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<DATE>2013-12-18</DATE>
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<NAME>Olivia Bottum</NAME>
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<P><HI>A REVIEW</HI> OF THE OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAjESTIES late An&s;wers <HI>and Expre&s;&s;es.</HI></P>
<P>Written by a Gentleman <HI>of Quality.</HI></P>
<P>OXFORD, Printed by LEONARD LICHFIELD, <HI>Printer to the Vniver&s;ity.</HI> 1643.</P>
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<HEAD>A REVIEW OF THE Ob&s;ervations upon &s;ome of His <HI>Maje&s;ties late An&s;wers and Expre&s;&s;es.</HI></HEAD>
<P>_IN the Conte&s;tation between Regall and Parliamentary authority, finding by the fre|quent Declarations of the two Honourable Hou&s;es made unto the People, (like &s;o many Appeales of the Body repre&s;entative, to the Body at large,) that the Soveraign judge|ment of all things is (upon the matter) brought unto the People, I &s;ee not, but that it is both lawfull, and even the nece&s;&s;ary duty of every private man, that hath any under&s;tanding of the things in que|&s;tion, to publi&s;h his particular judgement &amp; apprehen&s;ion of them; That from the mo&s;t free and univer&s;all agitation of the truth, &s;ome judgement from that va&s;t body may be rendered to the appealors &s;atisfaction. And &s;o, having conceived that the Author of the Ob|&s;ervations upon His Maje&s;ties late An&s;wers, hath upon this &s;ubject broached divers State-doctrines, neither agreeable to our Lawes, nor yet to true Chri&s;tian Religion: and that yet, (to the prejudice of the Truth,) they have, as truths, got a &s;trong prepo&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion of men<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter"> mindes; I have thought fit to offer &s;uch notions upon the &s;umme of them, as I conceive ought to bring them to a more &s;erious re-exami|nation. Saving therefore to His Maje&s;ty His Right of Animadver|&s;ion into the particular <HI>fal&s;ities, in&s;olences,</HI> and <HI>&s;editious calumnies</HI> in the &s;everall pa&s;&s;ages of that booke; I only apply my &s;elfe to the &s;umme and &s;cope thereof, and that I find to be to this purpo&s;e.</P>
<P>Fir&s;t, That God is no more Author of Regall power then of Ari|&s;tocraticall, and as much Author of u&s;urped Dominion as of Heredi|tary. That Power is originally inherent in the People, and but de|rivative
<PB N="2" REF="3"> in Kings. That the People are the efficient and finall cau&s;e of Kings. That the name of King is not greater then of People. That though the King be <HI>&s;ingulis major,</HI> yet He is <HI>univer&s;is minor.</HI> That He is not to be accounted a God, a King, a Lord, a Father <HI>&amp;c.</HI> to the People <HI>conjunctim,</HI> but <HI>divi&s;im</HI> only. That Trea&s;on (&s;o farre as it concernes the Prince) is not &s;o horrid in nature, as oppre&s;&s;ion in a Prince, <HI>&amp;c.</HI></P>
<P>In the better examining of the&s;e, we finde; That God creating man &s;ingle, left him not other meanes of multiplying, then only by propagation, and in propagating, he gave the Rule and Soveraignty of the i&s;&s;ues propagated, to the Father of whom they were propaga|ted; and in defailance of the Father, He gave the Rule of all the younger (and con&s;equently of their de&s;cendants too) unto the fir&s;t|borne,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Gen. 4.7.</NOTE> (as we may &s;ee where God tells <HI>Caine; Thy Brother &s;hall be &s;ubject to thee, and thou &s;halt beare rule over him.</HI> So that all men in the beginning were born Subjects, either to him that naturally was their Father, or to him that by right of primogeniture was repre|&s;entatively the Father. After the Flood, the then common Father of the world, having a family of three Sonnes of differing condition, and they (for the plantation of the then unpeopled world) by Gods determinate fore-councell di&s;per&s;ed into three di&s;tant parts of it, the elder Brothers right of Soveraignty over tho&s;e younger, (through di&s;tance of place, and want of occa&s;ion and meanes to ex|erci&s;e it.) became wholy neglected, as upon like &s;everance and &s;earch of new places of Plantation, it, in other places, often after be|came. But every Planter becomming &s;o by him&s;elfe a Father, &s;oon became a Family, and from a Family grew into a Citty, &s;o into di|ver&s;e Cities, and at length into a Kingdome. And though we fir&s;t heare of the irregular Kingdome of the de&s;cendant of <HI>Cham,</HI> yet find we al&s;o, that <HI>Shem</HI> the elde&s;t and ble&s;&s;ed Sonne of tho&s;e three, was grown into the Soveraignty of a Kingdome, and was the fir&s;t King that ever was in the world: for by the judgement and com|putation of the Learned, <HI>Melchi&s;edeck</HI> the King of <HI>Salem,</HI> could be no other then very <HI>Shem</HI> him&s;elfe. Neither had the tenne Tribes of <HI>I&s;raell,</HI> (when revolting from the &s;onne of <HI>David,</HI> they &s;aid, <HI>they had no part in</HI> David, <HI>nor Portion in the &s;onne of</HI> Ie&s;&s;e,) any other meaning then only to inferre; That <HI>David</HI> being neither their Fa|ther by <HI>nature,</HI> nor in primogeniture by <HI>repre&s;entation,</HI> they were
<PB N="3" REF="3"> free from that naturall &s;ubjection unto his &s;onne, which otherwi&s;e (they implied) they were bound to be &s;ubject to. And indeed, (if there had not been an e&s;peciall ordinance of God in the ca&s;e) it had truly followed; that being neither de&s;cended of <HI>Je&s;&s;e,</HI> nor <HI>Ie&s;&s;e</HI> the fir&s;t borne of their common Father; the rule of &s;ubiection which followed nature, had not tyed them to obey his &s;onne. The fifth Commandement it &s;elfe proveth this naturall bond of &s;ubiection, when (as all Churches expound it) it commands <HI>Obedience</HI> to Go|vernours, under the name of Parents only. And that (according to Gods &s;aying unto <HI>Caine) Soveraignty</HI> did rightfully follow <HI>primo|geniture,</HI> we may &s;ee it in this; that as God promi&s;ed <HI>Iacob</HI> the <HI>So|veraignty,</HI> &s;o he procured him the <HI>Birth-right,</HI> formally tran&s;acted by <HI>E&s;aus</HI> &s;ale of it. Therefore a King being no other then a common Father, by either <HI>naturall</HI> or <HI>legall</HI> Right; neither the People, nor any other Power then only God (the Father of nature it &s;elfe) can properly be &s;aid to be the author of the being of Kings.</P>
<P>Next, God hath not authorized Kingly Power in nature only; but by his expre&s;&s;e promi&s;es before the law, and by his ordinances con|cerning it, in the law, even before ever the people of <HI>I&s;raell</HI> &s;ought a King: al&s;o by &s;etling over his People the government of a King: by &s;acrating that office with <HI>annointing:</HI> by his own a&s;&s;uming of the name of King: and by &s;etting forth our Saviours Dominion over his Church, by that name and office. In all which if God hath done the like for authorizing <HI>ari&s;tocraticall</HI> or <HI>v&s;urped</HI> Dominion; then is the Ob&s;ervour in tho&s;e <HI>a&s;&s;ertions</HI> to be ju&s;tified: but if not, then is he in them an Author of lyes. Yea, God is more Author of what he or|daines and directs, then of what he only permits; and therefore more Author of good, then of evill. Wherefore to &s;ay <HI>v&s;urped</HI> Domini|on referres as much to God as author thereof, as lawfull <HI>hereditary</HI> Dominion doth, is not only fal&s;e but al&s;o bla&s;phemous.</P>
<P>As for Power inherent in the People, how &s;hould one imagine &s;uch a thing? unle&s;&s;e al&s;o he would imagine People to be <HI>juvenes aquilone creati,</HI> men like <HI>gra&s;hoppers</HI> and <HI>locu&s;ts</HI> bred of the winde, or like <HI>Cadmus</HI> his men &s;prung out of the earth; where none deri|ving from any pre-exi&s;tent Parents, had all of them equall originall and power, and therefore &s;ubject to no civill Power but what by agreement they them&s;elves ordained? But where man is borne of a Father, to whom, by the law of God and nature he is &s;ubject, he is
<PB N="4" REF="4"> &s;o farr from having inherent Power originally in him, as that he hath not his own originall being but only in &s;ubjection; either to his im|mediate Father, if his Father were ab&s;olute, or to him and his com|mon Father, if his Father were a Subject. Now if man, in his parti|cular and naturall capacity, hath not originall Power of him&s;elfe in|herent in him, he cannot have originall inherent Power, by any civill capacity what&s;oever.</P>
<P>And though, upon the overthrow and breaking up of Kingdomes, in&s;tance may perhaps be given; that People have made them&s;elves a King, yet does not that prove, the People to be the originall of Kingly Power; no more th<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">n going upon crutches, after lo&s;&s;e of a legg, proves crutches the originall and naturall way of going: for people being by misfortune deprived of their naturall common Fa|ther and Soveraign, mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity entertaine &s;uch &s;upply of their lo&s;&s;e, as their fortune can be&s;t afford them. And even in that ca&s;e too, their making of a King, was no other, then the choo&s;ing of one to beare the known Office of the true and naturall common Father. For we mu&s;t note, they never made Kings by giving them power <HI>con&s;titutive,</HI> to doe &s;o; and &s;o; (as they mu&s;t have done, if Kings had had nothing but commi&s;&s;ionary authority from the people,) but they made Kings, only by choo&s;ing one to beare the office and per&s;on of the &s;ame Governour, that the law of nature had before de&s;cribed and authorized to command and governe.</P>
