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<DATE>07-09-10</DATE>
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<NAME>Mona Logarbo</NAME>
<RESP>MURP</RESP>
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<IDG S="marc" R="UM" ID="A94173">
<STC T="W">S631</STC>
<BIBNO T="umi">99896366</BIBNO>
<VID>154344</VID>
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<TEXT LANG="eng">
<FRONT>
<DIV1 TYPE="bookplate">
<PB REF="1">
<P><FIGURE>
<Q LANG="lat">NEMO ME IMPUNE LACESSIT</Q>
<Q LANG="lat">SERO SED SERIO</Q>
<HEAD>The Mo&s;t Hon^b^l^e. William
Marqui&s;s of Lothian</HEAD>
<FIGDESC>blazon of clan Kerr</FIGDESC>
</FIGURE></P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="title page">
<PB REF="1" MS="y">
<PB REF="2">
<PB REF="2">
<PB REF="3" MS="y">
<PB REF="3">
<P>TEN
Lectures
ON THE
OBLIGATION
OF
Humane Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>READ
In the Divinity School at
<HI>OXFORD,</HI>
In the Year, 1647,</P>
<P>By that mo&s;t Learned and Reverend Father in God,
Doctor <HI>Robert Sander&s;on,</HI> Bi&s;hop of <HI>Lincoln. &amp;c.</HI></P>
<P>Tran&s;lated by <HI>Robert Codrington,</HI> Ma&s;ter of Arts.</P>
<P><HI>LONDON,</HI>
Printed by <HI>Tho. Leach&punc;</HI> and are to be &s;old by <HI>John Martin,
James Al<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">stry,</HI> and <HI>Tho. Dicas,</HI> at the S<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">gn of the
<HI>Bell</HI> in St. <HI>P<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">uls-Church Y<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">rd,</HI> 1660.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="alternative title page">
<PB REF="4">
<PB REF="4">
<P>SEVERAL
CASES
OF
CONSCIENCE
Di&s;cu&s;&s;ed In
Ten Lectures
IN THE
DIVINITY SCHOOL
AT
OXFORD.</P>
<P>By that mo&s;t Learned and Reverend Father
in God, Doctor <HI>Robert Sander&s;on,</HI>
now Lord Bi&s;hop of <HI>Lincoln.</HI></P>
<P><HI>LONDON,</HI>
Printed by <HI>Tho. Leach,</HI> and are to be &s;old by <HI>John Martin,
James Allestry,</HI> and <HI>Tho. Dicas,</HI> at the Sign of the
<HI>Bell</HI> in St. <HI>Pauls-Church-Yard,</HI> 1660.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="dedication">
<PB REF="5">
<PB REF="5">
<HEAD>To the mo&s;t Noble Robert Boyle, Son to the
Right Honourable Richard Earl of Cork, decea&s;ed,
and Brother to Richard Earl of Cork now living.</HEAD>
<OPENER><SALUTE>Honourable SIR,</SALUTE></OPENER>
<P>THis &s;mall pre&s;ent what&s;oever it is, cove|teth
to preferre it &s;elf to your Tru&s;t, and
Patronage, and to come abroad into the
world under the protection of your name. Mo&s;t
willingly therefore I do here make a tender of it
unto you, who, as I under&s;tand by Fame, (and
in Subjects of worth, Fame is &s;eldom found a
Liar) are not only Illu&s;trious by the &s;plendor
of your Birth, but far more Illu&s;trious by the
nobility of a generous mind, by your love to
Learning, your Humanity, Piety, and all man|ner
of Virtue, how&s;oever to me living private|ly,
and contentedly in a &s;mal Cottage, and not
much &s;olicitous what is done abroad, e&s;pecially
as the times noware) never known by your <HI>face,</HI>
nor by your <HI>name</HI> until within the&s;e few Months,
no nor as yet known unto me, but only by your
<HI>MUNIFICENCE.</HI> Neverthele&s;s I hope
this poor gift will find &s;ome acceptance with
you, becau&s;e having already obtained my <HI>Rod
of Liberty</HI> you endeavour to enclo&s;e me again in
my antient circle, and to draw me back to my
di&s;continued exerci&s;e, by propo&s;ing to me &s;ome
hone&s;t Salary by the excellently learned Mr.
<HI>Thomas Barlow,</HI> chief Keeper of <HI>Bodleys</HI> Library in
the famous&punc; Univer&s;ity of <HI>Oxford,</HI> It is indeed
well<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">done, that in this deplorable &s;tate of Civil
and Eccle&s;ia&s;tical affairs, (if we may call
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
<PB REF="6">
and a hideous confu&s;ion of all things) there
are peradventure found one or two of a more re|fined
clay, who either by their encouragment,
or their bounty are careful to comfort the &s;ad
Mu&s;es, and the Retainers to them, of what&s;oever
condition, tho&s;e e&s;pecially who being Profe&s;&s;ors
of true and Chri&s;tian Philo&s;ophy are every
where neglected, and di&s;pi&s;ed, as the <HI>refu&s;e</HI> of
the world: I<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> any thing therefore (by the permi&s;|&s;ion
of the Almighty) &s;hall hereafter be under|taken
and publi&s;hed by me in this kind of wri|ting,
which pertaineth to moral Philo&s;ophy
that may be either profitable to the Publick, or
u&s;eful to any private man, for the better In&s;titu|tion
of his life, and the framing of his manners,
by the pre&s;cript of the Divine Law and Go&s;pel,
whether it be in the Latin tongue, or in the En|gli&s;h,
which I perceive to be more acceptable of
to many of our Nation, I do here willingly ac|knowledge,
and freely profe&s;&s;e, that for the
greate&s;t part, it is due unto you, who were both
the Author to me to undertake it, and an A&s;&s;i&s;t|ant
cheerfully to proceed in it: And do you, mo&s;t
w<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">r<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">hy Sir, proceed to do good, that is,
to do that which you do already, to adorn Lear|ning,
to favour learned men, to advance Piety,
to procure you faithful friends at the charges of
unfaithful <HI>Mammon,</HI> that &s;o ou<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> of the abundance
of good works &s;owed in this world, there may
redound unto you, a mo&s;t fruitful Harve&s;t of e|ternal
ble&s;&s;edne&s;&s;e in the world to come. <HI>Amen.</HI></P>
<CLOSER><DATELINE>From <HI>Botheby Pannel<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter"> <GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 word"> Lincoln&s;hir<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">.</HI> <DATE>10 <HI>Cal.</HI> Decemb. 1659.</DATE></DATELINE></CLOSER>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="to the reader">
<PB REF="6">
<HEAD>To the Courteous
READER.</HEAD>
<OPENER><SALUTE>Friendly Reader who&s;oever you are,</SALUTE></OPENER>
<P>BEfore you advance into the Hou&s;e it &s;elf, you are
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ere in the fir&s;t entrance to be encountred, and de&s;ired
in &s;ome few things to &s;uffer your &s;elf to be informed
of the cau&s;e that chiefly compelled us to the publi&s;hing of
the&s;e papers which here we repre&s;ent unto you. I had rather
indeed, if others had been of the &s;ame mind with me, that
they &s;hould never have &s;een the light; for the proof whereof
this may be one Argument, and of force enough, that part
of the&s;e Lectures, written by me &s;ome y<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ars &s;ince, were never
for the space of ten years, and more, re&s;erved in any Desk,
but lay in corners up and down among&s;t my rejected, as m<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ch
as neglected papers; had I not another Argument of far
greater force than the former, <HI>viz. The Imperfection</HI>
of the worke, which of it &s;elf doth betray it &s;elf. For a
Writer that under&s;tands him&s;elf, and makes provi&s;ion for
his Reputation, and Dignity, m<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">&s;t carefully fini&s;h the work
he hath begun,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><HI>Lib.</HI> 2. de Natur. de|orum.</NOTE> and not &s;o much as think of &s;ending&punc; it abroad
before (to &s;peak with <HI>Cicero) it be every where apt and
poli&s;hed, and made compleat, and perfect, in all the parts
and numbers of it.</HI> For in vain from thence you may look for
<HI>Prai&s;e,</HI> where you may think you come off very hand&s;omely,
if, for <HI>Prai&s;e,</HI> you de&s;erve <HI>Pardon.</HI></P>
<P>What <GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">h<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="2+ letters">fore? Were friends the cau&s;e of it? Who are
<PB REF="7">
accu&s;tomed to encourage and give more rains to tho&s;e who
of their own accord are running into tho&s;e hazards, and to
spur on others who draw back? I will not affirm this neither,
for although I may grant that the exhortations, and de&s;ires
of friends, (the common refuge of the greate&s;t part of Scrib|lers)
may &s;erve oftentimes for an hone&s;t excu&s;e, yet they
could never &s;eem to me to be the ju&s;t and allowable grounds
for &s;uch a <HI>Cau&s;e.</HI> Neverthele&s;s (as mo&s;t frequently it is
&s;een) there were not wanting &s;ome <HI>ergodiocti&s;ts,</HI> &s;ome
Brain-Exacters who demanded of me, and (that I may u&s;e
the words of <HI>Fabius</HI>) with daily and reproaching Importu|nities
did efflagitate, that I would pre&s;ent tho&s;e things to
the eys of all men to be read, which heretofore in reading
were &s;o grateful to their ears, but I who was not ignorant
how acuter was the judgement of the eye than of the ear did
con&s;tantly deny it; They, on the other &s;ide, were more in&s;tant
with me, and more vehemently did urge me, and (as oft in
like ca&s;es it comes to pa&s;s) they did gently chide me; But I,
who was re&s;olved to be ob&s;tinate, &s;tood fixed to my &s;elf; for
what&s;oever they could object unto me&punc; I was ready always
to an&s;wer them, that a work begun (and not half of it, nor
the third part of it peradventure hardly accompli&s;hed) was
not ra&s;hly to be communicated to the publick; But they a|gain
were as ready to reply, <HI>Why cea&s;e you then? Why do
you not &s;et your &s;elf clo&s;e unto your &s;tudy, and put your
la&s;t hand unto that work which your fir&s;t hand hath &s;o
happily begun?</HI></P>
<P>What &s;hall I &s;ay for my &s;elf in this ca&s;e? I am a&s;hamed
to confe&s;&s;e, and I may not be &s;ilent; I an&s;wered how&s;oever,
(and what was too true indeed) that unle&s;s &s;ome <HI>Nece&s;&s;i|ty</HI>
did inforce me, of which I was not then capable (being out
of the Readers place) it could not be. As a faint-hearted &s;oul|dier
whom only Desperation makes valiant, grows then hot,
and is fiercely carryed on unto the Fight when no &s;ubter|fuge
is left for him, &s;o is my wit, give it lei&s;ure, &s;pace, and
<PB REF="7">
time, nothing is done;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Hotat. Sat. 3.</NOTE> <HI>The Quill in vain is vexed,</HI> my
mind is un&s;ettled, it roams, and rambles, and degenerates in|to
&s;loath. U&s;e compul&s;ion to it, and check it, it unites, and is
entire, it is stirred up and recollecteth &s;trength, and what
force it hath, &s;ince there mu&s;t be care and Indu&s;try, it puts
it all forth at once, and in one word it doth that which is ne|ce&s;&s;ary
to be done; So the Beams of the Sun diffu&s;ed in a
free and open air, do &s;o gently warm us, that we are hardly
&s;en&s;ible of it, but being united and contracted into the round
of a hollow Gla&s;&s;e, as into a Center, they do vehemently burn.
Being by long u&s;e in&s;tructed from my youth to this age, I
have learned how true is that Hemi&s;tich of <HI>Pythogoras</HI>
&mdash;<GAP DESC="foreign">,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Pythag. aur <HI>Car<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">&punc;</HI></NOTE> <HI>Performance</HI> is a
near Neighbour, and dwelleth at the next door to <HI>Nece&s;&s;ity.</HI></P>
<P>And although this imperfection of a &s;lothful mind may
to many men appear to carry before it &s;ome &s;how of mode&s;ty;
yet it &s;eems to me that it cannot be hand&s;omely defended, un|le&s;s
it be by this excu&s;e, that it is <GAP DESC="foreign">
&s;o born and bred up with &s;ome men (and I am in the &s;ame
number with them) that in vain he laboureth, who&s;oever he
is, that hopeth by any Art to correct it, or by indu&s;try to o|vercome
it. But enough, and too much, of &s;o unplea&s;ing a
Subject.</P>
<P>Peradventure you will demand (for as yet we are come
up to <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">o certainty, and are returning back &s;till where at fir&s;t
we were) <HI>If as you &s;ay, you are &s;o &s;low of your &s;elf, and
&s;o contumacious to your friends, from whence at la&s;t
came this Edition?</HI> Certainly from nothing el&s;e but from
this very <HI>Nece&s;&s;ity</HI> of which but even now was our di&s;cour&s;e,
and which u&s;urpeth &s;o va&s;t a Dominion over the affairs of
men.</P>
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign">&punc;</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Euripid.</NOTE></L>
<L>For wi&s;e men &s;peak it,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Helen.</NOTE> and not only we,</L>
<L>Nothing &s;o &s;trong as dire Nece&s;&s;itie.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Act. 2.</NOTE></L></Q>
<P><PB REF="8">
But to hold you no longer in &s;u&s;pence; I will in a few
words declare the whole bu&s;ine&s;s to you. All this contuma|cy
was broken as it were at one blow, by Mr. <HI>James Alle|<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="3 letters">y&punc;</HI>
Book-&s;eller of <HI>London,</HI> who in his Letter to me, did
acquaint me that two Copies of the&s;e Lectures were brought
unto him, and that he had them then in his own cu&s;tody, in
his own hou&s;e; that he who brought them to him was in hand
with him, that either by him&s;elf, or at lea&s;t by his procure|ment,
they &s;hould be printed, which he denyed to do without
my con&s;ent; He warned me withal, there being other Copies
abroad, i<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> hardly could be prevented if I neglected it, but
that they would be publi&s;hed by &s;ome one el&s;e, I not knowing
of it; I did commend, nay I did love in a man, at that time
utterly unknown unto me the candour of his mind and his
reverent respect to Equity; e&s;pecially being of their profe&s;&s;i|on,
who almo&s;t do make their gain their only bu&s;ine&s;&s;e. I
therefore wrote back unto him to &s;end me one of the Copies,
that &s;eemed to him to be the faire&s;t of the two, and the mo&s;t
perfect, and in the mean time I would con&s;ider with my &s;elf
what was needful to be done. To be &s;hort, he &s;ent it I did
read it, and examine it, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
Every Page was turned over, and nothing was found &s;ound,
nothing perfect; for be&s;ides the innumerable faults of the
Tran&s;criber, not a few things which in my fir&s;t meditation
were written by my &s;elf with too ha&s;ty a Pen, did &s;eem, as
they indeed ought, to be called back again to the Anvel and
the Hammer. Hence I perceived I was to undergo a trou|ble&s;ome
and tedious task, to write over the whole work anew,
which neverthele&s;&s;e was to be endured. I indured it, and
wrote it over, and did perfect it as <HI>I could,</HI> and (if no
man be a Debtor beyond his power) as <HI>I ought;</HI> If not as
<HI>I would,</HI> I require this one thing as rea&s;onable, (nay as due
unto him who doth as much as lies in his power) <HI>Pardon.</HI></P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="list of lecture summaries">
<PB REF="8">
<HEAD>The Summary of the fir&s;t Lecture.</HEAD>
<LIST>
<ITEM>1. The rea&s;on of the undertaking the work. 2</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. The Definition of Con&s;cience is propo&s;ed. 2</ITEM>
<ITEM>3. The name of the <HI>Thing</HI> defined. 3</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> And the original of that name 5</ITEM>
<ITEM>7. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Illu&s;trated from the Ambiguity of the word <HI>Sci|ence.</HI>
9</ITEM>
<ITEM>10. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> And the H<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">monymy of the word <HI>Con&s;cience.</HI> 10</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. Of the <HI>Genus</HI> of Con&s;cience. 17</ITEM>
<ITEM>The fir&s;t opinion that it is an <HI>Act</HI> is confuted. 18</ITEM>
<ITEM>15. The &s;econd opinion that it is a <HI>Potentia.</HI></ITEM>
<ITEM>16. Which is confuted al&s;o. 19</ITEM>
<ITEM>17. The third opinion that it is a Habit Innate.</ITEM>
<ITEM>18. Or a Faculty is &s;tated.</ITEM>
<ITEM>19. And unfolded. 21</ITEM>
<ITEM>20. The Subject of Con&s;cience <GAP DESC="foreign"> or <HI>of which.</HI> 23</ITEM>
<ITEM>21. And <GAP DESC="foreign"> in which. 24</ITEM>
<ITEM>22. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The Object of Con&s;cience. 26</ITEM>
<ITEM>24. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The fir&s;t Act of Con&s;cience. 29</ITEM>
<ITEM>27. And the following Acts. 31</ITEM>
<ITEM>28. Many things are ob&s;cured rather than illu&s;trated by
defining them. 33</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Second Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The twofold re&s;pect of Con&s;cience. 37</ITEM>
<ITEM>3 The erronious, and deceitful Rules of Con&s;cience. 39</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. A good Intention doth not &s;uffice to the g<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">odne&s;s of the
Act. 40</ITEM>
<ITEM><PB REF="9">
5. Which is proved fir&s;t by the words of the Apo&s;tle. 41</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Secondly, from the nature of Evil. 43</ITEM>
<ITEM>9. Thirdly, from the conditions required to the goodne&s;s
of an Act. 46</ITEM>
<ITEM>10. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> An Objection is an&s;wered. 48</ITEM>
<ITEM>12. Fourthly, by the perfection of the Divine Law. 51</ITEM>
<ITEM>13. Fourthly, by the perfection of the Divine Law. 51</ITEM>
<ITEM>13. Fifthly by the revenge of God puni&s;hing the tran&s;|gre&s;&s;ion
of a Law, although done by a good Intention. 52</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. Sixthly, from the Inconveniencies of the contrary o|pinion.
54</ITEM>
<ITEM>15. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fir&s;t Corrollary</HI> we mu&s;t take heed le&s;t under a
pretence of Zeal to Gods Glory we be not carryed away to
the committing of unlawful and forbidden things. 56</ITEM>
<ITEM>17. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>&s;econd,</HI> a le&s;&s;e &s;in is not to be committed by
us to avoid a greater &s;in in another. 59</ITEM>
<ITEM>19. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Whether it be lawful for any man to per&s;wade
to a le&s;&s;e &s;in to avoid a greater. 63</ITEM>
<ITEM>21. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The Third Corallary, one <HI>evil</HI> is not to be
driven out by another. 65</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Third Lecture</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. The rea&s;on of the method that is here ob&s;erved. 70</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The Fact of <HI>Paul</HI> reproving <HI>Peter.</HI> 72</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> All the deeds of the Saints barely recited in the
holy Scripture are not to be imitated. 77</ITEM>
<ITEM>8. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> No, nor all tho&s;e deeds neither which are prai&s;ed. 78</ITEM>
<ITEM>12. It is an ea&s;y thing to erre in the application of ex|amples.
82</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Some examples of perver&s;e Imitation. 85</ITEM>
<ITEM>16. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> An argument from the example examined a|gain&s;t
the cu&s;tom of kneeling in the holy Supper. 87</ITEM>
<ITEM>23. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> What is the u&s;e of examples. 95</ITEM>
<ITEM>25. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> It is un&s;afe to &s;ubject the Con&s;cience to the opi|nions
of every man. 99</ITEM>
<ITEM><PB REF="9">
28. The tyranny of the Pope of <HI>Rome</HI> over the Con&s;ci|ences
of men. 102</ITEM>
<ITEM>29. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Not to impute too much to the judgements of o|ther
men. <HI>ibid.</HI></ITEM>
<ITEM>31. Nor yet too little. 104</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Fourth Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> What is that Rule of Con&s;cience to be enquired
after? 106</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> To which we ought to conform our &s;elves. 109</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Diver&s;e Degrees of tho&s;e things which do oblige
the Con&s;cience. 111</ITEM>
<ITEM>9. <HI>&amp;c. The fir&s;t Conclu&s;ion,</HI> God alone hath a peculiar
and a direct command over the Con&s;cience 113</ITEM>
<ITEM>12. <HI>&amp;c. The &s;econd Conclu&s;ion,</HI> The next Rule of Con&s;ci|ence
is right rea&s;on. 116</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. &amp;c. The third Conclu&s;ion, <HI>The Scripture is not the</HI>
Adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience. 119</ITEM>
<ITEM>18. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> And nothing hereby derogated from the perfecti|on
of it. 124</ITEM>
<ITEM>20. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The fourth, <HI>The Adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience</HI>
is the will of God&punc; which way &s;oever it be manife&s;ted. 126</ITEM>
<ITEM>23. Which is al&s;o the Fundamental of the Obligation, 13</ITEM>
<ITEM>24. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The three parts of this rule; fir&s;t the <HI>light by nature</HI>
infu&s;ed into the mind, which is the <HI>Law of Nature.</HI> 131</ITEM>
<ITEM>26. Secondly the light conveyed into the mind by the <HI>writ|ten
Word</HI> of God.</ITEM>
<ITEM>27. &amp;c.</ITEM>
<ITEM>32. &amp;c.
<LIST>
<ITEM>In the old Law, or the Law of <HI>Mo&s;es.</HI> 137</ITEM>
<ITEM>In the new Law, the Law of the Go&s;pel 142</ITEM>
</LIST></ITEM>
<ITEM>35. Thirdly, the <HI><GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ight acquired.</HI> 143</ITEM>
<ITEM>Which con&s;i&s;teth by</ITEM>
<ITEM>36. The di&s;cour&s;e of Rea&s;on. 145</ITEM>
<ITEM>37. And the Authority of the Church. <HI>ibid.</HI></ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<PB REF="10">
<HEAD>The Summary of the Fifth Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> A rehear&s;al of what before hath been &s;poken. 147</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> What is to be under&s;tood by the word <HI>LAW.</HI> 149</ITEM>
<ITEM>5. And what by the word <HI>OBLIGATION</HI> ibid.</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. <HI>Que&s;tion.</HI> Whether Humane Laws do oblige the Con|&s;cience?
154</ITEM>
<ITEM>7. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fir&s;t Conclu&s;ion.</HI> Unju&s;t Laws do not oblige
the Con&s;cience. 155</ITEM>
<ITEM>Which is unfolded. 157</ITEM>
<ITEM>9. And confirmed. 158</ITEM>
<ITEM>10. The <HI>Second Conclu&s;ion.</HI> The Law of man can &s;uper|induce
a new Obligation to the former. 159</ITEM>
<ITEM>11. The <HI>Third Conclu&s;ion.</HI> A Law made by one not in|ve&s;ted
with lawful doth not oblige. 162</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> A Di&s;cour&s;e concerning the Office of a Subject,
when <HI>de Facto</HI> it is manife&s;t, that he commandeth who
hath no right to command. 166</ITEM>
<ITEM>22. The <HI>Fourth Conclu&s;ion.</HI> Humane Laws do oblige of them&s;elves in general. 175</ITEM>
<ITEM>23. And in particular al&s;o, by con&s;equence. 177</ITEM>
<ITEM>24. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Which is variou&s;ly confirmed. 178</ITEM>
<ITEM>31. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> An Objection is an&s;wered drawn from the liber|ty
of a Chri&s;tian Man. 184</ITEM>
<ITEM>36 As al&s;o from the allegation that there is but one Law-giver God and Chri&s;t. 190</ITEM>
<ITEM>37. And from what el&s;e is di&s;puted again&s;t this opi|nion.
191</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Sixth Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. A propo&s;al of the mo&s;t remarkable things here treat|ed
of.</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. The duty of Obedience and the difference of the either &s;ort of Subjection. 197</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. The Con&s;cience is free under that obligation which the
Laws induce. 20<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"></ITEM>
<ITEM><PB REF="10">
6. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fir&s;t Doubt.</HI> Of a Law commanding a thing
impo&s;&s;ible. 202</ITEM>
<ITEM>8. <HI>Second Doubt.</HI> Or a thing po&s;&s;ible, but very burthen|&s;ome. 204</ITEM>
<ITEM>9. <HI>Third.</HI> Or what before was nece&s;&s;ary. 205</ITEM>
<ITEM>10. <HI>&amp;c. Fourthly.</HI> Or a thing filthy and unlawful, where|in
are Que&s;tions and An&s;wers. 207</ITEM>
<ITEM>10.</ITEM>
<ITEM>13.</ITEM>
<ITEM>14.
<LIST>
<ITEM>1 Whether an unju&s;t Law ought to be made for the
publick profit? <HI>ibid.</HI></ITEM>
<ITEM>2 Whether the Subject <HI>be bound</HI> to ob&s;erve it &s;o
made? 210</ITEM>
<ITEM>3 Whether it be <HI>lawful</HI> for him to ob&s;erve it &s;o
made?</ITEM>
<ITEM>4 what unju&s;t Law he may obey, and what not? 213</ITEM>
</LIST></ITEM>
<ITEM>15.</ITEM>
<ITEM>16. &amp;c.
<LIST>
<ITEM>What is required to make a Law obliga|tory?
214</ITEM>
<ITEM>What a Subject is to do, being not &s;atisfied whe|ther
the Law be ju&s;t, or unju&s;t? 215</ITEM>
</LIST></ITEM>
<ITEM>18. <HI>&amp;c. The Fifth.</HI> of the Obligation of a Law permit|ing
evil. 217</ITEM>
<ITEM>22. <HI>&amp;c. Sixth.</HI> Of a Law determining a thing indifferent.
222</ITEM>
<ITEM>26. The <HI>Seventh.</HI> Of Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws <HI>in &s;pecie.</HI> 226</ITEM>
<ITEM>27. Tho&s;e things are refelled, which are alleaged again&s;t them by the adver&s;e party. 228</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Seventh Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. A Rehear&s;al of what hath been already &s;poken. 238</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fir&s;t Doubt,</HI> who it is to whom it belongeth to
make Laws. 237</ITEM>
<ITEM>Where it is &s;tated that, That the Power of making Laws
is the Power of a Superior. 238</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. Having an external Juri&s;diction. 239</ITEM>
<ITEM><PB REF="11">
5. And that in the highe&s;t Command. 241</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Which conclu&s;ion is largely unfolded. 243</ITEM>
<ITEM>9. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> And diver&s;ly confirmed. 246</ITEM>
<ITEM>11. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The late fiction of a Co-ordinate Power confuted. 248</ITEM>
<ITEM>13. The <HI>&s;econd Doubt.</HI> Whether the Con&s;ent of the people
be required to the obligation of a Law. 250</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The chief Command or Soveraignty is from
God. 253</ITEM>
<ITEM>19. And is an off-spring of Fatherly Power. 255</ITEM>
<ITEM>17. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> What are the Peoples parts in con&s;tituting a
Prince. 259</ITEM>
<ITEM>21. The People having given the &s;upreme Power to the
Prince have not any right to re-a&s;&s;ume that Power a|gain.
261</ITEM>
<ITEM>22. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> How it comes to pa&s;&s;e, that &s;ome con&s;ent of the
people is thought to be nece&s;&s;ary to the obligation of a
Law. 264</ITEM>
<ITEM>25. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>third Doubt.</HI> what? And how far the con|&s;ent
of the people is required? 266</ITEM>
<ITEM>28. The <HI>fourth Doubt.</HI> Of the Laws of le&s;&s;e Commo|naltyes.
268</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Eighth Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM>1. A Propo&s;al of things to be &s;poken. 273</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. Of the <HI>PROMULGATION</HI> of a <HI>LAW.</HI> 274</ITEM>
<ITEM>The fir&s;t <HI>Doubt.</HI> Whether it be nece&s;&s;ary? 275</ITEM>
<ITEM>3. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>&s;econd Doubt.</HI> When a Law is conceived to
be &s;ufficiently publi&s;hed. 276</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. The <HI>third Doubt.</HI> When a Law, that is promulgated
or publi&s;hed, beginneth to oblige. 279</ITEM>
<ITEM>7. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>Fourth Doubt.</HI> Whether and how far that man
is obliged to the ob&s;ervance of a Law, who is ignorant of
the Promulgatian of it. 281</ITEM>
<ITEM>10. <HI>Of a</HI> LAW PENAL. 28<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter"></ITEM>
<ITEM><PB REF="11">
The <HI>fir&s;t Doubt.</HI> How far the Con&s;titution of the penalty
pertaineth to the E&s;&s;ence of a Law. <HI>ibid.</HI></ITEM>
<ITEM>1. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>&s;econd Doubt.</HI> Of the Obligation of it;
And what a penalty is? 287</ITEM>
<ITEM>3. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> What manner of Law a Penal Law is, and how
manifold it is. 290</ITEM>
<ITEM>5. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fir&s;t Conclu&s;ion.</HI> A Penal Law doth &s;o far
oblige, as the Legi&s;lator doth intend it. 293</ITEM>
<ITEM>7. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>&s;econd Conclu&s;ion.</HI> A Law purely Penal,
doth of it &s;elf, and ordinarily, oblige only unto the pe|nalty.
295</ITEM>
<ITEM>9. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Diver&s;e Objections are an&s;wered. 299</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. The <HI>third Conclu&s;ion.</HI> A mixt Penal Law doth ob|lige
unto the Fault al&s;o. 304</ITEM>
<ITEM>5. The <HI>third Doubt.</HI> How far the tran&s;gre&s;&s;or of the
Law is bound to undergoe the penalty, <HI>ip&s;o facto.</HI></ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the Ninth Lecture</HEAD>
<ITEM><GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">. The end of the Law is the good of the Commonalty. 31<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter"></ITEM>
<ITEM><GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fir&s;t Doubt.</HI> Whether there be any nece&s;&s;ary
u&s;e of Humane Laws? 312</ITEM>
<ITEM>4. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>&s;econd Doubt.</HI> Whether it belongeth
to a Law-giver to command the Acts of all Virtues,
and to forbid all Vices? 315</ITEM>
<ITEM><GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>third Doubt.</HI> Of what importance the inten|tion
of the Lawgiver is to the effect of the obliga|tion.
320</ITEM>
<ITEM>2. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> The <HI>fourth Doubt.</HI> Of the changing of Laws. 322</ITEM>
<ITEM>5. The <HI>fifth.</HI> Of the changing of the form of the whole
politick Government. 326</ITEM>
<ITEM>6. <HI>The</HI> &s;ixth Doubt. <HI>How</HI> that Axiom The &s;afety of
the People is the &s;upreme Law <HI>is to be under&s;tood.</HI> 329</ITEM>
</LIST>
<LIST>
<HEAD>The Summary of the tenth Lecture.</HEAD>
<ITEM><GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> A rehear&s;al of &s;ome things already &s;poken. 334</ITEM>
<ITEM><PB REF="12">
4. The genuine &s;en&s;e of this Aphori&s;m, <HI>viz. The Safety of
the People is the &s;upreme Law,</HI> is again debated and re|&s;olved.
146</ITEM>
<ITEM>7. What is to be under&s;tood by this word <HI>Safety.</HI> 340</ITEM>
<ITEM>8. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> And what by the word <HI>People.</HI> 342</ITEM>
<ITEM>11. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> When words coll<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ctive, are to be taken collectively,
and when to be taken Di&s;cretively. 345</ITEM>
<ITEM>13. The Safety of the People doth include al&s;o the &s;afety of
the King. 348</ITEM>
<ITEM>14. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> And his &s;afety especially. 349</ITEM>
<ITEM>16. In every Common-wealth there mu&s;t be nece&s;&s;arily
&s;ome Authority which is to be above all Law. 351</ITEM>
<ITEM>17. <HI>&amp;c.</HI> Which cannot belong to any other but to the Prince
only. 353</ITEM>
<ITEM>19. The original of this Aphori&s;m is examined. 355</ITEM>
<ITEM>20. What Subjects may do in this ca&s;e, and how far they
may act. 357</ITEM>
<ITEM>22. An Illu&s;trious example of it. 359</ITEM>
</LIST>
<TRAILER>THE END.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
</FRONT>
<BODY>
<DIV1 N="1" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="1" REF="12">
<HEAD>THE
FIRST LECTURE&punc;
In which the Definition of Con&s;cience
is propounded, and unfolded.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>1 COR. 2. 11.</BIBL>
<Q>What Man knoweth the things of a Man, but
the Spirit of Man which is in him.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>I. _THat the power of Con&s;cience is
very great,<NOTE N="a" PLACE="marg">Cice|ro <HI>pro</HI> Mi|lone.</NOTE> either in the re&s;pect
of <HI>Fear</HI> or <HI>Confidence,</HI> hath been
of old declared by wi&s;e and lear|ned
Men, and more neerly and
abundantly atte&s;ted by the &s;ence
and the experience of all Men. It is therefore
the more to be lamented that many (while greedily
they imploy all their &s;tudies in the knowledge of
things indifferent) are in &s;o dark an ignorance in the
knowledge of their own Con&s;ciences, notwith&s;tand|ing
there is no where to be found, a more faithful
Admoni&s;her, or a more diligent Accu&s;er, or a Se|verer
<PB N="2" REF="13">
Witne&s;&s;e, or an uncorrupter Judge, or a
&s;weeter Comforter, or a more importunate Ene|my.
That therefore I may in&s;till into the Minds
and Ears of the ingenious, that old, and &s;o often
repeated in&s;truction <GAP DESC="foreign">, that is, <HI>Know
thy &s;elf,</HI> and divert them a little from the too im|moderate
de&s;ire of a more unprofitable knowledge,
gradually by inviting them to a greater care and &s;tu|dy
of their Con&s;ciences; I thought it would be a
work worth the labour, if I &s;hould a little more dili|gently
inquire into the u&s;e, &amp; Nature of Con&s;cience,
and in this place, according to my obligations, com|municate
to you, my Auditors, tho&s;e Meditations
which I &s;hall find mo&s;t ob&s;ervable on this Subject. I
have determined therefore in this fir&s;t Lecture to lay
open the Nature of Con&s;cience by defining it, and
in my following Lectures, by the Almighties per|mi&s;&s;ion,
I will expound unto you the u&s;e and office
of the <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> e&s;pecially as it reflecteth on
things to be done, and that in a double re&s;pect:
the fir&s;t, to the rule of the Law to which it ought to
be Subject, and the other in re&s;pect to former acti|ons
over which it is ordained to govern.</P>
<P>II. But the method of defining being twofold,
the one <HI>Synthetical,</HI> or by the way of Compo&s;iti|on,
when by due weighing of every part of the pre|mi&s;es,
the definition at la&s;t is perfectly collected:
the other <HI>Analytical,</HI> and by way of re&s;olution
which doth take a&s;under every peice of the definiti|on,
and open and unfold that, which at fir&s;t was
propounded entire; Although the former may per|adventure
&s;eem more convenient to the order of
Nature, yet I have made choice of the latter, which
I conceive more fit for in&s;truction. Thus therefore
<PB N="3" REF="13">
I do briefly define Con&s;cience. <HI>Con&s;cience is a fa|culty,
or a habit of the practical under&s;tanding, by
which the mind of Man doth by the di&s;cour&s;e of rea|&s;on
apply that light with which he is indued to his par|ticular
moral Actions.</HI> In this definition two things
do preferre them&s;elves to ob&s;ervation. Fir&s;t, the
name of the thing defined, which is the voyce of
the Con&s;cience it &s;elf. Secondly, the particular
members of the definition, which are all tho&s;e that
are ordinary in the definition of the qualities of the
fir&s;t and &s;econd <HI>Species;</HI> that is to &s;ay, the <HI>Genus,</HI> the
<HI>Subject,</HI> the <HI>Object,</HI> and the <HI>proper Act.</HI></P>
<P>III. As to the Name of the thing defined, it is
ob&s;erved by learned men that in all the old Te&s;ta|ment
there is not found a Hebrew word which pre|ci&s;ely,
and peculiarly doth &s;ignifie the Con&s;ci|ence;
But the Hebrews, according to their cu&s;tom
of &s;peaking, as often as mention is made of Con&s;ci|ence,
they make u&s;e of one of tho&s;e two words to
expre&s;&s;e it <GAP DESC="foreign"> or <GAP DESC="foreign">, and <GAP DESC="foreign">, the fir&s;t whereof is
known by all to &s;ignifie the <HI>Heart,</HI> and the other
the <HI>Spirit of Man.</HI> According to this is that of <HI>So|lomon</HI>
in the fourth of <HI>Proverbs;</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Prov. 4. 23.</NOTE> <HI>Keep thy Heart
with all diligence,</HI> as if he &s;hould have &s;aid, <HI>Le</HI> e|very
one have a diligent care of his own Con&s;ci|ence;
And in the &s;eventh of <HI>Eccle&s;ia&s;tes,</HI> where ac|cording
to the old interpretation the words are,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ccle. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">. 23.</NOTE> <HI>Thy
Con&s;cience knoweth that thou thy &s;elf hath often cur&s;ed
others;</HI> And according unto the Tran&s;lation of <HI>Tre|mellius,
thy Mind is Con&s;cious;</HI> It is in the He|brew
Text <GAP DESC="foreign"> that is, Thy Heart knoweth, And
in the new Te&s;tament, e&s;pecially in St. <HI>John,</HI> in
who&s;e writings there are many Hebrai&s;ms; the
word <GAP DESC="foreign">, the Heart is often put for the <HI>Con&s;ci|ence</HI>
<PB N="4" REF="14">
as <HI>John</HI> 1 3.<NOTE PLACE="marg">1 John 3&punc; 21.</NOTE> <HI>If our heart condemneth us not,</HI> that is
if our Con&s;cience doth condemn us not, it being the
proper office of the con&s;cience to condemn, or not to
condemn the guilty per&s;on &s;tanding before the tri|bunal
of Ju&s;tice; From this proceeds that com|mon
allu&s;ion of St. <HI>Bernard,</HI> and others; <HI>Con&s;cientia
qua&s;i cordis &s;cientia,</HI> The Con&s;cience is the hearts
con&s;ciou&s;ne&s;s. The con&s;cience al&s;o in the holy
Scripture oftentimes by the Hebrews and the G<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e|cians
is called and expre&s;&s;ed by the name of Spirit;
I will only in&s;tance two places, for what needs any
more in a thing &s;o evident: In the Old Te&s;tament
<HI>Proverbs</HI> the 18 and the fourteenth ver&s;e, <HI>The Spi|rit
of man will &s;u&s;tain his infirmity, but a broken Spi|rit
who can endure?</HI> As if he &s;hould &s;ay, a man of a
&s;ound and un&s;tained con&s;cience will endure with as
much courage as patience what&s;oever calamities
&s;hall befall him, but an afflicted and guilty con&s;ci|ence
is a burden in&s;upportable. And then in the new
Te&s;tament, I &s;hall make u&s;e of that of St. <HI>Paul, 1
Cor.</HI> 2. 11. which is the Theme and foundation of
this pre&s;ent di&s;cour&s;e. <HI>What man knoweth the things
of a man, but the Spirit of man which is in him.</HI> That
is his own Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>IIII. But mo&s;t certain it is that the Latin word
<HI>Con&s;cientia,</HI> Con&s;cience and the Greek <GAP DESC="foreign">,
which in all things is mo&s;t re&s;pon&s;ible to the Latin,
did both of them receive their de<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ivations <HI>a &s;ciendo,</HI>
from knowing; but a praepo&s;ition being added to
both the words in the pronunciation of them, doth
&s;eem to imply more then can hereby be contained
in the &s;ingle word <HI>Science;</HI> but &s;everal Authors
do give a &s;everal &s;ignification of it. To omit tho&s;e
two allu&s;ions that by many are alleadged, (which if
<PB N="5" REF="14">
we look on the nature of the thing it &s;elf, may
peradventure be retained as altogether not impro|per,
but if brought to the exactne&s;s of a lawfull exa|mination,
will pre&s;ently appeare but vain and not
worthy to be in&s;i&s;ted on.) <HI>viz.</HI> that <HI>Con&s;cientia e&s;t
qua&s;i cordis &s;cientia,</HI> Con&s;cience is no more than the
hearts con&s;ciou&s;nes; And <HI>Con&s;cientia qua&s;i conclu|dens
&s;cientia;</HI> Con&s;cience is as it were a concluding
Science: It is mo&s;t certain that tho&s;e two words
<GAP DESC="foreign"> and <HI>Con&s;cientia,</HI> beyond the bare notion
of a Science, have a certain order and relation of
<HI>that</HI> &s;cience to another; for &s;uch is the force of the
two particles, <GAP DESC="foreign"> and <HI>Con,</HI> that in their compo&s;iti|on
they imply a certain conjunction and an a&s;&s;ocia|tion
of many things, &s;o that this word <HI>Con&s;cientia</HI>
or Con&s;cience may be &s;aid to be <HI>conjuncta multorum
&s;cientia,</HI> a conjoyned &s;cience of many things, which
two ways may be under&s;tood; For it may be &s;aid to
be the &s;cience of many things, in re&s;pect of the &s;ub|jects,
as the &s;cience or the knowledge of many men
that do know; as when many per&s;ons do know the
&s;ame thing: or in re&s;pect of the objects, when it is
the knowledge of many things that are known, as
when the &s;ame per&s;on knows many things alike.
Let the word Con&s;cience be taken either in the one
&s;ence or the other, the account of the word neither
much borrowed nor incongruous may be given, whe|ther
we look on the thing it &s;elf, or the u&s;e and
manner of &s;peaking among&s;t approved Authors.</P>
<P>V. For in the fir&s;t place when many men know
the &s;ame thing, they may be &s;aid to be con&s;cious of
it, and to know it altogether; So tho&s;e whom <HI>Ca|tiline</HI>
had cho&s;en into the &s;ociety of his wickedne&s;s,
and were made partakers of his coun&s;els, were &s;aid
<PB N="6" REF="15">
to be con&s;cious of that con&s;piracy. And he is &s;aid
to be con&s;cious of the Kings &s;ecrets, to whom his
privy coun&s;els are intru&s;ted, <HI>A&s;citus in con&s;cientiam
facinoris,</HI> &s;aith <HI>Tacitus,</HI> Drawn in into the con&s;ci|ence
of the villany.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Mrrtial 12. 24.</NOTE> <HI>O &s;i con&s;cius e&s;&s;et hic Avitus</HI>
&s;aith <HI>Martial</HI> in his Epigrams,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Juven. Sat. 14.</NOTE> O that this man were
con&s;cious of it, and <HI>Con&s;cia Matri Virgo fuit,</HI> the
Daughter was con&s;cious to what the Mother did;
And <HI>Meorum omnium con&s;iliorum periculorum&abque; te&s;tis
con&s;cius, et adjutor,</HI> &s;aith <HI>Cicero</HI> in his orations;
A Con&s;cious witne&s;s, and a helper to me in all my
coun&s;els and dangers. I &s;hould here be infinite if
I &s;hould collect what&s;oever to this purpo&s;e I every
where do meet with in the Authors of greate&s;t repu|tation;
But that may &s;erve which already is alledged,
unle&s;s peradventure you exact of me to produce
&s;omething from the puddle of the Grammarians which
may conduce to this purpo&s;e; I will do it, not that
the authority of tho&s;e men is &s;o much to be valued,
but becau&s;e in the&s;e things they &s;eem as it were by
right to arrogate a kind of pre<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">eminence to them|&s;elves.
In the fir&s;t place, hear <HI>Nonius, In hoc diffe|runt,</HI>
&s;aith he, <HI>Scius &amp; con&s;cius, &s;cius &s;ecum, con&s;cius
cum alio &s;cius e&s;t,</HI> That is, the knowing or &s;cious man
doth differ in this fro~ the con&s;cious; the &s;cious knows
by him&s;elf, the Con&s;cious is &s;cious with another.</P>
<P>From this original of the word, they who thought
that Con&s;cience was &s;o called as one Science with
another, doe give this rea&s;on for their opinion,
that man not only knows what things he hath
committed, but he hath God who &s;earcheth the heart
and the reins, to be a con&s;cious witne&s;s and an in|&s;pector
into all his works, nay, into his mo&s;t &s;ecret
thoughts, And this is mo&s;t certain, though words be
<PB N="7" REF="15">
tongue-tyed, and the Voyce be dumb. Behold
my witne&s;&s;e is in the Heavens, and <GAP DESC="foreign"> my
Record that is con&s;cious of me is on high: <HI>Job.</HI> 16.
