<!DOCTYPE ETS PUBLIC "-//UMDLPS//DTD EEBOPROOF 2.0//EN">
<ETS>
<TEMPHEAD>
<REVDESCR>
<CHANGE>
<DATE>2014-04-09</DATE>
<RESPSTMT>
<NAME>Brian Matzge</NAME>
<RESP>MURP</RESP>
</RESPSTMT>
<ITEM>Checklist: x *Add TEMPHEAD, change DATE, validate x *Review structure: FRONT,BODY, BACK, DIV or rarely GROUP x *Add DIV TYPEs, make sure that types makes sense as a navigational aide, and work in the context of the whole text, validate x *Survey book for troublesome formats of all kinds, including lists, illustrations, tables, music, math, end-notes, quasi-tabular arrangments, and marginalia. x *Proof title page(s) x *Examine marginalia. Is it all best tagged as NOTE? x *Observe divtop and divbottom material marking beginnings and ends of divisions, check that they are correctly tagged as HEAD, TRAILER, OPENER, CLOSER, ARGUMENT, EPIGRAPH, SIGNED, DATELINE, BYLINE, etc. x *Check for GAPs x *Check PB placement and completeness, ensure sequence of N="" x *Check ^, italic I / J, _Initals, space between &amp;c. x *Check for illustrations and correct usage of FIGURE. Add FIGDESCs if necessary. x *Check q; startq endq Q x *If appropriate, check for yoghs. x *If appropriate, check for Latin problems, e.g. oe and ae digraphs x *If appropriate, check for abbreviation and brevigraph problems. x *If appropriate, check for units of measure, symbols (alchemical, astronomical, etc.) and the like. x *Correct illegibles from proofsheet x *Check illegible page, para, line, span, word, dollar signs x * Run Check x *Final validate Corrected [ ] illegible groups out of [ ]. Converted [ ] illegible groups to GAP DESC="illegible". DONE</ITEM>
</CHANGE>
</REVDESCR>
</TEMPHEAD>
<EEBO>
<IDG S="marc" R="UM" ID="B23952">
<STC T="W">H847</STC>
<BIBNO T="oclc">[ocm]08153651</BIBNO>
<VID>204224</VID>
</IDG>
<TEXT LANG="eng">
<FRONT>
<DIV1 TYPE="title page">
<PB REF="1">
<PB REF="2" MS="y">
<P>The <HI>Athei&s;t's</HI> Objections, Again&s;t the IMMATERIAL NATURE of GOD, AND <HI>INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES,</HI> Refuted.</P>
<P>In Two SERMONS Preach'd at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. <HI>Paul, April</HI> 4^t^h^. and <HI>May</HI> 2^d^. 1698.</P>
<P>BEING THE Fourth and Fifth of the LECTURE for that Year, Founded by the Honourable <HI>Robert Boyle,</HI> E&s;q;</P>
<P>By <HI>JOHN HARRIS,</HI> M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY.</P>
<P><HI>LONDON,</HI> Printed by <HI>J. L.</HI> for <HI>Richard Wilkin,</HI> at the <HI>King</HI>'s-<HI>Head</HI> in St. <HI>Paul</HI>'s <HI>Church-Yard,</HI> 1698.</P>
</DIV1>
</FRONT>
<BODY>
<DIV1 TYPE="sermon">
<PB REF="3">
<PB N="3" REF="3">
<EPIGRAPH>
<Q><BIBL>JOHN <HI>iv. 24.</HI></BIBL>
<P>God is a Spirit&mdash;</P></Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>THE Occa&s;ion of the&s;e words was this: Our Ble&s;&s;ed Lord, in his way into <HI>Galilee,</HI> pa&s;&s;ed through <HI>Sychar,</HI> a City of <HI>Samaria,</HI> near to which was the famous Well of the Patriarch <HI>Jacob.</HI> To this Well our Saviour went to refre&s;h him&s;elf on his Journey; and as he always made it his bu&s;ine&s;s to be doing Good, took occa&s;ion from a Woman's coming to draw Water, to di&s;cour&s;e with her about the Bu&s;ine&s;s of his Mi&s;&s;ion. By way of Introduction to which, He fir&s;t gives her &s;ome Proofs of his being endowed with a Super-natural Knowledge From whence &s;he ju&s;tly concluding Him to be a Pro|phet, or a Per&s;on enrich'd with Divine and Extraor|dinary Gifts and Qualifications; &s;he ask'd Him con|cerning one great Point that had been long in di&s;pute between the <HI>Samaritans</HI> and the <HI>Jews, (i. e.)</HI> about the true Place for Religious Wor&s;hip. The <HI>Jews</HI> rightly a&s;&s;erted <HI>Jeru&s;alem</HI> to be <HI>the Place where Men ought to Wor&s;hip.</HI> The <HI>Samaritans</HI> contended, that it ought to be with them, at <HI>Shiloh,</HI> in <HI>Mount Ephraim,</HI> where the Ark and Tabernacle were placed long before the building of the Temple at <HI>Jeru&s;alem,</HI> and where al&s;o the Patriarchs, before the Law, did u&s;e to &s;acrifice to, and wor&s;hip God. They pretended al&s;o to be the true Succe&s;&s;ors of <HI>Jacob,</HI> and of the Ancient Patriarchs,
<PB N="4" REF="4">and con&s;equently, that their Place of Wor&s;hip had the greate&s;t Support from Antiquity. This Pretence was an Umbrage to that Temple that they &s;et up in <HI>Mount Gerizim</HI> (in the time of <HI>Darius</HI>) in oppo&s;ition to that at <HI>Jeru&s;alem,</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Jo&s;eph. An|tiquit.</HI> l. 11. c. 8.</NOTE> and which they &s;uppo&s;ed to give an Holine&s;s to that Mountain, even after the Temple was de&s;troyed. And the <HI>Samaritan</HI> Ver&s;ion of the <HI>Pentateuch</HI> hath plainly fal&s;ified the Text of <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> in <HI>Deut.</HI> xxvii. 4. by &s;ub&s;tituting <HI>Mount Gerizim</HI> in&s;tead of <HI>Mount Ebal,</HI> in order to gain &s;ome Honour to this Celebrated Place. But notwith&s;tanding all the&s;e mighty Preten&s;ions, the <HI>Samaritans</HI> were per|fectly in the wrong. The Ancient Pedigree that they boa&s;ted &s;o much of, was wholly fal&s;e and precarious. For they were, in reality, only the Succe&s;&s;ors of &s;ome <HI>A&s;&s;yrians,</HI> who were planted in the Cities of <HI>Samaria</HI> by <HI>Salmane&s;er,</HI> when he carry'd the Tribe of <HI>Ephraim</HI> Captive into <HI>A&s;&s;yria;</HI> as you may read at large, 2 <HI>King.</HI> xxvi. 24.</P>
<P>This therefore being the true State of the Ca&s;e between the <HI>Jews</HI> and the <HI>Samaritans;</HI> our Saviour's An&s;wer to the Woman was, That the <HI>Jews</HI> were in the right, becau&s;e they wor&s;hipped the True God, and that too in &s;uch a manner as was agreeable to that Revelation God had given them of his Will: <HI>We know what we wor&s;hip</HI> &mdash; But the <HI>Samaritans</HI> were doubly mi&s;taken, both as to the Object, and as to the Place of their Wor&s;hip. They, He tells her, <HI>wor&s;hipped they knew not what.</HI> In which, it &s;eems probable, that he may allude to what is &s;aid of their Ance&s;tors the <HI>A&s;&s;yrians</HI> in the Place before men|tioned, 2 <HI>King.</HI> xvii. 26. <HI>(viz.)</HI> That <HI>they wor&s;hipped the God of the Land.</HI> That is, They blindly paid
<PB N="5" REF="4">their Devotion to the God of their New Country, without having any true and real Knowledge of him: But along with him, they wor&s;hipped their own <HI>A&s;|&s;yrian</HI> Deities too; &s;uch as <HI>Succoth-Benoth, A&s;hima-Nergal,</HI> and the like. Our Saviour tells this Woman al&s;o, That a Time of Reformation was now at hand, when the Wor&s;hip of God &s;hould not be confined either to <HI>Jeru&s;alem,</HI> or <HI>Mount Gerizim;</HI> and that a more pure and Spiritual manner of Wor&s;hip &s;hould be e&s;tabli&s;hed; one that was not embarra&s;s'd with &s;o va&s;t a number of External Rites and Ceremonies, but one more &s;uitable to the Nature of God, and to the Improved Sentiments of Mankind: for <HI>God,</HI> &s;aith he, <HI>is a Spirit;</HI> and <HI>they that wor&s;hip him, mu&s;t wor|&s;hip him in Spirit and in Truth.</HI> This &s;eems to be the Occa&s;ion and Connexion of the&s;e words: which having briefly &s;hewed you, I proceed now to &s;peak to the words them&s;elves, <HI>God is a Spirit.</HI></P>
<P>By which Terms, <HI>God</HI> and <HI>Spirit,</HI> thus connected together, we under&s;tand an Infinite Being, mo&s;t Wi&s;e and Powerful, containing in Him&s;elf all po&s;&s;ible Per|fection, without being &s;ubject to any of tho&s;e Defects and Limitations which we plainly di&s;cover in Ma|terial Beings. And after this manner the Holy Scrip|tures do de&s;cribe God Almighty to us; they attribute &s;uch Perfections and Qualifications to Him, as we can have no po&s;&s;ible Idea of, as belonging to Matter.</P>
<P><HI>Body</HI> or <HI>Matter</HI> is a Sluggi&s;h, In&s;en&s;ible, Pa&s;&s;ive and Unintelligent Thing, not po&s;&s;ibly able to move of it &s;elf, or to act or perform any thing by its own Power; but all the Motion and Activity that it hath, comes to it by Communication from &s;omething that is without it, or di&s;tinct from it. But <HI>all Power, both in Heaven and
<PB N="6" REF="5">Earth, is the Lords: In his Hands are Power and Might: with Him is Wi&s;dom and Strength, he hath Coun&s;el and Under&s;tanding. He made all Things; He &s;tretcheth forth the Heavens alone, and &s;preadeth abroad the Earth by him&s;elf. There is none like to Him, who created and maintaineth all things, and in whom all Things Live, and Move, and have their Being</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">1 Chron. 29.11, 12. Job 12.9, <HI>&amp;c.</HI> I&s;a. 44.24, <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Acts 17.24, 25, <HI>&amp;c.</HI></NOTE>.</P>
<P>The <HI>Form</HI> and <HI>Fa&s;hion</HI> of all Material Things, we &s;ee, is continually flitting and changing, and there is no|thing among them of any con&s;tant and la&s;ting du|ration. But God is <HI>Immutable</HI> and <HI>Eternal,</HI> the &s;ame <HI>Te&s;terday, to Day, and for ever; He was, and is, and is to come,</HI> and <HI>with him is no variablene&s;s, neither &s;hadow of Turning</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">Rev. 4.8. Jam. 1.17. Deut. 33.27.</NOTE>.</P>
<P>Material Beings are all <HI>limited and imperfect</HI> as to their <HI>Extent.</HI> The Place they are in confines and circum&s;cribes them; Nothing el&s;e can be there with them, nor they them&s;elves any where el&s;e. <HI>But the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain God,</HI> which yet he more than fills with his Pre&s;ence: <HI>which Pre&s;ence no one can flee or hide him&s;elf from: He is the &s;earcher even of our hearts, and knoweth the mo&s;t &s;ecret thoughts of Men.</HI> There is <HI>no Creature that is not manife&s;t in his &s;ight, but all things are Naked and open before him</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg">2 Chron. 6.18. Jer. 23.24. Jer. 17.10. &amp; 20.12.</NOTE>. This and &s;uch like is the Account that the Sacred Scripture gives of God, which is plainly Incon&s;i&s;tent with his being <HI>Material</HI> or <HI>Corporeal:</HI> and therefore it calls him in the words of my Text <HI>a Spirit,</HI> a Divine, mo&s;t Excellent and Perfect Being, that di&s;covers him&s;elf to our Rea&s;on and Under&s;tan|ding, but cannot po&s;&s;ibly do &s;o to our Sen&s;es; <HI>for him no Eye hath &s;een nor can &s;ee; he is Invi&s;ible, he is a Spirit.</HI></P>
<PB N="7" REF="5">
<P>But here the Athei&s;t thinks he hath a &s;ufficient Ground for in&s;uperable Objections; Here his Phi|lo&s;ophy is called in to his A&s;&s;i&s;tance; and by the Strength of that, he will undertake to maintain, that there is not, nor cannot be any &s;uch thing as <HI>a Spirit,</HI> (i. e.) Any <HI>Incorporeal</HI> or <HI>Immaterial</HI> Being or <HI>Sub&s;tance.</HI> And therefore &s;ince the Sacred Scrip|ture and Divines do de&s;cribe the Deity after this ab|&s;urd and impo&s;&s;ible manner, 'tis a good Argument (&s;ay they) that there is no &s;uch Being at all: For when Men pretend to De&s;cribe God after &s;uch a man|ner as is Non&s;en&s;ical, Unintelligible and Impo&s;&s;ible, (and yet &s;ay, that theirs is the only right way of Speaking of him): When Men attribute &s;uch a man|ner of Exi&s;tence to him, as we know is contradictory to the Nature of Things; we have then ju&s;t Ground to disbelieve all that they advance, in defence of &s;o ridiculous and ab&s;urd a Notion, and con&s;equently to conclude that there is no God at all. And hence we &s;ee the&s;e Men rai&s;e another Great Objection again&s;t the Being of a God, <HI>viz.</HI> That his Nature is &s;o De|&s;cribed as to be <HI>Unintelligible</HI> and <HI>Non&s;en&s;e.</HI> Which I &s;hall now therefore endeavour to Refute.</P>
<P>And in Order to &s;hew the Groundle&s;ne&s;s and Inva|lidity of this Objection, I &s;hall in pur&s;uance of my former Method:
<LIST>
<ITEM>I. Give you the &s;en&s;e of the Modern and Ancient Athei&s;ts on this Point. And then,</ITEM>
<ITEM>II. Endeavour to Refute what they Advance, and &s;hew how Unrea&s;onable it is to build Athei&s;m and Infidelity on &s;o weak and invalid a Foun|dation. And,</ITEM>
</LIST></P>
<PB N="8" REF="6">
<P N="1">1. I &s;hall give you the Modern and Ancient Athei&s;ts Sen&s;e on this Point.</P>