<P>Though therefore the ten Tribes of <HI>I&s;raell</HI> rebelled again&s;t <HI>Re|hoboam,</HI> for refu&s;ing to releive their greivance, made <HI>Ieroboam</HI> King, and God forbad <HI>Rehoboam</HI> to warre again&s;t them for it, yet this proves not, That people have power of making Kingdoms or Kings. For God him&s;elfe had fir&s;t declared, that he would rend ten Tribes from the Kingdome of <HI>Iudah,</HI> and that <HI>Ieroboam</HI> &s;hould be King over them. And had <HI>Jeroboam</HI> and the people attended Gods will and plea&s;ure in it, (as <HI>David</HI> after his annointing did) he had beene a King and they a Kingdome not of their own making but of Gods. But to &s;hew how quickly the by-affections of the people pervert the right work of God, when they looke not as well unto the way, as unto the end: we may &s;ee, that for all this, new Kingdome &amp; King were of Gods appointing, yet when the people would in a way of their owne, take upon them the Crowning of the man appointed, God di&s;claimes the authorizing of what they did. <HI>They &s;et up a
<PB N="5" REF="4"> King</HI> (&s;aith God) <HI>but not by me.</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Ho&s;ea. 8.4.</NOTE> and in recording the fact (both in the fir&s;t of <HI>Kings,</HI> and againe in the &s;econd of <HI>Chronicles</HI>) the Scrip|ture directly telleth us, that they rebelled. That therefore God forbad <HI>Rehoboam</HI> to fight again&s;t them, did not approve what the people had done, for God tells the rea&s;on why he forbad them; not becau&s;e the people had done well, but becau&s;e the thing was of God, which if God had not revealed, <HI>Rehoboam</HI> might, and ought to have reduced them to their obedience: and how&s;oever the thing it &s;elfe was of God, yet to teach us, that the people have not autho|rity to doe the thing that he hath ordained, without his e&s;pceiall ap|pointment, we &s;ee that when <HI>Abijah, (Rehoboams</HI> &s;onne) with foure hundred thou&s;and, again&s;t eight hundred thou&s;and, pitched a battle upon the right of that Kingdome, and committed the cau&s;e to God, though <HI>Ieroboam</HI> had entrapped him in an ambu&s;h, God gave &s;uch a &s;entence again&s;t <HI>Ieroboam</HI> and his people, that after an overthrow and &s;laughter of five hundred thou&s;and of them, they were di&s;abled from ever recovering &s;trength in all <HI>Abijahs</HI> dayes. And that Sub|jects for luck &s;ake may take heed of making new Kingdomes, or Kings: this King (the only in&s;tance of peoples King-making, and yet in making of whom the people did only anticipate Gods pur|po&s;ed work) became the in&s;trumentall efficient of their finall de|&s;truction, &amp; (&s;etting up the Idolatry which the people them&s;elves had fir&s;t affected) his &s;inne through all his &s;ucce&s;&s;ours &s;o adhered to them, as that it never left them, untill it had extirpated them from their own, and transferred them captives into another Country. To conclude this point, when we heare God him&s;elfe &s;tiling him|&s;elfe a <HI>King,</HI> a great <HI>King of Kings,</HI> and telling us that <HI>the Kingdome is the Lords,</HI> &amp;c: who without reluctance of con&s;cience and even horrour of it, can yeild the power of Kings to be <HI>derivative,</HI> and the People to be the <HI>originall</HI> of it? for then, God by &s;etting him|&s;elfe forth in the name of a King, does in&s;tead of pre&s;enting him|&s;elfe, in a notion of <HI>magnificence</HI> and <HI>Soveraignty,</HI> pre&s;ent him&s;elfe under the notion of an <HI>inferiour</HI> and of a <HI>derivative,</HI> from a more <HI>Soveraigne</HI> and <HI>originall</HI> Power: whereas we &s;ee God never ex|pre&s;&s;es his Power by the name of an Elder, or of a Magi&s;trate, or any &s;ubordinate Authority how good or honourable &s;oever. Yea to be <HI>King of Kings,</HI> is then no more, then to be the <HI>derivative</HI> and crea|ture of Kings.</P>
<PB N="6" REF="5">
<P>As for the Peoples being the efficient and finall cau&s;e of the King. If one knew in what &s;ence the Ob&s;ervour would be under&s;tood, he were &s;oone an&s;wered. For if he would be under&s;tood according to the propriety of his wordes, (as indeed that which he would main|taine does need he &s;hould,) Then is that po&s;ition not only fal&s;e, but an impious fal&s;hood, even full bla&s;phemy: for properly God, and none but God, is the efficient and finall cau&s;e of all things: there being no difference betweene the efficient cau&s;e and the Creatour. But if the Ob&s;ervour means, that the people be the in&s;trumentall cau&s;e of Kings; the in&s;trumentall cau&s;e and mediate end, are termes of &s;o extreame and notorious difference, and con&s;equence, from effi|cient and finall cau&s;e, as it is by no meanes to be pardoned him that he &s;hould meane the one, and &s;ay the other. Be&s;ides, to under&s;tand him &s;o, does overthrow all that he drives at: for if the People be but the in&s;trumentall cau&s;e of Kings, then can they not be the end of Kings, no more then the in&s;trument of any worke can be the end for which the work was made, but contrarily the work is the end of the in&s;trument, and therefore greater then the in&s;trument. As for the people, they are &s;o farre from being the finall end of Kings, as that they are not any way the end of them. For government is the end of Kings (of which the People are but the Subject) and God alone is both the efficient cau&s;e and finall end, both of the Govern|ment, Governour, and Subject to be governed.</P>
<P>As for that which he affirmes, That though Kings be <HI>&s;ingulis ma|jores</HI> yet are they <HI>vniver&s;is minores,</HI> and that wherein &s;oever they be to be accounted. <HI>Gods, Lords, Fathers, Heads,</HI> unto the People; they are not &s;o to be under&s;tood, otherwi&s;e then as to the particular per&s;ons of men, con&s;idered <HI>&s;ingly</HI> not <HI>jointly,</HI> what an impudent in|&s;olence is it that one that has u&s;e of rea&s;on, &s;hould &s;o wickedly belye the principles of it, to &s;o infinite a con&s;equent of ab&s;urdities. For if Princes be <HI>Kings, Lords, Fathers, Heads, &amp;c:</HI> to the &s;ingle per&s;ons of the Subject only, and not to the univer&s;ality of them, then is eve|ry &s;ingle Subject by him&s;elfe alone a body politique, whereof the King, as King, is Head, and &s;o hath as many Kingdomes as Subjects: &amp; every one being di&s;tinct in relation one from the other, have not, nor can have any civill communion among them; neither can any of them have to doe with the civill Affaires one of another. And fur|ther, (which is not only fal&s;e, but de&s;tructive to the publique weale
<PB N="7" REF="5"> and &s;afety of all Kingdomes) If Kings be not Heades of the pub|lique community of their People, as well as of the private particu|lars of them, then is the publique community out of the Kings Pro|tection, and Kings are di&s;charged of all care of the publique. For the mutuality of relation betwixt Protection and Subjection, &s;uffers not the one to move, but within the limits of the other, and if the uni|ver&s;ality mu&s;t be under the Kings Protection, it mu&s;t be al&s;o under His Subjection, for which cau&s;e the ancient and con&s;tant wi&s;edome of our Peers and Commons &s;itting in Parliament as the Body repre|&s;entative of the whole Subject of the Kingdome, doe in the Pream|ble of their Acts, in that quality, to this day, recite them&s;elves His <HI>Maje&s;ties loyall and faithfull Subjects.</HI> So that in this point the Ob|&s;ervour in&s;olently controules the Wi&s;edome and Iudgement of the repre&s;entative of the whole Kingdome, as well as contradicts the principles of rea&s;on.</P>
<P>La&s;tly, whereas he &s;aith that Trea&s;on &s;o farre as it concernes the Prince, is not &s;o horrid in nature as oppre&s;&s;ion in a Prince. Without excu&s;ing any way or dimini&s;hing the faults of Princes, in any the lea&s;t act of oppre&s;&s;ion, let every one but aske his owne con&s;cience, whether is more horrid in nature, Superiors to wrong Inferiours, or Inferiours their Superiours: Mai&s;ters their Servants, or Servants their Ma&s;ters: Husbands their Wives, or Wives their Husbands: Fathers their children, or children their Fathers: and he will &s;oon find the impiety of this a&s;&s;ertion. And whereas now the Ob&s;ervor profe&s;&s;eth his good will and affection to Monarchy. You may by the&s;e grounds which he hath laid, and by his propounding to us for a patterne to our Kings, the condition of the Prince of <HI>Orange,</HI> and for our Kingdome, the patterne of the Common-wealth of <HI>Venice,</HI> know how fal&s;e a meaning he hath, and what his de&s;igne is; even to loo&s;en the &s;acred tye of Obedience toward our Liege Soveraigne, and with it the firme and &s;etled &s;tability of the Kingdome, and to prepare mens hearts and per&s;wa&s;ions, to the receiving of &s;ome new forme of Government, according to the fancy of the common People.</P>
<P>Having therefore with fal&s;e principles endeavoured to found the originall of all Soveraignty in the People, as hoping thereby to find meanes to pluck it out of the Kings hands: he then proceeds to per&s;wade, that not only naturall rea&s;on, but even the frame of the
<PB N="8" REF="6"> Kingdome, and the po&s;itive lawes thereof, doe all concurr to main|taine the highe&s;t Soveraignty to be in the People. But when he &s;hould make that apparent by the manife&s;t Iudgement and Acts of our Law; not being able to doe that, he &s;eekes by &s;ly in&s;inuations, to have that admitted and &s;wallowed, which to prove he knowes were impo&s;&s;ible. Therefore pretending to &s;hew the originall, the progre&s;&s;e, and changes of &s;overaigne government, all from, and by the authority of the People, even from the fall of <HI>Adam</HI> to the pre|&s;ent. when it &s;hould be expected he &s;hould &s;hew the Soveraignty of this Kingdome to be deriued from them, he runnes him&s;elfe into a puzle, and then breakes off and tells us what he thinks, and he thinks, that <HI>when mo&s;t Countries have found out an Art and peaceable order for publique A&s;&s;emblies, whereby the people may a&s;&s;ume its own power, to doe it &s;elfe right, without di&s;turbance to it &s;elfe, or injury to Princes; he were unju&s;t that would oppo&s;e that art and order. That Princes may not be beyond all limits of Law, nor tryed upon them by private parties, the whole Community in its underived</HI> Maje&s;ty, <HI>&s;hall convene to doe Iustice, &amp;c:</HI> and &s;o he goes on in&s;inuating, that our Parliaments are &s;uch publique A&s;&s;emblies, wherein the Commu|nity in underived Maje&s;ty convenes to doe ju&s;tice upon the King.</P>