19. The ble&s;&s;ed Apo&s;tle al&s;o St. <HI>Paul,</HI> in the ninth
of the <HI>Romans</HI> and the fir&s;t, when he had called on
God to be the witne&s;&s;e of the truth he was about
to &s;peak, he pre&s;ently &s;ubnecteth <GAP DESC="foreign">,
my Con&s;cience bearing me witne&s;&s;e;
As if he &s;hould have &s;aid, <GAP DESC="foreign">.
Chri&s;t knows it, and I know it with him, <GAP DESC="foreign">.
Chri&s;t doth te&s;tify it,
and my Con&s;cience doth a<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">e&s;t it with him. Let
this therefore be the fir&s;t rea&s;on of the derivation
of the word, that Con&s;cience is &s;o called, becau&s;e the
deeds of Man are known unto God, as well as to
him&s;elf.</P>
<P>VI. In another &s;ence the Con&s;cience is called
the <HI>conjoyned Science</HI> of many things, as of <HI>Objects,</HI>
or of things that are known, when a man know|eth
many things at once, or (which &s;trikes on the
&s;ame &s;tring) when he conjoyneth and joyntly ap|plyeth
the knowledges of &s;everal things, that are in
them&s;elves di&s;tinct. From whence proceedeth this
&s;econd rea&s;on of the word, which plea&s;ed much St.
<HI>Thomas</HI> of <HI>Aquine,</HI> and a great part of the School|men;
and which &s;eeming to be de&s;ervedly prefer|red
above the other already mentioned, doth bear
no unprofitable light to illu&s;trate the Nature and
the force of Con&s;cience, which is, that <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is
&s;o called, becau&s;e it addeth <HI>Science</HI> unto <HI>Science,</HI>
that is, the univer&s;al knowledge, or the knowledge
of Law, and Right, to the particular knowledge,
or the knowledge of the fact by applying one unto
the other; I &s;hall make this more manife&s;t to you
<PB N="8" REF="16">
by one or by two examples, in the fir&s;t of <HI>Samuel</HI>
the 24 Chapter, and the 50 Ver&s;e, it is &s;aid that
<HI>Davids</HI> Heart did fail him, after that in the Cave he
had cut off the wing of <HI>Sauls</HI> Garment, that is to
&s;ay, his Con&s;cience did prick him; for we may i|magine
that <HI>David</HI> thus rea&s;oned within him&s;elf; I
know that I ought not to offer any violence to the
Sacred Per&s;on of the King, I know al&s;o that very
lately I have done that which commeth very near
unto violence; I am afraid therefore that I have
done that, which peradventure I ought not to have
done, and I give thanks unto God who held back my
hand from acting that which certainly I ought not
to have committed. In this manner al&s;o the Con|&s;cience
of <HI>Judas</HI> the Betrayer did object unto him:
Thou knowe&s;t that thou oughte&s;t not to betray thy
Ma&s;ter, and thou knowe&s;t that mo&s;t ba&s;ely thou
ha&s;t done it. The &s;ence and knowledge of a parti|cular
fact either committed, or to be committed,
comming in this manner to the univer&s;al knowledge
of Law and Right which is in the mind, and being
conjoyned, and applyed, and wholly reflecting on it,
there ari&s;eth from thence all <HI>that</HI> which we call <HI>Con|&s;cience.</HI>
The words which by way of Reciprocati|on
are expre&s;&s;ed, and are mo&s;t frequent in this
kind, do confirm this derivation of the name of
Con&s;cience,<NOTE PLACE="marg">I&s;ocrat. <HI>ad</HI> Dem.</NOTE> of which nature is that of <HI>I&s;ocrates,</HI>
<GAP DESC="foreign">; Although you lye
hid from others, yet you your &s;elf will be Con&s;ci|ous
to your &s;elf,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Horace 1.</NOTE> and that of <HI>Horace, Hic murus
abeneus e&s;to,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Epi&s;t. 1.</NOTE> <HI>Nil con&s;cire &s;ibi;</HI> This is as a Wall of
Bra&s;&s;e, to be con&s;cious of no offence; And that
of <HI>Virgil,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Virgil</NOTE> <HI>Mens &s;ibi con&s;cia recti;</HI> A Mind which is
con&s;cious to it &s;elf of its own uprightne&s;&s;e;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Anaead. 1.</NOTE> And
<PB N="9" REF="16">
to conclude all, of the &s;ame &s;ence, is that of St <HI>Paul,
1 Cor.</HI> 4. 4. <GAP DESC="foreign">, I am con&s;cious to
my &s;elf of nothing.</P>
<P>VII. I do believe that it is now manife&s;t to you
from whence the word <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is derived,
and it is left to your choyce to preferr the one ac|ceptation,
or the other, or to receive them both
with an equal approbation. The other Rea&s;ons
which the common Schoolmen, according to their
own capacities, do produce, are too weak to &s;top
the progre&s;&s;e of this di&s;cour&s;e, of which there are
many things that are yet remayning to be &s;poken.
I proceed therefore to open to you the <GAP DESC="foreign"> or
the cognomination of the word, from whence
there ari&s;eth among&s;t grave Authors &s;o wonderful a
difference in the definition, that as yet the con|trover&s;y
is high, and difficult concerning the very
fir&s;t Term of the definition to find out what is
the <HI>Genus</HI> of it. To remove therefore all Ambi|guity,
it is in the fir&s;t place ob&s;ervable, that there
is &s;uch an affinity, by nature, of the Indowments
of the mind, <HI>viz.</HI> of <HI>Potentia's, Habits,</HI> and
<HI>Acts,</HI> and &s;o near a conjunction, &s;o clo&s;e a con|nexion,
according to the u&s;e and exerci&s;e of them,
that not only the appellations of words, but the
offices, and real proprieties of every one of them,
are promi&s;cuou&s;ly, and without any di&s;tinction at|tributed
to one another, and that not only in the
Rhetorical expre&s;&s;ions of the Poets and Orators,
and others the Profe&s;&s;ors of Humane Literature,
to whom a Liberty was permitted; but even in the
Dogmatical po&s;itions of the Philo&s;ophers and
Schoolmen them&s;elves, who were denyed that hap|py
elegancy. Neverthele&s;&s;e, although it was
<PB N="10" REF="17">
alwayes accounted a great task, in their own certain
bounds, to define and di&s;tingui&s;h of things &s;o united
by U&s;e and Nature; yet as to the word <HI>Con&s;cience</HI>
which is a kind of Science, and &s;o named from it,
it will be no little advantage to us, in this place a
little more preci&s;ely to explain the <GAP DESC="foreign"> or cog|nomination
of this word <HI>Science,</HI> that &s;o, by the
manifold u&s;e of the &s;ingle word, the ambiguity of
the compounded may more rightly, and more
throughly be under&s;tood.</P>
<P>VIII. In the fir&s;t place therefore (as the Names
of <HI>Habits</HI> do familiarly pa&s;&s;e into their <HI>Objects)
Science</HI> is taken in a double con&s;ideration, <HI>formally</HI>
and <HI>objectively.</HI> And as the Divines do di&s;tin|gui&s;h
of <HI>Faith,</HI> that, <HI>Faith</HI> by which we do believe,
which is a <HI>Habit</HI> of <HI>Faith</HI> exi&s;ting in the mind, is
one thing; and that the <HI>Faith</HI> which we do believe,
which is no more than a thing believed by <HI>Faith,</HI>
and but the <HI>object</HI> of the former, and <HI>extrin&s;ical</HI> to
it, is another thing; the fir&s;t whereof may be cal|led
<HI>Faith formally,</HI> and the or the but <HI>objectively:</HI> &s;o
in the &s;ame manner we may di&s;tingui&s;h of <HI>Science,</HI>
and con&s;equently of <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> that they are taken
either properly, and formally, for the very <HI>Habit</HI>
of the Mind by which we know &s;omething our
&s;elves, or acknowledge it with others; or impro|perly,
and objectively for that thing it &s;elf which
we know, and know that others do know it with
us. In which latter and improper &s;ence, the Law
which is written in our Hearts, and is as it were a
rule of well living may be called <HI>Con&s;cience;</HI> And in
this &s;ence is that to be under&s;tood, which is &s;o of|ten
repeated in the Schools of <HI>Dama&s;cene,</HI> that <HI>Con|&s;cience
is the Law of the Mind,</HI> when indeed <HI>Con|&s;cience</HI>
<PB N="11" REF="17">
is not properly and formally the Law of the
mind, but rather an object of the Con&s;cience either
adaequate or in part.</P>
<P>IX. Secondly, Seeing the&s;e three things <HI>Potentia<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">'s,
Habits,</HI> and <HI>Acts,</HI> are pertaining to the Soul, and al|though
di&s;tinct in them&s;elves, they are yet ordinated to
one another, <HI>Potentia's,</HI> as the natural vertues of
the &s;oul it &s;elf, <HI>Habits,</HI> as formes perfecting tho&s;e
<HI>Potentia's,</HI> &amp; enabling them for the more ready, &amp;
the more plea&s;ant exerci&s;ing of their <HI>Acts,</HI> and <HI>Acts</HI>
which are the exerci&s;ings as much as the <HI>Poten|tia's,</HI>
as the <HI>Habits,</HI> as the names of <HI>Science,</HI> and of
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> doe in &s;ome mea&s;ure extend it &s;elf to
all the&s;e. For as the Carpenter is &s;aid to cut, or
hew, fir&s;t with his Axe as his In&s;trument, &s;econdly,
with the edge of the Axe, as the formal di&s;po&s;ition
of the in&s;trument, and thirdly, with the cutting or
hewing it &s;elf, as the u&s;e and action of the In&s;tru|ment:
in the &s;ame manner the mind of man may be
&s;aid to know; Fir&s;t, with the <HI>Potentia</HI> of know|ing,
as the In&s;trument, Secondly, with the <HI>Habit</HI> of
knowing, as a di&s;po&s;ition that brings that <HI>Potentia</HI> to
perfection; and thirdly, with an <HI>actual con&s;ideration</HI> as
with the u&s;e, &amp; operation of the <HI>Potentia</HI> &amp; the <HI>Ha|bit.</HI>
Science hereupon is taken in threefold re&s;pect
<HI>Subjectively, formally</HI> &amp; <HI>effectively.</HI> Fir&s;t <HI>Subjectively,</HI><MILESTONE N="1">
for the <HI>Pote<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">tia</HI> in whom it is and which it is apt to
bring to perfection, as every <HI>form</HI> in &s;ome mea&s;ure
doth perfect its <HI>Subject;</HI> For example, when we
&s;ay, that the my&s;teries of Faith do exceed our un|der&s;tanding,
the meaning is, that they exceed
the mea&s;ure of our <HI>cognitive power.</HI> Secondly, <HI>For|mally,</HI><MILESTONE N="2">
(the mo&s;t u&s;ual &s;ignification of this word)
for the <HI>Habit</HI> of knowledge, either <HI>innate,</HI> or <HI>acqui|&s;ite;</HI>
<PB N="12" REF="18">
in the &s;ame &s;ence we are &s;aid to know <HI>principles</HI>
known by them&s;elves, and <HI>conclu&s;ions</HI> by a legiti|mate
di&s;cour&s;e of rea&s;on deduced from them, and
univer&s;ally all things of which by the a&s;&s;i&s;tance of
&s;ence, and rea&s;on, we have any certainty. Thirdly,
Effectively, for the actual con&s;ideration of things
before known; In which &s;ence (to touch upon
it by the way) the words of St. <HI>Paul</HI> the Apo&s;tle, in
the 23 of the <HI>Acts,</HI> and the 5 ver&s;e (in the expound|ing
whereof, Interpreters have wonderfully perplex|ed
them&s;elves) are ab&s;olutely to be under&s;tood.
<HI>Brethren</HI> (&s;aith he) <HI>I knew not that it was the
high Prie&s;t,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> that is, <HI>I did not think, I did not
diligently enough con&s;ider of it.</HI> As if he &s;hould have
&s;aid; Brethren, pardon my ju&s;t indignation, if tran&s;|ported
by the heat of a troubled Spirit I have &s;po|ken
&s;omething more liberally than what became me,
being at that in&s;tant forgetfull of his place, and per|&s;on,
and of my duty, I ought not to revile the High
Prie&s;t, although he hath done &s;omething unworthy of
the honour of it; but the exilience of my pa&s;&s;ion did
prepo&s;&s;e&s;&s;e me from giving that re&s;pect unto him,
which by a more attentive deliberation I &s;hould have
done. This is the &s;ence of the Apo&s;tle in that
place, and it is as ea&s;ie, as it is proper and per|tinent.</P>
<P>X. But I proceed, as <HI>Science,</HI> &s;o <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> al|&s;o
is taken in three &s;everal wayes or acceptations
<MILESTONE N="1"> Fir&s;t <HI>Subjectively,</HI> for the intellective, practical
<MILESTONE N="2"> power, as when we &s;ay that the Law of Nature is
written in the heart or the <HI>Con&s;cience.</HI> Secondly;
<HI>Formally</HI> for the <HI>Habit</HI> pertaining to that <HI>Potentia<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">,</HI>
and informing it; In the &s;ame &s;ence, making menti|on
of a per&s;on notoriou&s;ly wicked, we &s;ay he is a
<PB N="13" REF="18">
man of no con&s;cience, &amp; that he hath either thrown
off or lo&s;t all con&s;cience, Thirdly <HI>Effectively,</HI> for any <MILESTONE N="3">
actual motion, exerci&s;e, or operation of that <HI>Ha|bit;</HI>
as when a man &s;aith that he is con&s;cious of this,
or that fact; In which &s;en&s;e is that of St. <HI>Peter,</HI>
the fir&s;t Book, &s;econd Chapter, and 19 ver&s;e. <HI>If a|ny
man for his con&s;cience to God doth &s;uffer troubles.</HI></P>
<P>XI. Again, &s;eeing that <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is properly
<GAP DESC="foreign"> or a knowledge Syllogi&s;ticall, in&s;o|much
that all who do treat of the nature and the
method of it do conceive that it cannot more open|ly
or more aptly be illu&s;trated than by a practical
Syllogi&s;m; It is to be ob&s;erved that the word <HI>Sci|ence</HI>
in the very &s;ame re&s;pect doth fall under a four|fold
con&s;ideration. Fir&s;t, and mo&s;t properly,<MILESTONE N="1">
for the preci&s;e knowledge of the <HI>conclu&s;ion,</HI>
and thus it is taken by <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in his <HI>Ana|lyticks</HI>
and many other places, Secondly, for the <MILESTONE N="2">
knowledge of <HI>Principles</HI> from which conclu&s;ions are
demon&s;trated, as if a man &s;hould &s;ay he knoweth
that <HI>Omne totum e&s;t majus qualibet &s;ui parte, Every
thing that is whole is more and greater than any part
thereof.</HI> Thirdly for the knowledge of the whole &s;yl|logi&s;m,<MILESTONE N="3">
for he who knoweth the premi&s;es, and the
Conclu&s;ion, doth know the whole argumentation.
Fourthly, for the aggregated knowledge of many <MILESTONE N="4">
conclu&s;ions or demon&s;trations pertaining to one
Subject; in the &s;ame &s;ence we are &s;aid to know na|tural
Philo&s;ophy, Geometry, Phy&s;ick &amp;c. The very
&s;ame is to be affirmed of con&s;cience who&s;e full di&s;|cour&s;e
many Authors do comprehend in one practi|cal
Syllogi&s;m. But <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> (as is already menti|oned)
being a conjoyned Science, that all which
comes under this name may more fully, and as it
<PB N="14" REF="19">
were at one &s;ight be di&s;cerned: the whole bu&s;ine&s;&s;e
(as I conceive) will more commodiou&s;ly be di&s;|patched,
if we &s;hall frame the whole di&s;cour&s;e of
Con&s;cience &s;o to con&s;i&s;t of two Syllogi&s;ms, that the
conclu&s;ion of the fir&s;t Syllogi&s;me be the Major pro|po&s;ition
of the following.</P>
<LIST>
<ITEM>Every thing that is unju&s;t is to be e&s;chewed,</ITEM>
<ITEM>Every Theft is unju&s;t, <HI>therefore</HI></ITEM>
<ITEM>Every Theft is to be e&s;chewed.</ITEM>
</LIST>
<P>Let this be the fir&s;t Syllogi&s;m, the fir&s;t propo&s;i|tion
whereof is known of it &s;elf by the light of Na|ture:
<HI>Rea&s;on</HI> doth prove the <HI>Minor,</HI> and the Con|&s;cience
doth bring in the conclu&s;ion; which con|clu&s;ion
it pre&s;ently takes up to be the beginning of
the following Syllogi&s;m&punc; and applying it to &s;ome
particular Fact, accordingly as the Will &s;hall pro|pound
unto it, it argues in this manner.</P>
<LIST>
<ITEM>All Theft is to be e&s;chewed.</ITEM>
<ITEM>This which is now propounded to me to be done is</ITEM>
<ITEM>a Theft, <HI>therefore</HI> it is to be e&s;chewed.</ITEM>
</LIST>
<P>And the Name of the Vice being changed, it
proceedeth in this manner, as often as it judgeth of
any pa&s;t particular Fact.</P>
<P>XII. The&s;e things being thus &s;tated, I &s;ay that
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> as well as <HI>Science</HI> is taken four wayes;
<MILESTONE N="1"> Fir&s;t, and mo&s;t properly for the la&s;t conclu&s;ion in
the cour&s;e of both Syllogi&s;ms, as that, in which the
la&s;t Judgem<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">nt of the <HI>practical under&s;tanding</HI> is
contained. As if a Man &s;hould &s;ay, my Con&s;ci|ence
doth &s;ugge&s;t unto me that this Theft is not to
<PB N="15" REF="19">
be committed, or my Con&s;cience cryeth out unto
me, that it ought not to be committed; And the
knowledge of this conclu&s;ion is properly <GAP DESC="foreign"> or
Con&s;cience, as it is di&s;tinct from <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>or a
guiltle&s;&s;e con&s;ervation of ones &s;elf.</HI> Secondly it is ta|ken <MILESTONE N="2">
for the knowledge of that fir&s;t univer&s;al princi|ple
known by the light of Nature, or Revelation on
which the whole thred of this di&s;cour&s;e depends;
As if a Man &s;hould &s;ay, my Con&s;cience dictates to
me that no unju&s;t thing is to be done. The word
<HI>Syntere&s;is</HI> which is a guiltle&s;&s;e conver&s;ation of ones &s;elf,
is often u&s;ed for <HI>Syneide&s;is</HI> or Con&s;cience, but im|properly,
as in this and &s;uch like expre&s;&s;ions; The
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is nothing el&s;e but a <HI>Syntere&s;is,</HI> or a
guiltle&s;&s;e con&s;ervation of the mind from falling
into any Vice, when indeed between <HI>Syntere&s;is,</HI> and
Con&s;cience properly &s;o called, there is no little dif|ference;
for there is as great a diver&s;ity betwixt this
<HI>Syntere&s;is,</HI> and <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> properly &s;o called, as be|twixt
<HI>Science,</HI> and the <HI>Habit</HI> of the <HI>Intellect,</HI> which are
two habits of the mind &s;pecifically di&s;tinct as here|tofore
we have read in the fifth of <HI>Ari&s;totles</HI> Ethicks.
As therefore in Speculatives, <HI>Intelligence</HI> is a habit
of the fir&s;t principles, about <HI>Truth</HI> and <HI>Fal&s;hood,</HI> from
whence conclu&s;ions are deduced, out of which pro|ceedeth
<HI>Science;</HI> So in practicks, <HI>Syntere&s;is</HI> is the ha|bit
of the fir&s;t principles, about <HI>Good</HI> and <HI>Evill,</HI> from
whence conclu&s;ions are deduced, out of which pro|ceedeth
Con&s;cience. Thirdly <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is taken <MILESTONE N="3">
more largely for that whole practical di&s;cour&s;e of the
mind, from the fir&s;t beginning to the la&s;t conclu&s;ion
which is contained in two &s;uch &s;yllogi&s;ms, as a little
above I have propounded to you, and in its circuit
comprehendeth <HI>Syntere&s;is,</HI> and <HI>Syneide&s;is</HI> al&s;o pro|perly
<PB N="16" REF="20">
&s;o called. For a mans Con&s;cience doth ea&s;ily
&s;ugge&s;t unto him all the&s;e things viz. that no unju&s;t
thing ought to be done, and that Theft is de&s;ervedly
ranked among&s;t tho&s;e Crimes which do carry on
them the face of inju&s;tice, and that this particular
act which is by me now committed, or which op|portunity
doth tempt me to commit, is the guilt of
<MILESTONE N="4"> Theft. Fourthly Con&s;cience is taken for the aggrega|ted
knowledge of many particular acts of which the
whole account of our life and conver&s;ation doth
con&s;i&s;t; In which &s;en&s;e tho&s;e words of the Apo&s;tle
do &s;eem to be under&s;tood; Men and Brethren in all
good Con&s;cience <GAP DESC="foreign"> I have conver&s;ed
with God unto this day, <HI>Acts</HI> 23. 1. To the &s;ame
&s;ence is that of the Author of the Hebrews, <HI>Cap. 13.
ver.</HI> 18. we do a&s;&s;ure our &s;elves we have a good
Con&s;cience de&s;iring to conver&s;e hone&s;tly with all
men; and that of St. <HI>Peter</HI> in the fir&s;t Book, third
Chapter, and fifteenth ver&s;e, where (as a godly and
learned man hath ob&s;erved) that which in the be|ginning
of the ver&s;e is called a good Con&s;cience,
the very &s;ame thing in the end of the &s;ame ver&s;e is
called <GAP DESC="foreign">, a good conver&s;ation, for as
often as we do prai&s;e and di&s;prai&s;e any one, to be a
man of a good or a bad Con&s;cience, it is by reflect|ing
altogether on his manners, and dayly conver&s;a|tion,
without re&s;pect to any particular fact he hath
committed.</P>
<P>XIII. I have expounded the&s;e things more large|ly
I confe&s;&s;e, then at the fir&s;t I determined, or per|adventure
then you expected; but I pre&s;ume you
will be more favourable to me, if it &s;hall appear
that this prolixity in explaining the <HI>thing defined,</HI>
will be the means to make the re&s;t of the treati&s;e
<PB N="17" REF="20">
more compendious, I &s;hall now proceed in the ex|plication
of the Definition of Con&s;cience it &s;elf,
and give you an account of every part, and member
thereof; I &s;hall only praeadverti&s;e this, (which in|deed
is clear of it &s;elf) that the Definition which
before I gave you of Con&s;cience, doth adaequately
pertain to <HI>Con&s;cience properly &s;o called,</HI> As it is taken
for the knowledge of the la&s;t <HI>Conclu&s;ion,</HI> of a <HI>practi|call
Syllogi&s;m,</HI> neverthele&s;&s;e with the due permutati|on
of &s;ome words it may &s;erve to explain the other
&s;ignifications as u&s;ually it is done in almo&s;t all other
words which <HI>Analogically are aequivocall. The De|finition
of Con&s;cience,</HI> which I &s;hall repeat again, be|cau&s;e
of many other things &s;ince intervening, is this,
<HI>Con&s;cience is a faculty or a Habit of the practical under|&s;tanding
by which the mind of man by the di&s;cour&s;e of
rea&s;on doth apply the light with which it is indued to
its particular moral acts.</HI> In this <HI>Syllogi&s;m</HI> the&s;e
four things are contained, which by them&s;elves are
&s;everally, and &s;ingly to be expounded, <HI>viz. The Ge|nus,
the Subject, the Object, and the Act.</HI></P>
<P>XIIII. There is a great and fierce controver&s;y a|mong&s;t
the School-men concerning the <HI>Genus</HI> of
<HI>Con&s;cience;</HI> But in the fir&s;t place they do all agree
that Con&s;cience pertaineth to the mind of man, but
whether to the <HI>Potentia,</HI> or the <HI>Habit,</HI> or the <HI>Act,</HI>
thereof, is a wonderfull di&s;&s;ention. <HI>Aquinas</HI> who in
the Schooles hath a great trayn to follow him,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ae&s;timare con&s;c<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">enti|am m<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="3 letters">is &s;uae <HI>Cic. pro Clu|ent.</HI></NOTE> doth
&s;tate it to be an <HI>Act;</HI> who&s;e opinion many have en|tertained,
and not only the School-men, who are
&s;wayed (as I believe,) more by the authority
of &s;o great a man, then convinced by his rea&s;ons, but
the <HI>Divines</HI> al&s;o of the <HI>reformed Churches,</HI><NOTE N="b" PLACE="marg">Aqui. 1. qu. 97. 13.</NOTE> out of a
fa&s;tidiou&s;ne&s;s to that contentious generation, had
<PB N="18" REF="21">
rather in the&s;e things follow the mo&s;t received opi|nions
(if cleer from all tincture of prophane&s;&s;e,
and &s;uper&s;tition) then to make too curious a &s;earch
into their thorny &s;ubtilities. But if I may freely
expre&s;s my &s;elf, this mo&s;t common opinion is al|together
to be di&s;proved, and to overthrow it there
needs no other argument then this. In Con&s;cience
there are very many <HI>Acts;</HI> It <HI>dictates,</HI> it <HI>forceth,</HI> it
<HI>holdeth,</HI> it <HI>te&s;tifies,</HI> it <HI>excu&s;eth,</HI> it <HI>accu&s;eth,</HI> it <HI>comforts,</HI>
it <HI>gnaweth,</HI> it <HI>tormenteth, &amp;c.</HI> But of <HI>Acts</HI> there are
no <HI>Acts,</HI> but of <HI>Forms, Potentia's</HI> and <HI>Habits;</HI> there|fore
Con&s;cience of nece&s;&s;ity mu&s;t be, a <HI>Forme,</HI> or a
<HI>Potentia,</HI> or a <HI>Habit,</HI> but no <HI>Act.</HI> To the argument
of <HI>Thomas Aquinas</HI> and tho&s;e that follow him <HI>viz.</HI>
That <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is <HI>an application of the knowledge</HI> or
<HI>light</HI> which is in the <HI>Syntere&s;is,</HI> or the un&s;tained con|&s;ervation
of the mind, and that every <HI>application</HI> is
an <HI>Act;</HI> I an&s;wer that the word <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> (as may
appear by what is already &s;poken) is taken &s;ome|times
<HI>Effectively</HI> for &s;ome certain Act of it, in the
&s;ame manner as the word of <HI>Science</HI> is taken for an
<HI>actual con&s;ideration,</HI> but improperly. For to &s;peak
properly, the <HI>Application</HI> of <HI>Science</HI> or <HI>Knowledge,</HI>
is not <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> it &s;elf, but an <HI>Act</HI> of it; as <HI>con&s;ider|ation</HI>
is not <HI>Science or Knowledge,</HI> but an <HI>Act</HI> of it,
therefore <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is not an <HI>Act.</HI></P>
<P>XV. It mu&s;t be therefore a <HI>Power,</HI> or a <HI>Habit;</HI>
for that it is not a <HI>Form,</HI> (to wit the Soul it &s;elf,
but &s;omething of it) is confe&s;&s;ed by all men: there
are many of the <HI>Moderns</HI> who do deny it to be a
<HI>Habit,</HI> and labour to prove it to be a <HI>Potentia,</HI> and
<MILESTONE N="1"> thus they di&s;pute it. Fir&s;t, becau&s;e it is a kind of
<HI>Memory,</HI> for the <HI>Intellect</HI> reflecting on things <HI>Agible,</HI>
that is, on things done, or to be done, hath a relati|on
<PB N="19" REF="21">
to the <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> as the <HI>Intellect</HI> reflecting on
things <HI>&s;peculable,</HI> hath its relation to the <HI>Memory.</HI>
And it is &s;ufficiently known that the <HI>Memory</HI> is a
<HI>Potentia,</HI> or <HI>Power,</HI> and not a <HI>Habit.</HI> Secondly, be|cau&s;e <MILESTONE N="2">
the <HI>Potentia</HI> is that by which the faculty <HI>Act|ing</HI>
is primitively enabled to Act; Now, by <HI>Con&s;ci|ence</HI>
a man is able to dictate to him&s;elf what is to
be done, and either to approve or to di&s;prove what
hath been performed by it, and that in the fir&s;t place;
becau&s;e, let him admit but of the Con&s;cience, he can
do all the&s;e, take away the Con&s;cience, and he can|not
do them. Thirdly, becau&s;e it is <HI>contradistinct</HI><MILESTONE N="3">
to another <HI>Potentia</HI> as <HI>Tit.</HI> 1. 15. where <GAP DESC="foreign"> and
<GAP DESC="foreign"> the <HI>Mind</HI> and the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> are openly
de&s;cribed as oppo&s;ite <HI>Species;</HI> It is therefore ne|ce&s;&s;ary,
according to the rules of contrary <HI>Species,</HI>
that they both mu&s;t have one, and the &s;ame <HI>Genus,</HI>
now the mind is a <HI>Potentia;</HI> and therefore &s;o mu&s;t
the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> be al&s;o. Moreover it is abundantly <MILESTONE N="4">
proved that the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is not a <HI>Habit,</HI> both be|cau&s;e
it &s;eemeth to be as natural to a man, as the
<HI>Will</HI> and <HI>Affections;</HI> &amp; becau&s;e it is found in all; even
in Infants and Sucklings, by a certain in&s;tinct of
Nature&punc; at that Age when they do not &s;eem to
be capable of <HI>Habits.</HI></P>
<P>XVI. <HI>Scotils</HI> neverthele&s;s, &amp; <HI>Durand,</HI> &amp; &s;ome others
of the mo&s;t &s;ubtile School-men, are of another opi|nion,
<HI>viz.</HI> that <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is a <HI>Habit,</HI> &amp; to &s;peak the
truth, their judgment is grounded on no contemti|ble <MILESTONE N="1">
arguments; Fir&s;t, becau&s;e that <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is a
kind of <HI>Science,</HI> whereupon the very &s;ame Acts are
attributed to it, as to <HI>know,</HI> and not to <HI>know.</HI> And
thus in the 7 <HI>Eccle&s;i. 23. Scit con&s;cientia tua,</HI> thy
Con&s;cience knows; And in the 43 of <HI>Gen. 22.
<PB N="20" REF="22">
Ne&s;cimus quis repo&s;uerit pecuniam no&s;tram in faccis
no&s;tris,</HI> we know not who did put our mony into our
&s;acks, where the vulgar tran&s;lation reades it, <HI>Non
e&s;t in con&s;cientia no&s;tra,</HI> It is not in our Con&s;ciences.
<HI>Nil mihi con&s;cius &s;um</HI> (&s;aith St. <HI>Paul,</HI>) in the 1
<HI>Cor.</HI> 4. 4. I am con&s;cious to my &s;elf, that I am faul|ty
in nothing, but <HI>Science</HI> is a <HI>Habit</HI> and therefore
<MILESTONE N="2"><HI>Con&s;cience.</HI> Secondly, becau&s;e by the <HI>right in&s;tituti|on,</HI>
and the <HI>new information</HI> and <HI>illumination</HI> of the
<HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> a man is enabled to do that, to which he
was before unable, but by the acce&s;&s;e of the &s;ame
<HI>illumination,</HI> there is no new <HI>Potentia</HI> ingendred in
<MILESTONE N="3"> the Soul, but rather a new <HI>Habit.</HI> Thirdly, becau&s;e
from meer <HI>Potentia's,</HI> no man is morally denomi|nated
either <HI>good,</HI> or <HI>evil,</HI> but from the <HI>Habits,</HI>
neither is he prais'd or di&s;prais'd for <HI>Potentia's,</HI> but
for the <HI>Habits;</HI> but men are &s;aid to be <HI>good,</HI> or <HI>evil,</HI>
and are either prais'd, or di&s;prais'd for the quality
of their <HI>Con&s;ciences,</HI> therefore Con&s;cience is a <HI>Ha|bit.</HI>
<MILESTONE N="4"> Fourthly, becau&s;e it is not proper unto <HI>Poten|tia's,</HI>
but to <HI>Habits,</HI> to be <HI>obtained,</HI> to be <HI>a&s;&s;umed,</HI>
to be <HI>layd down,</HI> or to be <HI>lo&s;t;</HI> but men are &s;aid to
<HI>find,</HI> to <HI>lo&s;e,</HI> to <HI>take up,</HI> and to <HI>depo&s;e</HI> their <HI>Con&s;ciences.</HI>
The <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> therefore is not a <HI>Potentia,</HI> but a
<HI>Habit.</HI></P>
<P>XVII. I do therefore thus &s;tate it. The Con&s;ci|ence
<HI>properly,</HI> and <HI>formally</HI> and by a <HI>direct praedicati|on</HI>
is a <HI>Habit,</HI> yet notwith&s;tanding it may be a <HI>Poten|tia,</HI>
and that two ways, fir&s;t <HI>materially,</HI> becau&s;e it
is in the <HI>Potentia</HI> as in the Subject, <GAP DESC="foreign"> that is to
&s;ay <HI>in which;</HI> Secondly by <HI>approximation,</HI> for be|ing
placed as it were in the mid&s;t, betwixt <HI>Habitum
acqui&s;itum,</HI> and <HI>puram potentiam</HI> a <HI>Habit</HI> acquired,
and a <HI>pure potentia,</HI> it can a&s;&s;ume the name of either,
<PB N="21" REF="22">
as the <HI>Mediums</HI> do participate of either of the Ex|treams;
And hereupon it is that Con&s;cience is
found in little Children, who are not capable of <HI>ac|quired
Habits;</HI> Neither is it altogether nece&s;&s;ary
that <GAP DESC="foreign"> and <GAP DESC="foreign"> the <HI>mind,</HI> and the <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI>
in <HI>Tit.</HI> 1. be contradi&s;tinct as <HI>bare Potentia's,</HI> but it
&s;eems rather that both words are there taken by a
<HI>Synecdoche;</HI> the <HI>mind</HI> for <HI>the &s;peeulative Intellect
with all its pertinences,</HI> as the Schoolmen &s;peak it,
and the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> for the <HI>practicall Intellect</HI> with
<HI>all its pertinences,</HI> that is, with all the <HI>faculties, Habits,</HI>
and <HI>Acts,</HI> and what do re&s;pectively pertain to any
of them.</P>
<P>XVIII. In the <HI>Definition of Con&s;cience,</HI> I have
placed the word <HI>Faculty,</HI> which in &s;ome mea&s;ure
doth &s;eem to me to be common to the <HI>Potentia's</HI>
and <HI>Habits,</HI> and is very proper to &s;ignifie <HI>Habits in|nate.</HI>
Peradventure you will object, that every <HI>Ha|bit</HI>
is acquired by often actings, and therefore this
doth &s;o appertain to the e&s;&s;ence of a <HI>Habit</HI> that
<HI>Habits</HI> are e&s;pecially to be known from <HI>Potentia's</HI>
by it, as by a <HI>&s;pecifical difference,</HI> to wit, that the <HI>Po|tentia's</HI>
are accquired, and the <HI>Habits</HI> natural, there|fore
unle&s;s a man will maintain meer contradicti|ons,
he ought not to &s;ay that Con&s;cience is a <HI>Habit
innate.</HI> To this I an&s;wer, that it mu&s;t be indeed con|fe&s;&s;ed
that all <HI>Habits</HI> what&s;oever, both are, and
ought to be called <HI>accquired,</HI> nay even tho&s;e <HI>Habits</HI>
which &s;eem to be mo&s;t <HI>natural,</HI> and for this cau&s;e,
becau&s;e they want the a&s;&s;i&s;tance of the <HI>&s;ences,</HI> and
many praevious &s;en&s;ible actions that &s;o the <HI>Species</HI>
of things &s;en&s;ible (in re&s;pect whereof the Soul of
it &s;elf is like a clear table-Book) may be conveyed
into the Phanta&s;y, and become at la&s;t intelligible;
<PB N="22" REF="23">
Neverthele&s;&s;e &s;ome <HI>Habits</HI> may be called, and with
great rea&s;on too <HI>innate,</HI> for as much as the mind by
an <HI>inbred-light</HI> doth immediately give an a&s;&s;ent to
the thing propounded, without any fear of the <HI>oppo|&s;ite</HI>
to it, only the <HI>Apprehen&s;ion of the Terms</HI> being
&s;uppo&s;ed; neither to procure its a&s;&s;ent, doth it want
the helps of internal <HI>&s;tudy</HI> or external <HI>in&s;titution.</HI>
For example, <HI>The Intellective Habit</HI> of this Princi|ple,
<HI>Omne totum e&s;t majus qualibet &s;ui parte,</HI> Every
thing that is whole is greater then any part of it, is
a <HI>Habit innate</HI> &s;o far as by the force of the light of
Nature, and only out of the apprehen&s;ion of the
Terms, the truth thereof of its own accord doth en|ter
into the mind, without any &s;tudy or Teacher;
And yet neverthele&s;s this <HI>Habit</HI> is acquired, &s;o far
as it needeth the a&s;&s;i&s;tance of the &s;ences, that &s;o by
<HI>often actions</HI> in &s;en&s;ible things, one may arrive unto
the <HI>knowledge of the Terms,</HI> that is to &s;ay, what be|longeth
to the whole, and what unto the parts.</P>
<P>XIX. If it may be yet objected that the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI>
cannot be called an <HI>Innate Habit,</HI> for tho&s;e things
which are <HI>Innate,</HI> are not capable of errour, neither
can they be defective, and they are the &s;ame in all,
in whom&s;oever they are, but the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> can erre,
and be evil, neither is it the &s;ame in all men, I make
an&s;wer, that it doth indeed follow from this that
the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is not a <HI>Habit &s;imply innate</HI> (which
no rea&s;onable man will affirm, for it is repugnant to
Nature, but as partly (as before mentioned) it is
<HI>innate,</HI> &s;o al&s;o it is partly <HI>acquired.</HI> The Soul of
man doth bring with it as it were, &s;ome &s;eeds of
knowledge of <HI>good,</HI> and <HI>evil,</HI> which grow up and are
perfected by <HI>&s;tudy</HI> and <HI>in&s;titution;</HI> In the &s;ame man|ner,
<HI>natural agility</HI> is compleated by <HI>Exerci&s;e,</HI> and
<PB N="23" REF="23">
<HI>natural Logick,</HI> by <HI>Logick artificial;</HI> the Con&s;ci|ence
therefore in re&s;pect of tho&s;e morall <HI>Agibles,</HI>
which as the School-men &s;peak, are of the fir&s;t
<HI>Dictates</HI> of Nature, and are its <HI>primary objects,</HI> is a
natural or an <HI>innate Habit,</HI> and is alike in all men,
and is always <HI>right,</HI> without any <HI>errour</HI> or <HI>depravati|on;</HI>
but in re&s;pect of tho&s;e things which are after|wards
learned and come clo&s;e up unto tho&s;e fir&s;t
principles, <GAP DESC="foreign"> whether it be by an <HI>internal</HI>
and <HI>proper meditation,</HI> or an <HI>external in&s;titution,</HI> it is
a <HI>Habit</HI> acquired, and may be erronious, and
defective.</P>
<P>XX. But this is enough, if not too much, of the
<HI>Genus of Con&s;cience.</HI> I &s;hall more briefly di&s;patch
the re&s;t. The &s;econd member of the <HI>Definition</HI> is
the <HI>Subject</HI> which is twofold, <HI>viz. Subjectum</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> and
<HI>Subjectum</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> the <HI>Subject, in which,</HI> and the <HI>Subject
of which;</HI> The Subject <GAP DESC="foreign"> or of which, is man, or
rather a rea&s;onable creature,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Math. 8 29.</NOTE> if we will &s;peak more
exactly, for it is found in holy Writ, that the An|gels
them&s;elves are con&s;cious of their Rebellion,<NOTE PLACE="marg">James 11 12.</NOTE>
and of the puni&s;hments thereby due unto them,<NOTE PLACE="marg">1 Corinth. 6. 3.</NOTE> and
that they know they &s;hall be tormented, yet never|thele&s;&s;e
they tremble at the revealed word of God,
as al&s;o that they are to be judged at the comming
of the Lord, and to give an account of all things
they have done. But becau&s;e it belongeth not much
to this di&s;cour&s;e to know the nature of <HI>Angelick
minds,</HI> and it hath plea&s;ed the mo&s;t wi&s;e God to
make but little mention of it in the Scriptures&punc; I have
appropriated this <HI>Definition of the Con&s;cience</HI> unto
man only; For although in bruti&s;h creatures there
appeareth a &s;hadow of <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> as of rea&s;on, and
many things are performed by them which do bear
<PB N="24" REF="24">
a &s;how of <HI>Ju&s;tice,</HI> and <HI>Prudence,</HI> (as indeed what is
reported of Elephants, and of the policy of <HI>Bees,</HI> and
Dogs, and of &s;ome other living Creatures is much
to be admired) yet they are all but the works of
the <HI>Phanta&s;y,</HI> and not of <HI>Rea&s;on,</HI> and they proceed
from a <HI>natural In&s;tinct,</HI> and not from <HI>Con&s;cience.</HI>
Man therefore is the proper <HI>Subject</HI> as well of <HI>Rea|&s;on,</HI>
as of <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> and every man is &s;o, the very
Heathens, the Reprobates, and even Infants them|&s;elves,
being not excluded. As for the Heathens,
St. <HI>Paul Rom.</HI> 2. 15. expre&s;sly &s;peaketh, that they
do &s;how the works of the Law to be written in
their hearts, <HI>their Con&s;ciences bearing them witne&s;&s;e;</HI>
And the &s;ame Apo&s;tle&punc; <HI>Tit.</HI> 1 15. declareth, that
the filthie&s;t per&s;ons have a Con&s;cience although an
impure one, for the <HI>uprightne&s;&s;e and integrity</HI> of
Con&s;cience is lo&s;t by the <HI>Fall,</HI> and not by nature.
And being regenerate and new born, there as no new
Con&s;cience infu&s;ed, which before was wanting,
but the Con&s;cience foul before, and impure by &s;in,
being &s;prinkled with the blood of Chri&s;t, is purified
by Faith&punc; according to the eternal Coun&s;els of the
Almighty God; And even in young Children (that
the name of God may be magnified in &s;ucklings)
&s;ome Sparks do fly from the a&s;hes of the old fire,
and though but very weakly, there is &s;ome light of
rea&s;on to be &s;een, the force of Con&s;cience &s;o early
working in them, that if they have committed any
tre&s;pa&s;&s;e, they will mode&s;tly &s;trive to cover and
conceal it.</P>
<P>XXI. <HI>Subjectum</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> The <HI>Subject in which;</HI> now
the <HI>Potentia</HI> of the Soul, in which the Con&s;cience
hath its &s;eate, is the <HI>practical Intellect,</HI> I &s;ay, the
<HI>Intellect</HI> and not the <HI>Will,</HI> and the <HI>practical,</HI> not the
<PB N="25" REF="24">
<HI>Speculative Intellect.</HI> There is a great controver&s;ie
among&s;t the School-men; whether the Con&s;cience
doth pertain to the <HI>Intellect,</HI> or the <HI>Will,</HI> or unto
<HI>both.</HI> I will not thru&s;t my &s;elf into the&s;e contenti|ons,
you have had enough, if not too much already
of the nicetyes and difficulties of the School-men.
I &s;hall therefore in few words di&s;patch unto you
what I &s;hall find expedient for my pre&s;ent purpo&s;e.
<HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in his third Book <HI>de anima,</HI> doth number
up three di&s;tinct <HI>Potentia's</HI> of the part <HI>intellective,</HI>
two whereof are <HI>Cognitive,</HI> that is to &s;ay, the <HI>&s;pecu|lative
Intellect,</HI> and the <HI>practical,</HI> and the third <HI>appeti|tive,</HI>
which is the <HI>Will.</HI> Of the&s;e three, the <HI>Extreams</HI>
are the <HI>Intellect &s;peculative</HI> which looketh on <HI>Truth</HI>
as <HI>Truth,</HI> and preci&s;ely re&s;teth in it, without any or|der
or re&s;pect to <HI>practice;</HI> and the <HI>Will</HI> which is no|thing
at all <HI>&s;peculative,</HI> and <HI>preci&s;ely</HI> tendeth to o|peration,
Now among&s;t both the&s;e <HI>Potentia's</HI> the
<HI>practick Intellect</HI> is &s;eated in the middle, and accor|ding
to the Cu&s;tome of things intermedial, doth in
&s;ome part concord with either of the <HI>Extreams,</HI>
and in &s;ome part doth differ from them. The <HI>practi|cal
Intellect</HI> doth agree with the <HI>Speculative</HI> in this,
that it doth look on <HI>Truth,</HI> and with the <HI>Will</HI> in
this, that it inclineth to operation. As for the Con|&s;cience,
it is mo&s;t certain that it doth not pertain
to the <HI>&s;peculative Intellect,</HI> becau&s;e it altogether
doth direct its <HI>Science</HI> into <HI>practi&s;e,</HI> neither doth it
properly pertain unto the <HI>Will,</HI> for if it were &s;o, it
would be in it as a <HI>Potentia,</HI> and be the &s;ame as <HI>libe|rum
arbitrium</HI> or <HI>free-will,</HI> or as a <HI>Habit,</HI> and &s;o it
would become one of the moral Vertues, neither
of which was ever admitted, or a&s;&s;erted by any Di|vine,
or any Philo&s;opher. It therefore altogether
<PB N="26" REF="25">
belongeth to the <HI>cognitive, practical potentia,</HI> that
is, to the <HI>practical Intellect.</HI> And thus <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI>
although he had placed the moral virtues in the <HI>pow|er
appetitive,</HI> yet he placed the <HI>Habits</HI> of <HI>Arts</HI> and
<HI>Prudence</HI> (though ordinated to practice) in the
<HI>cognitive power,</HI> as may be &s;een in the fifth book
of his <HI>Ethicks.</HI> This opinion is confirmed by
<MILESTONE N="1"> the&s;e Arguments; Fir&s;t, that <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is a kind of
<HI>Science,</HI> and all <HI>Science</HI> is in the <HI>Under&s;tanding.</HI> Se|condly,
<MILESTONE N="2"> that it is capable of <HI>Error,</HI> and <HI>Error</HI> is a
<MILESTONE N="3"> Di&s;ea&s;e of the <HI>Understanding.</HI> Thirdly, according
to the common u&s;e of &s;peaking, he who under|der&s;tandeth
the Kings Secrets, whether he ap|proveth
them, or not approveth them, is proper|ly
&s;aid to be <HI>Con&s;cious of them;</HI> therefore the pro|per
Seat, and Subject of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> in the Soul of
Man is the <HI>practical, cognitive power,</HI> which is the
<HI>practical Intellect.</HI></P>
<P>XXII. We have &s;een the <HI>Genus,</HI> and the <HI>Subject,</HI> the
<HI>Object</HI> followeth, which is <HI>that</HI> about which the
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is ver&s;ed, and they are the <HI>particular</HI>
<MILESTONE N="1"><HI>and proper Moral Acts.</HI> In the fir&s;t place I &s;ay
<HI>Acts, that is,</HI> &s;omething done by a Man, as he is a
Man, or a rational Creature, whether it be for
the future or to be done, or whether it be pa&s;t and
already done, or pre&s;ent, and now in doing. The <HI>Con|&s;cience</HI>
is compacted of Eyes, it &s;eeth, and &s;earch|eth
into all things; It beholdeth things to come, if
you are about to commit any filthyne&s;&s;e, it doth
Councel you to forbear it, it beholdeth things pre|&s;ent,
and in the very act of &s;inning, it <HI>murmureth,
checketh, biteth, picketh,</HI> it <HI>ju&s;tles,</HI> and <HI>joggs</HI> you to
give off; It looketh back on things pa&s;t, and when
you have &s;inned, it <HI>reproveth,</HI> it <HI>&s;tingeth,</HI> and <HI>accu|&s;eth,</HI>
<PB N="27" REF="25">
it <HI>condemneth,</HI> and <HI>tormenteth</HI> you. On the o|ther
&s;ide, to good deeds it exhorts you, and
whil&s;t you are a doing of them, it doth <HI>incourage,</HI>
and <HI>excite,</HI> and <HI>provoke</HI> you, and having done them,
it crowns your head with <HI>Honour,</HI> and fills your
brea&s;t with <HI>Peace</HI> and <HI>Joy.</HI> In the Second place I
&s;ay <HI>particular Acts;</HI> not by limiting the <HI>Subject,</HI><MILESTONE N="2">
as if there were &s;ome <HI>Acts</HI> that were not <HI>particu|lar;</HI>
but oppo&s;itely to that <HI>Science</HI> which the <HI>Con|&s;cience</HI>
doth &s;uppo&s;e and apply, and although this
<HI>Science</HI> be univer&s;al, it is yet referred to <HI>particu|lar
Acts.</HI> In the third place I &s;ay <HI>particular, proper</HI><MILESTONE N="3">
<HI>Acts</HI> to exclude that &s;ignification of <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI>
which more largely accepted, is extended to the
<HI>Actions</HI> of other Men; as when a man may be &s;aid
to be <HI>Con&s;cious of the Kings &s;ecrets,</HI> to be <HI>con&s;cious of
Catilines con&s;piracy,</HI> and the like; Such <HI>Actions</HI>
do not belong to our intent in this place, who do
here treat of <HI>Con&s;cience properly &s;o called,</HI> which is
exerci&s;ed in <HI>Agibles,</HI> either performed, or to be
performed by it &s;elf. In the fourth place, I &s;ay <MILESTONE N="4">
<HI>Moral Acts,</HI> where it is to be ob&s;erved that &s;ome
things are brought about by <HI>nece&s;&s;ity,</HI> and &s;ome
things do fall out by contingency; By <HI>nece&s;&s;ity,</HI> as the
Ri&s;ing of the Sun, the Eclip&s;e of the Moon, <HI>&amp;c.</HI>
of which there is a <HI>Science,</HI> by rea&s;on of their cer|titude,
but they have not the lea&s;t relation either
to <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> or <HI>Free-Will.</HI> Tho&s;e things which
ca&s;ually come to pa&s;&s;e, are either <GAP DESC="foreign"> <HI>things
in our own power,</HI> or <HI>things not in our power;</HI> Things
not in our power, as the flying of Birds; a Tempe&s;t
&s;uddainly rai&s;ed, <HI>&amp;c.</HI> which come not within the
compa&s;&s;e of <HI>Science</HI> by rea&s;on of their uncertainty,
and being out of our power, they may be as well put
<PB N="28" REF="26">
out of our care, the <HI>Will</HI> having nothing to do to
choo&s;e, nor the Con&s;cience to determine of them.
Again, things that are in our power, are &s;ome of
them morally <HI>neutral,</HI> and <GAP DESC="foreign"> that is, which
neither of them&s;elves, nor on the account of any,
permanent circum&s;tance do contain any moral
<HI>good</HI> or <HI>evil;</HI> as to go into the market, to write a
letter &amp;c. And &s;uch things indeed may pertain to
the freedom of the <HI>Will,</HI> if at lea&s;t they be worthy
to be taken into con&s;ideration, becau&s;e they may
come under the compa&s;s of <HI>Choyce,</HI> but of them|&s;elves,
they do not pertain to the <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> I &s;ay,
of them&s;elves, for they may pertain unto it by <HI>ac|cident,</HI>
by rea&s;on of &s;ome Scandal, or any other
circum&s;tance of which the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> may take cog|nizance;
Other things there are, which are moral|ly
<HI>good</HI> or <HI>bad,</HI> as to &s;erve God, to honour our Pa|rents,
to re&s;tore the pledge, to oppre&s;&s;e the poor,
to plunder, to keep or to break our tru&s;ts, and all
other things which the Philo&s;ophers call <GAP DESC="foreign">
or <GAP DESC="foreign"> that is, worthy prai&s;e, or reproof, and
the Schoolmen <HI>meritorious</HI> or <HI>demeritorious.</HI> And
the&s;e things are properly the objects of <HI>Con|&s;cience.</HI></P>
<P>XXIII. The <HI>object</HI> therefore of the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> of
man is a <HI>moral operable</HI> that is either done, or to be
done, either omitted or that may be omitted; Ne|verthele&s;&s;e
it is to be adverti&s;ed, that in men as they
are Chri&s;tians, the <HI>object</HI> of the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is further
to be extended, and not only oblige them to the
performance of their duties, as they are men, but
to believe the my&s;teries of Faith revealed in the
word of God, as they are Chri&s;tians, for <HI>infidelity
doth cau&s;e the Con&s;cience to be impure, Tit</HI> 1 15.
<PB N="29" REF="26">
And the Con&s;cience doth &s;ting that man as much,
who di&s;pi&s;eth what he vowed in Bapti&s;m to believe,
as him who violates the commandment which he
promi&s;ed to keep; And it may not unfitly perad|venture
be &s;aid that even the <HI>Evangelical Faith it</HI><MILESTONE N="2">
<HI>&s;elf</HI> is to be accounted among&s;t the <HI>moral operables.</HI>
They are the expre&s;s words of our Saviour, <HI>This is
the work of God that you believe in his Son, Joh.</HI> 6.
29. And the like in the fir&s;t Book of the Apo&s;tle
St. <HI>John,</HI> the third Chapter, and twenty third ver&s;e.
<HI>This is his Commandment that we believe in the name
of his Son Je&s;us Chri&s;t, as he hath commanded us.</HI></P>
<P>XXIIII. The la&s;t member of the <HI>Definition</HI> re|maineth,
which is, <HI>The proper act of Con&s;cience,</HI> to
wit the <HI>application</HI> of the light which is in the mind
by the di&s;cour&s;e of <HI>rea&s;on</HI> to particular <HI>Acts;</HI> I &s;ay
in the fir&s;t place, that <HI>application</HI> is the proper, and
primary Act of the Con&s;cience. That <HI>Axiome</HI> in
the Schooles is in every mans mouth; <HI>That of,
one Habit there is but one Act,</HI> to wit, the <HI>primary</HI>
and the <HI>chief,</HI> and unto which all the other <HI>Acts</HI>
pertaining to it, may be reduced; It may &s;ufficient|ly
appear by what is already &s;poken, that there are
many <HI>Acts</HI> of the Con&s;cience in the <HI>Species</HI> of it,
but what is that mo&s;t common <HI>Act,</HI> which brings
all the other within its compa&s;&s;e, is mo&s;t of all to
be inquired after; for no other <HI>Act</HI> but that <HI>prima<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ry</HI>
one, which is <HI>adaequate</HI> unto <HI>Habit,</HI> and to which all
other <HI>Acts</HI> are reduced, ought to come into the <MILESTONE N="3">
<HI>Definition</HI> of <HI>Habit;</HI> And hereupon it is that many
when they ob&s;erved that mo&s;t of tho&s;e <HI>Acts</HI> exer|ci&s;ed
by the Con&s;cience may in &s;ome mea&s;ure be
referred to the <HI>Act of judging</HI> (for the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI>
doth judge of <HI>Acts</HI> pa&s;t, pre&s;ent, and to come, they
<PB N="30" REF="27">
concluded that this <HI>primary Act</HI> was the <HI>Act of
judging.</HI> But there are &s;ome <HI>Acts</HI> of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI>
which cannot but hardly and with re&s;traint be refer|red
to it; As that <HI>Act</HI> (for example) by which
the Con&s;cience gives te&s;timony of &s;ome thing com|mitted,
or omitted; For it is not for a Judge to be
a witne&s;&s;e, nor for a witne&s;&s;e to pa&s;s judgement on
a Tre&s;pa&s;&s;e; Moreover that <HI>Act of judging</HI> doth
nece&s;&s;arily pre&s;uppo&s;e the <HI>Act of applying,</HI> as going
before it, for it cannot be but that the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI>
mu&s;t fir&s;t apply the Fact, which it is about to judge,
to the light of the mind, before it can give true
judgment on it; And this <HI>Act of application</HI> is very
neer of kine to the derivation of the word, of
which I have before &s;poken, that Con&s;cience is
&s;o called becau&s;e it is an <HI>application of knowledge un|to
knowledge.</HI></P>
<P>XXV. In the &s;econd place, I &s;ay, that this <HI>appli|cation</HI>
is an <HI>application</HI> of the light which is in the
mind, that is of the light pre&s;ent to the mind at that
time when the <HI>Application</HI> is made, whether it be
that light of Nature, <HI>viz.</HI> common notions written
in the Hearts of men by the dictates of nature, and
kept in the <HI>Syntere&s;is</HI> or guiltle&s;&s;e con&s;ervation
of the mind, as a trea&s;ure &s;natcht from the Com|mon
fire, and the reliques of the Image of God after
the Fall, or whether it be a light of <HI>Divine revela|tion</HI>
either extraordinary by <HI>Vi&s;ions, Dreams,</HI> and
<HI>Prophe&s;ies,</HI> or ordinary, being laid open to mankind
in the bookes of the old and new Te&s;tament. Or la&s;t|ly,
whether it be the <HI>light of rea&s;on,</HI> to wit, what&s;o|ever
from the principles of both kinds, from the <HI>law
of nature</HI> and the <HI>Divine revelation,</HI> is &s;o immediate|ly
and evidently deduced, that no man who doth
grant the one can doubt of the other.</P>
<P><PB N="31" REF="27">
XXVI. In the third place I do &s;ay that this light
is applyed by the di&s;cour&s;e of rea&s;on, for this light
that is to be applyed being <HI>quid univer&s;ale,</HI> &s;ome|thing
univer&s;al, and that which it is applyed to, be|ing
<HI>particular,</HI> or <HI>&s;ingular Acts,</HI> &s;uch an application
cannot be made but by the <HI>mediation</HI> of this <HI>di&s;|cour&s;e
of rea&s;on</HI> which is able to unite <HI>Univer&s;als</HI> un|to
<HI>Singulars;</HI> And this is the work of <HI>Rea&s;on,</HI> by
&s;uch a <HI>Syllogi&s;m,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ari&s;t. 1. Po&s;ter 17.</NOTE> or &s;uch <HI>practical Syllogi&s;ms,</HI> as al|ready
I have exhibited unto you. Moreover it of|ten
comes to pa&s;s, (as it is commonly &s;poken, and
experience doth prove it to be true) that we erre
by <HI>going downwards,</HI> and &s;o it is, that although we do
not ea&s;ily fall into an errour concerning the <HI>Prima</HI>
&amp; <HI>Univer&s;alia principia</HI> the univer&s;al principles which
do carry with them a greater evidence; yet in the
<HI>application</HI> of tho&s;e <HI>principles,</HI> and in deducing <HI>con|clu&s;ions</HI>
from them, errours mo&s;t often are commit|ted,
wherefore we mu&s;t u&s;e the greater care,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">; Ari&s;tot. 2. Metaph. 1.</NOTE> and dili|gence,
that we do not deceive our &s;elves, but that in
this <HI>di&s;cour&s;e of rea&s;on</HI> all things be exactly con&s;ide|red,
that &s;o we may ju&s;tly proceed, and as legitimate|ly
and duely conclude.</P>
<P>XXVII. Fourthly, I &s;ay that this <HI>application</HI>
ought to be made to <HI>particular Acts,</HI> which four
ways may be done, for the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> doth apply the
light of the mind, with which it is endued, either
to things already done, or to things to be done. To
things already done in a twofold con&s;ideration, fir&s;t
by bearing te&s;timony that this is done, or that it is
not done by us, in this manner are tho&s;e formes of
the <HI>Rhetoricians</HI> in the que&s;tion of the <HI>Fact, Cre&s;tes
ha&s;t thou killed thy mother?</HI> the Con&s;cience maketh
an&s;wer, <HI>I have killed her;</HI> Secondly by <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">
<PB N="32" REF="28">
judgment whether the fact committed or omit|ted,
be well or ill done, or whether well or
ill omitted; as in the que&s;tion of <HI>right</HI> or
<HI>Law</HI> (among the <HI>Rhetorici<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ns</HI>) where the Fact
is evident, as Did&s;t thou kill <HI>Clodius, Milo?</HI>
the reply is, <HI>I kill'd him.</HI> Do&s;t thou therefore con|fe&s;&s;e
thy &s;elf guilty? <HI>I have killed him lawfully</HI>
Here in the fir&s;t <HI>application</HI> the Con&s;cience proceeds
by the way of a <HI>witne&s;&s;e;</HI> in the &s;econd by the way
of a <HI>Judge;</HI> for the <HI>offices,</HI> and <HI>Acts of Con&s;cience</HI>
in the fir&s;t proceeding are to bear <HI>witne&s;&s;e,</HI> in the &s;e|cond
to <HI>reprove,</HI> to <HI>accu&s;e,</HI> to <HI>excu&s;e,</HI> to <HI>condemn,</HI> to
<HI>ab&s;olve;</HI> From hence there doe ari&s;e diver&s;e <HI>ef|fects</HI>
in the Soul from the <HI>Con&s;cience reproving, ac|cu&s;ing,</HI>
and <HI>condemning;</HI> a great &s;adne&s;&s;e and trou|ble
of mind, remor&s;es, terrours, and torments;
and on the other &s;ide, from the excu&s;ing, defending,
and ab&s;olving Con&s;cience, there proceeds an extra|ordinary
peace, and tranquility, an un&s;peakable joy,
and &s;olace, an erected hope, an un&s;tartling confi|dence,
and a mo&s;t &s;tedfa&s;t and un&s;haken con&s;tancy
of mind. The third <HI>application</HI> of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> doth
look on things, <HI>future</HI> that are to be done, in which
the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> doth proceed as a <HI>Law-giver, School|ma&s;ter,</HI>
and <HI>Admoni&s;her</HI> or a <HI>Coun&s;ellour:</HI> And in
this manner of proceeding, the <HI>offices</HI> and <HI>Acts</HI> of
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> are to <HI>dictate,</HI> to <HI>oblige,</HI> to <HI>incite,</HI> to <HI>retract:</HI>
the&s;e are the principle Acts of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> to who&s;e
voice incouraging to righteou&s;ne&s;s who&s;oever &s;hall
give ear, he &s;hall not fear her as a witne&s;&s;e, or as a
Judge.</P>
<P>XXVIII. I have now fini&s;hed what I conceived
nece&s;&s;ary to be &s;poken concerning the nature of
<HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> in which I have been longer (I fear)
<PB N="33" REF="28">
but certainly more ob&s;cure then either I would or
ought to be (if the Subject could otherwi&s;e have
born it,) or then I hope I &s;hall be in the following
Lectures concerning the u&s;e of <HI>Con&s;cience;</HI> But
truly all <HI>di&s;putation</HI> concerning the <HI>faculties</HI> and
<HI>Potentia's of the Intellective &s;oul,</HI> is intricate and
perplexed, as mo&s;t grave and learned men have al|ready
complained of it, both becau&s;e the things
them&s;elves are &s;omething more remote from <HI>&s;en&s;i|ble
matter and motion,</HI> as al&s;o by rea&s;on of their mu|tual
<HI>relation</HI> and <HI>connexion.</HI> But peradventure you
will &s;ay unto me, by your <HI>Definition</HI> you have rather
ob&s;cured, then any ways illu&s;trated a thing that is
manife&s;t, and vulgarly known, which is in the daily
u&s;e, and in the mouth of all men; truly in this, I
cannot deny the objection, &s;o empty are the &s;tu|dies
and cogitations of men, and &s;o weak are all our
endeavours, Tho&s;e things which are before our
feet, and eyes, which of them&s;elves do jump into
our <HI>thoughts,</HI> and <HI>&s;ences,</HI> tho&s;e things which are not
unknown to the Cobler, and the Weaver, things
which the mo&s;t illiterate men do think they under|&s;tand,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Odi ego in quit defi|nire&mdash;fa|cilius e&s;t mihi vide|re in alteri|us definiti|one quid non prob m, qu&agrave;m quic|quam be<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">&egrave; definiendo <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span"> <HI>Augu&s;t. 2. de Ord.</HI> 2</NOTE>
and indeed in &s;ome mea&s;ure do under&s;tand
them, the &s;ame things are not under&s;tood by the
greate&s;t of the Philo&s;ophers, and the mo&s;t refined
wits are here at a &s;tand. VVhat Clown almo&s;t is
there that thinks him&s;elf &s;o wretchedly &s;il<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">y, as
not to give you a perfect account, of what is <HI>Time,</HI>
or <HI>Place,</HI> or <HI>Motion,</HI> and the like, into the diving
into, and the unfolding of the Nature whereof,
<HI>Profound, Accute, Angelick, Seraphick, Doctors</HI>
have for many ages pa&s;t, exerci&s;ed, and are &s;till exer|ci&s;eing
them&s;elves, and after &s;o much &s;weat, and
labour, have, not yet attained their de&s;ired Gole.
<PB N="34" REF="29">
<HI>In time I am,</HI> and <HI>of time I &s;peak, and yet I know
not what time is,</HI> &s;aith St. <HI>Augu&s;tine of time.</HI> In
which I cannot &s;ufficiently admire the infinite wi&s;|dome
of the Almighty, by this means beating
down all humane pride,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Gal. 6. 3.</NOTE> and pre&s;enting to mortals
as in a miror that empty <GAP DESC="foreign"> <HI>&s;eeming wi&s;dom,</HI>
by which they would appear to be &s;omething when
they are indeed nothing,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Hor. 1. E|pi&s;t.</NOTE> mi&s;erably deceiveing their
own hearts, that &s;o men might learn <HI>metiri &s;e mo|dulo,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">7. Rom. 12. 30</NOTE>
<HI>ac pede &s;uo</HI> to mea&s;ure them&s;elves by their own
La&s;t &amp; their own Module, &amp; not to be wi&s;er than it
becommeth them, but to be wi&s;e unto &s;obriety,
acknowledging their own fooli&s;hne&s;s, that to God
alone may be the glory of his wi&s;dome.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="2" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="35" REF="29">
<HEAD>THE
SECOND LECTURE.
In which it is declared that in the Con|&s;cience
of a good Intention there is not
&s;uch a Protection, that a man
might &s;afely re&s;t therein.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>ROM. 3. 8.</BIBL>
<Q>And as we are blamed, and as &s;ome affirme
that we &s;ay why do we not evil, that good may come
thereof who&s;e damnation is ju&s;t.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_THat the mind of man doth contain
&s;omething in it of <HI>Divinity,</HI>
is with a great con&s;ent confe&s;&s;ed
by the wi&s;dome of the An<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ients,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Horat. 2. Satyr 2.</NOTE>
who have termed it to be <HI>Divinae
particulam aurae,</HI> a particle of the
Divine Ayre;<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">pictetus.</NOTE> <GAP DESC="foreign">
and have affirmed that our minds have been taken
from the immortal Gods, and are pure as Heaven
it &s;elf; Nay &s;ome of them ri&s;ing higher and &s;peak|ing
<PB N="36" REF="30">
more boldly, have not been afraid to &s;ay, that
the <HI>mind</HI> is God him&s;elf, and have rai&s;ed <HI>Temples</HI>
to it as to a <HI>Diety,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> &s;aith
<HI>Menander</HI> in <HI>Plutarch,</HI> and <HI>Ovid, Mens quo&abque; Nu|men
habet,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><HI>Menti aed<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">s in Cop<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> tolio</HI> vid. Cic 2. de nat. de|or. &amp; Liv. lib. 23.</NOTE> and <HI>Seneca, Quid aliud voces animam
quam Deum inhumano corpore hospitantem,</HI> What el&s;e
will you call the mind but a God lodging in a hu|mane
body. In which words as &s;ome of them &s;eem
to have mo&s;t reference to the <GAP DESC="foreign"> or the <HI>&s;ub&s;tance</HI>
of the <HI>&s;oul,</HI> which being void of matter and bulk, and
free from Death and Corruption,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Plutarch. in quae&s;t. platon. Ovid. 2. Fa&s;t. Senec. E|pi&s;t. 31.</NOTE> and endued with
under&s;tanding and the liberty of will doth &s;eem
rather to come nearer to the nature of immortal
Gods then of corporal things, &s;o the others do re|flect
upon that <HI>Power</HI> and <GAP DESC="foreign"> again&s;t
energetical Virtue, which we call the <HI>Con&s;cience.</HI>
And from hence it is of <HI>Menanders</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">.<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Xe|nocrat. a|pud Ari|&s;tot. 2. Top. 6.</NOTE>
<HI>To mortals every ones Con&s;cience is a
God.</HI> And in this &s;ence the Lord &s;aid that <HI>he had
placed</HI> Mo&s;es <HI>as a God to</HI> Pharoah, becau&s;e he did in|culcate
into <HI>Pharoah</HI> the <HI>will of God,</HI> he did excite
<HI>Pharoah</HI> to the performance of it,<NOTE PLACE="marg">M<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> min<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">rit Deum &s;e ad ibere te&s;tem, id est ut arbi|t<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">o, m&eacute;n|tem &s;uam. <HI>Cic. 3. Offic.</HI></NOTE> and for not obey|ing
it, he did pro&s;ecute him with continual
plagues, and in the &s;ame &s;ence it may be &s;aid that
God hath given to every particular man a proper
Con&s;cience to be as a God unto him, which in Gods
&s;teed, as the Preacher of his eternal Law; &s;hould
dictate to him what he ought to do, and what to a|void,
and which &s;ollicitou&s;ly &s;hould importune him
to the performance of the&s;e duties which are com|manded,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Exod. 8. 1.</NOTE>
and &s;everely &s;hould call unto him for an
account of his actions <HI>good</HI> or <HI>evil,</HI> which &s;hould ex|tort
from the mo&s;t wicked an acknowledgement of
the Divine Ju&s;tice, &amp; as a mo&s;t ju&s;t Judge &s;hould di&s;|cern
<PB N="37" REF="30">
and a&s;&s;ign unto every one either rewards, or pu|ni&s;hments,
according to their de&s;erts; for by nature
the &s;tate of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is placed as it were in the
middle betwixt both, beneath God, but above Man,
&s;ubject unto God as a <HI>Hand-maid,</HI> but &s;et over man
as a Mi&s;tre&s;&s;e.</P>
<P>II. From hence it is, that Con&s;cience is taken into <MILESTONE N="2">
a double con&s;ideration, as it cometh to pa&s;s in all o|ther
things which are in an order di&s;po&s;ed accord|ing
to the Rules of <HI>Sub</HI> and <HI>Supra, Above</HI> or <HI>Under,</HI>
in which tho&s;e which po&s;&s;e&s;s the middle place have
a two-fold relation, the one to the thing <HI>Superiour,</HI>
under which they are, and the other things to the
<HI>Inferiour</HI> which are placed under them; Thus a
<HI>Captain</HI> obeys his <HI>Lieutenant Colonell,</HI> but com|mands
the common Souldier. <HI>I am a man placed
under Authority, having Souldiers under me, Math.</HI>
8. 9. And in the <HI>praedicamental cour&s;e and order,</HI>
tho&s;e things which are placed between the <HI>highe&s;t
Genus,</HI> and the <HI>lowe&s;t Species,</HI> are both the <HI>Genera</HI> of
tho&s;e <HI>Species</HI> of which they are predicated, and the
<HI>Species</HI> of tho&s;e <HI>Genu&s;&s;es</HI> to which they are &s;ubject|ed.
In the &s;ame manner <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> receiveth a di|ver&s;e
Condition, as it hath a relation unto diver&s;e
things, for it hath the condition of a <HI>power regula|ting,</HI>
or of a <HI>thing regulated;</HI> In the re&s;pect of God,
and the Law of God, it hath the condition of a thing
<HI>regulated,</HI> but in re&s;pect of man, and of humane acti|ons,
the condition of a <HI>power regulating.</HI> And &s;ince
it is our purpo&s;e to expound unto you <HI>the u&s;e of Con|&s;cience,</HI>
of which in our la&s;t Lecture we have given
you the Definition, e&s;pecially &s;o far as it pertaineth
to the performance of things, and is commodious
for the In&s;titution of our life, and manners, the
<PB N="38" REF="31">
cour&s;e of the Subject, and of our &s;tudies doth here
require, that we &s;hould now &s;peak of the <HI>double ob|ligation
of Con&s;cience</HI> that &s;hall be u&s;efull to us, which
is the <HI>Active</HI> and <HI>pa&s;&s;ive obligation;</HI> The <HI>pa&s;&s;ive ob|ligation</HI>
of the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is that by which it is obli|ged
to confirm it &s;elf to the <HI>Divine Will,</HI> to which as
to a Rule it is &s;ubjected. The <HI>Active obligation</HI> is
that which obligeth all humane Acts to a conformi|ty
thereunto, and is as a rule over them; There are
therefore two parts of this pre&s;ent treati&s;e, the
fir&s;t of the <HI>&s;ubjection of Con&s;cience,</HI> or the <HI>pa&s;&s;ive obli|gation.</HI>
The &s;econd, of the <HI>power of Con&s;cience</HI> or the
<HI>active obligation of it.</HI></P>
<P>III. Of the fir&s;t of which, that this di&s;cour&s;e may
more legitimately proceed, this is fir&s;t to be premi|&s;ed,
&s;eeing that the <HI>Rectitude</HI> of every thing con&s;i&s;t|eth
in its conformity to its <HI>next and immediate Rule,</HI>
and &s;o gradually a&s;cendeth to its <HI>fir&s;t</HI> and mo&s;t <HI>chief
Rule,</HI> and &s;eeing the immediate Rule or Law of
Con&s;cience, is <HI>right Rea&s;on,</HI> but &s;ubject to the Supe|rior
Law which God hath prae&s;cribed to it, the <HI>Con|&s;cience</HI>
may there be &s;aid to be <HI>right</HI> when it is con|formable
to <HI>right Rea&s;on</HI> according to that Law
which God the &s;upreme Law-giver hath prae&s;cribed
to it, for the condition of that <HI>Act</HI> or <HI>Work,</HI> what&s;o|ever
it be, which at that time we are perfor|ming.</P>
<P>The la&s;t Explication or re&s;olution of Con&s;cience
is into a certain Law impo&s;ed by God on a rational
creature, as being the <HI>Lord of Con&s;cience</HI> alone, and
the <HI>Supreme Legi&s;lator,</HI> who indued man with
a Con&s;cience, and who is the only knower and the
Judge of it, &amp; who alone hath power to &s;ave or de|&s;troy
a Soul, accodingly as it hath kept or broken his
<PB N="39" REF="31">
Commandements, <HI>James 5 12. There is but one
Law-giver who can &s;ave and who can de&s;troy.</HI> Which
is &s;o confe&s;&s;ed by all men in what&s;oever parts of the
world they live, that there is hardly one to be found
who will not of his own accord allow it to be mo&s;t
true in the <HI>The&s;is</HI> or the <HI>Po&s;ition</HI> of it; but in the
<HI>Hypothe&s;iis</HI> or <HI>Suppo&s;ition,</HI> (when any thing is to be
done,) I know not by what depravedne&s;s of the heart
it comes to pa&s;s that many men (and even tho&s;e
men who appear neither to them&s;elves nor unto o|thers
to have thrown off all care of Con&s;cience)
are with &s;uch prone affections tran&s;ported to tho&s;e
things which they de&s;ire to be done, that they do
not only forbear to bring them mo&s;t faithfully to be
examined by that mo&s;t chief and &s;upreme rule,
which is onely able to &s;ecure the Con&s;cience, but
they conceive it is enough for the &s;ecurity of their
<HI>Con&s;ciences,</HI> if either by the <HI>pretence of a good Inten|tion,</HI>
or by the <HI>Example</HI> of &s;ome holy man, or if by
the <HI>Authority</HI> of &s;ome great Divine they can any
ways defend them&s;elves, and what they have acted.
And becau&s;e this Deceipt in the hearts of men
hath been too prevalent in all ages, and e&s;pecially in
the&s;e la&s;t times, I per&s;waded my &s;elf that it would
be a work mo&s;t profitable, and mo&s;t nece&s;&s;ary for
the manners in which we live, if I could expound
tho&s;e three vulgar <HI>&s;uppo&s;itions,</HI> which are &s;o full of
the <HI>trepanne,</HI> and &s;o dangerous unto &s;o many Con|&s;ciences,
therefore before we do di&s;cend to &s;eek and
find out the true rule of Con&s;cience, we mu&s;t fir&s;t re|mon&s;trate
that there is not any protection enoguh for
the &s;ecurity of the Con&s;cience, in the performance
of any affair, if that which is do<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e be not performed
only with <HI>a good intention,</HI> or be &s;upported by the
<PB N="40" REF="32">
example of a Godly Man, or by the Judgement of
a Learned one. Of the two la&s;t (God willing)
we &s;hall treat hereafter, our Di&s;cour&s;e at this pre|&s;ent
&s;hall be of that &s;ubject which in the fir&s;t place
doth incounter us, <HI>viz. Of a good Intention.</HI></P>
<P>IV. Where I &s;hall lay down this Conclu&s;ion,
<HI>That the goodne&s;&s;e of the Intention is not enough to
ju&s;tifie the goodne&s;&s;e of the Act.</HI> That is, a <HI>good In|tention</HI>
cannot alone, and of it &s;elf procure that any
humane <HI>Act</HI> &s;hould be <HI>morally good,</HI> or, which is
the &s;ame, and they are the very words of the A|po&s;tle,
that <HI>Evil &s;hould be done that Good may come
thereby.</HI> When I &s;ay an <HI>Act,</HI> I under&s;tand both
the <HI>inward Act,</HI> which is in the <HI>Will,</HI> and all the ex|terior
<HI>Acts</HI> in the <HI>executing faculties,</HI> which are
flowing from it, it being my meaning, that out of
a <HI>good Intention alone</HI> it doth not follow that either
the <HI>Will</HI> it &s;elf, which is the fir&s;t principle of acting,
or any externall Act flowing from it &s;hould be &s;aid
to be <HI>good.</HI> The <HI>Intention</HI> may be taken two wayes;
fir&s;t <HI>properly</HI> and <HI>formally</HI> for the Act of <HI>Intending,</HI>
that is, for the <HI>motion</HI> of the <HI>Will,</HI> tending to the
<HI>end</HI> by &s;ome certain <HI>mediums.</HI> Secondly, <HI>materially,</HI>
and <HI>objectively,</HI> for the <HI>thing it &s;elf intended,</HI> that is,
for the <HI>end</HI> to which the <HI>Will</HI> &s;o tendeth. For the
<HI>Act intending,</HI> and the <HI>end intended</HI> are of one and
an alike con&s;ideration to the <HI>goodne&s;&s;e</HI> or the <HI>evil|ne&s;&s;e</HI>
of the <HI>Act,</HI> if we look upon the <HI>quality of the
Act,</HI> but if we &s;hall reflect upon the <HI>quantity</HI> of the
<HI>goodne&s;&s;e</HI> or of the <HI>evilne&s;&s;e</HI> of it, there will be
found &s;ome di&s;proportion in the con&s;ideration
thereof. For it being granted that &s;uch a<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> <HI>Act</HI> is <HI>good</HI>
in its own <HI>Species,</HI> and upon the account of its <HI>Ob|ject,</HI>
and that it may be done for a <HI>good end,</HI> or on
<PB N="41" REF="32">
the contrary it being granted that the <HI>Act</HI> is <HI>evil,</HI> and
is done to an <HI>evil end;</HI> by how much the &s;tronger the
<HI>Will</HI> is moved whiles it tendeth to that end, by &s;o
much the <HI>Act</HI> re&s;pectively, will either be the bet|ter
or the wor&s;e; As if a man &s;hould partake of the
<HI>Supper of the Lord,</HI> to that <HI>end,</HI> to put him&s;elf in re|membrance
of the death of Chri&s;t; the more entire|ly
that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of
his death, the better he performes the duty of a
true Communicant. Again, if a man &s;hould &s;lander his
neighbour, intending the ruine of him, by how much
the more violently he intends it, by &s;o much the
wor&s;e is his <HI>Act</HI> of Calumnation, <HI>The quantity
therefore of a good or an evil Act is corre&s;pondent to
the quantity of the goodne&s;&s;e or the evilne&s;&s;e of the In|tention,</HI>
and is <HI>commen&s;urate with it,</HI> if the <HI>Intention</HI>
be under&s;tood according to the <HI>Act</HI> of <HI>intending,</HI>
and not as to the thing <HI>intended.</HI> But the <HI>intention</HI> ta|ken
either way doth not &s;uffice to prove this, that
any <HI>Act</HI> which otherwi&s;e is <HI>evil,</HI> &s;hould be made
<HI>good.</HI></P>
<P>V. This conclu&s;ion is proved by many and mo&s;t
&s;trong arguments, fir&s;t by the words of the &s;acred
Text, in the third Chapter of the <HI>Romans</HI> where the
Apo&s;tle not without indignation doth dete&s;t that
grievous &s;lander by which it was &s;aid to be taught;
<HI>That evil may be done that good &s;hould come thereof.</HI>
That the &s;ence, the &s;cope, and the force of this place,
may be the better under&s;tood, that St. <HI>Paul</HI> among&s;t
all the Apo&s;tles was abundantly the mo&s;t copious in
a&s;&s;erting every where, the <HI>mercy of God by Grace,</HI>
making <HI>a Covenant of grace</HI> with &s;infull men, and
faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promi&s;es, not|with&s;tanding
all that <HI>unrighteou&s;ne&s;&s;e</HI> and <HI>unbelief</HI> of
<PB N="42" REF="33">
men, which lyeth within their hearts, and openly
and abundantly doth declare it &s;elf in their dayly
lives, and conver&s;ations, which he profe&s;&s;eth to be
&s;o far from making the&s;e <HI>promi&s;es of God by Grace</HI> to
be in vain, that on the contrary they do render the
glory of his grace and truth to be far more illu&s;tri|ous,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Rom. 5. 2.</NOTE>
for <HI>where that the offence abounded, there it is ma|nife&s;t
that Grace &s;uperabounded.</HI> From hence the
<HI>Sophisters</HI> and <HI>Impo&s;ters</HI> took on one &s;ide to them|&s;elves
an advantage to &s;lander, and to dimini&s;h if
they could the authority of the Apo&s;tle. On the
other &s;ide the Hypocrites and profane did take an
occa&s;ion to live more licentiou&s;ly, and to &s;in more
&s;ecurely; For if that be true (&s;aid they) which is
preached by <HI>Paul,</HI> that the &s;ins of men do redound
to the greater glory of God, there is no rea&s;on that
God &s;hould puni&s;h &s;ins, or be angry with &s;inners;
There is no rea&s;on that a man or woman &s;hould ab|&s;tain
from &s;inning, nay they &s;hould &s;in more abun|dantly
that God might receive the more abundant
glory, and <HI>evil things are altogether to be done, that
good things may come thereby.</HI> The other objecti|ons
the Apo&s;tle confuteth, but to this, <HI>let us do evil
that good may come of it,</HI> he doth not vouch&s;afe a|ny
an&s;wer at all; he only cryeth out, that it is a
manife&s;t &s;lander, and near of kin unto bla&s;phemy,
and unle&s;s they repent, the ju&s;t judgment of God is
threatened to &s;uch importunate &s;landerers, as if
this Sophi&s;m was of that kind of arguments which
<HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> adjudged not to de&s;erve an an&s;wer, but ra|ther
a reproof;. It is hence manife&s;t, and all Inter|preters
do acknowledge it, that the Apo&s;tle mo&s;t
con&s;tantly denyeth that any <HI>evil ought to be done for
any intention be it never &s;o good.</HI> It much availeth
<PB N="43" REF="33">
(&s;aith St. <HI>Augu&s;tine) to con&s;ider what,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Aug. con|tra meuda|ciam.</NOTE>
<HI>what end, what intention &s;uch a thing is done, but tho&s;e
things which are manife&s;t &s;ins ought not to be done un|der
any pretence of a good cau&s;e, or a good end, or of a
good Intention.</HI> This is the fir&s;t argument.</P>
<P>VI. The &s;econd it is taken from the nature of <HI>evil</HI>
or of <HI>&s;in,</HI> which of its own nature is not <HI>fir&s;t</HI> to be
<HI>cho&s;en,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Hiercl. pag. 78.</NOTE> neither is it &s;econdly, <HI>ordinate</HI> to a good end,
neither is it thirdly, <HI>apt of it &s;elf</HI> to produce any
good, fir&s;t it is not <HI>eligible,</HI> or it is not to be cho&s;en
by rea&s;on of its own nature, <HI>qua tale,</HI> as it is of &s;uch
a nature, for there is nothing <HI>eligible</HI> which is not
al&s;o <HI>Expitible,</HI> and all things that are de&s;ired, are de|&s;ired
under the account of <HI>good.</HI></P>
<P>Neither is <HI>evil</HI> of its own nature <HI>ordinable</HI> to any
<HI>good end,</HI> for if it were, it were al&s;o to be de&s;ired;
for the <HI>appetite</HI> in Philo&s;ophy is not only carry|ed
to the <HI>end</HI> propounded by the <HI>Agent,</HI> but to
tho&s;e things al&s;o which &s;eem to conduce for the ob|taining
of that end. If you object&punc; <HI>God doth dispo&s;e
of our evils into a good end</HI> of his own, and therefore
it is not again&s;t the nature of evil to be ordinated to
a <HI>good end.</HI> I an&s;wer in the fir&s;t place, that the ways <MILESTONE N="1">
of Almighty God who is the <HI>Lord of Nature,</HI> and
according to his good plea&s;ure can produce <HI>good</HI>
out of <HI>evil</HI> are farre different from ours, who have
not the &s;ame right or the &s;ame power; neither is
it for us either too curiou&s;ly to enquire, or too ma|gi&s;terially
to pronounce any thing of the <HI>Providence
of God</HI> concerning evil. In the &s;econd place I an|&s;wer,<MILESTONE N="2">
that God indeed is able and accu&s;tomed to
make u&s;e of our &s;ins to &s;erve his <HI>Glory, Grace</HI> and
<HI>Providence,</HI> and that it is lawfull for us al&s;o, as op|portunity
&s;hall &s;erve, to follow his example and to
<PB N="44" REF="34">
make <HI>u&s;e of the &s;ins of other men</HI> for our <HI>&s;pirituall</HI> or
<HI>temporall advantage;</HI> Notwith&s;tanding, as God, al|though
he maketh u&s;e of the <HI>evil of others,</HI> and pro|duceth
<HI>Good</HI> out of it, yet he never doth <HI>evil</HI> him|&s;elf,
that from thence he might ab&s;tract <HI>good;</HI> &s;o nei|ther
is it lawfull for us to do <HI>evil,</HI> that <HI>good</HI> might
proceed from it; It is one thing to make u&s;e of the
<MILESTONE N="3"><HI>evil</HI> of others, and turn it into <HI>good,</HI> and another
thing to do <HI>evil</HI> with an <HI>intent</HI> of good. Thirdly, I
an&s;wer, a thing may be &s;aid to be <HI>ordinated</HI> in a two|fold
re&s;pect; either <HI>improperly,</HI> in the &s;ame man|ner,
as a thing which way &s;oever it is made u&s;e of
by the <HI>Agent,</HI> doth notwith&s;tanding tend to its <HI>end,</HI>
being &s;o done by the <HI>wi&s;dome</HI> and <HI>power</HI> of the <HI>&s;u|premer
Agent,</HI> contrary to the <HI>will</HI> and <HI>intention</HI> of
him that did it, or it is taken more re&s;trictly, and
properly, and &s;o that only is &s;aid to be <HI>ordinated to
its end,</HI> which <HI>antecedently</HI> is cho&s;en by the <HI>Agent</HI> as
a <HI>medium</HI> that by the nature of it is convenient, and
conducible to &s;uch an <HI>end.</HI> In the fir&s;t &s;ence, that
is to be under&s;tood, when we &s;ay that God doth <HI>or|dinate</HI>
and di&s;po&s;e of <HI>evil</HI> to a <HI>good end,</HI> that is, when
God,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Non co<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">|venire ho|mo viro Vitiis uti <HI>Quint 6. In&s;tit.</HI> 1.</NOTE> out of his infinite mercy and power, either
ab&s;tracts <HI>good</HI> from <HI>evil</HI> or turneth <HI>evil</HI> into <HI>good;</HI>
But we mu&s;t above all things take heed, that the&s;e
expre&s;&s;ions be not under&s;tood in the latter, and pro|per
&s;ence, as if God antecedently did <HI>well approve</HI>
or <HI>make choice</HI> of any evil, as a <HI>medium</HI> convenient
by the nature of it to the a&s;&s;ecution of any <HI>good
end.</HI></P>
<P>VIII. Moreover it is oppo&s;ite to the nature of
<HI>&s;in</HI> to produce of it &s;elf any <HI>good effect,</HI> as <HI>an evil tree
cannot bring forth good fruit,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Mat 7. 18.</NOTE> nor darkne&s;&s;e produce
light of it &s;elf;<NOTE PLACE="marg">2 Cor. 4. 6.</NOTE> but the &s;ame great and glorious
<PB N="45" REF="34">
God who out of his omnipotence, brought forth <HI>light
out of darkne&s;&s;e,</HI> can al&s;o out of our <HI>&s;ins</HI> take an oc|ca&s;ion
to illu&s;trate his infinite <HI>wi&s;dome,</HI> his <HI>righteou&s;|ne&s;&s;e,</HI>
and his <HI>goodne&s;&s;e;</HI> But the&s;e are the effects
of a <HI>divine power,</HI> as of a <HI>cau&s;e</HI> working properly, and
of it &s;elf, to the production whereof there needs no
a&s;&s;i&s;tance, nor &s;trength from our <HI>&s;ins,</HI> which as to
tho&s;e effects are but meerly <HI>contingent,</HI> and but by
<HI>accident.</HI> Tho&s;e words therefore of <HI>David P&s;alm</HI>
5. which St. <HI>Paul</HI> alleageth, <HI>Rom. 3. 4. I have &s;in|ned
again&s;t thee</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> <HI>that thou maye&s;t be
ju&s;tified when thou speake&s;t,</HI> are not &s;o to be under|&s;tood,
that <HI>David</HI> for <HI>that end</HI> committed murder and
adultery, or that it was lawfull for him &s;o to do,
that <HI>God might be ju&s;tified in his words</HI> but the word
<GAP DESC="foreign"> and &s;ome other Greek particles of the &s;ame
&s;ignification in many places of Scripture are to be
under&s;tood, according to the interpretation of St.
<HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome</HI> not <GAP DESC="foreign"> but <GAP DESC="foreign"> to denote and
inferre the <HI>event</HI> only, and not the true <HI>cau&s;e</HI> of the
thing; For as he who is in a &s;erious argumentation
can inferr a true conclu&s;ion from the fal&s;e praemi&s;es
which before were granted by another, and yet the
&s;ame Di&s;putant would &s;how him&s;elf ridiculous, if
to prove a <HI>true conclu&s;ion,</HI> &s;hould willingly make
u&s;e of &s;ome &s;al&s;e a&s;&s;umptions, for <HI>Truth doth not
&s;tand in need of the patronage of Fal&s;hood;</HI> &s;o Almigh|ty
God (and we al&s;o in &s;ome re&s;pect may do the
like) can di&s;po&s;e of things that are <HI>ill</HI> done into
<HI>good,</HI> but it is neither congruous to the divine Ju&s;tice
and Goodne&s;s, neither is it any ways lawfull for us
to <HI>will</HI> and to <HI>do evil</HI> that <HI>good</HI> may come thereby.</P>
<P>IX. The <HI>third argument</HI> is taken <HI>a natur&acirc; boni
Actus, from the nature of a good Act,</HI> to the comple|ment
<PB N="46" REF="35">
whereof the <HI>concur&s;e</HI> of all requi&s;ite <HI>conditi|ons</HI>
is &s;o nece&s;&s;ary, that if one be but ab&s;ent among&s;t
&s;o many of them, although all the other be pre&s;ent,
and &s;ub&s;ervient, yet that <HI>Act</HI> &s;hall not be <HI>morally
good.</HI> Mo&s;t remarkable is that <HI>Axiom, Bonum ex
cau&s;a integra, malum ex quolibet defectu, Good pro|ceeds
from an upright and an entire cau&s;e, but evil
from any defect.</HI> And it is be&s;ides manife&s;t in all kind
of things that there are more required to <HI>rai&s;e up,</HI>
than to throw down; or to de&s;troy. <HI>The defect of a
good Intention</HI> is enough to prove any <HI>Action evil</HI>
(for that, the <HI>end whereof is evil,</HI> mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity be
<HI>evil it &s;elf</HI>) but it is not enough, it is not &s;ufficient
that a <HI>good end,</HI> or a <HI>good Intention</HI> &s;hould prove the
Action good, unle&s;s all the other requi&s;ite conditi|ons
be conjoyned; Now that any <HI>Action</HI> whether
the <HI>internall</HI> of the <HI>will</HI> or the <HI>externall</HI> of the <HI>work,</HI>
may approve them&s;elves to be good, we are to un|der&s;tand
that there are three di&s;tinct <HI>goodne&s;&s;es, viz.</HI>
the <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> of the <HI>object,</HI> the <HI>goodne&s;&s;e</HI> of the <HI>end,</HI>
and the <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> of the <HI>circum&s;tances.</HI> The quality
of every Act doth <HI>fir&s;t</HI> of all, and <HI>principally</HI> depend
on the <HI>quality</HI> of the <HI>object,</HI> or of the <HI>matter,</HI> about
which it is conver&s;ant, &s;o that from thence every
<HI>Act</HI> may <HI>indefinitely</HI> and according to the whole <HI>&s;pe|cies</HI>
of it be denominated, either <HI>good or evil;</HI> in this
re&s;pect we affirm that <HI>Theft</HI> and <HI>Adultery</HI> are <HI>evil</HI> in
the whole <HI>Species</HI> of them, and that <HI>Prayer</HI> and the
<HI>giving of Alms</HI> are <HI>good</HI> in all their &s;everall <HI>re&s;pects,</HI>
and the acceptations of them; but with this differ|ence,
that things which in them&s;elves are <HI>&s;imply evil,</HI>
are &s;o <HI>evil,</HI> that neither upon the account of the <HI>end</HI>
although good, nor yet on the account of their <HI>cir|cum&s;tances,</HI>
although never &s;o promi&s;ing, they can e|ver
<PB N="47" REF="35">
be made truly <HI>good;</HI> But things which are good
in their own nature, may yet be &s;o corrupted by the
<HI>end,</HI> or by <HI>undue circum&s;tances,</HI> that they may leave
off to be <HI>good,</HI> and become <HI>evil;</HI> The <HI>pravity</HI> there|fore
of the <HI>object</HI> being pre&s;uppo&s;ed we are altoge|ther
to ab&s;tain from the <HI>Acts</HI> of <HI>Theft</HI> or of <HI>adulte|ry,</HI>
as being <HI>&s;imply evil</HI> in them&s;elves; But the <HI>good|ne&s;&s;e
of the object</HI> being pre&s;uppo&s;ed it is not &s;afe for
any one, at the fir&s;t, either to undertake to do it, or
to approve it being done, unle&s;s he hath diligently
weighed before hand the <HI>end,</HI> to which it is direct|ed,
and the &s;everall <HI>circum&s;tances</HI> with which it is
attended, and cloathed: In the&s;e things therefore
in which it is &s;aid that the <HI>Goodne&s;s of the Act doth
depend on the end, and that the end doth di&s;criminate
and crown the actions,</HI> they may be &s;aid &s;o for to be
true, if the Acts be <HI>good</HI> in con&s;ideration to the <HI>ob|ject,</HI>
or the <HI>matter,</HI> or at the la&s;t, if they be of a <HI>mid|dle
nature</HI> and <HI>indifferent,</HI> but not if they are <HI>evil.</HI>
For the <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> of the <HI>object</HI> being &s;uppo&s;ed the
Act doth chiefly take its <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> or its <HI>evilne&s;&s;e</HI>
from the <HI>end.</HI> For examples &s;ake, the <HI>Act</HI> of giving
a poor man an <HI>alms</HI> though it be a good <HI>Act</HI> in re|&s;pect
of the <HI>matter</HI> or the <HI>object,</HI> yet if it be done
for <HI>vain-glory</HI> it is morally an <HI>evil Act,</HI> becau&s;e it is
not ordinated to a <HI>good end.</HI> The &s;ame <HI>Act,</HI> if it be
to relieve the nece&s;&s;ities of a neighbour is an Act &s;o
far good, that it hath a lawfull <HI>matter,</HI> and a <HI>right
Intention</HI> and &s;o partaketh of both the <HI>goodne&s;&s;es</HI> a|bove
mentioned, to wit, of the <HI>object</HI> and the <HI>end,</HI>
but it cannot yet be affirmed to be <HI>&s;imply good,</HI> un|le&s;&s;e
it be moreover <HI>duely circum&s;tanced,</HI> for to this
complement of a <HI>good work,</HI> be&s;ides that <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> of
the <HI>object</HI> and the <HI>end,</HI> there is required the <HI>good|ne&s;&s;e
<PB N="48" REF="36">
of circum&s;tances;</HI> And from hence it is, that
commonly it is &s;poken that <HI>the goodne&s;&s;e of the Act
doth depend upon its circum&s;tances</HI> not <HI>primarily, and
principally,</HI> but <HI>ultimately,</HI> and for the accompli&s;h|ment
of it, the <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> of the <HI>object</HI> and the <HI>end</HI>
being fir&s;t laid down, &s;eeing therefore the&s;e three
things are required to the <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> of every <HI>moral
Act,</HI> and they are all to be conjoyned, to wit, the
<HI>matter</HI> lawfull, the <HI>intention</HI> right, and the <HI>circum|&s;tances</HI>
due, it is mo&s;t manife&s;t that a <HI>right intention</HI>
cannot alone &s;uffice by it &s;elf, and by con&s;equent,
that nothing can be performed out of a <HI>good Con&s;ci|ence,</HI>
what&s;oever the <HI>Intention</HI> be, that is either
unlawfull in the <HI>object</HI> or defective in the <HI>circum|&s;tances.</HI></P>
<P>X. But &s;ome there are who peradventure will
object unto this, tho&s;e words of our Saviour, <HI>Mat.
6. 22. If thy eye be &s;ingle thy whole body &s;hall be full
of light, but if thy eye be evil thy whole body &s;hall be
full of darkne&s;s.</HI> Where if the <HI>intention</HI> be unde&s;&s;tood
by the <HI>eye</HI> which is the judgment of almo&s;t all the
Interpreters upon it, it &s;eemeth that the <HI>goodne&s;&s;e</HI> of
the <HI>Act</HI> doth altogether depend on the <HI>goodne&s;s of
the Intention,</HI> &amp; that adaequately, &s;o that what power
an <HI>evil intention</HI> hath to corrupt an <HI>Act</HI> although o|therwi&s;e
<HI>good,</HI> the &s;ame power a <HI>good intention</HI> hath
to approve and to render an <HI>Act good,</HI> which other|wi&s;e
is <HI>evil,</HI> for a <HI>good</HI> or a &s;ingle eye is as efficati|ous
to <HI>inlighten</HI> the whole body, as an evil eye is to
infu&s;e darkne&s;s on it; To adde more &s;trength to this
opinion much may be alledged from the <HI>Fathers</HI> and
other <HI>Divines,</HI> of this nature is that in the <HI>Glo&s;&s;e;
As much good as you do intend, &s;o much you do perform;</HI>
And that ver&s;e in the mouth of every Scool-boy.</P>
<Q LANG="lat"><PB N="49" REF="36">
<L>Quicquid agunt homines, Intentio judicat illud.</L></Q>
<Q><L>It is th' Intention judgeth true</L>
<L>Of what&s;oever things we do.</L></Q>
<P>XI. But in the way of an&s;wer, as to that place in
the 6 of St. <HI>Mat.</HI> I am not ignorant in the fir&s;t
place, that &s;ome learned men of this age do give an
interpretation to it far different from that of
the antient Fathers, and not con&s;onant to that
we have now in hand; But in reverence to tho&s;e
antient Doctors, be it granted that tho&s;e words of
our Saviour had a proper relation to the <HI>Intentions</HI>
of men; I make an&s;wer, that the <HI>intention</HI> (when it
is a motion of the <HI>Will</HI> tending to &s;ome <HI>ends</HI> by cer|tain
<HI>mediums</HI>) is taken into a twofold con&s;ideration,
fir&s;t whether it be for the <HI>intention of that good</HI> into
which the <HI>Will</HI> is <HI>finally</HI> and <HI>preci&s;ely</HI> carryed, being
taken from all con&s;ideration of the <HI>mediums</HI> to at|tain
it; As if a man &s;hould &s;ay he intends <HI>the
glory of God,</HI> or his own <HI>profit,</HI> and <HI>plea&s;ure:</HI> or &s;e|condly
whether it be for <HI>an entire ordination of the
whole progre&s;&s;e of the work,</HI> from the beginning of
the work unto the end, including al&s;o the <HI>mediums</HI>
or the <HI>means</HI> to attain it; As if a man &s;hould &s;ay
that he intends the <HI>glory of God</HI> by building a Tem|ple,
or &s;taining an Idolater, or that he intends his
<HI>own profit,</HI> by getting riches by his hone&s;t labour, or
by theft, and plunder, And as he may be &s;aid, that
he intends a journey to <HI>Rome</HI> who only thinks of go|ing
thither, and hath not yet re&s;olved with him&s;elf
which way, or upon what accounts he will go, as
well as he who hath re&s;olved with him&s;elf, <HI>when</HI> to
go, <HI>which way,</HI> and upon what occa&s;ions. We &s;peak
<PB N="50" REF="37">
in this whole di&s;cour&s;e of the <HI>Intention</HI> taken the
<HI>fir&s;t way, viz.</HI> on the <HI>intention</HI> which looks altoge|ther
upon the <HI>end,</HI> and not on the <HI>means,</HI> &amp; which is
&s;o taken in the common u&s;e of &s;peaking; but tho&s;e
words of the <HI>Fathers</HI> and other <HI>Divines</HI> which &s;eem
by the <HI>intention</HI> alone to mea&s;ure the <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> or the
<HI>badne&s;&s;e</HI> of mens actions, and which are grounded
on tho&s;e words of our Saviour, in relation to a <HI>&s;in|gle
eye,</HI> and to an <HI>eye</HI> that is evil, do receive their <HI>in|tention</HI>
in the <HI>latter &s;ignification,</HI> as they include the
<HI>means</HI> with the <HI>end;</HI> ob&s;ervable is that of St <HI>Bernard,
That the eye</HI> (&s;aith he) <HI>be &s;ingle, two things are ne|ce&s;&s;ary,</HI>
viz. <HI>that truth be in the election, and Charity
in the intention.</HI> That is, that our intention be ab&s;o|lutely
right both are required, that &s;o we may not
propound unto our &s;elves &s;uch an <HI>end</HI> which is aver&s;e
unto the love of God, and of our neighbour, and that
we make not choice of any <HI>means</HI> that are not joyned
with hone&s;ty &amp; righteou&s;ne&s;s. In every work there|fore
we mu&s;t not only look to propound unto our
&s;elves a <HI>good end,</HI> but we mu&s;t withall endeavour to
the <HI>end</HI> &s;o propounded by <HI>apt,</HI> lawful, &amp; hone&s;t <HI>means,</HI>
for &s;eeing that the <HI>election of the means</HI> or the <HI>mediums</HI>
do ari&s;e from the <HI>intention of the end,</HI> &amp; is &s;o nece&s;&s;a|rily
joyned to it, that in the re&s;pect thereof, it hath
the place of an <HI>accident in&s;eperable,</HI> or a <HI>nece&s;&s;ary cir|cum&s;tance,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Animum laud&ocirc;: Con&s;ilium reprehen|d<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="2 letters">. <HI>Cic. 9. ad At|tic.</HI> 11.</NOTE>
the School-men do almo&s;t all of them con|clude,
that an <HI>evil election</HI> doth corrupt an <HI>intention</HI>
that is otherwi&s;e <HI>good,</HI> by rendring that <HI>evil</HI> which
before was <HI>good,</HI> in the very &s;ame manner as <HI>evil cir|cum&s;tances</HI>
do corrupt tho&s;e <HI>Actions,</HI> to which they
are retayners.</P>
<P>XII. The fourth argument is taken from the per|fection
and obligation of the Law of God; For there
<PB N="51" REF="37">
is <HI>a Law</HI> propounded from God to men, a mo&s;t per|fect
Law, which commandeth things to be done, and
forbiddeth tho&s;e things which are not to be done; <HI>It
hath &s;hewed unto thee O man what is good, &amp; what the
Lord requireth of thee Mich.</HI> 6. 8. This is the Law
which we mu&s;t obey if we will fulfil our duties, by
this <HI>Law</HI> we are commanded (as the Scriptures eve|ry
where do declare) to do <HI>good,</HI> and to e&s;chew <HI>evil;</HI>
But if we on the contrary, without the lea&s;t regard to
the <HI>law of God,</HI> &s;hall mea&s;ure out unto our &s;elves
things to be avoyded or performed, according to our
own profit, and as we &s;hall think good, and &s;hall
either omit tho&s;e <HI>good things</HI> which God com|mandeth
to be done for the fear of &s;ome following
<HI>evil,</HI> or &s;hall commit tho&s;e <HI>evil</HI> things which God
forbiddeth, for the vain hope of &s;ome good to come,
what is this but (worms as we are) to preferre
our own <HI>Coun&s;els</HI> above the expre&s;&s;e <HI>will</HI> of Almigh|ty
God, and the wi&s;dome of the fle&s;h above the <HI>Au|thority
of the mo&s;t holy Spirit.</HI> Farre otherwi&s;e did
that holy man <HI>David, By thy precepts</HI> (&s;aith he)
<HI>have I gotten under&s;tanding, therefore have I hated all
unju&s;t wayes, P&s;al.</HI> 119. 104. As if he &s;hould &s;ay,
being in&s;tructed by <HI>thy Law</HI> which both night and
day is in my heart, my mouth, &amp; before mine eyes,
I do plainly under&s;tand what I have to do, and what
I have to e&s;chew, wherefore I do not only decline
but hate every way which is not con&s;entaneous to
<HI>thy Law,</HI> whither &s;oever it may &s;eem to lead me.
Therefore &s;ince every &s;in is forbidden by the <HI>Law</HI>
of God, and that <HI>Law</HI> of his containeth not the
lea&s;t exception of any good <HI>Intention,</HI> or <HI>Event,</HI> and
we ought not to <HI>di&s;tingui&s;h</HI> where the <HI>Law maketh
no di&s;tinction,</HI> nor to <HI>except where the Law maketh
<PB N="52" REF="38">
no exception</HI> it is mo&s;t manife&s;t, that he who&s;oever
he is who for what <HI>Intention,</HI> or what <HI>cau&s;e</HI> &s;oever it
be, doth knowingly and willingly do that which is
evil, he doth &s;in again&s;t the Law of God.</P>
<P>XIII. The fifth argument followeth, drawn from
the examples of tho&s;e who under the pretence of a
<HI>good end</HI> being &s;o bold as to di&s;obey the expre&s;s
Commandment of God, have &s;atisfied his anger by
the ju&s;t puni&s;hment of their ra&s;hne&s;s, and di&s;obedi|ence.
The Prophet <HI>Samuel</HI> being &s;ent to <HI>Saul</HI> the
King of <HI>I&s;rael,</HI> who &s;aved &s;ome of the cattle of the
<HI>Amalekites,</HI> which God had commanded &s;hould be
totally de&s;troyed, for no other end, as he pretend|ed,
than by the bulk and fatne&s;s of his &s;acrifice to
make it the more acceptable, the &s;aid Prophet did
lay before his eyes the grievou&s;ne&s;s of his &s;in, and
for the puni&s;hment of &s;o great a di&s;obedience, did
prophe&s;y unto him that his Kingdom &s;hould be
taken from him; If any man &s;hall think this exam|ple
not congruous to prove this <HI>truth,</HI> becau&s;e it doth
not appear that <HI>Saul</HI> did this with any <HI>good intention,</HI>
neither was the <HI>end</HI> which afterwards he pretended,
fixed and grounded in his re&s;olution when he did
it, but it is more likely that he looked after his tem|poral
advantage and commodity, both becau&s;e it was
objected to him by the Prophet, and laid unto his
charge that he obeyed not the commandment of
God, and becau&s;e (which is common with Hypo|crits)
he did make an excu&s;e for his di&s;obedience;
That this exception may be waved, &amp; create no more
trouble or &s;cruple, it is to be ob&s;erved, that where
<HI>Hypocri&s;y</HI> is joyned to <HI>di&s;obedience,</HI> the crime is not
&s;o much increa&s;ed, as it is <HI>doubled.</HI> There is no
man doubteth but that <HI>Saul</HI> was guilty of a double
<PB N="53" REF="38">
fault, of <HI>di&s;obedience,</HI> and <HI>di&s;&s;imulation,</HI> not to make
mention of the third crime which was the root of the
two former, <HI>viz.</HI> a <HI>mundane affection,</HI> and a de&s;ire of
gain, and of his <HI>own glory.</HI> The &s;ins of <HI>di&s;obedience</HI>
and of <HI>di&s;&s;imulation</HI> were di&s;tinct in <HI>Saul</HI> &amp; neither
conjoyned by <HI>nature</HI> or by <HI>time;</HI> not by <HI>nature,</HI> for one
of them can be in any man, without the other; nor
by <HI>time,</HI> for <HI>di&s;obedience</HI> had the precedency, to w^c^h^.
afterwards upon another occa&s;ion was added <HI>D&s;&s;ii|mulation,</HI>
which not ob&s;curely may be collected
from the very words of <HI>Samuel</HI> him&s;elf, who ma|king
no mention of the <HI>di&s;&s;imulation</HI> of the King, did
only &s;harply and &s;ecurely reprehend him for his <HI>di&s;|obedience;</HI>
obedience &s;aith he is more acceptable
than &s;acrifice, as if he &s;hould have &s;aid, <HI>What do
you tell me of &s;acrifices,</HI> which if you did in earne&s;t be|fore
<HI>intend</HI> them, or now to excu&s;e your <HI>di&s;obedience</HI>
you do pretend them, it is all one in relation to your
duty. You ought to have obeyed the command|ment
of God, and without the lea&s;t murmuring or
di&s;pute to have fullfilled that which he pre&s;cribed:
But what&s;oever this mi&s;carriage of <HI>Saul</HI> was, mo&s;t
certain it is, that <HI>Uzzah,</HI> who&s;e Hi&s;tory is written
2 <HI>Sam.</HI> 6. did put forth his hand to the holy Ark
not deceitfully, but devoutly, and with a mo&s;t pious
<HI>Intention,</HI> that the <HI>Ark of the Covenant</HI> &s;hould not
fall on the ground (which at that time under the
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">economy of the old Te&s;tament was a dreadfull
Symbol of the <HI>Divine pre&s;ence</HI>) when the Cart in
which it was carryed being violently &s;haken, it &s;eem|ed
even ready to &s;lip down out of it; By this &s;light
(as &s;ome have thought) but importunate temerity,
although he had not the lea&s;t <HI>ill intent,</HI> yet he meri|ted
(a multitude of people beholding it) that he
<PB N="54" REF="39">
&s;hould &s;uffer the puni&s;hment of a &s;udden death, w^c^h^.
God then did inflict upon him.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Num. 7. 9.</NOTE> Indeed the Lord
Jehovah had before declared that the <HI>Ark of the Co|venant</HI>
&s;hould not be carryed in a <HI>Cart,</HI> but on the
&s;houlders of the Prie&s;ts, neither was it lawful for any,
who was not of the <HI>order of the Prie&s;thood,</HI> &amp; of the
Family of the <HI>Koathites</HI> to carry the Ark, or to touch
that <HI>&s;acred ve&s;&s;el,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Numb. 4. 15.</NOTE> he that &s;hould pre&s;ume to do it
was to peri&s;h by an evil death; Therefore by this
&s;evere puni&s;hment on the fir&s;t violator of that Law,
God did &s;trike into the hearts of men a <HI>reverence</HI>
to the more &s;trict ob&s;ervation of the Law,
and pre&s;erved its <HI>Authority,</HI> that no man un|der
any pretence what&s;oever &s;hould boldly pre&s;ume
to do or to attempt again&s;t that which he had <HI>or|dained;
And the anger of the Lord was kindled a|gain&s;t</HI>
Uzzah, <HI>and God &s;mote him there for his ra&s;h|ne&s;&s;e,
and he dyed by the Ark of God</HI> 2. Sam. 6. 7.</P>
<P><HI>XIIII. The la&s;t argument is taken, from the in|conveniences
that do attend the contrary opinion,
And they are many, I &s;hall only urge but one in&s;tead
of all, and it is often mentioned by St.</HI> Au|gu&s;tine,
<HI>which is, that the re&s;traint of the Law being
taken away, all things would be carried at random,
as the barrs being broken, when once the waves of
the Sea do exceed their banks they will not endure
to be contained within any bounds, but will grow
upon all places, by an unruly u&s;urpation, that are
farre or near them.</HI> He who hath once tran&s;gre&s;&s;ed
the bounds of mode&s;ty will quickly grow into a heighth
of impudence, <HI>&s;aith</HI> Petronius. <HI>But let us rather be
attentive to St.</HI> Augu&s;tine, Quod &s;eelerati&s;&s;imum
facinus, quod turpi&s;&s;imum flagitium, quod impii&s;&s;i|mum
&s;acrilegium. non dicatur fieri po&s;&s;e recte at&abque;
<PB N="55" REF="39">
ju&s;te, &s;i &s;emel conce&s;&s;erimus, in omnibus malis operi|bus
hominum ideo non quid fiat &s;ed quare fiat quaeren|dum
ut quaecun&abque; propter bonas cau&s;as facta obtendan|tur,
nec ip&s;a mala e&s;&s;e judicentur, What abom nable act,
what mo&s;t filthy wickedne&s;&s;e, what mo&s;t impious, &s;acri|ledge,
(<HI>Ah do you not gue&s;&s;e that he prophe&s;yed of
this our age, and of our affairs?</HI>) may not be &s;aid to be
done ju&s;tly, and uprightly, if we &s;hall once grant, that in
all the evil works of men we are not to demand &s;o much,
what is done, as wherefore it is done, that &s;o tho&s;e
things which are pretended to be done for good cau&s;es,
may not at all of them&s;elves be judged to be evil.</P>
<P><HI>And again,</HI> Cum conce&s;&s;eris admittendum e&s;&s;e aliquod
malum ne aliquid gravius admittatur, non ex regula
veritatis &s;edex &s;ua qui&s;que cupiditate aut con&s;uetudi|ne
metietur malum, et id putabit gravius quod ip&s;e
amplius exhorre&s;cit, non quod ampli&ugrave;s revera fugien|dum
e&s;t. When you grant that &s;ome evil is to be ad|mitted,
that a greater one may be omitted, every
one will be ready to mea&s;ure that evil, not by the Rule
of truth, but by his own de&s;ires, or by Cu&s;tome, and
will think that to be mo&s;t grievous which he doth mo&s;t
abhorre, and not that which indeed is mo&s;t to be a|voyded.</P>
<P>The &s;trength of the argument is in this, <HI>If evil
things are to be done that good things may come there|by,</HI>
when mo&s;t &s;ure it is that all things evil are not
to be done, and not for all things that are good,
we mu&s;t put &s;ome limitation or rule to both the&s;e
doubts, as fir&s;t to know <HI>what evil</HI> is to be done that
<HI>good</HI> may come thereof, and what not; and Se|condly
for <HI>what good</HI> things &s;ome things <HI>evil</HI> are to
be done, and for what they are not to be done) or
it mu&s;t be left to every mans judgment, to arbi|trate
<PB N="56" REF="40">
according to the nature of the thing, and as him|&s;elf
&s;hall think good, <HI>what</HI> is to be done, and what
is not to be done, and <HI>for what</HI> it is to be done;
If any of which be granted, there will be nothing
&s;afe among&s;t men, nothing &s;acred, nothing free from
injuries, perjuries, deceits, rapine, &s;laughter, and de|&s;truction.
Tho&s;e things without which <HI>Common-wealths</HI>
and the &s;ocieties of men cannot be pre&s;er|ved,
mu&s;t all be bani&s;hed from the earth, in which
number are, <HI>Religion, Ju&s;tice, Righteou&s;ne&s;&s;e, Faith,
and Peace.</HI></P>
<P>XV. The <HI>conclu&s;ion</HI> which I undertook to prove,
being now, as I conceive, &s;ufficiently confirmed; I
hope it will not be incon&s;onant, nor ungratefull,
certainly not unprofitable to you, to derive &s;ome
<HI>corallaries</HI> from it which may be u&s;efull to us all for
the in&s;titution of our <HI>lives</HI> and <HI>manners.</HI> It followeth
therefore in the fir&s;t place, from that which is alrea|dy
&s;poken, that all pious men mu&s;t take heed, lea&s;t
being tran&s;ported by a <HI>zeal to the</HI> glory of God, they
be carryed away to unlawfull <HI>Acts.</HI> There is no true
Chri&s;tian will deny but that the <HI>glory of God</HI> is the
<HI>&s;upreme</HI> and <HI>ultimate end</HI> of all our actions. <HI>Whether
we eat or drink or what&s;oever we do, it mu&s;t be all done
to the glory of God 1 Cor.</HI> 10 31. But being tran&s;por|ted
with too ha&s;ty, and too prepo&s;trous a <HI>zeal to the
glory of God,</HI> what contumelies, what &s;laughters,
did not tho&s;e men of <HI>that faction</HI> among&s;t the peo|ple
of the Jews commit, who peculiarly were call|ed
<HI>Zelots;</HI> And among&s;t Chri&s;tians in the memory
of our Fathers the &s;ame things have been recorded
(by men worthy of belief, and who were no ways
ignorant of the tran&s;actions of the affairs of their
times) to have been done in <HI>Germany,</HI> and other
<PB N="57" REF="40">
places by the <HI>Anabapti&s;ts,</HI> in who&s;e <HI>Chronologies</HI> &s;uch
horrid acts, and &s;o far from all humanity are repor|ted,
that we &s;hould hardly have given any belief unto
them, if we had not of late &s;een the &s;ame tragedies
every day to be prodigiou&s;ly acted to the life,
by their unhappy off-&s;pring, the di&s;mal &s;cene being
tran&s;lated into our <HI>Britannies.</HI></P>
<P>XVI. That none of you may be deceived there|fore
with &s;o &s;plendid a deceit, and that you may
not deceive others; Con&s;ider with your &s;elves in <MILESTONE N="1">
the fir&s;t place that all <HI>Seducers,</HI> the mini&s;ters of Sa|tan,
and in&s;tructed by Satan him&s;elf, the chief <HI>Sedu|cer,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">1 Cor. 11. 14.</NOTE>
<HI>who is accu&s;tomed to transform him&s;elf into an
Angel of light</HI> have not more advanced them&s;elves
by any artifice, nor impo&s;ed more upon the belief
of the common people of Chri&s;tendom, nor more
vigorou&s;ly troubled the peace of our Churches, and
Common-wealths than <HI>under the pretence of the glo|ry
of God, and of the reformation of Religion, and of the
propagation of the Gospell, and of rooting out &s;uper&s;ti|tion,
and of the exalting of the Kingdom of our Lord
Je&s;us Chri&s;t.</HI> The mo&s;t eminent of the Prote&s;tant
Mini&s;ters in the preceeding age, as <HI>Calvin, Bucer,
Zuinglius</HI> and others have all along in their write|ings
grievou&s;ly complayned of this; Among&s;t whom
<HI>Jerome Zanchius</HI> a man &s;econd unto few in <HI>learn|ing
mode&s;ty</HI> and <HI>piety</HI> hath this expre&s;&s;ion, <HI>Ego non
intelligo i&s;tam reformatorum mundi Theologiam,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Zanchius.</NOTE> <HI>I
do not under&s;tand this divinity of the new Reformers of
the world.</HI> I would to God that the experience of
what is dayly acted among&s;t us did not confirm too
much the truth of that vulgar Proverb, <HI>In nomine
Domini incipit omne malum.</HI> Secondly, Con&s;ider <MILESTONE N="2">
with your &s;elves with how great, and how perver&s;e
<PB N="58" REF="41">
a heat of Spirit, the <HI>glory of God</HI> is pretended to all
wars, tumults, quarrelling, contentions, and unpro|fitable
di&s;putations, of which the holy Apo&s;tles of
our <HI>Lord Je&s;us</HI> did hardly ever make mention of,
(and full often they have mentioned it) but in or|der
to <HI>peace</HI> and <HI>brotherly-love,</HI> and that &s;weet <HI>de|portment</HI>
in things indifferent, which e&s;pecially be|commeth
Chri&s;tians, that &s;o no man might abu&s;e that
<HI>liberty</HI> which we do by the benefit of Chri&s;t, to be an
<MILESTONE N="3"><HI>offence</HI> or a <HI>&s;tumbling-block</HI> unto his Brother. In the
third place con&s;ider, that the man who doth pro|pound
unto him&s;elf the <HI>glory of God</HI> to be his <HI>End</HI>
mu&s;t al&s;o propound unto him&s;elf the <HI>Law of God,</HI>
to be the <HI>Rule</HI> of all his actions. <HI>Ad Legem, &amp;
Te&s;timonium, to the Law, and to the Te&s;timony I&s;a.</HI>
8. 20. Grant that the re&s;pect unto the <HI>glory of God</HI>
is the <HI>final cau&s;e of thy acting,</HI> as it is fit it &s;hould be
&s;o, but the <HI>Rule</HI> and as it were the <HI>formal Rea&s;on</HI> of
thy acting is not to be the <HI>glory of God,</HI> but his revea|led
<HI>Will;</HI> In the whole cour&s;e of our lives <HI>the glory of
God</HI> is to be looked upon as the <HI>mark</HI> or the <HI>Gole</HI> to
which we run, but we mu&s;t look upon the <HI>Rule</HI> al&s;o,
that &s;o we may go the right way which doth bring us
to it, le&s;t that de&s;ervedly be objected to us which is
commonly &s;poken, <HI>Ben&egrave; curritis &s;ed extr&agrave; viam,</HI>
<MILESTONE N="4"><HI>You run well, but you run out of the way.</HI> La&s;tly, con|&s;ider,
that the <HI>glory of God</HI> in the re&s;pect of &s;ingular
actions hath the e&s;timation of an <HI>end tran&s;cendental.</HI>
Now it is manife&s;t that to a <HI>Tran&s;cendent</HI> no <HI>Indi|vidual</HI>
can immediately be &s;ubjected, &s;o not of a|ny
&s;ingular <HI>Ens</HI> or being, whether it be &s;ub&s;tantial, or
accidental, is immediately &s;ubjected to the <HI>&s;um|mum
Ens</HI> or the chief being; Therefore as <HI>Ens tran|&s;cendentale,
the tran&s;cendental being</HI> is verified of e|very
<PB N="59" REF="41">
very <HI>being</HI> which is in one of the <HI>ten praedicaments,</HI>
whether it be univer&s;al, or &s;ingular, &s;o the <HI>glory of
God</HI> is the end of all <HI>duties,</HI> &amp; of all <HI>acts</HI> thereto per|taining
which expre&s;sly, and virtually are contained
in any praecept of the <HI>Decalogue;</HI> God is to be wor|&s;hipped,
our Parents honoured, our Neighbours be|loved,
our promi&s;es performed, <HI>Ju&s;tice, Truth,</HI> and
<HI>Cha&s;tity</HI> pre&s;erved, and other duties of <HI>Piety</HI> and
<HI>Charity</HI> performed, to the honour and <HI>glory of God.</HI>
Now as nothing hath truly the condition of an <HI>Ens</HI>
or <HI>being</HI> which may not aptly be reduced to &s;ome
&s;pecies of it in &s;ome one of the ten praedicaments,
&s;o no particular action, let men that mind their own
ends &s;ay what they will to the contrary, can ever
truly and properly be referred to the <HI>glory of God</HI> as
to its <HI>end</HI> which is not reducible to &s;ome <HI>duty</HI> of pi|ety
and charity; grounded in &s;ome one of the ten
<HI>Commandments,</HI> of the Law of God. He but de|ludes
you therefore, who&s;oever he is who ob&s;treper|ou&s;ly
cries out <HI>the glory of God, the glory of God,</HI>
and yet is not able to tell you by what command|ment
in the <HI>Law of God</HI> he can maintain that,
which he vainly profe&s;&s;eth that he performeth for
<HI>the glory of God.</HI></P>
<P>XVII. From the <HI>Conclu&s;ion</HI> above named it fol|loweth
in the &s;econd place that they are in a great
error who think it is lawfull for them to commit a
le&s;&s;e &s;in that a greater &s;in might be avoyded, many
things are alledged to maintain this error, as in the
fir&s;t place, that common &s;aying which is in the
mouth of every man,<NOTE N="*" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ari&s;t. 2. Ethic. 9.</NOTE> <HI>Of evils we mu&s;t choo&s;e the
lea&s;t,</HI> and to give a rea&s;on for what they &s;ay, they
alledge that of <HI>Ari&s;tot.</HI> that a<NOTE N="&dagger;" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">, Id. 5. Ethic. 7.</NOTE> <HI>le&s;&s;e evil</HI> being com|pared
with a greater, may be taken for a <HI>good.</HI> To
<PB N="60" REF="42">
which is added that of <HI>Gregorius magnus, Dum mens
inter minora, et maxima peccata con&s;tringitur &s;i nul|lus
omnin&ograve; &s;ine peccato evadendi aditus pateat, minor&agrave;
&s;emper elegantur, When the mind is perplexed betwixt
le&s;s &s;ins, and tho&s;e of a higher nature, if there be no
po&s;&s;ibility to e&s;cape without &s;in, the le&s;&s;e &s;ins are always
to be cho&s;en.</HI> Neither to this are wanting the exam|ples
of godly men, in which that Act of <HI>Lot</HI> is re|markable
above all the re&s;t, for in the nineteenth of
<HI>Gene&s;is</HI> we do find that he per&s;waded the filthy and
mo&s;t impure Inhabitants of <HI>Sodom</HI> to the <HI>Act of
incontinency</HI> with his own Daughters, to divert them
from more nefarious lu&s;ts. I &s;hould appear too te|dious
if I &s;hould here in&s;i&s;t upon too many exam|ples,
<MILESTONE N="1"> to contract much therfore into few words, I
&s;ay fir&s;t of all that tho&s;e words, <HI>Of evills the
lea&s;t,</HI> is properly, and primarily to be under&s;tood of
the <HI>evills</HI> of <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> (as they call it) &amp; not of the
<HI>fault,</HI> that is to &s;ay not of <HI>Sir,</HI> but of <HI>Externall evills</HI>
compared among&s;t them&s;elves; In the &s;ame &s;ence
as <HI>David</HI> did, who, the choyce of three evils being
propounded to him,<NOTE PLACE="marg">1 Sam. 24. 14.</NOTE> <HI>viz.</HI> of <HI>War, Famine</HI> and <HI>Pe&s;ti|lence,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign"> Vid. Suid. <GAP DESC="foreign">.</NOTE>
did make choice of the lea&s;t of tho&s;e <HI>three:</HI> In
the &s;econd place I affiirm that the &s;ame proverb, in
the interpretation of it, is extended to a further
&s;ence, For two <HI>evils</HI> being propounded, the one of
<HI>puni&s;hment,</HI> the other of the <HI>fault,</HI> if neither of them
can po&s;&s;ibly be avoyded, but of nece&s;&s;ity one of them
mu&s;t be cho&s;en, the <HI>evil of the puni&s;hment</HI> is to be
made choice of, and not the <HI>evil of the fault,</HI> for it
is the lea&s;t evil of the two, to &s;uffer <HI>evil</HI> than to do
<HI>evil.</HI> We ought therefore rather to <HI>choo&s;e,</HI> to <HI>lo&s;e</HI>
our <HI>goods</HI> than to <HI>renounce</HI> our <HI>faith;</HI> and to &s;uffer
<HI>bani&s;hment</HI> than to be guilty of <HI>perjury;</HI> And from
<PB N="61" REF="42">
hence it is that the <HI>Martyrs,</HI> of old, were indued
with &s;uch a <HI>gallantry</HI> &amp; &s;trength of <HI>courage,</HI> as to be
plundred, and tormented, and to lo&s;e their lives,
rather than to burn incen&s;e u<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">to Idols, or to con|&s;ent
to any thing which were di&s;hone&s;t, or unworthy
the name of a Chri&s;tian. In the third place, if it <MILESTONE N="3">
were propounded to any one to commit <HI>two &s;ins,</HI> and
mo&s;t manife&s;t it is unto his Con&s;cience that both of
them are <HI>&s;ins,</HI> I do affirm that he is not to make <HI>any
choice</HI> of <HI>either,</HI> but to e&s;chew <HI>both</HI> of them. If you
object, that put the ca&s;e that neither of them can be
avoided, but one of them mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity be com|mitted,
as tho&s;e words of <HI>Gregory</HI> do manife&s;tly im|ply,
what will you per&s;wade a man unto being in
the&s;e &s;treights. I an&s;wer, that this cannot be &s;up|po&s;ed,
for &s;eeing that <HI>all &s;in is &s;o voluntary, that if it
were not voluntary it were not &s;in,</HI> as St. <HI>Augu&s;tine</HI>
truly affirms, it cannot be that any man &s;hould
be brought into &s;uch a &s;treight that of <HI>nece&s;&s;ity</HI> he
mu&s;t <HI>&s;in,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign"> Ari&s;t. 2. Eudem. 11.</NOTE> he therfore doth contradict him&s;elf who
&s;hall affirm that he committed &s;uch a &s;in being com|pelled
by meer nece&s;&s;ity, for there is no man &s;inneth
unle&s;&s;e it be by his own <HI>Will,</HI> and the <HI>will</HI> is &s;o <HI>free</HI>
that it cannot be <HI>compelled;</HI> And &s;urely this is the
&s;ence of St. <HI>Gregory</HI> although at the fir&s;t &s;ight the
words do &s;eem to bear another con&s;truction,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Nulla e&s;t nece&s;&s;itas delinquen|di, quibus una e&s;t ne|ce&s;sitas non delin|quendi. <HI>Tert. de Cor. Mil. Cap.</HI> 11.</NOTE> the&s;e
words e&s;pecially, (<HI>Si nullus &s;ine peccato evadendi
aditus pateat) But if it be impo&s;&s;ible to make any e|va&s;ion
without the committing of &s;in.</HI> For St. <HI>Grego|ry</HI>
doth not here &s;peak of two things propounded
to be done, both whereof are <HI>&s;ins</HI> (which is the &s;ub|ject
of which we now do treat) but of <HI>two things</HI>
whereof it is manife&s;t to the per&s;on that doth com|mit
them, that one is a <HI>&s;in,</HI> and the other by a mi&s;take
<PB N="62" REF="43">
of the Con&s;cience is conceived by him to be a <HI>&s;in,</HI>
when indeed it is not &s;o, but upon &s;ome ungrounded
&s;u&s;pition, or &s;ome new &s;cruple that doth in|vade
his Con&s;cience, he is affraid le&s;t peradventure
it be a &s;in, which ca&s;e is different from our pre&s;ent
in&s;titution.</P>
<P><HI>XVIII. If you demand, is it lawfull for</HI> Caius
<HI>to admit unto him&s;elf a le&s;s &s;in to hinder a far great|er
one, which</HI> Titius <HI>otherwi&s;e would have com|mitted,
as to be guilty of &s;ome</HI> petty larceny, <HI>that
the other might not commit a murder. I &s;ay with
St.</HI> Augu&s;tine, <HI>that it is not lawfull, his words are
the&s;e,</HI> Si quaeratur quid duorum potius debuit evitare
qui utrum&abque; non potuit, &s;ed alterutrum potuit, respondeo
&s;uum peccatum potius quam alienum, &amp; levius poti&ugrave;s
quod &s;uum, qu&agrave;m gravius quod alienum. If it be
demanded of me (<HI>&s;aith he</HI>) what of the two he ought
rather to avoid, who cannot e&s;chew both &s;ins, but may
one of them. I an&s;wer his own &s;in rather than anothers,
and more ea&s;ily his own than anothers. The rea&s;on is
ready, for it is in my power that I do not &s;in, but not if
another &s;inneth. <HI>And thus he proceeds,</HI> Ego utrum|&abque;
malum fieri nollem, &s;ed id tantum cavere potui, ne
fieret quod erat in mea potestate. I would have neither
of the two evils committed, but I could only be cautious
in this, that the evill &s;hould not be committed which
was in my power. <HI>But</HI> man-&s;laughter <HI>is a greater
crime then</HI> theft, <HI>St.</HI> Augu&s;tine <HI>doth confe&s;&s;e it,
and makes an&s;wer that</HI> neverthele&s;s it is wor&s;e to act
a theft, then to &s;uffer a man-&s;laughter; <HI>And to the
&s;ame purpo&s;e he expre&s;&s;eth him&s;elf in another place,</HI>
Quantumlibet di&s;tet inter tuum &amp; aliennm, hoc ta|men
erit tuum illud alienum. <HI>Let the crime be ne|ver
&s;o rightly &s;tated, yet</HI> this <HI>&s;hall be</HI> thy own, <HI>and</HI>
<PB N="63" REF="43">
that <HI>&s;hall be another mans. This is cleer, and I
need no longer to in&s;i&s;t upon it.</HI></P>
<P>XIX. In the fifth place, if it be yet demanded,
is it lawfull at lea&s;t for any man to per&s;wade a le&s;s
<HI>evil</HI> to him who is ready to commit a <HI>greater,</HI> as if
a man be ready to cut the throat of his enemy, to
per&s;wade him to inflict only &s;ome &s;light wound up|on
him. The &s;peech of <HI>Lot</HI> to his fellow Citizens
tendeth to this purpo&s;e; And there are many who
differ in their judgment concerning it. I do not
much wonder that <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome</HI> doth excu&s;e it, for
it is the inclination of his <HI>Genius</HI> and in the &s;ame
manner he excu&s;eth all the infirmities of the <HI>Patri|arches.