<P>Mr. <HI>Hobbs,</HI> that lofty Pretender to Philo&s;ophy, de|clares that to &s;ay there is any <HI>Immaterial Sub&s;tance,</HI> is not &s;o much an <HI>Error,</HI> as it is <HI>Non&s;en&s;e; 'tis u&s;ing an In&s;ignificant word, whereby we conceive nothing but the Sound</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 19.</NOTE>. And in his <HI>Kingdom of Darkne&s;s,</HI> where he undertakes to correct the Univer&s;ity Lear|ning, he is very Angry with <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Metaphy&s;icks, becau&s;e it brought in, as he &s;aith (tho' fal&s;ly, as I &s;hall prove hereafter) the Doctrine or Notion of <HI>Separated E&s;&s;ences,</HI> and al&s;o of <HI>Immateriality</HI> and <HI>In|corporeity;</HI> for what is not <HI>Corporeal,</HI> he &s;aith, <HI>is No|thing,</HI> and con&s;equently <HI>no where.</HI> And this he under|takes to prove from a Pa&s;&s;age which he &s;eems to have borrowed from <HI>Ocellus Lucanus,</HI> tho' without naming him; and which, tho' it be a poor So|phi&s;m, and much wor&s;e than tho&s;e he is condemn|ing; yet he boldly lays it down as a Demon&s;tra|tion. <HI>The Univer&s;e,</HI> &s;aith he, <HI>is Corporeal, that is to &s;ay Body, and hath the Dimen&s;ions of Magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth; al&s;o every Part of Body is Body; and con&s;equently every Part of the Uni|ver&s;e is Body, and that which is not Body is no Part of the Univer&s;e. And becau&s;e the Univer&s;e is all, that which is no Part of the Univer&s;e is Nothing, and con|&s;equently no where</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 371. 207.</NOTE>. In another place he &s;aith, <HI>That no Man can conceive any thing but he mu&s;t conceive it in &s;ome place, of &s;ome Determinate Magnitude, and as that which may be divided into Parts</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 11.</NOTE>. And again, p. 17. and 207. he tells us, <HI>That an Incorporeal Sub|&s;tance is a Contradictory and Incon&s;i&s;tent Name; 'tis all one as if a Man &s;hould &s;ay, an Incorporeal Body; which
<PB N="9" REF="6">words when they are joined together, do de&s;troy one ano|ther; and therefore Body and Sub&s;tance are all one</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 17. 207.</NOTE>. El&s;ewhere he tells us, That <HI>the proper Signification of the word Spirit in common &s;peech, is either a &s;ubtile, fluid and invi&s;ible Body, or el&s;e a Gho&s;t or other Idle Phanta&s;m of our Imagination</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 208.</NOTE>, and a little after he a&s;&s;erts, <HI>that to Men that under&s;tand the meaning of the words Sub&s;tance and Incorporeal, they imply a Contra|diction; and that to &s;ay an Angel or Spirit is an Incor|poreal Sub&s;tance, is to &s;ay in effect there is no Angel nor Spirit</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 214.</NOTE>. And this Notion he defends in his An&s;wer to Bi&s;hop <HI>Bramhall's</HI> Book written again&s;t his <HI>Leviathan;</HI> and per&s;everes in a&s;&s;erting <HI>that God him|&s;elf is a Mo&s;t Pure &s;imple and corporeal Spirit;</HI> and he defines a Spirit in General to be a <HI>thin, fluid, tran&s;|parent and invi&s;ible Body</HI>
<NOTE N="(d)" PLACE="marg">An&s;wer to Bi&s;hop <HI>Bram|hall,</HI> p. 31, 36.</NOTE>. Thus al&s;o <HI>Spinoza,</HI> in his <HI>Opera Po&s;thuma,</HI> p. 13. determines <HI>Extended Sub|&s;tance</HI> (that is <HI>Body</HI>) to be one of the Infinite Attri|butes of the Deity, and this he undertakes to demon|&s;trate from hence; that there is not (as he &s;aith) any Other Sub&s;tance but God; and who con&s;equently is a <HI>Corporeal,</HI> as well as a <HI>Cogitative</HI> Being. <HI>Deus e&s;t res exten&s;a</HI>
<NOTE N="(e)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Ethices Pars</HI> 2. <HI>Prop.</HI> 2. p. 42.</NOTE>. This, you perceive, is the plain &s;en&s;e of the&s;e Writers, That there is no other <HI>Sub&s;tance</HI> but <HI>Body;</HI> and con&s;equently to talk of a Spirit or an Incorporeal Sub&s;tance, is to them perfect Non&s;en&s;e and Contradiction. But tho' this be their Opinion and A&s;&s;ertion, yet they did not Invent it, nor fir&s;t find it out: they are as far from being Originals in this, as in other things; for herein they do but Copy the Sentiments of the Ancient Athei&s;ts, and tread exactly in their Steps. That there was nothing but Body in the World, was long ago the A&s;&s;ertion
<PB N="10" REF="7">of &s;uch unthinking Men as our Modern Athei&s;ts are. <HI>Plato</HI> tells us, <HI>That there were &s;ome in his Time, who a&s;&s;erted nothing to be Sub&s;tance but what they could feel, and which would re&s;i&s;t their Touch: and the&s;e Men af|firmed Body and Sub&s;tance to be the &s;ame thing; and what they were not able to lay hold of, and to gra&s;p with their Hands, they &s;aid was really nothing at all. And if any one happened to talk with them about any thing that was not Bo|dy, they would ridicule and de|&s;pi&s;e him, and not hear a word more that he &s;hould &s;ay</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">.&mdash;<GAP DESC="foreign">.&mdash;<GAP DESC="foreign">. Sophi&s;t. p. 172. Ficin.</NOTE>.</P>
<P><HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> acquaints us, That ju&s;t &s;uch were the Athei&s;tical Principles of his Contemporaries. <HI>They affirm</HI> (&s;aith he) <HI>Matter or Body to be the only Sub|&s;tance, and that all other things are only Pa&s;&s;ions and Affections of it.</HI> And in another place, he &s;aith, that the&s;e Men a&s;&s;erted <HI>all things to be one; That there is but one Nature only, which is the Matter of all Things, and this is Corporeal, and hath mag|nitude</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">.&mdash;<GAP DESC="foreign">. Metaph. l. 1. c. 7.</NOTE>. And this was long before the Opinion al&s;o of <HI>Leu|cippus</HI> and <HI>Democritus.</HI></P>
<P><HI>Epicurus</HI> argues again&s;t <HI>Plato,</HI> that <HI>there can be no Incorporeal Deity; not only becau&s;e no Man can frame a conception of an Incorporeal Sub&s;tance, but al&s;o becau&s;e whatever is Incorporeal, mu&s;t needs want Sen&s;e, and Prudence and Plea&s;ure; all which things are included in the Notion of God: And therefore an Incorporeal Deity,</HI> &s;aith he, <HI>is a Contradiction</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg">Dr. <HI>Cudw.</HI> Intel. Sy&s;t. p. 20.</NOTE>. And his Fol|lowers, as appears by <HI>Lucretius,</HI> continued in the
<PB N="11" REF="7">&s;ame Opinion, that there is no other Sub&s;tance in Nature but Body
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Praeterea nihil e&s;t quod po&s;&s;is dicere ab omni Corpore &s;e|junctum,</HI> &amp;c. Lib. 1. v. 431.</NOTE>; and they had no Notion of any Incorporeal thing, but their Vacuum or Empty &s;pace, which was really nothing at all.</P>
<P><HI>Sextus Empiricus</HI> tells us, that all the <HI>Epicureans,</HI> and &s;ome of the Stoicks, as <HI>Ba&s;ileides</HI> in particular, maintained <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>that there was nothing Incorporeal or Immaterial</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">Adv. Math. p. 267.</NOTE>. By the&s;e Te&s;timonies we &s;ee plainly, that the Modern Athei&s;ts tran&s;cribe the Ancient Opinions exactly, and have been able to add very little to them. And the Notion that Mr. <HI>Hobbs</HI> &s;eems &s;o fond of, and which he would fain &s;et up as his own Di&s;covery, That a Spirit is nothing <HI>but a Thin fluid and tran&s;parent Body:</HI> &s;eems to me to be plainly taken from the <GAP DESC="foreign">, which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> tells us, was the Definition that &s;ome then gave of <HI>a Spirit,</HI> or the Soul of Man.</P>
<P>And thus having truly &s;tated the Ca&s;e, and &s;hewed you what the Sentiments of the Ancient and Modern Athei&s;ts were and are, as to the Matter before us. I &s;hall now proceed to Examine by what Rea&s;ons and Arguments they endeavour to &s;upport their A&s;&s;er|tion, That there is no &s;uch thing as any <HI>Incorporeal Sub&s;tance,</HI> but that whatever really is, <HI>is Body.</HI> And here I find their main and chief Argument to be This; that an Immaterial Sub&s;tance is an <HI>Unconceivable Thing:</HI> 'Tis what no Man can po&s;&s;ibly have any no|tion or conception of; 'tis a perfect contradiction in Terms, and con&s;equently Non&s;en&s;e and Impo&s;&s;ible. This is every where almo&s;t the Language of Mr. <HI>Hobbs,</HI> as I have before ob&s;erved. He al&s;o pretends to di&s;|cover the <GAP DESC="foreign">, the true Cau&s;e of this Fiction about Immaterial Sub&s;tances. The Notion,
<PB N="12" REF="8">he tells us, took its ri&s;e from the Abu&s;e of ab&s;tracted Words, and &s;uch-like Metaphy&s;ical and Schola&s;tical Terms, which &s;ome have fan&s;ied as real Entities &s;eparated and di&s;tinct from the Subject, or Matter, of which they are Attributes or Qualities only. Thus for In&s;tance, <HI>becau&s;e we can con&s;ider Thinking or a Rea|&s;oning Power alone by it &s;elf, and di&s;tinct from Body; therefore &s;ome have been &s;o fooli&s;h as to conclude that it is not the Action or Accident of that Body in which it is, but a real Sub&s;tance by it &s;elf. And 'tis upon this Account, that</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 373.</NOTE> <HI>when a Man is dead and buried, they will &s;ay, his Soul (that is, his Life) can walk &s;eparated from the Body, and is &s;een by Night among the Graves,</HI> whereas Life is only <HI>a Name of Nothing,</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">p. 372.</NOTE> and the <HI>Soul or Mind of Man is in reality Nothing el&s;e but the re&s;ult of Motion in the Organical Parts of his Body</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 190. &amp; De Cive C 15. &sect;. 14. And in another place, he &s;aith, <HI>Mens nihil aliud e&s;t praeterquam mo|tus in quibu&s;|dam partibus corporis Orga|nici.</HI></NOTE>. 'Tis like the forms and qualities of Other things, depending purely on the Mechani&s;m, Modi|fication, and Motion of the Parts of Matter, accor|ding as it happens to be variou&s;ly di&s;po&s;ed, figured and agitated; and con&s;equently it can be nothing at all di&s;tinct from that Body who&s;e Form or Quality it is. And this Soul or Mind, or any other Faculty or Quality in Man, coming once to be conceived as a thing di&s;tinct from the Body, and being Invi&s;ible and In&s;en&s;ible, hath been called by &s;uch Names as we u&s;e to give to fine Subtile and aereal Bodies. Such as <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>Spiritus,</HI> and the like: which do properly &s;ignifie the <HI>Wind,</HI> or, which is near akin to it, the <HI>Breath</HI> of Man
<NOTE N="(d)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 207, 208.</NOTE>. And &s;o Mr. <HI>Hobbs</HI> tells us, that in order to expre&s;s our greater honour of God, the name of Spirit hath been given to him likewi&s;e, as better expre&s;&s;ing to vulgar Apprehen&s;ions his fine
<PB N="13" REF="8">aereal and Subtile Nature, than the gro&s;&s;er word of Body. But however, <HI>Philo&s;ophers</HI> and <HI>Men of &s;en&s;e</HI> mu&s;t take care, and not be impo&s;ed upon by in&s;ignificant words, &s;o far as to imagine there can in reality be any &s;uch thing as an <HI>Incorporeal Sub&s;tance:</HI> for that is, when throughly con&s;idered, an ab&s;olute <HI>Contradiction and Non&s;en&s;e.</HI> 'Tis nothing <HI>but an empty Name,</HI> with which &s;ome poor Wretches are frighted, as the Birds are <HI>from the Corn by an empty Doublet, a Hat and a Crooked Stick</HI>
<NOTE N="(e)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Leviath.</HI> p. 373.</NOTE>; as he is plea&s;ed to expre&s;s him&s;elf. And this is the &s;umm of what this mighty Philo|&s;opher advances again&s;t Immaterial Sub&s;tances. <HI>Spi|noza</HI> is the only Man be&s;ides, which I have met with, that aims at di&s;proving the Exi&s;tence of Incorporeal Beings: Which in his <HI>Opera po&s;thuma</HI> he pretends de|mon&s;tratively to do. But his chief and indeed only Argument is this (as I hinted before) that there is but <HI>one only Sub&s;tance</HI> in the World, and That is God. <HI>Matter</HI> or <HI>Body</HI> he a&s;&s;erts to be one of the Attributes of this Sub&s;tance, or the Mode by which God is con|&s;idered as <HI>Res exten&s;a;</HI> from whence he concludes, that there can be no Sub&s;tance but what is corpo|real, becau&s;e Body is an E&s;&s;ential Property of his <HI>one only Sub&s;tance,</HI> the Divine Nature. The Preca|riou&s;ne&s;s of which Ob&s;cure and Metaphy&s;ical way of Arguing, I &s;hall plainly &s;hew below.</P>
<P>And, Thus having given you the &s;um, of what the&s;e Writers advance again&s;t the Doctrine of Incor|poreal Sub&s;tances, I &s;hall next proceed to Refute it, and to &s;hew you how weak and inconclu&s;ive their Arguments and Objections are. In order to which, I &s;ay, In the Fir&s;t place,</P>
<P N="1">1. That 'tis a very precarious and groundle&s;s way
<PB N="14" REF="9">of arguing, to deny the Exi&s;tence of any thing only from our particular Apprehen&s;ions and Conceptions not being able to ma&s;ter it. For it will not in the lea&s;t follow, that there can be no &s;uch thing as an Incorporeal Sub&s;tance or a Spirit, becau&s;e <HI>&s;ome few Men</HI> pretend that they cannot conceive how any &s;uch thing can po&s;&s;ibly be. And I have already &s;hewed,