<P>Truly I am not &s;o well affected to arbitrary Government, as to admit the judgement (much le&s;&s;e the thought of one man) to be proof of Law and Government, We &s;hall therefore by Gods helpe examine how well this new conceipt agreeth with our Lawes and auncient &s;etled frame of Government. But this is obvious a fore|hand, that it is &s;o farre from being true that mo&s;t Countries, have found the art and order of <HI>A&s;&s;emblies</HI> wherein the People may a&s;|&s;ume the power of doing them&s;elves right. As that unle&s;&s;e you will call the <HI>A&s;&s;embly</HI> of &s;ome meere popular <HI>Republique,</HI> &s;uch an <HI>a&s;&s;embly:</HI> there is not the ordinance of any &s;uch <HI>a&s;&s;embly</HI> to be found in all the world. and the reducing of our Parliaments to &s;uch <HI>A&s;&s;em|blies,</HI> will &s;uit as well, as the &s;haping of our Kingdome to the frame of the common-wealth of the <HI>Venetians,</HI> or of the <HI>Hollanders.</HI></P>
<P>That we may know therefore that our Parliaments are no &s;uch imaginary A&s;&s;emblies, in which the people in underived Maje&s;ty convene to a&s;&s;ume any Power &s;uppo&s;ed to be theirs originally, and with that Power to doe them&s;elves right. Even the Ob&s;ervour him&s;elfe hath a&s;&s;ured us, when in his fa&s;t and loo&s;e play, he unawares
<PB N="9" REF="6"> confe&s;&s;eth that the compo&s;ition of our Parliaments are &s;o equall and geometricall, and all parts &s;o orderly contribute their office, as that no part can have any extreame predominance over other. This is mo&s;t true that he confe&s;&s;eth. God grant that no endeavour to the contrary may ever deprive the Kingdome of the right benefit of this happy and well compo&s;ed Ordinance. But now then if our Parlia|ments be ordained <HI>A&s;&s;emblies,</HI> compo&s;ed of three nece&s;&s;ary different parts, one <HI>Soveraigne,</HI> the others <HI>Subject,</HI> &s;ome appearing for their own intere&s;ts, others repre&s;entatively for them that &s;ent them, and all ballanced in &s;uch a geometricall equality, as is proper for the con&s;ervation of their &s;everall rights and intere&s;ts from any extream predominance of one of the parts above the other. Then can they not be a&s;&s;emblies of re&s;umption of the peoples &s;uppo&s;ed power, for in &s;uch imaginary a&s;&s;emblies, there mu&s;t be a di&s;&s;olution of all con&s;ti|tute orders, degrees, and qualities of the parts, and all the members mu&s;t be reduced to a naturall coequality undi&s;tingui&s;hed by any dif|ference, of quality, degree or priviledges what&s;oever: &s;o as there mu&s;t be neither King, nor Peers, nor any office or power of the for|mer State remaining, but all re&s;olved into a meere Chaos, till all be new framed by the deity of the people. So farre therefore are our Parliaments from the nature of &s;uch a&s;&s;emblies, as that the endea|vour of introducing of &s;uch A&s;&s;emblies is mo&s;t &s;editious, traiterous, and de&s;tructive, not only to the per&s;on and dignity of the King, to the Crowne Imperiall and to the Kingdome it &s;elfe (who&s;e well ballanced rights have (be&s;ide other tyes) beene &s;o often, &s;o &s;o|lemnely, and by &s;o many of us, even by our whole repre&s;entative body &s;worne to be defended) but even to the rights, priviledges, and being, of the ble&s;&s;ed Ordinance of our Peace and well-fare our very Parliaments them&s;elves.</P>
<P>For we mu&s;t know, that our law (taking notice, that in every State, there are three parties capable of ju&s;t or unju&s;t Soveraignty; that is to &s;ay, &s;ome Prince; the Nobles; and the People) judged no government &s;o &s;afe and a&s;&s;ured, as where every of the three parties capable of Soveraignty, were in &s;ome &s;ort admitted to a participati|on of it, but &s;o admitted, as that &s;till the Soveraignty &s;hould cleerly remaine to Him that ought to be the Soveraigne. And to this end, our law (having fir&s;t through the piety of our law-giving Princes obtained a ju&s;t &amp; regular cour&s;e of government; the &s;tability where|of
<PB N="10" REF="7"> it found to be more concerned in the power of making lawes, then in any other power belonging to the Soveraigne) did for pre|venting innovations that might &s;ubvert that &s;etled regularity: in &s;uch a &s;ort e&s;tabli&s;h the frame of State and government, as that the Prince &s;hould have his hands bound up from u&s;ing the legi&s;lative power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons. But then, to the end that they (who&s;e con&s;ent was brought in only to prevent the evill which ab&s;olute power might worke again&s;t the &s;etled frame of the State) might not them&s;elves become that evill, which they were called to prevent: The Law gave to them no more intere&s;t in the legi&s;lative power then it had &s;till left in the hands of the <HI>Prince,</HI> to wit, to every of the three parties, the King, the Peers, and the Commons, an equall power of a&s;&s;ent or di&s;&s;ent in making of new Law. And &s;o by oppo&s;ing the &s;ingle power of eve|ry one of them, to the votes of every other two; made &s;o &s;ecure a ballancing of their powers one again&s;t another; as that no practice of any two of them can doe any thing to the prejudice or diminution of the third, without that third party it &s;elfe doe give con&s;e~t unto it.</P>
<P>Nor did the providence of the Law here re&s;t. But con&s;idering that in the power of making Lawes it had now oppo&s;ed the pow|ers of two numerous bodies, again&s;t the power of the &s;ingle Sove|raigne. It fore&s;aw, and feared that by the Soveraignes con&s;enting to Lawes for the ea&s;e and benefit of the Subject, things might pa&s;&s;e to the prejudice and diminution of the &s;overaignty, if the &s;ingle per|&s;on of the &s;overaigne (&s;urcharged with the care of the manifold af|faires of the Kingdome) &s;hould be left all alone to advi&s;e and di&s;|pute His Right again&s;t all the wi&s;edome and &s;ollicitation of the nu|merous body of the Subject. To prevent that: it ordained, that the King &s;hould at His owne di&s;cretion &s;weare unto Him&s;elfe a body of Councell, to advi&s;e Him in the concernements of His Soveraigne Rights, and &s;afety (which is His Privy-Councell) and a body of Councell at law, to advi&s;e Him that He may neither doe, nor &s;uffer contrary to the rule of Law. And through this even Counter-poi&s;e &amp; ballance of all the three States of Parliament (as through a meanes wherewith God hath e&s;pecially ble&s;&s;ed us above other Lands) doe we enjoy the a&s;&s;urance of a regular freedome, under the govern|ment of a ju&s;t and legitimate &s;overaignty. In which, if without the free concurrence of every of the three ordained parties, there &s;hall
<PB N="11" REF="7"> be any inva&s;ion and exerci&s;e of the legi&s;lative power; then &s;hall the well ballanced frame of legitimate law-making be overthrowne, and with it, the rightfull being and u&s;e of Parliaments de&s;troyed.</P>
<P>But the Ob&s;ervor having not a&s;cribed &s;uch underived Maje&s;ty to A&s;&s;emblies of the Community, to the end to maintaine the rights of Parliaments, but to innovate Parliaments to the de&s;truction of their true being, and to the transformation of the State and government. How&s;oever that <HI>fol.</HI> 15. he tells us only of &s;ome defects in Parlia|ment that might receive amendment: yet let's he &s;lip, that tho&s;e Defects, are Divi&s;ions betweene the two Hou&s;es, and betweene the King and them. Now Divi&s;ion being almo&s;t inevitable, and power of di&s;&s;enting nece&s;&s;ary for ballancing the three differing parts of Parliament, to prevent this power of di&s;&s;enting, were to de&s;troy the ballance and being of Parliaments, and to make them Courts of popularity, where they that plea&s;e the People &s;hould ab&s;olutely car|ry all things. Though therefore he here di&s;covers his de&s;igne, yet being a&s;&s;ured not to bring it about, but by mi&s;leading the mo&s;t faith|full and well-affected both to true e&s;tabli&s;hed Religion &amp; Govern|ment, He covertly pur&s;ues His purpo&s;e altogether under the &s;hew of vindicating the Rights, Priviledges, &amp; being of Parliaments.</P>
<P>So, whereas our Parliaments are a&s;&s;emblies wherein the whole State in three di&s;tinct formall parts convenes in Councell, &amp; where|in every of tho&s;e three parts have free power of allowing or di&s;al|lowing of any thing propounded for a law, and wherein the law ta|keth notice of no vote, nor act, for any generall law, &s;ave what doth pa&s;&s;e with concurrence of all the three parts of the A&s;&s;embly, The Ob&s;ervor tells us, that for the King to &s;ay, that <HI>without the Kings concurrence and con&s;ent, Parliaments are without all power, this at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and &s;ubjects us to as unbounded a Regiment of the Kings will, as any Nation under Heaven ever &s;uffered under.</HI> And his rea&s;on is, If Kings may &s;o fru&s;trate Parlia|ments, He may by the &s;ame meanes fru&s;trate all inferiour Courts, &amp; then farewell Law, Right, Liberty, and all things. <HI>O impudence!</HI> does His Maje&s;ty in this claime more, then either the Hou&s;e of Peers to it &s;elfe, or the Hou&s;e of Commons to it &s;elfe challengeth? Nay, claimes His Maje&s;ty more then He acknowledgeth due by the Law to each of the two Hou&s;es, as well as to Him&s;elfe, freely to a&s;|&s;ent or di&s;a&s;&s;ent to what is propounded for a Law, and doe not, and
<PB N="12" REF="8"> have not, both they and His Maje&s;ty and both their Predece&s;&s;ours ever practi&s;ed that power? &s;o as we have had &s;carce one Parliament wherein either King or Peers, or Commons (or perhaps every one of them) have not &s;everally di&s;&s;ented from the votes each of other two and tye their di&s;&s;ent fru&s;trated the votes of the other two, and yet (God be prai&s;ed) our Parliaments doe, and (we hope) &s;till &s;hall continue, notwith&s;tanding &s;uch <HI>undermining foxes</HI> would bring that three fold Cord of our State, into the &s;ingle&s;tring of a popular A&s;|&s;embly, and all things &s;o into confu&s;ion?</P>
