cenna,</HI> and the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Aver|roes,</HI> pretends that both look like the raveries of a wandring imagination, and the Vi&s;ions of the Alcoran. And <HI>Thomas Aquinas</HI> in one of his <HI>Opu&s;cles</HI> &s;ays, that <HI>Averroes</HI> was not &s;o much a follower of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> which he pro|fe&s;&s;es, as a corrupter of his Doctrine. But be&s;ides that, under the <HI>Arabians</HI> Philo&s;ophy became nice and full of quirks, by the&s;e preci&s;ions and ab|&s;tracted Notions which it introduced
<PB N="43" REF="27">into the Schools: It became al&s;o whol|ly barbarous in its expre&s;&s;ions; Rea|&s;on, if I may &s;o &s;ay, having unlearned to &s;hew it &s;elf under rational terms. It mu&s;t be granted however, that the <HI>Arabians,</HI> by the quality of their geni|us, and through the lei&s;ure which the pro&s;perity of their Arms and Plenty afforded them, did &s;o apply them&s;elves to the &s;tudy of the Mathematicks and Philo&s;ophy, that they became in that time the learnede&s;t men in the world. And <HI>Averroes</HI> by the depth of his plodding genius, and the &s;tudy of <HI>A|ri&s;totle,</HI> de&s;erved to be called his Com|mentator, and founded a Sect of Phi|lo&s;ophers under his own name; who oppo&s;ed them&s;elves to <HI>Aphrodi&s;eus, Philoponus,</HI> and the re&s;t of the <HI>Greci|ans.</HI> Neverthele&s;s as <HI>Averroes</HI> under|&s;tood not <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> but by a Tran&s;lation not very exact, he fell him&s;elf into &s;o horrible perver&s;ions of his &s;en&s;e, that <HI>Bagolinus</HI> a Philo&s;opher of <HI>Verona, Zi|mara,</HI> and <HI>Mantinus</HI> in vain a&s;&s;ayed to correct him. For <HI>Vives</HI> &s;ayes, that he read only a ba&s;e Latin Tran&s;lation of
<PB N="44" REF="28">the Text of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> whereof he made another into <HI>Arabick</HI> &s;till wor&s;e. The truth is, that be&s;ides the unfaithful Co|pies, which the <HI>Arabians</HI> had of <HI>Ari&s;to|tle</HI>'s Text, as <HI>Vives</HI> and <HI>Po&s;&s;evin</HI> a&s;&s;ures us; it is thought, that the <HI>Genius</HI> of the <HI>Arabian</HI> Language is &s;o different from the <HI>Greek</HI> Tongue, that the one can hardly exhau&s;t the &s;en&s;e of the other, to make a Faithful Tran&s;lation: for with &s;ome proportion it may be &s;aid of all the re&s;t of the <HI>Arabians,</HI> what <HI>Caelius Rhodiginus</HI> &s;ayes of <HI>Avicenna, Avicenna linguae graecae ignarus cum li|bros Ari&s;totelis mutilos perver&s;o&s;&abque; lege|ret, autorem eminenti&s;&s;imum minus con|&s;equi potuit. Picus Mirandula</HI> &s;ayes, that <HI>Averroes</HI> &s;tuck to the &s;tudy of <HI>A|ri&s;totle,</HI> and <HI>Avicenna</HI> to <HI>Plato,</HI> which oca&s;ioned the Oppo&s;ition of Opini|ons that are to be found betwixt them. After all, they were both great Men, and of extraordinary e&s;teem among&s;t the Learned.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="16" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XVI.</HEAD>
<P>The School-men, who all addicted them&s;elves to the Doctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI>
<PB N="45" REF="28">and formed their minds by the &s;tudy of the <HI>Arabiaus,</HI> from whom they took that &s;ubtile and nice Spirit, which &s;ince &s;lipt into the Schools, made the la&s;t Sect of Philo&s;ophers, which hath been in any reputation. <HI>Thomas A|quinas</HI> is pretended to have been the founder of that Sect, for having read <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in a Tran&s;lation of <HI>Averroes</HI> made by a <HI>Spaniard,</HI> he took from it the Method, which <HI>Lanfranc</HI> Arch|bi&s;hop of <HI>Canterbury, Gilbert Porre|tain</HI> Bi&s;hop of <HI>Poictiers, Abelard,</HI> and <HI>Peter Lombard,</HI> had already rough|hewn upon the Idea that <HI>Dama&s;cenus</HI> had framed thereof: and whereof <HI>Peter Come&s;tor</HI> compo&s;ed the fir&s;t Ele|ments, for they were great Dialectici|ans. <HI>Danaeus</HI> in his <HI>Prolegomena</HI> upon the fir&s;t of the Sentences, hath written the beginnings of the Schola&s;tick Phi|lo&s;ophy, which may be &s;aid to have had three different periods, as is report|ed of the School of <HI>Plato;</HI> the an|cient, the middle and the new Scho|la&s;tick. The fir&s;t, which had it's be|ginning under the Archbi&s;hop of <HI>Can|terbury,</HI>
<PB N="46" REF="29">or to &s;ay better, under <HI>Pet<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> Lombard,</HI> la&s;ted almo&s;t two hundre<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> years, and ended under <HI>Albertus Mag<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> nus. Lombard</HI> &s;oiled much the purity<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1 span"> Theology, by many unprofitable que|&s;tions, wherewith he perplexed it <HI>Alexander Ale&s;ius</HI> was the mo&s;t con&s;i|derable of the&s;e fir&s;t School-men. Th<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> &s;econd began with <HI>Albertus Magnus</HI> Bi&s;hop of <HI>Rati&s;bonne,</HI> the va&s;te&s;t <HI>Geni<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"></HI> of the&s;e Ages, in the Judgment o<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> <HI>Trithemus,</HI> and continued until <HI>Du|randus:</HI> and during that &s;pace of a|bout an hundred years, the Doctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was rai&s;ed to the highe&s;t pitch of its reputation, by the vogue that <HI>Thomas Aquinas</HI> and <HI>John Duns</HI> a Scoti&s;h-man gave it. The&s;e were the two Spirits of greate&s;t capacity for Phi|lo&s;ophy in the&s;e la&s;t Ages. No Man ever rea&s;onned with more ju&s;tne&s;s and exactne&s;s than <HI>Thomas Aquinas:</HI> Soli|dity was his chief character, as &s;ub|tility that of <HI>Scotus.</HI> They both made them&s;elves &s;o famous by their learning, that they became the heads of two the mo&s;t celebrated Sects that ever were;
<PB N="47" REF="29">and had it not been for the mi&s;ery of their times, wherein barbarity reigned, they would have been comparable to the greate&s;t Philo&s;ophers of Antiqui|ty. The third Age of School-Philo&s;o|phy began with <HI>Durandus,</HI> who to get reputation, did ri&s;e again&s;t <HI>Thomas A|quinas,</HI> but with little &s;ucce&s;s, and la&s;ted till <HI>Gabriel Biel</HI> a <HI>German,</HI> the compiler of other Philo&s;ophers, who expre&s;&s;ed ill, what he conceived indiffe|rently well; for there is a dulne&s;s in his expre&s;&s;ion, that renders him dry and har&s;h. Then did the Wits &s;ubti|lize more and more by an emulation of being Nominali&s;ts or Reali&s;ts. <HI>Ocham</HI> was the chief of the Nominali&s;ts, who taught that Beings Univer&s;al were but words, and <HI>Scotus</HI> leader of the Rea|li&s;ts, who taught that the &s;ame Uni|ver&s;al beings were real things. And as that age was infected with that naughty air which corrupted the Schools; &s;o the animo&s;ity of the&s;e two Sects hurried mens minds into &s;uch ex|tremities, as cannot be paralell'd in an|tiquity; for in <HI>Germany</HI> they waged
<PB N="48" REF="30">&s;uch War together, as broke &s;ome|times out into extravagancy an<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> rage. It was no more di&s;puting in th<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> Univer&s;ities, but downright fighting and opinions were only defended by violence. Then it was that Philo|&s;ophy was wholly taken up about th<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> operations of the mind, conceptions and preci&s;ions: the wits drained thei<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> rea&s;ons with frivolous que&s;tions: Me<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> fell into heats for bare and pure forma|lities, rai&s;ed to them&s;elves Phanta&s;ms, and Di&s;putations; Rea&s;on became li|tigious and tricki&s;h to maintain it &s;elf, and truth was almo&s;t nothing el&s;e but the price of the di&s;pute. This was called Wit, but was it &s;o? In this me|thod were compo&s;ed heaps of idle Books and Opinions, which &s;tifled all that remained of a good reli&s;h for Let|ters. Neverthele&s;s, that Schola&s;tick Air, how dry &s;oever it was, appeared mo&s;t &s;olid and proper to overthrow fal&s;hood: error and impo&s;ture could not endure its &s;plendour; and the &s;harpne&s;s, animo&s;itie, and pa&s;&s;ion, which was then to be found in di&s;putes,
<PB N="49" REF="30">was not &s;o much the fault of the Schools, as of tho&s;e that abu&s;ed them.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="17" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XVII.</HEAD>
<P>There were notwith&s;tanding in the&s;e Ages three Philo&s;ophers, who by a &s;pirit of novelty took their flight out of the Schools, and devi&s;ed a method quite different from what was in u&s;e: the&s;e were <HI>Reymund Lully, Cardan,</HI> and <HI>Paracel&s;us,</HI> who with very different Notions were all three of a Character not much different. <HI>Reymund Lully</HI> by the commerce which he entertained with the <HI>Arabians,</HI> became very skil|ful in Medicine, Natural Philo&s;ophy and A&s;tronomy: And of the&s;e three Sciences he made a fourth, the Art of Chymi&s;try, whereof in <HI>Spain</HI> and <HI>Italy</HI> he was the Re&s;torer. He endeavoured to overturn the order e&s;tabli&s;hed in the Schools, by reducing Philo&s;ophy and other Sciences to a method, that has nothing of &s;olidity, and which is &s;o far from making men learned, that it could never make one rea&s;onable. <HI>Car|dan</HI> is a va&s;t and irregular head that offers at all without di&s;tinction; and
<PB N="50" REF="31">fixes on nothing: What he &s;ays him|&s;elf of his familiar &s;pirit, which he be|lieves to be made up of <HI>Saturn</HI> and <HI>Mercury</HI> is &s;o fooli&s;h, that one cannot read him in cold blood without laugh|ter: And what he adds el&s;ewhere, that that &s;pirit did not communicate it &s;elf to him but in dreams, is &s;till more ex|travagant. It is he who hath in the&s;e la&s;t Ages revived all that &s;ecret Philo|&s;ophy of the Cabal and Cabali&s;ts which fills the world with &s;pirits, to which he pretends that men may be|come like, purifying them&s;elves by Philo&s;ophy. But <HI>Paracel&s;us</HI> who had the air more of an Operator than Phi|lo&s;opher, is the mo&s;t extravagant of all: For he fancied to him&s;elf to make a new Philo&s;ophy, a new art of Medi|cine, and a new Religion; of his own head making him&s;elf, by a ridiculous neutrality, the Mediator between the Pope and <HI>Luther,</HI> that he might bring them both to his Maxims. <HI>Gohory</HI> was his fir&s;t Follower in <HI>France,</HI> a very &s;u|perficial Naturali&s;t, but a great Di&s;til|ler. <HI>Paracel&s;us</HI> had a deep wit, a dull
<PB N="51" REF="31">and ob&s;cure expre&s;&s;ion; all his words were Riddles, and his di&s;cour&s;es My&s;te|ries. <HI>Rullandus</HI> a <HI>German</HI> Phy&s;ician made a Dictionary of his terms, with which one cannot yet under&s;tand him. <HI>Paracel&s;us</HI> re-e&s;tabli&s;hed Chymi&s;try in <HI>Germany:</HI> The Emperour <HI>Charles</HI> the Fifth heard him; but upon the propo|&s;ition that he made to enrich him by Chymi&s;try, called him an Enthu&s;ia&s;t. To the&s;e three Philo&s;ophers may be ad|ded <HI>Cornelius Agrippa, Arnoldus de villa nova, Peter</HI> of <HI>Apono, Bacon,</HI> and &s;ome other Cabali&s;ts, of whom <HI>Agrip|pa</HI> him&s;elf &s;peaks in his Epi&s;tle to the Abbot <HI>Trithemius.</HI> But all that Philo|&s;ophy can &s;erve for no other end, but to lead men into extravagancy and il|lu&s;ion; becau&s;e it &s;eems to di&s;gui&s;e un|der the veil of Natural Knowledge, what is mo&s;t black and horrid in Ma|gick. About that time <HI>Reuchlin</HI> en|deavoured to revive in <HI>Germany</HI> the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> as <HI>Marcil|ius Ficinus</HI> had in <HI>Italy</HI> re-e&s;tabli&s;hed the Doctrine of <HI>Plato.</HI> The&s;e were the Di&s;tempers of tho&s;e Ages: Of
<PB N="52" REF="32">which the different ta&s;ts for Philo&s;o|phy, the diver&s;ity of &s;entiments, and the in&s;tability of &s;pirits that is to be &s;een at that time, &s;hews &s;ufficiently the weakne&s;s.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="18" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XVIII.</HEAD>
<P>In fine, &s;eeing the love of Learning, and e&s;pecially of Philo&s;ophy, became confined to <HI>Europe,</HI> the different Nati|ons thereof applyed them&s;elves vari|ou&s;ly to it, according to the diver&s;ity of their genius's and inclinations. The <HI>Spaniards</HI> according to the Character of their Wits, cut out for Dialectick and Reflexions, became &s;ubtle in their Rea&s;onings, Formali&s;ts and Metaphy|&s;icians. The <HI>Italians</HI> took a more a|greeable air, they grew for mo&s;t part curious in lovely Ideas; the Works of <HI>Triphus</HI> one of the learned of the la&s;t Ages, in&s;pired into them love for the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Ari&s;totle;</HI> and the Books of Cardinal <HI>Be&s;&s;arion</HI> and <HI>Marcilius Fi|cinus</HI> gave them an inclination for the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Plato,</HI> to which they accommodated them&s;elves better than other Nations, by the quality of their
<PB N="53" REF="32">fine genius, naturally quick but lazie. The <HI>French,</HI> who found them&s;elves ca|pable of all Sciences, embraced all; and by that Character of Capacity and Curio&s;ity, copied what they found good among&s;t other Nations, and &s;uc|ceeded in every thing. The <HI>Engli&s;h,</HI> by that depth of Wit which is com|mon to their Nation, loved the Me|thods that were profound, ab&s;tru&s;e, and far-&s;ought; and by a head-&s;trong application to labour, &s;et them&s;elves to the ob&s;ervation of Nature more than other Nations: as appears by the Works which they have publi&s;hed. The <HI>Germans,</HI> by the nece&s;&s;ity which the Climat impo&s;ed upon them to keep them&s;elves by the fire, and by the conveniency of their Stoves, addicted them&s;elves to Chymi&s;try; as did other Northern people: So that the Southern Countries contributed to make Philo|&s;ophy profound and &s;ubtle, and the Northern to render it labourious and mechanical. And of all the modern Philo&s;ophers, tho&s;e that have made greate&s;t noi&s;e, are <HI>Galilaeus</HI> an <HI>Italian,
<PB N="54" REF="33">Bacon, Hobbes,</HI> and <HI>Boile</HI> Engli&s;h, <HI>Ga&s;|&s;endus</HI> and <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> French, and <HI>Van|helmont</HI> Dutch-man. <HI>Galileus</HI> &s;eems to be the mo&s;t ingenious of all; and he I think may be called the Father of Modern Philo&s;ophy. His Method re|&s;embles much that of the <HI>Platoni&s;ts,</HI> his Stile is plea&s;ant; and by his man|ner of Writing he conceals many de|fects: though he hath copied many things from the Primitive Philo&s;ophers, yet all &s;eems to be his own, and he is taken for the original in &s;everal places, where he is but the tran&s;criber. <HI>Bacon</HI> has a ranging wit which dives not deep into any thing; his too great reach hinders him from being exact, the mo&s;t part of his &s;entiments are ra|ther Overtures for meditation, than Maxims to be followed: His Opinions are &s;omewhat &s;ubtile and &s;parkling; and if they be rightly con&s;idered, they re&s;emble more &s;parks of fire, than an entire and natural light. <HI>Hobbes</HI> is ob|&s;cure without delight, &s;ingular in his Notions, learned, but not very &s;olid, and incon&s;tant in his Doctrine; for
<PB N="55" REF="33">he is &s;ometimes <HI>Epicurean,</HI> &s;ometimes Peripatetick. <HI>Boile</HI> is exact in his Ob|&s;ervations; no man in <HI>Europe</HI> hath en|riched Philo&s;ophy with &s;o many Expe|riments as he; he rea&s;ons upon his Ex|periments with indifferent good con|&s;equence, which after all are not al|ways unque&s;tionable; becau&s;e his prin|ciples are not always certain: he is in a word, an able Philo&s;opher and great Naturali&s;t. <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus,</HI> who de&s;ired on|ly to pa&s;s for the Re&s;torer of the Phi|lo&s;ophy of <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Epicurus,</HI> &s;peaks little of his own head; there is nothing almo&s;t in him but the beauty of &s;tile, that may give him the credit of an admirable Author: To refute his Natural Philo&s;ophy there needs no more but the Arguments of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> again&s;t <HI>Democritus</HI> and his Di&s;ciples. <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> is one of the mo&s;t extraordi|nary genius's that hath appeared in the&s;e la&s;t times; one of a fertile wit and profound meditation: the conca|tenation of his Doctrine reaches his point, the order of it is well devi&s;ed according to his principles; and his
<PB N="56" REF="34">Sy&s;teme, though made up of the an|cient and modern, is well dige&s;ted. The truth is, he teaches men too much to doubt, and that is no good model for &s;pirits naturally incredulous: but in fine, he is more original than o|thers. <HI>Vanhelmont,</HI> through the know|ledge which he had of Nature after hi<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> way, performed &s;uch prodigious things by his Remedies, that he was put in|to the Inqui&s;ition, upon &s;u&s;picion that what he did was above the power o<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> Nature. In a word, <HI>Galileus</HI> is the mo&s;t agreeable of the Moderns, <HI>Bacon</HI> the mo&s;t &s;ubtle, <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> the mo&s;t learned, <HI>Hobbes</HI> the mo&s;t plodding and thoughtful, <HI>Boile</HI> the mo&s;t curious, <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> the mo&s;t ingenious, and <HI>Van|helmont</HI> the greate&s;t Naturali&s;t, but too much wedded to <HI>Paracel&s;us.</HI> The mo&s;t univer&s;al method of his Philo|&s;ophy, is the &s;ympathy and antipathy of Simples and mixt Bodies, which he well under&s;tood.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="19" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XIX.</HEAD>
<P>Upon the retail of all the&s;e notions of Ancient and Modern Philo&s;ophy, and
<PB N="57" REF="34">upon the different character of both, this compari&s;on may be made. The Ancient Philo&s;ophy is more founded on authority, and the Modern on expe|rience; the Ancient is &s;imple and na|tural, the Modern artificial and elabo|rate; the former is more mode&s;t and grave, the latter more imperious and pedantick. The ancient is peaceable and calm; for it was &s;o far from di&s;|puting, that it would have the minds of Youth prepared by the Mathema|ticks, that they might be accu&s;tomed to &s;ubmit to demon&s;tration without he&s;itation: the modern is of a &s;train of di&s;puting of every thing, and of train|ing up Youth to noi&s;e and the tumult of the School. The Ancient inquires only into truth out of a &s;incere de&s;ire to find it: the Modern takes plea&s;ure to di&s;pute it, even when it is di&s;cover|ed. The one advances more &s;ecurely in its method, becau&s;e it hath alwayes the Metaphy&s;icks for a guide: the o|ther is un&s;ure in its &s;teps when it is once deprived of that conduct. Con|&s;tancy, Fidelity, &s;ound Judgment, and
<PB N="58" REF="35">Stedfa&s;tne&s;s, was that which men called Philo&s;ophy in the dayes of <HI>Plato.</HI> And the di&s;like of bu&s;ine&s;s, peevi&s;hne&s;s, the renouncing of plea&s;ures when the u&s;e of them is lo&s;t through the extinction of pa&s;&s;ions, I know not what Autho|rity that is derived from the Gray|beard, counterfeit audacity, phleg|matick &s;ullenne&s;s, moderation, and all that Wi&s;dom which &s;prings from the weakne&s;s of Age and Con&s;titution, is the Philo&s;ophy of a great many now-a-dayes. The Ancient is univer&s;ally more learned, it aims at all: and the Modern confines it &s;elf to the &s;ole con|&s;ideration of nature, re&s;ting &s;atisfied to be a mere Naturali&s;t. In fine, the Ancient is more addicted to &s;tudy, more laborious and indefatigable in what it undertakes; for the Primitive Philo&s;ophers &s;pent their lives in &s;tudy: the Modern is le&s;s con&s;tant in its ap|plication, more &s;uperficial in its pains, and more precipitate in its &s;tudies. And this precipitation accu&s;tomes it by little and little to ground too ea&s;ily, rea&s;on|ings not very exact, upon uncertain
<PB N="59" REF="35">rumours, te&s;timonies of little credit, and upon experiments not well agreed upon. It pronounces boldly upon doubts and uncertainties, to &s;atisfie in &s;ome manner the eagerne&s;s that it &s;ome|times hath to vent its imaginations, and to give vogue to novelties: &s;o that to make a deci&s;ion between both, I am of the Opinion of that intelligent Philo&s;opher of the&s;e la&s;t Ages, who all things being well con&s;idered was of the mind to &s;tick to the Ancients, and leave the Moderns to them&s;elves: for the plain common &s;en&s;e of the Primi|tive Philo&s;ophers, is preferable to all the art and quaintne&s;s of the new. But let us conclude without prejudice, that as from what Cloud &s;oever the day breaks out, it &s;hould be accounted plea&s;ant; &s;o from what part &s;oever truth comes, it ought to be e&s;teemed. Let us no more di&s;tingui&s;h ancient rea|&s;on from new, becau&s;e on what &s;ide &s;oever we behold it, and what colour &s;oever we give it, it is alwayes the &s;ame. And let us make this reflexion, that if there be &s;ome Opinions better received
<PB N="60" REF="36">by the publick than others, it is b<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> &s;ometimes becau&s;e their Cabals hav<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> been more powerful, or their Stars mor<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> favourable.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="20" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XX.</HEAD>
<P>There are therefore two extremities to be avoided, in the cour&s;e that is to to be held between the Ancient and Modern Philo&s;ophers. The fir&s;t is o<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> tho&s;e who out of a good Opinion which they have of them&s;elves, find nothing comparable to their own Age: the Zeal which they have to free them&s;elves from the Tyranny, which the Authority of the Ancients have u|&s;urped over mens minds, is a fal&s;e Zeal: that is the way to impo&s;e new Laws on Rea&s;on, under pretext of giv|ing it liberty. And all the&s;e fair pre|cepts which men give us to &s;hake off the prejudices of Education, Cu&s;tome, Authority, and to cure our &s;elves of po|pular anticipations, are but Snares laid for our credulity: they &s;peak to us only of liberty, to impo&s;e upon us a new Yoke. It is only to give to the Moderns, what Men would take
<PB N="61" REF="36">from the Ancients; and to de&s;troy the credit of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> to &s;et up the reputa|tion of <HI>De&s;cartes:</HI> but is it ju&s;t to de|&s;pi&s;e tho&s;e whom all antiquity have re|&s;pected? Tradition alone and the U|niver&s;al Con&s;ent of all people, might oblige us to do Ju&s;tice to tho&s;e great Men, who have been the Founders of Sciences; for the World is a great A&s;|&s;embly, wherein every Age has its Vote; and to know who is preferable in the Judgment we pa&s;s on men, we mu&s;t look on tho&s;e who have de&s;er|ved from the Publick the mo&s;t Univer|ver&s;al Approbation. None but &s;uper|ficial minds can be plea&s;ed with Novel|ties. He that is &s;olidly wi&s;e, is not &s;urpri&s;ed at the lu&s;tre of Noveltie; he adheres only to what is e&s;tabli&s;hed by the &s;uffrage of the Ancients, as the Prophet hath it. Is it po&s;&s;ible that &s;o many Ages, &s;o many Great-Wits, &s;o much Application, and &s;o many Works, have been able to produce no|thing that is tolerable, &s;aith <HI>Cicero?</HI> So that if we compare our &s;elves with the great men of the fir&s;t Ages, let us
<PB N="62" REF="37">not decide ra&s;hly in our own favour we are partial Judges, it is the part po&s;terity to give their verdict there<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> Let us but ca&s;t our eyes on the ag<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> pa&s;t, and that will teach us mode&s;t The&s;e great Men, be&s;ides the extraor<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters">|nary <HI>genius</HI> they had for Sciences, &s;pe<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> their lives in continual pains, with<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1 span"> docility of Spirit without exampl<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> <HI>Pythagoras</HI> was a Schollar fifty yea<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> under the greate&s;t Ma&s;ters of the world <HI>Eu&s;ebius</HI> &s;ayes that <HI>Democritus</HI> &s;tudie<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> four&s;core years. <HI>Parmenides</HI> hid him|&s;elf eighteen years in a Cave, there t<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> meditate on Logick. <HI>Plato</HI> was th<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> Di&s;ciple of <HI>Socrates, Archytas</HI> and <HI>Eurytus,</HI> above forty years. <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;tudied under <HI>Plato</HI> more than twenty years. And &s;hall we, for&s;ooth, after two years &s;light &s;tudy, under very ordinary Ma&s;ters, pretend to compare with the&s;e great men!</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="21" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXI.</HEAD>
<P>The other extremity to be avoided is the pertinacious adhering to the An|tients &s;ometimes without Rea&s;on: Men make an Idol of their Authority by a
<PB N="63" REF="37">blind prejudicated per&s;wa&s;ion of their merit. Such was the head-&s;trongne&s;s of <HI>george</HI> of <HI>Trabi&s;ond,</HI> who made a Book to prove the conformity of <HI>A|ri&s;totle</HI> with the holy Scriptures: and of <HI>Marcilius Ficinus</HI> who pretends that <HI>Plato</HI> knew the my&s;tery of the Trinity. For which <HI>Medina</HI> a <HI>Spani&s;h</HI> Divine condemns him of boldne&s;s in|jurious to the purity of our Religion, which contains nothing but what is &s;u|pernatural. <HI>Hermolaus Barbarus</HI> was yet more whim&s;ical in his cleaving to the Doctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle:</HI> that learned man by an horrible Cata&s;trophe of his Wits rai&s;ed the Devil, that he might learn the true &s;en&s;e of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> about a Term which that Philo&s;opher u&s;ed, and whereof the &s;ignification &s;eemed to him ambiguous. But the mo&s;t fan|ta&s;tical of all, was the Emperour <HI>Ju|lian;</HI> who, as <HI>Ammianus Marcellinus</HI> &s;aith, deba&s;ed the Grandeur of his Vertues, by playing the Philo&s;opher: he was cha&s;te, &s;ober, ju&s;t and vigi|lant; but by a ridiculous devotion to the Authority of the Ancient Philo&s;o|phers,
<PB N="64" REF="38">he preferred the Doctrine of <HI>Plato</HI> to that which St. <HI>Paul</HI> taught the <HI>Athenians;</HI> and by a fearful rambling, he gave him&s;elf over to all the curio&s;i|ties of an un&s;ettled mind. The haugh|ty wi&s;dom of Pagani&s;m hindred him from &s;ubmitting his rea&s;on to the wi&s;e follie of the Mi&s;tery of the Cro&s;s, which appeared to be beneath that Philo&s;ophy wherein he gloried: and becau&s;e he made that Philo&s;ophy his Religion, &s;o &s;oon as he was Ma&s;ter of his Opinions, by becoming Ma&s;ter of the World, he renounced the Doctrine of JESUS CHRIST, that he might embrace that of <HI>Pythagoras</HI> and <HI>Socrates,</HI> whereby he laboured to gain an extra|vagant reputation among the Philo&s;o|phers of his time; and by an abomina|ble vanity, would acknowledge no Gods, but &s;uch as owed their Divini|ty to his grant: &s;o much was his mind debauched by his &s;tubborn adherence to the Ancients. There is therefore a mean to be ob&s;erved between the An|cients and Moderns; the&s;e are to be re&s;pected without vilifying of tho&s;e.