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">See my Second Ser|mon.</NOTE> that we have very ju&s;t rea&s;on to allow the truth of, and to be &s;atisfied of the Exi&s;tence of many things, who&s;e Nature neither we, nor perhaps any one el&s;e, can fully Under&s;tand and Comprehend. The&s;e Gentlemen pretend that they cannot conceive or have any Idea of an <HI>Incorporeal Sub&s;tance.</HI> But yet they think, I &s;uppo&s;e, that they have a clear Idaea and Conception of Body. Tho' &s;hould you put them to de&s;cribe it, they would be very much at a lo&s;s. For as one hath well ob&s;erved, (<HI>Mr.</HI> Lock <HI>in his E&s;&s;ay of</HI> Humane Under&s;tanding, <HI>Book</HI> 2. <HI>c.</HI> 23.) if we carefully examine our Idea of Sub&s;tance, we &s;hall find that it is a kind of <HI>complex one,</HI> con&s;i&s;ting as it were of &s;everal Idea's coexi&s;ting together: which becau&s;e we are apt to conceive as one thing, we give it the General Name of <HI>Sub&s;tance:</HI> as imagining that word to expre&s;s &s;omething, tho' in reality we know not what, which is the <HI>&s;upport</HI> of the&s;e Accidents or Qualities which occa&s;ion the Idea's we have in our Minds of it. Let us therefore take any corporeal Sub&s;tance, as &s;uppo&s;e Gold; and inquire in our Mind what is that <HI>Support, Sub&s;tratum</HI> or <HI>Sub&s;tance,</HI> in which the Accidents of <HI>Yellowne&s;s, great Specifick Weight,</HI> and <HI>&s;trange Ductility under the Hammer</HI> do inhere; all which concurr to give us that complex Idea which we have of Gold; Shall we not find our
<PB N="15" REF="9">&s;elves put to it how to conceive, or to have a clear Idea of this? If we &s;hould &s;ay that the &s;ubject of the&s;e Properties are the &s;olid extended Parts; we &s;hall not be much the nearer Satisfaction: for our Mind will be inqui&s;itive agen what is the Support or Subject of that <HI>Exten&s;ion</HI> and <HI>Impenetrability.</HI> We may &s;ay, indeed, that 'tis the Sub&s;tance it &s;elf: which is a word that we u&s;e, and implies &s;omething or other that is the Support of the&s;e Properties, but what that is, we have, I think, no clear and certain Idea. When yet we have clear and di&s;tinct Concep|tions enough of the&s;e Properties which we find in this Body, and from whence we pronounce it to be Gold. So if on the other hand we take any Incor|poreal Sub&s;tance, as &s;uppo&s;e the <HI>Mind</HI> or <HI>Soul of Man;</HI> and enquire what is the true Support of that <HI>Self-moving Power,</HI> that <HI>Rea&s;oning</HI> and <HI>Cogitative</HI> Fa|culty, and that <HI>Liberty</HI> or Freedom of Action which we plainly perceive to be inherent in it: we &s;hall indeed be at a lo&s;s, but yet no more than we were before in reference to Gold. For as from con&s;idering the Properties peculiar to that Body, we were &s;atis|fied that they mu&s;t be inherent in <HI>&s;omething,</HI> tho' <HI>how</HI> or in <HI>what,</HI> we have no clear Idea; &s;o when we con&s;ider <HI>Life, Cogitation</HI> and <HI>Spontaneous Motion</HI> in our Soul, we know very well that tho&s;e <HI>more real</HI> Pro|perties mu&s;t have &s;omething al&s;o for their Support, or &s;ome Sub&s;tance to inhere in: tho' what that is, and the peculiar manner of this we are wholly igno|rant of. But then we have as ju&s;t rea&s;on to believe that this Sub&s;tance is real, as that the Sub&s;tance of Gold is &s;o. For Cogitation, Life, and Spontaneous Action, are Properties undoubtedly of as real a Na|ture
<PB N="16" REF="10">as <HI>great Inten&s;ive Weight, Yellowne&s;s</HI> and <HI>Ducti|lity</HI> can po&s;&s;ibly be. And as we cannot but conclude both the&s;e to be real Sub&s;tances, &s;o we cannot al&s;o but conceive them as Natures ab&s;olutely di&s;tinct and different from each other, and which can have no ne|ce&s;&s;ary dependance upon and relation to each other: for we can never imagine that Gold can be ever brought to <HI>think, rea&s;on</HI> or <HI>move</HI> it &s;elf <HI>&s;pontaneou&s;ly,</HI> any more than we can conceive a Soul or Mind to be <HI>yellow, heavy</HI> or <HI>ductile.</HI> That is, we have quite different Idea's of each of them, and which nothing but wil|ful or long habituated Ignorance can ever make us confound together. And thus it appears to me that we may have as clear an Idea of Incorporeal Sub|&s;tance, as we have of Body; and that the former is no more unconceivable than the latter. And there|fore 'tis as ab&s;urd to argue again&s;t the Exi&s;tence of a Spirit, only from our not having any clear Idea of the Sub&s;tance of a Spirit; as it would be to &s;ay there is no &s;uch thing as Body, becau&s;e we don't know exactly what the Sub&s;tance of Body is: which I dare &s;ay no Man can affirm that he doth. 'Tis very po&s;&s;ible that Men may be &s;o blinded and preju|diced by fal&s;e Principles, &s;o &s;tupified by Ignorance, Idlene&s;s or Vice, and &s;o engaged and en&s;laved to a peculiar &s;ett of Notions, which advance and &s;upport that way of acting and proceeding which they take delight in, that a great many things may appear Un|conceivable and Impo&s;&s;ible to them, which &s;hall be far from being &s;o to others, who&s;e Minds are free, and more enured to thinking. Should you tell a Man, who is a Stranger to Geometry and A&s;tro|nomy, of the many admirable and &s;urprizing Truths
<PB N="17" REF="10">that can certainly be demon&s;trated from the Prin|ciples of tho&s;e Noble Sciences, he would boldly pro|nounce them Impo&s;&s;ible; and all your Di&s;cour&s;e and Proof (&s;hould you attempt any &s;uch thing) would to &s;uch a Per&s;on be Non&s;en&s;e, and your words meer empty and in&s;ignificant Sounds. And there are many Per&s;ons in the World, on whom the cleare&s;t and &s;tronge&s;t Method of Rea&s;oning that ever was, will make no manner of impre&s;&s;ion at all, becau&s;e their Minds are not at all enured to a clo&s;e way of Ar|guing and Thinking. And truly the Athei&s;tical Wri|ters do di&s;cover &s;o poor a Knowledge in Philo&s;ophy, and &s;o very little acquaintance with true Rea&s;oning and Science; that 'tis no wonder at all that they &s;hould not be able to conceive and comprehend a great many things which others are very well &s;atisfied with. <HI>I know very well,</HI> &s;aith the Ingenious Per&s;on be|fore cited,
<NOTE PLACE="marg">E&s;&s;ay of <HI>Human &V;nder&s;tanding,</HI> p. 143.</NOTE> <HI>that People who&s;e Thoughts are immer&s;ed in Matter, and who have &s;o &s;ubjected their Minds to their Sen&s;es, that they &s;eldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to &s;ay they cannot comprehend a thinking thing; which perhaps is true,</HI> &amp;c. And therefore &s;uch a Philo&s;opher as Mr. <HI>Hobbs,</HI> that defines <HI>Knowledge to be Sen&s;e;</HI> and &s;aith, that <HI>the Mind of Man is nothing but Motion in the Organical Parts of his Body,</HI> may ea&s;ily be infatuated &s;o far as to a&s;&s;ert that there is <HI>no other Sub&s;tance but Body,</HI> and that a Spirit or Incorporeal Being, is a Non&s;en&s;ical, Contradictory and Impo&s;&s;ible Notion. While Others, who can rai&s;e their Minds a little higher, and who can penetrate farther into things, will be fully &s;atisfied that &s;uch <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> is <HI>Non&s;en&s;e</HI> and <HI>Impo&s;&s;bility.</HI> As indeed &s;ome Per&s;ons, in all Ages of the World, of which we have any Account, have ever been. For,</P>
<PB N="18" REF="11">
<P N="2">2. Which is another very good Ground, from whence to refute this ab&s;urd Opinion that there is no &s;uch thing as an Incorporeal Being: I &s;ay, there have been always many Per&s;ons in the World, that have firmly believed and embraced the Doctrine of Immaterial Sub&s;tances, and who have al&s;o a&s;&s;erted the Deity to be of that Nature. And this will Un|deniably refute the two great Points of Mr. <HI>Hobbs</HI> his Opinion. For, if it be proved plainly that there hath been all along a received Belief and Opinion that there are Immaterial Sub&s;tances, and that God him|&s;elf is &s;uch an One: it is then mo&s;t clear and cer|tain, that the Notion is neither inconceivable, con|tradictory, nor non&s;en&s;e: and al&s;o that it did not take its Ri&s;e and Original only from the Abu&s;e of the Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> Not the <HI>former;</HI> for what is in its own Nature <HI>unconceivable, non&s;en&s;ical</HI> and <HI>ab&s;urd,</HI> could never &s;ure gain an Admittance into the Belief of &s;o many great Men, as we &s;hall &s;ee pre|&s;ently this Opinion did. <HI>Not the latter;</HI> for what was commonly received in the World before the time of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> could never be derived only from his and the Schoolmen's Philo&s;ophy, as Mr. <HI>Hobbs</HI> is plea&s;ed to &s;ay this Belief of Immaterial Sub&s;tances was. And that there was always in the World, a Notion and Belief of another more noble Sub&s;tance than Body, and that the Deity was of an <HI>Incorporeal</HI> or <HI>Spiritual Nature,</HI> we have the united Suffrages of all the Ancient Writers that are pre&s;erved down to our time.</P>
<P><HI>Cicero</HI> tells us, That the Heathen Philo&s;ophers generally defined God to be <HI>Mens pura &amp; &s;incera, &s;oluta &amp; libera ab omni concretione mortali</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">Lib. de Nat. Deorum, &amp; Tu&s;cul. Quae&s;t. lib. 1.</NOTE>; and
<PB N="19" REF="11">&s;peaking of <HI>Thales Mile&s;ius</HI> in particular, he &s;aith of him, <HI>Aquam dixit e&s;&s;e Initium Rerum, Deum autem eum Mentem quae ex aqu&acirc; cuncta fingeret.</HI> Now this <HI>Mind</HI> they all di&s;tingui&s;hed plainly from Matter, and looked upon it as a much more Noble Principle than 'twas po&s;&s;ible to conceive Matter to be. <HI>Lactantius</HI> acquaints of <HI>Pythagoras</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">De Ir&acirc; Dei, c. 11. p. 742. <HI>Oxon.</HI></NOTE>. <HI>Qu&ograve;d unum deum confi|tetur, dicens Incorporalem e&s;&s;e mentem, quae per omnem Naturam diffu&s;a &amp; intenta, vitalem &s;en&s;um cunctis Ani|malibus tribuat.</HI> And <HI>Plutarch</HI> gives us much the &s;ame Account of him in his Books, <HI>De Placitis Phi|lo&s;ophorum,</HI> viz. <HI>That he made two Principles;</HI>
<NOTE PLACE="marg">Lib. 1. c. 3.</NOTE> <HI>one Active, which was Mind or God: The other Pa&s;&s;ive, or the Matter of the World.</HI> And tho&s;e Ver&s;es of <HI>Em|pedocles,</HI> are very remarkable; wherein &s;peaking of the Deity, he a&s;&s;erts Him not to be of Humane &s;hape; And al&s;o that,
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">&mdash;</L></Q> (i. e.) <HI>That he is no way perceivable by any of our Sen&s;es;</HI> which is as much as to &s;ay, he is <HI>Incorpo|real.</HI> And in the next Lines he doth expre&s;ly tell us what he is:
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign">,</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q> <HI>A &s;acred and ineffable Mind, which by &s;wift Thoughts moves and actuates the whole World. Anaxagoras</HI> al&s;o a&s;&s;erted, That
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Plutarch</HI> de Placitis Phi|lo&s;oph. Lib. 1. c. 3. p. 876.</NOTE> <HI>an ordering and regulating Mind was the fir&s;t Principle of all things;</HI> and this <HI>Mind</HI> he made, as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;aith of him, <GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>The only, pure, &s;imple, and un|mixt
<PB N="20" REF="12">thing in the World:</HI> thereby plainly di&s;tingui&s;hing it from <HI>Matter,</HI> the Parts of which, he, who was as <HI>Sextus Empericus</HI> calls him <GAP DESC="foreign"> knew very well to be promi&s;cuou&s;ly blended and mixed toge|there very where. <HI>Sextus</HI> al&s;o tells us, That <HI>That Mind which</HI> Anaxagoras <HI>a&s;&s;erted to be God;</HI> was <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>an Active Principle;</HI> in oppo&s;ition to <HI>Matter,</HI> which is a <HI>Pa&s;&s;ive one,</HI>
<NOTE N="*" PLACE="marg"><HI>Sext. Empir.</HI> adv. Mathem. p. 309.</NOTE> and this is agreeable to what the Poets &s;ay of <HI>Spiritus intus alit; mens agi|tat molem,</HI> &amp;c. We are told likewi&s;e by <HI>Sextus,</HI> That <HI>Xenophanes</HI> held <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>That there is but One God, and he Incorporeal.</HI> And <HI>Plutarch</HI> de|&s;cribing the Deity, hath the&s;e remarkable words, <HI>God is Mind, a &s;eparated Form perfectly unmixed with Matter, and without any thing that is pa&s;&s;ible,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. And in another place he a&s;&s;erts, <GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>That 'tis impo&s;&s;ible Matter alone can be the &s;ole Principle of all things</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">De Placit. Philo&s;. l. 1. c. 3.</NOTE>.</P>
<P><HI>Plato</HI> every where di&s;tingui&s;heth between corpo|real, and incorporeal Sub&s;tances, calling the former by the Names of <GAP DESC="foreign"> Sen&s;ible, and the latter always either <GAP DESC="foreign"> or <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>immaterial</HI> or <HI>intelli|gible;</HI> and he &s;aith, <HI>That certain intelligible and incor|poreal Forms, are the true and fir&s;t Sub&s;tance; and that incorporeal Things which are the greate&s;t and mo&s;t ex|cellent of all others, are di&s;coverable by rea&s;on only, and nothing el&s;e</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. In Polit. p. 547. Ficin.</NOTE>.</P>
<P>And in another place, he &s;aith, <HI>That they were in|&s;tructed by their forefathers, that Mind and a certain wonderful Wi&s;dom, did at fir&s;t frame, and doth now govern all things.</HI> His words are <GAP DESC="foreign">.