<P>And how fal&s;e is the con&s;equence that if the King by di&s;&s;enting may make voyd, the &s;entence of the two Hou&s;es of Parliament He may al&s;o voyd the &s;entence of any inferiour Court of Iu&s;tice? When in Parliament, the law hath appointed the King Him&s;elfe to give His owne Vote and con&s;ent, per&s;onally if He will, or by His Let|ters under His great Seale, if He will. But in inferiour Courts hath appointed none to give &s;entence or Iudgement but only tho&s;e Iud|ges who in a definite and formall way are ordained to be the only Mini&s;ters and Deliverers of the Kings Iu&s;tice and Iudgement in that behalfe, &s;o as no per&s;onall or in&s;trumentall a&s;&s;ent or di&s;&s;ent of the Kings, can alter or fru&s;trate the &s;entence or judgement of any infe|riour Court, becau&s;e that though the Iudges there give the Kings Iudgement, and not their owne; yet the Law having authorized none but them to be the givers of the Kings Iudgement there, it taketh no notice of any other judgement in tho&s;e Courts, then only of the &s;worne Iudges them&s;elves, and though the King, the Peers, and Commons in Parliament have every one the power, by any one of their votes to fru&s;trate the votes of two of them, from be|comming the Iudgement of the whole Court: yet cannot the Vote of either the King, the Peers, or Commons alone, or of any two of them, fru&s;trate or change the Iudgement of any inferiour Court. And it is further to be ob&s;erved that in tho&s;e Courts the Iudges judge as &s;trangers of matters that concernes others only and not them&s;elves and therefore render Iudgement <HI>in invitum,</HI> again&s;t the will of one of the parties at lea&s;t, in which ca&s;e becau&s;e <HI>expedit rei publica ut finis &s;it litium,</HI> if all the Iudges agree not, yet Iudgement &s;hall be given according to the Iudgement of the Major part.</P>
<P>But now (contrary to the u&s;e of inferiour Courts) The parties in Parliament in (tho&s;e things that concerne the publique) meddle
<PB N="13" REF="8"> not as meere Iudges, but as Parties intere&s;&s;ed, with things that concerne every of their owne Rights, in which ca&s;e it is neither Law nor rea&s;on, that &s;ome of the Parties &s;hould determine of that that concernes all their mutuall intere&s;ts, <HI>invit&acirc; altera parte,</HI> again&s;t the will of any one of the Parties. But that all Parties concurre, or el&s;e their mutuall intere&s;t to remaine in the &s;ame condition it was before, For Parties cannot meddle with Iudging <HI>in invitum,</HI> but <HI>per con&s;en&s;um,</HI> and therefore no major part of the three Parties in <HI>Parliament,</HI> but the con&s;ent of all three, mu&s;t make the judgement of that Court, otherwi&s;e two of the three Parties, may totally or in part oppre&s;&s;e the third, and then one of tho&s;e two, oppre&s;&s;e the other, and be a &s;ole arbitrary Tyrant. The King and Peers may op|pre&s;&s;e the Commons; the King and Commons, may oppre&s;&s;e the Peers, the Peers and Commons may oppre&s;&s;e the King: and then the Peers being ea&s;ily &s;uppre&s;&s;ed by the Commons, what &s;hall hin|der but that &s;ome <HI>Appian decemvirate</HI> (that under &s;hew of zeale of reforming Church and Common-wealth, may carry the &s;ound and well-affected Subject with them) After they &s;hall have not only po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed mens mindes with the lawfulnes of their authority, but po&s;se&s;sed them&s;elves of the <HI>Militia</HI> &amp; all the Power of the King|dome, and two or three yeare kept all that power in their hands, pretending they cannot &s;ooner perfect their Lawes of Reformati|on (though indeed they doe but time it out, till they &s;ecure all unto their private ends) (as <HI>Appius</HI> in all things did) what then (I &s;ay) &s;hall hinder, but that by meanes of &s;ome &s;uch <HI>decemvirate</HI> among the Commons, &s;ome <HI>Appius</HI> may invade an ab&s;olute Soveraignty over us, or mi&s;&s;ing that, re&s;olve yet all our &s;etled State, into an un|&s;ure trouble&s;ome <HI>Ari&s;tocracy?</HI> or <HI>Republique?</HI></P>
<P>The better to prepare the way to &s;ome &s;uch up&s;hot. The Ob|&s;ervor findes a defect in the frame of our State, he cannot &s;ee how <HI>Parliaments</HI> can have &s;ufficient power, to re&s;traine Tyranny, if they can doe no Act without the Kings con&s;ent. And he findes, that if <HI>Princes</HI> in matters that concerne the publique, be admitted to preferre weake opinions (as he calls them) before Parliamen|tary motives, then <HI>Parliaments</HI> are vaine, <HI>Princes</HI> unlimitable, and Subjects mi&s;erable.</P>
<P>The Ob&s;erver will be more wi&s;e and faithfull then the Law it &s;elfe, and looking only one way, tells us of in&s;ufficient provi&s;ion
<PB N="14" REF="9"> for re&s;traint of regall power, without &s;ome coercive &s;uperinten|dant be placed over it. But the law that lookes every way, tells us, that the erecting of &s;uch a &s;uperintending power, would un&s;o|veraigne our King, and make that &s;uperintending power Soveraign and when it were made, the exerci&s;e of it would be &s;ubject to more dangerous extravagances then regall power is, and yet le&s;&s;e capable of regulation then it. Therefore the law (knowing that there is none but God, <HI>qui cu&s;todiat ip&s;os custodes,</HI> that can re&s;traine &s;u|pream Governours, and knowing that nothing in this world can be reduced to &s;o ab&s;olute a perfection of &s;etledne&s;&s;e, but that in the la&s;t meanes it mu&s;t meerly depend upon the providence of God) after a full con&s;ideration of the weakne&s;&s;e and imperfection of every &s;e|verall forme of Government, concludes, that the Soveraignty was better placed in the hands of a &s;ole Prince, then in a popular, or Ari|&s;tocraticall hand, and that a po&s;itive knowne law, without any coer|cive &s;uperintendant, was a &s;ufficient and the be&s;t boundary of regall power, again&s;t any irregularity what&s;oever, e&s;pecially when the law (being backed with a Parliament of all the orders of the King|dome) &s;hall thereby find meanes of di&s;covery and manife&s;tation, both of the truth of the law it &s;elfe, and likewi&s;e of the violation of it. For the law, and the tran&s;gre&s;&s;ion of the law, being both at once made manife&s;t and notorious, that will &s;o &s;ufficient a &s;ecurity of the future ob&s;ervance of the law, as Princes will not further en|dure to violate it; becau&s;e (as the Poet &s;aies)
<Q><L>Nec pueros coram populo Medea trucidat,</L>
<L>Aut humana palam coquit exta nefarius Atreus.</L></Q></P>
<P>Infamous acts will not endure to be committed in the &s;ight of all the world.</P>
<P>Therefore to &s;ay truth the Ob&s;ervor's conceipt of having &s;ome &s;uperiour power to enforce the law that &s;hould regulate the power of the Soveraigne Prince, is a meere fal&s;e conception, of an heart as traiterous to God as to his <HI>Prince,</HI> who would have ab&s;olute &s;ecuri|ty by an arme of fle&s;h, when no &s;uch can be given to it. For, to re|gulate his <HI>Prince,</HI> he would not only have a law, but a &s;uperiour power to enforce that law; and &s;uch a &s;uperiour power being once erected, that mu&s;t al&s;o be either boundle&s;&s;e, or mu&s;t be circum&s;cri|bed with a law: if circum&s;cribed with a law, then al&s;o mu&s;t that law have a &s;uperiour coercive power, to enforce it, and &s;o mu&s;t we
<PB N="15" REF="9"> have &s;uperiour Power, over &s;uperiour Power, <HI>u&s;&abque; ad infinitum,</HI> and yet at la&s;t, leave the mo&s;t &s;uperiour power, in that liberty which the Ob&s;ervour calleth boundle&s;&s;e, arbitrary, and tyrannicall. And how ab&s;urd a thing is it to imagine, That when the Law hath tru&s;ted the &s;overaigne Power in the hands of the King, it &s;hould again di&s;tru&s;t Him and un&s;overaigne Him, and place in another the &s;overaignty of the &s;ame &s;overaign Tru&s;t? and with a &s;econd ab&s;urdity leave in the Kings hand the Power of calling together and di&s;&s;olving the power whereby He him&s;elfe &s;hould be con&s;trained? and (to make up all) &s;hould by authority of that power, con&s;train all the Heads of the peo|ple, and even the repre&s;entative body of that power, by &s;olemne oath, to declare that the King is not only <HI>Supream</HI> Governour, but that He is the <HI>only Supream</HI> Governour, when (&s;uch a &s;uperiour power admitted) he can be neither only, nor at all, Supream.</P>
<P>But the Ob&s;ervour aiming more to &s;ubvert what is e&s;tabli&s;hed, then to reduce things unto their fir&s;t e&s;tabli&s;hment, quarrels &s;till with the Regall power; and he rea&s;ons, that whether or no the Law gives the &s;ingle Per&s;on of the Prince as full and free a Vote to a&s;&s;ent or not a&s;&s;ent, as it doth to either the Hou&s;e of Peers or Hou&s;e of Commons, yet is not the Prince to u&s;e the liberty of His Vote licentiou&s;ly, but advi&s;edly and by Councell, and what Councell can He have more wi&s;e, faithfull and impartiall, then theirs that repre&s;ent the whole Kingdom, who cannot be &s;uppo&s;ed to have private ends as Courti|ers, Cavaliers, and private men may have?</P>
<P>Truly that Princes ought with great re&s;pect to hearken to the ad|vice and information of the great Councell of the body of their peo|ple, who can &s;o much as make a que&s;tion of it? But why &s;hould the&s;e things be objected to His Maje&s;ty? For what Prince of all his Pre|dece&s;&s;ors hath &s;o much harkened &amp; conde&s;cended to his great Coun|cell, as His Maje&s;ty at once hath done unto this pre&s;ent Parliament? Not any one; Nay, not the whole &s;ucce&s;&s;ion of His predece&s;&s;ors &s;ince the granting of the great Charter hath done the like. Witne&s;&s;e the conde&s;cending to the Earle of <HI>Staffords</HI> attainder, the damning of Ship-mony, and of all Monopolies, the Star-Chamber, and high Com|mi&s;&s;ion Court, the taking away of the Votes of Bi&s;hops &amp; of Popi&s;h Lords, the parting with the long u&s;ed power of impo&s;ing upon mer|chandize, bounding of Forre&s;ts, and yeelding to the regulation of what&s;oever further greivance &s;hould be found in the common|wealth.