<PB N="65" REF="38">So let us endeavour to di&s;cover new Truths, and not neglect the Ancient. Let us not overthrow things e&s;tabli&s;h|ed, to e&s;tabli&s;h things that are uncer|tain: let us pre&s;erve our liberty, and let us not lo&s;e the u&s;e of our rea&s;on, by a blind adoration of the &s;entiments either of the Ancients or Moderns: let us do Ju&s;tice to both; and let us value merit wherever it be, without minding whether it be old or new.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="22" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXII.</HEAD>
<P>But though a man may have his mind &s;ufficiently armed again&s;t the prejudices which ari&s;e from the Au|thority of the Ancients, and the incli|nation which he may have to the Mo|dern, yet hath he hardly ever the pow|er to &s;trip him&s;elf wholly of the natu|ral love which he hath for his own o|pinions. That is one of the great in|firmities of the mind of man; becau&s;e &s;elf-love believes nothing to be &s;o much its own as its Opinion: men look upon that as a Creature of their own, and renounce all other intere&s;ts to maintain this. Men are even &s;ome|times
<PB N="66" REF="39">&s;o opinionative and ob&s;tinate in defending their own conceits, that they run upon &s;trange extremities. The Di&s;ciples of <HI>Plato</HI> gave them&s;elves to be burnt for the Doctrine of their Ma|&s;ter; and the Followers of <HI>Hege&s;ias</HI> &s;uf|fered them&s;elves to dye of hunger, by &s;ticking too clo&s;ely to the Maxims of their School. <HI>Socrates,</HI> for all his wi&s;|dom, in cold blood gave his life to pre&s;erve his Opinion. And even in the&s;e la&s;t Ages there have been men &s;o fooli&s;h, as to become the Martyrs of their Doctrine: For Errour hath its Votaries, &s;tricter than tho&s;e that Truth it &s;elf hath. Men have even &s;ome|times a &s;ecret vanity to authori&s;e by their &s;uffrage, what is not warranted by Rea&s;on; and blindly embrace Prin|ciples which they under&s;tand not, and whereof they are only fond, becau&s;e they are hard to be under&s;tood. The&s;e are the mo&s;t common illu&s;ions of &s;elf-love, which how ridiculous &s;oever it be in its other pa&s;&s;ions, yet is never &s;o much, as in its ob&s;tinacy to maintain its Notions. And as nothing is more
<PB N="67" REF="39">unrea&s;onable than what it wills; &s;o nothing is le&s;s maintainable than what it thinks. But the wor&s;t of extrava|gancies is, to be obdured again&s;t the torrent of publickly-received Opini|ons; and to admit of no other &s;enti|ments upon the &s;ubjects that are in hand, but a mans own private opinion: &s;uch men take pity to &s;ee others contra|ry to them&s;elves in judgment, becau&s;e they abound &s;o much in their own &s;en&s;e, that they ackowledge no other: this is the Character of &s;tinted minds. For in fine, the more merit there is &s;tedfa&s;tly to maintain true Rea&s;on, when once it is known; the more there is of Vertue to for&s;ake the wrong, when men are per&s;waded of its fal&s;|hood. That is a magnanimous inge|nuity, &s;aith <HI>Ari&s;totle:</HI> And it is a great|ne&s;s of Soul to retain its full liberty, by maintaining of truth and renoun|cing fal&s;hood, according to the diffe|rent views that one hath of both. Thus did <HI>Hippocrates</HI> acknowledge that he had been by fal&s;e Principles &s;ometime mi&s;taken in his Rea&s;onings. So great
<PB N="68" REF="40">mode&s;ty could not proceed but from a great capacity: and it is always a mark of judgment, to doubt of its own &s;uf|ficiency.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="23" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXIII.</HEAD>
<P>It is great knowledge to judge of things, according to the different degrees of certainty that they may have, to clear the truth of appearan|ces; to take that for Opinion, which is only but Opinion, and &s;o to di&s;tin|gui&s;h Judgments as one may give &s;ound Judgment of every thing. For the di&s;orders which &s;lip into the mind, by the various &s;entiments that pa&s;s in publick, &s;pring from this confu&s;ion of di&s;cerning. For example, <HI>Copernicus</HI> &s;huts him&s;elf up in his Clo&s;et, that he may frame a new Sy&s;teme of the World: he revives the Opinion of that <HI>Nicetas</HI> of <HI>Syracu&s;a,</HI> who taught that there was nothing in nature at re&s;t, but the Sun. He beats his brains to frame a new Opinion according to his fancy, and there is nothing better de|vi&s;ed than that Hypothe&s;is: however, would it be rea&s;onable to make the O|pinion
<PB N="69" REF="40">of that great man pa&s;s for a de|mon&s;tration? and without con&s;ulting the Univer&s;al con&s;ent of &s;o many Ages, who have gone before us, and who are of a contrary Opinion. Would it be ju&s;t to oblige all the World to be go|verned according to the imagination of <HI>Copernicus,</HI> and to make a private mans &s;entiment a Law to all the re&s;t of man|kind? <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> erects a new natural Philo&s;ophy, upon principles that are not altogether new. He calls his own Sy&s;teme him&s;elf a Chimera; for in that manner he di&s;cour&s;ed with his con|fidents, naming his Philo&s;ophy a <HI>Ro|mance:</HI> and men would have me e&s;|pou&s;e the Opinions, that he laughs at; is that rea&s;onable? I confe&s;s, I admire his Ideas, but am not &s;o &s;ubmi&s;&s;ive as to think them unque&s;tionable: and &s;o I return to my principle, which ought to be the rule of all the rea&s;onings in Philo&s;ophy, that one mu&s;t be frugal of his belief, that he may employ it, ac|cording to the different degrees of cer|tainty which he finds in the matters he examines; to the end that he may take nothing for a truth but what is true,
<PB N="70" REF="41">and think that only probable which is probable. In that con&s;i&s;ts all the pru|dence of the Wi&s;e-man, &s;aith <HI>Epicurus</HI> in <HI>Cicero:</HI> and it is a bad Character to act in an other manner; for things are often otherwayes than they appear, by the Opinion and Notion that men frame of them.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="24" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXIV.</HEAD>
<P>They are but fal&s;e mea&s;ures and de|ceitful notices, that make men deviate from the common ways of Philo&s;ophy, to &s;earch out extraordinary paths: and it is always a &s;ign of a depraved ta&s;te in Sciences not to love what is com|monly received by all the World: one is &s;ubject to wander, when he follows by-ways. It is even convenient in the conduct of life, to adhere only to com|mon Opinions: otherways a man ex|po&s;es him&s;elf to great ab&s;urdities. <HI>A|lexander</HI> for all his valour, having fail|ed in this principle, became worthy of contempt: He wept, &s;ays <HI>Plutarch,</HI> becau&s;e following the Opinion of <HI>De|mocritus,</HI> who made many Worlds, he had not as yet conquered the half of
<PB N="71" REF="41">one. That greatne&s;s of &s;oul which he makes appear by &s;o noble a &s;entiment becomes ridiculous, &s;aith <HI>Elianus;</HI> for it is grounded on a fal&s;e Foundation. So would a Magi&s;trate, who&s;e Life ought to &s;erve as a Model in a well-or|ordered State, be of little Judgment in the mind of <HI>Cicero,</HI> if in his conduct he followed the Opinion of <HI>Epicurus:</HI> and if in&s;tead of being &s;evere, he made appear ea&s;ine&s;s in his &s;entiments; for all the Coun&s;els of a publick per&s;on ought to be au&s;tere, to hold every one to his duty. To what purpo&s;e is it to pre&s;cribe rules to others to live in or|der, if he him&s;elf be irregular? <HI>If we did follow,</HI> &s;ayes that Orator, <HI>in our O|rations the&s;e &s;ingular Opinions of the</HI> Stoicks, <HI>who eye Glory and Ignominy after another manner than other people doe; becau&s;e they are not affected with either of the two: and if we would pro|po&s;e to the publick the opinion which the</HI> Porch <HI>teacheth of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil, no body would li&s;ten to us.</HI> And there is nothing more ab&s;urd, than the way that <HI>Cicero</HI> brings in <HI>Tor|quatus</HI>
<PB N="72" REF="42">&s;peaking in the Senate, upon the principles of <HI>Epicurus,</HI> who&s;e Do|ctrine he followed. There is in that di|&s;cour&s;e &s;ome quaint and delicate touch|es of Raillery: that Orator &s;eems de|lighted to declame again&s;t all other Phi|lo&s;ophies, but that which was in u&s;e, judging nothing more oppo&s;ite than that to true eloquence. It was that likewi&s;e which hindred <HI>Demo&s;thenes</HI> from embrace any Party, amid&s;t the ma|ny Sects which in his time &s;prung up at <HI>Athens;</HI> that he might not wander from the u&s;ual &s;entiments and common ways, which are fitte&s;t to per&s;wade. And for all that <HI>Julius Cae&s;ar</HI> was &s;o ambitious to be a great Philo&s;opher, yet he made it his only bu&s;ine&s;s to be|come popular, that he might the bet|ter gain upon the minds of the people. In fine, what-ever men &s;ay, one can hardly retain the Character of a wi&s;e|man, in deviating from the common opinions, nor of a publick &s;pirit by embracing private &s;entiments. And to extend this to all Profe&s;&s;ions, how &s;hould a Poet be laughed at, who, fol|lowing the opinion of <HI>Copernicus,</HI>
<PB N="73" REF="42">would make the Earth turn round the Sun: or who, according to the Sy&s;tem of <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> &s;hould never &s;peak of Stars or Con&s;tellations, without &s;peaking of whirlings and of &s;ubtile matter? how ridiculous &s;hould one be, what wit &s;o|ever he might have, with &s;o dainty principles!</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="25" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXV.</HEAD>
<P>Neverthele&s;s there is nothing now|adays more in u&s;e with Philo&s;ophers, and nothing bears greater rule than that kind of humour: For men &s;eek only to &s;et off their parts by new and extraordinary &s;entiments, and leave the way of common &s;en&s;e becau&s;e it is too much beaten. When one has got a more working brain than others, he falls on a fan&s;ie of &s;peaking that which other men never &s;aid. This whim&s;i|calne&s;s, as <HI>Cicero</HI> &s;ays, made <HI>Arce&s;ilas</HI> be taken for a &s;editious per&s;on, who overthrew the old Academy, to erect a new one. And <HI>Ramus,</HI> by that humour in the&s;e la&s;t Ages, was like to have de|&s;troyed the Univer&s;ity of <HI>Paris:</HI> For, that he might confute the fal&s;e <HI>Peripa|teticks,</HI>
<PB N="75" REF="43">he attacked the true; and to re&s;tore the Schools to peace, he be|came their di&s;turber: He was a learn|ed man, bold to decide; but natural|ly trouble&s;ome: he only imitated <HI>Lau|rentius Valla</HI> and <HI>Ludovicus Vives,</HI> two great Criticks in the former Age, that he might &s;et up for an Innovator. In fine, men often di&s;pute thus, only that by a fan&s;ie of innovation they may o|verthrow what is be&s;t e&s;tabli&s;hed. When men have not the power to make new Opinions, they find a way to give a new garb to the ancient; and that they may pa&s;s for Authors at any rate, begin the change of &s;enti|ments by the change of language: Men give new names, as <HI>Zeno</HI> did heretofore, to Opinions which are not new: and what do they not to &s;peak in a different &s;train from others, and to gain reputation at any rate what&s;o|ever? But &s;eeing the libertinage of &s;en|timents proceeds from the licentiou&s;|ne&s;s of manners, the mind &s;tands in need of barriers to keep it within bounds. Religion, Laws, Cu&s;tom,
<PB N="74" REF="43">Education, Puni&s;hments and Rewards, ought to &s;erve it for a Bridle when it begins to ramble; yet &s;ometimes it re|volts again&s;t all the&s;e: and when it hath once ca&s;t off the yoke, and runs out beyond the common Opinions, there is no kind of extravagancy that comes ami&s;s to it. This makes Laws nece&s;&s;ary: For Civil Authority ought to have a hand in regulating the &s;enti|ments of men who&s;e minds are natu|rally extravagant.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="26" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXVI.</HEAD>
<P>There are &s;ome minds naturally free in their &s;entiments, and others born &s;laves: The one &s;way the others by an a&s;cendant of birth, and the others &s;uf|fer them&s;elves to be governed through a weakne&s;s of wit; they are &s;o depen|dent through the quality of their ge|nius, that they are only fit to receive the impre&s;&s;ions that are given them, and to follow the motions that others in&s;pire into them. From this defect and weakne&s;s have &s;prung the different Sects of Philo&s;ophers: For as there are &s;ome &s;o bold as to rai&s;e them&s;elves a|bove
<PB N="76" REF="44">others, there are likewi&s;e ma<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> &s;o timorous and dependent, as to &s;u<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters">
|mit to them, and to entertain no op<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters">
|nion nor &s;entiment, but with a depe<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters">
|dance on their Ma&s;ters. There are a<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> &s;o &s;ome minds &s;o light and credulou<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> and who &s;o freely re&s;ign them&s;elves that the raveries of other men guid<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> their rea&s;on and conduct: the &s;pirit<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1 span"> bondage extends it &s;elf even to the<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> hearts and thoughts, becau&s;e they ar<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> too weak to retain the liberty of chu&s;|ing &s;entiments of their own. But what is more &s;trange, there are &s;ome|times ob&s;cure and &s;ullen &s;pirits, who&s;e notions are naturally perplexed and confu&s;ed, and yet are li&s;tened to like Oracles; and who gain a kind of Em|pire over mens minds, and no body can tell wherefore; unle&s;s it be that they are bolder and more po&s;itive in their deci&s;ions than others: and &s;uch blades procure authority only by pre|&s;umption and boldne&s;s. This was the way that <HI>Paracel&s;us</HI> got into vogue in the la&s;t Age: his affected ob&s;curity made him con&s;iderable: his credit was
<PB N="77" REF="44">built particularly on this, that he &s;pake not like other men, and that no body under&s;tood him: his confidence in playing the Ma&s;ter without Rea&s;on, won him di&s;ciples, and by that means his Doctrine received a my&s;terious air, which rai&s;ed him Followers. It is partly by that way al&s;o that <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> has got reputation: the entangled an|&s;wers which he makes to the difficul|ties that he forms to him&s;elf, are al|ways new difficulties which bu&s;ie the Reader: men take plea&s;ure to &s;ee them|&s;elves led from ob&s;curity to ob&s;curity, without knowing whither they are go|ing. Yet that Author does plea&s;e by that art, becau&s;e it is thereby that he &s;eems oraculous. His Interpreter that endeavoured to render him more intelligible, by a new explication of his Natural Philo&s;ophy which he publi&s;h|ed lately, hath robbed it of part of its beauty, by putting it in a plainer dre&s;s. Nothing &s;eems to give &s;o great &s;atis|faction in that admirable piece, as the trouble there is to under&s;tand it. That ob&s;cure &s;tile has &s;omewhat more my|&s;terious:
<PB N="78" REF="45">the quality of being inco<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> prehen&s;ible is a great charm to his D<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters">
|&s;ciples, who admire him more for that than for any thing be&s;ides. And tha<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> ob&s;curity is an art which &s;ome me<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> employ, and wherewith our blocki&s;<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters">
|ne&s;s is &s;atisfied.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="27" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXVII.</HEAD>
<P>Subtile and quick wits are not al|ways fitte&s;t for Philo&s;ophy. It were better to conden&s;e the imagination by &s;omething that is gro&s;s, than to &s;uffer it to evaporate in too quaint &s;peculati|ons. The plain common &s;en&s;e of <HI>So|crates</HI> triumphed over all the arts and quirks of the Sophi&s;ts. Philo&s;ophy be|comes only ab&s;tracted, when it leaves off to be &s;olid: men addict them&s;elves to formalities, when they have nothing that is real to &s;ay; and never think of betaking them&s;elves to &s;ubtilty, but when they are out of hopes to make Rea&s;on prevail by &s;implicity. That &s;ame <HI>Protagoras</HI> who was the fir&s;t that devi&s;ed captious Rea&s;onings, took that &s;ubtle way, becau&s;e his mind was &s;tuf|fed with nothing but fal&s;e Notions.
<PB N="79" REF="45">He was no true Philo&s;opher, &s;ayes <HI>Aulus Gellius,</HI> becau&s;e having rendered him&s;elf redoubtable by his arguments he became the greate&s;t jangler of the <HI>Sophi&s;ts.</HI> All was &s;poilt, &s;aith <HI>Seneca,</HI> by &s;triving too much to refine every thing. For to make a vain o&s;tentation of wit men left the e&s;&s;ential part of Sciences, began to weaken the truth of things by the artifice of words, and made u&s;e of Sophi&s;ms when they wanted &s;olid rea&s;ons. By this new art <HI>Nau&s;iphanes</HI> and <HI>Parmenides</HI> turned all things top&s;ie turvie. By this, <HI>Cle|antes, Chry&s;ippus,</HI> and the re&s;t of the <HI>Stoicks</HI> made their wi&s;e King an Effigy, whom they furni&s;hed with Titles of Nobility and Trea&s;ures, that con&s;i&s;ted only in fair words and magnificent ex|pre&s;&s;ions, as <HI>Cicero</HI> plea&s;antly upbraides them. So the Simplicity of rea&s;on was corrupted by the artifice of di&s;|cour&s;e: and men played with truth in|&s;tead of u&s;ing it with re&s;pect. This was the fault of the <HI>Spaniards</HI> of the la&s;t age: they did with Philo&s;ophy, as with policy, by the quality of their
<PB N="80" REF="46">Spirits born to reflexions, they drew them both out into unconceivable &s;ub|tilities; and there was not any Scho|lar who did not refine his Ma&s;ter. From whence happened a di&s;order like to that whereof <HI>Seneca</HI> complained heretofore: di&s;putation became all the fruit of Philo&s;ophy, and it was more made u&s;e of to try the wit than to cure the mind. Let us be &s;atisfied with the common wi&s;dom that is in u&s;e, and with the rea&s;on that we find in the Commerce of the World, with|out keeping &s;uch a &s;tir and making &s;o much ado: one runs a hazard of turn|ing Fool, when he would be otherwi&s;e; and there is nothing more unprofitable in the common conduct of life, than tho&s;e two exqui&s;ite Opinions which are made u&s;e of to &s;ubtilize in Scien|ces.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="28" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXVIII.</HEAD>
<P>Philo&s;ophy taken the wrong way hath &s;poiled a great many men, and that &s;tudy of wi&s;dom ill under&s;tood hath made a good many fools. <HI>Empe|docles</HI> had a lofty and high genius;
<PB N="81" REF="46"><HI>Lucretius</HI> compares him to the greate&s;t of the Ancients; but the vapours of Melancholy meeting with an over|&s;trained Application, and a too head|&s;trong &s;tudy, &s;o &s;ullied his imagination and altered his brain, that he became mad; and in the fit of his rage threw him&s;elf into Mount <HI>Aetna,</HI> where he was devoured by flames. <HI>Horace</HI> pre|tends that he endeavoured to render him&s;elf immortal by &s;uch a fair piece of boldne&s;s. <HI>Henry Cornelius Agrippa</HI> in the&s;e la&s;t Ages &s;o weakened his Spi|rit by reading of <HI>Plato,</HI> and by the Doctrine of the <HI>Platoni&s;ts,</HI> that he fell into extravagancy, as he him&s;elf con|fe&s;&s;es. <HI>Peter D'Apono</HI> a Phy&s;ician of <HI>Padua,</HI> who flouri&s;hed under <HI>Clement</HI> the Seventh, &s;o marred his imaginati|on by reading of the <HI>Arabian</HI> Philo&s;o|phers, and by too frequent meditation on the A&s;trology of <HI>Alfraganus,</HI> that he was put into the Inqui&s;ition, as having been &s;u&s;pected of Magick. <HI>Pom|ponatius</HI> and <HI>Cremoninus,</HI> the one Pro|fe&s;&s;or of Philo&s;ophy at <HI>Padua,</HI> and the other at <HI>Bolonia,</HI> became impious by
<PB N="82" REF="47">too immoderate &s;tudy of Philo&s;ophy, and left to po&s;terity the marks of their Extravagancy. They were Philo&s;o|phers who did injury to rea&s;on, by by making &s;o bad an u&s;e of it. It may be &s;aid al&s;o, that Libertinage was the mo&s;t u&s;ual effect which Philo&s;ophy produced in mo&s;t part of the Wits of that Age, and which rendred it odious. For by the wicked u&s;e that men made of it, they &s;poiled their Judgment, endeavouring to improve their rea&s;on. But to be &s;hort, if the mo&s;t regular wi&s;|dom of man is &s;ubject to &s;traying, what is to be expected from the fal&s;e glimp&s;es of an inordinate Philo&s;ophy, joyned to the weakne&s;s and extravagances of a brain-&s;ick head?</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="29" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXIX.</HEAD>
<P>It is no &s;mall progre&s;s in Philo&s;ophy, to have learnt how much ob&s;curity and uncertainty is mingled with our exact|e&s;t knowledge, and to be &s;atisfied to be ignorant of that which cannot be known. That is it which makes the knowing man &s;peak with trembling; his great capacity makes him the more
<PB N="83" REF="47">timorous, becau&s;e the light of his un|der&s;tanding di&s;covers to him more of the darkne&s;s of his mind: the greater his penetration is, the more it lets him &s;ee his own weakne&s;s, and obliges him to di&s;tru&s;t his &s;trength. That made <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;ay, that old men are more jealous and incredulous than others; becau&s;e the experience which they have of the uncertainty of things, ren|ders them more cautious and circum|&s;pect. <HI>Socrates</HI> could not conceive why the Oracle had called him the wi&s;e&s;t of men: he examined him&s;elf, and found nothing worthy of that elogy; unle&s;s perhaps that he was wi&s;e, becau&s;e he did not believe him|&s;elf to be &s;o: his knowledge &s;erved to make him the better under&s;tand his ignorance, which he frankly confe&s;|&s;ed. <HI>Epicurus</HI> was naturally wi&s;e, for he was a Philo&s;opher even in his plea&s;ures: He was &s;o &s;harp-&s;ighted, that his Brother <HI>Niocles</HI> &s;ays, in <HI>Plu|tarch,</HI> that Nature had a&s;&s;embled all the Atoms of knowledge and wi&s;dom, to compo&s;e his per&s;on; whil&s;t he him|&s;elf
<PB N="84" REF="48">&s;ays that he knows nothing. His Friends &s;tun him with acclamations and prai&s;es, and he minds them not. But be&s;ides that mode&s;ty which is the vertue of great men, there is a &s;age and di&s;creet ignorance, that in the con|duct of life can doubt of things, whereof no certainty can be had, and is willing not to know &s;uch things, whereof no knowledge is to be attain|ed, unle&s;s men would dive into that which is in&s;crutable. For Nature ha|ving re&s;erved to her &s;elf &s;ome certain &s;ecrets that are above our reach, it is great wi&s;dom to &s;hut our eyes, and not to pry into &s;uch My&s;teries. There is no truth but may appear fal&s;e, nor fal&s;hood which may not &s;eem true: and on this uncertainty is grounded the doubtfulne&s;s which the learned man &s;hows in his judgments. It is al&s;o to be acknowledged, that this circum|&s;pection is one of the great fruits that may be reaped from Philo&s;ophy. So that the opinion of tho&s;e Philo&s;ophers is to be e&s;teemed, who place the &s;u|preme knowledge of man and his true
<PB N="85" REF="48">rea&s;on, in acknowledging the weak|ne&s;s of his wit, and the uncertainty of his judgment: but when they deprive the &s;en&s;es of all credit, becau&s;e they may may be deceived, and doubt of every thing, becau&s;e they have ground to doubt of &s;ome things, they are not to be li&s;tned to. The&s;e are extremi|ties far contrary to true Philo&s;ophy, which only enjoyns moderation.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="30" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXX.</HEAD>
<P>But how much there is of folly to doubt of nothing, and to doubt of e|very thing: &s;o much there is of im|prudence to approve all, and to ap|prove nothing. To pre&s;erve the en|tire liberty of ones judgment, with|out being prepo&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed with fal&s;e Rea|&s;on, or pretended authority, is a &s;trength of mind whereof few are ca|pable. The proud man approves of nothing, for fear he &s;ubmit him&s;elf by approving of &s;omewhat; the light and &s;uperficial per&s;on approves every thing, that he may &s;pare him&s;elf the pains of examining what is propo&s;ed to him. To clo&s;e with every thing,
<PB N="86" REF="49">and to clo&s;e with nothing, are other extremities to be avoided by a wi&s;e man. The de&s;ign of that Proconful of <HI>Greece,</HI> who called together to his hou&s;e all the Philo&s;ophers of different Sects that were then in vogue at <HI>A|thens,</HI> that he might bring them to a|greement, appeared ridiculous to <HI>Pom|ponius Atticus:</HI> but the de&s;ign of that <HI>Arabian</HI> Philo&s;opher, who undertook to refute the opinions of all the other Philo&s;ophers, and to overthrow their Doctrine, by a Book written to that purpo&s;e, which he called <HI>The De&s;tru|ction of Philo&s;ophy,</HI> &s;eems to me more ridiculous. <HI>Averroes</HI> wrote a Confu|tation of that Book, which he calls, <HI>The De&s;truction of the De&s;truction,</HI> and which is one of the be&s;t of his pieces. For I look upon it to be the utmo&s;t point of extravagancy, con&s;idering the way that men live in the world, for one to &s;u&s;pend his judgment among&s;t &s;o many truths, and &s;o many fal&s;hoods univer&s;ally acknowledged, and to ap|ply him&s;elf to no &s;ide. There is like|wi&s;e weakne&s;s to follow only the &s;en|timents
<PB N="87" REF="49">of others, and to become a &s;lave to all their opinions: but it is a far more dangerous condition, to be hardened by a &s;pirit of pride, again&s;t that inclination which man naturally hath to be per&s;waded by rea&s;on and truth, &s;o as to believe nothing, and to doubt of every thing. I like not that blind &s;ubmi&s;&s;ion of the Di&s;ci|ples of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> who rea&s;oned no more after that he had &s;poken: his au|thority &s;erved them for rea&s;on. Tho&s;e imperious ways, which force men to yield, are fitter to overturn the mind, than to in&s;truct it. For, if we &s;peak properly, all the liberty that man hath, is his right to judge of things as he plea&s;es; and there is nothing that de|pends on him&s;elf but the u&s;e which he makes of his opinion. All the&s;e ex|ce&s;&s;es are blame-worthy in a Philo&s;o|pher, who ought to mind nothing, but to hear rea&s;on, and find out truth. It is true there are &s;ome &s;pirits, who &s;tand in need of exerci&s;e and nouri&s;h|ment that they may be employed: all goes well with them, even fal&s;e Noti|ons,
<PB N="88" REF="50">empty Imaginations, chimerical De&s;igns, and rather than have nothing to think on, they amu&s;e them&s;elves with the Vi&s;ions of others, their own heads having nothing to pre&s;ent them with for entertainment. From this Character men &s;tumble on another more pernicious, which is a levity in believing every thing. Let us avoid the&s;e extremities; let us examine what is doubtful, but let us give our a&s;&s;ent to what is true: let us never be impo|&s;ed upon by conjectures, but let us not re&s;i&s;t evidence; and let us above all things con&s;ult rea&s;on and common &s;en&s;e, which are the &s;ure&s;t means to attain to the knowledge of the truth.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="31" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXXI.</HEAD>
<P>When we &s;eriou&s;ly examine the mo|tives that incline mo&s;t part of Philo&s;o|phers to e&s;pou&s;e a Party in the Opini|ons which are publickly profe&s;&s;ed, we find in their conduct nothing le&s;s than Philo&s;ophy: For it is often without deliberation, without choice, before maturity of age, by chance, and even &s;ometimes without thinking on it, that
<PB N="89" REF="50">they cleave to an Opinion. As it com|monly happens to tho&s;e who come to be of a Sentiment, by the Cloaths they wear, by the Country they belong to, by the company they keep, by the in|tere&s;t of the cour&s;e of life they follow, by the Cabal that wheadles them, by the Croud that draws them along, by the Torrent that hurries them, and al|ways by any other Con&s;ideration than that of Rea&s;on and Prudence. Where|in they are like tho&s;e Philo&s;ophers, of whom <HI>Cicero</HI> &s;peaks drollingly; <HI>ad quamcun&abque; di&s;ciplinam qua&s;i tempe&s;tate delati, ad eam tanquam ad &s;axum ad|haere&s;cunt:</HI> who &s;tick to an Opinion, as men to&s;&s;ed in a &s;torm cleave to the Rock on which the tempe&s;t has ca&s;t them. By this means men &s;ubmit them&s;elves to the tyranny of prepo&s;|&s;e&s;&s;ion, becau&s;e they want &s;trength of di&s;cerning to &s;et them above preju|dices: they for&s;ake their own judg|ment, to be led by the fancies of ano|ther: they defend with heat, what they have undertaken without Rea|&s;on; and maintain ra&s;hly what they
<PB N="90" REF="51">have embraced incon&s;iderately. And when one is prepo&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed by a &s;enti|ment, he makes it a &s;en&s;ele&s;s point of honour to maintain a fooli&s;h opinion. It happens even &s;ometimes, that the animo&s;ity of Parties puts a &s;pirit into tho&s;e that have none; and that many times they have no other talent, nor other rea&s;on, but the bitterne&s;s where|by they are animated. To conclude, the&s;e ra&s;h and fortuitous embracings of the &s;entiments of others, look &s;o ridiculou&s;ly, that it were far better not at all to be a Philo&s;opher, than to be one of that &s;tamp. The choice that is to be made in the&s;e occa&s;ions, is to make none at all. For a Philo&s;ophy &s;o little founded on rea&s;on is but a mere debauchery of Wit, and real weak|ne&s;s.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="32" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXXII.</HEAD>
<P>Truth is now-a-dayes &s;o per&s;ecuted by all the di&s;gui&s;es of the Age, that men have not ingenuity enough to &s;peak candidly, or courage to be &s;incere. He mu&s;t be re&s;olute that would be a Philo|&s;opher in good earne&s;t. It is a great|ne&s;s
<PB N="91" REF="51">of &s;oul to &s;peak as one thinks, and think as one &s;peaks; as that <HI>Roman</HI> did, of whom <HI>Quintilian</HI> &s;peaks, <HI>Scias eum &s;entire quae dicit;</HI> You may be a&s;&s;ured he &s;peaks what he thinks. A Moral Philo&s;ophy from the hand of &s;o candid a man would have been of great force, and the lo&s;s of the Trea|ti&s;e of Vertue which he compo&s;ed is great: for never man &s;pake with great|er freedom than he. He imitated that &s;train of <HI>Socrates,</HI> who could not di&s;|gui&s;e his &s;entiments. Men are never &s;ubject to &s;peak again&s;t their Con&s;cien|ces but when they are weak: intere&s;t, pa&s;&s;ion, head-&s;trongne&s;s, prejudice, the torrent of cu&s;tome, dependance, are the mo&s;t u&s;ual ob&s;tacles to &s;incerity, and the purity of our judgments. Such kinds of weakne&s;&s;es only make men for&s;ake their own &s;entiments, to em|brace the Opinions of others: And it is but a lowne&s;s of Spirit, and a ba&s;e complai&s;ance that make men &s;quare their Opinions, by the judgment of tho&s;e they depend on, and whom they de&s;ire to plea&s;e. The truth is the mo&s;t
<PB N="92" REF="52">lovely of all Philo&s;ophies, is to know how to live; that is, to accommodate ones &s;elf to per&s;ons, affairs, and &s;ea|&s;ons, as rea&s;on requires it: Yet that is to be done freely and without con&s;traint; that we may not imitate tho&s;e weak &s;ouls, who&s;e &s;entiments on every thing are borrowed, and who a|ba&s;e them&s;elves to conde&s;cend to Opi|nions, to which they can hardly &s;ubmit, becau&s;e they want courage to retain their entire liberty. So &s;ervile a kind of Philo&s;ophy is but a counterfeit wi&s;dom. Such was that of the <HI>Senators,</HI> who lived under <HI>Tiberius</HI> and <HI>Nero,</HI> of whom <HI>Tacitus</HI> &s;peaks; who having pro&s;tituted them&s;elves to the mo&s;t in|famous kind of flattery, put on the Mask of Philo&s;ophy to &s;ave them from per&s;ecution, wanting courage to be true Philo&s;ophers, and truly to &s;peak their Judgments in the Senate.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="33" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXXIII.</HEAD>
<P>Di&s;putation is an Art &s;et in vogue by the Schooles to rou&s;e Youth, and to exerci&s;e their Wits: it &s;erves to incul|cate rea&s;on to the&s;e that under&s;tand it
<PB N="93" REF="52">not, and to impo&s;e &s;ilence on bablers; but it &s;erves likewi&s;e to feed animo&s;ity, to give a fair colour to all &s;orts of pa&s;&s;i|on, and to maintain opinionativene&s;s, in de&s;pight of Truth and &s;ound Judg|ment. There is no Philo&s;opher who becomes not by this fine Art, a man for progre&s;s, and clearing of doubts. For every di&s;putant may undertake to per&s;wade others of his Opinion by noi&s;e, when Rea&s;on fails him. In fine, di&s;putation, as all things el&s;e, has its good and evil: &s;o that without pre|tending to condemn it, let us imploy it to tho&s;e u&s;es wherein it may do good. But let us open the eyes of rational men, that we may not abu&s;e them; for mo&s;t-times men only di&s;pute, becau&s;e they under&s;tand not one another. <HI>Thales</HI> has vacuity in horrour, <HI>De|mocritus</HI> bogles not at it; let them but mutually explain them&s;elves, and they are good friends. <HI>Epicurus</HI> believes his &s;en&s;es too much, <HI>Empedocles</HI> be|lieves them not at all: they &s;hall di&s;|pute no more, when they have once agreed upon it what the errour is,
<PB N="94" REF="53">which hinders the belief that &s;hould be given them. Let us make a <HI>Carte&s;ia<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"></HI> under&s;tand, what &s;en&s;e and &s;en&s;ation is, and he &s;hall ea&s;ily allow that a Hor&s;e is a Bea&s;t, though now he be|lieves it not. Men have di&s;puted al|mo&s;t three hundred years about Liber|ty, becau&s;e as yet they are not agreed what it is: Let us make appear to Phi|lo&s;ophers and Divines, who have &s;po|ken of it &s;o differently, wherein it con|&s;i&s;ts, and they &s;hall &s;peak in the &s;ame Language. For in fine, when men have rea&s;on, and are agreed about principles, there is no more di&s;puting. That great Diver&s;ity of Opinions which reign in the World, proceeds only from the different manner that Men think and &s;peak of them. This made <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;ay, that when two ra|tional men are of a different &s;entiment, it is commonly becau&s;e they &s;peak dif|ferently; and all di&s;putation is more a|bout words than things.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="34" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XXXIV.</HEAD>