<PB N="21" REF="12">In <HI>Phileb.</HI> p. 28. Which &s;ufficiently &s;hews the Antiquity of the Notion of an Incorporeal Deity, and the way al&s;o how they came by it. Of the &s;ame Opinion al&s;o was <HI>Socrates,</HI> as we are told by <HI>Plutarch,</HI> and others. <HI>Lib. de Placit. Philo&s;.</HI> 1. <HI>c.</HI> 3. <HI>Zeno</HI> and the Stoicks defined the Deity to be <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>an Intellectual and Rational Nature;</HI> or as <HI>Plutarch</HI> recites their Opinion, <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>an Intelligent Spirit devoid of all Bodily &s;hape.</HI> Ibid. And <HI>Sextus Empericus</HI> tells us of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> that he con&s;tantly a&s;&s;erted God to be <HI>Incor|poreal,</HI> and <HI>the Utmo&s;t Bounds of the Univer&s;e</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">Adv. Math. p. 155.</NOTE>. And <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> concludes his Book of Phy&s;icks with <HI>affirming</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Nat. Au&s;cult. l. 8. c. 15.</NOTE> <HI>that 'tis impo&s;&s;ible the fir&s;t Mover</HI> (or God) <HI>can have any Magnitude; but he mu&s;t needs be devoid of Parts, and Indivi&s;ible.</HI> And <HI>Plutarch</HI> gives us this as the received and common Opinion of the Stoicks, that God was <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>a Spirit that was extended, or did penetrate throughout the whole World.</HI> De Placitis Philo&s;oph. lib. 1. c. 3. p. 882.</P>
<P>Now by the&s;e Pa&s;&s;ages, and many others that might ea&s;ily be produced, it appears very plain that the mo&s;t Ancient Writers had a good clear Notion of God, and that they &s;peak of him as of a <HI>Mind</HI> per|fectly di&s;tinct from Matter, or as an immaterial or incorporeal Being. Many of them al&s;o deliver them|&s;elves very expre&s;ly as to the Soul of Man; which, as <HI>Plutarch</HI> tells us
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign"> c. 2. p. 898.</NOTE>, <HI>they generally a&s;&s;erted to be In|corporeal; and that it was naturally a Self-moving and Intelligible Sub&s;tance.</HI> But of this, more in another
<PB N="22" REF="13">place. And that the Ancients did believe God to be a Spirit, or a mo&s;t Powerful, Intelligent, and Perfect Immaterial Sub&s;tance will yet farther appear, if we con&s;ider what Notion they had of, and how they defined <HI>Matter</HI> or <HI>Body. Plato</HI> de&s;cribes it by the words <GAP DESC="foreign">, that which thru&s;ts again&s;t other Bodies, and re&s;i&s;ts their Touch or Impul&s;e. Others call it <GAP DESC="foreign">, that which &s;o fills up a place, as, at that time, to exclude from it any other Body. Sometimes they called it the <GAP DESC="foreign">, in contradi&s;tinction to the <GAP DESC="foreign">, or the <GAP DESC="foreign">. That is, they di&s;tingui&s;hed it to be of a <HI>pure pa&s;&s;ive Nature,</HI> and which was acted and deter|mined only by Impul&s;e from without it, or di&s;tinct from it; they knew very well that there was al&s;o be&s;ides it, &s;ome <HI>Active Thing,</HI> &s;omething that was <HI>the Cau&s;e of Motion</HI> and <HI>Action</HI> in the Univer&s;e. For, as <HI>Plutarch</HI> well ob&s;erves, <GAP DESC="foreign">.
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">De Placitis Philo&s;. Lib. 1. c. 3.</NOTE> <HI>'Tis impo&s;&s;ible Matter alone can produce any thing, unle&s;s there be be&s;ides it &s;ome Active Cau&s;e. Sextus Empiricus</HI> al&s;o gives this Definition of Matter or Body
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Adv. Math. p. 32.</NOTE>. <HI>That it is that which re&s;i&s;ts other things which are brought again&s;t it; for Re&s;i&s;tance,</HI> &s;aith he, or Impenetrability, <HI>is the true Property of Body.</HI> By the&s;e Accounts that they have given us of Matter or Body, 'tis very ea&s;ie to under|&s;tand their Notion or Idea of it; which, indeed, was the Ju&s;t and True one. They thought Matter or Body to be a purely Pa&s;&s;ive Thing, incapable of mo|ving or acting by it &s;elf; but wholly determined ei|ther by &s;ome Internal and Self-moving Mind, or by the Motions and Impul&s;es of other Bodies without it: That it was <GAP DESC="foreign">, that is, as we now
<PB N="23" REF="13">adays &s;peak, <HI>Impenetrably extended,</HI> and did &s;o fill up &s;pace or place, as to exclude any other Body from being in the &s;ame Place with it at the &s;ame Time: If to this you add what <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> and &s;ome others, &s;aid of it, that it was al&s;o capable of all Forms, Fi|gures and Modifications, you have then the whole that ever they thought Matter could do or be. Now from hence 'tis exceeding clear that they could not, as indeed we find actually they did not, think Mat|ter or Body the only Sub&s;tance in the World; and that the Deity was Material or Corporeal. For they always de&s;cribed the Divine Nature by Attributes and Properties that were the very Rever&s;es of what they appropriated to Matter or Body. God, they have told us, is an Intelligent Mind, pervading and encompa&s;&s;ing all things; an Active Energetical Prin|ciple; the Cau&s;e of all Motion and Operation what|ever; Intangible, indivi&s;ible, invi&s;ible, and no ways the Object of our Bodily Sen&s;es; But yet who&s;e E&s;&s;ence is plainly di&s;coverable by our rea&s;oning and Under&s;tanding Faculty. This was, as we have &s;een, the Notion or Idea that many of the Ancient Phi|lo&s;ophers had of the Deity; and this plainly &s;hews us, that they look'd upon him to be what St. <HI>John</HI> here defines him, an Incorporeal Being, or a Spirit. There were indeed &s;ome even then, as I have before &s;hewed, who being wholly immer&s;ed in Matter them|&s;elves, did a&s;&s;ert that there was nothing el&s;e but Body in the World. Such were <HI>Leucippus</HI> and <HI>Democritus;</HI> and afterwards <HI>Epicurus</HI> and his Sect, who perverted the Ancient Atomical and true Philo&s;ophy to an Athe|i&s;tical Sen&s;e, and made u&s;e of it for the bani&s;hing the Notion and Belief of a God out of their own and
<PB N="24" REF="14">others Minds: as, indeed, &s;ome others long before them had attempted to do
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>Ari&s;t.</HI> Metaph. l. 1. c. 3. p. 842. <HI>Paris.</HI></NOTE>. But in this, 'tis very plain (as
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">Dr. <HI>Cudw.</HI> in his <HI>Intelle|ctual Sy&s;t. of the &V;niver&s;e.</HI></NOTE> an Excellent Per&s;on of our Na|tion hath ob&s;erved) that the&s;e Men did not under|&s;tand the Philo&s;ophy they pretended to: For it doth mo&s;t clearly follow from the Principles of the True Atomical or Corpu&s;cular Philo&s;ophy, that there mu&s;t be &s;ome other Sub&s;tance, di&s;tinct from, and more Noble than Matter; and which is of an Immaterial, Incorporeal or Spiritual Nature. And this, I hope, it will not be judged impertinent briefly to prove at this Time; becau&s;e &s;ome, who &s;eem not &s;o throughly to under&s;tand it, have of late reckoned the Mecha|nical Philo&s;ophy among the Cau&s;es of the growth of Athei&s;m and Infidelity. It is very much to the Pur|po&s;e, that the Ancient Atomi&s;ts before <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Leucippus,</HI> did plainly a&s;&s;ert and maintain the Doctrine of Incorporeal Sub&s;tances, and that the Deity was al&s;o of that Nature him&s;elf, as I think I have &s;ufficiently proved in this Di&s;cour&s;e; and there|fore tho&s;e confident Modern Writers, who &s;ay that the <HI>Ancients never had any Notion of an Immaterial Being,</HI> betray equally their Ignorance with their A&s;|&s;urance: for the Doctrine of Immaterial Sub&s;tances was as well the <HI>Concomitant,</HI> as indeed it is the <HI>Ne|ce&s;&s;ary re&s;ult</HI> of this kind of Philo&s;ophy. The Em|bracers of it, found plainly that they had a clear and di&s;tinct Idea of two Things, <HI>viz. Pa&s;&s;ive Matter,</HI> and <HI>Active Power;</HI> and the&s;e they found were perfectly di&s;tinct from each other, and no way dependent at all upon each other. To the <HI>former</HI> of the&s;e, they only attributed exten&s;ion and impenetrability, and a Power of being variou&s;ly figured, modified, di&s;po&s;ed
<PB N="25" REF="14">and moved. To the <HI>latter,</HI> they a&s;cribed Cogitation, Life, Sen&s;ation, and the Power of Motion, which they plainly &s;aw did belong to <HI>this,</HI> and could not do &s;o to the <HI>other.</HI> And <HI>the&s;e Two,</HI> they made the Two Great Principles or General Heads of Being in the Univer&s;e, and called them by two va&s;tly different Names, as I have before &s;hewed, <HI>viz.</HI> the <GAP DESC="foreign">, and the <GAP DESC="foreign">. The one <HI>Pa&s;&s;ive Matter</HI> or <HI>Bulk,</HI> and the other <HI>Self-Activity,</HI> or <HI>Life.</HI> In the former of the&s;e, <HI>viz. Pa&s;&s;ive Matter;</HI> they found that there was nothing Real, be&s;ides its Bulk, or impenetrably extended Parts: and that con&s;equently all <HI>Forms</HI> and <HI>Qualities</HI> in Bodies were no real Entities di&s;tinct from the Body in which they inhered, but only the Parts of the Body differently modified, di&s;po&s;ed and agitated, and therefore they held, that when any Body received a new Form or Quality differing from what it had before, there was no new Entity pro|duced, any more than an old one de&s;troyed; for that they look't upon to be perfectly Impo&s;&s;ible: And this was the true Ground of that Fundamen|tal Axiom of theirs, <HI>That Nothing could be made or produced out of Nothing;</HI> which they did not (as the Modern Athei&s;ts do) advance at all in Oppo&s;ition to a Creative and Almighty Power's producing all things at fir&s;t from Nothing; but purely again&s;t the produciblene&s;s of real Entities out of Nothing, in an U&s;ual and Natural way: which tho&s;e that a&s;&s;ert Forms and Qualities to be Sub|&s;tantial and Real Beings, mu&s;t needs grant to be daily done. But it was this, and this only, that that Axiom was levelled again&s;t. And hence it was that they a&s;&s;erted the Deity and the Souls of Men to be
<PB N="26" REF="15">real Entities di&s;tinct from Matter, and not to be pro|ducible out of the Power of Matter; as all Qua|lities which are nothing but Modes of it, they main|tained, were: and this made them perhaps have recour&s;e to the <GAP DESC="foreign"> and <GAP DESC="foreign">, the <HI>Prae-exi&s;tence</HI> and <HI>Tran&s;migration</HI> of Souls; for they could never believe their Souls were, as one expre&s;&s;es it, <HI>younger than their Bodies,</HI> and that they peri&s;hed, when the Bodies died. And therefore nothing can be plainer, than that the very Principles of this Philo|&s;ophy did lead Men to the Acknowledgment of In|corporeal Sub&s;tances, and forced them to believe Life, Motion, and Cogitation to be things that could not be Modifications of Matter, nor peri&s;hable and pro|ducible, as the common Qualities and Forms of Body or extended Bulk are. And thus when it is rightly con&s;idered and throughly under&s;tood, the Atomical or Mechanical Philo&s;ophy is &s;o far from being any way in&s;trumental to the leading Men into Athei&s;m, that there is none other that doth &s;o truly di&s;tingui&s;h between Matter and Incorporeal Beings; none that renders the Operations and Qualities of Bodies &s;o In|telligible, and none that prepares &s;o clear, natural, and ea&s;ie a way for the Demon&s;tration of Immaterial Sub&s;tances, as this kind of Philo&s;ophy doth. Indeed, as almo&s;t all things are, &s;o <HI>This</HI> is capable of, and hath been made u&s;e of to ill Purpo&s;es by its Athei&s;tical Votaries; who did anciently, as they do now, a&s;&s;ert that Cogitation, Life, Sen&s;ation, and Active Power, were all producible out of bare Matter without a Deity. But as this was what the True Atomi&s;ts ne|ver could think po&s;&s;ible; &s;o it is really involved with the mo&s;t mon&s;trous Ab&s;urdities that ever any Opi|nion
<PB N="27" REF="15">was: and which therefore ought not to be charged on the Philo&s;ophy it &s;elf, but only on that Dark, Unintelligible and Incon&s;i&s;tent Sy&s;tem of it, which the Ignorant Athei&s;ts have Compiled; and that only to render it &s;ub&s;ervient to their wicked De&s;igns of excluding the Idea's of God and of Incor|poreal Sub&s;tances out of the World. Tho' (God be thanked) they do in this Point &s;o far fail of Succe&s;s, that nothing can be clearer than that 'tis utterly im|po&s;&s;ible to account for any fir&s;t Cau&s;e of things, for Cogitation, Li&s;e, Sen&s;ation, or Motion, according to their Principle, that there is no other Sub&s;tance but Body: And this nece&s;&s;arily leads me to another very good Argument, for the Nece&s;&s;ity of allowing Incorporeal Sub&s;tances, and to prove that God him|&s;elf is of that Nature, or a Spirit, <HI>viz. The &s;trange Ab&s;urdities of the contrary Opinion.</HI></P>