Ambro&s;e</HI> doth excu&s;e him al&s;o, and &s;o do ma|ny
more, e&s;pecially the <HI>Antients.</HI> But St. <HI>Au|gu&s;tine</HI>
doth cen&s;ure him as guilty of &s;in, and his
judgment hath been approved of by many who
&s;ince have followed him; and undoubtedly it doth
appear, that this holy man out of a pious affection
to his Gue&s;ts, being extreamly &s;ollicitous, that no
force or inj<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ry &s;hould be offered to them, did
&s;ome things, and peradventure &s;poke more out of
the di&s;temper of a troubled mind, than might ea&s;ily
be excu&s;ed. Therefore to pa&s;&s;e over this fact of <HI>Lot,</HI>
we will return from the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> to the <HI>The&s;is,</HI> or
to the que&s;tion now in hand; I do conceive that it
is lawfull for a man to per&s;wade a le&s;s evil unto his
friend to avoid the commi&s;&s;ion of a greater. If perad|venture
you &s;hall alledge, who&s;oever <HI>per&s;wades a &s;in</HI>
unto another, although it be but a little one, doth
neverthele&s;&s;e <HI>per&s;wade</HI> him to a <HI>&s;in,</HI> which who&s;oe|ver
doth do, he in that very <HI>Act</HI> doth make him&s;elf
guilty of <HI>another mans &s;in.</HI> I make an&s;wer, that it
is one thing <HI>ab&s;olutely</HI> to per&s;wade a man to <HI>this</HI> or
<PB N="64" REF="44">
<HI>that &s;in,</HI> which who&s;oever doth, he doth undoubted|ly
<HI>&s;in,</HI> and another thing to per&s;wade him to a <HI>&s;in
conditionally,</HI> and upon that &s;uppo&s;ition that he can|not
otherwi&s;e e&s;chew a greater <HI>&s;in,</HI> which being &s;up|po&s;ed,
and granted, he is not &s;o much to be e&s;teem|ed,
to have induced by his Coun&s;el another to a <HI>le&s;s
&s;in,</HI> as to have diverted him from a <HI>greater and a
more crying one,</HI> for he did not <HI>per&s;wade</HI> him to <HI>&s;in</HI>
as it was <HI>&s;in,</HI> but as it was a le&s;s <HI>&s;in,</HI> and the hin|derer
of a <HI>greater one.</HI> If you &s;hall again object;
If it be lawfull for me to per&s;wade another man
to make choyce of a <HI>le&s;s &s;in,</HI> why is it not lawfull
for that man of his own accord to <HI>make choice</HI> of
that &s;in, I not per&s;wading him to it, nay, why may
I not do that <HI>&s;afely</HI> my &s;elf, which <HI>lawfully</HI> I do per|&s;wade
unto another, and that is <HI>of two &s;ins pro|pounded
to make choice of the le&s;s.</HI> Or of the <HI>three</HI> ways
here &s;poken of, why is the fir&s;t only thought to be
lawfull, and neither of the <HI>two others,</HI> the manner
and the account of all the <HI>three</HI> appearing to be the
&s;ame. I make an&s;wer, and do con&s;tantly deny the
condition and the rea&s;on of them to be the &s;ame,
the difference being mo&s;t manife&s;t, that it is not
lawfull for <HI>him</HI> on <HI>his accord,</HI> nor for <HI>me</HI> on <HI>my own
accord</HI> to choo&s;e a le&s;s &s;in to avoid a greater, is be|cau&s;e
it being in both our powers (<HI>respectively</HI>) to
<HI>forbear both,</HI> we are both obliged to make choice of
neither, but that it is lawfull for me to per&s;wade
unto another, a <HI>le&s;s &s;in</HI> that a greater may be abando|ned,
doth proceed from this, that it is not in the
power of <HI>me the per&s;wader,</HI> (for that is already &s;up|po&s;ed)
to hinder or to &s;top the cour&s;e of <HI>either of
them;</HI> I mu&s;t do my endeavour indeed, as much as
lies in the <HI>power</HI> of my per&s;wa&s;ions, to give a &s;top
<PB N="65" REF="44">
unto <HI>them both,</HI> but when I find that I cannot per|form
that, which above all I <HI>would,</HI> and have a de&s;ire
to do, I do at the lea&s;t perform that which I am <HI>able,</HI>
and which I ought to do, to per&s;wade to a <HI>le&s;s &s;in</HI>
to hinder the commi&s;&s;ion of a <HI>greater.</HI></P>
<P>XX. By the&s;e things hitherto di&s;cour&s;ed of it
is ea&s;y to be under&s;tood, what is the &s;ence of that
Proverb, <HI>E malis minimum, Of evils the lea&s;t,</HI> and
what is the u&s;e of it in all humane con&s;ideration,
whether it be applyed to the <HI>evils</HI> of <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> or
to the <HI>evils</HI> of <HI>fault,</HI> for (as St. <HI>Augu&s;tine</HI> doth right|ly
lay down the &s;tate of the que&s;tions) it holds and
that univer&s;ally al&s;o, and in both the <HI>kind of evils,</HI> as
often as things do come &s;o to pa&s;s when it lyes in
our power, to e&s;chew one of the two evils if
not to avoid them both. Indeed every <HI>evil</HI> as it is
an <HI>evil</HI> is to be e&s;chewed by a pious and a prudent
man as much as lyes in his power, therefore two
kind of <HI>evils,</HI> of what kind &s;oever, being propound|ed,
he ought to avoid <HI>both, if po&s;&s;ible,</HI> if not he may
give ear to his admoni&s;her, and choo&s;e that which
is the lea&s;t; Neverthele&s;&s;e it doth not follow that
although he may choo&s;e the lea&s;t of two <HI>evils,</HI> whe|ther
the <HI>evil</HI> of the <HI>fault,</HI> or the <HI>evill</HI> of <HI>puni&s;hment,</HI>
that he may choo&s;e the lea&s;t of two &s;ins, for in &s;ins
both of them may be avoided as is already above
demon&s;trated; And thus much concerning the
&s;econd corallary.</P>
<P>Out of this principal <HI>conclu&s;ion,</HI> it followeth in the
third place, that they are in no le&s;&s;e, if not a greater
errour who conceive, that <HI>&s;in</HI> may drive out <HI>&s;in,</HI> as
one nayl doth drive out another, as for example,
<HI>Super&s;tition</HI> is to be driven out by <HI>Sacriledge</HI> and
<HI>Tyranny</HI> by <HI>Sedition</HI> &amp;c. And this commonly is the
<PB N="66" REF="45">
error of tho&s;e men who think them&s;elvs to be then
mo&s;t wi&s;e, when like Gardiners, when their plants
and twigs being crooked, &amp; &s;tooping too much on
the one &s;ide, they bend them &s;o much on the other
&s;ide, to make them &s;traight, that they quite do break
them off, and by taking too much care to avoid
one extreme, they improvidently do fall into an|other,
&s;o.</P>
<Q LANG="lat"><L>Stulti dum vitant vitia in contraria currunt.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Hor. Sa|tyr.</NOTE></L></Q>
<Q><L>Whiles fools &s;ome vices &s;trive to &s;hun,</L>
<L>Into their contraries they run</L></Q>
<P>Whiles they endeavour to keep off from <HI>Scylla,</HI>
they fall into <HI>Charibdis;</HI> And as that Aphori&s;m
hath &s;ome place in curing the affections of the bo|dy
(which notwith&s;tanding is not altogether appro|ved
by all the &s;ons of <HI>E&s;culapius) viz. Contraria
contrariis curari, extrema extremis,</HI> that <HI>Contraries
by contraries,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">.</NOTE> <HI>and extreams are cured by extreams,</HI> &s;o
in correcting the manners, and reforming the cor|ruptions
of the Church and Common-wealth, in|&s;tead
of remedy, it bringeth for the mo&s;t part a cer|tain
ruine. Grave is that &s;aving of <HI>Sophocies,</HI> in his
<HI>Stobaeus,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">.
<HI>Hence it is that the affairs of
mortals do &s;o much decay, that with one evil they would
cure another, and much of the &s;ame nature is that in his
Ajax.</HI></P>
<Q><L>&mdash;<GAP DESC="foreign">,</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L></Q>
<Q><L>One being tame, no more ill medecines try,</L>
<L>Le&s;t you contract &s;ome greater grief thereby.</L></Q>
<P><PB N="67" REF="45">
XXI. But if no other remedy can be procured
for the publick evils, unle&s;&s;e &s;ome go<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ly cou&s;enages
be admini&s;tred, and the lawes of God and men be
violated, were it not better to &s;uffer for a little
time that &s;uch things &s;hould be done, than that the
Common-wealth &s;hould be &s;ick and peri&s;h? I do
read indeed in the Holy Writ that <HI>Chaiphas</HI> the
high Prie&s;t of <HI>Jeru&s;alem</HI> was of that opinion, who
in the Senate of his Nation, all the re&s;pects to <HI>Law</HI>
and <HI>Ju&s;tice</HI> being laid a&s;ide,<NOTE PLACE="marg">John 11. 50.</NOTE> pronounced that <HI>Je&s;us</HI>
though guilty of no crime, was to be put to death,
becau&s;e it was expedient; I do remember I here|tofore
have read that one of the Bi&s;hops of <HI>Rome</HI>
being pre&s;ent at a great debate in the conclave of
the Cardinals, when it was told him by one of them
that the coun&s;el which was then propounded did
not appear to be ju&s;t unto him, he made an&s;wer, <HI>Al|though
it may not be done by the way of ju&s;tice yet it
mu&s;t be done by the way of expediency.</HI> This you &s;ee
what is the only way to be wi&s;e; This is the Divi|nity
of tho&s;e men whom they call <HI>Polititians</HI> taken
(as I believe) from the coun&s;els of the Je&s;uits, <HI>to
mea&s;ure all things by the profits of the holy mother the
Church,</HI> to write the word of God him&s;elf as they
plea&s;e, and <HI>this way</HI> and <HI>that way</HI> to bend it like a
no&s;e of wax, and to inforce it to an interpretation
for their own profit, according to their own &s;ence;
And as that <HI>Lacedemonian</HI> &s;aid, <HI>that all things at
Sparta were hone&s;t which were profitable,</HI> the&s;e &s;parks
of Sparta think nothing is filthy enough, nothing is
to be avoided that may be &s;ub&s;ervie<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">t to their ad|vantages;
But fie on this mad <HI>Divinity,</HI> let it be f<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">r
from our <HI>Schools, Pulpits,</HI> and <HI>Bre&s;ts.</HI> The holy
Apo&s;tles of our Saviour, have far otherwi&s;e in&s;truct|ed
<PB N="68" REF="46">
us, who would give no place to that que&s;tion, <HI>Is
it expedient or not,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">1 Cor. 10. 23.</NOTE> before they were fully &s;atisfied in
that other que&s;tion, <HI>is it lawfull or not?</HI> Nay the more
&s;ober &s;ort of the <HI>Heathens</HI> them&s;elves were of ano|ther
judgment, who as often as <HI>Hone&s;ty</HI> did &s;eem to
di&s;agree with profit, they &s;o always have made the
reconcilement, that they have pronounced that the
&s;ame is not profitable which is not al&s;o hone&s;t.</P>
<P>XXIII. But to make no long digre&s;&s;ion, St. <HI>Paul</HI>
in this ver&s;e doth altogether deny, that <HI>any evil is
to be done that good may come thereby,</HI> than which
words what can be &s;poken more plainly, or effectu|ally
to prove our conclu&s;ion; But not long &s;ince
I heard with the&s;e ears when tho&s;e words of the <HI>A|po&s;tle</HI>
were urged, and &s;ome then pre&s;ent could
not otherwi&s;e defend what they &s;o much de|&s;ired
to maintain, they made u&s;e of this di&s;tinction,
that it was not lawfull indeed for a <HI>private man</HI> to
do <HI>evil</HI> at his own plea&s;ure <HI>that good may come there|by,</HI>
and this was only that which St. <HI>Paul</HI> in the&s;e
words did prohibit, but it was lawfull notwith&s;tand|ing
for the common-Council of a Nation to who&s;e
care it doth belong that the <HI>Common-wealth &s;hould
receive no detriment</HI> to do it, if the <HI>publick nece&s;&s;ity</HI>
and the <HI>&s;afety of the people</HI> do &s;o require; <HI>What</HI> and
how much is to be done for the &s;afety of the peo|ple
I &s;hall hereafter God willing examine, and de|termine:
In the mean time it is in the fir&s;t place to
be ob&s;erved that this is but an extravagant &s;ugge&s;ti|on,
and that there is nothing in the whole di&s;cour&s;e
of St. <HI>Paul,</HI> on which that di&s;tinction may rely. <HI>Se|condly,</HI>
If we &s;hall mark the force, and the &s;cope of
St. <HI>Pauls</HI> argument in this place, we &s;hall perceive
that all &s;uch limitations, and ridiculous inventions
<PB N="69" REF="46">
of deceitfull men, for the <HI>Apostle</HI> here meets with
the objection for promoting the <HI>glory of God,</HI> by the
&s;ins of men, he denyeth that <HI>evil</HI> is to be done for
that <HI>end</HI> to render the <HI>glory of God</HI> more illu&s;trious.
It followeth therefore, <HI>a fortiori, from the stronger,</HI>
that no evill things are to be done, for any thing that
is inferiour to the <HI>glory of God;</HI> And &s;eeing the
<HI>glory of God</HI> is infinitely to be preferred to all hu|mane
<HI>good</HI> what&s;oever, whether <HI>publick,</HI> or <HI>private,</HI>
and it is not lawfull notwith&s;tanding to do evil for
<HI>Gods glory,</HI> certainly it is not lawfull for a <HI>private
man</HI> or for the <HI>Repre&s;entatives</HI> of a whole Common|alty
for the redre&s;&s;e of any <HI>publick</HI> or <HI>private incon|venience</HI>
to do <HI>evil</HI> them&s;elves, or to commend it to
be done by another.</P>
<P>XXIV. Let us meditate I be&s;eech you (my hea|rers)
on the&s;e things with our &s;elves and that mo&s;t
&s;eriou&s;ly, and the wor&s;e that the dayes are, and the
more that the &s;nares of temptation are, and the
a&s;&s;aults more violent, let us walk the more exactly,
and look unto our &s;teps with a greater circum&s;pecti|on,
let us not &s;uffer our &s;elves by any machinations
of the Devills, or allurements of fle&s;h &amp; the world
to be led a&s;ide, though never &s;o little, from that
right, &amp; that &s;treight path of the Commandments of
God; carrying allwayes in our memoryes that the
<HI>evils</HI> which wittingly and willfully we have com|mitted,
&s;hall find no excu&s;e in that day when <HI>God
&s;hall be our Iudge,</HI> and our <HI>Con&s;ciences our witne&s;&s;es,</HI>
And thus much concerning the pretence of a <HI>good
Intention:</HI> what remaineth to be &s;poken concerning
the <HI>examples</HI> &amp; <HI>placits</HI> of men, &s;o far as it appertain|eth
to the regiment of con&s;cience, I will (God wil|ling)
proceed to give you a full account of it in my
following Lecture.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="3" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="70" REF="47">
<HEAD>THE
THIRD LECTURE,
In which is declared that neither in
the examples of good men, nor
the judgment of experienced
men, there is protection e|nough
to &s;ecure the
Con&s;cience.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>GAL. 2. 13.</BIBL>
<Q><GAP DESC="foreign">&mdash;</Q>
<Q>And the other Jews
di&s;&s;embled likewi&s;e with him, in&s;omuch that Barna|bas
was brought into their di&s;simulation al&s;o.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_HAving propounded to my &s;elf to
examine and di&s;cover to you the
<HI>adaequate rule of Con&s;cience</HI> which
is to be the certain and &s;afe Law
how to lead our lives; I conceived
it in the fir&s;t place mo&s;t nece&s;&s;ary,
to declare unto you in what a grievous &amp; dangerous
errour they are, who think in the things they
<PB N="71" REF="47">
do they provide well enough for the &s;ecurity
of their own Con&s;ciences, if either by the flattering
intention of &s;ome <HI>good end,</HI> or the <HI>example</HI> of &s;ome
holy man, or the <HI>authority</HI> and <HI>judgment</HI> of a man fa|mous
for learning and <HI>piety,</HI> they can any ways de|fend
them&s;elves and what they have done; And
truly how little protection there is in a bare <HI>good in|tention</HI>
either as to the benefit of the Con&s;cience or
the confidence of any good work, without the other
concomitants of it, I think hath been &s;ufficiently
declared by me in my former Lecture, where by
many rea&s;ons I have convinced, that <HI>no evil is to be
done that good may en&s;ue thereby.</HI> It remaineth that
this day, I do repre&s;ent unto you, that neither the
<HI>example</HI> nor the <HI>judgment</HI> of any man ought to be
of &s;o great <HI>authority</HI> with us, that our <HI>Con&s;ciences</HI>
may &s;ecurely re&s;t in either of them; and neither
from that alone can we duely conclude, that all
things which are pa&s;&s;ed are rightly done, or tho&s;e
things for the time to come are &s;imply lawfull to be
done, which another man indued with never &s;o
much <HI>learning</HI> and <HI>&s;anctity</HI> hath either done
him&s;elf, or hath judged lawfull to be put into
practice by another.</P>
<P>II. Moreover, how un&s;afe it is to frame our lives
and actions to the examples of other men, and how
un&s;atisfying it is to the &s;ecurity of the Con&s;cience
to defend our &s;elves by alledging, that what&s;oever
we have done or are about to do, hath been done al|ready
by &s;ome pious man before us, may by a mo&s;t
cleer argument appear by the words of the
propo&s;ed Text, e&s;pecially if we &s;hall go a little high|er
and derive the ground and the occa&s;ion of them
from the Hi&s;tory of the thing performed. St. <HI>Peter
<PB N="72" REF="48">
the Apo&s;tle</HI> living at <HI>Antioch</HI> among&s;t the Gentiles
converted to the Chri&s;tian faith, who were not
bound incon&s;cience to the ob&s;ervation of the Law of
<HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> did freely eat with them, and did partake of
what&s;oever meats were &s;et before him, as well pro|hibited
as permitted to the people of the Jewes,
without the lea&s;t &s;cruple according to the liberty
which he had in Chri&s;t. But when &s;ome Chri&s;tians
of the nation of the Jewes came to <HI>Antioch</HI> from
Jeru&s;alem, whither they were tho&s;e <HI>fal&s;e brethren</HI>
<GAP DESC="foreign"> of whom mention is made in
the fourth ver&s;e of this 2 of the <HI>Galatians,</HI> who pre|tending
that they came from <HI>James</HI> did indeed <HI>creep
in privily of them&s;elves,</HI> to ob&s;erve the liberty of St.
<HI>Paul,</HI> and other Chri&s;tians, as &s;ome do think, or ra|ther
(as others are of opinion, and more probably)
whether they were <HI>weak Brethren</HI> &s;ent indeed by St.
<HI>James,</HI> but as yet not throughly in&s;tructed concern|ing
the ce&s;&s;ation of the Rites and Ceremonies of
the Law; St. <HI>Peter</HI> de&s;iring to be gracious with
them, or rather fearing to give them an offence, did
immediately, and altogether, ab&s;tain from the Tables,
and the &s;ociety of the Gentiles, and from the <HI>meats</HI>
forbidden in the Law of <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> by who&s;e example
the <HI>Jews</HI> of <HI>Antioch</HI> being induced, who by the Ser|mons
of <HI>Paul</HI> and his <HI>fellow labourers</HI> in <HI>Chri&s;t</HI> had
been taught the Chri&s;tian <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">iberty a little better than
tho&s;e that came from <HI>Jeru&s;alem,</HI> and more fully un|der&s;tood
the aboli&s;hing of the ceremonial Law, yet
being but weak them&s;elves, and more addicted to
the ceremonies to which a long time they had been
accu&s;tomed, they ea&s;ily &s;uffered them&s;elves to be
&s;eperated from the communion of their brethren
the believing Gentiles, not without &s;ome &s;u&s;pition
<PB N="73" REF="48">
(as it is probable) that <HI>Peter</HI> the chief of the Apo|&s;tles,
was the more compent judge of the&s;e things, &amp;
what was to be done, &amp; that them&s;elvs were hither|to
drawn in by <HI>Paul</HI> with the gratefull but the emp|ty
&s;hew of liberty; and what is more to be admired
(for it is not &s;trange or unaccu&s;tomed for the weak|er
&s;ort to &s;tumble) even <HI>Barnabas</HI> him&s;elf, who
was St. <HI>Pauls</HI> collegue, and his daily companion
in his journeys, who con&s;tantly a&s;&s;erted the Do|ctrine
of <HI>Chri&s;tian liberty</HI> again&s;t the Jews, being o|vercome
by the authority of &s;o great an Apo&s;tle,
did &s;toop with him into the &s;ame fellow&s;hip
of di&s;&s;imulation, not without a great offence to the
believing Gentiles.</P>
<P>III. <HI>Paul</HI> doth here declare, that for this fact St.
<HI>Peter</HI> was reprehended by him, and that vehement|ly,
openly, and de&s;ervedly; Not only that he him|&s;elf,
to the &s;candal of &s;o many of the brethren, out
of too great de&s;ire of complacence, or th<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> fear of
offence; had &s;hewed him&s;elf more favourable to
the Jewi&s;h ceremonies, than did become him, but
that he drew others by his example into the &s;ame
participation of Hypocri&s;ie with him, and by the
&s;ame example had endeavouted to enforce the be|lieving
Gentiles, although unwilling, and again&s;t
their Con&s;ciences, unto <HI>Judai&s;me:</HI> I am not igno|rant
that St. <HI>Hierom</HI> (having alleged &s;ome other
Authors that jump with him in that opinion) doth
give a far different interpretation of this reproof,
than what I here have &s;pecified, <HI>viz.</HI> That this af|fair
was not carryed <HI>&s;eriou&s;ly,</HI> and as indeed it was
betwixt the&s;e two <HI>chiefe&s;t</HI> of the <HI>Apo&s;tles,</HI> but
<GAP DESC="foreign">, and by <HI>contrivance,</HI> the benefit of
the Church at that time &s;o requiring it. Indeed he
<PB N="74" REF="49">
would per&s;wade us that this <HI>di&s;&s;imulation</HI> of St. <HI>Pe|ter</HI>
was nece&s;&s;ary to retain the good opinion of the
<HI>Jews,</HI> which that it might not be too dangerous
to the <HI>Gentiles,</HI> this <HI>counterfeit</HI> reproof of St. <HI>Paul</HI>
was altogether as nece&s;&s;ary, by which the <HI>errour of
the Jews,</HI> concerning the continuing force of the
<HI>ceremonial Rites</HI> might be &s;o corrected, that by the
&s;ame endeavour, provi&s;ion &s;hould be made that no
danger of &s;candal &s;hould be given to the Gentiles.
And thus by the conjoyned <HI>di&s;&s;imulation</HI> of both
the <HI>Apo&s;tles,</HI> it was &s;o effected, that the Jewes as
well as the Gentiles &s;hould by this <HI>pious fraud</HI> be
more ea&s;ily retained, in the <HI>faith</HI> of <HI>Chri&s;t,</HI> which
not long they had imbraced. The&s;e words there|fore
<GAP DESC="foreign"> are &s;o hand&s;omly in|terpreted
by him to maintain his own opinion
(as above all other of the <HI>Fathers</HI> he is accu&s;tomed
<GAP DESC="foreign">, to &s;erve tho&s;e a&s;&s;ertions
which are but his own conjectures) that the words
he <HI>with&s;tood him to the face</HI> do not in his con&s;tructi|on
&s;ignifie, <HI>openly,</HI> and <HI>before the people,</HI> or to his
<HI>own face,</HI> but only under <HI>a pretence</HI> and <HI>&s;hew,</HI> and
according to the <HI>outward appearance,</HI> in which
con&s;truction the&s;e words <GAP DESC="foreign"> are by him
u&s;urped al&s;o, as it is manife&s;t 2 <HI>Cor.</HI> 10. 7.</P>
<P>IV. This opinion of St. <HI>Hierome</HI> was nothing
plea&s;ing to St. <HI>Augu&s;tine,</HI> who denieth that any
thing was here done by <HI>contract</HI> or <HI>contrivance,</HI> but
that St <HI>Paul</HI> mo&s;t &s;incerely, and expr&s;sely did op|po&s;e
him&s;elf to this un&s;ea&s;onable <HI>combination;</HI> he
therfore in a letter did very friendly admoni&s;h St.
<HI>Hierome</HI> of his errour,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Inter E|pi&s;t. Hie|rou. Epi&s;t. 97.</NOTE> who per&s;i&s;ting more ob&s;tinate
in his opinion, (letters being often &s;ent from the
one to the other) the que&s;tion began to be di&s;pu|ted
<PB N="75" REF="49">
betwixt them (as became the conte&s;tation of
two &s;uch great wits) with much acutene&s;&s;e on both
&s;ides, and with &s;olid weights of <HI>rea&s;on;</HI> at the la&s;t
in the judgment of mo&s;t men, the victory &s;tood on
St. <HI>Augu&s;tines</HI> &s;ide, and his arguments being con|ceived
to be more &s;ound, and more con&s;iderable,
but very few did adhere to the opinion of <HI>Chry|&s;o&s;tome;</HI>
in which it is not to be wondred at, if <HI>Car|dinall
Baronius</HI> were one, who being carefull that
the affairs of <HI>Rome</HI> &s;hould not &s;uffer any <HI>diminuti|on,</HI>
and that the <HI>infallibility</HI> of his <HI>Jove of the Capitoll</HI>
&s;hould not grow into contempt, if any &s;tain of
<HI>ra&s;hne&s;s</HI> or <HI>error</HI> &s;hould blemi&s;h the reputation of
St. <HI>Peter,</HI> or if any man &s;hould be &s;o bold to rep|rove
him, or to dare to open his mouth again&s;t
him, by &s;aying, (<HI>Ma&s;ter why do you &s;o.</HI>) doth here
u&s;e all his art and indu&s;try to crown with applau&s;e
the exploded opinion of St. <HI>Hierome,</HI> and to re&s;tore it
unto <HI>honor,</HI> though bani&s;hed, and begging for <HI>repu|tation</HI>
all the world over; but truly this is that <HI>Baro|nius</HI>
(as every where he doth betray him&s;elf to be
partiall) who in his voluminous, and laborious
Chronicles did make it all his bu&s;ines to gratify the
<HI>Bi&s;hop</HI> of <HI>Rome,</HI> and to mea&s;ure the faith and Au|thority
of all <HI>monuments</HI> and the great <HI>moments</HI> of
all <HI>opinions</HI> and <HI>te&s;timonies</HI> by the dignity and Ad|vancement
of the <HI>Sea of Rome.</HI> But <HI>Paul</HI> (to return
from whence I have digre&s;&s;ed) did mo&s;t iu&s;tly re|prove
St. <HI>Peter</HI> his fellow Apo&s;tle <GAP DESC="foreign">; that
is <HI>face</HI> to <HI>face</HI> (as the &s;ame phra&s;e is read in the 15
of the <HI>Acts</HI> and in other places) of <HI>importunate
di&s;&s;imulation,</HI> and this he did <HI>boldly</HI> and <HI>openly</HI> before
all, and more e&s;pecially becau&s;e that by his exam|ple;
he had drawn <HI>Barnabas</HI> into an error, and the
<PB N="76" REF="50">
<HI>Jewes</HI> of <HI>Antioch,</HI> and given a great, and a greiveous
offence to the <HI>Gentiles</HI> who had newly imbraced the
Chri&s;tian faith to the great danger and &s;candal of
the liberty of the Go&s;pel.</P>
<P>V. I have more willingly inlarged my &s;elf upon
this, as well to give &s;ome light to a place heretofore
ob&s;cure, and much controverted, as to make more
manife&s;t the force of the argument which for the
confirmation of our <HI>po&s;ition</HI> is deduced from this
di&s;cour&s;e <HI>of the Apo&s;tle.</HI> For St. <HI>Paul</HI> judged that
not only St. <HI>Peter</HI> who was the <HI>leading example,</HI> but
that <HI>Barnabas,</HI> and others al&s;o who followed him,
and did con&s;ent to the &s;ame di&s;&s;imulation, were to
be noted, <GAP DESC="foreign"> as men that did not
<HI>tread with an upright foot,</HI> nor walked according to
the &s;implicity of the truth of Chri&s;t: By which it is
mo&s;t evident, that, St. <HI>Paul</HI> being Judge, it would ren|der
no great advantage unto uncertain <HI>Barnabas,</HI> and
halting as it were betwixt <HI>Judai&s;m</HI> and <HI>Chri&s;tia|ni&s;m</HI>
to call into the patronage of his di&s;&s;imulation
the <HI>example</HI> of St. <HI>Peter,</HI> although of the highe&s;t e&s;ti|mation
among&s;t the Apo&s;tles; but grant that <HI>Peter</HI>
was worthy of a &s;harper reprehen&s;ion, becau&s;e that
by his example he became a <HI>&s;tumbling block</HI> to ano|ther,
neverthele&s;s <HI>Barnabas</HI> is not the more to be
excu&s;ed, that he tran&s;gre&s;&s;ed by following the ex|ample
of another; And this may &s;uffice concerning
our fir&s;t <HI>argument</HI> taken from the Text of St. <HI>Paul.</HI></P>
<P>VI. The &s;econd argument is derived from the
<HI>difficulty</HI> of <HI>judging,</HI> for &s;eeing that all the deeds of
the righteous are not to be imitated, it is no obvi|ous
thing to under&s;tand what deeds of theirs are to
be <HI>examplar;</HI> and what not; and that by rea&s;on of a
<HI>twofold uncertainty</HI> that is in them; For it may &s;o
<PB N="77" REF="50">
come to pa&s;&s;e both ways, that what a righteous man
hath done, may not be <HI>well done,</HI> and hath been well
done by him, is neverthele&s;s not to be imitated by us.
In the fir&s;t place mo&s;t certain it is, that tho&s;e deeds
of theirs which are <HI>ill done</HI> are not to be imitated,
and that the mo&s;t holy of men have had their ble|mi&s;hes,
and infirmities, it having plea&s;ed the mo&s;t
wi&s;e God to permit them to fall &s;ometimes into
the mo&s;t grievous &s;ins, of <HI>murder, adultery, idolatry,</HI>
and the <HI>renouncing of their faiths,</HI> that they might
con&s;ider that they are but men, and by their own ex|perience
that they as well do pertake with, as they do
pardon the mi&s;treadings of another, that &s;o they
might not tru&s;t in their own &s;trengths again&s;t temp|tations
but depend altogether on the a&s;&s;i&s;tance of
God, and if <HI>unconquered, un&s;haken,</HI> or <HI>unhurt</HI> they
have &s;u&s;tayned the mo&s;t violent a&s;&s;aults of temp|tations,
that they may acknowledge it to proceed
wholy from the <HI>providence,</HI> and the <HI>grace</HI> of God;
and it hath plea&s;ed <HI>him who worketh all in all accord|ing
to the coun&s;els of his own will,</HI> that &s;ome of their
<HI>foulest defects</HI> &s;hould <HI>punctually</HI> be expre&s;&s;ed in the
book of <HI>holy Writ,</HI> that &s;o <HI>illu&s;trious, and never dying
examples</HI> &s;hould remain unto all ages, on the one &s;ide
of humane <HI>frailty</HI> and <HI>incon&s;tancy,</HI> and on the other
of the <HI>Divine goodne&s;s and mercy.</HI></P>
<P>VII. Peradventure it will be here objected. It
is true indeed, that tho&s;e Examples of the Saints
are not to be imitated, which in the word of God
are expre&s;&s;ely noted to be ill done, for what &s;ober
man will propound unto him&s;elf either the <HI>abnega|tion</HI>
of St. <HI>Peter,</HI> or the <HI>adultery of David,</HI> as exam|ples
for him to imitate; Neverthele&s;&s;e it doth &s;eem
that we may &s;afely take examples from tho&s;e acts of
<PB N="78" REF="51">
theirs which are &s;o recorded in the Scriptures, that
they are there as free from <HI>disprai&s;e,</HI> as from any
tincture of <HI>guilt;</HI> I make an&s;wer, that this is not
to be done, for in the Scriptures (as every where in
other Hi&s;tories) the deeds of many men are only <HI>hi|&s;torically</HI>
and nakedly related, ju&s;t as they were done,
&amp; are neither expre&s;&s;ely <HI>commended,</HI> or <HI>di&s;commen|ded</HI>
by the Writers, notwith&s;tanding it is not to be
doubted, that &s;ome of them were unju&s;t, &s;ome of
them di&s;hone&s;t, and far from the duty of a godly
man; And many other things there are recorded of,
which we may not unde&s;ervedly doubt, whether
they were well done or ill done, concerning which
the Interpreters are accu&s;tomed to expre&s;s them|&s;elves
probably and liberally on both &s;ides; Of
&s;uch a nature is that act of <HI>Lot,</HI> offering the violati|on
of his Daughters Virginities to the impure Citi|zens
of <HI>Sodom,</HI> and that act of <HI>Jo&s;eph</HI> &s;wearing as it is
thought by the life of <HI>Pharaoh;</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Gen. 19. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">. 42. 15. 16.</NOTE> and that act of <HI>Ja|cob,</HI>
craftily &s;tealing from <HI>E&s;au</HI> his brother, the be|nediction
of his father; and many other examples of
the &s;ame nature, which if any man &s;hall adventure
to follow, on this pre&s;umption only, that he hath
read the &s;ame things to be acted by godly men, and
not to be condemned, he &s;hall object him&s;elf to a
mo&s;t certain <HI>danger</HI> of errour and of &s;in, by <HI>&s;ubject|ing</HI>
his Con&s;cience to a mo&s;t uncertain Law.</P>
<P>VIII. But you will &s;ay, we may &s;afely how&s;oever
follow tho&s;e examples which expre&s;&s;ely are com|mended
in the world of God; I make an&s;wer, that
even <HI>this</HI> al&s;o is not <HI>&s;imply</HI> to be granted, for in the
fir&s;t place I &s;ay, that what&s;oever <HI>deeds</HI> of men are o|penly
condemned in the word of God to be vitious,
they are &s;imply to be e&s;chewed; for the &s;trength
<PB N="79" REF="51">
and u&s;e of bad examples are more powerfull to ar|gue
<HI>negatively</HI> upon them, than of good examples
to argue <HI>affirmatively,</HI> which manner of arguing out
Apo&s;tle u&s;eth, 1 <HI>Cor.</HI> 10 6. &amp;c. where having pro|pounded
out of the Ho&s;tory of the old Te&s;tament
the examples of &s;everal &s;orts of &s;ins, as al&s;o of the
<HI>judgments</HI> of God upon the prevaricators of his Law,
he doth admoni&s;h that all of us would look upon
them as <HI>types</HI> and examples, not to imitate, but to
e&s;chew them. <GAP DESC="foreign">.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ut fuge|rem, exem|plis viti<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">|rum quae|que nota<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">do. 1 <HI>Sa|tyr.</HI> 4.</NOTE>
That we may not <HI>lust</HI> after evil things as &s;ome of
them <HI>lusted,</HI> nor wor&s;hip <HI>Idols,</HI> nor commit <HI>forni|cation,</HI>
nor <HI>tempt Chri&s;t,</HI> nor <HI>murmur</HI> in afflictions as
they have done.</P>
<Q LANG="lat"><L>&mdash;Hoc quidem non bell&egrave;, nunquid ego illi</L>
<L>Imprudens ol&igrave;m faciam &s;imile: <HI>Horat. ibid.</HI></L></Q>
<Q><L>This is not well, but filly Elf,</L>
<L>Shall not I do the like my &s;elf.</L></Q>
<P>IX. In the &s;econd place I do affirm that what
<HI>Deeds</HI> in the Scriptures are expre&s;&s;ely pray&s;ed, and
are &s;o pray&s;ed, that they may &s;eem to be propoun|ded
to us for Examples, are notwith&s;tanding not
&s;uddainly, and headily to be followed by us, nei|ther
mu&s;t we imagine that the whole aggregate
Action, as it was at fir&s;t performed, is commen|ded
unto us to imitate; But we mu&s;t u&s;e <HI>choyce</HI> and
<HI>caution</HI> to imitate tho&s;e things which are commen|dable,
on that part only of them, and intirely on
that account for which they are commended. The
rea&s;on of this <HI>Caution</HI> is, becau&s;e that God
oftentimes in a <HI>mixt Action</HI> according to his infinite
<PB N="80" REF="52">
goodne&s;&s;e, doth <HI>approve</HI> and look upon that only in
it which is <HI>Good,</HI> and doth pa&s;&s;e by, and as it were
takes no notice of that in it which is <HI>Evil;</HI> As in the
16 <HI>Luke 8. The Lord pray&s;ed the unju&s;t Steward, be|cau&s;e
he had done wi&s;ely;</HI> although in the &s;ame Act
he had hazarded the <HI>Reputation</HI> of his <HI>Tru&s;t.</HI> The
<HI>Wi&s;dome</HI> therefore, and not the <HI>Inju&s;tice</HI> of that
Steward, is to be imitated; Again in that com|mended
Example of the <HI>Egyptian Midvives</HI> pre&s;er|ving
the new-born of the I<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">raelites, and by a <HI>Lye</HI>
excu&s;ing their contempt of the Kings Commande|ment,
their <HI>Lye</HI> is not to be numbred with their
<HI>humanity</HI> and their <HI>piety,</HI> but careful<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">y to be &s;eve|red,
and di&s;tingui&s;hed from it, for their <HI>Lye</HI> was
a Vice, and not to be followed, but their <HI>humani|ty</HI>
and their <HI>piety</HI> is pray&s;ed by God, and they both
de&s;erve our <HI>Imitation.</HI></P>
<P>X. In the third place I &s;ay, that the extraordi|nary
<HI>atchievements</HI> of the <HI>Worthyes</HI> are pray&s;ed in the
Scriptures which, being &s;tirred up by a peculiar
motion and in&s;piration of the holy Spirit they per|formed
as it were by a peculiar mandate, and
beyond the ordinary Law, and yet notwith&s;tanding
tho&s;e <HI>atchievements</HI> are not to be followed. Of this
Nature, is that remarkable Act of <HI>Phineas,</HI> for
which he received both <HI>commendations</HI> and <HI>recom|pence</HI>
from God him&s;elf, for being but a private
Man, and inve&s;ted with no Lawful Authority, he did
notwith&s;tanding with his Spear, run through the bo|dies
of tho&s;e two &s;hamele&s;&s;e per&s;ons, whom he
had taken in the Act of Incontinency. <HI>Numb.</HI> 25.