<P>Though the Philo&s;ophy which is taught in the Schools at pre&s;ent, with
<PB N="95" REF="53">that method of di&s;putation introduced there, hath been much cen&s;ured by <HI>Ramus,</HI> a Profe&s;&s;or of the Univer&s;ity of <HI>Paris,</HI> about the end of the la&s;t Age, by <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> in the beginning of the pre&s;ent, and generally by all the mo|dern Natural Philo&s;ophers of any repu|tation; becau&s;e it hath &s;uffered much of the purity of the Doctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> to be corrupted by its Profe&s;&s;ors, who profe&s;s them&s;elves to be his greate&s;t Followers: yet for all that I &s;till think it the mo&s;t convenient, in regard of the way that men live in at pre&s;ent, yea and the mo&s;t proper for Youth, at the age that they apply them&s;elves to it; becau&s;e that after all that hath been &s;aid, it &s;tamps on the mind an impre&s;|&s;ion of order, to make men &s;peak ex|actly, and with method of every thing: it teaches us to reduce unto certain principles the matters we treat of, that we may methodically deliver our opi|nions: it exerci&s;es the &s;pirits of youth by the &s;ubtleties of Logick and Meta|phy&s;ick, in the only way that they are capable of: it gives them but an
<PB N="96" REF="54">abridgment of Moral Philo&s;ophy, whil&s;t their under&s;tanding is not ripe enough to &s;upport a long deduction of Con|clu&s;ions, which are entertainments too &s;erious and calm for the heat and edge of youth; which is an age of too lit|tle experience, to delight in the con|templation of the Works of Nature by a &s;erious &s;tudy of Natural Philo&s;ophy, and of too narrow a capacity to compre|hend the va&s;t extent of humane Affairs. It were however to be wi&s;hed, that that part of Philo&s;ophy were handled more methodically in the Schools, and that the mo&s;t important Experiments and Ob&s;ervations of Nature were more par|ticularly di&s;cu&s;&s;ed: But it often comes to pa&s;s that Ma&s;ters affect to teach u&s;e|le&s;s things, to make it be thought that they will not forget the nece&s;&s;ary. However, the method that is at pre|&s;ent in u&s;e, might be brought to grea|ter perfection: but that perfection is only to be expected from the genius and candour of the Profe&s;&s;ors, who can wave things indifferent, and in|&s;i&s;t on what is e&s;&s;ential, according to
<PB N="97" REF="54">the mea&s;ure of knowledge that expe|rience may furni&s;h them with. For matters being in the &s;tate they are, there is no great rea&s;on to expect as to that a well-adju&s;ted Reformation. To conclude, it is probable that the Laws, which &s;uffer no innovation in the u&s;e of things univer&s;ally e&s;tabli&s;hed, will not countenance any other method, but what is now at pre&s;ent followed in the Univer&s;ities; that they may not allow too great a freedom to the pa&s;&s;i|on that men have naturally for new Opinions, the tendency whereof is of dangerous con&s;equence in a well-order|ed &s;tate; e&s;pecially con&s;idering that Philo&s;ophy is one of the in&s;truments whereof Religion makes u&s;e in explain|ing its deci&s;ions, as we &s;hall &s;ee at the end of this Treati&s;e. The&s;e are the Re|flexions which we have made on Philo|&s;ophy in general: Let us now proceed to the&s;e which are to be made on the parts of Philo&s;ophy &s;everally.</P>
</DIV2>
<TRAILER>The end of the fir&s;t Part.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="chapter">
<PB N="98" REF="55">
<HEAD>Reflexions ON LOGICK.</HEAD>
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>I.</HEAD>
<P>_LOGICK may be &s;aid to be the fir&s;t ray of Evidence, and the fir&s;t draught of Method, that is di&s;played on Sciences: becau&s;e its bu&s;i|ne&s;s is to form the judgment, which is the u&s;ual in&s;trument that the mind employs in rea&s;oning truly, and in di&s;cerning truth and fal&s;hood exactly, by di&s;tingui&s;hing what is &s;imple from what is compound, and what is con|tingent from what is nece&s;&s;ary. And &s;eeing this Art is the &s;ource from whence flows certainty, there is but
<PB N="99" REF="55">little &s;ecurity in all the Rea&s;onings of men without its a&s;&s;i&s;tance. So that its chief office is to di&s;cover truth, and make Rea&s;on palpable. But that Art became counterfeit by the character of the &s;pirits of tho&s;e that fir&s;t made u&s;e of it: That ray, though pure and in|corruptible in it &s;elf, was corrupted; and humane Rea&s;on, which &s;ubmitted it &s;elf to that conduct, fell into Errour, by the bad u&s;e it made of that Science. In&s;omuch that Logick, which was on|ly invented to imprint a Character of ju&s;tne&s;s on the mind, did help to mi&s;|lead it: and the fir&s;t Precepts of Dia|lectick which were given to men for a Rule, &s;erved as &s;nares laid for them, to make them fall into Errour. For as there is nothing &s;o &s;ecret as the thoughts, &s;o men found the art to di&s;|gui&s;e them into a thou&s;and &s;hapes; as may be &s;een in the Hi&s;tory and Revo|lutions of this Science.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>II.</HEAD>
<P>The fir&s;t Philo&s;ophers who made more u&s;e of rea&s;on than rea&s;oning, ad|dicted them&s;elves &s;o much to the &s;tudy
<PB N="100" REF="56">of Natural Philo&s;ophy, that they mind|ed Logick but little: they rea&s;oned in their ob&s;ervations, without knowing the Art of rea&s;oning. There was no Logick in u&s;e in the School of <HI>Pythago|ras,</HI> but his &s;ole Authority; his Di|&s;ciples were &s;ilent when he had &s;poken. It is true, <HI>Apuleius</HI> pretends that <HI>Plan</HI> took his fir&s;t Notions of Logick from the <HI>Pythagoreans.</HI> But <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> a&s;|&s;ures us, that though there be exact e|nough Definitions to be found in their writings, yet they knew not Dialectick, whereof the Art was not then di&s;co|vered, nor the Rules e&s;tabli&s;hed. <HI>Zeno Eleates</HI> &mdash; a man of a quick and &s;ubtile Spirit, was the fir&s;t that found in di&s;|cour&s;e that natural connexion of prin|ciples and con&s;equences, which he re|duced into an Art, as <HI>Plato</HI> te&s;tifies and <HI>Proclus</HI> confirms. From whence it appears that the Logick of <HI>Zeno</HI> con|&s;i&s;ted in ob&s;erving the dependance which propo&s;itions have one on ano|ther, and upon that ob&s;ervation to rank them in their natural order. That was his Method; he explained nothing
<PB N="101" REF="56">but by way of Dialogue, and brought in two or three Per&s;ons, who by que|&s;tions and an&s;wers made a Methodical Rea&s;oning on every thing: and from this Art, he was the fir&s;t that called that Science Dialectick; whereby the way of handling Philo&s;ophy in ver&s;e which was u&s;ed before, cea&s;ed. For in Dialogue Men found the means to retain an agreeable air, without lo&s;ing Solidity: and that way <HI>Plato</HI> follow|ed, as the mo&s;t proper for in&s;truction. The cu&s;tome was to interrogate him whom they taught, and to make him an&s;wer according to his Cpacity. <HI>Zeno</HI> who was &s;ubtle, mingled a quaint and captious air with his Method, whereby he puzled the mind. <HI>Prota|goras,</HI> the Di&s;ciple of <HI>Zeno,</HI> who had likewi&s;e <HI>Democritus</HI> for Ma&s;ter, refined that Method, and made it &s;till more nice by his Sophi&s;ms; for wanting &s;o|lidity he endeavoured to be &s;ubtile, and coming &s;hort of a Philo&s;opher, he &s;et up for a Sophi&s;t. <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;ayes that he framed common-places of que|&s;tions and an&s;wers, whereof he made
<PB N="102" REF="57">an Art to &s;urprize and perplex the mind<GAP DESC="illegible" REASON="right margin cropped or obscured" RESP="MURP" EXTENT="1+ letters"> <HI>Simon</HI> that famous Arti&s;t of <HI>Athens,</HI> of whom <HI>Socrates</HI> &s;peaks &s;o much, and <HI>Crito</HI> his friend, were likewi&s;e the Di&s;ciples of <HI>Zeno</HI> and great Dialecti|cians, as <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> a&s;&s;ures us.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>III.</HEAD>
<P><HI>Euclide</HI> of <HI>Megara</HI> &s;ubtilized more all the &s;ubtility of Dialectick; and ad|ded to it a brisker way of di&s;puting by giving more heat to his di&s;cour&s;e: he drove that even to exce&s;s, which gave occa&s;ion to <HI>Timon</HI> to reproach him, for having in&s;pired into tho&s;e of <HI>Mega|ra,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">, a rage of di&s;putation, by that Captious and Sophi&s;tick Logick that he taught them, which <HI>Socrates</HI> approved not, becau&s;e there was no Sincerity in that way. It was <HI>Euclide</HI> and his Scholar <HI>Eubulides,</HI> who invent|ed the Sophi&s;ms, which became &s;ince &s;o famous in the Schools, whereof <HI>Dio|genes Laertius</HI> makes mention; which after all have nothing real but their &s;ubtility, as the <HI>Dilemma,</HI> the Horned Argument, the <HI>Sorites,</HI> the&s;e &s;o fa|mous <HI>Megarick</HI> interrogations, of
<PB N="103" REF="57">which <HI>Plutarch</HI> &s;peaks; and all the Pettifoggings of that kind, which made Dialectick &s;o contemptible at <HI>Athens, Socrates</HI> was obliged to render it ridicu|lous in his di&s;cour&s;es again&s;t the <HI>Sophi&s;ts,</HI> to the end he might undeceive mens minds in the Opinion thereof. From <HI>Euclide Demo&s;thenes</HI> learnt the Art of the <HI>Dilemma,</HI> and the&s;e pre&s;&s;ing ways that rendered him &s;o vehement in that manner of Eloquence which he follow|ed. The Logick of <HI>Plato,</HI> which is the &s;ame with that of <HI>Socrates,</HI> con|&s;i&s;ts more in Examples than Precepts; it hath nothing that is particular for rea&s;oning, becau&s;e <HI>Socrates</HI> valued not that part of Philo&s;ophy. Though both of them placed the fir&s;t di&s;cerning of Truth and Fal&s;hood in the &s;en&s;es; yet they pretended that the mind ought to judge thereof, and that Men &s;hould only refer them&s;elves to that Judgment: becau&s;e that without &s;ticking on the &s;urface of things, it penetrated into the eternal and immutable principle of them, which they called the Idea, and which alone they e&s;tabli&s;hed as the rule
<PB N="104" REF="58">of the di&s;tinction which &s;hould be made in the Judgment of things. But &s;ee|ing the Soul of Man was but a &s;mall &s;park of the Univer&s;al Soul of the World, and according to them, a Beam of the Divinity; they thought that that particle united to its principle was ig|norant of nothing; but that entring into the Body, by that alliance it con|tracted Ignorance and Impiety, from which Logick &s;erved to purify it. <HI>Alcinous</HI> who explains exactly enough the Dialectick of <HI>Plato,</HI> &s;ays, That that Philo&s;opher made u&s;e of Divi&s;i|on, Definition, and Induction, to re|mount to the Fountain-head of fir&s;t Truth, from whence he drew his prin|ciples, to the end he might think and &s;peak wi&s;ely of every thing; and that that was his mo&s;t u&s;ual Method. Divi&s;ion was as a ladder, whereby to a|&s;cend from &s;en&s;ible things to things in|tellectual. Definition was a way to lead from things demon&s;trated, to tho&s;e that were not: and Induction the means to find the truth by the principle of &s;uppo|&s;itions. For by Divi&s;ion he came to De|finition, and by Definition to Induction
<PB N="105" REF="58">and Demon&s;tration. And <HI>Diogenes Laer|tius</HI> a&s;&s;ures us, that that was the mo&s;t general way which <HI>Plato</HI> made u&s;e of in making his Demon&s;trations. <HI>Cicero</HI> and <HI>Quintilian</HI> are of the &s;ame Opini|nion. However, it mu&s;t be granted, that <HI>Socrates</HI> in his manner of rea&s;on|ing addicted him&s;elf more to Interro|gations than An&s;wers; becau&s;e the Character of his Mind was fitter to rai&s;e, than to re&s;olve difficulties. More|over, it appears by the Principles of the Logick of <HI>Socrates</HI> and <HI>Plato,</HI> which allowed no truth but in the Ideas, that all their School made Pro|fe&s;&s;ion of knowing nothing; becau&s;e that Men cannot judge of &s;ingle and Individual beings, but by the &s;en&s;es which are fallacious: So that the Di|&s;ciples of <HI>Plato</HI> placed all their Logick in not believing any thing too &s;lightly, and in retaining the entire Liberty of Judgment, among the uncertainties which are found almo&s;t in every thing. And in fine, upon that great maxime of a general Incomprehen&s;ibility of all things, was the Academy reformed under <HI>Lacydes</HI> and <HI>Arce&s;ilas,</HI> and the
<PB N="106" REF="59">Sect of the <HI>Scepticks</HI> and <HI>Pyrrhoni&s;ts</HI> rai&s;|ed, who doubted of things that were mo&s;t certain. The <HI>Academicks</HI> under|&s;tood very well, that nothing could be under&s;tood; the <HI>Pyrrhoni&s;ts</HI> did not &s;o much as under&s;tand that. And &s;o far the Principles of the Logick of <HI>Plato</HI> trained on the minds of men.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IV.</HEAD>
<P>There appeared nothing before <HI>A|ri&s;totle,</HI> regulated and &s;etled in Logick. That &s;ublime and intelligent genius &s;o &s;ounded the Aby&s;s of the mind of Man, that he di&s;covered all its movements, by the exact di&s;tinction that he made of the operations thereof. Men had not as yet launched out into the Ocean, nor known the depth of the thoughts of man. <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was the fir&s;t that di&s;covered that new way of attaining to Science by the evidence of Demon|&s;tration, and of proceeding geometri|ally to demon&s;tration by the infallibili|ty of Syllogi&s;m, the mo&s;t accompli&s;hed work and the greate&s;t attempt of the Wit of Man. Thus you have an abridg|ment of the Art and Method of the Lo|gick of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> which is &s;o &s;ure, that
<PB N="107" REF="59">without it, one can have no perfect a&s;&s;u|rance in rea&s;oning, and which is a rule to make men ju&s;t and exact in conceiving what is to be conceved. But what Road hath he taken to attain to that, and what Art hath he employed to fix the mind of man naturally volatile, and to render it inexpugnable in what it knows? It behoved him fir&s;t to re|move all ambiguity and equivocation from expre&s;&s;ion, make a perfect De|mon&s;tration of Humane Rea&s;oning, which has no better Foundation than Words and Thoughts cloathed with all their imperfections, and to give the greate&s;t &s;olidity of Science to the mo&s;t uncertain and undetermined matter that can be imagined. He marches in the pur&s;uit of that de&s;ign by ways then unknown to Rea&s;on, and whereof before him there was hardly any tract: he removes from the thoughts all the defects whereby expre&s;&s;ion is able to impo&s;e upon any man, and di&s;per&s;es all the mi&s;ts wherewith the imagination may offu&s;cate the mind. For that end in the Book of <HI>Interpretation</HI> which is
<PB N="108" REF="60">a kind of rational Grammar, he exa|mines the vertue and &s;ignification of words; in the <HI>Categories</HI> he forms the true notions of terms, to prepare them for Divi&s;ion and Definition, by reduc|ing them to their natural &s;en&s;e; in his Books of <HI>Analyticks,</HI> he lays down the rules of the Modal Conver&s;ion of all &s;orts of propo&s;itions, and of the dif|ferent Figures of Syllogi&s;m, whereof he &s;etles the principal grounds on three Axioms of his Logick: and all that con|&s;tructure is purely a work of his own. He demon&s;trates nothing in his Book of <HI>Categories,</HI> which are but di&s;po&s;i|tions to Demon&s;tration: he demon|&s;trates nothing in his Book of <HI>Interpre|tation,</HI> but the principle of contradicto|ry propo&s;itions: but in the Books of <HI>Analyticks</HI> his conceptions are almo&s;t &s;o many demon&s;trations, and his de|mon&s;trations &s;o many principles. The <HI>Topicks</HI> are but common places of dia|lectick or probable Arguments. The <HI>Elenchs</HI> are all the Sophi&s;ms imaginable in their &s;ource. The two rules which he e&s;tabli&s;hes for the perfect compo&s;i|tion
<PB N="109" REF="60">of a Syllogi&s;m, are, That there ought to be nothing fal&s;e in the matter, nor nothing faulty in the form. His manner of writing has nothing of the faintne&s;s of the di&s;cour&s;e of <HI>Plato,</HI> nor of the diffu&s;ed &s;tile of his Age; all is vigorous and clo&s;e. In fine, that pure Geometrical Method of Demon&s;trati|on, which he followed, hath appear|ed always &s;o exact, that it hath been u&s;ed by the learned in all Sci|ences, as the mo&s;t &s;olid, and mo&s;t con|&s;onant to the u&s;ual manner of rea&s;on|ing: and that con&s;truction of Syllo|gi&s;m, which is the true Logick of <HI>A|ri&s;totle,</HI> is &s;o perfect in its kind, that no|thing can have &s;ince been added to it, or dimini&s;hed from it, without cor|rupting the &s;ame. Men of &s;ound Judg|ment can admit of no other man|ner, nor no other principles of rea&s;on|ing, but tho&s;e of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> And &s;ee|ing in all Ages men have di&s;puted a|gain&s;t rea&s;on, becau&s;e it is Opinion commonly that &s;wayes the World; the Learned Ages have been only di&s;tin|gui&s;hed from others, by the e&s;teem
<PB N="110" REF="61">they have had of the Logick of <HI>Ari&s;to|tle.</HI> For, to &s;peak the truth, what he hath done for the rectifying of rea&s;on, by cutting off equivocation from terms, and confu&s;ion from conceptions, is one of the greate&s;t Ma&s;ter-pieces of Humane Rea&s;on; it mu&s;t notwith|&s;tanding be acknowledged, that the principal &s;cope of that Logick is not &s;o much to teach man the Art of rea|&s;oning, which he knows naturally, as to give rules for examining fal&s;e rea|&s;onings, that they may be well di&s;tin|gui&s;hed from the true, and to guard one again&s;t the Sophi&s;ms of <HI>Zeno</HI> and <HI>Parmenides.</HI> For there was forged in his time a fal&s;e method of rea&s;oning, which the Sophi&s;ts put in vogue, and which he endeavours to overthrow by making it known. Upon this Idea all the de&s;ign of his Logick does move, that he may form the Laws of an Art which gives Laws to all others.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>V.</HEAD>
<P>The School of <HI>Zeno</HI> exerci&s;ed them|&s;elves &s;o much in Dialectick, that the Sect of the Stoicks &s;ubtilized more up|on
<PB N="111" REF="61">it, than all the other Sects be&s;ides. It was perhaps the difficulty they had to maintain their imaginary Morality, which obliged them to &s;upply by their &s;ubtlety what was wanting in &s;oli|dity to their Doctrine. So they ad|ded to the Artifices of <HI>Zeno Eleates,</HI> to the wranglings of <HI>Euclid</HI> of <HI>Megara,</HI> and to the quaintne&s;s of <HI>Socrates,</HI> all the artifice of <HI>Cleantes</HI> and <HI>Chry&s;ippus,</HI> the greate&s;t Dialecticians that ever were, that they might make to them|&s;elves a new Logick. To that it was properly that they bent all their wit, &s;ays <HI>Cicero,</HI> that they might make to them&s;elves an artificial Rea&s;on, having but little real to maintain the fal&s;e wi&s;|dom of their Philo&s;ophy: it may be &s;aid that they bri&s;tled their wit with all the prickles of Dialectick, to arm them|&s;elves again&s;t their Adver&s;aries, and that they became the mo&s;t redoubtable Pettifoggers of the School, that they might &s;afely be the greate&s;t amplifiers, in the notion that they forged to them|&s;elves of their wi&s;e-man. Nor did any thing give greater reputation to
<PB N="112" REF="62">their opinion, than the art that they employed to defend it. They altered nothing of the grounds of the Diale|ctick of <HI>Ari&s;totle;</HI> except that they added to the Syllogi&s;m, which was of common u&s;e among&s;t them, a more animated air of di&s;putation, by quick, &s;hort, and pre&s;&s;ing Interrogatories, which gave great vigour to their rea|&s;onings. That knacky and nice hu|mour which held them commonly, made them turn all their Dialectick into perver&s;e &s;ophi&s;tication, that they might invent new modes of Syllogi&s;m le&s;s natural, but more captious than tho&s;e of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> It is pretended, that <HI>Chry&s;ippus</HI> was &s;o much addicted to that Science, that he alone wrote of it a|bove three hundred Volumes: but he weakened the &s;trength of it, &s;ays <HI>Se|neca,</HI> by too much refining. It was he and his Succe&s;&s;ors who fir&s;t brought in vogue the formalities and virtual di&s;tinctions: it is true, that by the vi|vacity of their wit they gave too great authority to the imagination, which makes things always greater
<PB N="113" REF="62">than they are, by giving too much vertue to expre&s;&s;ions, and too great a power to terms. There was nothing but words and their &s;ignification di&s;pu|ted of in their Schools. And thereby they became the fir&s;t Authors of that Philo&s;ophy, which was revived by the Nominali&s;ts in the&s;e la&s;t Ages: at lea&s;t they have much re&s;embled one ano|ther in their way of &s;ubtilizing too much on the terms they made u&s;e of. But that Dialectick which con&s;i&s;ted al|mo&s;t altogether in words, made the Stoicks &s;omewhat &s;uperficial; and pla|ced all their Philo&s;ophy on their lips. Yet &s;eeing the Logick of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was long unknown, becau&s;e his Writings were &s;o; the Logick of <HI>Zeno</HI> pa&s;&s;ed current in the following Ages more than any other; it was even the fir&s;t that was taught at <HI>Rome.</HI> And it is on the&s;e &s;ubtleties of Logick, that <HI>Plau|tus</HI> plays in &s;everal places of his Co|medies, as <HI>Cicero</HI> did afterwards in many parts of his Works. For the Stoicks by rea&s;on of their &s;ubtlety were decryed at <HI>Rome.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="6" TYPE="section">
<PB N="114" REF="63">
<HEAD>VI.</HEAD>
<P><HI>Epicurus</HI> fell upon a method of rea|&s;oning le&s;s artificious, but more deli|cate than that of <HI>Zeno.</HI> What <HI>Cicero</HI> objects to him that he de&s;pi&s;ed Diale|ctick, is not true but in re&s;pect of that of the Stoicks, which he approved not, becau&s;e he found it to be puncti|lious. <HI>Epicurus</HI> took a plainer way. That analytical method of divi&s;ion and argumentation introduced by <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was unknown to him, which rendred him weak in di&s;pute. He &s;ought truth only by the &s;en&s;es, which he called the fir&s;t natural light of man; and that was his fir&s;t Rule, as reflexion on the judg|ment of the &s;en&s;es was his &s;econd. And as he did acknowledge two kinds of truth, the one Natural and the o|ther Moral; &s;o he would have the &s;en|&s;es di&s;tingui&s;h what is real, and the ap|petite, which is the way by which the heart declares it &s;elf, pur&s;ue what is good and convenient for its &s;tate: and that is it which he calls Moral Truth. This is in general the ground of his Doctrine; and the&s;e are its Principles.
<PB N="115" REF="63">1. That &s;en&s;e cannot be deceived; be|cau&s;e the impre&s;&s;ion that it receives from the object is always true, being wrought by a &s;en&s;ible &s;pecies: but that the rea&s;oning which the Soul makes up|on that impre&s;&s;ion may be fal&s;e. 2. That the opinion which is drawn from the &s;en&s;ation may be true or fal&s;e. 3. That it is true when the judgment of the &s;en&s;es is made in form, without let, and with &s;uch evidence as Rea&s;on can|not re&s;i&s;t; and that it may be fal&s;e, when it wants that evidence. The&s;e are the principal Maxims of the Lo|gick of <HI>Epicurus:</HI> upon which he grounds the different rea&s;onings of the Soul that are made in the mind, ac|cording to the &s;ympathy that there is between the Spirit and the Sen&s;es. It is only, &s;ays he, upon the ideas and notices which the Soul receives by the Sen&s;es, that are formed the doubt or opinion, the ob&s;curity or evidence, whereof it re|ceives the impre&s;&s;ion. Moreover that way of anticipated knowledge, which he calls <GAP DESC="foreign">, pre&s;umption, is in his Doctrine a kind of Idea of things in|dividual
<PB N="116" REF="64">re-united in a general con|ception: from whence he forms the rule of Definition, which he takes to be the only way of attaining to know|ledge. By all the&s;e Principles he foun|ded a more natural way of rea&s;oning than the other Philo&s;ophers did. It is true that he grounded a part of the &s;implicity of his Logick upon the per|&s;picuity of terms, being per&s;waded that all di&s;putes did commonly proceed but from the ambiguity of Propo&s;iti|ons. He an&s;wered all Sophi&s;ms by the &s;ole explication of the words. For when men under&s;tand them&s;elves, and are no more Bea&s;ts, there is no more di&s;puting. But he was careful to re|ctifie the defect of that Principle in all his Rea&s;onings, by great circum&s;pe|ction. And <HI>Lucretius,</HI> who in his Poem explains the Doctrine of <HI>Epi|curus,</HI> propo&s;es to him&s;elf more than fourteen Objections which are made again&s;t the judgment of the Sen&s;es, to which he an&s;wers &s;o clearly in his fourth Book, that he leaves not a word to be &s;aid more. In fine, plain com|mon
<PB N="117" REF="64">&s;en&s;e, maintained by &s;ome natu|ral reflexions, was all the art of <HI>Epicu|rus:</HI> he made not &s;o much ado about it, as the Stoicks did, who placed a part of their wit in the magnificence of their expre&s;&s;ions, whereby they be|came ridiculous to the <HI>Epicureans.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="7" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VII.</HEAD>
<P>After that the Writings of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> which were &s;o long concealed, were di&s;covered, and that his method was known, men addicted them&s;elves to it in &s;ucceeding times, as to the &s;o|lide&s;t and &s;ure&s;t of all: the art of think|ing and di&s;cour&s;ing appearing in it, in its highe&s;t perfection, by the inventi|on of Syllogi&s;m; to which all the me|ditation and reflexions of Philo&s;ophers can adde nothing. <HI>Galen</HI> him&s;elf who had entertained other Notions on Lo|gick, and who had compo&s;ed a new Dialectick, which is lo&s;t, followed at la&s;t that of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> and gave it even applau&s;e and reputation: and that new Figure of Syllogi&s;m, which he invent|ed, pa&s;&s;ed only for an indirect method of demon&s;tration. <HI>Alexander Aphro|di&s;eus,
<PB N="118" REF="65">Simplicius, Ammonius, Philopo|nus,</HI> among&s;t the <HI>Greeks; Apuleius,</HI> S. <HI>Augu&s;tine, Boetius, Thomas Aquinas,</HI> and many others among&s;t the <HI>Latines</HI> a&s;well as the <HI>Arabians,</HI> laboured on the Logick of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> as on the be&s;t of all others. It is even true that there hath been nothing &s;aid rationally &s;ince on that Science, which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> had not thought on before: and it may be affirmed, that there has not any new thing almo&s;t been di&s;covered, in the univer&s;al oeconomy of the operations of the mind, &s;ince that Philo&s;opher hath written on it. Upon that admirable Mo|del al&s;o was framed the Sect of the Scho|la&s;ticks or Schoolmen, who reigned &s;o long in the Schools, and with &s;o much authority. It is true that there happened therein a Schi&s;m between the Nomi|nali&s;ts and Reali&s;ts: but both of them in their di&s;putes rea&s;oned only on the Principles of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> I &s;hall &s;ay no|thing of the Logick of <HI>Raymund Lully,</HI> which is but the meer gibri&s;h of the Cabal, and a ranking up of words in an order that is but arbitrary, and
<PB N="119" REF="65">which hath nothing of reality: it is an art of &s;peaking of all things with|out judgment, and of di&s;cour&s;ing at random as much as men plea&s;e. In fine, it is a very extravagant Notion of Lo|gick, which <HI>Peter Montuus</HI> pretends to have been copied from head to tail, from an <HI>Arabian</HI> Philo&s;opher called <HI>Abezebron,</HI> proper to puzzle Antichri&s;t when he comes into the world. Upon this fair original <HI>Raymund Lully</HI> formed the Idea of his Logick, which could never as yet make men any thing but Enthu&s;ia&s;ts or Ignorant. About two hundred years ago <HI>Laurentius Valla</HI> un|dertook to reform the Logick of <HI>Ari|&s;totle,</HI> by reducing the ten Categories into three, and cutting off the third Fi|gure of Syllogi&s;m. He &s;ucceeded not in that boldne&s;s, for he had no Fol|lowers. <HI>Ludovicus Vives</HI> undertook another Reformation, which concern|ed the Schoolmen more than <HI>Ari&s;totle;</HI> but likewi&s;e without &s;ucce&s;s. <HI>Ramus</HI> had no better luck in his de&s;ign of o|verthrowing the credit of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> up|on the Memoires of <HI>Valla</HI> and <HI>Vives.</HI>
<PB N="120" REF="66">For the Idea that he conceived of his new Dialectick contains nothing ratio|nal, but what he hath borrowed from the Dialectick of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> which he hath corrupted by endeavouring to re|form it. <HI>Cardan</HI> compo&s;ed a Logick, upon the Logick of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> of <HI>Hip|pocrates,</HI> of <HI>Euclide,</HI> of <HI>Ptolomy,</HI> and of <HI>Galen;</HI> but that Work hath no|thing in it that is good, but what he hath taken from the geometrical me|thod of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> which he brings in|to it.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="8" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VIII.</HEAD>
<P>We &s;hall now tell you our thoughts of the late Dialecticians. The Organ of <HI>Bacon</HI> is not methodical; it is made up of curious conceits, which pro|ceed only from an exce&s;&s;ive pa&s;&s;ion that that Author hath to &s;ignalize him&s;elf by new &s;entiments, and to &s;ay what o|thers have not &s;aid. There is nothing le&s;s &s;olid than the four Idols, which he makes the Principles of all things. Every thing there is metaphorical, and hardly any thing proper: that geome|trical way of rea&s;oning in u&s;e among
<PB N="121" REF="66">the Schoolmen is unknown to him. But the <HI>Spaniards,</HI> who are the Ma|&s;ters of other people in the matter of Reflexions, refined Logick &s;o much in the la&s;t Age, that they corrupted the Purity of Natural Rea&s;on, by the &s;ub|tilty of their Rea&s;onings; falling into empty and ab&s;tracted &s;peculations, which had nothing of reality. The&s;e Philo&s;ophers found an Art of enjoying Rea&s;on in &s;pight of common-&s;en&s;e; and of giving a colour, and I know not what &s;pecious paint, to the mo&s;t un|rea&s;onable matters. It was not now, as heretofore, the refining the know|ledge of things that they endeavoured, but Conceptions and Terms. And Di&s;|putation became thereby &s;o full of wrangling and animo&s;ity, that it was good for nothing el&s;e but to heat the Choler, and blacken the Blood of Phi|lo&s;ophers. <HI>Smigle&s;ius</HI> a <HI>Polonian</HI> Je&s;uit, was one of the fir&s;t that wrote at the &s;ame time both mo&s;t &s;ubtilly and mo&s;t &s;olidly on the Logick of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> He hath by the Sagacity of his Wit dived into the depth of that Science, with a
<PB N="122" REF="67">per&s;picuity and exactne&s;s, that is hard|ly to be found el&s;ewhere. His Logick is a lovely piece. The other Modern Philo&s;ophers are more addicted to Na|tural Philo&s;ophy than Logick: but there is nothing more extravagant, than the Treati&s;e which <HI>Van Helmont</HI> hath written on Logick, by his unrea|&s;onable overthrowing all the Principles of <HI>Ari&s;totle. De&s;cartes</HI> began a Logick which is not compleated: Some Frag|ments thereof have remained in the hands of one of his Scholars, under the Title <HI>of Erudition.</HI> There are &s;ome Lineaments of Dialectick in his Me|thod, where he &s;ayeth that the mind of man being limited, it mu&s;t at fir&s;t be bu&s;ied about &s;imple Objects; then accu&s;tomed by little and little to the knowledge of compound Objects, and to di&s;tingui&s;h the one from the o|ther. He would have men to di&s;en|gage them&s;elves from prejudices, en|ter into a thought of doubting of every thing, that they may be able to di&s;tin|gui&s;h what is true from what is fal&s;e. His fir&s;t Principle, <HI>I think, therefore I am,</HI>
<PB N="123" REF="67">which he propo&s;es as the fir&s;t evident and &s;en&s;ible truth, if it be narrowly ex|amined, hath in it &s;omewhat defective: for the Propo&s;ition, <HI>I think,</HI> being to be reduced to this, <HI>I am thinking;</HI> that is to &s;ay, <HI>I am, therefore I am,</HI> makes a frivolous &s;en&s;e. But neverthele&s;s, as he hath raved the be&s;t of any of the Moderns, &s;o what he hath &s;aid, for all its Noveltie is not ill devi&s;ed: And there is found in it a depth of Meditati|on, which is peculiar to him&s;elf; yet there is nothing le&s;s Methodical than his Di&s;cour&s;e <HI>concerning Method.</HI> It is a hodge-podge of Morality, Natural Philo&s;ophy, and Metaphy&s;icks, which e&s;tabli&s;hes hardly any thing. Howe|ver there is to be found in it &s;ome draughts of Sincerity, which &s;how the true intention of his mind; e&s;pecially when he mo&s;t ingeniou&s;ly &s;ays, <HI>That Men gain nothing by Philo&s;ophy but the means to &s;peak probably of every thing, and to make them&s;elves be admired by the le&s;s knowing.</HI> The Dialectick of <HI>Campanella</HI> is confu&s;ed and perplexed, being built upon the Platforme of
<PB N="124" REF="68">the <HI>Averroi&s;ts,</HI> whereof he framed to him&s;elf too ab&s;tracted a Notion. But to conclude this point; it may be &s;aid, that the compleate&s;t Modern piece of Logick in all its parts, is that which <HI>Peter Mounyer,</HI> a Phi&s;ician of <HI>Grenoble,</HI> hath publi&s;hed on the Writings of Fa|ther <HI>Fabri</HI> a <HI>Je&s;uit.</HI> There is nothing more Original than what he hath writ|ten, chiefly on the Art of Syllogi&s;m, and Con&s;equence. No man hath hitherto carried that Science farther, nor hath more exhau&s;ted that matter by the al|mo&s;t Infinite Enumeration of all the modes, and of all the imaginable con|nexion of terms which con&s;titute a Syllogi&s;m. But let us proceed to Mo|ral Philo&s;ophy, which is &s;omewhat le&s;s ob&s;cure and more real.</P>
</DIV2>
<TRAILER>The end of the &s;econd Part.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="chapter">
<PB N="125" REF="68">
<HEAD>Reflexions ON <HI>Moral Philo&s;ophy.</HI></HEAD>
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>I.</HEAD>
<P>_MORAL Philo&s;ophy teaches the way of liv|ing, as Logick the man|ner of &s;peaking and rea|&s;oning; the one regu|lates the thoughts, and the other the de&s;ires of the Soul. <HI>De|mocritus</HI> was the fir&s;t of Philo&s;ophers that thought it &s;trange, that Man who was ignorant of him&s;elf, amu&s;ed him|&s;elf about the &s;tudy of the Heavens. For that was the exerci&s;e of the Philo|&s;ophers before <HI>Socrates,</HI> who began fir&s;t to mind the ordering of his Manners.