<P>But the&s;e being very many, and it being of great moment truly to clear up this Point, in an Age wherein Men are &s;o fond of Corporeali&s;m. I &s;hall deferr this till my next Di&s;cour&s;e: wherein I &s;hall fini&s;h this and my remaining Arguments to <HI>Prove God to be a Spirit,</HI> and that there are Beings of an Immaterial and Incorporeal Nature.</P>
<TRAILER>The End of the Fourth Sermon.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="sermon">
<PB REF="16">
<PB N="29" REF="16">
<HEAD>THE Fifth Sermon.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<Q><BIBL><HI>JOHN iv. 24.</HI></BIBL>
<P>God is a Spirit. &mdash;</P></Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>I Have already &s;hewn the Meaning and Import of the&s;e Words, and what we under&s;tand by <HI>God's being a Spirit.</HI> I have &s;hewn you al&s;o the Athei&s;t's Objections again&s;t the Immaterial Nature of God, and the Exi&s;tence of Incorporeal Sub&s;tances; and have endeavoured to Refute them, from Two Ar|guments. I have proved,</P>
<P N="1">1. That 'tis a precarious and unfair way of Ar|guing again&s;t the Exi&s;tence of any thing, only be|cau&s;e our particular Apprehen&s;ions and Conceptions cannot ma&s;ter it: And that it will not follow, That there is no &s;uch thing as an Incorporeal Sub&s;tance, on the Account only of &s;ome Mens declaring that they cannot conceive how any &s;uch thing can be. Where likewi&s;e I &s;hewed, That the Notion of a Spirit, or an Immaterial Sub&s;tance, is as Intelligible as that of Body; and that we have as much rea&s;on to believe the Exi&s;tence of the former, as of the latter.</P>
<PB N="30" REF="17">
<P N="2">2. I have plainly proved, That the Notion of In|corporeal Sub&s;tances hath all along been believed and received by many Knowing and Judicious Men a|mong&s;t the mo&s;t Ancient Writers and Philo&s;ophers; and con&s;equently that it can neither be Non&s;ence and Impo&s;&s;ible, nor of &s;o late an Originial as the perverted Philo&s;ophy of <HI>Ari&s;totle:</HI> both which the Athei&s;ts are plea&s;ed to a&s;&s;ert.</P>
<P N="3">3. I proceed now to &s;peak to a <HI>Third</HI> Argument, To prove the Deity to be of a Spiritual or Immaterial Nature, and that there are Incorporeal Sub&s;tances: And this I &s;hall draw from the many and &s;trange Ab|&s;urdities of the contrary Opinion, <HI>That there is no|thing but Matter in the World.</HI> And if the&s;e can fully be made to appear, I hope the Doctrine involved with them will al&s;o appear fal&s;e and precarious; and that the contrary Opinion, of the Real Exi&s;tence of In|corporeal Beings, will find an ea&s;ie admittance into our Faith. But here I mu&s;t premi&s;e, as taken for granted, That we are all agreed on the Definition of, or know what we mean by Matter or Body, <HI>viz.</HI> That it is <HI>Sub&s;tance Impenetrably extended;</HI> whereby we di|&s;tingui&s;h it from Spirit, which is a Thinking Sub|&s;tance without Corporeal Exten&s;ion, or without having <HI>Partes extra Partes.</HI> For if this be not the Notion which our Adver&s;aries have of it, as well as we; 'Tis in vain to di&s;pute about it at all. If there|fore they have any other Idea of it that is different from this, let them produce it, and make it as clear and Intelligible as this is; for without doing &s;o, they do nothing to the purpo&s;e. And if they have not a clear and di&s;tinct Idea of Matter or Body, how come they &s;o boldly to &s;ay that Matter and Sub|&s;tance
<PB N="31" REF="17">are all one? how can they di&s;tingui&s;h the Idea's of Body and Spirit &s;o plainly, as to be &s;ure there can be no &s;uch thing as an Incorporeal Sub|&s;tance, but that it implies a Contradiction? Unle&s;s they fully know what Matter or Body is, there may be Millions of Varieties and Degrees of Immaterial Sub&s;tances; or there may be no &s;uch thing as Body at all, for any thing they can prove to the contrary. The Athei&s;t mu&s;t then do one of the&s;e two things; he mu&s;t either e&s;tabli&s;h a new Notion of Matter, that &s;hall be &s;o intelligible and plain, that all Mankind &s;hall as readily acquie&s;ce in it, as they do in the <HI>old</HI> and <HI>common</HI> one, or el&s;e he mu&s;t re&s;olve to keep to <HI>That.</HI> The former of the&s;e he hath not yet done, nor I believe is very ready to do; but when he doth it, 'twill be time enough to con&s;ider it. In the mean while, I will readily join I&s;&s;ue with him, on the common and received Notion of Body: And from thence undertake to maintain, That nothing is more ab&s;urd and unaccountable than their A&s;&s;ertion, <HI>That there is no other Sub&s;tance but Matter or Body in the World.</HI> For,</P>
<P>Fir&s;t, Had there been nothing el&s;e but Matter in the World from Eternity (and if there be nothing el&s;e now, there never was any thing el&s;e) I cannot po&s;&s;ibly &s;ee how the&s;e Gentlemen can account for Mo|tion,
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">, &s;aith <HI>A|naxagoras.</HI> Vid. <HI>Diog. Laert.</HI></NOTE> or &s;hew us how Matter came fir&s;t to be moved. And Matter without Motion &s;ure could never be God, never be the Cau&s;e of any thing, nor could it ever produce, act, or do any thing whatever. Before Motion began, Matter could have been no|thing but an heavy, lifele&s;s Lump of va&s;t extended Bulk; which mu&s;t have lain al&s;o for ever in the &s;ame
<PB N="32" REF="18">dead and unactive Po&s;ition, if nothing had been &s;uper|induced to put it into Motion and Action. And no one &s;ure can be &s;o &s;tupid as to call this a Deity! This is as Mr. <HI>Blount</HI> rudely and irreverently expre&s;&s;eth him&s;elf, wor&s;e than to &s;uppo&s;e
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Oracles of Rea&s;on,</HI> p. 126, 127.</NOTE> a <HI>Hum-Drum-Deity, chewing of his own Nature; a Droning God, that &s;its hoarding up of his Providence from his Creatures.</HI> And this even he can't but acknowledge, <HI>is an Athei&s;m no le&s;s Irrational, than to deny the very E&s;&s;ence of a Divine Being.</HI> I hope therefore they will grant, that Matter without Motion cannot be &s;uppos'd to be a Deity. And if &s;o, then the Divine Nature (whatever it be) mu&s;t be <HI>&s;omething di&s;tinct from, and more Noble than Matter,</HI> and more akin to Motion, than to Matter or Body in general, or to it <HI>quatenus Matter,</HI> as the Schools &s;peak. And indeed, Motion taken in this &s;en&s;e, not for a tran&s;lation of Body from one place to another, but for the Active Cau&s;e of Motion, may be very well &s;aid to be Incorporeal, or the Deity it &s;elf. But how came this Motion into Matter at fir&s;t? and which way did Matter attain this <HI>Divine Activity,</HI> or <HI>God-like Energy?</HI> Here they mu&s;t a&s;&s;ert one of the&s;e three things, either, 1. That Motion came into Matter from &s;omething without it, and di&s;tinct from it. Or, 2. That Motion is E&s;&s;ential to Matter, and Co-eternal with it. Or, 3. That it came into it afterwards by Chance, or without any Cau&s;e at all. The Fir&s;t of the&s;e they will not &s;ay, I doubt, becau&s;e it's Truth: but how|ever, if they do, our Controver&s;ie is at an end; for we believe that 'twas a Divine and powerful Mind, perfectly di&s;tinct from, and more Noble than Matter, who fir&s;t made it, and moved it, and doth &s;till con|tinue
<PB N="33" REF="18">to modifie and di&s;po&s;e it according to his Infi|nite Wi&s;dom and Providence.</P>
<P>And one would think no Man can be &s;o &s;en&s;ele&s;s as to maintain the la&s;t, <HI>viz.</HI> That <HI>Motion came into Matter without any Cau&s;e at all,</HI> and that it was <HI>Chance</HI> only that fir&s;t produced it; for Chance here &s;ignifies no|thing in reality: And truly, Men that will be &s;o ridi|culou&s;ly ab&s;urd as to a&s;&s;ert, that a Body, or Particle of Matter, that is once at re&s;t, may move by <HI>Chance</HI> only, or may <HI>Chance to move of it &s;elf,</HI> though there be nothing to cau&s;e its Motion, de&s;erve no &s;erious Refutation, but ought to be treated only as we do Fools and Madmen, with &s;ilent Pity and Compa&s;&s;ion. And yet &s;o very fond are &s;ome Per&s;ons of any thing that oppo&s;es Truth, that they will run into the greate&s;t Ab&s;urdities to maintain it. For a late Cor|poreali&s;t is pleas'd to &s;ay,
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Ob&s;erv.</HI> on Dr. <HI>Bentley</HI>'s Serm. <HI>p.</HI> 6, 7.</NOTE> <HI>That Matter can move of it &s;elf:</HI> and to &s;hew his deep Skill in Philo&s;ophy, he tells us, that <HI>Wind, Fire, and very fine-&s;ifted &s;mall Du&s;t, are Matter, and yet Self movers.</HI> And of <HI>Wind</HI> and <HI>Fire,</HI> he profoundly a&s;&s;erts, <HI>That they cannot lo&s;e their Motion, or cea&s;e Moving, &s;o long as they continue to be Wind and Fire.</HI> That is, As long as Wind and Fire are in Motion, they cannot cea&s;e to move. This, indeed, is a very deep and important Di&s;covery! But yet 'tis what hardly any Man would have pub|li&s;h'd in Print, but one that concludes a Body mu&s;t needs move of it &s;elf, only becau&s;e he can't &s;ee with his Eyes the Cau&s;e or Origin of its Motion. And yet even this he may often &s;ee in the ca&s;e of <HI>Fire,</HI> if he will but vouch&s;afe to ob&s;erve how 'tis u&s;ually kindled. A little Con&s;ideration would have &s;atisfied him al&s;o, that <HI>Winds</HI> may be produced in the Atmo&s;phere, by
<PB N="34" REF="19">the Air's being moved &s;ome way, by Heat, Com|pre&s;&s;ion, or &s;ome other Accidental Cau&s;e, as well as in an Eolipile, or a Pair of Bellows. And as for his <HI>fine Du&s;t's ri&s;ing up in a Cloud of it &s;elf;</HI> had he under|&s;tood that the Agitation of any Fluid will keep the &s;mall Particles of any heavier Matter mixed with it from de&s;cending to the bottom of it, nay, and rai&s;e them up from thence too; and had he not forgotten that this was the ca&s;e here, (the Air being &s;o agitated by the Motion of Sifting) he would not, &s;ure, have been &s;o &s;illy as to have brought the&s;e as In&s;tances of Spontaneous Motion in Matter. But however, he is not the fir&s;t that hath been guilty of this Ab&s;urdity. For <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> upbraids &s;ome, in his time,
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Metaph.</HI> l. 1. c. 3.</NOTE> <HI>with in|troducing Motion into Matter, without any Cau&s;e,</HI> or with|out &s;uppo&s;ing any Principle whence it &s;hould proceed.</P>
<P>The Second Point therefore, is, I &s;uppo&s;e, that which our Corporeali&s;t will adhere to, <HI>viz. That Mo|tion is E&s;&s;ential to, and Co-eternal with Matter;</HI> and that either all Matter and Motion taken together, or el&s;e &s;ome Fine and Subtile Parts of it are the Deity. But this, if it be throughly con&s;idered, will appear almo&s;t as ab|&s;urd and unaccountable as that Matter &s;hould be mo|ved without any Cau&s;e at all. For, in the fir&s;t place, 'tis plain, That Motion is <HI>not E&s;&s;entially included in the Idea of Matter.</HI> I can conceive Matter to the full as well, if not better, when it is at re&s;t, as when it is in Motion. When I look on any Body, or con&s;ider any determinate quantity of Matter, I can conceive that 'tis a Sub&s;tance that is impenetrably extended, divi&s;ible, and moveable; that it fills up &s;uch a &s;pace, and that it excludes any Body from being there with it at the &s;ame time, without conceiving it to be
<PB N="35" REF="19">in Motion at all; much le&s;s being forced to ac|knowledge that it <HI>mu&s;t be,</HI> and was <HI>always</HI> in Mo|tion. Whereas certainly, if <HI>Motion</HI> were as <HI>E&s;&s;ential</HI> to Matter, as <HI>Impenetrability</HI> and <HI>Exten&s;ion,</HI> 'twere as impo&s;&s;ible for me to conceive it at re&s;t, as it is to conceive it without tho&s;e Qualifications or Proper|ties: But no doubt I have as true an Idea of a Stone or a Bullet, or of any other Body or Part of Matter, when it lies &s;till on the Ground, as I have of it when 'tis projected from a Sling or a Gun. Now if Motion be not E&s;&s;entially included in the Idea or Notion that we have of Matter, how can any one &s;uppo&s;e it as E&s;&s;ential to, and Co-eternal with it? This is a Conclu&s;ion beyond the power of our Rea&s;on to make; no one can come to it naturally, and in the ordinary way of Apprehending and Rea&s;oning; and 'tis much more Unintelligible and My&s;terious than a great many other things which they pretend they cannot believe purely on this account.</P>