<PB N="16" REF="10"> And (for a &s;eale of ob&s;ervance of all) the granting of a Tri|enniall Parliament, and the perpetuating of this pre&s;ent Parliament. With what di&s;pen&s;ation of the violating of Chri&s;tianity can a Subject (through all the&s;e pre&s;umptions to the contrary) charge his Sove|raigne with aver&s;nes to publique coun&s;ell, and inclination to private whi perers? O that being at once po&s;&s;e&s;t of &s;o many not long &s;ince unhoped for &s;atisfactions, we might not want hearts to enjoy them and acknowledge them.</P>
<P>But the two Hou&s;es thought the Kingdome in imminent danger, and de&s;ired it &s;hould be put in a po&s;ture of defence, and His Maje&s;ty by evill Coun&s;ell refu&s;ed and de&s;erted them. Truly the Ob&s;ervour neither doth nor can &s;hew, that His Maje&s;ty, upon the Parliaments apprehen&s;ion of danger, refu&s;ed to take order for the defence of the Kingdom; for the contrary thereof is true. And in His &s;eeking to &s;e|cure it by a military po&s;ture, He &s;o farre conde&s;cended to the &s;atis|faction of His <HI>Parliament,</HI> as that He offered to change the per&s;ons, that in any County had the charge of the <HI>Militia,</HI> if His <HI>Parliament</HI> made any ju&s;t exception to any of them. And for His <HI>Maie&s;ties</HI> com|ming to the <HI>Parliament</HI> to <HI>We&s;tmin&s;ter,</HI> even in that al&s;o He &s;o farre hearkned to them as that he offered, that if, to &s;ecure future &s;editions, they would make &s;ome exemplar puni&s;hment of the Actors in the late <HI>&s;editious Tumults there,</HI> He would even come thither. And be|ing refu&s;ed in that: He notwith&s;tanding, offered them to come to any other indifferent place. As for the place where they now &s;it, who (that hath vowed His Faith to the Lawes of the Land, and to the Priviledge of <HI>Parliament</HI>) can in &s;uch con&s;cience as He will an|&s;wer God withall, hold that a place of indifference and of freedom to vote in, where the people in <HI>Tumult</HI> demanded of the Hou&s;e of Commons to know who were the Lords that refu&s;ed to vote with them, and where &s;ome of the <HI>Peers</HI> were a&s;&s;aulted by the multitude for having differed in their votes from them, and yet none of tho&s;e <HI>Tumulters</HI> were puni&s;hed or ever que&s;tioned for it?</P>
<P>But ere we leave this point of hearkning to the advice of Parlia|met, we mu&s;t co~&s;ider too, that though we grant it behoovefull for the King to hearken to His Parliament, we mu&s;t not under&s;tand it &s;o be|hoovefull, as that there &s;hould be inevitable nece&s;&s;ity laid upon Him, that He mu&s;t follow what&s;oever they advi&s;e, for then at one blow we overthrow the fundamentall Law &amp; frame of Parliaments.
<PB N="17" REF="10"> If from any of the three formall parts of the Parliament we take a|way the freedome of voting, to a&s;&s;ent or di&s;&s;ent, we breake the threefold cord of the State, we ca&s;t away the ballance of it, &amp; even di&s;&s;olve the very frame it &s;elfe. If when for nece&s;&s;ity of State, the Head a&s;&s;embles the whole body in Coun&s;ell, (where the Law gives the Head one vote of three, and allowes Him a Body of Privy Coun|cell to maintain the proper Rights of the Head) the Head may not u&s;e that Power which the Law giveth it, no not in ca&s;e the two other partes conte&s;t &amp; claime part of the Right belonging to the Head, &amp; where (by Law) the Vote of the Head is oppo&s;ed in ballance, to the moderation of tho&s;e two powers; as well as their powers are oppo|&s;ed in ballance to the power of the head; but that the Head mu&s;t do all things according to the advice &amp; coun&s;ell of the two parts, which are the body of the Subject. Then all that &s;olemne forme of Law, that calleth the Head, Soveraign: that authori&s;eth the Head to &s;wear a body of Privy Councell; to convoke the Nobles and Commons in publique Coun&s;ell; to call to that Coun&s;ell whom He thinker good: to take homage of the Peers, and Oath of Supreamacy of the Commons: and having u&s;ed their Coun&s;ell, at His Iudge|ment to di&s;&s;olve it. All this (I &s;ay) is then a meer mi&s;leading for|mality of the law, The Soveraignty (again&s;t all our Oathes and ex|pre&s;&s;ions to the contrary) is not in the King but in the people; the King is the only Subject, and but a common vouchee, who&s;e concur|rence is unavoidably implyed; His will, his under&s;tanding, and his power (though he be acknowledged Head, Soveraigne, and chief re&s;idence of authority) is all &s;ubjected to the body of the very Subject that in Parliament doth &s;weare &s;ubjection to Him. The tripartite frame of a Parliament of three E&s;tates, is a vani&s;hing ap|parition: there is really nothing but a meer popular a&s;&s;embly, not of Subjects but Soveraignes. The Crowne Imperiall and King|dome it &s;elfe, (though a&s;&s;erted by our &s;olemne&s;t Acts of Recogniti|on and oathes of the body repre&s;entative,) are meer <HI>non entia,</HI> we are but a Republique, and the chief Head of the Kingdome hath not (be&s;ide the name) more of a King, then the Duke of <HI>Venice,</HI> or the Prince of <HI>Orange.</HI> And this being hid ever &s;ince the fir&s;t beginning of the Kingdome; the whole generation of the Subject ever &s;ince, hath by the injury of our Lawes, been mo&s;t impiou&s;ly mi&s;-worne in their allegiance; and the errour hath never been di&s;covered till the
<PB N="18" REF="11"> whole Kingdome (having now &s;olemnly &s;worne to &s;tand to, and defend the Lawes) cannot receade from their wrong-&s;worn obedi|ence, but with the guilt of univer&s;all perjury, and under the burthen of that guilt, expo&s;e an old grown Kingdom, to the hazards of a new framed Common-wealth. All this does nece&s;&s;arily follow, if we take away the freedome of the Kings a&s;&s;ent and di&s;&s;ent in <HI>Parlia|ment;</HI> or barre Him of the u&s;e of His Coun&s;ells advice therein.</P>
<P>I &s;hould little need to &s;ay any thing concerning that which the Ob&s;ervour &s;o much pretends that Communities, and univer&s;alities of men, are voyd of corrupt affections and of private ends, and that therefore their de&s;ires are alwayes lu&s;t, and their councell faithfull and impartiall. But when in the fallacy of this per&s;wa&s;ion there lyes (I fear) a great part of the &s;inne, for which Gods anger now &s;o publiquely doth &s;hew it &s;elfe upon us, I would be loath to pa&s;&s;e it over without any touch at all. I feare we are too diffident to re&s;t upon the ordinance of God: I feare we are too confident of our &s;elves, as if our owne naturall providence (if we were left unto it) were beyond any other meanes of &s;afety, although it were the ordi|nance of God unto us. A word or two &s;hall not therefore be unne|ce&s;&s;ary concerning the corruptions &amp; errors that even communities them&s;elves are often &s;ubject to.</P>
<P>That Communities are le&s;&s;e &s;ubject to private ends and affections then particular men are, is true: but it is al&s;o true, that they are not ab&s;olutely free from them, and when they fall into them, they are more fatally violent and dangerous. And though one would think it repugnant, that an univer&s;ality (which conteines the whole pub|lique) &s;hould have private ends; or that that &s;hould any way be coun|ted private, which they that conteine the publique doe pur&s;ue: yet &s;eeing it is not the number of agents, but the capacity in which they act, the quality of their acting, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pur&s;ue, with the publiques end and weale; that makes the actions of men publique or private: it mu&s;t needs follow, that if without authority, or out of the way of the publique ordinance, men pur&s;ue any thing (though the whole community concurre in the pur&s;uit) yet is all of the nature of a private action, done to a corrupt and private end, for though the thing intended be to the pre&s;ent good of the publique, yet being be&s;ide the ordinance and way, it is in con&s;equence again&s;t the good and weale of the publique, &amp; &s;o again&s;t
<PB N="19" REF="11"> the very ends of the publique. And as in the body naturall a very few members (that is none but the eyes) have the &s;en&s;e of &s;eeing, but all the members have the &s;en&s;e of feeling. &s;o in Communities all have the &s;ence of enjoying good, or &s;uffering evill: but very few the faculty of di&s;cerning the cau&s;e and means of either. Yet the ma|jor part of the Community (more carried by &s;en&s;e then true di&s;|cerning) oft makes the judgement of the whole Community, and brings it to act that, that agreeth not with the intended weale of the Comity. By this means (at the be&s;t) the whole univer&s;ality of the <HI>I&s;raelites</HI> (contrary to their own finall good and pro&s;perity) forced their Prie&s;t to &s;et them up golden Calves. By this meanes the uni|ver&s;ality of them againe revolted from <HI>David</HI> (their King by Gods immediate Ordination) to <HI>Ab&s;olom</HI> an u&s;urper. By this means the univer&s;ality of the tenne Tribes, for redre&s;&s;e of their grievances, rebelled again&s;t <HI>Davids</HI> Grand-child, and &s;et up <HI>Jeroboam,</HI> who re|viving their own affected fal&s;e religion, authorized that &s;inne which pur&s;ued them in their extirpation. It is therefore an untruth, to &s;ay that Communities can have no private ends, and a belying of the Law and Truth to &s;ay (as fol. 22.) that ever there was &s;uch a <HI>Maxime.</HI></P>