<PB N="126" REF="69">He had the fir&s;t notion of it from <HI>Py|thagoras,</HI> who applyed him&s;elf to Mo|rality whil&s;t he ob&s;erved Nature. That Science which he learnt from the <HI>Ae|gyptians,</HI> by the corre&s;pondence that he had with their Prie&s;ts, was not his greate&s;t delight; though it was not al|together indifferent to him. The de|&s;ign of that Moral Philo&s;ophy of his aimed at the purifying of the mind, from the impurities of the body and the mi&s;ts of imagination, by the &s;tu|dy of Philo&s;ophy, which he called a meditation on death; it was al&s;o the mo&s;t pure and religious, but the lea&s;t exact of all Moral Philo&s;ophies. For it contained only bare Maxims, with|out order and connexion: and his Maxims were only a plain interpreta|tion of the Wor&s;hip of the Gods, of the care that is to be had of Parents and Friends, of natural hone&s;ty, of mode&s;ty, probity, publick intere&s;t, and other duties of life. And by the Pre|cepts of &s;o &s;ound Doctrine he formed the manners and minds of the people that heard him. St. <HI>Jerome</HI> &s;aith, that
<PB N="127" REF="69">all the Morality of <HI>Pythagoras</HI> is com|prehended in his Poem, which is not &s;o much to be attributed to him as to his Scholars: we have an abridgment of it in the Commentary of <HI>Hierocles</HI> on that Poem. This <HI>Hierocles</HI> was Go|vernour of <HI>Alexandria</HI> under <HI>Diocle&s;i|an.</HI> There is to be found in <HI>Longinus</HI> a hint of the Morality of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> which gives a great Idea of his Do|ctrine,
<Q>Do always good: and never lye.</Q></P>
<P>And though <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> affirms, that that Philo&s;opher &s;peaks not &s;o well of vertues as <HI>Socrates</HI> did: yet it mu&s;t be granted, &s;ays <HI>Cicero,</HI> that there appear|ed a certain Character of Wi&s;dom in the followers of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> which &s;o di&s;tingui&s;hed them from other Philo&s;o|phers, that at <HI>Rome</HI> under the fir&s;t Con&s;uls, a man pa&s;t for a <HI>Pythagorean</HI> when he had a compo&s;ed meen; and what <HI>Athenaeus</HI> reports of the Sobriety of the&s;e Philo&s;ophers, hath given An|tiquity a great admiration for &s;o au&s;tere a Morality.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="section">
<PB N="128" REF="70">
<HEAD>II.</HEAD>
<P><HI>Socrates</HI> gave Principles to the Mo|ral Philo&s;ophy, which <HI>Pythagoras</HI> brought from <HI>Egypt,</HI> and began to re|duce it into Method, by the di&s;tincti|on which he made of Virtues, and by their Definitions. The other Philo&s;o|phers that went before him, &s;tudied nature. <HI>Socrates</HI> &s;tudied him&s;elf, by the care he had of cultivating his Soul more than his Rea&s;on, and of improv|ing his Manners rather than his Wit. He had a wonderful di&s;po&s;ition to ver|tue, for with a profound Capacity, he had a Mode&s;ty and Simplicity that ren|dred him amiable to all men. That familiar Spirit, which <HI>Apuleius</HI> calls the God of <HI>Socrates,</HI> hath given occa&s;ion of much di&s;cour&s;e concerning the Mo|rality of that Philo&s;opher. <HI>Plato</HI> pre|tended that it was a kind of invi&s;ible genius that guided him: <HI>Tertullian</HI> and <HI>Lactantius</HI> &s;ay it was a real demon: <HI>Plutarch</HI> a&s;&s;ures us that it was a way of &s;neezing to the right or left, which &s;erved <HI>Socrates</HI> for a good or bad Omen in any thing he undertook. <HI>Maximus</HI>
<PB N="129" REF="70">of <HI>Tyre</HI> thinks it was a &s;ecret in&s;tinct of his Con&s;cience, which inclined him to good, and averted him from evil. <HI>Pomponatius</HI> judges that it was only the Planet which ruled in his Nativity. And <HI>Montanus</HI> will have it to have been a &s;udden inclination of his Will, and a kind of in&s;piration, which &s;erv|ed for fore&s;ight to that Philo&s;opher in &s;urpri&s;es, an intimation in doubts, and a guide in dangers. But without &s;o much ado, it is probable that that pre|tended Spirit of <HI>Socrates,</HI> which &s;erved him for a Conductor in his actions, was nothing el&s;e but the Prudence which he had acquired by his Experience in things, and the Reflexions he made on their Events; wherein he was &s;eldom mi&s;taken. In&s;omuch that it hath been believed of him, what <HI>Homer</HI> would have us believe of the great men, of whom he &s;peaks in his Poems; to whom he a&s;&s;igned Deities for Guides, in the dangers to which their Valour expo&s;ed them. For in fine, the Mo|rality of <HI>Socrates</HI> was his Demon: and all his Art con&s;i&s;ted in his Prudence.
<PB N="130" REF="71">He was unju&s;tly condemned to death, for want of Religion. His ruine, &s;aith <HI>Plutarch,</HI> was an effect of his Piety; and he became only &s;u&s;pected of irre|ligion, becau&s;e he would render the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Pythagoras</HI> purer, by cutting off the Fables and Super&s;titions that had &s;lipt into it, and which ren|dred it ridiculous to his di&s;ciples, that he might leave nothing in it but what was rea&s;onable. In effect <HI>Socrates</HI> had &s;o great a veneration for the Gods, &s;ays <HI>Cicero,</HI> that <HI>Xenophon</HI> having con&s;ult|ed him, if he &s;hould follow <HI>Cyrus: Mans coun&s;el,</HI> &s;aid he, <HI>is uncertain, you mu&s;t advi&s;e with God.</HI> In fine, the Do|ctrine of <HI>Socrates</HI> was a continual Le&s;|&s;on to Vertue, whereof the mo&s;t part of other Philo&s;ophers &s;peak only for o&s;tentation, or policy: that drolling way he made u&s;e of, was but a me|thod to procure attention. Morality which in its natural au&s;terity would have been apt to have di&s;gu&s;ted peo|ple, invited them under an agreeable appearance: the &s;ea&s;oning which that Philo&s;opher gave to the dryne&s;s of his
<PB N="131" REF="71">Maxims, made them be much more favourably received of the Publick; yea and thereby he avoided that &s;tile of authority and arrogance, which was then in u&s;e among the Sophi&s;ts, as an odious yoke to Rea&s;on: and he handled with &s;o little &s;eriou&s;ne&s;s the mo&s;t &s;erious matters, that he made it one of his Maxims to do &s;o, knowing very well that the &s;ure&s;t way to per|&s;wade was to plea&s;e.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>III.</HEAD>
<P><HI>Plato</HI> brought Moral Philo&s;ophy &s;till to greater perfection, upon the Model that <HI>Socrates</HI> had left him: For by his Ideas, which he gave to every thing, as the Univer&s;al Principle of Philo&s;o|phy, he rai&s;ed all Vertues to their highe&s;t perfection. In his <HI>Phedrus</HI> he explains the nature of Moral Philo&s;o|phy, the end whereof is to purifie the mind from the errours of imagination, by the reflexions that Philo&s;ophy &s;ug|ge&s;ts to him. However the greate&s;t part of his Dialogues are but good di&s;cour&s;es without principles, but which fail not to hit the mark, and
<PB N="132" REF="72">to in&s;truct in their way; for the Morals of that Philo&s;opher are full of in&s;tru|ctions, which tend always either to countenance Vertue, or to di&s;courage Vice: and that Morality is &s;pread in all his di&s;cour&s;es, though there be nothing in it extraordinary &s;ingular. Some pre|tend that the Metamorpho&s;is of <HI>Apu|leius</HI> his Golden A&s;s, is an Allegory of the Moral Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Plato;</HI> the end whereof is to teach that Philo&s;o|phy &s;erves to purifie the mind, and to purge it from pa&s;&s;ions, and tho&s;e gro&s;|&s;er &s;entiments which make men re&s;em|ble bea&s;ts. For my part I believe no &s;uch thing: the notions of it are too impure. There reigned in the time of <HI>Plato</HI> at <HI>Athens</HI> a fal&s;e wit, introduced by the Sophi&s;ts, which &s;truck at Man|ners a&s;well as Rea&s;on. <HI>Protagoras</HI> was a Sophi&s;t in Di&s;cour&s;e, and <HI>Diogenes</HI> in Manners: all his Morality was coun|terfeit, there was nothing but arro|gance in his probity, and o&s;tentation in his mode&s;ty: he acted the &s;evere for envy of <HI>Plato,</HI> who&s;e delicatene&s;s he endeavoured to cen&s;ure, by an affecta|tion
<PB N="133" REF="72">of au&s;terity. It was only again&s;t Vertue and Grandure that he played the Philo&s;opher: he pitied the King of <HI>Per&s;ia</HI> becau&s;e he was too rich: <HI>Alexander</HI> the Great &s;eemed to him un|happy, becau&s;e he was too powerful: and merit and good fortune put him out of humour. So that the Morality of <HI>Diogenes</HI> mu&s;t needs have been extra|vagant, having had no other founda|tion but a clowni&s;h &s;urline&s;s: he was a great Hypocrite, and in reality more a Bragadochio than Philo&s;opher. So that <HI>Plato</HI> by the &s;olidity of his Doctrine and Vertue, had no great difficulty to overthrow the erroneous Morality of <HI>Diogenes,</HI> and of the Cynicks, who were the Di&s;ciples of <HI>Anti&s;thenes,</HI> and of all Philo&s;ophers the mo&s;t open E|nemies of mode&s;ty and civility. <HI>Plato</HI> was the fir&s;t that rectified the opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, which <HI>Socrates</HI> learnt of <HI>Pythagoras, Pythago|ras</HI> of the <HI>Egyptians,</HI> and the <HI>Egypti|ans</HI> of the <HI>Hebrews,</HI> by the means of <HI>Abraham</HI> whil&s;t he &s;ojourned in <HI>Egypt.</HI> He made it likewi&s;e the mo&s;t impor|tant
<PB N="134" REF="73">principle of Pagan Morality, to oblige men to be vertuous by the hope of reward, and the fear of puni&s;h|ment. But the Doctrine of <HI>Plato</HI> had a tendency to that of the Stoicks; as appears by the example of <HI>Antiochus</HI> of <HI>A&s;calon,</HI> who having been bred in the Academy turned Stoick. <HI>Cicero</HI> remarks the rea&s;on of it, when he &s;ays, that the mo&s;t part of the Maxims of <HI>Zeno</HI> were drawn from the Do|ctrine of <HI>Socrates. Stoicorum mirabi|lia Socratica &s;unt pleraque.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IV.</HEAD>
<P>Though in the judgment of <HI>Cicero</HI> the Moral Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> hath the &s;ame grounds, the &s;ame principles, and the &s;ame oeconomy as that of <HI>Pla|to</HI> hath, and that there is no e&s;&s;ential difference betwixt them; yet it is to be granted, that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> erects a far more methodical Scheme of Doctrine: not only by the notion that he gives of a publick and a private vertue, in di|&s;tingui&s;hing the prudence of a Sove|raign in the conduct of his State, from that of the Ma&s;ter of a Family in the
<PB N="135" REF="73">ordering of his Hou&s;hold; but al&s;o by e&s;tabli&s;hing in his Books to <HI>Nicoma|chus</HI> the two mo&s;t e&s;&s;ential points in Moral Philo&s;ophy, a la&s;t End, and the Means to attain it: and in the la&s;t Book he teaches, that that Beatitude con&s;i&s;ts in the noble&s;t action of man in refe|rence to the mo&s;t excellent Object. This is all the Moral Philo&s;ophy of <HI>A|ri&s;totle:</HI> the mo&s;t exact, the mo&s;t regu|lar and compleat of all other Morali|ties. Every thing therein is ranked in &s;o good a method, that the chief ground of the de&s;ign, and the parts of it have &s;o natural a relation to one ano|ther, and tend all in &s;o &s;treight a line to their end, that it is one of the mo&s;t accompli&s;hed Works of Antiquity. For every thing therein is dige&s;ted in that admirable method of <HI>Analy&s;is,</HI> very fa|miliar to that Author, who by that art reduces the End to the Means, in the &s;ame manner that the parts are refer|red to the whole, and the effects to the cau&s;e. And though in the third Book of his Morals he affirms, that an exact method cannot be ob&s;erved in &s;uch a
<PB N="136" REF="74">matter, by rea&s;on of its natural in&s;ta|bility, &s;eeing it hath for object the actions of men, which are in them|&s;elves &s;o mutable: yet he hath ob&s;erv|ed a regularity therein, beyond what can be imagined; and nothing war|rants more the Morality of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> than the univer&s;al policy of the world. For there is not at this day any well &s;etled form of Government which is not founded on that Moral Philo&s;ophy. And that is al&s;o the Rea&s;on that <HI>Ma|chiavel,</HI> who teaches Magi&s;trates to rule by crime, cannot endure it, be|cau&s;e it is too vertuous. But after all that hath been &s;aid, that Moral Philo|&s;ophy of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> a&s;well as that of <HI>Socrates</HI> and <HI>Plato,</HI> can make men on|ly Philo&s;ophers, and are too weak to make them throughly good. For they can only teach man his duty, but not make him in love with it. Neither is it in the&s;e fair Maxims (though men brag &s;o much) that patience in affli|ctions, and fortitude again&s;t adver&s;ity is to be found. And when a man has no more but the vertue of a Philo&s;o|pher, he has none at all.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="5" TYPE="section">
<PB N="137" REF="74">
<HEAD>V.</HEAD>
<P>The great Principle of the Morality of <HI>Zeno,</HI> head of the Stoicks, was to live in conformity to Nature; foun|ded on that pretended maxim of the School of <HI>Plato, Nulla in re, ni&s;i in natura, quaerendum &s;ummum bonum: That the chief good is no-where to be &s;ought but in Nature.</HI> But &s;eeing that maxim favoured &s;en&s;uality too much, and even agreed with the Doctrine of <HI>Anti&s;thenes,</HI> and the Cynicks, who in their &s;entiments were naturally impu|dent, it offended the mo&s;t part of Phi|lo&s;ophers, and made them revolt and fall off from <HI>Zeno.</HI> That Philo&s;opher, that he might not di&s;plea&s;e the Pub|lick, put his opinion in a cleaner dre&s;s, by explaining that conformity to Na|ture, by a conformity to right Rea&s;on. The Ma&s;ters explanation was variou&s;ly interpreted by his Scholars. <HI>Cleanthes</HI> would have it, to live conformably to that ray which Heaven had imprint|ed on the mind of man. <HI>Chry&s;ippus</HI> pretended, that it was to live accord|ing to the light of Vertue: but both
<PB N="138" REF="75">of them grounded them&s;elves on that principle of <HI>Zeno,</HI> that Vertue and Rea|&s;on were circum&s;cribed by as narrow bounds as Truth: and as what&s;oever is contrary to Truth, is alike fal&s;e; &s;o whatever is contrary to Rea&s;on, and Vertue, is equally ab&s;urd and vicious. Every thing moved on that axis in the School of <HI>Zeno:</HI> but the con&s;equences of &s;o extravagant a principle were di&s;|liked by all men: nothing appeared more ridiculous than that equality of &s;ins, which made all men alike crimi|nal; and nothing &s;eemed fal&s;er than that Tranquillity which they founded on an indifferency for external goods and evils. The&s;e Maxims begot admira|tion, when they were only con&s;idered on the out&s;ide; but they occa&s;ioned laughter, when men pryed more deep|ly into them. That Kingdom of the wi&s;e-man, whereof <HI>Zeno</HI> &s;peaks, which rendred the Stoick Ma&s;ter of the world, &s;o &s;oon as he became a Philo&s;opher, was but chimerical; and that calm of mind which he affected by his in&s;en&s;i|bility to all things, was but a dream.
<PB N="139" REF="75">How much agitation might be &s;een through that apparent Serenity? what &s;ervitude appeared in that imaginary Soveraignty? and how frivolous are all the rea&s;onings that <HI>Seneca</HI> makes in his Books of Tranquillity and Con&s;tancy to <HI>Serenus?</HI> For to be &s;hort, there was nothing natural nor &s;incere in that Phi|lo&s;ophy. All that Vertue had no other principle but Vanity: That external grimace of wi&s;dom which was taught in the <HI>Porch,</HI> was but a fal&s;e repre&s;en|tation of the Soul; it made a man but a machine of Philo&s;ophy: and they preached a height of &s;entiments that was &s;omewhat &s;avage, and bore no proportion to humane infirmity. The&s;e fair maxims of con&s;tancy, moderation, equality, greatne&s;s of Soul, undaunt|edne&s;s, and the like, were but great names, whereby the&s;e Ape-Sages di&s;|gui&s;ed their pride. It was rather an hy|pocritical arrogancy, than true honour, that &s;wayed their conduct. That Sto|ick who fills the Books of <HI>Seneca</HI> and <HI>Epictetus,</HI> was a wi&s;e-man in fan&s;ie, whereof there hath never been &s;een
<PB N="140" REF="76">any example: and <HI>Plutarch</HI> in one of his Treati&s;es again&s;t <HI>Zeno,</HI> proves that the Morality of that Philo&s;opher is e|ven more fabulous than the poetical Fictions. Under <HI>Tiberius</HI> men became Stoicks, only that they might put on a &s;tedfa&s;tne&s;s in di&s;grace, and all they got by it was &s;ome &s;entiments hoi&s;ted above Rea&s;on and Humanity, which made them look demure, and dye with a better meen. That Senatour, of whom <HI>Tacitus</HI> &s;peaks, may be an in|&s;tance of this truth, who turned Sto|ick upon no other account, but that he might become &s;editious and an incen|diary; for which that Sect was very fit: and an unmasked Stoick was an incon&s;iderable thing. Wherefore <HI>Lip|&s;ius,</HI> in my opinion, had no rea&s;on to have &s;o much extolled that Morality, and to have found it &s;o con&s;onant to our Religion: I think there is nothing more oppo&s;ite to it, becau&s;e it in&s;pires into men pride and independence: for a Stoick is only humble in his words, that he may be fierce and haughty in his thoughts. That Morality is, in
<PB N="141" REF="76">truth, more &s;plendid than any other, becau&s;e it is full of lofty expre&s;&s;ions and &s;olemn maxims: but there is no|thing more &s;uperficial than the Vertues it profe&s;&s;eth: and in a Stoick every thing, even Mode&s;ty it &s;elf, is vain.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="6" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VI.</HEAD>
<P>There is nothing more hone&s;t in ap|pearance, than the Morality of <HI>Epicu|rus:</HI> it propo&s;es only for its end the pure plea&s;ure of mind, and has no o|ther de&s;ign but to guide man unto per|fect liberty, by curing his infirmities, and delivering him from his pa&s;&s;ions, that it may make him wi&s;e. <HI>Epicurus</HI> him&s;elf was a very able man, who fetched great compa&s;&s;es to come to his point, and to di&s;gui&s;e appearances: he knew that that &s;oft and voluptuous Doctrine, which <HI>Ari&s;tippus</HI> taught, and which abridged not man of his plea|&s;ures, was highly cen&s;ured by <HI>Plato, Xenophon,</HI> and all tho&s;e who &s;tood much upon di&s;cipline and probity. He him|&s;elf affected &s;everity in his manners, that he might be the more favourably heard: and he concealed his real &s;en|timents,
<PB N="142" REF="77">under &s;o frugal a way of liv|ing, and &s;o prudent a conduct, that <HI>Cicero,</HI> who in many things finds fault with him, could not forbear to prai&s;e him for that. <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> makes a great Apology for the opinion of that Philo&s;opher, pretending that the plea&s;ure wherein he made his happi|ne&s;s con&s;i&s;t, was no more but a &s;ove|raign tranquillity of the Soul, accom|panied with a perfect con&s;titution of body. But <HI>Cicero, Horace, Plutarch,</HI> and almo&s;t all the Fathers of the Church, &s;peak otherwi&s;e of it. The truth is, that plea&s;ure, wherein <HI>Epicu|rus</HI> placed his chief good, is a great Problem in his Philo&s;ophy. And <HI>Ci|cero</HI> &s;ays that the <HI>Epicureans</HI> were wont to complain, that men were always mi&s;taken in the plea&s;ure that they &s;peak of, and that they were not right|ly under&s;tood: and that divided the opinion of the Learned, as to the truth of their Doctrine; which by the dif|ferent ways that <HI>Epicurus</HI> explained him&s;elf in, had two faces; one lovely and agreeable, and the other &s;evere
<PB N="143" REF="77">and rude. <HI>Epicurus</HI> &s;pake &s;ometimes like a Philo&s;opher in a grave &s;train, declaiming again&s;t voluptuou&s;ne&s;s; and by and by in a &s;ofter dialect, and like a &s;age Debauchee: he was a vo|luptuous Politician, who would plea&s;e the delicate, without offending the &s;e|vere. There were &s;ecrets in that School which were not indifferently revealed to every body. <HI>Epicurus</HI> when he &s;pake in publick, mentioned nothing but the pure plea&s;ure of the mind; but when he entertained his Confidents at pri|viledged times, he altered his &s;tile. And here you have all the my&s;tery of that admirable Doctrine; whereof the expre&s;&s;ions were innocent, and the opi|nions criminal: it was a lewd in&s;ide under a fair out&s;ide, civility in words and impudence in actions. The&s;e Phi|lo&s;ophers cloaked under an apparent &s;trictne&s;s an indulgence for them&s;elves, and all the art of their Morality tended only to hide their irregularity. For they lived ill, though they &s;poke well: and to ju&s;tifie their own conduct, they never found fault with other men;
<PB N="144" REF="78">wherein they were very ingenious. So poli&s;hed a Morality gave ground to the different &s;entiments that Antiquity entertained of them; they pa&s;&s;ed both for vertuous and for debauched. But they who undertake to ju&s;tifie <HI>Epicu|rus,</HI> are too &s;trongly out-voted, not to be a&s;hamed to favour him. For not to &s;peak of the primitive Stoicks, who have always declaimed again&s;t him, there was never any Doctrine more de|cryed by the Fathers of the Church than his. It is true <HI>Epicurus</HI> had ma|ny great vertues, that his Di&s;ciples were di&s;creet, faithful, commodious and kind to their friends, and that he him&s;elf was &s;ober: but in reality that &s;obriety was but a regimen; the weak|ne&s;s of his con&s;titution obliged him to that circum&s;pection for his healths &s;ake, and the mo&s;t important hours of his life were the hours of dige&s;tion. He had be&s;ides a mode&s;t air, and that he might purge him&s;elf of the arro|gance of a Philo&s;opher, he voted of|ten for ignorance again&s;t the Learned. Yet in the mo&s;t au&s;tere heads of his
<PB N="145" REF="78">Morality, there appeared &s;ome Linea|ments of Humanity, that di&s;covered the real Sentiments of his Heart. In a Word, how&s;oever men may colour this Doctrine, by the plea&s;ure which Rea&s;on and Hone&s;ty may allow to the mo&s;t &s;peculative Philo&s;ophers; yet there is &s;o great enormity in the bold|ne&s;s that it takes to baffle Religion, that a good and vertuous man cannot main|tain it. And not to rip up any more the inju&s;tice of <HI>Epicurus,</HI> proved by <HI>Ari&s;todemus</HI> in <HI>Plutarch,</HI> of depriving God of Providence; the di&s;cour&s;e of <HI>Theon</HI> in the &s;ame place, to prove that the Plea&s;ures of the Body are pre&s;era|ble to the Plea&s;ures of the Mind; what <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> reports of his Gallantries, his Mi&s;tre&s;&s;es, his Nicety in his Plea&s;ures, and of the Effeminacy of his Sentiments, are &s;ufficient Rea|&s;ons to render that Doctrine &s;u&s;pected to a true Philo&s;opher. And <HI>Plutarch</HI> pretends that <HI>Epicurus</HI> by taking Man off from Religion, deprives him of a greater plea&s;ure, than all the other de|lights he leaves him. It is no calumny
<PB N="146" REF="79">then to &s;ay, that that Philo&s;opher was not over innocent.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="7" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VII.</HEAD>
<P>The noi&s;e that the Morality of <HI>Zeno</HI> and <HI>Epicurus</HI> made at <HI>Athens,</HI> where they were much in vogue, excited the Wits to employ them&s;elves in that part of Philo&s;ophy more than in any other: that &s;tudy grew &s;o much in fa&s;hion there, that Natural Philo&s;ophy was neglected; and men bu&s;ied them&s;elves &s;o much in finding out the Chief Good that they &s;lighted all the re&s;t. But as every one rea&s;oned according to his Principles, &s;o every one likewi&s;e &s;hap|ed to him&s;elf a Beatitude according to his Humour. <HI>Herillus</HI> who loved &s;tu|dy, placed the chief good in Know|ledge: <HI>Calliphon</HI> and <HI>Dinomachus</HI> plac|ed it in hone&s;t and lawful Plea&s;ure; <HI>Diodorus</HI> in the Ab&s;ence of pain: <HI>Theo|phra&s;tus</HI> who loved a commodious and ea&s;ie life, thought that Vertue without Fortune would not make a Man happy. Some added to that Health, others In|dolency, Beauty, and a good Con&s;ti|tution: &s;everals placed Happine&s;s in
<PB N="147" REF="79">Honour, Credit, Authority, Reputa|tion, and in the other qualities which might contribute to the &s;atisfaction of Body and Mind. It was from that ea|gerne&s;s which men had then to form to them&s;elves a Model of Felicity, wherein every one fancied to him&s;elf an intere&s;t above all other concerns, the notions of it multiplyed &s;o va&s;tly by the multitude of different Spirits who applyed them&s;elves thereto, that <HI>Varro</HI> reckons up two hundred and four&s;core different Opinions upon the &s;ole que&s;tion of the Chief Good; as St. <HI>Augu&s;tin</HI> in his Book <HI>De civitate Dei</HI> a&s;&s;ures us; every one pur&s;uing the ob|ject to which his humour drew him, that he might make to him&s;elf a Bea|titude according to his own mind. But the Spirit of man is &s;o weak in all the Rea&s;onings that he makes of the Chief Good of his own head, that he can|not conceive but an imperfect notion thereof: for he wanders after the &s;ha|dow, in&s;tead of the truth which he pur&s;ues. It is true, that that Idol of Glo|ry, and Hone&s;ty, which the Pagan
<PB N="148" REF="80">Morality propo&s;ed for an Object, how frivolous &s;oever it was, did notwith|&s;tanding &s;tir men up to Vertue, and was the firme&s;t Foundation it had. That is all that man by the light of na|ture found rea&s;onable. From that prin|ciple <HI>Panetius</HI> deduced the mo&s;t e&s;&s;enti|al parts of the duties of life, for the in|&s;truction of men. For &s;ince <HI>Zeno</HI> and <HI>Epicurus</HI> there hath appeared no new model of Morality, whereof any thing remains. The Characters of <HI>Theo|phra&s;tus,</HI> the Comedies of <HI>Menander, Plautus,</HI> and <HI>Terence,</HI> are indeed fair Le&s;&s;ons for manners but without Prin|ciples. And of all the Moral Philo&s;o|phies of <HI>Pagani&s;m,</HI> that of <HI>Cicero</HI> con|tained in his <HI>Offices</HI> is the mo&s;t exact; for its maxims are grounded on au&s;ter|e&s;t vertue. The Morality of <HI>Seneca</HI> is not altogether &s;o pure; for though his Maxims be mo&s;t lovely, yet they are not always maintained by the &s;ame Rea&s;on. <HI>Plutarch</HI> is more real, he teaches vertue in a plainer way, by re|lating the actions of the vertuous. <HI>Pliny,</HI> for all he was &s;o great a Liber|tine,
<PB N="149" REF="80">hath &s;ome draughts of Morality in the Prefaces to his Natural Hi&s;tory, which are of great weight. He &s;peaks always magi&s;terially, with that lofti|ne&s;s of expre&s;&s;ion, that is natural to him. His &s;ole de&s;ign is to reform manners by his vehement declamations again&s;t Luxury, Debauchery, and the other Di&s;orders of his Age; his in|tention is always good, in prai&s;ing &s;in|cerely what is laudable, and condemn|ing what is otherways. Of all the Stoicks <HI>Epictetus</HI> is the mo&s;t rational; for he is the mo&s;t &s;incere, and lea&s;t head-&s;trong of all. The re&s;t of Phi|lo&s;ophers who wrote on manners, fol|lowed either the Principles of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> as <HI>Panetius, Cicero</HI> and <HI>Plutarch,</HI> or wrote to little purpo&s;e.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="8" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VIII.</HEAD>
<P>But nothing more di&s;compo&s;ed the Heatheni&s;h Morality, than the Lives of the Primitive Chri&s;tians. That Do|ctrine which the Apo&s;tles and their Succe&s;&s;ors publi&s;hed, teaching men to be humble in greatne&s;s and mode&s;t in &s;ucce&s;s, and that Probity whereof Chri|&s;tianity
<PB N="150" REF="81">made Profe&s;&s;ion, appeared &s;o wonderful to them; that in making attempts to imitate the Chri&s;tians, they fell into extravagancy, by &s;tepping beyond their Character, and the bounds of that worldly wi&s;dom, whereof they followed the maxims. Their vertue degenerated into o&s;tentation, and they became Braggadochioes, when they could be no longer Sages; and as it is often weakne&s;s that makes men bold, &s;o it was only vanity that made the Pa|gans become vertuous. The life of <HI>Appollonius</HI> &s;o full of Prodigies, was only written by <HI>Philo&s;tratus,</HI> that he might oppo&s;e it to the miraculous life of JESUS CHRIST: So likewi&s;e the lives of the Sophi&s;ts were publi&s;hed by <HI>Eunapius,</HI> who lived under <HI>Theodo|&s;ius</HI> the great; that he might compare them to the lives of the Primitive Be|lievers, and overthrow the belief that men had in their Doctrine. <HI>Vopi&s;cus</HI> in imitation of <HI>Eunapius</HI> undertook the &s;ame: and long before them <HI>Epictetus,</HI> who had remitted much of that haugh|tine&s;s which he learned from <HI>Zeno,</HI>