8. And of the &s;ame nature was that of <HI>Elias</HI> the
Prophet, who having called <HI>Fire</HI> down from Heaven
de&s;troyed the Souldiers that were &s;ent to &s;ecure
<PB N="81" REF="52">
him. 2 <HI>Kings 4. 10. &amp;c.</HI> Which Act of his, when
two of the Di&s;ciples of Chri&s;t <HI>James</HI> and <HI>John</HI> de|&s;iring
to imitate, having asked coun&s;el of their
Ma&s;ter concerning it, he was &s;o far from approving
their ra&s;h de&s;ires,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Luke 9 54</NOTE> that he did reject them, and
gave a great check to their Chole<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ick Importunity,
<HI>You know not</HI> (&s;aith he) <HI>of what Spirit you are;</HI> As
if he &s;hould have &s;aid, forbear the extravagant
heats of your unquiet minds, and contain your &s;elves
within the bounds of your Vocation; If <HI>Elias</HI> here|tofore
did any thing &s;everely, do not you &s;uppo&s;e
that the &s;ame thing is fitting to be performed by
you. That which he did, was effected by the ex|traordinary
Spirit of God, which inwardly did &s;ug|ge&s;t
and dictate to him, and was like unto that parti|cular
Mandate which was given to <HI>Abraham</HI> to kill
his Son <HI>I&s;aac,</HI> But this belongs not to you whom the
<HI>Spirit of God</HI> hath not yet called to the Execution
of &s;o extraordinary and &s;o high a charge, you ought
not to entertain any thought of attempting it.</P>
<P><HI>XI. Seeing therefore it is not alwayes certain
that what hath been performed by a Godly Man,
ought to be commended, and though it hath been
commended, it ought not unpremeditately to be
imitated, it is far more conducible to the &s;ecurity
of our Con&s;ciences to bring home and conform our</HI>
Deeds <HI>to the</HI> Rule <HI>of the</HI> Law <HI>which is</HI> certain, <HI>than
to follow the</HI> uncertain Examples <HI>of Men. Mo&s;t
true is that of St.</HI> Augu&s;tine, Haec quae in Scripturis
Sanctis legimus, non ide&ograve; qui&agrave; facta credimus, eti|am
facienda credamus: ne violemus praecepta, dum
pa&s;&s;im &s;ectamur exempla. We ought not to believe that
the&s;e things which we read in the Holy Scriptures, are
therefore to be done again, becau&s;e, that already they
<PB N="82" REF="53">
have been performed, lea&s;t we violate the precepts,
whiles every where we do follow the Examples. <HI>And
after other words to the &s;ame purpo&s;e, he doth
thus conclude;</HI> Unde con&s;tat, quod non omnia quae &agrave;
Sanctis et ju&s;tis viris legimus facta transfere debe|mus
ad mores. From hence it is manife&s;t, that we
ought not to tran&s;late all things into practice and man|ners
which we do read to have been performed by holy
and ju&s;t men. <HI>And thus far of our</HI> &s;econd Argument
<HI>concerning the difficulty of judging the examples of
Godly men by rea&s;on of the great uncertainty which
is in them.</HI></P>
<P>XII. The third Argument followeth, taken from
the difficulty of <HI>rightly applying</HI> the Examples of
other men, to our own Affairs and Actions, by rea|&s;on
of the <HI>uncertainty of the Circum&s;tances</HI> which be|ing
of an infinite variety, do al&s;o infinitely vary
the qualities of humane Actions; That which is
<HI>free</HI> and <HI>lawful</HI> in the <HI>The&s;is,</HI> that is, the <HI>Po&s;itions,</HI> is &s;o
al&s;o in the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> or <HI>Suppo&s;ition,</HI> the &s;ame <HI>Circum|stances</HI>
remaining, I call that <HI>lawful</HI> which may be
done without <HI>Sin,</HI> and that <HI>free,</HI> which without <HI>Sin</HI>
may be omitted; now the &s;ame thing (any one cir|cum&s;tance
being added or taken away, or any wayes
changed) may be made <HI>unlawful</HI> of that which was
<HI>Lawful,</HI> and <HI>nece&s;&s;ary</HI> of that which before was
<HI>free;</HI> and this we &s;ee every day by Experience in
our Courts of <HI>Law,</HI> when pleadings are made at the
Bar, where by the advocate of one &s;ide, the prece|ding
Examples of <HI>Ca&s;es</HI> before judged are cited for
the advantage of their Cau&s;e, and it is an&s;wered by
the Advocate of the other &s;ide, that there is not in
both <HI>Ca&s;es</HI> the &s;ame <HI>Rea&s;on</HI> of <HI>Law,</HI> that the Cir|cum&s;tances
are varyed, from whence it comes to
<PB N="83" REF="53">
pa&s;&s;e that the <HI>Ca&s;e</HI> is altered, and tho&s;e things
which were cited to be <HI>reported,</HI> and to be <HI>judged
of before;</HI> do not appertain to the Suit now in
Controver&s;ie; But if that rightly the <HI>Ca&s;e</HI> be de|mon&s;trated,
the whole frame of the Defence which
did &s;upport it &s;elf on this Foundation, doth pre&s;ent|ly
fall to the ground; And the <HI>precedent</HI> taken here|tofore
of the things that have been &s;o judged, will
be of no moment at all with the <HI>Judges.</HI> From
hence it comes to pa&s;&s;e, that among&s;t the &s;everal
kinds of Argumentation with Logicians, the <HI>Exem|plum</HI>
or <HI>Example</HI> is ranked among&s;t the la&s;t, as more
fit to <HI>illu&s;trate</HI> than to demon&s;trate a thing. And
certainly if that of <HI>Fabius</HI> be true, <HI>Tot &s;eculis nul|lam
repertam e&s;&s;e cau&s;am quae &s;it tota alteri &s;imilis;
In &s;o many ages there hath never yet any cau&s;e been
found which hath been altogether like to one another;</HI>
Its likely enough that very ea&s;ily he may Erre,
who by the condition of <HI>one cau&s;e</HI> doth ha&s;tily pa&s;&s;e
his Judgement on <HI>another</HI> like unto it, having not
fir&s;t with all diligence weighed with him&s;elf the cir|cum&s;tances
of them both.</P>
<P>XIII. In which con&s;ideration we are &s;o much the
more ready to fall into an error becau&s;e we are mo&s;t
of us of &s;uch a temper, that in the application of the
examples of others unto our &s;elves, we only look
upon the bare <HI>fact,</HI> and greedily make u&s;e of it by
enforcing it to our purpo&s;e, e&s;pecially if it &s;eems to
comply with our affections, and the <HI>de&s;ires</HI> of our
hearts, in the mean time taking not into our lea&s;t
con&s;ideration, either the cau&s;es of the <HI>fact,</HI> or of
the <HI>end,</HI> or the manner of the circum&s;tances of it,
e&s;pecially if they are not &s;uitable or complacent
unto us. The Prophet <HI>Amos</HI> in the &s;ixth Chapter,
<PB N="84" REF="54">
and fifth ver&s;e, doth reprove &s;ome of his time, who
in the mid&s;t of publick calamities, being too &s;loth|full
and &s;ecure, did delight them&s;elves in Riot and all
manner of plea&s;ures, and among&s;t other things did
whi&s;per unto them&s;elves <HI>that like unto David they
did invent unto them&s;elves instruments of Mu&s;ick,</HI> as
if they &s;hould have &s;aid, <HI>why &s;hould that be condemn|ed
in us to be a Vice,</HI> which was a <HI>prai&s;e</HI> and <HI>honour</HI>
unto <HI>David.</HI> That Holy Man did exerci&s;e him&s;elf
in P&s;alms, and In&s;truments of Mu&s;ick; And we do
the like; but in the mean time we do di&s;&s;emble
with our &s;elves, and fail in that which principally
was to be imitated in <HI>David,</HI> for he did it to the
<HI>Honour of God,</HI> and the <HI>Solemnity</HI> of his <HI>wor&s;hip</HI> in
<HI>publick,</HI> and not to the <HI>exce&s;&s;e</HI> in Bankettings, and
the fomenting of <HI>Sloth</HI> and <HI>Wantonne&s;&s;e.</HI></P>
<P>XIV. The Rhetoricians do give many Precepts
concerning Imitation in Oratory, to wit, that it
will be profitable for him who would be an <HI>Orator</HI>
to propound unto him&s;elf &s;ome remarkable per&s;on,
who is excellent in the <HI>Art</HI> of <HI>Speaking</HI> whom
he mu&s;t indeavour to imitate; which al&s;o the Phi|lo&s;ophers
do make mention of as a &s;alubrious pre|cept
for the in&s;titution of our lives. <HI>Seneca</HI> doth
exhort us to the Example of &s;ome famous and ex|cellent
per&s;on for the better compo&s;ition of our
lives, &amp; manners, <HI>for the way by precepts, he &s;aith, is te|dious,
which is made but &s;hort and more effectual by
Examples. Examples</HI> moreover do carry with
them a kind of &s;ecret delight, and have joyned to
them as much profit as per&s;wa&s;ion, as we may &s;ee
in little Children, who unwillingly do obey the
commands of others, but take a great plea&s;ure to
imitate their Acts; Tho&s;e men neverthele&s;&s;e who
<PB N="85" REF="54">
give the&s;e Coun&s;els do withal advi&s;e us, that to <HI>live
well and happily,</HI> we ought to have a &s;ound judgment
to make a wi&s;e choice, both of the men whom we
would propound unto our &s;elves for examples, and
of the things them&s;elves which we are to imitate;
<HI>Fabius</HI> derides tho&s;e weak Orators, who endeavour|ing
by a vain affectation, and empty circum&s;tance of
words, to imitate the &s;tyle of <HI>Cicero,</HI> do conc<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ive
they have performed &s;omething rare and happy if
they can often but conclude with an <HI>e&s;&s;e videatur;</HI>
And <HI>Tully</HI> him&s;elf doth reprove the perver&s;e dili|gence
of &s;ome men in this particular, who having
propounded to them&s;elves &s;ome famous Orator for
examples, do imitate nothing of them but their in|firmities;
Such a man was <HI>Fu&s;ius</HI> an evil imitator
of a good Orator, <HI>Caius Fimbria, Nervos Caii Fim|briae
in dicendo,</HI> (&s;aith <HI>Tully) non a&s;&s;equitur, oris
pravitatem imitatur, He attains not to the &s;oundne&s;&s;e
and pithine&s;&s;e of Caius Fimbria in speaking, he imi|tates
only the imperfection of his &s;peech. Nazianzen</HI>
relateth that <HI>Bazil</HI> Bi&s;hop of <HI>Cae&s;aria,</HI> (by rea&s;on
of his great piety, and learning, called commonly
<HI>Bazil</HI> the great) was had in &s;uch a reverent e&s;teem
by all men, that not a few did &s;tudiou&s;ly affect, and
&s;trove to have &s;ome re&s;emblance of his bodily infir|mities,
as of the palene&s;s of his countenance, his
&s;low gate, and pronunciation of his words, and o|ther
defects of his body. In the &s;ame nature others
do atte&s;t, that there were not &s;ome wanting who
with all their indu&s;try did endeavour to counterfeit
the <HI>drawling</HI> of the great Orator <HI>Demo&s;thenes,</HI> and
the <HI>&s;tammering</HI> of the famous Philo&s;opher <HI>Ari&s;to|tle.
O Imitatores &s;ervum pecus!</HI> &s;aith <HI>Horace, 1
Epi&s;t.</HI> 19.</P>
<P><PB N="86" REF="55">
XV. The&s;e things and a thou&s;and more like un|to
them, which every day we read of in approved Au|thors,
being all of them the examples of a <HI>perver&s;e
imitation,</HI> would provoke our mirth rather than our
choler, if this perver&s;ne&s;s con&s;i&s;ted only in <HI>words</HI> &amp;
in the outward <HI>habit and ge&s;ture of the body,</HI> and had
no place at all in our <HI>lives</HI> and <HI>manners.</HI> But here
al&s;o, nothing peradventure more unfrequently, but
certainly far more dangerou&s;ly, <HI>Decipit examplar
vitiis imitablie, The example doth deceive being vi|tiou&s;ly
re&s;embled,</HI> whiles too indulgent to our own
affections, and tran&s;ported by the pravity of our de|sires,
out of the abundant heaps of examples, we
make choice of tho&s;e mo&s;t willingly, and in them
doe mo&s;t vehemently urge tho&s;e <HI>circum&s;tances,</HI>
which &s;eem mo&s;t &s;uitable to that &s;ide, to which al|ready
our minds do incline, that &s;owe may the better
&s;erve our vain <HI>affections</HI> and <HI>de&s;ires.</HI> And this, who|&s;oever
&s;hall more diligently peru&s;e the books pub|li&s;hed
by the <HI>Anabapti&s;ts</HI> and <HI>Browni&s;ts</HI> and other
Sectaries, of that complexion, or what &s;ome few
years before have been written by their true prede|ce&s;&s;ors,
the <HI>Puritan Reformers</HI> he &s;hall mo&s;t readily
find to be egregiou&s;ly performed by tho&s;e who make
it their bu&s;ine&s;&s;e to di&s;turb the <HI>order</HI> of the Church &amp;
the peace of the Common-wealth, and that I may
give you &s;ome te&s;timony of the perver&s;ene&s;s of the&s;e
mens &s;pirits, (which I hope I &s;hall perform without
ju&s;t offence to any &s;ober man) give me leave I pray
you but briefly to examine one of their arguments,
taken (as they alledge from the example of <HI>Christ</HI>
and the <HI>Apo&s;tles</HI>) which being handled large enough,
and with great animo&s;ity by them how &s;olidly, and
&s;incerely they have carryed them&s;elves therein, I
<PB N="87" REF="55">
&s;hall leave it unto you to judge.</P>
<P>XVI. About forty years &s;ince there came forth
a book publi&s;hed by &s;ome Mini&s;ters of the Dioce&s;&s;e
of Exce&s;ter (for there were many heads and hands
in it) again&s;t the <HI>Rite</HI> of kneeling at the receiving
of the Sacrament. Among&s;t other arguments which
they had every where &s;ought for, and brought toge|ther,
they &s;eemed to triumph mo&s;t in this, which they
&s;ay was taken from the example of Chri&s;t him&s;elf,
The &s;um and &s;trength of the argument lyes in this.
It is not lawfull for a Chri&s;tian in any religious acti|on
pertaining to the wor&s;hip of God, to recede a jot
from the example of Chri&s;t and the Apo&s;tles, the
action being imitable, as every action of Chri&s;t is to
be imitated, and being rightly followed by others,
ought to be imitated as well by all Chri&s;tians; But
<HI>Chri&s;t</HI> and his <HI>Apo&s;tles</HI> did receive the holy &s;up|per
in another po&s;ture than kneeling, therefore we
Chri&s;tians al&s;o ought to do the like; This &s;o weak
and &s;o pittyfull a Sophi&s;m, being impo&s;ed not only
on the unlearned people but on others al&s;o, who, if
they were more wi&s;e, it would be better with the
Church of Chri&s;t, it will not be labour lo&s;t to pro|pound
&s;ome things unto you which may abun|dantly
demon&s;trate to you the vanity of the whole
argumentation.</P>
<P>XVII. In the fir&s;t place therefore, ob&s;erve that
here is a <GAP DESC="foreign"> a tran&s;ition to a
thing of another kind, which is &s;o foul an errour
that it is hardly to be pardoned in School-boys, for
the whole controver&s;ie being altogether of the ge&s;t|ure,
they di&s;pute here with much importunity on an|other
Subject, which is of <HI>Actions</HI> only. Let us
grant that <HI>every action of Chri&s;t</HI> is to be imi|tated,
<PB N="88" REF="56">
but who will &s;ay that <HI>ge&s;ture</HI> is an <HI>action,</HI>
there being &s;o wide a di&s;parity and and di&s;proporti|on
betwixt them, that they are not in the capacity
of one common <HI>Genus,</HI> but do properly belong to
two di&s;tinct praedicaments, for <HI>ge&s;ture</HI> belongeth to
<HI>Situs</HI> or the praedicament of <HI>po&s;ture,</HI> and <HI>Action</HI> to
another proper praedicament of its own name.</P>
<P>XVIII. In the &s;econd place ob&s;erve, that the
four la&s;t praedicaments are of a <HI>lower extract, viz.
Ubi, Quando, Situs,</HI> and <HI>Habitus,</HI> the <HI>where,</HI> the <HI>when,</HI>
the <HI>ge&s;ture,</HI> and <HI>habit,</HI> are almo&s;t of one e&s;timation
and account in re&s;pect of tho&s;e <HI>actions</HI> to which as it
were they are added as Concomitants, for they are
nothing el&s;e but &s;ome <HI>relations</HI> of an inferiour note,
and <HI>circum&s;tances</HI> altogether extrin&s;ical to the acti|ons
them&s;elves; It &s;eems not therefore agreeable
to rea&s;on that by the force of the <HI>example of Christ
&amp; the Apo&s;tles</HI> we &s;hould be obliged to the imitation
of one of them only, which is in the <HI>ge&s;ture,</HI> &amp; that
in the other three, <HI>viz.</HI> the <HI>where,</HI> the <HI>when,</HI> and the
<HI>habit,</HI> we have no obligation even in the judgment
of tho&s;e men who do urge this example; For as to
the <HI>where</HI> they them&s;elves do not hold it nece&s;&s;ary
whether the <HI>Sacrament</HI> or <HI>holy Euchari&s;t</HI> be celebra|ted
in <HI>private hou&s;es</HI> below or in <GAP DESC="foreign"> in the up|per
room thereof; Neither do they hold them&s;elves
obliged as to the <HI>when,</HI> whether it be after &s;upper,
or in the dusk of the Evening, nor as to the <HI>habit,</HI>
whether it be &s;olemnized by a Mini&s;ter in a <HI>Semea|los
coat,</HI> notwith&s;tanding that all the&s;e particulars
were ob&s;erved in the fir&s;t <HI>in&s;titution</HI> of the <HI>&s;upper,</HI> it
is apparent in the &s;acred Hi&s;tory, neither is it deny|ed
by them&s;elves; Since therefore they them&s;elves
do a&s;&s;ume the <HI>liberty,</HI> and do grant it unto others,
<PB N="89" REF="56">
that with a &s;afe Con&s;cience it is lawfull for them
in all the&s;e things to recede from the practice of
<HI>Chri&s;t,</HI> and his <HI>Apo&s;tles,</HI> I would willingly learn
from the&s;e new ma&s;ters what it is that is &s;o &s;ingular
in the praedicament of <HI>Situs,</HI> or of <HI>ge&s;ture,</HI> that it is
&s;o much to be ranked either above or beneath the
e&s;timation of the re&s;t of its Con&s;orts, &amp; it is not law|full
without great Sacriledge to &s;tartle the lea&s;t on
this &s;ide or on that &s;ide from that <HI>primitive example.</HI>
Surely it is but rea&s;on that the&s;e four praedicaments
&s;hould either go hand in hand, or walk with an even
pace together, or &s;ome rea&s;on for the difference
&s;hould be a&s;&s;igned, that we may under&s;tand where|fore
it is not to be done, which as yet, as far as
I can learn, they have neither performed, nor at|tempted.</P>
<P>XIX. In the third place ob&s;erve again, that &s;ee|ing
every <HI>Act examplar</HI> ought to be &s;o certain that
it cannot be denyed, it is not &s;o cleerly manife&s;t by
any Text of Scripture, that &s;hould it be denyed,
that could be proved which they a&s;&s;ume, and I wil|lingly
will grant, <HI>viz.</HI> that Chri&s;t and the Apo&s;tles
did not celebrate that <HI>fir&s;t Supper</HI> with bended knees
but in &s;ome other ge&s;ture. But they will object
doth not that word <GAP DESC="foreign"> in the Go&s;pels intimat
only a <HI>triclinary ge&s;ture,</HI> by lying along on a bed,
which was familiar to tho&s;e times, and Countries?
I an&s;wer, <HI>no,</HI> &amp; altogether do deny, that any certain
kind of <HI>ge&s;ture</HI> can be proved by the &s;ignification only
of that word. From that kind of ge&s;ture which here|tofore
at Dinner or Supper was u&s;ed in Parlours was
the Greek word <GAP DESC="foreign"> derived, and the Latin
word <HI>di&s;cumbere</HI> which is to <HI>&s;it</HI> or to <HI>lye down,</HI> but
he will put the weight and force of the words in a
<PB N="90" REF="57">
very unrighteous ballance, who&s;oever, after they are
grown more old by u&s;e, and of a far larger extent,
&s;hall endeavour to bring them back again to their
fir&s;t Cradles, &amp; to include them within their antient
limits. Tho&s;e two words therefore in the com|mon
u&s;e of &s;peaking, do &s;ignifie that <HI>act</HI> by which
we do purpo&s;ely and u&s;ually apply our &s;elves in
&s;ome commodious place to eat our meat, in what|&s;oever
<HI>ge&s;ture</HI> or <HI>po&s;ture</HI> of the body it be done,
whether it be by <HI>&s;tanding,</HI> or <HI>&s;itting,</HI> or <HI>kneeling,</HI> or
<HI>lying down,</HI> properly or improperly &s;o called.</P>
<P>XX. But although by the force of the word in
the original we cannot prove it, yet (by &s;ome cir|cum&s;tances
of the Hi&s;tory) it may very probably
be collected, that <HI>Chri&s;t</HI> and the <HI>Apo&s;tles</HI> in that fir&s;t
Supper, did u&s;e a <HI>triclinary ge&s;ture</HI> by lying along
on beds, where in the fourth place ob&s;erve, that our
new Dictators do not obey them&s;elves that Law
which they impo&s;e upon the Con&s;ciences of others;
For if Chri&s;t in the in&s;titution of the holy Supper
did u&s;e a <HI>triclinary ge&s;ture,</HI> his feet, and all the
lower part of his body being &s;tretched forth on a
bed, and leaning with the upper part thereof on his
elbow, why do not the&s;e men, who are &s;o hot upon
it in their di&s;putations imitate this example of
Chri&s;t, which undoubtedly they may? why do they
not provide them&s;elves with <HI>beds,</HI> and <HI>parlours</HI> that
&s;o being provided with all things nece&s;&s;ary, they may
be made partakers of the <HI>holy Table</HI> in the &s;ame <HI>ge|&s;ture</HI>
which <HI>Chri&s;t</HI> and his <HI>Apo&s;tles</HI> u&s;ed? From which
ge&s;ture it is mo&s;t certain that tho&s;e doe differ who
either <HI>&s;tand</HI> or <HI>&s;it,</HI> (the one of which they both do
them&s;elves, and per&s;wade others to it (as much
as tho&s;e who kneel upon their knees: If
<PB N="91" REF="57">
they &s;hall object, as &s;ome of them do, that in this
We&s;tern part of the world, the <HI>tricliniary ge&s;ture</HI> is
out of u&s;e, and therefore we are not obliged to the
<HI>&s;ame po&s;ture in the &s;ame &s;p<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ifical manner of it,</HI> neverthe|le&s;&s;e
by the force of that primitive example we are
bound to ob&s;erve the &s;ame po&s;ture as to the gener|ality
of it, that is, that at lea&s;t we may u&s;e the <HI>Table
ge&s;ture</HI> which according to the cu&s;tome of our Na|tion,
is <HI>anological</HI> and &s;ucce&s;&s;ive to it, as they
then u&s;ed that <HI>ge&s;ture,</HI> which after the fa&s;hion of
tho&s;e times and places was accu&s;tomed to be ob|&s;erved.
But let them feed the people with &s;uch
deceits; Is it po&s;&s;ible for men out of a <HI>prejudicate</HI>
affection, and a vain <HI>de&s;ire of contradicting</HI>
to &s;ink &s;o much from under&s;tanding as to thru&s;t into
the world &s;uch empty conceits for &s;olid ones, or to
think to impo&s;e on any &s;ober man &s;uch ridiculous
a&s;&s;ertions; which how vain, and how empty they
are, that I may briefly and cleerly &s;hew, I mu&s;t de|&s;ire
tho&s;e men that do &s;o di&s;pute, directly and
without any tergiver&s;ation to an&s;wer to the&s;e few
Interrogatories.</P>
<P>XXI. In the fir&s;t place I do demand, that &s;eeing
it is &s;o certain that <HI>Chri&s;t,</HI> if he u&s;ed the tricliniary
ge&s;ture, that he did not eat, neither <HI>&s;itting</HI> nor <HI>&s;tand|ing,</HI><MILESTONE N="1">
as &s;ure it is that he did not eat <HI>kneeling on his
knees,</HI> why by the power of the &s;ame example are
we not obliged in the act and in&s;tant of commu|nicating
to ab&s;tain as well from <HI>&s;itting</HI> or from <HI>&s;tan|ding</HI>
as from <HI>kneeling?</HI> For by the &s;ame &s;uppo&s;ition
it doth follow that there is not any one of the &s;aid
three Po&s;tures which is not as de&s;titute of the exam|ple
of Chri&s;t, as the other two. It is therefore
mo&s;t right (as a little above was &s;poken of the
<PB N="92" REF="58">
four la&s;t predicaments) that the&s;e three &s;hould en|joy
the &s;ame priviledge, and be either all of them <HI>con|demned</HI>
as guilty, or acquitted as blamele&s;&s;e; If they
&s;hall reply, as it is their u&s;ual refuge, that by the
cu&s;tom of the Nation <HI>&s;itting</HI> or <HI>&s;tanding</HI> did &s;ucceed
<MILESTONE N="2"> the <HI>triclinary Ge&s;ture</HI> and not <HI>kneeling.</HI> I demand in
the &s;econd place, how comes it about, that only the
&s;ilent cu&s;tome of any Nation (&s;uppo&s;e the Engli&s;h)
&s;hould be of power, that <HI>&s;itting</HI> or <HI>&s;tanding</HI> &s;hould
&s;ucceed rhe <HI>tricliniary ge&s;ture,</HI> or lying down on the
bed, at our <HI>common tables,</HI> and the po&s;itive Law
of the &s;ame Nation &s;hould not &s;uffice, that <HI>kneeling</HI>
&s;hould &s;ucceed the &s;ame <HI>Ge&s;ture at the Sacred Table.</HI>
Can a Cu&s;tom changed without any publick Autho|rity
&s;en&s;ibly &s;o prevail, that what before was not
<HI>un-decent,</HI> or <HI>un-lawful,</HI> mu&s;t now no longer be <HI>de|cent,</HI>
and no longer <HI>lawful?</HI> Cannot a Law <HI>inacted</HI>
by <HI>Publick Authority,</HI> and e&s;tabli&s;hed by an expre&s;&s;e
con&s;ent of the people, and allowed of by dayly u&s;e,
prevail, that what upon no lawful rea&s;ons was ever
found to be ever unlawful, &s;hould be e&s;teemed law|ful
again for the time to come? Indeed, where
the&s;e two things <HI>Law</HI> and <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> do fight be|tween
them&s;elves (as hardly they do in this ca&s;e)
there is no man of a &s;ober under&s;tanding
but will acknowledge; that Cu&s;tome &s;hould
give place to <HI>Law,</HI> and not <HI>Law</HI> to <HI>Cu&s;tome.</HI>
In the third place, I demand of them, do they &s;e|riou&s;ly
believe, or do they not believe, that he
<MILESTONE N="3"> &s;inneth immediately in that Act who receiveth the
<HI>Communion</HI> with <HI>bended knees?</HI> If they &s;hall &s;ay that
he Sinneth, &s;eeing that every Sin is a tran&s;gre&s;&s;ion
of the Law of God, let them &s;hew me &s;ome pre|cept
in that Law again&s;t which he that &s;o doth, Sin|neth?
<PB N="93" REF="58">
If they &s;hall acknowledge that it may be
done without Sin, then by their own confe&s;&s;ion
they will level their own <HI>Ri&s;e,</HI> and over|throw
all the force of their Arguments. In the
fourth place, &s;uppo&s;e that the &s;aid <HI>tricliniary
ge&s;ture</HI> had been aboli&s;hed before the fir&s;t in&s;tituti|on <MILESTONE N="4">
of the <HI>Holy Supper,</HI> and that <HI>Sitting</HI> or <HI>Standing</HI>
did &s;ucceed it, &s;o that <HI>Chri&s;t</HI> and his <HI>Apo&s;tles</HI> mu&s;t
have eaten either <HI>Standing</HI> or <HI>Sitting,</HI> both of which
could not be u&s;ed at one time; I demand if they
had eaten <HI>Standing,</HI> whether it were &s;o nece&s;&s;ary for
us to &s;tand al&s;o, that we &s;hould have &s;inned if we
had &s;ate, and on the contrary, or whether we
might have been free to have u&s;ed which we would?
If they &s;hould &s;ay, that we are free for both, the
Argument taken from the Example of Chri&s;t, will
be of no power, and will fall to the Ground, for
he u&s;ed only but one of the &s;aid Ge&s;tures, and not
both of them. If they &s;hall &s;ay again, that we are
preci&s;ely bound up to the ob&s;ervation of that po|&s;ture
which is &s;uppo&s;ed was u&s;ed by our Saviour,
wherefore do the&s;e &s;o &s;evere Dictators, and Con|troulers
of the Liberty of every Church, admit un|to
them an Indulgence of <HI>Standing</HI> or <HI>Sitting</HI> at the
<HI>Holy Supper,</HI> but not of kneeling, or of that po&s;ture
which it is mo&s;t probable, that our Saviour u&s;ed?
In the fifth place I demand, If the Example of <MILESTONE N="5">
Chri&s;t doth oblige us to the Imitation of it, why is
this obligation preci&s;ely determined in that po&s;ture,
which is but a &s;ubalternate <HI>Species,</HI> and hath no re|ference
to &s;ome higher <HI>Genus,</HI> or why doth it not
fall lower to &s;ome more <HI>inferiour Species?</HI> To make
it more obvious to your under&s;tandings, &s;eeing tho&s;e
three things are to be con&s;idered. The <HI>gesture</HI> or
<PB N="94" REF="59">
Po&s;ture it &s;elf, as a <HI>&s;uperior Genus,</HI> the <HI>Po&s;ture at
the Table</HI> as a <HI>Species &s;ubalternate</HI> to it; And the
Po&s;ture of lying along and leaning, as the <HI>lowe&s;t
Species;</HI> And it is probable that Chri&s;t u&s;ed the la&s;t
according to the cu&s;tom and practice of tho&s;e
Times, and Climates, why mu&s;t the <HI>po&s;ture</HI> only
at the <HI>Table,</HI> which is but an <HI>intermedial</HI> and a <HI>&s;ubal|ternate
Species</HI> be accounted nece&s;&s;ary and &s;ufficient
to the true Imitation of <HI>Chri&s;t,</HI> and not any other
<HI>po&s;ture</HI> &s;ufficient in the <HI>Genus</HI> of it, or why may not
the <HI>po&s;ture</HI> of <HI>Leaning</HI> and <HI>lying along</HI> be as nece&s;&s;ary
in the <HI>Species.</HI> La&s;tly I demand, Is the <HI>po&s;ture</HI> of
<HI>leaning and lying along</HI> practi&s;ed by our Saviour and
the Apo&s;tles at the fir&s;t in&s;titution of the Holy Sup|per
to be imitated or not? I am confident they
will not deny that it is to be imitated, for in|deed
they cannot deny it, becau&s;e from thence they
do derive the chiefe&s;t ground and foundation of their
Cau&s;e; For thus they do propound the examples
of Chri&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity to be imitated by us, that is
to &s;ay, not every example &s;imply in it &s;elf, but every
example that may be practi&s;ed by us; I Only there|fore
in this argumentation take <HI>that</HI> which they of
their own accord do grant, which is, 1&s;t. the <HI>propo&s;i|tion,
That every imitable example of Chri&s;t</HI> doth ob|lige
a Chri&s;tian to the imitation of it. And 2ly. the
<HI>a&s;&s;umption,</HI> that the <HI>po&s;ture</HI> in the <HI>Species</HI> of it which
Chri&s;t u&s;ed in the holy Supper what&s;oever it was is
<HI>imitable.</HI> From the&s;e premi&s;es I infer this conclu&s;ion;
By the force therfore of this example, &s;ay I <HI>Chri&s;tians</HI>
of the next age unto our Saviour, were obliged to
the &s;ame <HI>po&s;ture</HI> in the &s;ame Species which he u&s;ed,
And in the &s;ame manner were Chri&s;tians of the &s;e|cond
and third age, ever &s;ince, unto the&s;e pre&s;ent
<PB N="95" REF="59">
times; And it mu&s;t accordingly be acknowledged that
the Church of Chri&s;t even at this time al&s;o is obliged
to the practice of the <HI>tricliniary</HI> or <HI>leaning po&s;ture,</HI> if
indeed Chri&s;t did u&s;e it, or at lea&s;t it mu&s;t be &s;hown,
at what <HI>time</HI> and on what <HI>account,</HI> and by what <HI>Au|thor</HI>
and <HI>Authority</HI> the force of this obligation
is made void.</P>
<P>XXII. By the&s;e things which have been &s;poken
it is manife&s;t that all the force of their <HI>Argument</HI>
which with &s;o much pompe is dre&s;&s;ed and held
forth by them, doth come to no more than this,
that it cannot more rightly or more commodiou&s;ly
be propounded for their own purpo&s;e than under
this <HI>form.</HI> The example of Chri&s;t and his Apo&s;tles
doth &s;o farre oblige, as we think it expedient that
it &s;hall oblige, but we think it expedient that it &s;hall
oblige to the not <HI>bending of the knee</HI> in the receiving
of the Sacrament, &amp; no further; therefore &s;o farre
only, and not a jot further is the extent of the obli|gation.
I am a&s;hamed I confe&s;&s;e to furre your ears
with the repetition of the&s;e vanities, for it becomes
not this place, nor my age, or manners to <HI>provoke to
laughter in &s;o &s;erious a Subject.</HI> But what &s;hall we
do with the&s;e men? A bad cau&s;e indeed doth need
&s;uch a Patronage, and it cannot but come to pa&s;s that
oftentimes they are enforced to &s;peak many vain and
incongruous things, and (if throughly they be ex|amined)
very ab&s;urd ones, who&s;oever they are, who
like unto tho&s;e men, do &s;uffer them&s;elves to be go|verned
by <HI>affectation</HI> rather than <HI>truth.</HI> I do &s;peak
from my heart and as indeed it is, although in their
writings we do meet with many things not &s;olidly
argued, and &s;ometimes not &s;incerely, yet I do not
remember that I have any where ob&s;erved meer
<PB N="96" REF="60">
trifles to be carryed on with &s;o much animo&s;ity and
contention, or the &s;welling Hills to bring forth a
more mi&s;erable and ridiculous production, than
when the bare examples of good men in the holy
Scriptures are &s;o importunately urged, either to ex|cu&s;e
tho&s;e acts which by the law of God do &s;eem to
be prohibited, or to induce an obligation upon the
Con&s;ciences of men for the ob&s;ervation of tho&s;e
things which do not appeare by any law of God to
be commanded. But I return from whence I have
digre&s;&s;ed, if have tran&s;gre&s;s'd at all, and proceed.</P>
<P>XXIII. The fourth argument is taken from the
end, and proper u&s;e of examples, for we mu&s;t duely
confe&s;&s;e, that examples in them&s;elves are of great
u&s;e, both for the in&s;titution of our manners, and for
the amendment of our lives; And certainly other|wi&s;e
&s;o many <HI>precepts</HI> had not been left us in the
word of God, for what&s;oever is there written is
written for our <HI>in&s;truction</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">.
<HI>Rom</HI> 15 4. And for our <HI>admonition,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">.
neither would the Apo&s;tles otherwi&s;e have
&s;o con&s;tantly inclucated them. <HI>My brothers take
the Prophets for an example of patience, you have heard
of the patience of Job, Elias prayed, James</HI> 5. 19 11. 17.
Again, <HI>Be you followers of me as I am of Chri&s;t,
1 Cor. 11. 1. What you have heard and &s;een in me do
tho&s;e things Philip. 4. 9. Ob&s;erve tho&s;e who &s;o do,
walk as you have us for an example, Phil.</HI> 3. 17.
And the like in many places. But the u&s;e and end
of <HI>examples</HI> are not to be rules unto us for <HI>good live|ing,</HI>
but only as <HI>helps</HI> and as it were <HI>spurs</HI> to &s;hake
off our dulne&s;s, and to rouze our &s;loth when we are
more heavy and dull in the performance of our du|ties
than indeed we ought to be. For humane frail|ty
<PB N="97" REF="60">
(e&s;pecially upon &s;ome great temptations, and
violent &s;ugge&s;tions of the Devil and the World) is
commonly attended with many murmurings and
complaints again&s;t the <HI>&s;ecurity of the Law of God,</HI>
and the <HI>difficulty of giving obedience to it,</HI> nay often|times
it is heard to cry out that there are Lyons in
our way, and that there are &s;nares and &s;tumbling
blocks laid under our feet to cau&s;e us to trip and
fall; that we mu&s;t endure injuries, contumelies, and
calumnies, the plundring of our goods, the &s;e|que&s;tering
of our E&s;tates, the lo&s;s of our dear pa|rents,
and of tho&s;e dearer pledges, our Wives, and
Children, and that with the lo&s;&s;e of our friends, that
we mu&s;t lo&s;e our Countrey, nay even life it &s;elf, and
become a hatred even to tho&s;e who mo&s;t of all are
obliged to love us. How unplea&s;ing are the&s;e di&s;|cour&s;es?
How un&s;upportable is the burden of this
oppre&s;&s;ion? As often as the&s;e thoughts, and the
like, do invade our minds, &s;o that we even begin to
de&s;pond all hope, and even to abandon the care of
all our duties, as of things impo&s;&s;ible, which in vain
we do endeavour to perform, our langui&s;hing &s;pi|rits
are revived and ray&s;ed by the &s;ea&s;onable autho|rity
of <HI>examples,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Tu<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">iter desperatur quicquid fieri pote&s;t. <HI>Quint. 1. In&s;tit.</HI> 10. cum quid difficile videtur, difficiliora alios obe|untes re|<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="3 letters"> amus: <HI>Tert. 1. ad uxor <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"></HI></NOTE> and are by degrees encouraged and
armed, to de&s;pi&s;e all <HI>difficulties,</HI> overcome all <HI>temp|tations,</HI>
and to endure all <HI>contumelies</HI> what&s;oever,
when I &s;ay we &s;eriou&s;ly thus do con&s;ider that pious
&amp; godly men, and obnoxious to the &s;ame troubles
and temptations with us, being a&s;&s;i&s;ted by the grace
of God, (which will not be wanting unto us if we
wholy depend upon it and faithfully adde our en|deavours
thereunto) have performed and endured
all tho&s;e things which by the help of God are to be
performed and to be endured by us, our &s;pirits will
<PB N="98" REF="61">
begin to return, and our bre&s;ts grow warm with a
godly emulation, <HI>the fire will burn within ns as we
are mu&s;ing</HI> and in the fulne&s;&s;e of the heart the&s;e or
the like expre&s;&s;ions will break forth; <HI>Behold Lord
I am ready to perform what thou commande&s;t, and to
undergo what thou laye&s;t upon me.</HI> The &s;ame cloud of
witne&s;&s;es, that which way &s;oever we look, doth eve|ry
where &s;urround us, will per&s;wade us al&s;o, that all
revenge &amp; di&s;temper of &s;pirit being ca&s;t away, as al|&s;o
the importunity of &s;in (which as it doth clo&s;ely
embrace us, &s;o if we u&s;e our be&s;t endeavours, by the
grace of God, will with no great difficulty abandon
us) we couragiou&s;ly con&s;tantly and patiently do
run the race that is &s;et before us.</P>
<P>XXIV. St. <HI>James</HI> the Apo&s;tle in his fifth Chap|ter
doth exhort us to a fervency in prayer, after the
example of <HI>Elias,</HI> who by the importunity of his
prayer, did as it were at his plea&s;ure, lock and un|lock
the Gates of Heaven; And that no man might
conceive, that it was to be imputed rather to the
&s;anctity, and the merits of <HI>Elias,</HI> than to the pro|mi&s;e
of God to the prayers of the faithfull by the
Covenant of Grace: The Apo&s;tle in the very begin|ing
of this narration doth take away all occa&s;ion
of &s;u&s;pition, <HI>Elias</HI> (&s;aith he) was a man <HI>the &s;ame
pa&s;&s;ions with us ver&s;e</HI> 17. <GAP DESC="foreign">. He was a
man, not a God, or an Angell, nor made of better clay,
but out of the &s;ame <HI>ma&s;&s;e</HI> out of which all other
men are fa&s;hioned; This here urged is the mo&s;t pro|per
&amp; the mo&s;t profitable u&s;e of <HI>examples,</HI> we ought
therefore to bear in our minds that <HI>examples</HI> are
not the <HI>rule</HI> it &s;elf, neither do they carry with them
the <HI>weight</HI> or <HI>e&s;timation</HI> of a <HI>rule;</HI> nay, if any doubt
be made of the uprightne&s;s or the pravity of the
<PB N="99" REF="61">
act, they are them&s;elves to be brought, and dili|gently
to be examined by the <HI>Rule</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">
&s;aith St. <HI>James</HI> in his fifth Chapter and
the <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> ver&s;e, where I know not well if that word
<GAP DESC="foreign"> doth carry with it a &s;pecial force of &s;ignifi|cation.
Certainly, it &s;eemeth unto me, to imply
that the acts of the holy Prophets are no<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
the principal <HI>coppy</HI> and <HI>example</HI> which is to be
ob&s;erved by us, but as it were the <GAP DESC="foreign">, or the
<HI>&s;econd example,</HI> which is not of <HI>authority</HI> of it &s;elf,
or for it &s;elf, but &s;o far to be believed, and recei|ved,
as it <HI>agreeeth with the original.</HI></P>
<P>From what hitherto hath been &s;poken it may be
now made manife&s;t, that it doth not &s;uffice to prove
the goodne&s;s of any humane act, that it is comfor|mable
to the <HI>example</HI> of &s;ome good and holy man;
and therefore no mans Con&s;cience can &s;ecurely
and &s;afely acquie&s;&s;e therein, unle&s;s the <HI>example</HI> it
&s;elf be comformable to the rule.</P>
<P>XXV. Again, that we may now come to the other
part of our propo&s;ition; The account is almo&s;t the
&s;ame of another mans <HI>judgment,</HI> as of his <HI>example,</HI>
and <HI>that</HI> almo&s;t for the &s;ame <HI>Cau&s;es,</HI> &s;o that we need
not to make many words to enlarge our &s;elves upon
this Subject, I will therefore run it over in as
few as I can.</P>
<P>And in the fir&s;t place, all men though <HI>godly</HI> and
<HI>learned</HI> are no le&s;s lyable unto errours, than they
are to &s;ins, nay peradventure much more, and there|fore
we ought to have a more acute inve&s;tigation of
the mind, to di&s;cover the difference betwixt <HI>Truth</HI>
and <HI>Fal&s;hood,</HI> then betwixt <HI>Good</HI> and <HI>Evil;</HI> Fir&s;t
by rea&s;on of that natural <HI>ignorance</HI> with which our
minds are darkened, and vaild as with a cloud. Se|condly
<PB N="100" REF="62">
by rea&s;on of our <HI>education,</HI> which fa&s;hione
and formeth our minds, as yet but tender, and doth
imprint certain notions on them which it is no ea&s;y
task to expunge. Thirdly by rea&s;on of long <HI>u&s;e</HI> and
<HI>Cu&s;tome,</HI> which is as it were another nature. Fourth|ly,
by rea&s;on of the depraved affections which do
ecclip&s;e our judgments, and do hinder the right u&s;e
of them. From the&s;e and many other cau&s;es it is
&s;o obvious unto men to <HI>erre,</HI> to <HI>fall,</HI> and to be <HI>decei|ved,</HI>
that it hath been long agoe a proverb,
<HI>Humanum est errare,</HI> It is the property of a man
to erre.</P>
<P>XXVI. Adde to this in the &s;econd place, that
not we our &s;elves do not alwayes &s;incerely judge of
their <HI>piety</HI> and <HI>wi&s;dome,</HI> who&s;e <HI>Judgments</HI> we do
de&s;ire to follow, it being very cu&s;tomary with
tho&s;e men who permit them&s;elves to be governed
by the arbitration of other men to make choice of
&s;uch Conductors whom they before are confident
will lead them in that way in which before hand
they had determined to go them&s;elves. Thus doth
Satan hold fa&s;t unwary men, being as it were inclo|&s;ed
in his circle. If you demand of them, why they
&s;uppo&s;e &s;uch a thing to be <HI>true</HI> and <HI>right,</HI> they an|&s;wer,
Becau&s;e this, or that wi&s;e, and godly man hath
&s;o taught us. If you again &s;hall demand of them,
how they do know their Teacher to be a pious
and a prudent man; they an&s;wer, or at lea&s;t would
&s;o an&s;wer, if they would &s;peak according to their
hearts, becau&s;e he thinketh as we do think.</P>
<Q LANG="lat"><L>Et &s;apit &amp; mecum facit &amp; <HI>Jove</HI> judicat aequo.</L>
<L>The man is wi&s;e and doth as I intend,</L>
<L>And judgeth rightly having <HI>Jove</HI> his friend.</L></Q>
<P><PB N="101" REF="62">
Many there are indeed who do mea&s;ure the pie|ty
of other men, not according to the practice of the
duties of a Chri&s;tians life, and by the works of righ|teou&s;ne&s;&s;e,
Mercy, Charity, and Devotion, but by
an affection to that faction to which they have be|queathed
them&s;elves, and by the hatred to another
party to which they profe&s;&s;e them&s;elves to be Ene|mies.
<GAP DESC="foreign">
&s;aith the Apo&s;tle, 2 <HI>Tim.</HI> 4. 3. They
&s;hall heap up unto them&s;elves, Teachers according
to their own de&s;ires. The Metaphor following is
mo&s;t proper, <GAP DESC="foreign">; when their ears
do itch they &s;eek tho&s;e that will tickle them; and
thus the &s;ame doth befall them which in the old
proverb is expre&s;&s;ed; <HI>Muli &s;e mutuo &s;cabunt, One
Mule doth &s;cratch another.</HI></P>
<P>XXVII. Thirdly, the word of God doth ex|pre&s;&s;ely
forbid us to &s;ubject our Con&s;ciences to the
judgment of any other, or to u&s;urp a Dominion o|ver
the Con&s;ciences of any one: <HI>Ne vocemini
Rabbi, unus est enim ve&s;ter</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"><HI>Magi&s;ter,
Praeceptor, Doctor, Unctor, Chri&s;tus.</HI> Be not ye call|ed
Rabbi for one is your <HI>Ma&s;ter</HI> who is Chri&s;t, the
word in the original &s;ignifies as well School-ma&s;ter,
Tutor, Leader, as Ma&s;ter. <HI>And my brethren be you
not many ma&s;ters</HI> &s;aith St. <HI>James Chap. 3. ver&s;e</HI> 5.
To this purpo&s;e is that of St <HI>Peter,</HI> in his fir&s;t Book
<HI>Chap 5. ver&s;e 2. Feed you the Flock of God which
is committed to you,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">, as holding forth a
light before them, that is, the Doctrine of the true
faith, and the example of a godly life, but not <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>not as excerci&s;ing a dominati|on
and an uncontrouled empire over the Clergy or the
people of God,</HI> And again, 1 <HI>Cor. 7. 23. Emp<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">i
<PB N="102" REF="63">
e&s;tis pretio, nolite fieri &s;ervi hominum You are bought
with a price, be you not made the &s;ervants of men;</HI> that
is, do not &s;ubmit your Con&s;ciences to be governed by
the Authority of any man, according to his plea|&s;ure,
and command.</P>
<P>XXVIII. From the&s;e things which are thus &s;ta|ted,
and proved, to give you now &s;ome few Coral|laryes,
and tho&s;e in a few words, it followeth in the
fir&s;t place, that the in&s;upportable pride and tyranny
of the <HI>Pope</HI> of <HI>Rome</HI> ought mo&s;t de&s;ervedly to be ha|ted
by every true Chri&s;tian who by arrogating an <HI>in|fallible
judgment</HI> to him&s;elf, and to his chair, doth
by that name exerci&s;e an u&s;urping power and domi|nation
over the Con&s;ciences of men, and pretendeth
&s;o much right thereunto, that if he &s;hould &s;ay <HI>vir|tues</HI>
were <HI>vices,</HI> and <HI>vices virtues,</HI> all Chri&s;tians are
bound under the penalty of mortal &s;in, to &s;ubmit
to his judgment without the lea&s;t doubt, or &s;cruple.