<P>But it will be &s;aid, that though in Communities the body at large (in which the vulgar is the greate&s;t part) may be &s;ubject to corrupt affections and ends; yet the body repre&s;entative, which is the Choice of the Community, is to be pre&s;umed free from corrupt ends and affections, and therefore mo&s;t wi&s;e, faithfull, and a&s;&s;ured.</P>
<P>Truly we pray, that &s;ince in this knot lye many &s;cruples that wring the con&s;ciences of thou&s;ands in our <HI>I&s;rael,</HI> we may with mo|de&s;t freedom, rea&s;on the things that tend to clearing the honour and ob&s;ervance due to repre&s;entatives. To whom we acknowledge the highe&s;t honour and ob&s;ervance that can be given to the body repre|&s;ented. But the honour and authority of the repre&s;entative will al|waies depend upon two things, that is, the quality and condition of the body repre&s;ented, and the quality of the repre&s;entation it &s;elfe: for as that is more or le&s;&s;e proper and lively, &s;o will it derive more or le&s;&s;e authority and reputation. If therefore the body at large be an ab&s;olute free &s;overaigne (as is the Community of a right Re|publique) the true repre&s;entative of that body is then to be ob&s;er|ved with all &s;overaigne honour and due &s;ubjection: but if the body
<PB N="20" REF="12"> at large be it &s;elfe a Subject, the honour and authority of the repre|&s;entative cannot exceed the honour and authority of a Subject: for none can make their image more then they them&s;elves are. Next then, (be&s;ides that all repre&s;entations how plenarily &s;oever autho|rized, mu&s;t ever be &s;ubject to the condition of the body repre&s;en|ted) The repute and authority of repre&s;entatives, will al&s;o follow the &s;oundne&s;&s;e or weakne&s;&s;e, exactne&s;&s;e or imperfection of the re|pre&s;entation it &s;elfe. For if throughout an whole Community the repre&s;enters be equally and proportionably ordained according to the true relative intere&s;t, that each part which &s;endeth them hath to the whole publique (as in the united Provinces they are) there will be all full acknowledgement of authority to the repre&s;enta|tive, that po&s;&s;ibly can be to the body at large: and there will al&s;o be &s;ome pre&s;umption that the repre&s;enters are authorized, to deter|mine &s;overaignly of tho&s;e things that concerne the publique. But if (on the other &s;ide) there be no equality, in making repre&s;enters, ob&s;erved: but that &s;ome parts &s;end as many as others that are an hun|dred times greater and more con&s;iderable, both in power and &s;up|port of burthen in the Commonwealth and if for &s;ome of the parts none are admitted to choo&s;e the repre&s;enters, but &s;ub&s;tantiall legall Freeholders, and for other parts all are admitted of what condition &s;oever. And if the number of tho&s;e that are unproportionably and promi&s;cuou&s;ly cho&s;en, doe three or foure fold, exceed the number of them that are &s;trictly cho&s;en for the mo&s;t principall part of the Community. And la&s;tly, if it lye in the power of &s;ome other autho|rity to give to &s;ome particular Townes the power of &s;ending repre|&s;enters, equall in number to the greate&s;t Provinces of the Community. The&s;e circum&s;tances will not only detract from the repute and au|thority that a more exact repre&s;entative of the Community might have, but vehemently demon&s;trate that the in&s;titution and end of &s;uch a repre&s;entative is rather to mini&s;ter information of the &s;tate and condition of every of tho&s;e particular places and advice, and a&s;|&s;i&s;tance to &s;ome other &s;overaigne, and to con&s;ent with him, then to determine &s;overaignly it &s;elfe.</P>
<P>To come then to the Objection of the a&s;&s;uredne&s;&s;e of Repre&s;en|tatives in their judgement and fidelity. If in Kingdoms, we by the repre&s;entative body of the Community meane a perfect repre&s;en|tation of the whole body Politique, &s;o as that the head as well as
<PB N="21" REF="12"> the other parts doe freely cooperate and concurre (as in our Acts of Parliament it ever doth) then can we pre&s;ume no other Coun|&s;aile more a&s;&s;uredly wi&s;e, faithfull, or &s;afe for the publique, then is the coun&s;aile of the univer&s;all repre&s;entative in that &s;en&s;e. But if by the repre&s;entative, we mean the repre&s;entation of the gro&s;&s;e of the body without the head, (that is, the repre&s;entative of the body of the Subject only) then is the a&s;&s;ertion fal&s;e, for the Law pre&s;umes not in the repre&s;entative of the Subject, &s;o a&s;&s;ured judgement and fidelity for government, as it doth in the &s;overaigne head alone, for then it would not have placed the &s;overaignty in the head, but in the repre&s;entative of the gro&s;&s;e of the body. But the Law knowing both Communities them&s;elves, &s;ubject to dangerous inclinations from private incitements, and their repre&s;entatives likewi&s;e &s;ubject to mi&s;leadings, factions and ambitions of private men, hath (as in the mo&s;t a&s;&s;ured place, placed the &s;overaignty in the head, and the head &s;o having the ordinance, both for judgement and for government, where the ordinance is, there is the ble&s;&s;ing and there the be&s;t a&s;|&s;urance.</P>
<P>We need not &s;eek examples how repre&s;entative bodies of Sub|jects moving without con&s;ent of their head have been mi&s;led: there is not one imitable example to be found that ever the repre&s;enta|tive of the Subject, moved to act &s;overaignly without the con&s;ent of the head. But we have examples of &s;overaigne repre&s;entatives, in Republiques them&s;elves, notoriou&s;ly mi&s;led by private men; was there ever a more reverend repre&s;entative then the Roman Senate, yet did not <HI>Appius</HI> and his Faction, under the Colour of a <HI>Dec<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">mvi|rate</HI> (or Comittee of reformation) &s;o blind that Senate, as to work them to conferre all the power of the Commonwealth into his, and his Factious hands, to the &s;ubver&s;ion of the common liberty? &s;o as that if by accident he had not been taken away, he had made him&s;elfe Prince? And was not that &s;overaigne repre&s;entative, ano|ther time wholly &s;wayed and caried by <HI>Marius</HI> and <HI>Sulpitius?</HI> Sure as nothing is more whol&s;ome for the publique, then that the Sove|raigne of a Kingdom &s;hould often have the advice of the body repre|&s;entative of the Community, &s;o is it mo&s;t dangerous for the publique to have the advice of the Community enforced on the Soveraigne. Lea&s;t &s;o that that &s;hould be for Our good, be unto us an occa&s;ion of falling.</P>
<PB N="22" REF="13">
<P>But the Ob&s;ervour in&s;i&s;ts not &s;o much, that the repre&s;entative bo|dy is the great Councell of the King and Kingdom: as that it is the &s;upream judge and the mo&s;t &s;overaigne power. If the Prince (&s;aith he) be &s;educed, &s;ome Court mu&s;t judge of the &s;educement, and &s;ome power enforce that judgement , and that mu&s;t be the Parlia|ment (meaning the two hou&s;es of Parliament.)</P>
<P>We have already &s;hewed the ab&s;urdity of a &s;uperior power to enforce the Soveraigne: but farther to di&s;&s;olve all difficulties in this fal&s;e a&s;&s;ertion, we mu&s;t know that in Parliament there are diver&s;e kinds of judgements. And that the meer repre&s;entative body, that is, the hou&s;e of Commons &s;olely, hath not any judicatory power by it &s;elfe, unle&s;&s;e it be in particular ca&s;es concerning their own hou&s;e and members. But they are as the great Inque&s;t of the Kingdom to enquire, di&s;cover, impeach, &amp;c. The hou&s;e of Peeres hath general|ly in all things judgement preparatory in order to judgement of Parliament, as to give Oath, to take recogni&s;ance, to fine, to impri|&s;on &amp;c. In matters that come before them bywrit of Error, it hath judgement <HI>deci&s;ive</HI> to determine and adjudge Law. But this judge|ment it hath not as it is part of the repre&s;entative body: for the re|pre&s;entative body hath not therein any part with it. But the hou&s;e of Peeres alone hath this &s;uperior judgement, as great Court of the Kings Barons of the Kingdom, which being a&s;&s;i&s;ted with the Iudges of all the Benches, is by formall Ordinance of Law in all matters &s;o coming before it, the proper and immediat &s;uperior Iudge of Law. But it is not ab&s;olute &s;upreme Iudge of Law in all things: and there|fore it cannot revoke the judgement which it &s;elfe hath given. Nei|ther can the Hou&s;e of Commons, nor the two hou&s;es together re|voke, or anull any judgement given in the Hou&s;e of Peeres, or el&s;e|where; therefore al&s;o the two Hou&s;es are not &s;upream judges or de|clarers of Law. The <HI>Ob&s;erver</HI> (fol. 44.) tells you the rea&s;on, To be &s;upream judge or declarer of Law is all one as to be &s;upream maker of Law, and that you know the two Hou&s;es are not. But in the whole three E&s;tates of Parliament, that is, in the King, the Peeres and Commons, there and there only are all powers ingredient, for they upon Bill are not only judges of the la&s;t re&s;ort, to rever&s;e the judgement of the Hou&s;e of Peeres and of inferior Courts, but they can repeale and re&s;tore, and repeale againe <HI>in infinitum</HI> their own Iudgements and Acts. And they can not only declare the Law but