<PB N="151" REF="81">by the Conver&s;ation he had with the Chri&s;tians, gave occa&s;ion to that &s;pirit of emulation, which made the Morality of the Stoicks reflouri&s;h un|der the Empire of the <HI>Antonines:</HI> For at that time mo&s;t part of Philo&s;ophers became Stoicks, as <HI>Sextus Empiricus</HI> affirms, that they might counterfeit the &s;everity of Chri&s;tianity by that &s;ur|ly gravity which the <HI>Porch</HI> in&s;pired in|to them, and which was good for no|thing but to puff man up. But how|ever, all other moral Philo&s;ophy ap|peared very defective in compari&s;on of Chri&s;tian morality; which only at length became commendable, by the profe&s;&s;ion it made of mode&s;ty, disin|tere&s;tedne&s;s, and &s;incerity. For there is none but the Chri&s;tian Doctrine, that teaches man to appear to be what he is, and to be what he appears; be|cau&s;e to a Chri&s;tian who&s;e Glory is his Infirmity, it is no &s;hame to di&s;cover his Imperfections. He is that true <HI>Hero,</HI> who has always courage enough to be &s;incere, and is never &s;o weak as to di&s;gui&s;e him&s;elf. All the Pagan Mo|rality
<PB N="152" REF="82">was overthrown by the fir&s;t word that JESUS CHRIST uttered in pub|lick; when in his Sermon on the Mount he pronounced, Happy the poor and humble in &s;pirit: becau&s;e all the Pagan Morality is but Pride, and the Chri&s;tian, Submi&s;&s;ion. The one teaches man to be vain, and the other to be mode&s;t. And &s;eeing purity of manners and &s;incerity is only to be found among Chri&s;tians, it may be affirmed, that there is no real Probity out of Chri&s;tianity. For the greate&s;t Probity that can be, if it be attacked by an intere&s;t as prevalent as is the motive to the vertue whereof it makes Profe&s;&s;ion, may &s;uccumb. It is on|ly to be found in our Religion, wherein the intere&s;t of an Eternity, which &s;urpa&s;|&s;es all other concerns, can render impreg|nable the principles that &s;upport it. So that out of Chri&s;tianity there is no true Morality, becau&s;e there is no real vertue: and every Morality el&s;e, be&s;ides that of a Chri&s;tian, is commonly but a kind of policy, and piece of cunning.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="9" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IX.</HEAD>
<P>The truth is, Pagan Morality began
<PB N="153" REF="82">of it &s;elf to appear &s;o weak for &s;up|porting the infirmity of man, that it fell altogether into contempt, among&s;t tho&s;e who a&s;pired to a good life: for be&s;ides that the indifference for plea&s;ure or pain, for riches or poverty, for glory or ignominy, which <HI>Zeno</HI> taught, is not to be found real but in the Chri|&s;tian Religion; and that that Feli|city which Philo&s;ophy endeavoured to find in &s;ufferings, was only to be found in our Doctrine, all the Vertue of Pa|gans appeared to tho&s;e that examined it, but an Art to hide Vices, and a Le&s;&s;on of Ignorance; becau&s;e it teach|es man only to fill his mind with fal&s;e Notions of Con&s;tancy and Stedfa&s;tne&s;s, whil&s;t Chri&s;tian Philo&s;ophy di&s;covers to him his infirmities; and that the one teaches him to follow his de&s;ires, and the other to repre&s;s them. By the help of that light, and by the know|ledge of the&s;e admirable truths the new Morality of the Go&s;pel was e&s;ta|bli&s;hed, which made the wi&s;e change their maxims, and all the earth its coun|tenance: becau&s;e that Heavenly Do|ctrine
<PB N="154" REF="83">of the Law of Grace, wherein God had included the depth of his Wi&s;dom, having taught man what it behoved him to hate, and what he ought to love; humiliation and po|verty became preferable to greatne&s;s and riches; and the Chri&s;tian mea&s;ur|ed no more his e&s;teem and inclinations, but by the Eternity which God pro|po&s;ed to him for a recompen&s;e. That was the Morality which the Apo&s;tles preached, which the Martyrs &s;ealed with their Blood, which Virgins &s;an|ctified by the Purity of Life, which the Laws authori&s;ed, and which, in fine, was &s;etled in the World by Probity and Rea&s;on. Among&s;t the Fathers who be&s;t explained that Divine Morality to men, S. <HI>Ba&s;il,</HI> S. <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome,</HI> S. <HI>Jerome,</HI> S. <HI>Ambro&s;e,</HI> S. <HI>Augu&s;tin,</HI> S. <HI>Gregory,</HI> S. <HI>Bernard</HI> and <HI>Thomas Aquinas,</HI> ob|tained greate&s;t reputation. S. <HI>Ba&s;il</HI> did it as a Spiritual Father, in his a&s;ce|tick di&s;cour&s;es; S. <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome</HI> as a preacher in his Sermons, and in his Meditations on the Epi&s;tles of S. <HI>Paul,</HI> where he hath left us one of the per|fecte&s;t
<PB N="455" REF="83">Ideas of Morality, which we have in our Religion; and a pattern likewi&s;e of preaching, which ought to be propo&s;ed to tho&s;e who are called to that holy Mini&s;try: S. <HI>Jerome,</HI> S. <HI>Ambro&s;e,</HI> and S. <HI>Augu&s;tin</HI> have done it as Interpreters of the Scripture, and Doctors of the Church; S. <HI>Gregory</HI> as a Philo&s;opher by his Allegories; S. <HI>Ber|nard</HI> as a Contemplative, and <HI>Thomas Aquinas</HI> as a Theologue. His <HI>&s;ecunda &s;ecundae</HI> is the mo&s;t rational, the be&s;t dige&s;ted, and mo&s;t accurate Morality that hath ever been written. It is in|deed the Morality of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> reduced into the perfecte&s;t method that it can be. <HI>Javellus</HI> a theologue of the &s;ame order with <HI>Thomas Aquinas,</HI> hath writ|ten the be&s;t after him on that part of Philo&s;ophy. The work of <HI>Petrarch</HI> upon the divers accidents of life, is a kind of Moral Philo&s;ophy: but &s;eeing it is made up but of curious reflexions on Fortune, it is of no u&s;e for mans conduct. It is true that it is fer|tile in thoughts, but very barren in Rea&s;on and Di&s;cour&s;e. There is more
<PB N="156" REF="84">ingeniou&s;ne&s;s in the Morality of <HI>Bacon,</HI> than in his other works. Every thing therein is well excogitated; but I know not if all be true. The wi&s;dom of <HI>Car|dan</HI> teaches nothing le&s;s than manners, his notions are empty, which pre&s;cribe no real cour&s;e for the conduct of life; and that knowledge of the World which he promi&s;es, is but a Morality of often|tation and no-ways of practice. <HI>De&s;|cartes</HI> in his method hath but one or two principles of Morality; Natural Philo&s;ophy was his predominant pa&s;&s;i|on. I wave an infinite number of o|ther Authors, who have &s;ucceeded in this kind of writing, e&s;pecially the <HI>Italians</HI> and <HI>Spaniards,</HI> who are plea&s;ed to moralize more than other people, as appears by their &s;piritual Fathers, who are the mo&s;t famous.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="10" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>X.</HEAD>
<P>To conclude, we have &s;een in the&s;e la&s;t Ages Moralities, who&s;e maxims were admirable, and their principles notwith&s;tanding horrid. Men &s;uffer them&s;elves to be mi&s;led by the&s;e fair appearances, becau&s;e they examine not
<PB N="157" REF="84">the grounds of them; and blindly fol|low tho&s;e maxims, without informing them&s;elves of the principles thereof. The pure&s;t Morality cannot be true, if it be not founded on a &s;ound and Ortho|dox Faith; &s;uch as is that of the Univer|&s;al Church, to which men &s;hould adhere, and firmly relye on. But it is a matter much to be lamented, That that Mora|lity, which might be &s;o ready a relief to Chri&s;tians in their afflictions, becomes to them almo&s;t u&s;ele&s;s when they &s;tand in need of it, through the Igno|rance in which they live, of the Holy In&s;tructions of &s;o &s;aving a Philo&s;ophy; That &s;o nece&s;&s;ary a remedy turns fruit|le&s;s through the levity of our minds, which in vain &s;eek after Humane Con|&s;olations; and through a Natural Cu|rio&s;ity which puts out the heavenly light within us, and fills our &s;ouls with extreme darkne&s;s. Happy is that Chri&s;tian who being per&s;waded of his Religion, knows no other Philo&s;o|phy but the fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of true Wi&s;dom. But that once for all we may undeceive our
<PB N="158" REF="85">&s;elves of the Vanity of all Humane Knowledge: let us labour to conceive how cold are all the con&s;olations of Pa|gan Morality to a man abandoned of all the World, after that he hath been adored therein, &s;uch as we have &s;een in this Age; and how comfortable to a man in affliction is the Morality of our Religion, though it &s;hould only &s;erve to redouble his Faith in the Agony of Tribulation, by teaching him that af|fliction is a favour, and that temporal pain is the a&s;&s;urance of a Joy and Re|ward that &s;hall never have an end. In this it is properly that the Chief Good, which Pagan Philo&s;ophy in vain &s;ought after, does con&s;i&s;t, which can only be the fruit of the pure and holy Chri&s;tian Religion: but nothing denotes &s;o much the weakne&s;s of man, as to know that Chief Good, and not to love it; to have rea&s;on and want &s;trength to follow it; and to be always endeavouring to per|&s;wade, but never able to convince him|&s;elf.</P>
</DIV2>
<TRAILER>The end of the third Part.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="chapter">
<PB N="159" REF="85">
<HEAD>Reflexions ON <HI>Natural Philo&s;ophy.</HI></HEAD>
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>I.</HEAD>
<P>I Very well conceive that man may frame to him&s;elf principles of Lo|gick and Moral Philo&s;ophy, be|cau&s;e rea&s;oning, and manners, which are the object of the&s;e two Sci|ences, are the work of man: but I can|not conceive how he dares form prin|ciples of Natural Philo&s;ophy, where|of Nature is the object, and that the Work of God. In effect what means have we to know the de&s;ign of the Creator, who many times have not under&s;tanding enough to know the de&s;igns of the Creature? Did God
<PB N="160" REF="86">advi&s;e with you, when he &s;u&s;pended in the air the Foundations of the Earth, to frame an Univer&s;e? And which of the Philo&s;ophers hath &s;ounded that e|ternal wi&s;dom, which was before all things, that he might di&s;cover the depth of his thoughts. St. <HI>Augu&s;tin</HI> &s;aith, that the World is a great Theatre, where the Art of him that made it &s;hines forth on all hands: But is it not rather a great Riddle which the Philo|&s;ophers have e&s;&s;ayed to explain with|out being able to &s;ucceed in it. It is true there have been minds &s;ufficiently qualified, to know the effects of na|ture by examining their cau&s;es: But never was there any as yet capable, to &s;ee into the intentions of the Creatour, and to di&s;cover the hidden &s;ecrets of his art, by knowing the principles of this great work. For if the &s;malle&s;t Creatures that are within the reach of our &s;en&s;es, and which we have &s;o long &s;tudied, have &s;omething that is incom|prehen&s;ible: If the &s;malle&s;t Herbs of the Fields have qualities unknown to man: Shall we be &s;o vain as to pretend to
<PB N="161" REF="86">know the vertue of tho&s;e great Ma|chins which compo&s;e the World, and to a&s;cend to the &s;ource of all the Won|ders that we admire therein. Let us not deceive our &s;elves: Nature hath her my&s;teries; &s;he attains her ends by wayes that we are ignorant of: And &s;ince men have applied them&s;elves to the knowledge of her Secrets, there hath been &s;o little of certainty di&s;co|vered, that one would think nothing &s;hould more bring down the pride of man, than the &s;tudy of Natural Phi|lo&s;ophy. It is an ab&s;tru&s;e and profound Science, wherein there is little agreed upon among&s;t men: tho&s;e that have &s;poken of it be&s;t, have as yet &s;aid no|thing to the purpo&s;e: So therefore let us not beat our Brains to imagine new Sy&s;temes. That matter hath already pa&s;&s;ed through &s;o many heads, that if there had been any better than what we know, it would have been found out: And indeed, after &s;o much think|ing on it, it is even wi&s;dom to mind it no more; and to content our &s;elves by an humble acknowledgment of
<PB N="162" REF="87">our own ignorance, to admire the depth of the knowledge of God. It is true, there is nothing &s;o capable, fully to &s;atisfie the mind of man, as the con|&s;ideration of Nature, and Natural Be|ings; no other Science tickles &s;o much our curio&s;ity. Happy is he that can know any thing thereof; but Nature &s;hows her &s;elf to us only by her out-&s;ide. The knowledge that we have of her is but &s;uperficial, and God Almighty to puni&s;h our Pride, takes plea&s;ure to a|bandon us to our curio&s;ity, as to a cha|&s;ti&s;ement; becau&s;e by in&s;piring into us a de&s;ire to know all things, he re|duces us to the pa&s;s of being ignorant of all, and even of our &s;elves.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>II.</HEAD>
<P>But by how much that Science is vain through the ob&s;curity and uncertainty of the matters it treats of, by &s;o much it is frivolous through the Diver&s;ity of Opinions, that are to be found in the &s;entiments of the greate&s;t men who &s;tudied it; for all the Ancient Philo&s;o|phy hath hardly as yet been able to e|&s;tabli&s;h any Principle that is agreed
<PB N="163" REF="87">upon. <HI>Thales</HI> makes Water the prin|ciple of all things. <HI>Heraclitus</HI> pre|tends that it is Fire; <HI>Anaximenes</HI> will have it to be the Air; <HI>Pythagoras</HI> maintains they are numbers; <HI>Democri|tus</HI> Atomes, <HI>Mu&s;aeus</HI> Unity, <HI>Parmeni|des Infinitum,</HI> or Infinitude. And in &s;o profound an ob&s;curity of Natural Be|ings, and among &s;o many different &s;entiments one cannot be &s;ure of any thing. <HI>Protagoras</HI> thinks that what appears true to every one &s;everally, is true in effect. <HI>Ari&s;tippus</HI> will have nothing true but what one perceives by an internal per&s;wa&s;ion of mind. <HI>Chry&s;ippus</HI> &s;ays, that the &s;en&s;es are con|tinual impo&s;tours. <HI>Lucretius</HI> a&s;&s;ures us that they never are. <HI>Picus Miran|dola</HI> in the examination that he hath made of the Doctrine of the Pagans, <HI>Ludovicus Vives</HI> in his Book of the Corruption of Arts, <HI>Po&s;&s;evin</HI> in the third Book of his Bibliotheck, are elo|quent upon the uncertainty of the Judgments of Men: in effect there is nothing more certain than that, nor freer from di&s;pute. It is not, that one
<PB N="164" REF="88">ought to doubt of every thing; but we &s;hould not at lea&s;t too ea&s;ily believe the&s;e Philo&s;ophers, who propo&s;e to us daily new principles of Natural Philo|&s;ophy. Let us examine them before we believe them: let us di&s;tingui&s;h what is probable in their Doctrine from what is true, and not &s;uffer our &s;elves to be &s;urprized by their Conjectures. Let us admit of no Sy&s;temes, but upon the terms that <HI>Ptolomy</HI> propo&s;ed his, which he de&s;ired &s;hould pa&s;s for an Opinion, without pretending that men &s;hould believe it on his Authority, before that he proved his Rea&s;ons. And in truth one is very ridiculous, when he &s;peaks not mode&s;tly on this matter, whereof there is &s;carcely any thing known. <HI>Lu|cretius</HI> for all he is &s;o pre&s;umptious in the Judgments that he makes on Na|ture, confe&s;&s;es that he knows not the Principles thereof. It may be &s;aid then in general, that the Primitive Philo&s;o|phers by giving their principles, have only pretended to give their con|jectures; for Nature &s;hews her &s;elf hard|ly to any man. It is true, the Invi&s;ible
<PB N="165" REF="88">Power of its Vertue may be known by the vi&s;ible effects of its Operations. But what Eye is &s;o &s;harp as to pene|trate to the &s;ource of its Intentions, and to unfold the De&s;igns thereof? Let us therefore only con&s;ider the Principles which Naturali&s;ts propo&s;e to us, as Explications which may be made on what pa&s;&s;es in Nature, and not as Laws that they impo&s;e upon her. Let us look upon the Numbers of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> the Atoms of <HI>Democritus,</HI> the Pleni|tude and Vacuity of <HI>Leucippus,</HI> the Ideas of <HI>Plato,</HI> the Matter and Form of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> the <HI>Vortices</HI> and Corpu&s;cles of <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> which the&s;e great men propo&s;e for the Principles of their Na|tural Philo&s;ophy, as Conjectures to be examined, and not as Rules to be fol|lowed. Let us even li&s;ten more favou|rably to tho&s;e who give the be&s;t Rea|&s;on for every thing, becau&s;e they have had the wit to rank their Imaginations in better order: But let us not think them &s;uch Fools, as to have been wil|ling to vent for Science, what is but Opinion, and to make current for
<PB N="166" REF="89">Truth, what is but Probability. It is a Caution that one cannot take too much to make him walk di&s;creetly in &s;o ob&s;cure a Path as that of Natural Philo&s;ophy, the ways whereof are un|certain. For as a fal&s;e Rule makes a whole Building irregular; &s;o in the &s;ame manner a fal&s;e Principle renders the whole Platform of Natural Philo|&s;ophy defective.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>III.</HEAD>
<P>What cour&s;e is then to be taken in &s;o great an uncertainty, and what guide may one follow in &s;o difficult a way? <HI>Plutarch</HI> in the &s;econd Volume of his Opu&s;cles, reckons up the diffe|rent Opinions of the ancient Philo&s;o|phers concerning Natural Philo&s;ophy, to a pretty con&s;iderable number, as <HI>Cicero</HI> had done before in his A|cademicks: and both adhere to the &s;entiment of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> which after exa|mination of all they prefer to the re&s;t: wherein they were followed by <HI>Galen,</HI> and all the &s;olid wits that have been &s;ince. So that ye have at fir&s;t great Suffrages for <HI>Ari&s;totle:</HI> For what can
<PB N="167" REF="89">be more advantageous for that Philo|&s;opher, than the te&s;timony of the&s;e great men; who have been all three particularly con&s;iderable, for the &s;oli|dity of their judgment, and the accu|ratene&s;s of their Criticks. That judg|ment which they made of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> hath been followed by all tho&s;e who in the following Ages applyed them&s;elves to the di&s;cerning of the capacity of that profound Genius. S. <HI>Jerom</HI> &s;aith that the mind of that Philo&s;opher hath been a kind of Prodigie of Nature, who knew all that man is naturally ca|pable to know. And <HI>Medina</HI> a <HI>Spani&s;h</HI> Divine, pretends that the capacity of the Spirit of man cannot dive into the knowledge of Nature, as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> did, without the particular a&s;&s;i&s;tance of a good or bad Angel. It is true, that be&s;ides that that Philo&s;opher hath re|ported all that hath been &s;aid in Natu|ral Philo&s;ophy before him&s;elf, to ap|prove or to refute it; there is nothing almo&s;t &s;ince to be found in that Science which is rational, that hath not pa&s;|&s;ed the tryal of his thoughts, and
<PB N="168" REF="90">whereof he hath not conceived the Principles. But &s;eeing men never al|mo&s;t &s;tudy him by them&s;elves, or that he is not well under&s;tood by them; there are a kind of good people, who take &s;ometimes that which he refutes, for the thing he approves; and that which he approves for what he refutes. This occa&s;ions contradictions in his Followers, who to warrant them&s;elves by his authority, make him incline to their &s;ide, whether he will or not: and &s;o it is no wonder if them&s;elves be lo&s;t, when they have put their Guide out of the way.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IV.</HEAD>
<P>But let us not be dazled with the lu|&s;tre of the high reputation of that Phi|lo&s;opher; let us neither li&s;ten to the Voice of all Ages, nor to the Votes of all the Learned that have &s;poken in his favour; let us trye <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> by him|&s;elf, let us &s;ee in what manner he hath handled that Science of Natural Philo|&s;ophy, which is the mo&s;t common Rock on which all Philo&s;ophers &s;plit: and that we may not be &s;urprized, let
<PB N="169" REF="90">us begin to judge of his Doctrine by his Principles, that we may be the more equitable in our &s;entence. As he had a Wit beyond the common rate of men, &s;o he followed extraordinary methods. He begins by a kind of Hi&s;tory of the Opinions of all the Philo&s;ophers that went before him; and that he might furni&s;h his thoughts with matter, and &s;ay nothing but what he him&s;elf was fully informed of, he is willing to know all that others have &s;aid on the &s;ame &s;ubject. And in&s;tead of going into forraign Countreys to conver&s;e with the Learned, as <HI>Plato</HI> did into <HI>E|gypt, Per&s;ia</HI> and <HI>Italy,</HI> there to &s;tudy their &s;entiments: <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;hut him&s;elf up in his Clo&s;et, that he might exa|mine in private all that was written on Natural Philo&s;ophy, and upon that examination e&s;tabli&s;h his Opinion, re|jecting what made again&s;t him, and making u&s;e of what he found for his turn. This was his fir&s;t method. He affirms nothing but what he was &s;ure of, by the perfect knowledge he had
<PB N="170" REF="91">of the Opinions of their Philo&s;ophers. His Phy&s;icks are an abridgment of the Natural Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Pythagoras, O|cellus, Timaeus, Leucippus, Parmenides, Hippocrates, Meli&s;&s;us, Democritus,</HI> and of others that went before him. The mo&s;t part of Philo&s;ophers &s;peak at ran|dom what they think fit; <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> alone dives into his matter, prepares it by overthrowing that which choaks his Opinion, and lays down nothing, till he hath fir&s;t refuted that which is con|trary to his Doctrine, and therein con|&s;i&s;ted his chief Talent. That is the method which he takes to e&s;tabli&s;h his Principles. For having overthrown the Opinion of <HI>Parmenides</HI> and <HI>Me|li&s;&s;us,</HI> who e&s;tabli&s;hed an immoveable and infinite being for the Principle of all things; having made appear the ab|&s;urdity of the &s;entiment of <HI>Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras,</HI> and the o|ther Philo&s;ophers; he lays down his Opinion of three Principles, Matter Form and Privation, as the mo&s;t proper method to illu&s;trate the altera|tion
<PB N="171" REF="91">which happens in Generation; wherein men always conceive &s;ome|thing that receives, and &s;omething which is received, that is to &s;ay, a &s;ub|ject common to the Form which comes a-new, and to that which goes away: and that is &s;o true, that without it a new production cannot be conceived. <HI>Plato,</HI> who admits the &s;ame Principles as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> doth, di&s;tingui&s;hes not Pri|vation from Matter as he doth, who is the Author of that di&s;tinction, and brags of it as his own Invention. That made him &s;ay in the la&s;t Chapter of his fir&s;t Book of Phy&s;icks, that mo&s;t part of the errours of Ancient Philo&s;ophy proceeded from this, that the fir&s;t Phi|lo&s;ophers had not framed a di&s;tinct e|nough Idea of Matter and Privation: and that which he calls Form, is no|thing el&s;e but the principle of the di&s;|po&s;itions, qualities and operations of every compound being; and which con&s;titutes every thing in its e&s;&s;ence making it to be what it is: &s;o that taking the&s;e three Principles of <HI>Ari&s;to|tle</HI> as a proper method to give a Notion
<PB N="172" REF="92">of what occurs in all the mutations that happen in Nature, and to facilitate the knowledge which men ought to have thereof, they are preferable to the principles of all the other Philo&s;ophers. And this is an abridgment of his general Phy&s;icks.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>V.</HEAD>
<P>In the fir&s;t Book, he lays down the method that he propo&s;es to him&s;elf in his de&s;ign; and &s;eeing the knowledge of Nature is in it &s;elf ob&s;cure, he pre|tends that men &s;hould rai&s;e them&s;elves as by &s;teps to clear and evident notions, from &s;uch as are not &s;o; and that in that Science we mu&s;t de&s;cend from ge|nerals to particulars. He adds that in that manner all things become clear in becoming &s;en&s;ible by their particular accidents and circum&s;tances. Having e&s;tabli&s;hed that method, in the re&s;t of that Book he refutes the principles of other Philo&s;ophers to confirm his own. In the &s;econd Book he examines what Nature is, and inquires into the proper &s;ignification of that terme. In the &s;e|cond, third, fourth and fifth Books he
<PB N="173" REF="92">treats of Cau&s;es, of Motion, and of Place, which are the attributes of a Na|tural Body. In the &s;ixth Book he ex|plains Quantity, whereof he makes an exact Treati&s;e; he begins to give an Idea of the fir&s;t Mover in the &s;eventh Book: and in the eighth he &s;peaks of Time which is the natural mea&s;ure of Motion. In the fir&s;t and &s;econd Books of the Heavens he de&s;cribes the Stars, the matter whereof they are formed, their Qualities, Motion, Scituation, Figure, and all that concerns the con|&s;truction of the World: and in the third and fourth he treats of the Gra|vity and Levity of Cele&s;tial Bodies, and of the different Opinions that the Ancients entertained thereof: and there he di&s;cour&s;es likewi&s;e of the Elements and their Qualities. In the fir&s;t Book of the <HI>Meteors</HI> he explains all that happens in the Air: in the third and fourth, what occurs in the Earth and Sea; where he likewi&s;e treats of Winds, Thunder, Lightning, Exha|lations, Thunder-bolts, the Rain-bow, Fal&s;e-&s;uns or Parelies: and in the fourth
<PB N="174" REF="93">he &s;peaks of Heat and Cold, of Siecity and Humidity, of Putrefaction, of Salts, of the different qualities of mixt bodi|es, of their mixture and temperament. In the three Books of the Soul, he ex|plains its nature, and the operations thereof, a&s;well by the external &s;en&s;es, as by the internal faculties. In the Books of his little natural que&s;tions he ob&s;erves particularly all that concerns &s;en&s;ation, memory, remini&s;cence, &s;leep|ing, waking, dreams, the progno&s;tick of dreams, the motion of Animals, their progre&s;&s;ion, the length and &s;hortne&s;s of life, old age, youth, re&s;piration, &s;ick|ne&s;s and health. The Hi&s;tory of Ani|mals is his Ma&s;terpiece, and the com|pleate&s;t of his Phy&s;icks; in the four fir&s;t he hath included the different kinds of Animals, and in the five la&s;t he hath hinted at their divers manners of mul|tiplication: he hath enriched that work with an infinite number of Experi|ments, and curious Que&s;tions, where one may find, if he narrowly ob&s;erve, the fir&s;t hints of the mo&s;t part of the new di&s;coveries, whereof modern Phi|lo&s;ophy
<PB N="175" REF="93">boa&s;ts. I wave his Book of Co|lours, his Treati&s;e of Phy&s;iognomy, his mechanical Que&s;tions, his Problems, the two Books of Generation and Cor|ruption, the Book of the World, which he compo&s;ed for <HI>Alexander,</HI> and many other Subjects which he hath handled, wherein he rendred a Rea&s;on of every thing from the greate&s;t to the lea&s;t, as <HI>Diogenes Laertius</HI> ob&s;erves. This makes me &s;ay for Conclu&s;ion, that his Natu|ral Philo&s;ophy is the mo&s;t ample that ever was; and that there has nothing e&s;caped that va&s;t mind, who&s;e profound capacity and comprehen&s;ive genius hath fathomed all things.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="6" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VI.</HEAD>
<P>And &s;o much may be &s;aid in favour of <HI>Ari&s;totle:</HI> Let us now &s;ee what may be found ami&s;s in him. There is a great deal of confu&s;ion in that Treati&s;e of his eight Books of Phy&s;icks: The connexion is no-ways natural; there is nothing harder to be under&s;tood than the fir&s;t Matter, and the eduction of Forms out of that Matter: the whole treati&s;e of Motion is ab&s;tracted; the e|ternity
<PB N="176" REF="94">of Motion which in his eighth Book he pretends to prove by circula|tion is incomprehen&s;ible, and all that Book is too metaphy&s;ical. The Trea|ti&s;e of Time and Place is not purely phy&s;ical, &s;eeing it can quadrate to Spi|rits. What he &s;ays of Time is borrow|ed from <HI>Archytas,</HI> as that which he &s;peaks of Motion is taken from <HI>Ocellus,</HI> and what he &s;ays of Vacuity from <HI>Ti|maeus,</HI> as <HI>Patricius</HI> has ob&s;erved. What he affirms in the two fir&s;t Books of the Heavens, in the Treati&s;es of Comets, the Rain-bow, and of &s;ome other Me|teors, is not found to be true in all its Circum&s;tances: Yet the fourth Book of Meteors is to be excepted, which &s;eem|eth to be more exact than the re&s;t. The Scituation, which in the third Book of the Heavens he hath given to the &s;phere of Elementary Fire, conform to the Opinion of <HI>Leucippus</HI> and <HI>Democri|tus,</HI> has not any Foundation: <HI>Pytha|goras</HI> was not of that opinion. In his &s;econd Book of Meteors he pretends that the Earth under the Equinoctial cannot be inhabited: which Experience