<P>But &s;uppo&s;ing that <HI>Motion be E&s;&s;ential to Matter;</HI> it mu&s;t then be &s;o to every Particle of it, and that Uniformly alike, or in the &s;ame Proportion. And if &s;o, then every Atom of Matter mu&s;t always re|tain its Original Degree of Motion or Velocity, and can never po&s;&s;ibly be deprived of it: For no Acci|dental Cau&s;e can any way either encrea&s;e or dimini&s;h, promote or hinder the E&s;&s;ential Properties of a Being. Thus, for In&s;tance, take a Particle of Matter, or any Body whatever, and move it as fa&s;t or as &s;low as you plea&s;e, place it where or how you plea&s;e, &s;epa|rate it from other Particles or Bodies, or combine it with them; &s;till 'twill retain its E&s;&s;ential Properties of <HI>Exten&s;ion</HI> and <HI>Impenetrability,</HI> and they will receive
<PB N="36" REF="20">no <HI>Inten&s;ion</HI> and <HI>Remi&s;&s;ion</HI> all this while. But now 'tis quite otherwi&s;e in the ca&s;e of Motion; we find the &s;ame Body may be brought to move &s;ometimes fa&s;ter, &s;ometimes &s;lower, and &s;ometimes (to all ap|pearance) be reduced to ab&s;olute re&s;t; which could never be, if Motion were E&s;&s;ential to each Particle of Matter, in &s;uch a Determinate Degree of Velocity, and there were (as is now &s;uppo&s;ed) Nothing el&s;e <HI>without</HI> or <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> from Matter to put it into Motion. For then nothing could ever accelerate or retard its Motion: no one Body could ever move fa&s;ter or &s;lower than another. But a <HI>Snail</HI> or the <HI>Pigritia</HI> would keep pace with the &s;eemingly In&s;tantaneous irradia|tions of Light.</P>
<P>And thus we may &s;ee plainly, that without &s;uppo|&s;ing &s;ome Principle of Motion di&s;tinct from Matter, Motion could never have come into it, nor have been co-eternal with it.</P>
<P>But allowing them that Motion &s;hould get into Mat|ter neither they nor we know how, or that it is Eternal and E&s;&s;ential to it: If there be nothing el&s;e but Matter and Motion in the Univer&s;e, which way will they account for the Deity? they dare not &s;ay Matter alone without Motion can be God; and I think there can be nothing more clear, than that Bare Motion in Matter can never make a Deity. For if Motion came into Matter any time after its Exi&s;tence, the Deity mu&s;t then be produced, and con&s;equently receive a Beginning; and &s;o the Fir&s;t Cau&s;e of all things mu&s;t be cau&s;ed him&s;elf after all things, which is contradi|ctory to the Notion of a Deity.</P>
<P>If they &s;ay that Motion is Co-eternal with, and E&s;|&s;ential to Matter, and the Deity be Matter thus Eter|nally
<PB N="37" REF="20">moved; then either every Particle of Matter mu&s;t be e&s;&s;entially God, or el&s;e he mu&s;t be the re&s;ult of the whole, or of &s;ome Parts of Matter combined together. If the former be a&s;&s;erted, there mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity be as many Gods as there are Atoms or Phy&s;ical Monads: for each of them are Individually di&s;tinct from each other, and have their &s;eparate and peculiar Properties of Impenetrability, Exten&s;ion and Motion; which in this fine Hypothe&s;is, are the only Perfections of the Divine Nature. But no doubt they will &s;ay, that 'tis not any one Particle of Matter that is a God alone, and therefore they cannot be all Dei|ties &s;ingly; But <HI>'tis all of them,</HI> or at lea&s;t a <HI>good con|venient Number</HI> of the&s;e luckily combined together, out of whom the Deity is compo&s;ed. Though which of the&s;e to &s;tick to, our Corporeali&s;ts are very much at a lo&s;s; <HI>Spinoza</HI> a&s;&s;erting the former, and Mr. <HI>Hobbs</HI> the latter. But I think 'tis no great matter which they adhere to; for both are alike unaccountable and ab&s;urd: For if there be not a Divine Nature, and its Perfections, in each &s;ingle Atom of Matter; will barely combining &s;ome, or all of them, toge|ther make a Deity of them? Can it ever enter into the Heart of Man to conceive that barely collecting together a parcel of roving Particles of Matter, &s;uch as agitated Du&s;t, or Motes moving up and down in the Sun, will ever unite them into a God? give the Combination Almighty Power, Wi&s;dom, and Good|ne&s;s? when there was nothing like this before in any of the Atoms them&s;elves? Certainly, Men that can a&s;&s;ert &s;uch mon&s;trous Opinions as the&s;e, do not think as other People do; or, indeed, rather do not think at all. The&s;e certainly labour under the Di&s;ea&s;e men|tioned
<PB N="38" REF="21">by <HI>Epictetus,</HI> of <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Arrian.</HI> Lib. 1. c. 5.</NOTE> a <HI>&s;tony In&s;en&s;ibility or Deadne&s;s of Under|&s;tanding,</HI> by which they are be&s;otted and &s;tupified in their Intellectuals; &s;o that they can believe and a&s;&s;ert any thing, if it be &s;ub&s;ervient to their de&s;igns, tho' never &s;o contradictory to the cleare&s;t light of Rea&s;on and Truth.</P>
<P>But to go on: Granting to the Corporeali&s;ts that Matter either hath been <HI>always</HI> in Motion, or for what time they plea&s;e; allowing its Particles to be <HI>&s;mall</HI> or <HI>great,</HI> to <HI>move &s;wiftly</HI> or <HI>&s;lowly,</HI> and to be <HI>combined</HI> together, or <HI>disjoined</HI> from each other as they think fit. I enquire what all this will &s;ignifie towards producing of <HI>Cogitation, Wi&s;dom,</HI> and <HI>&V;nder|&s;tanding?</HI> or to the production of Life, Self Activity, or Spontaneous Power? And yet The&s;e are the mo&s;t Great and Noble Things in the World; the&s;e are the highe&s;t Perfections of the Divine Nature, and in the&s;e we place the E&s;&s;ence of the Deity.</P>
<P>Now here Matter and Motion is more than ever at a lo&s;s; and I think it demon&s;tratively certain that it cannot account for the&s;e things. <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> did very truly find fault with the Corporeali&s;ts of his Time, that they did not, as ours cannot now, a&s;&s;ign <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">Lib. 1. Metaph. c. 3.</NOTE> any Cau&s;e of well and fit; any Origin of, or Rea&s;on for that <HI>Wi&s;dom</HI> and <HI>Regularity,</HI> that <HI>harmonious Relation</HI> and Aptitude of one part of the Creation to another, which is &s;o very con&s;picuous in all things; &s;uppo&s;ing that there is nothing in Na|ture but Matter and Motion. And it is mo&s;t cer|tainly true, that the Idea which we have of Body doth not nece&s;&s;arily include Cogitation in it, nor our Notion of Cogitation include Body: but they are
<PB N="39" REF="21">two as di&s;tinct Idea's as any we have. So far are they from being the &s;ame thing, that we cannot po&s;|&s;ibly conceive Cogitation with Exten&s;ion. No Man ever conceived a Thought to be &s;o many Inches or Yards <HI>long;</HI> to be <HI>deep, thick</HI> or <HI>broad,</HI> to be divi&s;ible into two or more Parts, or to have any Kind of Fi|gure or determinate Po&s;ition or Exten&s;ion; whereas if what&s;oever be unextended, or not Body, be ab&s;o|lutely Nothing, as the&s;e Gentlemen a&s;&s;ert: Cogita|tion, Wi&s;dom, Under&s;tanding, and Spontaneous Power mu&s;t be <HI>nothing:</HI> or el&s;e they mu&s;t be <HI>figurate Bodies;</HI> than which nothing can be more ab&s;urd. And if we farther examine our own Mind, and con|&s;ult our own Rea&s;on, we &s;hall find that we cannot po&s;&s;ibly conceive how thinking, Wi&s;dom, Con&s;ciou&s;|ne&s;s, and Spontaneous Power can po&s;&s;ibly be the re|&s;ult of Bare Motion of the Parts of Matter. Was there ever any one that &s;eriou&s;ly believed a Particle of Matter was any Wi&s;er or had any more Under|&s;tanding for being moved than it was before when it lay &s;till? for let it be never &s;o briskly agitated, is it not &s;till Body? there is no other Idea ari&s;eth from hence, but only that it changeth its place, and is united &s;ucce&s;&s;ively to &s;everal parts of &s;pace, that it will move &s;uch other Particles of Matter as 'tis ca|pable of, and be retarded in its Motion by hitting or &s;triking again&s;t them; the&s;e, and &s;uch like, are all the Ideas that we can have of a Body in Motion; but what is this to <HI>Thought</HI> and <HI>Con&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s?</HI> Did ever any one but a &s;tupid Corporeali&s;t imagine that a Particle of Matter by being moved, was made Intel|ligent? and that its travelling from place to place, made it under&s;tand all things in its way? and did
<PB N="40" REF="22">any one ever think that the Knowledge of &s;uch a rambling Atom encrea&s;ed in Proportion to the velo|city of its Motion? Yes, doubtle&s;s! and thus a Bul|let di&s;charged from the Mouth of a Cannon, ought to be look'd upon as one of the mo&s;t Ingenious Be|ings in Nature. And hence it will follow, that the more ha&s;t any one makes to tumble over Books, or to ramble over Countries; and the more precipitantly he makes a judgment of Notions or Opinions, the Better Account he can give of Authors and Places; and the more &s;olid and &s;ub&s;tantial will be his Learning. This, indeed, is the be&s;t Account that can be given of the finene&s;s and quickne&s;s of Thought, that <HI>&s;ome Men</HI> &s;o much pretend to; for this way <HI>they</HI> may come by a va&s;t &s;hare of Penetration, and be vola|tilized far above the dull &s;tudious and con&s;iderate Vulgar: and the Event &s;hews that <HI>they</HI> frequently make u&s;e of the Experiment.</P>
<P>But again; As we cannot po&s;&s;ibly conceive that the <HI>Motion of one Particle</HI> of Matter <HI>alone,</HI> can give it Knowledge and Under&s;tanding; &s;o neither can we &s;uppo&s;e that a <HI>Body compo&s;ed of many of them,</HI> can ac|quire any &s;uch thing barely on the Account of the Motion or Agitation of its Parts, for Motion only will do no more to the whole, than it did to each one &s;ingly; and 'tis not conceivable that Three, or Three Millions of Bullets will be any wi&s;er for being di&s;charged together, than if they were all &s;hot &s;ingly in pur&s;uit of Under&s;tanding. Nor can any happy <HI>Combination</HI> or <HI>Con&s;titution</HI> of <HI>Parts</HI> avail any thing in this Ca&s;e, any more than Motion; nor can <HI>that</HI> be e&s;&s;ectual to &s;uper-induce <HI>Wi&s;dom</HI> and <HI>Under&s;tanding</HI> into Matter. The <GAP DESC="foreign"> will be no more
<PB N="41" REF="22">a God, than <HI>Jupiter</HI>'s <HI>Log was among the Frogs,</HI> nor than the mo&s;t <HI>den&s;e</HI> and <HI>gro&s;s</HI> body in Nature. For after all the various Po&s;itions, Configurations, and Combinations of Matter, is it not Matter &s;till? will rarefying or &s;ubtilizing of Matter change its Nature and E&s;&s;ential Properties? A Rare Body is nothing but a contexture of fine and &s;ubtile Particles, which be|ing &s;eparated farther a&s;under than is u&s;ual, are al&s;o perhaps more briskly agitated and moved. And pray what is here new? what will this do towards Divi|nity? will bare <HI>Figure</HI> and <HI>Po&s;ition</HI> of Parts change the Nature of tho&s;e Parts, and give them Cogitation and Knowledge when they had no &s;uch thing &s;ingly and before? will adding, &s;ubtracting, multiplying or dividing of Numbers, make them any thing el&s;e more Noble than what they were before? will not the <HI>Summs, Remainders, Products,</HI> or <HI>Quotients</HI> be &s;till Figures and Numbers like the fir&s;t Digits, out of which the&s;e do by Combination or various Po&s;itions ari&s;e? and is it not ju&s;t &s;o with Matter? will a Par|ticle of it be made any more Wi&s;e and Intelligent, for being render'd &s;maller than it was before? and hath a little Particle more Sen&s;e than a larger? will Three or Four, or Four Millions of the&s;e be more ingenious than a Body or Lump that is as big as them all? and will moving a few Atoms a good di&s;tance from each other, <HI>Separate</HI> them into Knowledge, and <HI>Di&s;|join</HI> them into an Under&s;tanding Power which none of them had before? If Men can &s;wallow &s;uch things as the&s;e, and think at this Extravagant and Unac|countable Rate; I fear all good Arguments and &s;ound Rea&s;on will be lo&s;t upon them, and they ought to be neglected as downright Stupid or Di&s;tracted.