<PB N="23" REF="13"> they can make the law, and none but they. They alone are they that cannot be bound by precedents or Acts of Parliament, they alone are they that have the Legi&s;lative Power: and therefore they, and only they that have the ab&s;olute Supream Iudgement of the Law.</P>
<P>But (&s;aith the Ob&s;erver) <HI>The King de&s;erts His Parliament,</HI> imply|ing that then the two hou&s;es mu&s;t be Supream judges; though other|wi&s;e they were not. As well may he imply, that if the King come not to Parliament then are the two Hou&s;es no more Subiects, but So|veraign's, yea Soveraign's in the highe&s;t exaltation. Let us &s;ee what this de&s;erting is, that &s;hall &s;o ea&s;ily create Soveraignty in Subiects. We know that by the law, the Kings per&s;onal pre&s;ence is of no ab&s;o|lute nece&s;&s;ity to the proceedings of Parliament, and that by the law (declared and confirmed 33. <HI>Hen:</HI> 8.21.) the Kings pre&s;ence is not nece&s;&s;ary at His giving con&s;ents to Acts pa&s;&s;ed, but He may give con&s;ent in His ab&s;ence by His great Seale. If then the Law count His per&s;onall ab&s;ence no de&s;erting: and as to de&s;erting for want of iu&s;t and rea&s;onable con&s;ent to their demands, His Maie&s;ty be &s;o little faulty toward this Parliament, as that he hath given His Con&s;ent be|yond the example of His Predece&s;&s;ours. Where then &s;hall a &s;incere Con&s;cience in any de&s;erting the King hath made, finde warrant e|nough to de&s;ert this Soveraign, and acknowledge another Superiour? but to return.</P>
<P>Diver&s;ity of Powers and authorities exerci&s;ed in the &s;everall parts of Parliament, nece&s;&s;arily cau&s;es a diver&s;ity of re&s;pect and ob&s;ervance to be rendred to them. And though the iudgement of the repre&s;en|tative of the Subiect (that is of the Peers and Commons) in tho&s;e things wherein it is properly exerci&s;ed, ought to have e&s;teem and credit before any other iudgement of the Subiect. Yet is it not to be oppo&s;ed to the iudgement of the Soveraigne, in tho&s;e things which the law hath entru&s;ted to the iudgment of the Soveraign for the law tru&s;teth none but whom it iudgeth to have judgment, fidelity, &amp; pro|vi&s;ion of all nece&s;&s;ary incidents &s;ufficient for that tru&s;t and then it preferrs both the Acts and iudgement, of the party tru&s;ted, before any other iudgement what&s;oever. Not is the iudgment of the whole Kingdome any whit &s;lighted thereby, no more then if in particular Sciences (as Divinity, Philo&s;ophy, Phy&s;ick, Mathematique, &amp;c.) the iudgement of the profe&s;&s;ors of tho&s;e Sciences &s;hould be preferred before the iudgement of the whole body repre&s;entative, for <HI>&V;ni|cuique
<PB N="24" REF="14"> in &s;ua arte credendum:</HI> Matters of State and &s;ecrets of govern|ment are not only unfit and dangerous to be publiquely managed, by &s;o numerous a body as our repre&s;entative is, but the greater part are &s;o little experienced or able to manage them as that in <HI>Edw.</HI> the thirds time, the Hou&s;e of Commons them&s;elves (as the Ob&s;ervour (fol. 6. tell us) de&s;ired they might be &s;pared from giving advice in tho&s;e matters, <HI>de queuxals nont pas cognizance,</HI> of which they had not the Cogni&s;ans. The Iudgement of the body repre&s;entative it &s;elfe, did not at that time beleive, but that a&s;well the Iudgement, as the care of the <HI>Ardua Regni,</HI> did cheifly belong to the King. To whom alone, the Law having committed the Soveraign Govern|ment, ordained him withall, a body of &s;worn privy Councell to ad|vi&s;e with therein, and a &s;worne Coun&s;ell at Law to advi&s;e Him of the Rights and Priviledges, that belong unto Him as &s;upream Go|vernour, and fir&s;t of the three States of Parliament.</P>
<P>If any of the&s;e &s;worn Coun&s;ailers &s;hall Coun&s;aill the King again&s;t the known Law, or any by their coun&s;aill, act any thing again&s;t it: after legall proceeding and conviction, it will &s;oon be out of que&s;ti|on what &s;hall become of them. But if without legall proof of par|ticulars, &s;uch Coun&s;ailers &s;hall by generall vote of the Subject, be ce~|&s;ured private whi&s;perers and &s;educers of the King, and to be wholly removed from Him: then &s;hall the King at once be dangerou&s;ly de|prived of the con&s;tant meanes which the Law hath e&s;pecially or|dayned Him, for &s;upport of His Right again&s;t the other two oppo|&s;ed powers, and for the good di&s;charge of His Kingly office. Be|&s;ides if men &s;hall &s;o be condemned and made guilty, more by Sove|raignty and uncontroulablenes of Iudgement a&s;cribed to the con|demners, then by clearne&s;&s;e of evidence and legall proof of any fact then is the birth-right of the Subiect, in the highe&s;t concernment of Life and fortunes taken from Him, and He mu&s;t&s;tand and fall by the vote of the people, that (like a Iudgement infallible) &s;hall &s;up|ply the office of both witnes, Peers, and Iudge.</P>
<P>While I pur&s;ue the examination of tho&s;e things which the Ob|&s;ervour would have received for rea&s;on, I may not let &s;lip the ob|&s;erving of his &s;lye unfaithfulnes and deceipt, to pa&s;&s;e over that point which mo&s;t of all concernes the &s;oules and bodyes, lives and for|tunes of the whole Kingdome, and all becau&s;e his want of proof in that point, does (if noted) overthrow all that he contends for. For
<PB N="25" REF="14"> though he argues the lawfulnes of Subjects taking up Armes and re|&s;i&s;ting the Authority and Commands of the King, under the warrant of a generall rule to this effect, <HI>That in extream perill and failance of ordinary meanes, any extraordinary meanes may be taken for the &s;afety of the People:</HI> yet finding an impo&s;&s;ibility of proving the State in &s;uch extream danger (for indeed &s;uch a danger mu&s;t be &s;o vi&s;ible to all men as not to need any proving) and finding it al&s;o not po&s;&s;ible to prove a nece&s;&s;ity of the Subjects arming him&s;elfe for want of other meanes, when His <HI>Maie&s;ty,</HI> (in whom the naturall ordinary meanes of protection is placed) readily offered, and yet offers, to performe that regall office of protecting; The Ob&s;ervour pa&s;&s;es over the matter without proving either danger or want of other meanes, and pre&s;&s;es only the lawfulnes of &s;elfe-defence in extreame danger, as if (if that were granted) all men might take up Armes whether there were danger or no, and whether there were other ordinary meanes of defence or no, and &s;o &s;ecurely doe we pur&s;ue this errour, as that we with it &s;wallow any thing, and becau&s;e that in ordinary providing for danger before it threaten; the ordinary cour&s;es of put|ting the Kingdom in a po&s;ture of defence by Commi&s;&s;ions of Liev|tenancy and of Array, are voted illegall; therefore we not only ad|mit them to be &s;o, but we admit al&s;o that the King (to whom it pro|perly belongs to take order for the &s;afety of the Kingdome) may not in extreamity of danger, by any meanes that he can u&s;e, rai&s;e Armes, and put the Kingdome in a po&s;ture of defence, but the Subject (to whom it is Trea&s;on (by the Law) to rai&s;e Forces without autho|rity from the King) he may (again&s;t the ordinary rule of Law) rai&s;e Armes in the very &s;ame forme that is unlawfull for the King to doe, and all becau&s;e of the extream nece&s;&s;ity and danger. Yet the very &s;ame nece&s;&s;ity and danger &s;hall not make it lawfull to the Right and proper Authority of the King to doe the very &s;ame thing. Oh, what &s;hall we &s;ay, when at once, extreame nece&s;sity is pretended, all wonted formes of defence (without &s;hewing a lawfull forme) are declared unlawfull, and the cour&s;e which Law abhorres, and the Con&s;cience of every Law-&s;worne Chri&s;tian trembles at, is &s;et on foot, without the warrant of the lawfull Soveraign, when yet he is ready to &s;upply that office in the Iu&s;t and lawfull way?</P>
<P>I cannot al&s;o but note, that though levying of Armes and put|ting the Kingdom in a po&s;ture of defence is a right &s;o clearly belong|ing