<PB N="177" REF="94">proves to be fal&s;e. But what he teaches of the eternity of the World, how fal&s;|ly &s;oever, is &s;till more pardonable than the re&s;t. He could not conceive the Creator but in the way that we con|ceive the Sun, which produces light at the very in&s;tant that it begins to be: and from thence there may be even great advantage drawn again&s;t the <HI>Ar|rians,</HI> who could not comprehend the Word but with &s;ome kind of po&s;terio|rity to his Principle. So that the Er|rour of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> might have furni&s;hed Rea&s;ons to rectifie the <HI>Arrians,</HI> who perhaps would not have lo&s;t their way, if they had li&s;tned to the Argument of that Pagan, although he was out of the way him&s;elf. <HI>Patricius</HI> a Philo&s;opher of <HI>Venice,</HI> in his Book of the Di&s;cu&s;&s;i|ons of the Doctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle; Ra|mus</HI> in his Phy&s;ical Schools, <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> in his Ob&s;ervations again&s;t the Peripa|teticks, relate a great many things in Natural Philo&s;ophy, wherein that Phi|lo&s;opher has been mi&s;taken, e&s;pecially in the order and con&s;truction of Cele|&s;tial Bodies, in the Hi&s;tory of Animals,
<PB N="178" REF="95">in the Anatomy of the Body of man, and in &s;ome other matters. I grant the modern Natural Philo&s;ophy is &s;o im|proved by Experiments, and by the help of new In&s;truments, whereof it makes u&s;e, that it hath &s;urpa&s;&s;ed the Phy&s;icks of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in &s;ome things, which have been more clearly di&s;co|vered in the progre&s;s of time: and that the mo&s;t part of the Opinions of anci|ent Philo&s;ophers, contained in the &s;e|cond Tome of the Works of <HI>Plutarch,</HI> concerning the Heavens and Stars, are found fal&s;e by In&s;truments proper for Cele&s;tial Ob&s;ervations, that have been invented in the&s;e la&s;t Ages. In fine, I grant that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> is le&s;s demon&s;tra|tive in his Phy&s;icks, than in the other parts of his Philo&s;ophy, that his me|thod is not &s;o exact, nor his principles &s;o &s;ure. But that defect is more to be imputed to the matter, than to the ca|pacity of the Workman, which &s;hows it &s;elf always equally vigorous in all his Rea&s;onings and Reflexions. Rea&s;on it &s;elf for all it is &s;o univer&s;al, yet is limited in &s;ome Subjects: and one cannot tran&s;|gre&s;s
<PB N="179" REF="95">tho&s;e limits, but that he goes too far.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="7" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VII.</HEAD>
<P>This is the judgment that may be made of all the Philo&s;ophers, whether ancient or modern, who have written on Natural Philo&s;ophy. The <HI>Egypti|ans</HI> have left nothing on this Science, whereof there remains any trace, but their Ob&s;ervations on the Heavens and Cele&s;tial Bodies; which they under|&s;tood better than other people, becau&s;e the quality of their &s;pirits born to Prog|no&s;ticks, inclined them more to it. <HI>Sim|plicius</HI> &s;ays that <HI>Cali&s;thenes,</HI> at the de&s;ire of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> his Kin&s;man, &s;ent into <HI>Greece</HI> Ob&s;ervations on the Heavens, made by the <HI>Chaldeans,</HI> for above two thou|&s;and years before <HI>Alexander. Porphyrie</HI> a&s;&s;ures us, that he &s;aw the&s;e Ob&s;erva|tions. What the <HI>Phenicians</HI> and <HI>Aethio|pians</HI> wrote on Natural Philo&s;ophy is lo&s;t, by the lo&s;s of the Books of <HI>Dio|dorus</HI> the <HI>Sicilian,</HI> from the fifth to the eleventh. However the <HI>Grecians,</HI> who have been the Ma&s;ters in all others Scien|ces, have been likewi&s;e in this, whereon
<PB N="180" REF="96">they have written better than other people, and have been the fir&s;t ob&s;er|vers of Nature. For <HI>Plutarch</HI> in the Life of <HI>Nicias</HI> &s;aith, that <HI>Anaxagoras</HI> and the other Philo&s;ophers of <HI>Ionia</HI> of that time were only Naturali&s;ts. To &s;peak properly, the <HI>A&s;&s;yrians</HI> under|&s;tood no more but the fir&s;t Elements of A&s;tronomy, by the unexact Ob&s;erva|tions which they made without In&s;tru|ments; having no other way to mea|&s;ure the motions of the Stars but by water-Gla&s;&s;es. Among&s;t the <HI>Grecian</HI> Philo&s;ophers <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> and <HI>Ocellus, Architas, Timaeus,</HI> who were his Di&s;ci|ples, <HI>Hippocrates, Leucippus,</HI> and <HI>Demo|critus</HI> &s;tudied Nature, and wrote there|on more learnedly than others. <HI>Demo|critus</HI> is one of the greate&s;t Naturali&s;ts that ever was; to whom <HI>Aulus Gellius</HI> gives many Elogies. <HI>Empedocles</HI> com|po&s;ed a Natural Philo&s;ophy in Ver&s;e, according to the Principles of <HI>Pythago|ras,</HI> of which <HI>Lucretius</HI> &s;peaks as of a miracle, and whereof <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> and <HI>Dio|genes Laertius</HI> make mention. <HI>Plato</HI> hath written hardly any thing on this
<PB N="181" REF="96">part, which he hath not taken from the <HI>Pythagoreans.</HI> The Opinion of <HI>Demo|critus,</HI> which had many Followers be|fore and after <HI>Aristotle,</HI> and which is revived by mo&s;t part of the modern Natural Philo&s;ophers of note, is &s;ome|what more real and &s;en&s;ible by the Do|ctrine of Atoms, than the Opinion of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> of Matter, Form, and Priva|tion: but be&s;ides that it e&s;tabli&s;hes a Matter, without e&s;tabli&s;hing a Work|man, that is to &s;ay, an Art without an Arti&s;t; that Doctrine which is much the &s;ame with that of <HI>Leucippus,</HI> falls into &s;o great ab&s;urdities when it is exa|mined to the bottom, that one hath much ado not to reject it. <HI>Socrates</HI> who found that the <HI>Sophi&s;ts</HI> had abu&s;ed that part of Philo&s;ophy by their fal&s;e argumentations, took another way and applyed him&s;elf to Morality. So that what <HI>Plato</HI> brings him in &s;aying of Na|tural Things, is none of his, as <HI>Xeno|phon</HI> alledges. The Book of <HI>Theophra|&s;tus</HI> on Plants, is in the judgment of <HI>Julius Scaliger,</HI> who hath comment|ed on it, one of the lovelie&s;t pieces of
<PB N="182" REF="97">Natural Philo&s;ophy, that is to be found in all Antiquity. <HI>Zeno</HI> the head of the <HI>Stoicks</HI> hath nothing particular in his Phy&s;icks, but that he explains not him|&s;elf as others do; though his &s;enti|ments be the &s;ame. He e&s;tabli&s;hes two Principles, God and Matter: He a&s;&s;igns to the World a Soul &s;o diffu&s;ed in all the parts thereof, that he makes it a great Animal. <HI>Lip&s;ius</HI> hath abridged the Phy|&s;icks of this Philo&s;opher, as he hath his Morals. <HI>Epicurus</HI> is uncertain in his Phy&s;icks: he takes a &s;ingular way of his own in all things. <HI>Cicero</HI> thinks that this Philo&s;opher, having addicted him&s;elf to <HI>Democritus,</HI> hath &s;poiled his Opinion by what he hath changed in it: he taught Natural Philo&s;ophy only to &s;ecure him&s;elf again&s;t the fears which Religion occa&s;ions. Vacuity and Atoms are the principles of his Phy&s;icks. The <HI>Epicureans</HI> little under&s;tood the nature of Motion, becau&s;e they no ways un|der&s;tood the nature of Time and Place, whereof the explication belongs to the Metaphy&s;icks. Notwith&s;tanding of that, <HI>Lucretius</HI> hath preferred <HI>Epicurus</HI>
<PB N="183" REF="97">to all the other Philo&s;ophers, and hath &s;et him off for the greate&s;t man that ever was: as appears by the Elogies which he makes of him in divers pla|ces of his Poem; and e&s;pecially in the beginning of his third Book, where he &s;peaks of him in a &s;train, wherein never man was &s;poken of. <HI>Amafanius,</HI> of whom <HI>Cicero</HI> makes mention, main|tains nothing different from <HI>Epicurus,</HI> who&s;e Doctrine he de&s;cribes. <HI>Plutarch</HI> cites a Book of Nature and Natural Be|ings, compo&s;ed by <HI>Chry&s;ippus,</HI> which <HI>Favorinus</HI> prai&s;eth much. What remains of the Works of Natural Philo&s;ophy written by the <HI>Greeks,</HI> is to be found by &s;hreds in the Fragments of <HI>Diogenes Laertius.</HI> We are promi&s;ed from <HI>Flo|rence</HI> a Work, who&s;e Author named <HI>Rucelai,</HI> hath collected all that the An|cients have written on that Science; and which he reduced to &s;ix and thirty different Sy&s;tems of Natural Philo&s;ophy: But &s;eeing that Work which he hath written in <HI>Italian,</HI> and which contains twelve Volumes, could not come to light before his death, it is to be feared
<PB N="184" REF="98">that it will not yet appear &s;o &s;oon, by rea|&s;on of the lo&s;s that Learning hath &s;u&s;tain|ed by the death of Cardinal <HI>de Medicis,</HI> who alone might have ha&s;tened the im|pre&s;&s;ion.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="8" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VIII.</HEAD>
<P>Though the <HI>Romans</HI> have not much applyed them&s;elves to Natural Philo|&s;ophy, the honour of which they ought wholly to yield to the <HI>Greeks;</HI> yet there are to be found among&s;t them learned Works on that &s;ubject. There hath been nothing written in <HI>Latine,</HI> in a more poli&s;hed and purer &s;tile, than the Poem of <HI>Lucretius</HI> on the Philo&s;o|phy of <HI>Epicurus;</HI> which for the puri|ty of diction <HI>Lambinus</HI> prefers to <HI>Vir|gil:</HI> but there is no piece more dange|rous for Morality. <HI>Cicero,</HI> who under|&s;tood the Philo&s;ophy of the <HI>Grecians,</HI> and wrote of it the be&s;t of all the <HI>Ro|mans,</HI> &s;peaks thereof in &s;uch a man|ner, that one cannot tell what opinion he was of: when we take him upright, we find that he addicts him&s;elf to no|thing, and that he diverts him&s;elf with every thing: but in fine, it is known
<PB N="185" REF="98">that <HI>Plato</HI> and <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> plea&s;e him bet|ter than the re&s;t. <HI>Seneca,</HI> it &s;eems, hath not well ob&s;erved a Didactick way in his Books of Natural Que&s;ti|ons; he makes too &s;ubtle Reflexions, where natural &s;implicity is only nece&s;|&s;ary; he affects too much to be moral, where he &s;hould only be natural. No man hath written more in <HI>Latine</HI> on Natural Philo&s;ophy, nor with greater elegancy, than <HI>Pliny:</HI> the &s;ole Idea of his Work is the va&s;te&s;t de&s;ign that e|ver entred into the mind of man. He is the univer&s;al Hi&s;torian of Nature, who hath given his opinion of every thing, and well; he hath pickt up a thou&s;and things, that without him would have been lo&s;t. But if we con|&s;ult the &s;entiment of <HI>Salma&s;ius</HI> in his Ob&s;ervations on <HI>Pliny,</HI> we &s;hall find that that Author hath many times &s;uf|fered him&s;elf to be deceived by tho&s;e who furni&s;hed him with the Memori|als of his Hi&s;tory; that he hath &s;ome|times lo&s;t the way him&s;elf, by a&s;&s;aying to go too far; that he hath been too credulous in following the Opinions of
<PB N="186" REF="99">others, and too ha&s;ty to follow his own; that in his Relations he takes &s;ometimes greater care of the beauty of words, than the verity of things; and that the nece&s;&s;ity that he found him&s;elf in of relying on the credit of others, makes his own to be que&s;tion|ed. Not but that he hath had Patrons in the&s;e la&s;t Ages, who pretend that mo&s;t part of the matters which he pub|li&s;hed, and whereof men heretofore doubted, are found after &s;trict exami|nation to be true. Yet I think we ought to tru&s;t more to <HI>Salma&s;ius</HI> than to tho&s;e others, who hath written more learnedly on <HI>Pliny</HI> than all that have gone before him; and it mu&s;t be ac|knowledged, that the work of <HI>Pliny</HI> is too large to be very exact. Howe|ver his Hi&s;tory is one of the mo&s;t ad|mirable works of antiquity. <HI>Plutarch, Dio&s;corides, Elianus</HI> and <HI>Solinus,</HI> eve|ry one of them in their own way have by their Books likewi&s;e much enriched Natural Philo&s;ophy: <HI>Plutarch</HI> is more a Morali&s;t than Naturali&s;t, <HI>Dio&s;corides</HI> more Phy&s;itian than Philo&s;opher, <HI>E|lianus</HI>
<PB N="187" REF="99">a better Hi&s;torian than Natura|li&s;t, and <HI>Solinus</HI> a greater Geographer than ob&s;erver of Nature. <HI>Galen</HI> hath built upon the Natural Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Hippocrates</HI> whom he followed exactly, and hath taken many things from <HI>Pli|ny,</HI> who&s;e Natural Hi&s;tory he &s;tudied much. All the other learned of the following ages have divided them|&s;elves according to the inclination they have had for <HI>Plato,</HI> or for <HI>Ari&s;totle;</HI> as <HI>Avicenna</HI> and <HI>Averroes</HI> have done: and that was likewi&s;e the party which the Schoolmen embraced in the Ages wherein their Sect hath flouri&s;hed mo&s;t. But mo&s;t of them have &s;tuck to <HI>Ari|&s;totle,</HI> notwith&s;tanding of the Animo|&s;ity and Jealou&s;ies that &s;et them toge|ther by the Ears. The Schools with all the Arrogance which they in&s;pired into their Di&s;ciples, have not been &s;o bold for the &s;pace of three hundred years, as to teach any thing in Natural Philo&s;ophy, which was not conform to the &s;entiments of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="9" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IX.</HEAD>
<P>The Modern Natural Philo&s;ophy
<PB N="188" REF="100">began not to be formed, until the la&s;t age. <HI>Galileus</HI> a Florentine Philo|&s;opher was the fir&s;t that conceived &s;uch a de&s;ign, upon the notion that he had of the Principles of <HI>Leucippus.</HI> He was a man of &s;olid wit, who by the perfect knowledge he had of A&s;trono|my and Geometry, hath rea&s;oned bet|ter on the nature of Motion, than tho&s;e that went before him or followed after. He was the fir&s;t that found out the proportion of the vibrations of &s;u&s;|pended weights, and of the accelera|tion of the motion of heavy bodies in falling, whereof he took the princi|ples from <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> He was more a Peripatetick than his Succe&s;&s;ors: but in reforming the Ancients he hath ta|ken too modern an Air. For he fol|lows the Opinion of <HI>Copernicus</HI> in the Sy&s;teme of the World, which he hath reformed: and by the u&s;e of the Tele&s;|cope, he di&s;covered many new Stars, he ob&s;erved &s;pots in the Sun, he found Mountains and Vallies in the Moon, he ob&s;erved waxings and waneings in the Planet <HI>Venus,</HI> he &s;hewed great
<PB N="189" REF="100">&s;trength in his rea&s;onings, and acquired &s;ingular Reputation in <HI>Italy,</HI> where he was in a manner the founder of Mo|dern Philo&s;ophy. Thus did <HI>Bacon</HI> a|waken the love of Philo&s;ophy in his Country. He had a va&s;t genius for Natural Philo&s;ophy, but hath in no part which he treated of it, better &s;ucceeded, than in his Hi&s;tory of Winds: though he hath been a little too credu|lous as to the memorials which were furni&s;hed him on that &s;ubject. The re&s;t of his Natural Philo&s;ophy is not of the &s;ame force; though the Cha|racter of his Wit appear therein in all its features: and what he hath written on Nature hath not contributed a little to excite the minds of his Country-men to the love of that Science, and to the &s;tudy of natural beings, which of late has reflouri&s;hed in <HI>England;</HI> where he hath found many imitators of the pa&s;&s;ion he had for Philo&s;ophy. The Phy&s;icks of <HI>Campanella,</HI> wherein he gives &s;en&s;ation to the mo&s;t in&s;en&s;ible things of nature, whereof he proves all the parts to be animated, is a Vi&s;ion
<PB N="191" REF="101">to which he was &s;ubject. <HI>Tele&s;ius</HI> is of his opinion in his treati&s;e again&s;t <HI>Galen.</HI> He is too bold in his deci&s;ions, he treats <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> often very highly, but with|out rea&s;on. <HI>Gilbertus</HI> hath explained the Experiments of the Load&s;tone bet|ter than any other. <HI>Harvey</HI> has rea&s;on|ed the be&s;t on the progre&s;s of the gene|ration of Animals, and the circulation of the Blood, as <HI>Fromond</HI> hath writ|ten the be&s;t of Meteors, <HI>Savot</HI> of Co|lours, <HI>Mer&s;ennus</HI> of Sounds and Har|mony, <HI>Willis</HI> of the Brain and its parts, <HI>Grew</HI> of the Anatomy of Plants. <HI>Floid</HI> hath little &s;ound Rea&s;on: and he might pa&s;s for the <HI>Paracel&s;us</HI> of Philo&s;ophers, as <HI>Paracel&s;us</HI> for the <HI>Floid</HI> of Phy&s;icians; for they are two Spirits much like one another. <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> hath written well again&s;t the Natural Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Floid. Borellus</HI> is a good Geometrician, and no bad Naturali&s;t, but without any prin|ciple of Metaphy&s;ick, which makes him not very &s;ure in his Propo&s;itions. <HI>Tho|mas Hobbes</HI> hath &s;hewed a great depth of wit in his Phy&s;icks; but as he is one of the bolde&s;t <HI>Epicureans</HI> of the&s;e
<PB N="190" REF="101">la&s;t Ages, and follows in every thing the principles of <HI>Epicurus,</HI> with|out any re&s;erve; &s;o hath he rea&s;oned ill about the Mind and its chief Opera|tions, the principle of which he attri|butes to Phanta&s;ms, and the Imagina|tion. <HI>Boile</HI> is a rational per&s;on, who hath applyed him&s;elf to the enriching of Natural Philo&s;ophy by his Experi|ments and Reflexions, which have al|ways an air of &s;olidity. <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> is but the Re&s;torer of the Phy&s;icks of <HI>Epicurus;</HI> which he hath handled by <HI>Galileus</HI> his principles of Motion, wherein he is altogether <HI>Galilei&s;t;</HI> and for the re&s;t an <HI>Epicurean</HI> mitigated by a principle of Con&s;cience: for he ac|knowledges the creation of Atoms, which <HI>Epicurus</HI> denys; he will have God to give them the Motion, Exten&s;i|on and Figure, which <HI>Epicurus</HI> a&s;cribes to them&s;elves: he admits of Provi|dence, which that Philo&s;opher allow|ed not. In fine, he makes <HI>Epicurus</HI> an hone&s;t man, becau&s;e he is &s;o him&s;elf: but never man hath treated <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> wor&s;e, whom he calls ignorant, fool,
<PB N="192" REF="102">and fancyful, for all he was him&s;elf &s;o moderate. As to <HI>Vanhelmont,</HI> who can find nothing rational in <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Phy|&s;icks, it mu&s;t be acknowledged his judg|ment is not great: the truth is <HI>Paracel|&s;us</HI> had infected his Wit.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="10" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>X.</HEAD>
<P>Now after all, that we may do ju|&s;tice to our Nation, and to the Me|morie of <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> we mu&s;t acknow|ledge that his Natural Philo&s;ophy is one of the mo&s;t learned and accompli&s;h|ed pieces of Modern Phy&s;icks: In it there are curious Idea's, and quaint Imaginations: and if one mind it well, there is to be found therein a more re|gular Doctrine, than in <HI>Galilaeus</HI> or the <HI>Engli&s;h;</HI> and even more novelty and invention than in <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> him&s;elf. In a word, it is a Work whereof the or|der is well excogitated: his Method is altogether Geometrical, which leads from principles to principles, and from propo&s;itions to propo&s;itions. However this is to be found fault with in him; That he &s;ettles for the principle of a Natural Body, motion, figure and ex|ten&s;ion,
<PB N="193" REF="102">which are much the &s;ame with the Principles of <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Epicurus:</HI> Whereupon it is &s;aid, That Father <HI>Mer&s;enne,</HI> who was his Re&s;ident at <HI>Paris,</HI> having one day given out in an A&s;&s;embly of the Learned, That Mon|&s;ieur <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> who had gained Repu|tation by his Geometrie, was project|ing a method of Natural Philo&s;ophy, wherein he admitted Vacuity; that project was hi&s;&s;ed at by <HI>Robertval</HI> and &s;ome others, who from thenceforwards thought it would prove no great at|chievement. Father <HI>Mer&s;enne</HI> wrote to him that Vacuity was not then a-la|mode at <HI>Paris:</HI> which obliged <HI>De&s;|cartes</HI> to devi&s;e mea&s;ures to keep in good terms with the new Naturali&s;ts, who&s;e &s;uffrage he courted, and to ad|mit the plenitude of <HI>Leucippus:</HI> So through policy the exclu&s;ion of Vacuity became one of his Principles. This made <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> &s;tart new difficulties to him; &s;howing him, that if there were no Vacuity, motion, which was one of his Principles, would be impo&s;&s;ible: becau&s;e nothing moves if there be no
<PB N="194" REF="103">void for it <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> to &s;alve that in|convenience, invented his thin &s;ubtile matter, whereof he made a kind of engine which he applied to many things; and thereby he reconciled the opinion of Plenitude and Vacuity, ac|cording as he &s;tood in need of either. But as Plenitude, and that thin &s;ubtile matter got place in the Sy&s;teme of <HI>De&s;|cartes,</HI> meerly out of complai&s;ance to the reli&s;h of the Age, and as an after|game; &s;o his Philo&s;ophy &s;eemed weak in the matter of motion, which is one of his Principles. For that Philo&s;o|pher taught that all motion was cre|ated with the World, that there was no new motion produced, and that it did no more but &s;hift from one Body to another: That the thin &s;ubtile matter by its impul&s;e, cau&s;ed all the gravity or levity of Bodies: That the alteration of heavy Bodies in their motion towards the center, proceeded from the &s;ame impul&s;e: That heat was nothing but the agitation of the particles of the Air put in motion by the &s;ubtile matter, which in his
<PB N="195" REF="103">Doctrine was a kind of a Spring fit for all things. That the Vegetation of Plants, and Generation of Animals is performed only by a fortuitous mo|tion of his little Bodies, as a Palace might be erected by a heap of Stones moved by chance: That there is no &s;en&s;ation in Animals: That the&s;e De|mon&s;trations of Joy, Sadne&s;s, Amity, and Aver&s;ion, the&s;e impre&s;&s;ions of pain and plea&s;ure, that appear in them, are but the effects of a kind of Spring and Engine, that plays according as the matter is di&s;po&s;ed: That heat is not in the Fire, hardne&s;s in the Marble, humidity in the Water; that the&s;e things are only in the Soul, which finds Fire hot, Marble hard, and Water hu|mid, by its thought, and not at all by the&s;e qualities, which are but Chy|mera's. In fine, <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> who would have us begin, by doubting of every thing, to lay a&s;ide all our notices, &s;trip our &s;elves of our Sentiments, of Cu|&s;tom, Education, Opinion, of our very Sen&s;es, and all other impre&s;&s;ions, that we may but learn &s;ome &s;mall incon&s;i|derable
<PB N="196" REF="104">matter, demands more than he promi&s;es. And when, to give the rea|&s;on of things, he &s;ays, they happen by a certain Figure, Motion, or Exten&s;ion, he hath &s;aid all; for he dives into no|thing, and for all he pretends to be &s;o great a Democriti&s;t, he under&s;tands not the true Doctrine of <HI>Democritus.</HI> His Sy&s;tem of the Load&s;tone with the&s;e little hooked bodies, the&s;e hol|lowed and &s;piral parts, is without foundation. His opinion of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, by the impre&s;&s;ion of the Atmo&s;phere of the Moon, is found fal&s;e by experience; for the parts of Water that are under the Moon, &s;well in&s;tead of &s;inking, as he &s;aith. The explication which he gives to all the motions of the Soul in its pa&s;&s;ions by the Conjunction of Nerves and Fi|bres which are in&s;erted in the <HI>(glandula pinealis)</HI> is a Dream, for there are no Nerves which terminate at that glan|dule: he &s;ays nothing rational con|cerning &s;ounds. In fine, it may be &s;aid, that he is very like tho&s;e <HI>Pythago|reans</HI> of whom <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;peaks, who
<PB N="197" REF="104">did not &s;o much endeavour to give a rea&s;on of the things they explained, as to reduce every thing to their own Principles and Sy&s;tem. However, as he made it his bu&s;ine&s;s rather to &s;how his Wit, than to di&s;cover the truth; &s;o when one is &s;o rational as to be &s;atis|fied with probabilities, he may find e|nough to &s;atisfie him&s;elf in that Na|tural Philo&s;ophy: yet that haughtine&s;s of his Di&s;ciples, who call all other Phi|lo&s;ophers ignorants, is not to be appro|ved of: their minds are dazled with a new kind of Language, and there|fore they make a noi&s;e, as all novel|ties do. The ob&s;curity of his expre&s;|&s;ion encrea&s;ed the number of his fol|lowers; for in matter of Doctrine that is often found to be the be&s;t which is lea&s;t under&s;tood.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="11" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XI.</HEAD>
<P>The Natural Philo&s;ophy of the Chy|mi&s;ts with their three principles, Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury, hath no Solidi|ty: they are narrow-&s;pirited Philo&s;o|phers, who being unable to compre|hend Univer&s;al Philo&s;ophy, have &s;tint|ed
<PB N="198" REF="105">them&s;elves to limited Subjects, and thereto &s;tinted their own Genius. They may be reduced to three orders. The fir&s;t is, of tho&s;e that pretend to the knowledge of Nature in general: the &s;econd, of tho&s;e who prepare Reme|dies: and the third, of tho&s;e who ap|ply them&s;elves to the finding out of the Art of changing of Metals, by gi|ving them either new Figures, new Colours, or new Con&s;i&s;tence. The fir&s;t and &s;econd may be rational, as <HI>Albertus Magnus, Van Helmont,</HI> and the Di&s;tillers are. The third are Ex|travagant: for to pretend to make new Creatures, is to invade the right of the Creator. As for the Cabali&s;ts and Judicial A&s;trologers, there is no|thing more frivolous than their Natu|ral Philo&s;ophy: neither &s;hall I &s;peak of the Phy&s;icks of <HI>Cardan,</HI> which are all contained in his Books of Subtilitie. But I cannot forbear to take notice, that the Royal Society of <HI>England;</HI> the Academy of Philo&s;ophers lately e&s;tabli&s;hed at <HI>Paris,</HI> by Order of the King; the Cares of the late Cardi|nal
<PB N="199" REF="105"><HI>de Medicis,</HI> to encourage the Learn|ed by his example, and the new piece of Experiments which he cau&s;ed with|in the&s;e few years to be Printed at <HI>Flo|rence;</HI> have &s;o effectually revived the love of Natural Philo&s;ophy in the Age we live in, that nothing &s;eems at pre|&s;ent more in Vogue among&s;t the Learned of <HI>Europe,</HI> than that &s;tudy which now-a-days reigns there Uni|ver&s;ally. And Men have advanced in it with &s;o much &s;ucce&s;s, that it may be &s;aid, that within the &s;pace of three|&s;core years, there have been made more new di&s;coveries in Nature, by Experiments, Ob&s;ervations, and the Invention of new In&s;truments of A|&s;tronomy, than had been made for a|bove a thou&s;and years before. For there is found out an Art of ob&s;erving all the different affections of the Air by the <HI>Thermometer:</HI> there are new De|&s;criptions made of the Moon by a Map, which repre&s;ents all its Monthly Appearances, and the Variety of the <HI>Phoenomena</HI> which the Shadow makes by Eminencies and Concavities like
<PB N="200" REF="106">to Mountains and Valleys: there is found an Art to ob&s;erve the Cour&s;e of the Stars, with as great exactne&s;s as the Motion of a Watch, or their &s;hadow on a Sun-Dial: and it was in our Age, or but a little before, that Men began to find out Irregularites in the Motion of the Heavens, and Cele&s;tial Bodies: that is to &s;ay, in the mo&s;t regular works of Nature that God hath made. In fine, it &s;eems that by that virtuous emulation, which hath been of late rai|&s;ed among&s;t the Naturali&s;ts of <HI>En|gland, France, Italy,</HI> and <HI>Holland,</HI> the World hath begun to change its Face, the Heavens to move on other princi|ples, and by other Sy&s;tems, the Air to be more cleared by the knowledge of Meteors, the Sea to become more ea&s;ie for Commerce by the Science of Na|vigation, the Earth to be better known by the perfect knowledge of Simples, mixt Bodies, Salts, and Minerals, and all Arts to be enobled by new di&s;cove|ries: at pre&s;ent there is nothing &s;tudied but the finding out of new lights in Sciences, which have been darkned by
<PB N="201" REF="106">the negligence of preceding Ages; and the &s;tudy of Experiments is rai&s;ed to a greater height than ever. What &s;hall I &s;ay of the wonderful Springs of motion in the Heart, the Circulation of the Blood, the Con&s;truction of the Brain, the Univer&s;al Oeconomie of the Body of Man, wherein there are &s;o ma|ny new &s;ecrets found out; of all the rare and late di&s;coveries in Flies and and other In&s;ects, whereof the Engli&s;h have compo&s;ed a great Volume full of Ob&s;ervations, which hitherto have been almo&s;t unknown? If with the &s;ame ardour they per&s;i&s;t in the Study of Nature, by the Ob&s;ervations which they have begun to make in all parts of the World, where their Commerce gives them entrance, they may be able &s;hort|ly to publi&s;h a &s;econd Volume of Na|tural Hi&s;tory worthy to be &s;ubjoyned to that of <HI>Pliny.</HI> If I pretended to enter into the retail of all that is found out in Nature by &s;tudy and the appli|cation of Modern Philo&s;ophy, I &s;hould never make an end. But I cannot for|get how much that Science is enriched