<PB N="42" REF="23">And yet the&s;e, and &s;uch like Ab&s;urdities, mu&s;t be the Natural Con&s;equences of &s;uppo&s;ing Matter and Mo|tion alone capable of <HI>thinking,</HI> that Matter can be <HI>rarified</HI> into a Deity, and that Divine and Almighty <HI>Wi&s;dom, Knowledge, Goodne&s;s</HI> and <HI>Power,</HI> are the re|&s;ult of <HI>Body luckily di&s;po&s;ed and moved;</HI> which yet was the Opinion of <HI>Hobbs,</HI> and is &s;till of many of his Admirers and Followers. For notwith&s;tanding tho&s;e Excellent Demon&s;trations that many Learned Men
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg">Dr. <HI>Cud|worth,</HI> Dr. <HI>Bent|ley,</HI> and others.</NOTE> among&s;t us have e&s;tabli&s;hed, that Mat|ter and Motion cannot po&s;&s;ibly produce Cogi|tation, Con&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s, Under&s;tanding and Liberty of Will: There is lately an Ignorant Corporeali&s;t who a&s;&s;erts,
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">Ob&s;erva|tions on Dr. <HI>Bentley</HI>'s Ser|mon, <HI>p.</HI> 10.</NOTE> <HI>That the Inflamed and glowing Particles of the Blood, called Spirits, tho' they are not in them|&s;elves Sentient and Intelligent, are yet the active Prin|ciple of Life and Motion, of Sen&s;e and Under&s;tanding in Man and Bea&s;t; and do act the Under&s;tanding or Brain to apprehend, judge and remember.</HI> Now by this 'tis plain that he &s;uppo&s;es Cogitation, Under|&s;tanding, Con&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s and Liberty, and all the Fa|culties of the Soul of Man to be nothing but the re&s;ult of &s;ome peculiar Motions in a Fitly organized Body. The Animal Spirits he thinks are like the Ela&s;tick Particles in the Spring of a Watch, tho' they cannot tell what a Clock it is them&s;elves, yet they can by means of the Spring which they actuate, do that and many other things that the Movement &s;hall be fitted for: Or to make u&s;e of a Compari&s;on of his own; The Animal Spirits may do as the Wind doth in the Che&s;t of an Organ, tho' it can make no Mu&s;ick of it &s;elf, yet by being communicated &s;o as to in&s;pire the &s;everal Pipes, it may actuate them into a very fine Harmony.</P>
<PB N="43" REF="23">
<P>It is not my Bu&s;ine&s;s nor De&s;ign to di&s;cour&s;e <HI>here</HI> of the Soul of Man: but yet I would fain beg the&s;e Corporeali&s;ts clearly to explain, how <HI>Self-Con&s;ciou&s;|ne&s;s, Reflection,</HI> and <HI>Liberty of Action</HI> can po&s;&s;ibly be accounted for by this Hypothe&s;is. For this nece&s;&s;a|rily makes Men meer Machines at long run. An En|gine is never the more <HI>free</HI> and <HI>con&s;cious</HI> to its &s;elf of its own Operations for being fine and curiou&s;ly contrived: And the wonderful Clock at <HI>Strasburgh</HI> knows no more what it doth, nor is it any more the <HI>Spontaneous Cau&s;e</HI> of its &s;o many and curious Motions, than the Ancient <HI>Clep&s;ydra,</HI> or a modern <HI>Hour-gla&s;s</HI> knoweth what it is about, when it rudely mea&s;ureth the Duration of any Part of Time. For whatever is performed by meer Matter and Motion mu&s;t needs be nece&s;&s;ary in every &s;tep and degree of its cour&s;e, be the way of acting in the Engine never &s;o curious, and never &s;o remote from the cogni&s;ance of our Sen&s;es. They know well enough, as I &s;hall &s;hew be|low, that there is no po&s;&s;ible room for freedom of Action, Con&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s of any Operation, nor for a Cogitative and Rea&s;oning Power, according to this way of explicating the Operations of the Humane Soul. For in the Animal Spirits they grant there is no &s;uch thing; they are only a fiery and briskly agi|tated Fluid, which &s;erves to actuate any Part. of the Rational Machine <HI>pro re nat&acirc;:</HI> And the&s;e &s;everal Parts or Organs of the Machine can no more produce any &s;uch thing without the Animal Spirits, than the Hand or Dial-Plate of a Watch can, or any other Part of a curious In&s;trument. If therefore you enquire of them, wherein they place this Cogitation, Self-Con|&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s and Liberty; they will tell you <HI>'tis in the
<PB N="44" REF="24">Man, 'tis in the whole;</HI> 'tis neither his <HI>Soul</HI> alone, nor his <HI>Body</HI> alone; 'tis no Spiritual Sub&s;tance di&s;tinct from Matter, but 'tis the whole Man that thinks, rea|&s;ons, and acts freely by the form of the whole: But this is very unaccountable, and is what neither they nor any one el&s;e, I believe, can ever apprehend or conceive; that <HI>Liberty</HI> &s;hould be the re&s;ult of <HI>Nece&s;&s;arily moved Matter;</HI> that <HI>Cogitation</HI> &s;hould ari&s;e from <HI>Sen&s;ele&s;s and Unthinking Atoms,</HI> and that <HI>Knowledge</HI> and <HI>Con|&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s</HI> of its own Operations &s;hould come into any Engine by its being finely and curiou&s;ly contrived, and be nothing but the nece&s;&s;ary re&s;ult of bare local Motion, and rightly Organized Matter.</P>
<P>The&s;e Ab&s;urdities &s;ome other Corporeali&s;ts clear|ly perceiving, and being fully convinced that 'tis impo&s;&s;ible to account for Cogitation, Con&s;ciou&s;|ne&s;s, and the like, from bare Matter and Motion; and to educe the Perfections of the Deity out of the Power of Matter only. The&s;e, I &s;ay, had recour&s;e to another way of maintaining their beloved A&s;&s;er|tion, <HI>that there is no other Sub&s;tance but Body.</HI> They a&s;&s;ert, <HI>that Cogitation is E&s;&s;ential to Matter:</HI> or, as <HI>Spinoza</HI> words it, <HI>All Sub&s;tance is e&s;&s;entially Cogi|tative and Extended;</HI> &s;o that as there is no Sub&s;tance but what is <HI>Material,</HI> &s;o there is none but what is <HI>Cogitative</HI> too. Indeed, as I &s;hewed you before, he a&s;&s;erts that there is but <HI>One only Sub&s;tance,</HI> which <HI>is God,</HI> or in other words, <HI>Univer&s;al Matter;</HI> and Cogi|tation and Exten&s;ion (he &s;aith) <HI>are the two Infinite Attributes, or el&s;e the Affections of the Attributes of the Deity</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Op. Po&s;t|hum.</HI> p. 12. &amp; 14.</NOTE>. And this, with a great deal of A&s;&s;u|rance (as the way of the&s;e Writers is) he pretends to demon&s;trate Mathematically, by a Pompous, tho' a very Ob&s;cure, <HI>Apparatus</HI> of <HI>Definitions, Axioms, Po|&s;tulates</HI>
<PB N="45" REF="24">and <HI>Propo&s;itions.</HI> But it is not <HI>calling</HI> a thing a Demon&s;tration, that will make it to <HI>be</HI> &s;o; nor con|cluding with <HI>Quod erat Demon&s;trandum,</HI> that will make every body acquie&s;ce in a Propo&s;ition, when it is either perfectly unintelligible or fal&s;e. And yet &s;uch are tho&s;e that <HI>Spinoza</HI> brings to prove and &s;upport this &s;trange Opinion. The Mon&s;trous Ab&s;urdities of which, I &s;hall now con&s;ider.</P>
<P>And Fir&s;t, 'Tis plain, That if Cogitation be as E&s;&s;ential to Matter as Exten&s;ion; Then all and every Particle of it mu&s;t needs be a <HI>Thinking Sub&s;tance or Body</HI> by it &s;elf, <HI>Di&s;tinct</HI> from all Other Particles of Matter in the World. There is no one doubts but 'tis &s;o, in reference to the proper and allowed Affections of Body, <HI>Impenetrability</HI> and <HI>Exten&s;ion.</HI> Every lea&s;t Particle or Atom of Matter hath <HI>the&s;e</HI> Properties as compleat within it &s;elf, as they are in the whole Bulk of the Univer&s;e, or in any larger Body what|&s;oever: The&s;e are al&s;o individually di&s;tinct in each Particle; &s;o that its Properties, though of the &s;ame kind, are not the very &s;ame with tho&s;e of other Parts of Matter. Now if to each &s;uch Particle of Matter Cogitation be al&s;o added; then every Atom in the Univer&s;e will be a Thinking, Intelligent and Rea|&s;oning Being, di&s;tinct from all the re&s;t, and have its own proper and peculiar Faculties and Operations; 'twill be a <HI>different Per&s;on</HI> from all Others; and every Individual Particle of Matter will be <HI>&s;o</HI> from it, and from every one el&s;e in the World. Every Atom al&s;o will be equal to any of the re&s;t, in re&s;pect of this <HI>Cogitative Power;</HI> will have it in the very &s;ame Pro|portion, and not be wi&s;er or more fooli&s;h, duller or more ingenious than its neighbours. And if this be
<PB N="46" REF="25">&s;o (as it mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily be, if all Matter be E&s;&s;en|tially Cogitative) then there mu&s;t either be no God at all, or el&s;e every Particle of Matter mu&s;t be a di&s;tinct God by it &s;elf; and &s;o the mo&s;t ridiculous Polythei&s;m that ever was imagin'd, mu&s;t be introduced and al|lowed of. For if there be any &s;uch things as <HI>Perfect Knowledge, Power, Wi&s;dom</HI> and <HI>Goodne&s;s, every one</HI> of the&s;e Particles mu&s;t <HI>have</HI> it: For 'tis impo&s;&s;ible <HI>Infinite</HI> or Perfect Power, Wi&s;dom, Knowledge and Good|ne&s;s, can be produced out of <HI>finite;</HI> the le&s;&s;er can never produce the greater, nor any thing make or give that which it hath not within it &s;elf: And there|fore it plainly follows, that either there is no Deity at all, or el&s;e that every Particle of Matter mu&s;t be a God by it &s;elf, according to this Hypothe&s;is. For finite or imperfect Cogitation can no more be the Cau&s;e of Infinite, than <HI>Cogitation</HI> can ari&s;e from inco|gitative Matter. And this <HI>Spinoza</HI> &s;aw very well; and therefore he a&s;&s;erts <HI>all Cogitation,</HI> as well as <HI>all Sub&s;tance,</HI> to be <HI>Infinite</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Op. Po&s;t.</HI> p. 21. 6.4, 5.</NOTE>. Indeed, to avoid this abominable Ab&s;urdity of <HI>each Particle of Matter's being God by it &s;elf;</HI> he &s;aith, that there is <HI>but one only Sub&s;tance in Nature, and that this is God</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg">Ib. p. 12.</NOTE> But this will not help him out, nor do him much &s;ervice in defending him from the horrid Ab&s;urdities of this Notion. For if by <HI>Sub&s;tance,</HI> he mean only <HI>Sub&s;tance</HI> in general, or the Idea that we have of &s;ome <HI>Sub|&s;tratum, Support</HI> or <HI>Subject of Inhe&s;ion</HI> in which we con|ceive the Properties and Accidents of Real Beings to inhere; as by his Definition of <HI>Sub&s;tance</HI> he &s;eems to imply; 'Tis plain, this is only a <HI>Metaphy&s;ical</HI> Notion, only a general <HI>Word</HI> or <HI>Term</HI> that &s;erves to denote our conception of &s;omething in a Being that doth not