<PB N="26" REF="15"> to the King, as that we know His <HI>Maje&s;ty,</HI> &amp; all His Predece&s;&s;ors have ever been po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed of it as a right and authority in&s;eperably an|nexed to the Crown, w^c^h nere any have lawfully exerci&s;ed, but they. And though the repre&s;entative body of the Kingdom, and (in them) every one of the body repre&s;ented have, according to the po&s;itive law, &s;worn allegiance to the King and &s;worn to a&s;&s;i&s;t and defend &amp;c. <HI>all Priviledges, preheminences, and authorities belonging to his high|ne&s;&s;e, His heirs and &s;ucce&s;&s;ors, or annexed to the Imperiall Crown of the Realm &amp;c.</HI> Yet is not the ob&s;erver afraid to &s;ay that the Oath of Su|premacy is not endangered by &s;uch taking of Armes. Nor is he affraid to &s;ay that next to renouncing of God, nothing under Heaven can be more perfidious then peoples withdrawing them&s;elves fro~ their re|pre&s;entations. As if Subjects, by giving authority to &s;ome of their fel|lowes to repre&s;ent them, &amp; to advi&s;e, &amp; con&s;ent for them, gave them a power &s;o much above the condition of Subjects, yea &s;o much above the condition of their Soveraign, as that neither breach of faith, nor Oath, nor any other duty unto him, were comparable to their with|drawing fro~ the vote or act of their own repre&s;enters: as if the right of the King, the Crown, &amp; Kingdom; &amp; the concurrence of the three E&s;tates in Parliament, did not &s;o concern the Commons of the Land but that, (again&s;t all) they &s;tood &s;oly bound in allegiance to their re|pre&s;enters as to the only Soveraignes of their obedience. Of that it may plea&s;e the two honourable Hou&s;es to take into a &s;erious con&s;i|deration; how repugnant the&s;e po&s;itions are to the loyalty of a true Chri&s;tian: how hard it is for a pious con&s;cience to per&s;wade is &s;elfe, that they that broach &s;uch Doctrines intend nothing but the defence of the King, of the lawes of the Land, and of the true Prote&s;tant Re|ligion: how much the name and Maie&s;ty of God him&s;elfe is bla&s;|phemed, when in a Chri&s;tian Kingdom that boa&s;tes it &s;elfe of the knowledge and true profe&s;&s;ion of his word; &s;uch Doctrines &s;o dero|gatory to Chri&s;tianity &s;hould &s;o audatiou&s;ly be maintained: And la&s;t|ly, how much it mu&s;t needs reflect upon their own honour, in poynt of jealou&s;ie and di&s;tru&s;t (as if &s;ome ill-affected factious per&s;ons had too great an influence and power over their votes) when &s;uch impi|ous a&s;&s;ertions, &s;o de&s;peratly mi&s;leading the &s;oules and con&s;ciences of men, are &s;o licentiou&s;ly divulged without any condemnation check, or di&s;countenances, from them though earne&s;tly de&s;ired by His <HI>Ma|je&s;ty</HI> at their hands.</P>
<PB N="27" REF="15">
<P>I &s;uppo&s;e there remaines not in the ob&s;ervations any thing mate|riall, that is not already an&s;wered. As for the de&s;ign of changing Religion into Popery, which the ob&s;erver perhaps glances at in &s;peaking of <HI>Popi&s;h Prelaticall and Military Courtiers.</HI> If a Chri&s;ti|an can in his con&s;cience find any other ground for &s;uch beleife then only the opinion of a judgement, that would be beleived rather for authorities &s;ake, then for any thing prooved or di&s;covered, he then may well li&s;ten to it. But if in&s;tead of pre&s;umptions that way, he findes pre&s;umptions of intended change to the contrary Corruption of Religion, a good Con&s;cience will not be &s;o Popi&s;hly affected, as for the infallibility of any judgement, to beleive contrary to what his heart telleth him the mo&s;t apparent pre&s;umption mu&s;t incline him. For be&s;ides that it is ea&s;ier to bring in a corruption in extremi|ty contrary to an old exploded corruption, then to recover that, that hath been once exploded, (as Popery hath been and is.) We have His <HI>Majesties</HI> often &s;olemne atte&s;tation of God, imprecating the pro&s;perity of Him and His, if he do not maintain the true Prote&s;tant Religion e&s;tabli&s;hed in the Church of England again&s;t all Popery. We have not the like on the other part, again&s;t Schi&s;maticall innovati|ons. Yet our Schi&s;matiques are thrice as many as our Papi&s;ts; and whereas our Papi&s;ts are (God be thanked) di&s;armed, awed, and in feare, our Schi&s;matiques are bold, armed, and in authority, and therefore licentious, and tumulting in every place.</P>
<P>God will require an account of our Oathes, and Prote&s;tations for defence of the true Prote&s;tant Religion, aswell again&s;t Schi&s;mati|call corruptions, as again&s;t Popi&s;h. And an account of our &s;olemn Oathes of Supremacy, and of ob&s;ervance of the Law, as well again&s;t popular in&s;olences, and inva&s;ions of Soveraigne power, as again&s;t regall Tyranny. Let us take heed, that when <HI>becau&s;e of Oathes the Land</HI> already <HI>mournes;</HI> we through an univer&s;all breach of Oathes make it not for perjury mourn more greivou&s;ly. Lea&s;t when with our &s;olemn Oathes, we have brought the animadver&s;ion of our ob|&s;ervance of Law, of right, and of Religion, before the pre&s;ence of God, as Iudge and Revenger of it; and with out own hands kind|led a fire for the triall of it: we our &s;elves be found guilty of a breach, or of halting in it. Let us weigh well the cau&s;e, the ground, the way, and the end of our taking Armes, that the horror of unju&s;t and cau&s;ele&s;&s;e blood-&s;hedding may not lye upon us; let us &s;ee what
<PB N="28" REF="16"> it is that we would have, which we may not already have without it.</P>
<P>May we not after &s;ome provi&s;ion made for forbearance of &s;uch Ceremonies, as by the Iudgement of the Church &s;hall be thought fit to be &s;pared, have the authorized &s;ervice of the Church e&s;tabli&s;hed? And after purgation and regulation of &s;ome enormities in Church government, have the di&s;cipline of the Church of <HI>England</HI> in a good condition &s;etled, with &s;evere penall provi&s;ion again&s;t connivers and Innovators in the one or in the other? Hath not His Maje&s;ty de|clared him&s;elfe ready and willing to con&s;ent thereto? Againe, to make &s;ure the aboli&s;hing of all grievances already &s;uppre&s;t, and to regulate Armes, and &s;ome other extravagances in government not yet provided for, may we not have fit provi&s;ionary lawes, with &s;evere and penall damning of all practices to the contrary? Doth not His Maje&s;ty to that al&s;o freely offer His con&s;ent? what can be wan|ting to the &s;etling of as &s;ound and well a governed Church and State, as any Nation under Heaven hath ever lived in? For if by a &s;evere Law the per&s;ons of them that &s;hall attempt any thing prejudiciall to the &s;etled practice of Religion or to the declared liberty of the Sub|ject be expo&s;ed to exemplary puni&s;hment, no feare of Innovation to the prejudice of either can remaine. Nor can we feare His <HI>Maje|&s;ties</HI> tolerating of offenders when be&s;ides his imprecating in that ca&s;e him&s;elfe and His, he has (in ca&s;e he &s;o violates the Law) with His owne mouth di&s;penced with His Subjects obedience. As for Our <HI>Parliaments,</HI> it can no way be in the power of the King to take away the lea&s;t Right, much le&s;&s;e the being of <HI>Parliaments;</HI> for what|&s;oever a King can doe to the prejudice of <HI>Parliaments,</HI> and how &s;o|ever aver&s;e He may be from them, yet alwayes the nece&s;&s;ity of State will at la&s;t enforce the calling of a <HI>Parliament,</HI> and when it is called, it is pre&s;ently repo&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed, and re-inve&s;ted of all the Rights and Priviledges that doe belong unto it. For nothing but a <HI>Parlia|ment</HI> it &s;elfe, or &s;o much of a <HI>Parliament,</HI> as in the peoples opinion &s;hall have the authority of a whole <HI>Parliament,</HI> can any way de&s;troy the being of <HI>Parliaments,</HI> or deprive them of the lea&s;t right or pri|viledge belonging to them.</P>
<P>To conclude therefore, if they that devi&s;ed and broached the new State principles &amp; doctrines publi&s;hed in the Book of <HI>Ob&s;ervations,</HI> have in them dealt truely and faithfully with the Subject. Then let
<PB N="29" REF="16"> the Author of tho&s;e Doctrines reioyce in them that receive and maintaine them; and let the maintainers of them reioyce in them that were the authors. But if they have dealt unfaithfully and de|ceiptfully with the &s;oules of the Subiect to cau&s;e the blinde (that cannot Iudge) to erre, thereby to bring to pa&s;&s;e their own de&s;igned innovations. Then let it plea&s;e the ju&s;t, and all-&s;eeing Supream Iudge of Iudges in mercy to &s;o many thou&s;and &s;oules in this our <HI>J&s;ra|ell,</HI> who in the darkne&s;&s;e of the&s;e difficulties know not the right hand from the left, to &s;end (as once he did at <HI>Jothams</HI> in&s;tance) <HI>Iud</HI> 9.16. a fire from the malitious authors of them, to bring to confu&s;ion and &s;hame the malignant maintainers and defenders of them; and a fire from them to bring to confu&s;ion the malitious authors. And let the Throne of our Soveraigne Lord the King, (with us the only &s;upream Vice-gerent of the great and Supream Iudge) be in righteou&s;ne&s;&s;e, in Iudgement, to true Religion, and in Peace for ever e&s;tabli&s;hed over us.</P>
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<DIV1 TYPE="to the reader">
<HEAD>The Printer, to the Reader.</HEAD>
<P>THis Summary An&s;wer (good Reader) having it &s;eemes lyen long upon the way to <HI>Oxford,</HI> happned to come to the Pre&s;&s;e before <HI>Chri&s;tmas</HI> la&s;t, where by rea&s;on of our full imployment ever &s;ince, Is could not be dispatched till now.</P>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
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