<PB N="202" REF="107">by the Works of <HI>Mon&s;ieur de la Cham|bre,</HI> chief Phy&s;ician in Ordinary to the King, who adhering to the Doctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> hath written on Phy&s;icks, more &s;olidly than others, and in a more florid &s;tile. In &s;o dry and barren matters, there was never &s;o much grace and beauty: and yet his politene&s;s le&s;&s;ens not the force of his rea&s;ons, nor does the flouri&s;h of his expre&s;&s;ion take any thing off from the Gravity of his matter. It may be &s;aid that he is the polite&s;t and mo&s;t &s;olid of all Modern Philo&s;o|phers, and that if Nature her &s;elf would explain her &s;elf, &s;he would u&s;e no other terms.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="12" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XII.</HEAD>
<P>It remains now to be ob&s;erved, that we may put an end to the Reflexions on Natural Philo&s;ophy, what it is that may contribute to the perfection of that Art, whereof men are &s;o fond of late, and what may hurt the progre&s;s which it &s;o ju&s;tly makes in the minds of men. As honour and emulation are chiefly the Soul of Arts and Sciences; &s;o they who have a Genius for Natural Philo|&s;ophy,
<PB N="203" REF="107">whereof the knowledge is &s;o important for Society, cannot be too much e&s;teemed. Yet they cannot be &s;ufficiently warned to have a care of be|ing &s;urpri&s;ed by new Opinions, with|out &s;trict examination of them, and of e&s;pou&s;ing the &s;entiments of others by a Spirit of Cabal and partiality; they &s;hould ca&s;t off that Character, as one of the greate&s;t hindrances to the know|ledge and di&s;cerning of Truth. Let us exhort them to guard them&s;elves by the U&s;e and Experience of Things, that they may prevent plea&s;ant Errours, and lay a&s;ide the natural prepo&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion that men have for their own Opinions: but let us likewi&s;e advi&s;e them never to be too curious, without &s;ome lit|tle docility, nor to be too docile, with|out &s;omewhat of curio&s;ity. For curio|&s;ity without &s;ubmi&s;&s;ion leads men out of the way; and too great &s;ubmi&s;&s;ion without curio&s;ity guides men into igno|rance. Let them know that Rea&s;on and Experience are the two only ways whereby that Science is acquired: but that Rea&s;on without Experience hath
<PB N="204" REF="108">no &s;olidity, as Experience without Rea|&s;on has no exactne&s;s. Let them not a|mu&s;e them&s;elves to &s;atisfie too much the publick curio&s;ity by Novelties: for it is a vanity of the new Philo&s;ophers to make it more their bu&s;ine&s;s to &s;ay things that are agreeable, than u&s;e|ful. The&s;e maxims are to be in&s;inu|ated to the modern Philo&s;ophers, to imprint on their minds that Character of &s;olidity, without which that Science cannot be well handled, wherein there is nothing more to be avoided, than il|lu&s;ion and uncertainty. Moreover, though there be hardly any thing more to be added to the general Phy&s;icks, to enrich them with new Principles and Methods, becau&s;e they con&s;i&s;t in a li|mited perfection: yet it may be &s;aid that the &s;pecial Phy&s;icks are of &s;o va&s;t an extent, that there may be always found new ways to rai&s;e them to grea|ter perfection. And for all the new Stars that are di&s;covered, there will re|main &s;till more to be found out. For that is a Stock, which, though it be &s;o much already drained by the Studies of
<PB N="205" REF="108">&s;o many Learned, and by the &s;eries of &s;o many Ages, yet will &s;till prove in|exhau&s;tible.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="13" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>XIII.</HEAD>
<P>The la&s;t Reflexion which we have to make on this Science, regards the pro|cedure of Naturali&s;ts, who in their Rea&s;onings refer all things toNature, giving it greater vertue than it ought to have, and &s;tretching its power beyond the bounds that the Creator hath pre|&s;cribed to it. As <HI>Alcindus,</HI> that <HI>Ara|bian</HI> Philo&s;opher, did heretofore, whom <HI>Averroes</HI> ranks among the greate&s;t wits that ever were; in effect he knew ma|ny things: but he made a Treati&s;e wherein he imputed to Nature, what is commonly attributed to Spirits, which are above Nature, that is to &s;ay, to An|gels and Demons. So did <HI>Peter</HI> of <HI>A|pono</HI> and <HI>Pomponatius,</HI> both great &s;tick|lers for Nature, pretend that all that happened in &s;ublunary things, was but an effect of Cele&s;tial impre&s;&s;ions. And as <HI>Galen</HI> referred every thing to the Qualities of Temperament, <HI>Albertus Magnus</HI> to the Specifick Form, <HI>Marci|lius
<PB N="206" REF="109">Ficinus</HI> to Planets; &s;o <HI>Peter</HI> of <HI>Apo|no</HI> referred every thing to the Vertue of Cele&s;tial Bodies, and acknowledged no other Miracles but the changes of Sea|&s;ons, as <HI>Du Loyer</HI> a&s;&s;ures us. This gave occa&s;ion to <HI>Bapti&s;ta</HI> of <HI>Mantua</HI> to call him, <HI>Virum magnae &s;ed nimium audacis &s;apientiae; a great Philo&s;opher, but of too great boldne&s;s.</HI> That is the common infirmity of &s;tinted Spirits, that believe nothing but what they comprehend. <HI>Montanus</HI> &s;eems to be a Philo&s;opher of this Character: he is often incredulous, through a de&s;ire of being too much a Naturali&s;t; and he is the more dange|rous for Religion, the more he affects not to appear &s;o. For by the ingenuity of plain common &s;en&s;e, and of too civil a Philo&s;opher, he works greater effects on mens minds, with his negligent way of &s;aying what he &s;ays. The Natural Phi|lo&s;ophy of <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> rai&s;es not the Mind above the Sen&s;es: by Bodies alone he explains the mo&s;t &s;piritual operations of the Soul: and an <HI>Engli&s;hman</HI> of late hath made appear, that in all the Rea|&s;onings of that Philo&s;opher there is a
<PB N="207" REF="109">mechanical air that reduces every thing to the method of Art; for which he thinks it dangerous to Religion. But &s;peaking generally, Natural Philo&s;o|phy, Medicine, A&s;trology, and Chymi|&s;try, &s;tick too much to Nature, to rai&s;e men to him who is the Author thereof: they allow too much to the Sen&s;es, to make men able to get above Senfe; and they harden the heart again&s;t the be|lief of God, by accu&s;toming men to con&s;ider things by too low a view. Un|happy are the Philo&s;ophers of that Ge|nius, who &s;ubtilize on the Knowledge of the Creature, and &s;tick at the belief of the Creator. That was not the Cha|racter of the ancient Philo&s;ophers, who had not only higher thoughts than we, but rai&s;ed them&s;elves above them&s;elves, that they might acknowledge a Sove|raign Rea&s;on, which they made the Rule of all their Rea&s;onings, and to which they &s;ubmitted their minds. In fine, that we may make an end, let us ob&s;erve our &s;elves in the judgments we make of Nature, and judge of it with reverence, let us not decide too
<PB N="208" REF="110">boldly on its operations, whereof Man ought never to judge but with trembling. For to be &s;hort, to cen&s;ure Nature is to cen&s;ure God who&s;e work it is, and to &s;ubmit the greatne&s;s of his Power to our Criticks. Wherein that Prince &s;eemed Extravagant, that would have reformed the Fabrick of the World by a fal&s;e Gu&s;to of Philo&s;ophy, which he had learnt from the <HI>Arabians.</HI> True Philo&s;ophy, when it hath attain|ed to its highe&s;t pitch of perfection, judges of every thing with fear; it &s;hakes when it comes to decide, becau&s;e it knows its own incapacity, by know|ing the weakne&s;s of the mind of man. But when it con&s;iders the Works of God, it impo&s;es &s;ilence on its Rea&s;on, and bends downwards all its know|ledge, as the Cherubims of the Pro|phet fold their Wings, and humble them&s;elves before God, that by their own humiliation they may reverence the greatne&s;s of his Maje&s;ty.</P>
</DIV2>
<TRAILER>The end of the Fourth Part.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="chapter">
<PB N="209" REF="110">
<HEAD>Reflexions ON <HI>The Metaphy&s;icks.</HI></HEAD>
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>I.</HEAD>
<P>_NAtural Philo&s;ophy is the know+ledge of natural and &s;en&s;ible things: and Metaphy&s;icks is the Science of things pure|ly intellectual. All other Sciences have a dependance on this; for it &s;erves them for Foundation and Method, and without it there is no|thing known but imperfectly. That is perhaps the Rea&s;on which obliged <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> to call that Science the true beginning of Philo&s;ophy, and the no|ble&s;t of Sciences. As it is taken up only about the thoughts, by a view
<PB N="210" REF="111">ab&s;tracted from corporeal and incorpo|real beings, &s;o it rai&s;es it &s;elf above &s;en&s;e and matter: it leaves the quantity of Bodies to the con&s;ideration of Geome|try, and their other qualities to Natural Philo&s;ophy; that it may imploy it &s;elf only about being &s;eparated from their Individual Singularity, &s;uch as are Sub|&s;tances, Accidents, Relations, Oppo|&s;itions, and all that can be conceived by an ab&s;traction from Matter: and that it may only con&s;ider beings that are purely &s;piritual, &s;uch as, the Soul, Spirits, Angels, and even God him|&s;elf: wherein it hath &s;omething of Di|vinity. It is for that Rea&s;on al&s;o that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> calls it Divinity or Natural Theology. The end of this Science is the finding out of pure and ab&s;tract|ed Verity: thereby it perceives things in their original, that it may know them to the full: it enters into the retail of all particular Species, which it redu|ces to their principles; and that retail is almo&s;t infinite: this is the Rea&s;on that without it all the knowledges of man are but &s;uperficial and imperfect,
<PB N="211" REF="111">becau&s;e there is not almo&s;t any true de|mon&s;tration without its Principles.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>II.</HEAD>
<P>The de&s;ign of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in his Meta|phy&s;icks is to give Principles to other Sciences, which they cannot have of them&s;elves; and to e&s;tabli&s;h a princi|pal vertue, which might &s;erve for a Rule to all other Verities. That Phi|lo&s;opher hath written twelve Books of Metaphy&s;icks, whereof the three fir&s;t are preliminary to that Science. In the fir&s;t Book he teaches, that Memory is formed from Sen&s;e, Experience from Memory, and Art and Science toge|ther from Experience. He &s;hews that Sapience being a perfect knowledge of the fir&s;t Principles, is preferable to Sci|ence; that nothing is known as it &s;hould be but by the cau&s;es; and that the ancient Philo&s;ophers have &s;ome|times &s;aid well, without knowing the rea&s;on why, becau&s;e they were not methodical in their Science. He teaches that the impre&s;&s;ions receiv'd from Edu|cation and Cu&s;tom are great hinderan|ces to the knowledge of Truth; and
<PB N="212" REF="112">that to know a-right, we mu&s;t &s;eek out the method mo&s;t convenient for the Science we inquire into. He de|clares in his third Book, That to begin to know we mu&s;t begin to doubt: and that to know Truth a-right, we mu&s;t know Fal&s;ity and Untruth: There he refutes tho&s;e that explain Nature by Fables, de&s;igning thereby <HI>Pythagoras</HI> and <HI>Plato.</HI> In the &s;ame Book he exa|mines if one Science may propo&s;e all other Sciences for its object. He ends with the Notion that he gives of Sub|&s;tance; and enquires if there be any other Sub&s;tances be&s;ides what fall un|der our Sen&s;es, &s;uch as Ideas and fir&s;t Matter. Having made this preparati|on of Que&s;tions nece&s;&s;ary to his de|&s;ign, he treats in the fourth Book of the Principle object of Metaphy&s;icks, which is <HI>Being,</HI> ab&s;tracted from Mat|ter, in &s;o much as it is <HI>Being.</HI> In the fifth Book he explains the various At|tributes of <HI>Being,</HI> and gives a general notion of the terms of Metaphy&s;icks. The &s;ixth Book is another Preliminary to the following Books. In the &s;eventh
<PB N="213" REF="112">Book he explains the Nature of Sub|&s;tance, which is the fir&s;t of <HI>Beings,</HI> what is e&s;&s;ential to it, and wherein it differs from an <HI>Accident:</HI> In the eighth Book he di&s;tingui&s;hes it into Sub&s;tance material and Sub&s;tance immaterial. There it is that he &s;peaks of the Sub|&s;tantial Form, of the Numbers of <HI>Py|thagoras,</HI> and the Ideas of <HI>Plato,</HI> which he pretends to be no-ways &s;ub&s;tantial. The ninth Book is an Explication of the different kinds of <HI>Being,</HI> of the <HI>Being</HI> actual and the <HI>Being</HI> po&s;&s;ible, of the Act and the Power, <HI>Actus</HI> and <HI>Po|tentia,</HI> of the notion and difference thereof; and ends the Book by a Di&s;|cour&s;e of True and Fal&s;e. In the tenth Book he tells what Unity is, which is the fir&s;t property of a <HI>Being,</HI> he &s;hews the oppo&s;ition between Plurality and Unity, he explains how and how many ways one thing is contrary to another, and all the Doctrine of Contraries, which is the ground of the mo&s;t part of the Principles of Metaphy&s;icks. In the eleventh Book he repeats a great many things already laid down in
<PB N="214" REF="113">the third and fourth Books, and a|mong&s;t others, the Method of right doubting, to attain to right knowing: for he that doubts hath a greater di&s;po|&s;ition to know Truth, than he that doubteth not: becau&s;e he grounds not the a&s;&s;urance of his judgement, but up|on the clearing of his uncertainties. Having proved Sub&s;tantial Forms, he teaches in the twelfth Book that there are Sub&s;tances &s;eparate from Bodies, and that there are Spirits. All that Di&s;|cour&s;e tends to the demon&s;tration of a fir&s;t Mover, and to the e&s;tabli&s;hment of a Deity. The two following Books were not come to light in the time of <HI>Thomas Aquinas. Po&s;&s;evin</HI> in the third Book of his Bibliotheck pretends that they are none of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s: but &s;eeing there is to be found in them the &s;ame Character, the &s;ame Wit and the &s;ame rea&s;oning, all the Learned are of a con|trary opinion. It is true, that in his thirteenth Book there are repetitions about the Numbers of <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> and the Idea's of <HI>Plato:</HI> But the fourteenth Book is a Collection of Axioms, Prin|ciples,
<PB N="215" REF="113">Divi&s;ions and admirable Defi|nitions, which he hath gather'd out of the former Books. And though his Metaphy&s;icks be rank'd in no very exact order, and that in many places thereof there be &s;everal repetitions; it is notwith&s;tanding a fountain fertile in Notices, Rea&s;onings, Maxims, and Veri|ties, which are rare overtures for other Sciences: and there is nothing more nece&s;&s;ary for a Philo&s;opher, who would know things intimately, than the Me|taphy&s;icks of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>III.</HEAD>
<P>What is more to be wondered at in this Work, <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> is the fir&s;t Founder of that manner of Rea&s;oning by way of ab&s;traction, and of &s;peaking of Imma|terial Beings, of Spirits, and of God him&s;elf. For the Philo&s;ophers that went before him, &s;pake of &s;uch things with little &s;olidity. It is true <HI>Pythagor as</HI> learnt from the <HI>Hebrews,</HI> by the com|merce that he had with the <HI>Egyptians,</HI> the Unity of one God, and taught it the <HI>Grecians.</HI> But as the <HI>Egyptians</HI> were naturally my&s;terious and vi&s;ioni&s;ts;
<PB N="216" REF="114"><HI>Pythagoras</HI> took from them the mo&s;t part of their Vi&s;ions, concerning Spi|rits and Intelligences, to which the <HI>Egyptians</HI> a&s;&s;igned little &s;ubtile Bodies, wherewith they filled the World. And <HI>Pythagoras</HI> was the fir&s;t who by that imagination gave occa&s;ion to all the ex|travagancies of the <HI>Cabali&s;ts</HI> about Spi|rits, and to all the&s;e Fables, whereof the Author of the <HI>Cabalis</HI> hath endeavour|ed to renew the Notion in the&s;e la&s;t times. <HI>Plato,</HI> who &s;eems to lay down that Doctrine in his Dialogues of <HI>Epi|nomis</HI> and <HI>Cratilus,</HI> took it from <HI>Py|thagoras,</HI> and <HI>Zeno</HI> the <HI>Stoick</HI> had it from <HI>Plato,</HI> as <HI>Lip&s;ius</HI> relates at length. <HI>Apuleius</HI> pretends that <HI>Plato</HI> of all the Ancient Philo&s;ophers, hath di&s;cour&s;ed be&s;t of God, of Providence, of divine matters, and of Spirits. It mu&s;t be granted that he appears more know|ing in that kind of Science than any of the re&s;t; but &s;eeing he learnt of <HI>Pytha|goras</HI> mo&s;t part of what he delivers on that &s;ubject, it is not &s;ure to follow him. <HI>Tertullian</HI> &s;ays, That the <HI>Plato|ni&s;ts</HI> a&s;&s;ign'd even a Body to God, as
<PB N="217" REF="114">well as the <HI>Stoicks. Ari&s;totle,</HI> who had more reality in his thoughts, &s;peaks in another &s;train. He had the Art to purge the Verities that he learnt in the School of <HI>Pythagoras</HI> from the raveries of the <HI>Pythagoreans.</HI> As for <HI>Epicurus</HI> he makes Gods of &s;o ridiculous a &s;hape, that by owning of them he overthrows them. <HI>Zeno</HI> makes his Wi&s;e-man &s;o indepen|dant of Providence, and &s;o equal to the Gods, that thereby he renders them contemptible: For he leaves Men to think of them what-ever they plea&s;e. <HI>Chry&s;ippus</HI> wrote &s;ome Treati&s;es of the Gods and a Deity; whereof <HI>Plutarch</HI> &s;peaks in his Morals; but they are lo&s;t: It is probable he &s;peaks no otherways of them, but in the &s;entiments of <HI>Zeno.</HI> There is nothing in all Antiquity &s;o ra|tionally written on that &s;ubject, as the Books of <HI>Cicero</HI> concerning the Nature of the Gods. His &s;entiments are as right, and his doctrine as &s;ound, as the Doctrine of a <HI>Pagan</HI> can be. But that which makes him &s;peak better than o|thers is, becau&s;e he followed the Do|ctrine of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> and made u&s;e of his
<PB N="218" REF="115">arguments, to prove a Providence. <HI>Se|neca</HI> &s;peaks of a Deity but like a half-knowing man; the Idea that he gives of God, as an univer&s;al Spirit that ani|mates the World, is not exact: but it &s;eems rea&s;onable what he &s;ays, that the &s;ame injury is done to the Gods, not at all to believe them, as to believe them to be other than what they are, and what they &s;hould be. All that hath been written &s;ince by the later <HI>Platon|i&s;ts</HI> under the Emperours carries no &s;o|lid character. The mo&s;t part of the <HI>Greek</HI> Fathers, who were all almo&s;t <HI>Pla|toni&s;ts,</HI> are not exact in what they &s;ay of Angels and Spirits, by rea&s;on of the fal&s;e notions that they learn'd in the School of <HI>Plato.</HI> Since the e&s;tabli&s;hment of Chri&s;tianity, the Exi&s;tence of God, the Immortality of the Soul, its &s;tate of Separation from the Body, good and bad Angels, and the other mo&s;t e&s;&s;ential truths of our Religion are &s;o illu&s;trated, that none can now doubt thereof with|out impiety. <HI>Pomponatius</HI> in the la&s;t Age, wrote a Treati&s;e of the Soul in a &s;train that drew upon him the cen&s;ures
<PB N="219" REF="115">of <HI>Rome. Agrippa</HI> &s;peaks like an ex|travagant in all the di&s;cour&s;e which he made of God, Religion, and Intelligen|ces, in the third Book of his Secret Phi|lo&s;ophy. <HI>Ramus</HI> exceedingly &s;lighted the Metaphy&s;icks, wherein he &s;eems not very judicious. He would have joyn'd to the Body of Philo&s;ophy, the knowledge of the Liberal Arts, that he might more &s;ecurely cut off the Meta|phy&s;icks. But among&s;t that fearful multitude of Writings hatch'd in the du&s;t of the Schools of the&s;e la&s;t A|ges, there hath been nothing compo|&s;ed with greater penetration and capa|city, than the Metaphy&s;icks of <HI>Suarez</HI> the <HI>Je&s;uit.</HI> That piece, which con|tains all the &s;ubtility and force of the Schools, is one of the wonderful pro|ductions of the&s;e la&s;t times. It cannot be too much recommended to young Divines, who by a fal&s;e appetite to a new method for&s;ake the Schola&s;tick way in their di&s;putes, that they may become Hi&s;torians: becau&s;e it is le&s;s trouble to them to make an o&s;tentation of their memory, than to give proofs
<PB N="220" REF="116">of their judgement. There hath been in the&s;e la&s;t times a croud of Commen|tatours, who in a profound &s;tile have written on the Metaphy&s;icks of <HI>Ari|&s;totle:</HI> among&s;t others <HI>Fon&s;eca</HI> a <HI>Portu|gue&s;e</HI> Je&s;uit. Sir <HI>Kenelm Digby</HI> is too ab&s;tract in his Treati&s;e of the Immorta|lity of the Soul. The Metaphy&s;ical Me|ditations of <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> have been held in reputation; for he hath dived into the&s;e matters more than others. In his fir&s;t Meditation he teaches man to doubt well, that he may know a-right: he proves in the &s;econd, that the Thought is more &s;en&s;ible and better known than the Body. The third is a Demon&s;tration of the Exi&s;tence of God. The fourth, a Method of di|&s;cerning of Truth and Fal&s;hood. The fifth treats of the E&s;&s;ence of material Beings. The &s;ixth explains their Exi|&s;tence: and the Conclu&s;ion is a real Di|&s;tinction betwixt the Body and the Thoughts, for the e&s;tabli&s;hing that great Principle, <HI>I think, therefore I am;</HI> to which may be added his An&s;wers to the Objections of <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus,</HI> which
<PB N="221" REF="116">have the &s;ame force as the re&s;t of his Works. <HI>Willis</HI> an <HI>Engli&s;h</HI> Phy&s;ician hath written rationally <HI>of Separated Forms.</HI> There are not many Works compo&s;ed in the&s;e la&s;t times of &s;uch a nature: wherein the Speculations of Natural Philo&s;ophy take up the minds of men, more than tho&s;e of Metaphy|&s;icks. It were to be wi&s;hed that men would employ them in &s;ubjects that are capable thereof: but the Idea and De|&s;ign of &s;ome Speculatives is not to be approved, who mingle too much Me|taphy&s;icks with Religion: which ought to be handled more plainly, and in a le&s;s ab&s;tracted manner than other &s;ub|jects; becau&s;e there is nothing more real, nor more &s;imple.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IV.</HEAD>
<P>Though this Science be &s;o much en|quired into already by the Works I have been &s;peaking of, yet it might &s;till be more improved by Reflexions that might be made on the Principles and Rea&s;onings of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> becau&s;e what con&s;i&s;ts in Conceptions and I|deas cannot be limited: but there is
<PB N="222" REF="117">need of a di&s;po&s;ition proper for Re|flexion and rea&s;oning in &s;uch an e&s;&s;ay: for that Science rea&s;ons, and reflects on its rea&s;onings more than others. Yet it meets likewi&s;e with great Ob&s;ta|cles in its procedure; whereof the fir&s;t is, that it marches (to u&s;e the word) by ways not much frequented, and by unknown paths, having no|thing &s;ufficiently e&s;tabli&s;hed; for it hath hardly any true Definition, or exact and compleat Divi&s;ion: and &s;ee|ing it gives occa&s;ion to many doubt|ings, it furni&s;hes Matter of Di&s;pute, there being none of the Principles thereof that can be univer&s;ally agreed upon. The &s;econd ob&s;tacle is the na|tural timidity of the mind of man, which looks upon Metaphy&s;icks, being ab&s;tracted from Matter and Sen&s;e, to be above its &s;trength: whereby it be|comes like to tho&s;e timorous and ill-a&s;&s;ured Travellers, who go by ways that they know not. The third Ob|&s;tacle is, a great number of hard and barbarous Terms, ob&s;cure and perplex|ed Definitions, thou&s;ands of Concep|tions
<PB N="223" REF="117">and Rea&s;onings hatched in the Du&s;t of the Schools, which render that Science de&s;titute of the u&s;ual Charms of other Sciences. The fourth is a &s;tock of wrangling, and a heap of thorny and di&s;plea&s;ing Que&s;tions, fitter to confound than in&s;truct the mind. The la&s;t Ob&s;tacle is, the rarity of Spi|rits fit for that Science. Spirits that are either too profound or too &s;uperficial are not proper for it. By the too great pro|foundne&s;s of meditation men are apt to fall into a black and melancholick Phi|lo&s;ophy: as it happened to <HI>Agrippa</HI> in his Metaphy&s;icks. And by the vivacity of an aiery and &s;uperficial wit, they are apt to evaporate in empty and &s;pongie imaginations: as it befel <HI>Cardan,</HI> who wandered among the Vi&s;ions of the mo&s;t chymerical Philo&s;ophy in the World; and as it happens daily to wits that have no foundation. There hath lately come abroad a Treati&s;e of Meta|phy&s;icks, printed at <HI>London,</HI> and com|po&s;ed by <HI>Henry More,</HI> which overturns all the Rea&s;ons that <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> makes u&s;e of to prove the exi&s;tence of God, and
<PB N="224" REF="118">which overthrows the mo&s;t part of his Meditations. That were no great mat|ter, if that <HI>Engli&s;h</HI> Philo&s;opher did not wound <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> in his Religion, when he declaims again&s;t his Natural Philo|&s;ophy, which he would have pa&s;s for Libertini&s;m, as well as that of Mr. <HI>Hobbes.</HI> The <HI>Carte&s;ians,</HI> who are jea|lous of the honour of their opinion, have Rea&s;on to make their zeal fla&s;h out again&s;t that Author, by ju&s;tifying the reputation of their Ma&s;ter. There might be a great many other Reflexions made, if the&s;e Metaphy&s;ical Ideas were not &s;o ob&s;cure. Let us now &s;ee, before we end this di&s;cour&s;e, what is the u&s;e that is to be made of Philo&s;ophy in matters of Religion, which ought in|deed to be all the fruit of it. For men are not over tender of Religion, when once they become Philo&s;ophers.</P>
</DIV2>
<TRAILER>The end of the fifth Part.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="chapter">
<PB N="225" REF="118">
<HEAD>Reflexions ON <HI>The &V;&s;e which is to be made</HI> OF PHILOSOPHY, IN <HI>Matters of Religion.</HI></HEAD>
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>I.</HEAD>
<P>_THe fir&s;t In&s;trument that Re|ligion makes u&s;e of to prove its maximes, is Rea&s;on; and Rea&s;on cannot be rightly employed but by Philo&s;ophy, which reduces it into method by giving it principles. It is therefore important
<PB N="226" REF="119">that Philo&s;ophy it &s;elf &s;hould be &s;ound, that it may &s;tamp a right Character on the mind, and conduct it &s;ecurely in a way, which one cannot mi&s;take or lo&s;e without Eternal Ruine. And therefore it is that <HI>Lactantius</HI> &s;ays, that Philo&s;ophy is of great u&s;e to a Man, when he hath once got &s;ome Tincture of Religion. But Men may ea&s;ily a|bu&s;e &s;o advantagious a means, by the bad u&s;e that the mind of Man may make of it, when it yields to the con|duct of pa&s;&s;ion, intere&s;t, or prejudices. This made <HI>Callicles</HI> in <HI>Plato</HI> &s;ay, that Philo&s;ophy taken the wrong way was able to &s;poil Religion. There is there|fore great circum&s;pection to be u&s;ed as to that. Faith is an Heavenly Uncti|on, that will ea&s;ily corrupt in a mind infected with fal&s;e Doctrine. And as any Liquor would be &s;oon &s;poiled in an impure Ve&s;&s;el: &s;o nothing is more ca|pable to alter the purity of Religion, than the impurity of &s;entiments where|with it is received. It is not that one mu&s;t needs be a Philo&s;opher, to be a Chri&s;tian, nor that the Wi&s;dom of the
<PB N="227" REF="119">World is a rule to the Wi&s;dom of Hea|ven. But that the rea&s;on of Man being &s;ubmitted to Faith; Faith how Divine &s;oever it be, conde&s;cends to make u&s;e of Humane Rea&s;oning, to bring Rea|&s;on to its Obedience. So that it can|not be ab&s;olutely pure, if Philo&s;ophy, which is the In&s;trument that it makes u&s;e of, be not &s;o likewi&s;e. This obliged St. <HI>Paul</HI> to admoni&s;h the Primitive Chri&s;tians to beware, <HI>le&s;t any Man &s;hould &s;poil them through Philo&s;ophy, and vain Deceit, through the Traditions of Men, according to the Rudiments of the World, and not after Chri&s;t.</HI>) The World was &s;o infected with the diffe|rent opinions of &s;o many Philo&s;ophers, that a Chri&s;tian needed all his Wits a|bout him to guard him&s;elf from that danger. For <HI>Tertullian</HI> ob&s;erves, that the Primitive Here&s;ies &s;prang only from the opinions, wherein tho&s;e that were the Authours of them had been bred. Philo&s;ophy ill under&s;tood, &s;aith St. <HI>Augu&s;tin,</HI> made the <HI>Egyptians</HI> Wor&s;hip the Sun and Stars. The <HI>Va|lentinians,</HI> again&s;t whom St. <HI>Irenaeus</HI>