<PB N="47" REF="25"><HI>depend</HI> upon the Properties of <HI>it,</HI> nor inhere in <HI>them,</HI> but <HI>they</HI> upon and in <HI>it.</HI> But we can have no Notion of <HI>Sub&s;tance exi&s;ting without any Properties,</HI> any more than of <HI>Properties</HI> without <HI>it.</HI> If therefore he mean that God is &s;uch a Sub&s;tance as this, that God is the <HI>Term or Idea of Sub&s;tance</HI> in general, he makes the Deity nothing at all but a meer Name, a meer <HI>Ens Rationis,</HI> or Creature of the Brain only; than which nothing can be more ridiculous and fooli&s;h. For 'tis the <HI>Attributes</HI> or <HI>Properties</HI> of the Deity that we chiefly contend for, and which we are chiefly obliged to Acknowledge and Reverence; and 'tis <HI>The&s;e</HI> that we a&s;&s;ert mu&s;t be <HI>inherent in an Infinite and Immaterial Sub&s;tance, or Spirit.</HI> But if by there be|ing <HI>but one only Sub&s;tance,</HI> which he &s;aith is God, <HI>Spinoza</HI> means, that the Deity is the whole Ma&s;s of Beings or of Matter in the Univer&s;e, as by what he delivers in many places, I do really believe that he did; for he a&s;&s;erts, that <HI>all Corporeal Sub&s;tance is Infi|nite and One</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg">Ib. p. 14.</NOTE>; and that <HI>Exten&s;ion</HI> and <HI>Cogitation</HI> are the <HI>Attributes,</HI> or the <HI>Affections of the Attributes of God,</HI> as I hinted before. I &s;ay, if this be his Opinion, there cannot po&s;&s;ibly be a more unaccountable, ab&s;urd and impo&s;&s;ible Notion of God advanced. And 'tis al&s;o ab&s;olutely incon&s;i&s;tent and contradictions with what he doth at other times a&s;&s;ert. For if <HI>Sub&s;tance, Matter,</HI> and <HI>God,</HI> &s;ignifie all the &s;ame thing, and all Matter be <HI>E&s;&s;entially Cogitative,</HI> as &s;uch; Then 'tis plain, as I have &s;hewed already, that God cannot be the whole Matter of the Univer&s;e, but each Particle of Matter will be a God by it &s;elf. For if there be any &s;uch thing as Infinite Perfection, it mu&s;t be E&s;&s;entially in every Particle of Matter; otherwi&s;e Infinite Perfection
<PB N="48" REF="26">may ari&s;e out of what is only Finite, which is im|po&s;&s;ible. And if every Particle of Matter have this Infinite Perfection, the whole Ma&s;s of the&s;e, Col|lectively con&s;idered, will be by no means <HI>One God,</HI> or <HI>One Being, Infinitely Perfect,</HI> but a Swarm of In|numerable Deities, every one of which will be Per|&s;onally di&s;tinct from each other, and yet contain all po&s;&s;ible Perfection in it &s;elf. But allowing him all the Collective Ma&s;s of Beings, or the Univer&s;e to be God; What a &s;trange kind of a Deity would this make? The Divine Nature mu&s;t then nece&s;&s;arily be <HI>Divi&s;ible, part of it here,</HI> and <HI>part there;</HI> part of it in <HI>Motion,</HI> and part of it at <HI>Re&s;t;</HI> part of it <HI>Hot,</HI> and part <HI>Cold;</HI> part <HI>Fire,</HI> and part <HI>Water;</HI> and, in a word, &s;ubject to all manner of <HI>Imperfections, Vici&s;&s;itudes, Changes, Contrarieties</HI> and <HI>Alterations</HI> that can be imagined. But this the common Sen&s;e of all Mankind will abhorr and dete&s;t to be &s;poken of the Deity: and be&s;ides, 'tis contrary to what <HI>Spinoza</HI> a&s;&s;erts in other places, where he &s;aith Sub&s;tance is <HI>Indivi&s;ible</HI>
<NOTE N="(d)" PLACE="marg">Ib. p. 11.</NOTE>. But how there can be <HI>but One Only Sub&s;tance,</HI> and <HI>that</HI> the Mat|ter of the Univer&s;e; and how this Sub&s;tance can be <HI>Indivi&s;ible,</HI> when yet each Particle of Matter mu&s;t be a di&s;tinct Sub&s;tance by it &s;elf, and is <HI>divi&s;ible,</HI> and divided from all others, as our Rea&s;on and our Sen&s;es do every day inform us, is a flight of Metaphy&s;icks above my Under&s;tanding, and can, I believe, never be conceived by any one that under&s;tands the meaning of the Words or Terms &s;uch an Opinion &s;hall be de|livered in. But he indeed that doth not, and that will admire lofty and in&s;ignificant Sounds, without Sen&s;e, or he that hath &s;ome wicked and ba&s;e De&s;ign to cover under &s;uch Cant, may conceive any thing, or at lea&s;t &s;ay that he doth &s;o.</P>
<PB N="49" REF="26">
<P>The Operations and Actions al&s;o of a Corporeal Deity (were it po&s;&s;ible there &s;hould be &s;uch an one) mu&s;t be all ab&s;olutely Nece&s;&s;ary, and determined by pure Phy&s;ical and Mechanical Fatality. For he would be really and truly <HI>Natura Naturata,</HI> only the bare Re&s;ult of Motion in Matter, as 'tis variou&s;ly formed, figured, moved and di&s;po&s;ed &s;o as to produce any Natural Effect. And this, I doubt not but &s;ome of the&s;e Corporeali&s;ts very well under&s;tand; and that is the rea&s;on that makes them &s;o very fond of the No|tion of a Corporeal Deity, and of a&s;&s;erting, That there is nothing in the World but Body: For then they know very well, that there can be nothing but <GAP DESC="foreign"> in Nature, &s;uch a Phy&s;ical Nece&s;&s;ity as will perfectly exclude all Freedom and Liberty of Will among&s;t Men, and con&s;equently de&s;troy all Notions of, and Di&s;tinctions between Good and Evil. They don't care to &s;ay plainly there is no God, that looks a little too bare-faced: for <HI>Athei&s;m</HI> is a Name they don't love to take. But they will readily and &s;tudiou&s;ly endeavour to advance &s;uch an Account and Notion of a Deity as &s;hall do as well; &s;uch an one as they know is in effect the &s;ame as to &s;ay there is no God at all. And this the repre&s;enting him as <HI>Corporeal,</HI> will effectually do; for this &s;ubjects Him to a Phy&s;ical Nece&s;&s;ity, makes Him nothing at all but Nature, and deprives both Him and us of the Noble Principle of <HI>Freedom of Will:</HI> and then they know that there can be no &s;uch things as Rewards and Puni&s;hments pro|portionate to Mens Actions; but that all things are alike, without any di&s;tinction of Good and Evil, and con&s;equently that they may do any thing that they have a mind to. And this appears to be the I&s;&s;ue that
<PB N="50" REF="27">they would willingly bring all things to; For if this were not the ca&s;e, what Rea&s;on can be given why Men &s;hould be &s;uch zealous Sticklers for a <HI>Corporeal Deity?</HI> Why &s;hould they &s;till, in &s;pite of Sen&s;e, Rea&s;on and Philo&s;ophy, maintain, That there can be no &s;uch thing as an Incorporeal or <HI>Immaterial Sub|&s;tance?</HI> Is it purely out of a devout and holy De&s;ire to under&s;tand the Divine Nature more clearly, in order to &s;peak of him more properly, to adore him more re|ligiou&s;ly, and obey him more heartily? I fear, not: For if Matter and Motion can Think, and (as they &s;ay) the Properties or Attributes of God can be ac|countable that way, and there be really and truly a Wi&s;e, Powerful, Ju&s;t and Good God, though Cor|poreal; why &s;hould not the&s;e Gentlemen look upon them&s;elves obliged to obey &s;uch a God, as well as a Spiritual one? Why do they quarrel with, and ca&s;t off his Holy Word, and reject and de&s;pi&s;e his Re|vealed Will? Is not a Corporeal Deity (according to their Notion) truly a Being endowed with all po&s;&s;ible Perfections. Is not He the Fir&s;t Cau&s;e, Maker and Pre&s;erver of all Things? and con&s;equently is not He as fit and worthy to be wor&s;hipped as well as a Spiritual One? and cannot &s;uch a Deity acquaint his Creatures how he will be wor&s;hipped and &s;erved? cannot He Reward them for &s;o doing, and Puni&s;h them for offending again&s;t Him, equally as if He were Incorporeal? If he cannot, indeed, then there is &s;omething more than bare Speculation in the ca&s;e, and there mu&s;t be &s;ome &s;ub&s;tantial Rea&s;on why <HI>Dei&s;ts</HI> and <HI>Anti&s;cripturi&s;ts</HI> are always Corporeali&s;ts. And this is the truth of the Matter; the God of the Corporeali&s;ts is not the True Deity, whatever
<PB N="51" REF="27">they may pretend, but a blind, &s;tupid, &s;en&s;ele&s;s Idol, that hath nothing but the Name of God wickedly applied to it. 'Tis only <HI>Nature</HI> or a <HI>Pla&s;tick Power</HI> in Nature, the whole ma&s;s of, or &s;ome fine, &s;ubtile and active Parts of Matter in rapid Motion, without any <HI>Under&s;tanding,</HI>
<NOTE N="(a)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Quando attribuimus Deo &s;en&s;us, Scientiam &amp; Intellectum, quae in nobis nihil aliud &s;unt qu&agrave;m &s;u&s;citatus &agrave; rebus externis organa prementibus animi Tumultus, non e&s;t putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Hobbs</HI> de Civ. c. xv. &sect;. 14. p. 271. The &s;ame thing he &s;aith al&s;o, <HI>Leviath.</HI> c. 31. p. 190.</NOTE> <HI>Wi&s;dom,</HI> or <HI>De&s;ign, without liberty of Will</HI> or <HI>freedom of Action;</HI> but Phy&s;i|cally and Mechanically Nece&s;&s;ary in all its Operations. Their God is <GAP DESC="foreign">, and <GAP DESC="foreign">, as <HI>Herodotus</HI> &s;peaks, he is the <HI>Servant of Nece&s;&s;ity,</HI> and <HI>cannot po&s;&s;ibly him&s;elf avoid the de&s;tined fate.</HI> And to be &s;ure, if God be not a free Agent, Nothing el&s;e can: for all things <HI>flowing from him by an inevitable Nece&s;&s;ity</HI>
<NOTE N="(b)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Omnia In|evitabili nece&s;|&s;itate ex Dei Natur&acirc; &s;equi &s;tatuo. Op. Po&s;t.</HI> p. 453. <HI>Vid. etiam,</HI> p. 24.18.26, &amp;c.</NOTE>, or being <HI>Parts of Him,</HI> as <HI>Spinoza</HI> a&s;&s;erts, they mu&s;t be under the &s;ame Nece&s;&s;ity with the Deity, and he &s;aith plainly, That <HI>every thing that is determined to Operate, is &s;o determined nece&s;&s;arily by God, and could not act at all if God did not thus nece&s;&s;arily determine it</HI>
<NOTE N="(c)" PLACE="marg"><HI>Op. Po&s;t.</HI> p. 24.</NOTE>. <HI>That the Will of Man cannot be called free, but is only a nece&s;&s;ary Cau&s;e</HI>
<NOTE N="(d)" PLACE="marg">P. 28.</NOTE>. And in another place
<NOTE N="(e)" PLACE="marg">P. 36.</NOTE> he tells us plainly, <HI>that there are no &s;uch things as final Cau&s;es in Nature, they being only the Ignorant Figments of Mankind; but that all things are Governed by Ab&s;olute Nece&s;&s;ity.</HI> A while after this,
<NOTE N="(f)" PLACE="marg">P. 37.</NOTE> <HI>he a&s;&s;erts Man to be a meer Machine,</HI> and &s;aith, that <HI>'tis only tho&s;e who are Ignorant of Cau&s;es that &s;ay he was thus finely formed by any Art or De&s;ign;</HI> or who attri|bute his <HI>Compo&s;ition to any Supernatural Wi&s;dom.</HI> And then at la&s;t he comes to the <HI>great Point</HI> on which all this Philo&s;ophy turns; which is, <HI>That Good and Evil
<PB N="52" REF="28" MS="y">are not by Nature; but that the Notions of them came only from Mens mi&s;taken Opinion, that all things were made for them; and who therefore call that Good which is agreeable to their Fancy, and that Evil which is con|trary to it.</HI> By which &s;hort Connexion of their Opi|nions, 'tis clear enough why <HI>Spinoza</HI> was a Corpo|reali&s;t, as al&s;o why Mr. <HI>Hobbs</HI> advanced the &s;ame Notions. And I doubt tho&s;e that E&s;pou&s;e the &s;ame Opinions now adays, know too well the Con&s;equences of them.</P>
<P>But of the Precariou&s;ne&s;s of the&s;e Notions, I mu&s;t &s;ay no more now; de&s;igning particularly to confute them hereafter, as they are made Objections again&s;t the Truth, and Obligation of Religion in general.</P>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
</BODY>
<BACK>
<DIV1 TYPE="publisher's advertisement">
<HEAD>ADVERTISEMENT.</HEAD>
<P>REmarks on &s;ome late Papers relating to the Univer&s;al Deluge, and to the Natural Hi&s;tory of the Earth; By <HI>John Harris,</HI> M. A. and Fellow of the Royal-Society. In <HI>Octavo.</HI></P>
<P>Di&s;cour&s;es on &s;everal Practical Subjects; By the late Re|verend <HI>William Payne,</HI> D. D. with a Preface giving &s;ome Account of his Life, Writings, and Death.</P>
<P><HI>Both Printed for</HI> Richard Wilkin.</P>
</DIV1>
</BACK>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