We are therefore with all thankfulnes to acknow|ledg
the great and Singular goodnes and mercy of
Almighty God, who for the&s;e many years hath
freed us, and our fore-fathers, and the <HI>Church of
England</HI> from &s;o uncon&s;cionable a Tyranny, and
hath again re&s;tored us to our <HI>ju&s;t liberties.</HI></P>
<P>XXIX. But we mu&s;t all of us, and every one of us
take heed, that being freed now from that <HI>Tyranny,</HI>
we do not &s;toop our necks to a <HI>new bondage,</HI> lea&s;t
we be found not &s;o much to have &s;haken off our
yoak, as to have changed it.</P>
<Q LANG="lat"><L>&mdash;Quae bellua ruptis</L>
<L>Qu&ugrave;m &s;em&egrave;l effugit reddit &s;e prava catenis,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Horat.</NOTE></L></Q>
<Q><L>Like to the Bea&s;t who having broke his chain</L>
<L>Fondly returns to have it on again.<NOTE PLACE="marg">2 Satyr. 9.</NOTE></L></Q>
<P><PB N="103" REF="63">
It doth indeed concern us highly, if &s;eriou&s;ly
we would provide for the peace of our own Con&s;ci|ences,
or of the Church and Common-wealth, to
take care lea&s;t what heretofore was &s;poken of the
Church of Corinth; <HI>I am of Paul, I of Apollos,
and I of Cephas</HI> be not heard of us; <HI>I am of Lu|ther,
I of Calvin, I of Arminius, and I of Soci|nius.</HI>
No let God be true, and every man a Lyar;
He is not worthy to be Chri&s;ts Di&s;ciple, who is
not the Di&s;ciple of Chri&s;t alone. The &s;implicity
and &s;incerity of the Chri&s;tian Faith, hath &s;uffered a
great prejudice &s;ince we have been divided into
parties; neither is there any hope that Religion
&s;hould be re&s;tored to her former vigour and purity,
until the wounds made wider by our daily quarrels
and di&s;&s;entions, being anointed with the Oyl of Bro|therly
Love, as with a Bal&s;ome, &s;hall begin to
clo&s;e again, and to grow intire into the &s;ame unity
of <HI>Faith</HI> and <HI>Charity.</HI></P>
<P>XXX. In the third place we are to take heed,
le&s;t being too indulgent to our depraved affections,
we do &s;uffer our &s;elves to be &s;o drawn a&s;ide in|to
the admiration of &s;ome men, that we wholly de|pend
upon their Authority,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Jude 1<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"></NOTE> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
In which words the Apo&s;tle with a
finger pointeth at the <HI>very Fountain</HI> of all this evill;
For this perver&s;e admiration of Names hath no o|ther
Spring from whence it floweth, but from this
de&s;perate &s;elf-admiration, <HI>viz.</HI> whiles every man &s;tu|dyeth
his own profit, is ambitious of Honour, and
pur&s;ueth vain-glory, and e&s;teemeth no otherwi&s;e
of all other men, than according to the advan|tage
he may receive from them; And his Judge|ment
being corrupted with the&s;e &s;ordid affections,
<PB N="104" REF="64">
he is mo&s;t ready to admire tho&s;e per&s;ons whom he
thinks will be mo&s;t ready to advance his Profit, Ho|nour,
Glory, and his other inordinate de&s;ires.
And the very &s;ame thing another of the Apo&s;tles,
whom already I have cited, doth expre&s;&s;ely inti|mate
they did choo&s;e unto them Ma&s;ter,<NOTE PLACE="marg">2. Tim. 4. 3.</NOTE> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
according to their own de&s;ires.</P>
<P>XXXI. Neverthele&s;&s;e, that due Authority may
be given to the <HI>Catholick Church,</HI> and to every
<HI>Learned and Godly Man,</HI> notwith&s;tanding tho&s;e
things which have been here by me repre&s;ented;
You are in the fir&s;t place to be admoni&s;hed, that in
the Interpretation of the Scriptures, and in judg|ing
of Controver&s;ies in reference to <HI>Faith</HI> and
<HI>Manners,</HI> much Reverence and Authority is
to be given to the Judgement, and the Practice of
the <HI>Univer&s;al Church.</HI></P>
<P>Secondly, That much al&s;o is to be imputed to
the Authority and the Judgement of a Learned
Man, for the &s;atisfying of ordinary &s;cruples that
too often ari&s;e in the minds of men, as al&s;o for the
directing of the Con&s;cience in <HI>doubtful things</HI> con|cerning
which no <HI>certainty</HI> can otherwi&s;e be had;
But of both the&s;e we &s;hall expre&s;&s;e our &s;elves, we
hope, more commodiou&s;ly hereafter.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="4" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="105" REF="64">
<HEAD>THE
FOURTH LECTURE,
In which it is both Di&s;cu&s;&s;ed, and
Stated, what is the Adaequate
Rule of Con&s;cience.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>JAMES. 4. 12.</BIBL>
<Q>For there is but one Law-giver who can both Save,
and De&s;troy.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>I. _HOw &s;mall is the Benefit and Pro|tection
which redoundeth to e|very
one, either in the re&s;pect of
the Fruit of his Con&s;cience to
excu&s;e tho&s;e things which he
hath done, or of the &s;ecurity of
it with confidence to undertake tho&s;e things which
he is about to do, if they only do rely upon the <HI>In|tention</HI>
of a good <HI>End,</HI> or upon the Authority alto|gether
of another Judgement or Example, I have
abundantly declared in my two la&s;t Lectures, in
<PB N="106" REF="65">
which my purpo&s;e was, tho&s;e &s;tops being removed,
to make the way more plain &amp; ready to proceed un|to
tho&s;e things which I had determined to &s;peak, of
the <HI>obligation of Con&s;cience;</HI> which obligation being
two fold, <HI>Active,</HI> by which it bringeth one obliga|tion
on another, and <HI>Pa&s;&s;ive,</HI> by which it is &s;ub|jected
to the obligation of another, the method
and privilege of order doth require that we &s;hould
begin with the <HI>Pa&s;&s;ive;</HI> For then we more &s;ecure|ly
can pronounce of the <HI>thing mea&s;ured,</HI> when it is
once manife&s;t that the <HI>mea&s;ure</HI> it &s;elf is ju&s;t. Our bu&s;i|ne&s;&s;e
therefore now in hand, is to <HI>inquire</HI> what <HI>that</HI>
is which properly doth <HI>oblige Con&s;cience,</HI> or, (which
is the &s;ame) what is the proper and <HI>Adaequate Rule
of Con&s;cience,</HI> to which, to <HI>be upright,</HI> it ought to
conform it &s;elf; which inqui&s;ition, that it may be
the more certain, and profitable, &s;ome few things
being premi&s;ed by way of explication, I &s;hall en|deavour
at the la&s;t by certain conclu&s;ions to give
you an account of the thing it &s;elf.</P>
<P>II. In the fir&s;t place therefore it is to be under|&s;tood,
that for the more exact performance of
the offices of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> it is nece&s;&s;ary to lay down
&s;ome <HI>Rules</HI> to which it ought to be &s;ubjected; for
where&s;oever there is any <HI>Virtue active</HI> which of its
own Nature is not <HI>determined unto one thing</HI> in its
<HI>acting,</HI> but is in a <HI>Potentia</HI> to another, &s;o
that it may act either well, or evilly; whether this
<HI>Virtue</HI> be a <HI>Habite</HI> of the fir&s;t <HI>Species</HI> of Quality, or
a natural <HI>Potentia</HI> of the &s;econd, it is nece&s;&s;ary that
there &s;hould be &s;ome <HI>Law</HI> or <HI>Rule,</HI> which may di|rect
it in the <HI>acting;</HI> For as often as any thing doth
offer it &s;elf to the Fancy to be done, whither repre|&s;ented
by the exterior &s;ence, or by &s;ome internal
<PB N="107" REF="65">
&s;ugge&s;tion of the mind, becau&s;e the <HI>Will</HI> which is
the next <HI>principium</HI> of <HI>acting</HI> is (as commonly it is
&s;poken in the Schools) but <HI>Potentia caeca, a blind
Potentia,</HI> and of it &s;elf cannot di&s;cern <HI>Good</HI> from
<HI>Evill,</HI> &s;o as to be a <HI>Rule</HI> unto it &s;elf, the <HI>Inqui&s;i|tive
Rea&s;on</HI> doth &s;traight reflect on Con&s;cience, and
doth li&s;ten to her <HI>Dictates.</HI> Now it is the Office of
Con&s;cience pre&s;ently to <HI>Examine</HI> the thing pro|pounded;
And the examination being made, to
<HI>Judge</HI> whether it ought to be performed, or e&s;|chewed,
whether to be admitted or omitted, and
accordingly as &s;he hath judged, &s;o pre&s;ently to
tran&s;mit her Judgement to the <HI>Will,</HI> that is to pro|pound
it to the <HI>Free-will,</HI> the &s;ame thing either to be
cho&s;en, or di&s;liked; To which Office, of <HI>Exami|ning,
Judging,</HI> and <HI>Informing,</HI> lea&s;t it &s;hould
ra&s;hly be performed, &amp; le&s;t the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> as <HI>blind</HI> as
the <HI>Will</HI> it &s;elf &s;hould mi&s;guide it, it is nece&s;&s;ary
that there &s;hould be a certain <HI>Rule</HI> according to
which it &s;hould be examined.</P>
<P>III. In the &s;econd place we are to know, that
in <HI>Rules</HI> as well as in <HI>Cau&s;es,</HI> there is a kind of &s;ub|ordination;
And as in <HI>Cau&s;es</HI> that are <HI>ordinated</HI> to
one another, the latter, if compared with the for|mer,
carry with them the Relation and the Ac|count
of <HI>Effects;</HI> So in <HI>Rules</HI> and <HI>Mea&s;ures</HI> ordina|ted
to one another, every one of the po&s;terior, in
re&s;pect of the &s;uperior, doth &s;eem to be <HI>regulated,</HI>
or to be men&s;urated by it. Since therefore the
<HI>Rule</HI> of the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is two fold, one <HI>next</HI> or the
<HI>immediate,</HI> and the other <HI>the fir&s;t,</HI> and <HI>more
remote;</HI> that <HI>Rule</HI> which is next, as it is a <HI>Rule</HI> in
re&s;pect of the <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> which it doth direct, &s;o
it is al&s;o as a <HI>Rule Regulated</HI> in re&s;pect of the <HI>fir&s;t
<PB N="108" REF="66">
Rule</HI> by which it is it &s;elf to be directed.</P>
<P>IV. Seeing the <HI>Rectitude</HI> of every thing, what&s;o|ever,
doth con&s;i&s;t in the conformity of it to its <HI>Rule;</HI>
we are in the third place to under&s;tand that (as I
have &s;aid) there is a two fold <HI>Rule</HI> of <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI>
to wit the <HI>Rule</HI> which is <HI>neere&s;t,</HI> &amp; the <HI>Rule</HI> which is
more <HI>remote;</HI> So there is al&s;o a twofold <HI>Rectitude</HI> of
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> corre&s;pondent to that two fold <HI>Rule</HI> of it;
For the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> may be &s;aid to be <HI>upright</HI> either
<HI>ab&s;olutely</HI> and <HI>&s;imply,</HI> or <HI>re&s;pectively,</HI> and <HI>&s;ecundum
quid</HI> as the Schoolmen do expre&s;&s;e it; In this la&s;t
Acceptation, a <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> may be &s;aid to be up|right
when it is conformable to its neare&s;t, and im|mediate
<HI>Rule,</HI> as he is &s;aid to have a true and cer|tain
knowledge of any <HI>proper pa&s;&s;ion,</HI> who from
the Subject of it, can demon&s;trate it by <HI>its next
Cau&s;e,</HI> although he can a&s;cend no higher. But in
the former acceptation, the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> may then
be &s;aid to be <HI>upright,</HI> when it is not only confor|mable
it &s;elf to its <HI>next Rule,</HI> but when that <HI>Rule</HI>
is conformable al&s;o unto the <HI>fir&s;t Rule;</HI> In the &s;ame
&s;ence he may be &s;aid to have attained to a perfect
knowledge of any <HI>thing,</HI> who knoweth all the cau|&s;es
of it from the <HI>fir&s;t</HI> to the <HI>la&s;t,</HI> &s;o &s;aith <HI>Ari&s;to|tle</HI>
lib. 1. phi&s;ica: <HI>Tunc enim unam quamque rem &s;ci|re
dicimur, quum omnes ejus Cau&s;as, principia &amp;
elementa cogno&s;cimus, u&s;que ad prima.</HI> We are
then &s;aid to under&s;tand what any thing is, when
we can give you an account of all its cau&s;es, princi|pals,
even to the fir&s;t Elements thereof. There|fore
as the certainty of Science, though immedi|ately
ari&s;ing from the knowledge of the <HI>next</HI> Cau&s;e
doth not arrive to its ultimate perfection but by the
knowledge of the <HI>fir&s;t</HI> cau&s;e, &s;o the <HI>Rectitude</HI> of
<PB N="109" REF="66">
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> though immediately it reflecteth upon a
conformity to its <HI>next rule,</HI> yet it a&s;cendeth higher,
and ultimately concludeth in that Rule which is the
<HI>fir&s;t rule</HI> of it, and the &s;upreme.</P>
<P>II. In the fourth place it is to be under&s;tood that
when we &s;peak of the obligation of <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI>
that the &s;aid obligation doth not &s;ignifie any com|pul&s;ion
(for to &s;peak properly, the <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> can
no more be compelled than the <HI>free-Will</HI>) but a <HI>pow|er</HI>
rather and authority (which &s;he is bound to o|bey)
to urge her to the performance of that which
belongs unto her duty; In the very &s;ame manner
altogether, as a King, who hath the Legi&s;lative pow|er,
by enacting lawes, doth oblige his &s;ubjects to
the ob&s;ervation of them. As therefore in the exter|nal
Courts, Subjects <HI>properly</HI> and <HI>formally</HI> are ob|liged
to obedience, not &s;o much by the <HI>law</HI> it &s;elf,
as by the power of the <HI>Law-giver,</HI> (how&s;oever the
Law it &s;elf is &s;aid to oblige, but when it is &s;o &s;poken,
it is to be under&s;tood <HI>improperly,</HI> and as it were <HI>ma|terially</HI>
and <HI>terminatively</HI> becau&s;e the <HI>obligation</HI> is
made by it, and to it, &s;o the Law is &s;aid to judge,
<HI>John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one?</HI> although
the Law it &s;elf doth not judge, but the Magi&s;trate,
becau&s;e the Magi&s;trate ought to judge according to
the Law) &s;o in the internal Court, the <HI>Rule</HI> or the
<HI>Law</HI> impo&s;ed on <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> doth not properly ob|lige
it, but the power and authority of the <HI>Impo&s;er,</HI>
yet &s;o, as by the Con&s;equent <HI>truly</HI> and not <HI>unaptly</HI>
although not &s;o <HI>properly,</HI> the <HI>Rule</HI> it &s;elf may be &s;aid
to carry with it an <HI>obliging Virtue.</HI> When there|fore
it is demanded, what is that which obligeth
<HI>Con&s;cience</HI> to the performance of her duty? At the
&s;ame time both the&s;e que&s;tions are propounded;
<PB N="110" REF="67">
<HI>First</HI> and <HI>principally,</HI> who is the <HI>Lord of Con&s;cience,</HI>
who hath <HI>right</HI> and <HI>power</HI> to impo&s;e a <HI>Rule</HI> or <HI>Law</HI>
upon it, to which it ought to conforme it &s;elf? And
then <HI>&s;econdly</HI> and <HI>con&s;equently,</HI> what is that <HI>Rule of
Con&s;cience,</HI> or that <HI>Law</HI> which is impo&s;ed on it by
the Lord thereof, and to which by his dominion
and Empire over it, it is bound to conform
it &s;elf.</P>
<P>VI. In the fifth place it is to be under&s;tood,
when any thing is attributed to another, it is attribu|ted
either <HI>by it &s;elf,</HI> or <HI>not by it &s;elf,</HI> that is to &s;ay,
<HI>by accident;</HI> Tho&s;e things therefore to which the
power of obliging the Con&s;cience is any ways
to be attributed, do fall under a threefold con&s;ider|ation;
For in the fir&s;t place they either oblige the
Con&s;cience &s;imply by them&s;elves, that is, they do <HI>di|rectly</HI>
oblige <HI>by them&s;elves,</HI> and by their <HI>own power,</HI> not
only as <HI>the</HI> Term <HI>by it &s;elf</HI> is oppo&s;ed to <HI>the</HI> Term <HI>by
accident,</HI> but as it oppo&s;ed al&s;o to this Term by <HI>another.</HI>
Or in the &s;econd place they do <HI>oblige by them&s;elves
re&s;pectively,</HI> that is, as the Term <HI>by it &s;elf</HI> is oppo&s;ed
to the Term <HI>by accident,</HI> and not as it is oppo&s;ed to
the Term <HI>per aliud,</HI> that is by another; The mean|ing
is they do not oblige by <HI>their own proper power,</HI>
but by the vertue of another, having a power to ob|lige.
Or thirdly they do oblige <HI>by accident</HI> only, and
in neither of the con&s;iderations <HI>by it &s;elf.</HI> It is be|&s;ides
ob&s;ervable that in tho&s;e things which do oblige
the Con&s;cience in the <HI>&s;econd con&s;ideration</HI> there is
&s;ome difference to be made according to the differ|ent
account of the cau&s;e from whence the obligati|on
doth ari&s;e; For it is one thing when the obliga|tion
is forcibly impo&s;ed by the authority of another,
and another thing when it is willingly contracted,
<PB N="111" REF="67">
and of <HI>its own accord,</HI></P>
<P>By this that hath been &s;poken it is manife&s;t, that
there are four degrees of tho&s;e things which do ob|lige
the Con&s;cience; For examples &s;ake (to give
you a &s;hort view of what hath been already &s;poken,
and of what as yet remaineth to be &s;poken) you are
to under&s;tand in the <HI>first place;</HI> that the expre&s;s <MILESTONE N="1">
Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it
&s;elf, and by its own force.</P>
<P>In the &s;econd place, the Laws of men, and the <MILESTONE N="2">
mandates and orders of our Superiours, do ob|lige
the Con&s;cience, but by no power or authority,
but by the vertue of the Commandement of
God.</P>
<P>Thirdly, Vows and promi&s;es being made of our
own accord, when it was wholy in our own choice <MILESTONE N="3">
to do otherwi&s;e, do in their <HI>proper fact,</HI> and free|dom
of election oblige our Con&s;ciences to the
performance of them.</P>
<P>Fourthly and la&s;tly, the Law of con&s;ideration of <MILESTONE N="4">
Scandal and offence doth <HI>by accident</HI> oblige the
Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>VII. We are here to under&s;tand, that only that
obligation which con&s;i&s;teth in the <HI>fir&s;t degree</HI> is <HI>ab|&s;olute
and univer&s;al,</HI> the other three are <HI>relative</HI> and
<HI>particular;</HI> I &s;ay it is <HI>ab&s;olute</HI> becau&s;e it doth <HI>direct|ly</HI>
and <HI>alwayes</HI> oblige, and becau&s;e it obligeth <HI>all
per&s;ons;</HI> and the obligation of it is never to be can|cell'd.
The others may be &s;aid to be <HI>relative</HI> both
becau&s;e they do not bind of them&s;elves, or by their
own power, but by a <HI>relation</HI> to &s;ome precept, or in|&s;titution
of God, as al&s;o becau&s;e they do not <HI>always</HI>
or <HI>every where</HI> oblige, and in every ca&s;e, but when
tho&s;e con&s;iderations do require which they do bear
<PB N="112" REF="68">
a reference and re&s;pect unto. The <HI>obligation there|fore
of the fir&s;t degree</HI> is predominant over any obli|gation
what&s;oever in the other three, in&s;omuch
that it is able to make them of no effect, but it is
impo&s;&s;ible for them to render it fru&s;trate; Nay, if we
take it univer&s;ally, the <HI>obligation</HI> in any &s;uperiour
degree, (the other being equall) is more valid
than the obligation in any inferiour degrees what&s;o|ever,
and doth judge over them, either by <HI>taking a|way</HI>
what was done and contracted, as oftentimes,
or at lea&s;t by <HI>hindring</HI> what was to be done, as al|ways.
Therefore as to the <HI>power of obligation,</HI> the
Laws of men mu&s;t give place to the Laws of God,
private contracts and promi&s;es to publick con&s;ti|tutions,
and the Law or con&s;ideration of offence
or <HI>&s;candal</HI> to them both.</P>
<P>VIII. The&s;e things being thus premi&s;ed, that we
may be happy in a certain <HI>Rule</HI> by which we may
know how to live, I will according to my promi&s;e
comprehend in &s;ome few conclu&s;ions tho&s;e which
are mo&s;t nece&s;&s;ary to be under&s;tood concerning the
<HI>Rule</HI> of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> and the <HI>pa&s;&s;ive obligation of it.</HI></P>
<P>The fir&s;t conclu&s;ion is; <HI>That God alone hath a
mo&s;t proper and direct command on the Con&s;ciences
of all men;</HI> So that none but God alone hath power
to impo&s;e a Law upon the Con&s;cience of any man,
to which it ought to be &s;ubjected, as obliging <HI>by it
&s;elf,</HI> I &s;ay <HI>by it &s;elf,</HI> for we are all bound in our Con|&s;ciences
to ob&s;erve the <HI>ju&s;t Laws of men,</HI> to keep
our <HI>vows</HI> and <HI>promi&s;es</HI> made to God, or men, and to
be careful that we become not a <HI>&s;candal</HI> or an <HI>offence</HI>
unto others; But we are bound unto all the&s;e
things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable
to the will of God, commanding them as in its due
<PB N="113" REF="68">
place we &s;hall give an account unto you of the parti|culars
thereof.</P>
<P>IX. This Conclu&s;ion is proved fir&s;t by the words
of the Apo&s;tle already mentioned, <HI>There is but one
Law-giver, who can both &s;ave, and de&s;troy.</HI> In which
words two arguments do prefer them&s;elves to our
ob&s;ervation; In the fir&s;t place; they a&s;&s;ert there is
but one Legi&s;lator; not <HI>one</HI> picked out among&s;t ma|ny,
not <HI>one</HI> above many, but <HI>one exclu&s;ively,</HI> that is
to &s;ay, <HI>one,</HI> and but <HI>one only.</HI> The Apo&s;tle other|wi&s;e
had made u&s;e of a very uneffectual argument,
to prove what he had propounded; For he rebuketh
tho&s;e who unadvi&s;edly did pa&s;s their judgments ei|ther
on the per&s;ons, or the deeds of other men, as
the invaders of their <HI>Rights.</HI> Who art thou (&s;aith
he) who Do&s;t judge another? As if he &s;hould have
&s;aid, do&s;t thou know thy &s;elf, what thou art, and
what thou do&s;t? It doth not belong to thee to
thru&s;t thy &s;awcy Sicle into the harve&s;t of another
man, much le&s;s boldly to fling thy &s;elf into the
Throne of Almighty God. If already thou are ig|norant
of it, then know, that it belongeth to him a|lone
to judge of the Con&s;ciences of men, to whom a|lone
it doth belong to impo&s;e Laws upon the Con|&s;ciences
of men, which none can do but God alone.
<GAP DESC="foreign">, There is but one Law-giver.</P>
<P>It is ob&s;ervable, that the Apo&s;tle doth a&s;cribe unto
God alone the power of &s;aving and de&s;troying, from
whence we frame the &s;econd Argument; He only
hath power over the Con&s;ciences of men either for
<HI>command</HI> or <HI>prohibition,</HI> who hath power with un|merited
Rewards to crown the well-doers, and
with ju&s;t puni&s;hments to torment the tran&s;gre&s;&s;ors:
but it is in the power of God alone, the <HI>onely Law-giver</HI>
<PB N="114" REF="69">
to give <HI>Rewards</HI> and <HI>Puni&s;hments</HI> according to
the quality of every con&s;cience; Therefore he
alone hath a right and privilege over the Con&s;ci|ences
of men.</P>
<P>X. It is thus proved again in the &s;econd place;
He who alone knoweth the internal motions of the
Con&s;cience, he only hath the power of pre&s;cribing
a Law unto them (for the Law doth neither deter|mine
or judge of things unknown) But unto God
alone the &s;earcher of the heart, the internal motions
of <HI>hearts</HI> and <HI>Con&s;ciences</HI> are di&s;covered; Therefore
<HI>he alone</HI> hath the power of impo&s;ing <HI>a Law</HI> upon the
Con&s;ciences, which may oblige them. From hence
it is that the Laws of men do only bind the external
motions of the body to an external Conformity,
from the knowledge and command whereof, all in|ternal
motions, and &s;everal hammers that &s;trike up|on
the clocks of the <HI>mind,</HI> and <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> are alto|gether
to be exempted; And upon this account it
was, that not only holy men and endued with the
knowledge of the true God, &s;uch as were the three
Captive young men among&s;t the <HI>Babylonians</HI> in the
third of <HI>Daniel,</HI> and the &s;even brethren of <HI>Macca|beus,</HI>
but many wi&s;e men among&s;t the Heathens did
deride the threatnings and torments of Tyrants, as
exerci&s;ing their violence not &s;o much upon them|&s;elves,
as upon the out&s;ides only, and on the &s;ub|burbs
of them. But let us con&s;ider what our Savi|our
<HI>Je&s;us Chri&s;t</HI> did think him&s;elf of the&s;e thing<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">,
and what Coun&s;els he pre&s;cribed to his Di&s;ciples
concerning them: <HI>Fear not them,</HI> &s;aith he, <HI>that kill the
body, and after that have no more that they can do up|on
you, but fear him, who after he hath killed, hath
power to ca&s;t into Hell, yea I &s;ay unto you fear him,
<PB N="115" REF="69">
Luke</HI> 12. 3, 4. As if he &s;hould have &s;aid, Tyrants
by the permi&s;&s;ion of God have power upon the <HI>Bo|dies,</HI>
but upon the <HI>Souls</HI> and <HI>Con&s;ciences</HI> of men they
have no <HI>power,</HI> no <HI>right</HI> at all, the Laws can neither
ordain nor afflict any puni&s;hment which doth belong
to the inward man; God hath only the <HI>prerogative</HI>
of the Soul and Body, and for the neglect of their du|ties
can afflict puni&s;hments on both, and condemn
the whole man to everla&s;ting torment.</P>
<P>XI. In the third place it is proved by the condi|tion,
and natural e&s;tate of the Con&s;cience it &s;elf,
which (as before I have expre&s;&s;ed) is &s;o placed as it
were in the middle betwixt God, &amp; the Will of man,
as that which is u&s;ually and truly &s;poken of <HI>Kings</HI>
and <HI>Emperours,</HI> may as truly be verified of the Con|&s;ciences
of every man, <HI>Solo Deo minores e&s;&s;e, nec ali|quem
in terris &s;uperiorem agno&s;cere; They are le&s;&s;e
than God only, and on Earth do acknowledge no Supe|rior.</HI>
That &s;peech of the Emperour <HI>Maximilian</HI>
the fir&s;t is very memorable, <HI>Con&s;cientiis dominari
velle, est arcem coeli invadere, To exerci&s;e a domina|tion
over Con&s;ciences, is to invade the Tower of Hea|ven.</HI>
He is a plunderer of the glory of God, and a
nefarious invader of the power that is due unto him,
who&s;oever he is that &s;hall claim a <HI>right</HI> to the Con|&s;ciences
of men, or practice an u&s;urpation over them.
Let the <HI>Bi&s;hops of Rome,</HI> (and the <HI>Canoni&s;ts</HI> and the
<HI>Je&s;uits</HI> who do flatter and cringe unto him, &amp; all o|thers)
take heed that they be not guilty of this &s;o
great a Sacrilege; I would al&s;o have tho&s;e admo|ni&s;hed
who do &s;o &s;ubmit their Con&s;ciences to the
power of any creature which ought only to be &s;ub|jected
to God him&s;elf, to be carefull, le&s;t whiles
they conferre the <HI>Honour</HI> of that &s;ervice to the
<PB N="116" REF="70">
creature which is due unto God alone, they make a
God of the Creature, which <HI>at lea&s;t</HI> is interpreted to
be Idolatry. From this fir&s;t Conclu&s;ion thus proved,
there followeth this <HI>remarkable po&s;ition,</HI> That the pro|per
Rule of <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is that which God the &s;u|preme
Law-giver hath pre&s;cribed to it, and be&s;ides
that Rule there ought no other to be admitted.</P>
<P>XII. The &s;econd Conclu&s;ion followeth, which is,
That the next and mo&s;t <HI>immediate Rule of Con&s;ci|ence</HI>
(although it be neither the <HI>Adaequate</HI> or the <HI>&s;u|preme
Rule</HI>) is <HI>that light with which the mind at that
in&s;tant is endued.</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. So|crat. ap. Stob. <GAP DESC="foreign">. Joh. 1. 9. <GAP DESC="foreign">. Nazian. Orat 15.</NOTE> And this is the &s;ame <HI>light</HI> which
&s;ome do call the <HI>light of Rea&s;on,</HI> others the <HI>Law of
the mind,</HI> and which the Schoolmen following the
Philo&s;ophers do call <HI>right,</HI> or <HI>rectified Rea&s;on.</HI> This
is fir&s;t proved by &s;ome places out of the word of
God, as <HI>Luke 12. 57. Wherefore even of your &s;elves
do you not judge that which is right?</HI> They are the
words of our Saviour; as if he &s;hould have &s;aid, You
have <HI>the light within you</HI> infu&s;ed into your minds
from that true light which enlightneth every man
comming into this world, by the help whereof (un|le&s;&s;e
you will be wanting to your &s;elves) you can
di&s;tingui&s;h what is <HI>&s;traight</HI> from what is <HI>crooked,</HI> and
what is <HI>ju&s;t</HI> from that which is <HI>unju&s;t.</HI> The Text <HI>Rom.
2. ver&s;e</HI> 14. and 15. is very remarkable, <HI>Quum
Gentes quae legem</HI> (&s;criptam &s;cilicet) <HI>non habent,
natur&acirc; ea quae &s;unt legis faciunt,</HI> Seeing the Gen|tiles
who have not the Law (<HI>viz.</HI> the written
Law) do by natue perform tho&s;e things which
are of the Law, to wit they practice the Acts of
<HI>Ju&s;tice, Prudence, Fortitude,</HI> and <HI>Temperance,</HI> and
of all other Virtues, <HI>The&s;e men having not the Law
are a Law unto them&s;elves, for they &s;how the works of
<PB N="117" REF="70">
the Law written in their hearts, their Con&s;ciences give|ing
witne&s;&s;e thereunto, and their thoughts either accu|&s;ing
or defending them.</HI> By which words it is mani|fe&s;t,
that in the particular Acts of <HI>Te&s;tifying, accu|&s;ing,</HI>
and <HI>defending,</HI> and in what&s;oever Acts that al|ready
are committed by any per&s;on, his Con&s;cience
doth pa&s;&s;e its judgment on every one of them by
the <HI>light of Rea&s;on</HI> which is infu&s;ed and imprinted
into his mind; And &s;eeing the <HI>Rule</HI> is the &s;ame con|cerning
<HI>Acts</HI> to come, as well as concerning <HI>Acts</HI>
pa&s;t, it followeth, that the Con&s;cience as well in
tho&s;e Acts determined to be done, as in tho&s;e
which are already done, doth make u&s;e of the &s;ame
light of <HI>examining, judging, and dictating,</HI> as the
Rule &amp; mea&s;ure of tho&s;e Acts. I here &s;hall willingly
take no notice of that Text in the fourth <HI>P&s;alm</HI> and
&s;ixth <HI>ver&s;e,</HI> which is commonly produced by the
Latin Fathers e&s;pecially of the latter <HI>times,</HI> and by
the Schoolmen, for a proof of this Conclu&s;ion, the
words are <HI>Signatum e&s;t &s;uper nos lumen vultus tui do|mine,
Thy light O Lord is &s;igned over us,</HI> becau&s;e that
interpretation of the words are grounded on a bad
tran&s;lation, &amp; &s;eemeth not to appertain to the mind
and &s;cope of the Prophet.</P>
<P>XIII. This is proved again by our common
cu&s;tom, and manner of &s;peech, for we u&s;ually &s;ay,
that the man who acteth according to the light of
his mind, doth u&s;e a <HI>good Con&s;cience,</HI> although per|adventure
he hath <HI>committed</HI> or <HI>omitted</HI> that which
was not to be <HI>omitted</HI> or <HI>committed</HI> by him; and a|gain,
that he who hath not obeyed tho&s;e <HI>dictates</HI> of
his <HI>mind,</HI> but hath acted contrary to them, hath u&s;ed
a bad Con&s;cience. St. <HI>Paul</HI> the Apo&s;tle, <HI>Acts 2<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</HI> 1
doth profe&s;&s;e, that <HI>In all things he &s;erved God with a
<PB N="118" REF="71">
good Con&s;cience even unto that day,</HI> which words, if
they are to be extended to the former part of his
life before he was made a Chri&s;tian, (which inter|pretation
hath been complacent to many, and &s;eem|eth
probable unto me) we may conclude by them,
that although he was an open and a dangerous ene|my
to Chri&s;tianity,<NOTE PLACE="marg">1 Tim. 1. 13.</NOTE> and as he him&s;elf confe&s;&s;eth, a
<HI>per&s;ecutor</HI> and a <HI>bla&s;phemer,</HI> yet it may be &s;aid, that
even then, in all good Con&s;cience he &s;erved God,
becau&s;e in all that time he acted nothing but what
his Con&s;cience (according to the mea&s;ure of that
light with which it was then endued) did pre&s;cribe
unto him; For indeed he then thought (as he him|&s;elf
doth openly and &s;incerely profe&s;&s;e in his Apo|logy
before King <HI>Agrippa</HI>) that <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>he
thought in him&s;elf,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Act. 26. 9.</NOTE> <HI>that he ought to do many things
contrary to the name of Je&s;us of Nazareth;</HI> But
what&s;oever may be determined of <HI>Paul</HI> and of his
Con&s;cience at that time, mo&s;t certain it is, that
God him&s;elf gave a te&s;timony to <HI>Abimeleck,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Gen. 20. 6.</NOTE> who ig|norantly
&s;ent for the wife of <HI>Abraham,</HI> that he did
it, <HI>integritate cordis,</HI> in the <HI>integrity of his heart,</HI> that
is with a <HI>good Con&s;cience,</HI> and for no other rea&s;on but
for this only, by which he did excu&s;e him&s;elf, for had
he known her to have been the wife of another man,
he would not have &s;ent for her unto his hou&s;e. The
Con&s;cience therefore (by an ignorance of it &s;elf
not much to be blamed, peradventure erronious)
may be &s;aid to be <HI>good and right,</HI> God him&s;elf being
Judge, (not <HI>&s;imply</HI> and <HI>ab&s;olutely,</HI> but as but <HI>&s;o far,</HI> &amp;
<HI>&s;ecundum quid,</HI> as they &s;peak it in the Schooles) by
rea&s;on of the conformity which it hath with the
light of the <HI>mind thereof,</HI> as its next and immediate
<HI>Rule.</HI> But that the Con&s;cience may be &s;aid to be
<PB N="119" REF="71">
right <GAP DESC="foreign">, that is fully, and in every re&s;pect,
there mu&s;t another and a further Conformity be of
nece&s;&s;ity added unto it, which is, it mu&s;t be con|formable
to its fir&s;t <HI>and &s;upreme Rule,</HI> which
what it is, &s;hall mo&s;t diligently be now di&s;|cu&s;&s;ed.</P>
<P>XIV. This therefore &s;hall be our third Conclu|&s;ion:
<HI>The holy Scripture or the written word of God
is not the Adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience.</HI> Which in
the fir&s;t place is thus proved; Beyond the Adaequate
Rule of any thing what&s;oever, it is not nece&s;&s;ary
that for the &s;ame thing there &s;hould be any other
<HI>Rule</HI> to be added to it, for <HI>Adaequation</HI> doth ex|clude
the nece&s;&s;ity of any Supplement: But it is ne|ce&s;&s;ary
that there &s;hould be another Rule of Con|&s;cience
be&s;ides the holy Scripture, for otherwi&s;e the
Gentiles who have not the Scripture &s;hould have
no Rule for their Con&s;cience, which comes quite
cro&s;&s;e to rea&s;on, experience, and the expre&s;&s;e te&s;ti|mony
of the Apo&s;tle in the Text above mentioned.
Mo&s;t certain it is, that there is a Con&s;cience in all
men, and that it is under a Law, which is a rule to
direct it; For as the Apo&s;tle maketh mention, and
it is every where extant in Hi&s;tory, and confirmed
by daily experience, from whence do proceed tho&s;e
grievous accu&s;ations of Con&s;cience, tho&s;e whips,
tho&s;e pangs, and torments of the Soul, &amp; tho&s;e fu|ries
expre&s;&s;ed by the Tragedians, but from the <HI>viola|ted
Law of Con&s;cience?</HI> of which if there were no Law
at all, tho&s;e people that are mo&s;t barbarous &s;hould be
&s;o much the more happy, as they are the more far
remote from the voice, and &s;ound of the Go&s;pel, be|cau&s;e
that then no crime of &s;in could ju&s;tly be im|puted
to them, <HI>For where there is no Law, there is no
<PB N="120" REF="72">
tran&s;gre&s;&s;ion, Rom.</HI> 4. 15. Sin being nothing el&s;e
but the tran&s;gre&s;&s;ion of the Law, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
1 <HI>Joh.</HI> 3. 4. That the power of Con&s;cience is
&s;trong in both regards, to fear every thing when it is
guilty, and to be in dread of nothing when it is inno|cent,
is not only cryed up by the <HI>Schools,</HI> but by the
<HI>Theaters</HI> of the <HI>Heathens,</HI> who notwith&s;tanding
knew nothing of <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> or of Chri&s;t, nor of the
Law or the Prophets, and never heard of the Go&s;|pel
or the Apo&s;tles. The Scripture therefore is not
the &s;ole and Adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>XV. It is confirmed again in the &s;econd place
from the proper end of the holy Scripture, which is
<GAP DESC="foreign">, 2 <HI>Tim. 3. 15. To make us wi&s;e
to everla&s;t<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">g Salvation by faith in Je&s;us Chri&s;t.</HI> For
when the <HI>light</HI> of <HI>natural rea&s;on</HI> could not rai&s;e us
high enough to tho&s;e things which do tend to a <HI>&s;u|pernatural
end,</HI> both becau&s;e of our natural light too
much ob&s;cured and ecclip&s;ed by the fall of <HI>Adam,</HI>
and becau&s;e we mu&s;t have &s;upernatural helps to ar|rive
to &s;upernatural ends, it plea&s;ed Almighty God
in pity of our infirmities, in his own word to open
his own <HI>will</HI> unto us, according to that mea&s;ure
which he him&s;elf thought good, in&s;omuch that by
this gracious and &s;aving Coun&s;el, not only tho&s;e
things by divine revelation may be made known un|to
us, which properly do concern our faith, and can|not
be known by the <HI>light of nature,</HI> but that more
perfectly and more &s;avingly we may be in&s;tructed
in tho&s;e things al&s;o which by nature are known un|to
us, that &s;o tho&s;e works which nature enjoyneth
to be performed, taking their <HI>ri&s;e</HI> from a nobler
principle, which is, <HI>the love of God,</HI> and ordained to
more noble ends, to wit <HI>the Glory of God,</HI> and the
<PB N="221" REF="72">
&s;alvation of our &s;ouls, may from <HI>moral</HI> become <HI>&s;pi|ritual,</HI>
and be grateful and acceptable to God by
Chri&s;t. The Scripture therefore, as &s;upernaturally
it is to be believed, is the only and Adaequate
Rule of our faith, and according to our actions and
performances (&s;o far as they are &s;piritual, and per|tain
to a &s;piritual end) it is to be the only and
<HI>Adaequate Rule of our Manners,</HI> and by con&s;equent
the principal, and (as I may &s;o &s;peak it) the Ar|chitectonical
Rule of all our actions. But &s;eeing it
doth belong to Con&s;cience to look back on things
that are done, not only upon this account as they are
&s;piritual, that is to &s;ay whether they are done out of
<HI>Charity,</HI> and directed to a <HI>&s;upernatural end,</HI> but as
they are <HI>moral,</HI> that is, whether they be <HI>good</HI> or <HI>evil,
lawfull</HI> or <HI>unlawful, free</HI> or <HI>nece&s;&s;ary,</HI> that a right
judgment may be pa&s;&s;ed on the&s;e things, we are not
only to &s;eek unto the <HI>holy Scriptures,</HI> but to make
our &s;ea&s;onable addre&s;&s;es unto other helps.</P>
<P>XVI. In the third place this is proved again, by
the <HI>Form,</HI> the <HI>Character,</HI> and the <HI>Temperature</HI> of
the Scripture, which &s;eeing it containeth in it very
many precepts, but not all of one kind, &s;ome of
them pertayning to <HI>Manners,</HI> &s;ome to <HI>Rites,</HI> and
&s;ome indifferently common unto all, and &s;ome pe|culiar
only to &s;ome Nation, and &s;ome again to
&s;ome one <HI>order</HI> or <HI>per&s;on;</HI> Some of them induring
only for a <HI>time,</HI> and others of <HI>a perpetual obligation,</HI>
&s;ome by way of Coun&s;el, of things expedient ac|cording
as the exigence of the affairs requireth, and
&s;ome again in the way of <HI>mandate</HI> or command, of
things &s;imply or ab&s;olutely nece&s;&s;ary in them&s;elves,
if there were not &s;ome other rule, be&s;ides the
Scriptures, for the di&s;cerning of <HI>moral</HI> from <HI>ritual
<PB N="122" REF="73">
precepts,</HI> and of things <HI>temporary</HI> from <HI>perpetual</HI>
and of things <HI>peculiar</HI> from <HI>common,</HI> the Con&s;cience
would oftentimes labour in a Labyrinth of doubts,
and know not which way to turn, e&s;pecially when
<HI>precepts of diver&s;e kinds</HI> being delivered as it were
in one &amp; the &s;ame breath, in the &s;ame Phra&s;e, and in
continued connexion of words, do immediately fol|low
and tread on the heels of one another. For ex|amples
&s;ake, <HI>Levit.</HI> 19. 18. An example is there
given <HI>to love thy neigbour as thy &s;elf;</HI> And in the
ver&s;e immediately following there is a command,
that two Bea&s;ts of a &s;everal kind might not be &s;uffer|ed
to mingle in generation with one another, and
that one Field be not &s;owen with diver&s;e &s;orts of
&s;eeds, nor any garment made of Linnen thread inter|woven
with Woollen. The fir&s;t command herein
is <HI>moral</HI> and <HI>univer&s;al,</HI> the other but <HI>Ceremonial</HI> and
<HI>judicial,</HI> and peculiar only to the Nation of the
Jews; But when the&s;e things are read in the Chur|ches,
it cannot by the Text appear what &s;o great a
difference there is betwixt them; And in the 30th.
ver&s;e of the &s;ame Chapter, the Sanctification of the
Sabbath, &amp; the reverence of the Sanctuary are equal|ly
commanded, and in a continued cour&s;e of words,
and even in the very &s;ame &s;olemn &s;anction of the
Law given, <HI>Ego Jehovah,</HI> I the Jehovah: yet I doubt
not but that mo&s;t men are of opinion, that in one of
the Precepts the Con&s;ciences of men are at this
day obliged to the performance of it, and that in
the other they are not. Now what the rea&s;on is
that their opinion is &s;uch, the precepts in the Text
being all alike, and no di&s;tinction, nor the lea&s;t ap|parence
of &s;o great a difference, there can certain|ly
no other rea&s;on be given but that it proceedeth
<PB N="123" REF="73">
from the judgment of <HI>rea&s;on</HI> and <HI>prudence,</HI> which
being excluded, <HI>obligatory precepts</HI> cannot &s;o be
known from tho&s;e which are not obligatory, but
that the Con&s;cience will be oftentimes in a &s;u&s;pence,
and not able to know or judge what is commanded
to be done, or what to be left undone.</P>
<P>XVII. It is proved in the fourth place by an ar|gument
drawn from the inconvenicies which do a|ri&s;e
from the contrary opinion, that is, from the
mo&s;t grievous calamities which have a long time a|fflicted
the church of Chri&s;t by rea&s;on of the mi&s;|under&s;tanding
of the <HI>perfection of the holy Scriptures,</HI>
from whence a mo&s;t dangerous error hath po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed
&s;ome men of great e&s;timation, that they have de|clared,
that nothing can be lawfuly done, or com|manded,
which is not authorized by God in the
Scripture, or at lea&s;t there approved by &s;ome lau|dable
example. This foundation being once laid,
not a few men of a hot &s;pirit being tran&s;ported (<HI>to
judge charitably of them</HI>) with a zeale to God,
but not according to knowledge, did begin to rai&s;e
unnece&s;&s;ary &s;trifes and di&s;putation concerning the
Ceremonies of the Church, they did declare that all
Ceremonies not expre&s;sly mentioned in the word
of God, were to be thru&s;t out, and for ever to be
bani&s;hed from the Church of Chri&s;t; that Laws or|dained
by men concerning things Indifferent were
to be cancelled, that all the Churches throughout <HI>Eu|rope</HI>
were to be reformed, &amp; all things to be reduced
to the <HI>Evangelical purity and Simplicity.</HI> The unruly
rage of the&s;e men did hete for a while <HI>make a &s;tand,</HI>
but it did not &s;tand here long, but as commonly it
commeth to pa&s;&s;e <GAP DESC="foreign">
<HI>one ab&s;urdity being granted, a thou&s;and will in&s;ue,</HI>
their boldne&s;&s;e derived from his fountain did flow
<PB N="124" REF="74">
at la&s;t into an open rage, and brake forth into an
Anabapti&s;tical fury; And although the <HI>growing
mi&s;chief</HI> hath gon &s;o far that it can &s;carce ri&s;e high|er,
yet every day it &s;wels, and more and more
doth inlarge it &s;elf by bringing into the world new
mon&s;ters of opinions, that were we not a&s;&s;ured by
the word of God, that the foundation of God doth
continue firm, and that the Gates of Hell &s;hall ne|ver
be able to prevail altogether again&s;t the
Church, it were much to be feared, le&s;t the <HI>uni|ver&s;al
Church</HI> of Chri&s;t overwhelmed with a Deluge
of Athei&s;m, &s;hould utterly be &s;wallowed up by it
throughout the world.</P>
<P>XVIII. And let no man think that in vain Rheto|rick
I do complain of this, with more enuy, than
truth; for I am mo&s;t confident, that he who&s;oever
he is that is &s;trongly prepo&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed and infected with
this errour, &s;hall never be able in his daily contro|ver&s;ies
any ways to &s;atisfie the importunate argu|ments
of the <HI>Anabapti&s;ts, Socinians,</HI> and other
<HI>Sectaries,</HI> who&s;e names I am a&s;hamed to mention.