<PB N="228" REF="120">writes, came out of the School of <HI>Dioge|nes</HI> and <HI>Epicurus;</HI> the Gno&s;ticks out of <HI>Plato</HI>'s; and the Manichees out of that of <HI>Pythagoras. Martian</HI> became Heretick by the Doctrine of <HI>Zeno;</HI> and <HI>Manes</HI> took the principles of his opinion from a Saracen Philo&s;opher, whom St. <HI>Epi|phanius</HI> mentions. St. <HI>Jerome</HI> a&s;&s;ures us that it was the Morality of the Sto|icks that made the Pelagians fall into errour. But what happened in the Primitive Ages by that manner of de|pendance which Religion hath on Phi|lo&s;ophy, is come to pa&s;s in the la&s;t. <HI>Po&s;&s;evin</HI> ob&s;erves, that it is incredible how many Libertines and Hereticks the reading of <HI>Averroes</HI> made in <HI>Eu|rope. Alphon&s;us</HI> King of <HI>Ca&s;tile</HI> cen|&s;ured the Workman-&s;hip of God, by Critici&s;ing on Nature, and grew impi|ous by the &s;tudy of the Arabian Phi|lo&s;ophers, and by the plea&s;ure he took in the ravings of a Spani&s;h Jew, who found out the motion of Trepidation in the Firmament. <HI>Agrippa</HI> &s;poiled his &s;pirit by the reading of <HI>Porphyrie, Pro|clus,</HI> and <HI>Ple&s;&s;us,</HI> that is to &s;ay, by the
<PB N="229" REF="120">Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Plato,</HI> as he him&s;elf confe&s;&s;es. <HI>Cervetus</HI> a Spaniard, and <HI>Socinus</HI> an Italian, made only u&s;e of Philo&s;ophy, to make Innovations in Religion. And it is pretended that the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>De&s;cartes</HI> was at fir&s;t well received in the North, be|cau&s;e it &s;eemed to favour the opinion of <HI>Calvin,</HI> which is in greate&s;t Vogue there: for the principles of that new Philo&s;ophy lead a Man to believe that the Creature in its free&s;t Actions, acts only by the impul&s;e of the Creator, and that it is God alone that wills in the willings of Man. In fine, nothing tends more to the corruption of the Heart, than the corruption of Do|ctrine; and there is nothing that over|throws Religion, &s;o much as the vain Rea&s;onings of a fal&s;e Philo&s;ophy. It is not by the School of Errour and Ly|ing, that one becomes a Di&s;ciple of truth: neither was it by the incon|&s;tancy and levity of Humane Opini|ons, that the Apo&s;tles became the Pil|lars of Faith. That was al&s;o the rea|&s;on that moved the Fathers in &s;ome
<PB N="230" REF="121">coun&s;els, to order the Profe&s;&s;ors of Phi|lo&s;ophie not to teach any Doctrines that were prejudicial to Religion.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>II.</HEAD>
<P>It much concerns a Chri&s;tian then, not to make u&s;e indifferently of every kind of Philo&s;ophy, &s;eeing the u&s;e of it may prove &s;o dangerous: it is even Prudence to make &s;ure in the choice that is to be made among&s;t &s;o many different opinions, as have pa&s;&s;ed cur|rent in all Ages. But what a&s;&s;urance is there amid&s;t &s;o many clouds wherein Truth is commonly wrapped up? to which may be added the ob&s;curity of Natural things; the weakne&s;s of the Spirit of Man; the erroneou&s;ne&s;s of the Judgement of the Sen&s;es naturally Im|po&s;trous: in a word, Opinion and Pa&s;&s;i|on, which are perpetual hindrances to Natural evidences; as well as all the&s;e idle and curious Speculations, to which Philo&s;ophers are &s;ubject, &amp; which &s;erve more for oftentation and the Pomp of Science, than the conduct of the Mind, and edification of manners. Whence appears how empty and vain Humane
<PB N="231" REF="121">Wi&s;dom is, whereof all the Light can only &s;erve to &s;educe and lead Men out of the way: Becau&s;e, &s;aith St. <HI>Augu&s;tin,</HI> God hath concealed Truth from Man, as well for the puni&s;hment of his crime, as to in&s;truct him of his mi&s;ery. Where|fore that we may not mi&s;take our &s;elves, let us begin to &s;tudy what is to be believed, before we &s;et our &s;elves on Rea&s;oning. Let us regulate the u&s;e of our Faith, that we may regulate the u&s;e of our Rea&s;on: let us be Chri&s;tians before we be Philo&s;ophers: let our fir&s;t Wi&s;dom and our chief Philo&s;ophy be our Religion. Men learn to rea&s;on by Phi|lo&s;ophy; but they learn to &s;ubmit their minds to Rea&s;on and eternal Verity, by Chri&s;tianity. Let us know the duties thereof by the &s;tudy of the Law, which is, &s;ays St. <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tom,</HI> the rule of Know|ledge and Truth: That we may learn that method of Rea&s;oning which may be mo&s;t &s;utable to it, let us apply our &s;elves to the Doctrine of the Go|&s;pel, which the pride of Pagan Philo|&s;ophers could never comprehend, and our Rea&s;on will &s;ettle it &s;elf upon &s;o
<PB N="232" REF="122">&s;olid a foundation: becau&s;e there is nothing but Faith, that can give bounds to the mind of Man, &s;tay the incon|&s;tancy of his Rea&s;on, and fix it on its object. Let us not expo&s;e our &s;elves to the agitation of our vain Rea&s;on|ings, which are apt to carry us fur|ther than we &s;hould go. Happy is he, who admid&s;t the waves of this Sea, which is always to&s;&s;ed with the er|rours and opinions in Religion that reign in the World, hath taken the cour&s;e to &s;tick clo&s;e to the immoveable foundation of the Word of God.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>III.</HEAD>
<P>Religion is then the fir&s;t Principle according to which Humane Wi&s;edom is to take its mea&s;ures: &s;o that all the different methods of ancient or modern Philo&s;ophy, all the new Sy&s;tems of Na|tural, and all the new Maxims of Mo|ral Philo&s;ophy, may be good, if they be not contrary to it. For the Go&s;pel ought to be the rule of our &s;entiments. What is not conform to that Rule, leads to di&s;order. The Doctrine of <HI>Plato</HI> or <HI>Ari&s;totle, Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> or <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> is not to be e&s;teem'd, but in &s;o much
<PB N="233" REF="122">as it favours Religion; which &s;hould be the fir&s;t of all Philo&s;ophies. Let us for&s;ake all the re&s;t, for all other Scien|ces are but illu&s;ion, and every other Light but a tran&s;itory fla&s;h, fitter to a|mu&s;e our curio&s;ity than to &s;atisfie our mind. To &s;peak properly, we know things but as in dream, and are igno|rant of them in effect: Yea, and we would pitty our own ignorance, if our vanity kept it not from our Knowledge. The mo&s;t frivolous Que&s;tion in the World, divided all the minds of Anti|quity: and after almo&s;t three thou&s;and Years of di&s;pute, it is not as yet well decided. <HI>Thales</HI> and his Di&s;ciples un|til <HI>Plato,</HI> &s;ays <HI>Plutarch,</HI> have denied a Vacuity in Nature, tho&s;e that follow'd after, to begin with <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Epicurus,</HI> and to continue until our new Atomi&s;ts, have taught it. Men di&s;|pute thereon &s;till every day, and come to no agreement. That degree of Cer|tainty, which was heretofore with &s;o many Rea&s;onings &s;ought for in the A|cademy, tended only to uncertainty. In fine, the knowledge of Man &s;tag|gers always in doubting and he&s;itation;
<PB N="234" REF="123">and Truth is only come into the World by <HI>JESUS CHRIST.</HI> Faith alone can teach that Divine Philo&s;ophy, which none of the Great Men of the World have been able to know. To open our Eyes to &s;o pure a Light is the way to be illuminated. It was not by the force of Syllogi&s;ms and Arguments that Men were convinced of that Phi|lo&s;ophy; but by the Simplicity and Ig|norance of tho&s;e that publi&s;hed it in the World: the <HI>Greeks</HI> and <HI>Romans</HI> &s;ub|mitted all their pride and haughtine&s;s of mind to the Go&s;pel; who&s;e vertue was &s;o powerful, that it made its Fir&s;t-Di&s;ciples its greate&s;t Votaries. It is Faith then, which ought to make all the Wit and Knowledge of man: for he that &s;hall follow his own Under&s;tand|ing, will undoubtedly lo&s;e him&s;elf.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>IV.</HEAD>
<P>Faith having undeceived man of the counterfeit gli&s;terings, which &s;hined in the Philo&s;ophy of the Heathens, it accu&s;tomed him to di&s;pute no more a|bout tho&s;e things, which God hath not &s;ubmitted to Rea&s;oning, and taught him
<PB N="235" REF="123">that it is better not to know what God hath thought fit to conceal from him, and with a reverent ignorance to adore the Secrets, which he hath not reveal|ed to us, than to undertake to &s;ound that Aby&s;s of knowledge, by the ra&s;h|ne&s;s of our conjectures, and the faint views of our Rea&s;on. To this Divine beam of Faith, the Faithful took plea|&s;ure to &s;acrifice all the&s;e in&s;olent curio|&s;ities, which made them too ra&s;hly ex|amine the works of God, by examining of Nature; and to &s;tifle all the pro|&s;pects of that proud Rea&s;on, which ad|dict them to the Creature, to make them revolt again&s;t the Creatour. It was by the rays of that mo&s;t Heavenly Light, that the Chri&s;tian came to un|der&s;tand that it was better to be &s;ub|mi&s;&s;ive, than to rea&s;on in matters of Religion; that the &s;malne&s;s of Wit was &s;omewhat more advantageous to make a man a Believer, than all the force and acutene&s;s of Under&s;tanding; and that the &s;implicity of Faith was preferable to all the lu&s;tre and reputation of Sci|ence; becau&s;e that the works of God,
<PB N="236" REF="124">which carry the greate&s;t marks of his Omnipotency and Character, are tho&s;e which we lea&s;t under&s;tand: &s;o that there is nothing more rea&s;onable than to humble Rea&s;on, and to &s;ubmit it to the direction of Eternal Rea&s;on, which is the Rule of all other Rea&s;ons; and the rather, &s;eeing that there is no kind of Science, which depends not on &s;ubmi&s;&s;i|on, that it may &s;ettle it &s;elf by its Prin|ciples. Is it ju&s;t that Men &s;hould exer|ci&s;e a kind of tyranny upon our belief and upon our minds, for things indiffe|rent, &s;uch as are Arts and Sciences, and that we &s;hould take our freedom as to Religion? We are told things incompre|hen&s;ible in the name of <HI>De&s;cartes,</HI> from which we reap no advantage; we take them on their bare word: And having mo&s;t credible My&s;teries delivered to us in the Name of God, which a&s;&s;ures us of Eternal Life, &s;hall we not believe them?</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>V.</HEAD>
<P>When Rea&s;on is once &s;ubmi&s;&s;ive, Phi|lo&s;ophy which is its rule may be u&s;eful to explain it. That is the fir&s;t u&s;e that is to be made of Philo&s;ophy in Religion. So it was that <HI>Anatolius</HI> B. of <HI>Laodicea,</HI> S.
<PB N="237" REF="124"><HI>Jerom,</HI> S. <HI>Augu&s;tin, Theodoret, Didymus of Alexandria, Boetius,</HI> S. <HI>John Dama&s;cen,</HI> and many others, began fir&s;t among&s;t Chri&s;tians to give vogue to the Philo&s;o|phy of <HI>Ari&s;totle:</HI> which afterwards was continued by the Fathers and Divines in the Church, to defend the Chri&s;tian Religion again&s;t Pagani&s;m and Here&s;ie. And though our Religion be not groun|ded on human Rea&s;oning, but on the &s;implicity of a pure Faith, which is al|ways oppo&s;ite to the weak and corrupt mind of Man: yet it is lawful to under|prop that Faith by all the force of Hu|man Rea&s;on, when once it hath begun to give law unto Rea&s;on. And &s;o does God Almighty, who draws light out of darkne&s;s, &s;peak to us by the Mouth of Men, as by the mo&s;t proportionate in&s;trument to the weakne&s;s of our Un|der&s;tandings: and yet that In&s;trument dimini&s;hes nothing of the Dignity of him that employes it. The mo&s;t pro|fane Creatures are as &s;o many voices which publi&s;h the Glory and Holine&s;s of the Creatour; and what is even mo&s;t &s;tupid and dumb in Nature &s;erves to in&s;truct us in the knowledge of God:
<PB N="238" REF="125">and &s;hall not the words, the rea&s;on, the terms and expre&s;&s;ions of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> be made u&s;e of by us in &s;peaking of Religion, becau&s;e they are the words and expre&s;&s;ions of an Heathen? What rea&s;on have we to boggle at them, af|ter that all the Learned and Pious Men, who knew and lived in the purity of Chri&s;tian Religion as well, if not bet|ter then we, have &s;o employed them; let us &s;tick to a Cu&s;tom Authorized to us by the example of the&s;e Holy Men. And whatever may be objected to us, let us never give cavelling A|thei&s;ts, and the Enemies of our Re|ligion, the &s;atisfaction to change the Language of the Church, by the u&s;e of new Philo&s;ophies, which Men would bring in credit; &s;eeing that the Anci|ent Philo&s;ophy, be&s;ides terms of Ex|plaining, may likewi&s;e furni&s;h Re|ligion with a Method of Rea&s;on|ing.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="6" TYPE="section">
<PB N="239" REF="125">
<HEAD>VI.</HEAD>
<P>Be&s;ides the terms and method which Philo&s;ophy may furni&s;h Religi|on with, to &s;erve it as an In&s;trument in what it thinks and &s;ays, it may like|wi&s;e afford it rea&s;ons, to arm tho&s;e that defend it, and di&s;arm its Adver&s;aries. It was Philo&s;ophy that fir&s;t began to o|pen the great Book of the World, for an in&s;truction to the Learned, and Un|learned and by the beauty of the Crea|tures, to declare to all the Nations of the World, the Greatne&s;s and Power of the Creator. It was &s;he that by her Le&s;&s;ons rai&s;ed the Spirit of Man from the Knowledge of &s;o many wonders, to the knowledge of their Original, by di&s;covering to him the Cau&s;e of the&s;e admirable Effects. It was Philo&s;ophy which made Man under&s;tand that voice of the Heavens and Stars, which declare the Glory of God, that he might come to the knowledge of his greatne&s;s. By that marvellous &s;ucce&s;&s;ion of Day and Night, by that con&s;tant and uniform revolution of Sea&s;ons, by that Order and Harmony of Elements, and of all
<PB N="240" REF="126">the parts that compo&s;e the Univer&s;e; as by the loud &s;ound of a Trumpet, that Science publi&s;hed the Divinity of &s;o great a Ma&s;ter, by expo&s;ing to view the lineaments of &s;o perfect a work. It was Philo&s;ophy in fine, which taught <HI>Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Socrates, Plato,</HI> and <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> who were the &s;olide&s;t Heads of Antiquity, the Unity of the Godhead; whereof they them&s;elves were convinced by the bare and &s;imple contemplation of this great Theatre of the World. But that which &s;erved to in&s;truct the&s;e Great Men in &s;o im|portant a truth, &s;erved only to puzzle and confound the proud minds of a great many &s;tinted Souls, who, as St. <HI>Paul</HI> &s;ays, became vain in their thoughts, and their fooli&s;h heart was full of darkne&s;s, and when they profe&s;|&s;ed them&s;elves to be wi&s;e, became Fools: becau&s;e they rendred to the Creature, the Honours that were only due to the Creator; by the wrong u&s;e that they made of their Rea&s;on and Philo&s;ophy. They applied them&s;elves to the &s;tudy of Nature, without reve|rencing
<PB N="241" REF="126">the Authour thereof. Thus it hapned with <HI>Epicurus,</HI> who pretended that Natural Philo&s;ophy was fit for no|thing but to &s;tifle all the&s;e kinds of fears which the impre&s;&s;ions of Religi|on may cau&s;e in the Soul. On the contrary <HI>Plato</HI> made u&s;e of Natural Philo&s;ophy only to prove the exi&s;tence of God, by the exi&s;tence of the World: as a Workman is known by his Work. And <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> reduces al|mo&s;t all his rea&s;onings about motion, to that admirable demon&s;tration of a fir&s;t mover, which <HI>Avicenna</HI> takes to be one of the mo&s;t evident demon|&s;trations of the Phy&s;icks of that Philo|&s;opher. So true it is, that it is but on|ly an infirmity of mind, that makes Men &s;o unea&s;ily believe what is propo|&s;ed to them by Religion. For when one hath rea&s;on, it is no trouble to him to u&s;e it, by &s;ubjecting the &s;ame in &s;uch &s;ubjects, where it ought to be &s;ubmi&s;&s;ive.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="7" TYPE="section">
<PB N="242" REF="127">
<HEAD>VII.</HEAD>
<P>The&s;e are the chief u&s;es that may be made of Philo&s;ophy in matters of Re|ligion; wherein it may likewi&s;e give weight to the Rea&s;onings that are em|ployed for e&s;tabli&s;hing the maxims thereof: it may &s;erve to unmask Impo&s;tures, the errour whereof di&s;|gui&s;es it &s;elf under &s;o many different &s;hapes: it may repre&s;s that immode|rate liberty, which the Wi&s;e of the World take to them&s;elves of inquiring too curiou&s;ly into matters which ex|ceed their capacity: it teaches Rea|&s;on not to &s;tartle at things which &s;eem mo&s;t incredible, when it hath once been able to make it perceive the Au|thority of God, by reviewing the&s;e ad|mirable Idea's of the Virtue of the Go&s;pel; wherewith a &s;mall number of Fi&s;her-men by their &s;implicity triumph over all the Wi&s;dom of <HI>Athens</HI> and <HI>Rome,</HI> and by their Patience and Humi|lity render them&s;elves Ma&s;ters of the Mi&s;tre&s;s of the World. In this man|ner it was that <HI>Origen,</HI> who thought him&s;elf obliged, as <HI>Eu&s;ebius</HI> a&s;&s;ures us,
<PB N="243" REF="127">to ju&s;tifie his conduct in his applicati|on to the &s;tudy of Pagan Philo&s;ophers, as not unbe&s;eeming a Chri&s;tian, made u&s;e of Philo&s;ophy, and gave even rules how to u&s;e it, by &s;hewing Chri&s;tians, that Men ought only to be Philo&s;ophers, to &s;ettle them&s;elves in the Faith, and therein to become impregnable: by the &s;ame principle a&s;&s;uring them, that Phi|lo&s;ophy ought not to be con&s;idered, but as an In&s;trument of Religion. What he explained to them by that judicious re|flexion, was the &s;ame that St. <HI>Clement</HI> of <HI>Alexandria</HI> had done before him: &s;aying, that it &s;eemed God was plea&s;ed to give a pattern of that conduct, by what he in|&s;pired into the I&s;raelites; when he orde|red them to make u&s;e of the riches and &s;poils of <HI>Egypt,</HI> to adorn the things that concerned Religion and his Wor&s;hip. For <HI>Origen</HI> recommended nothing &s;o much to the Chri&s;tian Philo&s;ophers, as the reading of the Holy Scriptures; and to read them with an attention &s;u|table to the Heavenly Truths which &s;o Divine Books contained, that they might attain to the knowledge of Sa|cred
<PB N="244" REF="128">My&s;teries, by &s;inglene&s;s of heart and humility of mind. And in&s;tead of di&s;puting about Religion, as Men di&s;pute about indifferent things in the Schools, he would have Men adore with reverence the Maje&s;ty of Holy My&s;teries, and believe incomprehen&s;i|bility with &s;ubmi&s;&s;ion. Thus it was, that that Learned Man made u&s;e of prophane Sciences, and Secular Philo|&s;ophy to guide his Di&s;ciples to Je&s;us Chri&s;t, and to rai&s;e them to Faith, as St. <HI>Jerom</HI> a&s;&s;ures us.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="8" TYPE="section">
<HEAD>VIII.</HEAD>
<P>The&s;e Terms, that Method, and the&s;e Rea&s;ons, which Philo&s;ophy may fur|ni&s;h Religion with, would not be &s;uffi|cient, if it did not likewi&s;e give it a kind of di&s;cretion, to prepare them ind to the Light of Faith, by the Light of Nature, which is the fir&s;t principle of the operation of the Soul. For it hap|pens that Man is often deceived, and that unhappine&s;s may proceed, &s;aith St. <HI>Augu&s;tin,</HI> from the weakne&s;s of his Heart, though it proceeded not from the wickedne&s;s and pre&s;umption of
<PB N="245" REF="128">his mind. And &s;eeing the Philo&s;opher is more &s;ubject to that than the &s;imple ignorant, that Holy Father concludes in the &s;ame place, that Man &s;hould not become a Philo&s;opher, but that he may think on Eternity which is his end. That gave occa&s;ion to <HI>Thomas Aquinas</HI> to begin his Treati&s;e of Religion a|gain&s;t the <HI>Gentiles,</HI> by this Que&s;tion, <HI>What is the Obligation of the Wi&s;e Man,</HI> and the chief duty of a Philo|&s;opher: and he concludes, that it is <HI>to &s;earch the Verity, which is the Original of all Verities,</HI> as he proves by the Te&s;timony of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> That was likewi&s;e the chief &s;tudy of the Primi|tive Chri&s;tians, who were Philo&s;ophers: and not only made u&s;e of their Philo|&s;ophy to find out the Truth of Religi|on: but likewi&s;e to teach it to tho&s;e who were ignorant thereof, and to de|fend it again&s;t tho&s;e that attacked the &s;ame. In that manner did St. <HI>Ju&s;tin, Tatian</HI> his Di&s;ciple, <HI>Athenagoras,</HI> and <HI>Clemens Alexandrinus,</HI> who were the fir&s;t Philo&s;ophers of the Chri&s;tian Re|ligion, employ their Philo&s;ophy to
<PB N="246" REF="129">maintain their Faith, by ju&s;tifying their Conduct again&s;t the Calumnies of Pa|gans, and overthrowing the fal&s;e noti|ons that were put into the minds of the people. In that manner <HI>Tertullian</HI> made his Zeal manife&s;t in that admira|ble Apology, which he made of Reli|gion; where among&s;t &s;o many other rea&s;ons, which &s;o ju&s;t a cau&s;e as that which he handled might furni&s;h him with, the life of Chri&s;tians was one of the chief; that life &s;o pure, &s;o holy, &s;o far above &s;en&s;e; that fidelity, di&s;-intere&s;ted|ne&s;s and Charity wherewith all their actions were animated, which made them pray for tho&s;e that per&s;ecuted them. And in fine, their innocence &s;er|ved him as a living Image of the Holi|ne&s;s of the Go&s;pel they preached, to &s;top the mouth of Errour and Impo&s;ture. <HI>O|rigen</HI> took another Method again&s;t <HI>Cel|&s;us,</HI> who having been a Jew turned Pa|gan. He proves the Verity of Chri&s;tiani|ty by the Divinity of Je&s;us Chri&s;t: by making appear, that nothing is objected again&s;t Je&s;us Chri&s;t, which may not be objected again&s;t <HI>Mo&s;es.</HI> Seeing that Je|&s;us Chri&s;t, cannot be the fulfilling of
<PB N="247" REF="129">the Law, as he is, but it mu&s;t the &s;tronge&s;t proof of the Authority of the Law-giver. For, if he be not the Truth, the Law and all the Prophets are but a Lie. St. <HI>Hippolitus</HI> makes u&s;e of another Argument: <HI>Ye cannot conceive,</HI> &s;ays he to Un-believers, <HI>the manner how ye are formed, and ye dare pretend to now he Eternal Ge|neration of the Son of God.</HI> It is not by curio&s;ity, but by &s;ubmi&s;&s;ion that one becomes a Believer. Faith ma|nife&s;ts its Light only to him who can blind his rea&s;on: and for all its ob&s;cu|rity, it de&s;erves adoration even of tho&s;e who under&s;tand it not. Among the other Arguments of <HI>Minutius Felix,</HI> there is not any &s;tronger than this: The belief of an Infidel leading only to doubting and uncertainty, he &s;hould do as does a Traveller, who finds him|&s;elf among&s;t many ways, and knows not the right. If he be wi&s;e he &s;tops, not daring to follow any of them in the doubt that he is in, and being una|ble to follow them all: which Libertines do not, who having no other ground
<PB N="248" REF="130">for their Libertini&s;m, but their uncer|tainty; yet &s;till pur&s;ue the wrong way and per&s;i&s;t in their Errour, being un|able to take the re&s;olution, which the &s;illye&s;t people do in their mo&s;t ordina|nary affairs, not to act on any doubt; for it is prudence to endeavour to be &s;ure in what one doeth. It is upon the Vanity and Fal&s;ity of Idols, and the extravagance of the Pagan Religion, that St. <HI>Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius</HI> his Scholar, <HI>Eu&s;ebius</HI> Bi&s;hop of <HI>Ce&s;area,</HI> and St. <HI>Cyril</HI> of <HI>Alexandria</HI> e&s;tabli&s;hed the Chri&s;tian Religion. The Treati&s;e of <HI>Theodoret</HI> concerning Providence, and St. <HI>Augu&s;tins</HI> Book of the City of God, are mo&s;t Learned and Solid Apo|logies for our Faith, full of profound Learning and admirable Eloquence. And this was the way that all the Fa|thers almo&s;t employed their Science and Philo&s;ophy, every one in his own Method to defend Chri&s;tian Religion, which was attacked by all the violence of the powers of the Earth; by all the Learning of Pagan Philo&s;ophers, and by all the wickedne&s;s of Hereticks.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="9" TYPE="section">
<PB N="249" REF="130">
<HEAD>IX.</HEAD>
<P>But as the primitive Chri&s;tians were more taken up to defend their Religion again&s;t its Enemies, and to be always ready for Martyrdom by a pure and holy Life, than to unfold the My&s;te|ries of our Faith: &s;o the mo&s;t part of the ancient Apologi&s;ts contented them|&s;elves to ju&s;tifie their Belief again&s;t the calumnies that were rai&s;ed again&s;t it, without explaining the ground of their Religion, that they might not pro|fane holy things, by di&s;covering them to Infidels, It was nece&s;&s;ary in the In|fancy of the Church to veil from the World corrupted with Idolatry, the new Spirit of our Faith, whereof the Pagans were not capable. But &s;ince our Eyes in the&s;e la&s;t Ages have been accu&s;tomed to the light of the Go&s;pel, it hath been thought more fit to unfold the Sanctity of our Augu&s;t my&s;teries, than to ob&s;cure them under ambiguous terms; and this hath been the cour&s;e that the later Apologi&s;ts have follow'd. <HI>Thomas Aquinas</HI> in his Work again&s;t the Gentiles, &s;hews in the fir&s;t three Books
<PB N="250" REF="131">of it, That there is nothing in the Chri|&s;tian Faith but what is conform to the light of Nature: and in the fourth he teaches, that though it be highly eleva|ted above the wit of Man, yet it con|tains nothing contrary to Rea&s;on. <HI>Sa|vanarola</HI> hath gathered all that is &s;olid in the Fathers on that &s;ubject: to which he hath added this argument which is properly his own. If our Religion be not true, a Chri&s;tian is the mo&s;t mon|&s;trous thing in Nature: he is wi&s;e and a fool at the &s;ame time; wi&s;e in his manners, a fool in his Belief: his mind is erroneous, and his heart upright. His Will is orderly, and his Rea&s;on ir|regular; his Under&s;tanding is out of the way, though he have innocence and probity for its guides. In fine, he is but a Hodge-podge of Truth and Fal&s;hood, of Purity and Corruption. In the &s;ame manner, &s;ays that Divine, If <HI>JESUS CHRIST</HI> be not God, he is at the &s;ame time the mo&s;t holy and the mo&s;t flagitious Per&s;on that ever was. For it is the greate&s;t of crimes to de&s;ire to be taken for a God, when
<PB N="251" REF="131">one is not. How could it be, that &s;o much Vertue &s;hould be founded on &s;o great Inju&s;tice? that the proude&s;t Man that ever was &s;hould be the Ma&s;ter of the mo&s;t perfect notion of Humility that can be? that &s;o holy a Doctrine as the Go&s;pel &s;hould be the Work of an Impo&s;tor; and that &s;o perfect a Mora|lity, &s;hould be e&s;tabli&s;hed on &s;o great a Wickedne&s;s? The Treati&s;e of the truth of Faith compo&s;ed by <HI>Ludovicus Vives,</HI> is an Abridgement of all that the Fathers have written upon Reli|gion, reduced into Method. One of his &s;tronge&s;t Arguments, is the accom|pli&s;hment of the Prophecy of <HI>Ho&s;ea</HI> concerning the de&s;tiny of the <HI>Jews,</HI> which he handles in his third Book, and whereof Saint <HI>Augu&s;tin</HI> &s;peaks in the eighteen Chapter of the 28. Book of the City of God: but which &s;eems not to be &s;et off to all its advantages by <HI>Vives;</HI> for there is nothing more con|vincing to a &s;olid mind, than a Pro|phecy delivered near a thou&s;and years before it come to pa&s;s, and which is literally verified throughout the whole
<PB N="252" REF="132">World, for above the&s;e &s;ixteen hun|dred years. The Work of <HI>Marcilius Ficinus</HI> is nothing almo&s;t but a proof of the Divinity of <HI>JESUS CHRIST,</HI> ju&s;tified by the Prophets of the old Te|&s;tament, by the Miracles of the New, and by the truth of the Doctrine which ignorant men without pa&s;&s;ion or inter|e&s;t have preached, who never deceived any, nor were ever deceived them&s;elves. I &s;hall wave the Writings of a great many modern Apologi&s;ts, which are every-where extent, for proof of the ve|rity of Chri&s;tian Religion; which hav|ing been once &s;ettled upon the foun|dation of the Word of God, has &s;tood un&s;haken amid&s;t the Revolutions of Empires, fortifying it &s;elf maugre the tempe&s;ts rai&s;ed again&s;t it in the World, by no other defence but that of Pati|ence and Mode&s;ty. What I have &s;aid of others, may &s;uffice to give a Chri|&s;tian Philo&s;opher an Idea of the u&s;e he &s;hould make of his Philo&s;ophy, in imi|tation of tho&s;e Great men, who have only employ'd it for the e&s;tabli&s;hment and defence of Religion. For all things
<PB N="253" REF="132">well con&s;idered, that is the only &s;olid and real enjoyment of this Life. The truth is all things el&s;e being tran&s;itory and peri&s;hing, the true Wi&s;dom is to think of Eternity, and to be a good Man is the be&s;t of Philo&s;ophies.</P>
</DIV2>
</DIV1>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
</BODY>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