For to pa&s;&s;e by the e&s;tabli&s;hed form of <HI>Eccle&s;ia&s;ti|cal
Government</HI> which now adays our <HI>Political Di|vines</HI>
would either referr to the Civil Magi&s;trate, or
quite take them away, upon no other account but
this only, that they think it is no where expre&s;&s;ed in
the word of God, they mu&s;t take away with it the
ob&s;ervation of the Lords day, the Ordination of
Mini&s;ters of the Go&s;pel, the Bapti&s;m of Infants,
the Sprinkling of water in Bapti&s;m for the dipping of
the whole body, the Sacramental reverence, and
many other things, with all Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Rites,
and Laws, or el&s;e having reformed their judge|ments,
they mu&s;t confe&s;&s;e they may all of them
<PB N="125" REF="74">
be retained without, or &s;in or &s;candal.</P>
<P>XIX. But this, you will &s;ay, is to derogate from
the perfection of the Scriptures (which all the Di|vines
of the reformed Churches do willingly ac|knowledge)
and to open a door to the Traditions
of the Church of <HI>Rome,</HI> and to take away all the
force from the arguments drawn <HI>negatively</HI> from
the <HI>Scriptures,</HI> which the antient <HI>Fathers</HI> of the
Church, and the mo&s;t learned of the <HI>Divines</HI> of
the&s;e times do very frequently make u&s;e of. I
make an&s;wer, that the <HI>Church of Rome</HI> doth derogate
from the perfection of the Scripture in this con&s;i|deration,
that in the matters of Faith, and things ne|ce&s;&s;ary
to &s;alvation, they do thru&s;t in their <HI>unwritten
Traditions</HI> to be received with the <HI>&s;ame reverence</HI> as
the written word of God, as if it were not enough
for the &s;ons of God, to be wi&s;e unto &s;alvation,
by having the <HI>new Te&s;tament</HI> conferred on them,
which is the Inheritance left them by their Fa|ther,
but they mu&s;t al&s;o have the vain books in|&s;erted
of humane Traditions; But as for tho&s;e
who do di&s;pute <HI>negatively from the Scriptures,</HI>
concerning things which are nece&s;&s;ary to &s;alvation,
either to be believed or practi&s;ed, let them make
u&s;e of this argument, as indeed they ought to do.
But there is no que&s;tion here of the rule of Faith,
but of the rule of Con&s;cience, and not of the <HI>chief</HI>
rule of it, but of the <HI>Adaequate,</HI> and not what is ne|ce&s;&s;ary
for a Chri&s;tian to believe or practice to at|tain
unto the &s;alvation of the Soul, but what is law|full
for a pious and prudent man to do lawfully, or
to leave undone, at <HI>&s;uch a time,</HI> or in <HI>&s;uch a place.</HI>
The &s;um of all is, that the <HI>holy Scripture</HI> is the <HI>Ad|aequate
Rule of Faith,</HI> and of things <HI>&s;upernaturally to
<PB N="126" REF="75">
be believed,</HI> as al&s;o of all <HI>moral actions</HI> &s;o far as they
are &s;piritual, and ordained to a <HI>&s;upernatural end,</HI> and
it is al&s;o the the <HI>Law of Con&s;cience,</HI> &amp; the <HI>Chief</HI> and
<HI>&s;upreme Rule</HI> for the putting of <HI>moral things</HI> in
practice; &s;o that where the Scripture determineth
of any thing univer&s;ally, either by the way of <HI>precept</HI>
or <HI>prohibition,</HI> it is not lawfull for any other <HI>Law</HI>
what&s;oever to &s;tand in oppo&s;ition to it: but it is not
&s;o to be under&s;tood to be the only <HI>Law of Con&s;cience,</HI>
that what is not <HI>commanded</HI> there, to be there|fore
pre&s;ently unlawfull: And thus much of the
third Conclu&s;ion.</P>
<P>XX. The fourth followeth; <HI>The proper and
adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience is the will of God, in
what way &s;oever it is revealed unto Men.</HI> Some call
this the <HI>Law of God,</HI> others the <HI>eternal Law,</HI> the
words differing in the <HI>&s;ound,</HI> but agreeing in the
<HI>&s;ence.</HI> Every part of this <HI>Conclu&s;ion</HI> is to be weigh|ed
by it &s;elf; In the fir&s;t place I do &s;ay, it is the
<HI>will of God,</HI> which by the Schoolemen (though by
&s;ome of them not rightly expounded, and by o|thers
of them not rightly applyed) is di&s;tingui&s;hed
into <HI>Voluntatem, beneplaciti,</HI> and <HI>Voluntatem &s;igni,</HI>
the <HI>will of the good plea&s;ure,</HI> and the <HI>will of the &s;ign.</HI>
The fir&s;t called the <HI>will of the good plea&s;ure of God,</HI>
is that, which God from all eternity did with
him&s;elf re&s;olve what he him&s;elf will do; the other
which is called the <HI>will of the &s;ign</HI> is that by which
God hath given us a Law, by &s;ignifying what he
would have us to do. The fir&s;t is called the <HI>will</HI> of
God <HI>properly,</HI> and <HI>univocally,</HI> the other <HI>improperly,</HI>
and <HI>analogically.</HI> The <HI>will of the good plea&s;ure,</HI> (if
it be lawfull to &s;peak of the maje&s;ty of God after
the manner of men) is in &s;ome re&s;pect a Law unto
<PB N="127" REF="75">
God him&s;elf, whereby he <HI>acteth,</HI> for he always act|eth
that which is <HI>complacent</HI> unto him; but it is
not given to us by God to be a Law, or to be a
rule unto our Con&s;ciences, or at the lea&s;t for the
putting of any thing into action; In &s;ome re&s;pect
indeed it may be &s;aid to pertain unto the Con&s;ci|ences,
in regard of <HI>&s;ufferings;</HI> but this is a <HI>po&s;teriori,</HI>
&amp; from an after ob&s;ervation, &amp; in this &s;ence, that in
Con&s;cience we are obliged with patience to endure
all things what&s;oever &s;hall befall us, after that by
the event it is manife&s;t to us that God would have
it &s;o; For rectified rea&s;on doth dictate this unto us,
that we ought not to be di&s;plea&s;ed at the method
of the Divine Providence, who can will nothing but
that which is mo&s;t righteous: It remaineth there|fore,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Optimum e&s;t Deum quo Au|thore om|nia prove|niunt &s;ine murmura|tione con|comitari: Senec. E|pi&s;tol. 108 Placeat homini quicquid Deo placu|it. Idem Epi&s;t. 71.</NOTE>
that the <HI>will</HI> be the rule of our Con&s;ciences,
which is called, <HI>The will of the &s;ign;</HI> For when
God by <HI>prohibiting</HI> and by <HI>commanding</HI> hath &s;ignifi|ed
what we ought to do, and what we ought not to
do, it is our duties ab&s;olutely to conform our wills
unto his <HI>will.</HI> Many things among&s;t the School-men
are with unprofitable acutene&s;&s;e di&s;puted on this
Subject, <HI>viz. Whether and how far the will of the
rea&s;onable creature in a thing willed is bound to con|form
it &s;elf to the will of the Creator?</HI> When the
whole matter (as much as belongs to our bu&s;ine&s;s,
and the u&s;e of humane life) may briefly in one
word be di&s;patched, which is, <HI>That we are always
bound to will that which God willeth, that we &s;hould
will;</HI> Thus when God commanded <HI>Abraham</HI> to
offer up his Son <HI>I&s;aac,</HI> Although God in the <HI>will of
his good plea&s;ure</HI> would not have had that done
which at the &s;ame time he commanded to be done,
as by and by &s;hall appear by the event, yet <HI>Abraham</HI>
<PB N="127" REF="76">
was bound to will the very &s;ame thing, becau&s;e
God by <HI>commanding</HI> it, did &s;ignifie that <HI>it was his
will that</HI> Abraham <HI>&s;hould have a will unto it.</HI></P>
<P>XXI. I &s;ay &s;econdly; <HI>the will of God revealed
unto Men,</HI> becau&s;e this <HI>revealed will</HI> is the formal
<HI>Cau&s;e</HI> and <HI>Rea&s;on</HI> of the <HI>obligation;</HI> For the <HI>will of
God</HI> doth not oblige tho&s;e unto whom it is not re|vealed;
And hence it is, that the Gentiles to whom
the Go&s;pel is not preached, are not bound to be|lieve
it, or to have any faith in Chri&s;t; for there
is no man that is bound to that which is impo&s;&s;ible:
And it is impo&s;&s;ible for that man to whom the Go&s;|pel
hath been never preached, and who never hath
heard any thing of Chri&s;t, to believe either in
Chri&s;t, or in the Go&s;pel, &s;eeing that the light of
Rea&s;on cannot a&s;cend &s;o high, according to that of
the Apo&s;tle, Rom. 10. 15. <HI>How &s;hall they believe
in him of whom they have not heard? and how &s;hall
they hear without a Preacher?</HI> And the &s;ame Apo|&s;tle
thinks it not meet, that <HI>others &s;hould be judged by
the Law,</HI> but tho&s;e only who have <HI>&s;inned in the
Law,</HI> Rom. 11. 12. Neither doth this &s;uffize to
bring an obligation upon the Con&s;cience, that the
<HI>will of God is revealed to him,</HI> unle&s;&s;e it be revea|led
to him as the will of God, in a peculiar reference
to him&s;elf. In&s;omuch that if any of the Gentiles
who were <HI>Aliens</HI> &s;hould ca&s;ually have met with the
Books of <HI>Mo&s;es;</HI> and by reading of them &s;hould
ob&s;erve the Commandements which are there gi|ven
to the people of <HI>I&s;rael,</HI> he had not pre&s;ently
been obliged to the performance of them, becau&s;e
they did not pertain unto him, but were only pe|culiar
to the <HI>I&s;raelites;</HI> and it is known, that the
Law doth not oblige all men unto whom it is
<PB N="129" REF="76">
known, but all tho&s;e only to whom it is given.</P>
<P>XXII. In the third place I &s;ay, <HI>the will of God in
what way &s;oever it be revealed;</HI> for the will of God
receiveth its authority from it &s;elf, and not from
the manner of revealing it. So that the Church of
<HI>Rome,</HI> in their <HI>controver&s;ie</HI> concerning <HI>Traditions,</HI> need
not to take &s;o much pains to prove That the word
of God unwritten is of equal authority with the
word of God that is written, for this we willingly
do grant unto them; We only <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ain would under|&s;tand
how we may &s;atisfie our &s;elves that the <HI>Tra|dition</HI>
unwritten, may appear to be the <HI>word of God,</HI>
as undoubtedly as the <HI>word</HI> which is written. The
will of God therefore in what manner &s;oever it be
revealed, is the Rule of the Con&s;cience, provided,
it be &s;o revealed, that it either actually be made
known, or may be &s;o made known unto the mind,
if culpable negligence doth not hinder; And it doth
oblige the Con&s;cience to acknowledge it, and to
propound it unto our own will, as the will of God,
to which it is bound to conform it &s;elf, and not only
&s;o, but to command the <HI>executive potentiaes</HI> to be|&s;tirre
them&s;elves for the fulfilling of this will of
God. Remarkable is that of <HI>Dama&s;cene,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
what God willeth, m<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">&s;t of
nece&s;&s;ity be good; for <HI>his will is the mea&s;ure of
goodne&s;&s;e:</HI> but the Law of God is <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">hat commandment by which <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
that good will of his; he proceeds <GAP DESC="foreign">,
the Law of God
comming to our <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ind doth attract it to it, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
it doth <HI>incite, in&s;tim<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">late,</HI>
and as it were &s;purs it doth urge our Con&s;ciences
to the performance of their duties, by repre&s;enting
<PB N="130" REF="77">
and inculcating into our <HI>wills</HI> the <HI>will of God.</HI> And
this is that mo&s;t proper and exact <HI>obligation of Con|&s;cience</HI>
which we before have &s;poken of.</P>
<P>XXIII. The force and effect of this obligation is
variou&s;ly expre&s;&s;ed by St. <HI>Paul;</HI> Sometimes <HI>he con|fe&s;&s;eth
him&s;elf a Debator to the Grecians and Barbari|ans,
Rom.</HI> 1. 14. As if he &s;hould &s;ay, &s;eeing I know by
<HI>the will of God</HI> that I am &s;et apart to preach the
Go&s;pel to the <HI>Gentiles,</HI> without difference, whether
they are Graecians, or Barbarians, I acknowledge
that in this re&s;pect I am a Debtor to them; And in
the 2 <HI>Cor.</HI> 2. 14. he &s;aith, that he is tyed, and bound,
as men are bound with bonds, to the performance
of this duty. And in the fir&s;t of the <HI>Corinthians,</HI> the
ninth Chapter, and the &s;ixteenth ver&s;e, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
The preaching of the Go&s;pel is intru&s;ted to
me, &s;o that I have not the lea&s;ure to be idle, for a
great nece&s;&s;ity doth pre&s;&s;e me, and wo unto me if
I &s;hould neglect it. The like nece&s;&s;ity to be impo|&s;ed
upon them, and not to be &s;haken off, was open|ly
and before St. <HI>Pauls</HI> time acknowledged by two
of the greate&s;t of the Apo&s;tles, and for a long time
<HI>individual Companions,</HI> S. <HI>Peter,</HI> and St. <HI>John, Acts</HI>
4. 20. <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>For we cannot but &s;peak.</HI>
God hath commanded us to &s;peak with authority,
and you command us to hold our peace; Whether
it be better to obey him, or to obey you, Do you
judge? We are free, and can be &s;o from your com|mand,
for you have no power upon our Con&s;cien|ces:
but the command of God doth hold us fa&s;t, and
ha<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">h &s;uch a coercive power over us, that unle&s;&s;e we
wil peri&s;h, we cannot be free, nor do any thing but
that only which he commandeth.</P>
<P>XXIV. Moreover, when it is a&s;&s;erted, that the
<PB N="131" REF="77">
next and immediate <HI>Rule of the Con&s;cience</HI> is <HI>the
light of the mind,</HI> and <HI>the primary and the &s;upreme
Rule, is the written word of God,</HI> and the proper and
the Adaequate Rule of it, <HI>the will of God by man|ner
what&s;oever revealed,</HI> or which is to the &s;ame
&s;ence, <HI>The Law impo&s;ed by God on the rea&s;onable
Creature,</HI> That the&s;e things may more fully be un|der&s;tood,
we are to know, that the light of the mind
is threefold, as God in three ways hath manife&s;ted
his will to the rea&s;onable Creature. There is the
<HI>light innate,</HI> the <HI>light inferred,</HI> and the <HI>light acqui|red;</HI>
or the <HI>light of nature,</HI> the <HI>light of Scripture,</HI>
and the <HI>light of Doctrine.</HI> The fir&s;t light, which I
do call the light Innate, doth proceed from the
<HI>Law of nature;</HI> For in the fir&s;t creation of the
World, as God endued brute and inanimate Crea|tures
with a natural in&s;tinct, by which they are in|clined
unto tho&s;e things which are congruous to
their natures, and the con&s;ervatives of it, which is as a
<HI>Law</HI> unto them, as it is &s;o expre&s;&s;ed by <HI>David, P&s;al.
148. 6. Thou ha&s;t given them a Law which they may
not tran&s;gre&s;&s;e,</HI> So a certain <HI>natural Law</HI> is given
unto man, and proportionated to his <HI>nature,</HI> as he
is a <HI>rea&s;onable Creature,</HI> that is, more &s;ublime and
noble, and if I may &s;o &s;peak it more Divine than
what is given to other Creatures of this inferiour
O<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">h; And this Law doth incite him to the perfor|mance
of tho&s;e things which are agreeable to his
nature, as he is a man, that is to &s;ay, a living
Creature indued with rea&s;on, or to live according
to rea&s;on. Now this Law is natural impre&s;&s;ion,
and as it were a figure of that eternal Law which is
in the mind of God, and it is a part of that <HI>Divine
Image</HI> after which man at the fir&s;t was &s;aid to be
<PB N="132" REF="78">
made, <HI>Gen.</HI> 1. by which knowing of a certainty
that there are &s;ome things in <HI>our rea&s;onable nature</HI>
that are congruous to the will of God the Creator,
and other things which are not &s;o, we do conclude,
that the one is <HI>good</HI> and ought to be performed by
us, and the other <HI>evil</HI> &amp; altogether to be abhomined.
The <HI>light</HI> proceeding from this <HI>law</HI> is extremely
ob&s;cured by that grievous ruine which folowed the
fall of <HI>Adam,</HI> and from hence ari&s;e tho&s;e thick
clouds of <HI>Ignorance</HI> and <HI>Error</HI> in which all his po&s;t|erity
whil&s;t we live in this World, are invelopped.
But the <HI>providence of God</HI> hath &s;o mo&s;t wi&s;ely or|dered
it, that in the common wrack it hath come
off more unhurt than many other of the Faculties:
for it hath plea&s;ed God that certain propo&s;itions,
and <HI>practical principles,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Quae ani|mis impri|muntur in|<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="3 letters">atae in|telligentiae <HI>Cic. 1 de leg.</HI></NOTE> which the Philo&s;ophers call
<GAP DESC="foreign"> and <GAP DESC="foreign">, and <HI>Ba&s;ili|us</HI>
mo&s;t acutely <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>&s;park of the Divine Fire which in the great con|flagration
was pre&s;erved in the a&s;hes of it,</HI> &s;hould
&s;till remain, that &s;o in our brea&s;ts and mo&s;t inward
parts,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Haec ta|men exi|gua lucis &s;cintillula r<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">man&s;it. <HI>Calvin. In&s;tit. 10. Sect.</HI> 5.</NOTE> he might have the Preachers of his will.
The&s;e <GAP DESC="foreign">, The&s;e common Notions,
are that <HI>Law of God,</HI> which the Apo&s;tle <HI>Rom.</HI> 1.
doth &s;ay is <HI>written in the Hearts of men,</HI> in the
very &s;ame manner, as the Lawes of <HI>Cities</HI> or o<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">
the <HI>Prince</HI> are accu&s;tomed to be in&s;cribed in <HI>Ta|bles
of Bra&s;&s;e.</HI> For they have the &s;ame authority
and e&s;timation of a <HI>Law</HI> or of a <HI>Rule</HI> impo&s;ed by
God upon us, as the <HI>Will of the Law-giver</HI> &s;igni|fied
in a publick in&s;trument, and expo&s;ed to the
peoples view, is adjudged to be a Law.</P>
<P>XXV. This natural Law doth con&s;i&s;t of dive<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">
<HI>practical principles</HI> which notwith&s;tanding are red<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">|ced
<PB N="133" REF="78">
to one fir&s;t and univer&s;al Law which doth con|tain
the other, This <HI>univer&s;al Law,</HI> though but
&s;hort, is <HI>bipartite,</HI> of two parts, <HI>viz. Good is to
be done, Evil is to be avoyded.</HI> In the &s;ame manner
all the Commandements in the Decalogue are re|duced
to one <HI>Univer&s;al Law,</HI> to wit, the <HI>love of
God,</HI> and the <HI>love of our neighbour.</HI> To this <HI>Univer|&s;al
Law</HI> con&s;erved in the <HI>Syntere&s;is</HI> there are other
<HI>particular Laws</HI> &s;ubordinated, which are derived
from it, as <HI>Conclu&s;ions</HI> are from <HI>Premi&s;es;</HI> &s;ome
whereof are of the <HI>fir&s;t Dictate of Nature,</HI> and
next of all adjoyning to that <HI>principal Law;</HI> others
&s;tand farther off, and have only a <HI>Secondary rela|tion,</HI>
and by the virtue of tho&s;e which are more
neere. Tho&s;e which are of the <HI>fir&s;t dictate of Na|ture,</HI>
as &s;oon as they are pre&s;ented to our minds
and cogitations, they pre&s;ently command our be|lief,
and by rea&s;on of the undeniable evidence of
them, they do inforce us to a&s;&s;ent unto them; for
it is not lawful to doubt of the truth of them,
nor is it po&s;&s;ible for any one who under&s;tands the
&s;ence of the words, to erre concerning them; for
no &s;ooner it is propounded that <HI>God is to be wor|&s;hiped,
and no man to be injured,</HI> but the mind
pre&s;ently is at re&s;t, and without delay a&s;&s;enteth to
it; but in the latter, by rea&s;on of the difference
which may ari&s;e from Circum&s;tances, it mo&s;t often
comes to pa&s;&s;e, that we both doubt, and erre, and
the more <HI>remote</HI> we are from tho&s;e <HI>fir&s;t Principles,</HI>
the more prone we are to run into error. For the
<HI>fir&s;t</HI> and <HI>univer&s;al Principles,</HI> are &s;o much the
more <HI>certain</HI> than the <HI>po&s;terior</HI> and the <HI>particular,</HI>
as they are the le&s;&s;e <HI>circum&s;tanced.</HI> For by <HI>Circum|&s;tances,</HI>
and by <HI>de&s;cending,</HI> as commonly it is &s;po|ken
<PB N="134" REF="79">
we oftentimes do fall into errors, The precepts
of the fir&s;t kind are, <HI>that Parents are to be honoured,
Children nur&s;ed, the life of our neighbours to be pre|&s;erved,
the pledge to be re&s;tored;</HI> which as they are
commonly and for the mo&s;t part to be ob&s;erved,
yet they are not ab&s;olutely and &s;imply if the thing
and place (which might &s;o come to pa&s;&s;e) &s;hould
otherwi&s;e require it. For the Commands of the Pa|rents
are to be de&s;pi&s;ed in compari&s;on of the Love
of God, and there may be a ju&s;t cau&s;e of di&s;claym|ing
unreclaymed Children, and taking away the life
of our neighbour, neither is the &s;word to be re&s;to|red
to the mad man. Near unto this di&s;tinction is
that di&s;tribution of <HI>Offices,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Cicer. lib. 1. Offic.</NOTE> in <HI>Cicero,</HI> which he hath
taken from the Stoicks, for with them, <HI>a right and
perfect Duty</HI> which the Greeks call <GAP DESC="foreign"> is
one thing, and a <HI>mean</HI> or a <HI>common duty</HI> which
the Greeks call <GAP DESC="foreign"> is another. Wherefore
that the Con&s;cience may judge more rightly and
more certainly, what is the <HI>will of God</HI> &s;o far as is
pertaining to <HI>this part</HI> of the <HI>Rule of it,</HI> it will be
requi&s;ite to direct it to the <HI>mo&s;t univer&s;al precepts</HI>
that po&s;&s;ibly may be had, and to tho&s;e fir&s;t Axi|oms
which are of them&s;elves to be believed. But
becau&s;e I mu&s;t make ha&s;te to other ob&s;ervations, I
&s;hall here put a period to my di&s;cour&s;e concern|ing
this <HI>Law of Nature,</HI> and pre&s;ent you with
that of <HI>Cicero,</HI> in his lo&s;t books <HI>de Republica,</HI>
which by <HI>Lactantius, 6. In&s;tit.</HI> 8. is expre&s;&s;ely thus
recorded. <HI>E&s;t quidem ver&ograve; lex recta ratio, naturae
congruens, diffu&s;a in omnes, con&s;tans, &s;empiterna, quae
vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando &agrave; fraude detereat.
&mdash;Huic legi nec obrogari fas e&s;t, nec derogari ex
hac aliquid licet, ne&abque; tota abrogari pote&s;t; Nec ve|r&ograve;
<PB N="135" REF="79">
aut per Senatum, aut per populum &s;olvi hac lege
po&s;&s;umus. Nec e&s;t quaerendus explanator, aut inter|pres
ejus alius; Nec erit alia Lex Romae, alia Athe|nis;
alia nunc, alia po&s;thac: &s;ed &amp; omnes gentes, &amp;
omni tempore, una lex &amp; &s;empiterna &amp; immortalis
continebit. Un&uacute;&s;que erit communis qua&s;i Magi&s;ter
&amp; imperator omnium Deus ille Legis hujus inventor,
di&s;ceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit, ip&s;e &s;e fugiet,
ac naturam hominis a&s;pernabitur; atque hoc ip&s;o luet
maximas poenas, etiam&s;i caetera &s;upplicia qu<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e putantur
effugerit.</HI> The Law is right Rea&s;on, agreeable to
nature, diffu&s;ed into all, con&s;tant, everla&s;ting, which
calleth unto duty by commanding, and by forbid|ding
deterreth from deceit.&mdash;This Law is not
to be contradicted, neither is it lawfull for any
man to derogate from it, neither is it po&s;&s;ible that
it &s;hould be altogether abrogated. We cannot be
di&s;charged from it either by the Senate, or the Peo|ple;
It needs not an Expounder, or Interpreter;
It will not bear one con&s;truction at <HI>Rome</HI> and ano|ther
at <HI>Athens;</HI> it will not be one <HI>now,</HI> and another
<HI>hereafter:</HI> but being the &s;ame Law, perpetual, and
immortal, it includeth all Nations, and at all times&punc;
And there is as it were one common ma&s;ter, and
Soveraign Commander over all, the one God, the
Inventor, Di&s;cu&s;&s;or, and Communicator, of this
Law, whom who&s;oever &s;hall not obey, he &s;hall fly
from him&s;elf, and be unworthy of the nature of
man; and for this alone &s;hall grievou&s;ly be tormen|ted,
although he e&s;capeth other puni&s;hments that
are conceived. A remarkable place, and which &s;o
cleerly unfoldeth the force and nature of this <HI>inbred
light,</HI> that we need not to make any addition to it.</P>
<P>XXVI. <HI>The &s;econd light</HI> which is conveyed into the
<PB N="136" REF="80">
<HI>mind</HI> (as I have &s;aid) doth come unto it <HI>from
without,</HI> and proceedeth from <HI>Divine Revelation,</HI>
to wit, from that light which God hath held forth
unto us in the holy Scriptures, in which more fully
he hath made known his will unto man; that there
nothing might be wanting which is nece&s;&s;ary for
the in&s;titution of his manners, and the attainment
of everla&s;ting happine&s;&s;e. And the rather, becau&s;e
the <HI>inward natural light,</HI> as already I have &s;hewed,
doth not &s;uffice thereto. Now this light differs
from the <HI>natural light,</HI> not only in its <HI>original,</HI> but in
its <HI>perfection.</HI> Fir&s;t, becau&s;e it manife&s;teth the will
of God in tho&s;e things to which the light of Nature
cannot attain. Secondly, becau&s;e it ordinateth the
moral actions dictated by the light of Nature, to a
higher end; Thirdly, becau&s;e that whereas the Law
ingraven in the mind is in&s;tituted by God, as he
is the Author of Nature; This Law revealed in the
word is in&s;tituted by him, as he is the <HI>Author of Grace
and Salvation.</HI> Therefore where the <HI>light of nature</HI>
is either <HI>weak,</HI> or <HI>defective,</HI> as it is <HI>defective</HI> in
tho&s;e things which are beyond its Sphear, of which
nature are the <HI>my&s;teries of Faith,</HI> and weak in tho&s;e
things which are a little more remote from tho&s;e
<HI>precepts</HI> which are <HI>mo&s;t univer&s;al,</HI> in tho&s;e ca&s;es I
&s;ay we mu&s;t have recour&s;e to the <HI>light of the word,</HI>
as to a light &s;hining in a dark place, 2 <HI>Pet. 1. 19.
To the Law and the Te&s;timony: if they &s;peak not ac|cording
to this word, it is becau&s;e there is no light in
them.</HI> Ifa. 8. 20. <HI>Thy word is a Lantern unto my feet,
and a light unto my path, P&s;.</HI> 119. 105. If I &s;hould
enlarge my &s;elf upon the <HI>perfection</HI> and the <HI>profit</HI> of
this Law, there would be no end of my di&s;cour&s;e.
See on this Subject, the nineteenth <HI>P&s;alm,</HI> where
<PB N="137" REF="80">
there you &s;hall find much in few words, and con|ci&s;ely;
And the hundred and nineteenth <HI>P&s;alm,</HI>
where you &s;hall find the &s;ame things in more
words, and more largely repre&s;ented.</P>
<P>XXVII. Moreover, there are two parts of this
<HI>Law,</HI> the <HI>Law</HI> properly &s;o called, and the <HI>Go&s;pel.</HI>
I do not here under&s;tand the <HI>Law</HI> and the <HI>Gospel</HI>
in that &s;ence, as for the mo&s;t part it is taken by Di|vines,
for the two Covenants made by God with
man; The covenant of <HI>Works,</HI> and the covenant
of <HI>Grace:</HI> but in the more common acceptation, for
the Books of the old and new Te&s;tament, which
the <HI>Fathers</HI> not unaptly for this purpo&s;e have called
the <HI>old Law,</HI> and the <HI>new Law;</HI> but both the&s;e Laws,
all the whole Law of <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> and the new Law of
Chri&s;t, for that part of it which containeth moral
in&s;titutions, is cryed down by the <HI>Antinomians,</HI> the
<HI>Anabapti&s;ts,</HI> and <HI>Enthu&s;ia&s;ts,</HI> and other prodigious
names of a generation of people of our age, as alto|gether
unprofitable, and unworthy of the care, and
&s;tudy of a Chri&s;tian, after he is come to be of age
in Chri&s;t, and annoynted with the unction of the
Spirit; They will admit of no Law but only the
Law of Faith, and the Dictates of the Spirit. I am
not at lea&s;ure now to confute them, neither indeed
is it very needfull, &s;eeing that the Apo&s;tle <HI>James</HI>
hath long &s;ince &s;o oppo&s;ed the Mon&s;ters of &s;uch
errours, as if by &s;ome Prophetick Spirit, he
had on purpo&s;e undertaken the Confutation of
them.</P>
<P>XXVIII. The old Law, which is called the Mo|&s;aical
Law, is di&s;tingui&s;hed into three parts, the
<HI>Moral,</HI> the <HI>Ceremonial,</HI> and the <HI>Judicial;</HI> Of every
one whereof, many things are diver&s;ely di&s;puted by
<PB N="138" REF="81">
many men; I &s;hall at this time pa&s;&s;e them by, and
briefly propound unto you what I conceive of the
obligation of them, re&s;erving in the mean time
to every man his own Judgment. I &s;ay therefore
in the fir&s;t place, That no Law at all delivered by
<HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> doth <HI>formally, directly,</HI> and <HI>by its &s;elf</HI> ob|lige
the Con&s;cience of Chri&s;tians, as it is the
Law delivered by <HI>Mo&s;es;</HI> my rea&s;on is, that every
Mo&s;aical Law, as Mo&s;aical, was <HI>po&s;itive,</HI> and a
Law po&s;itive doth oblige none but tho&s;e only on
whom it is impo&s;ed. Seeing therefore that the
Law delivered by <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> was only impo&s;ed on the
peculiar Nation of the <HI>Hebrews,</HI> as may ea&s;ily ap|pear
to any man that will ob&s;erve but the begin|ning
of it, <HI>Hear I&s;rael,</HI> and the whole Addre&s;&s;e
of the folowing di&s;cour&s;e, it cannot &s;o appertain
unto tho&s;e who are out of the number of that Na|tion,
as by that account to oblige them becau&s;e de|livered
by <HI>Mo&s;es.</HI> But if any part of that Law
doth now oblige Chri&s;tians (as certainly the Com|mandements
of the Decalogue are obliging) it
commeth to pa&s;&s;e by Accident, and <HI>ratione mate|riae,</HI>
by rea&s;on of the matter, not becau&s;e <HI>Mo&s;es</HI>
&s;o commanded, but becau&s;e that which hath
been commanded by him is either agreeable to the
Law of Nature, or confirmed in the new Law by
Chri&s;t him&s;elf.</P>
<P>XXIX. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, That the
Ceremonial Law of <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> doth oblige the <HI>Jewes</HI> in
their Con&s;ciences, before the Go&s;pel of <HI>Je&s;us
Chri&s;t</HI> was preached to them, but not other men,
unle&s;&s;e tho&s;e only who were <HI>Pro&s;elytes</HI> of the <HI>Jew|i&s;h
Religion,</HI> and <HI>wor&s;hip,</HI> who con&s;i&s;ting of two
kinds, <HI>Pro&s;elytae Portae,</HI> and <HI>Pro&s;elytae Ju&s;titiae,</HI> &s;o
<PB N="139" REF="81">
called by the Jews, that is to &s;ay, <HI>Pro&s;elytes of the
Gate,</HI> and <HI>Pro&s;elytes of Righteou&s;ne&s;&s;e,</HI> were obliged
to the ob&s;ervation of the <HI>Ritual precepts;</HI> Tho&s;e of
the former kind were obliged to the fewer, but
tho&s;e of the latter, as the Jews them&s;elves, were
obliged to the ob&s;ervation of them all. Now from
the time of the <HI>Death</HI> and <HI>Re&s;urrection</HI> of Chri&s;t,
&s;ince the Go&s;pel began fir&s;t to be preached to the
Jews, and afterwards to the Gentiles, until the e|ver&s;ion
of the Temple of <HI>Jeru&s;alem,</HI> and the Jew|i&s;h
Common-wealth, this Law indeed was dead
(if we love to &s;peak after St. <HI>Augu&s;tine</HI>) but not
deadly, which is to &s;ay, that it had lo&s;t the force
of obliging, but the Rites, and Ceremonies deli|vered
by <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> were not altogether unlawful, but
left as indifferent to the ob&s;ervation of every man,
&s;o that it was lawful for any one (according to
the emergency of the occa&s;ion) to u&s;e the free|dom
of his own will, and to u&s;e them, or not to
u&s;e them, a due re&s;pect being always had to <HI>Pru|dence,</HI>
and <HI>Charity.</HI> And that this was the &s;ence
of St. <HI>Paul,</HI> is &s;o manife&s;t, both by his con&s;tant
<HI>Doctrine</HI> and his <HI>Practice,</HI> that there needeth no
proof of it. And&punc; after the ever&s;ion of the Tem|ple
it was &s;poken by diver&s;e men, that this part of
the Law of <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> was not only <HI>dead,</HI> but <HI>mortife|rous;</HI>
which unle&s;&s;e it be rightly applyed, and
with a prepared <HI>Di&s;tinction,</HI> I am affraid will be
found to be more wittily than &s;olidly expre&s;&s;ed;
For all Ceremonies are not alike to be e&s;teemed;
But tho&s;e which concern <HI>Order,</HI> and <HI>Decency,</HI> are
wi&s;ely to be &s;evered from tho&s;e which were the
Figures of Chri&s;t to come: for tho&s;e figurative Ce|remonies,
which were in&s;tituted by God, to be
<PB N="140" REF="82">
Types of <HI>Chri&s;t our Redeemer,</HI> to come in the Fle&s;h,
&s;uch as were <HI>Circumci&s;ion, &s;acrifices,</HI> and many &s;uch
like, became certainly of no u&s;e after Chri&s;t did
really fulfill all things which were typically figured
in tho&s;e Ceremonies, and &s;ufficiently declared to
the whole world by the Preachers of his Go&s;pel,
that all tho&s;e things were rightly fulfilled, they are
therefore to be taken away, not only as dead, and
rotten, but are mo&s;t carefully to be &s;hunned by e|very
true Chri&s;tian, as deadly and pe&s;tiferous; and
above all things it mu&s;t mo&s;t preci&s;ely be taken
heed unto, that they be not ob&s;erved with any opini|on
of nece&s;&s;ity, according to that, <HI>Gal. 5. 2. I Paul
&s;ay unto you, if you be circumci&s;ed, Chri&s;t will pro|fit
you nothing.</HI> But tho&s;e Ceremonies which per|tain
only to the outward Decency, in the &s;olemni|ty
of the Divine-wor&s;hip, although peradventure
it were better not to u&s;e them where a ju&s;t cau&s;e
of offence may be given, yet they are not <HI>&s;imply</HI>
to be condemned as unlawfull, upon this bare ac|count,
that they are a part of the Mo&s;aical pae|dagogy.</P>
<P>XXX. I &s;ay in the third place, That although ma|ny
do di&s;tingui&s;h betwixt tho&s;e <HI>Political Laws of
Mo&s;es</HI> which were of a <HI>common right,</HI> of which
they a&s;&s;ign &s;ome Notes and Criti&s;ms, and betwixt
tho&s;e which were of a <HI>particular right,</HI> it is not
nece&s;&s;ary that any &s;uch di&s;tinction &s;hould be made;
Nay we may roundly affirm, that tho&s;e Laws of
<HI>Mo&s;es</HI> which are called <HI>Political,</HI> or <HI>Judicial,</HI> do none
of them oblige Chri&s;tian Magi&s;trates to a &s;trict ob|&s;ervation
of them, but it is lawfull for them, accor|ding
to their own di&s;cretion, and as they &s;hall find
find it expedient for the &s;afety and profit of the
<PB N="141" REF="82">
Common-wealth, either to revive them into power,
or to make them of no effect.</P>
<P>XXXI. I affirm in the fourth place, That the <HI>mo|ral
Law</HI> delivered by <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> that is to &s;ay, the
<HI>praecepts of the Decalogue</HI> or the ten Commande|ments,
do oblige all Chri&s;tians as well as Jews to
the ob&s;ervation of them; All Prote&s;tants that I
do know of, do with one mouth acknowledge this
truth; <HI>Bellarmine</HI> therefore doth us the greater in|jury,
who feigneth, <HI>that we do make Chri&s;tian li|berty
to con&s;i&s;t in this,</HI> not to be bound in Con&s;ci|ence
<HI>to be &s;ubjected to any Law, and that</HI> Mo&s;es
<HI>with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us.</HI> Let him
&s;ee how he can clear him&s;elf of <HI>this</HI> &s;candal, and
vindicate tho&s;e of his part from this crime, if we
are in it. For the Controver&s;ie among&s;t his School-men
is agitated, Whether Chri&s;tians are bound to
<HI>the praecepts of the Decalogue,</HI> only as they are the
<HI>Declaratives</HI> of the Law of Nature, or as they were
al&s;o delivered by God to <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> and by Gods Com|mandement
given by <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> to the people of God,
and tran&s;mitted into the holy Books; Some there
are of them that do deny the one, &amp; others that do
affirm both. And in our Churches the &s;ame diver|&s;ity
of opinions is to be found, if it be not rather
a diver&s;ity in words, than in opinions. For &s;eeing
they among&s;t them&s;elves, and we do agree with them
in this, which is the main of all, that the Moral Law
which is delivered by <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> and is contained in
the precepts of the <HI>Decalogue,</HI> hath the power to
oblige the Con&s;ciences of Chri&s;tians, it will per|adventure,
be not worth our labour, from whence
it doth obtain that power to oblige; In my judge|ment
they &s;peak more unto the purpo&s;e, who &s;ay,
<PB N="142" REF="83">
that this Law of <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> doth not oblige Chri&s;tians
<HI>formally,</HI> and as it is delivered by <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> but onely
by <HI>rea&s;on of the matter,</HI> as it is the <HI>Declarative</HI> of
the <HI>Law of Nature;</HI> and it receiveth therefore all
its force of obliging, not from <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> bringing or
delivering it, but from the Dictates of the <HI>Law of
Nature,</HI> which God in the fir&s;t Creation did in&s;pire
into our minds, and after the Fall would have it to
remain in them, as the Remembrancer of <HI>his will.</HI>
And this may &s;uffice to be &s;poken of the old Law,
or the Law of <HI>Mo&s;es.</HI></P>
<P>XXXII. The new Law, or the Law of Chri&s;t,
that is to &s;ay, the Go&s;pel, doth contain the&s;e three
things. 1. <HI>My&s;teries of Faith</HI> to be believed, in
which chapter I comprehend the promi&s;es of God
by Grace. 2. <HI>Sacred In&s;titutions</HI> Ceremonial, and
Eccle&s;ia&s;tick. And 3. The Moral Precepts, of
which I &s;peak, and univer&s;ally of all of them; <HI>That
the Go&s;pel obligeth none but tho&s;e only who are called,</HI>
tho&s;e only to whom it is preached. For where
there is no Law, there can be no tran&s;gre&s;&s;ion, for
moraly, e&s;pecially in <HI>Supernaturals,</HI> it is the &s;ame
thing, <HI>Non e&s;&s;e, et non apparere,</HI> not to be, and
not to appear, or not to be &s;o &s;ufficiently pro|pounded,
as it may be known. The words of our
Saviour are expre&s;sly to this &s;ence, <HI>Ioh. 15. 22.
If I had not come, and &s;poken to them, they had not
had &s;in,</HI> that is, they had not been guilty of de&s;pi|&s;ing
the Go&s;pel; But it obligeth all men to whom
it is preached to an obedience as well of <HI>Faith</HI> as of
<HI>Life,</HI> &s;o that we are all bound, to whom the Go&s;|pel
is preached, both to <HI>believe in Chri&s;t as our Re|deemer,</HI>
and to <HI>obey him as our Law-giver;</HI> And
who&s;oever &s;hall fail in the performance of the&s;e
<PB N="143" REF="83">
two things, &s;hall &s;uffer everla&s;ting puni&s;hment for
the neglect of his duty.</P>
<P>XXXIII. I &s;ay in the third place, That the
<HI>Chri&s;tian Church</HI> is obliged to the Sacred In&s;tituti|ons,
that is, to the preaching of the word, the
admini&s;tration of the Sacraments, the Ordination
of Mini&s;ters of the Go&s;pel, and the exerci&s;e of
the <HI>Keyes</HI> as well of <HI>Knowledg</HI> as of <HI>Power;</HI> it is
bound, I &s;ay, in all tho&s;e things which pertain to
the e&s;&s;ence of them, according to the in&s;titution
of Chri&s;t, and the Apo&s;tles, &s;o that it is not law|ful
for the Church, much le&s;&s;e for any particular
congregation, or per&s;on, either willingly to dimi|ni&s;h,
or to change any thing at all therein: But the
external circum&s;tances of the Sacred In&s;titution are
&s;o free, that any particular Church may determine
of them according to Time and Place, and to the
cu&s;tome of the People of God, and as it &s;hall &s;eem
mo&s;t expedient to <HI>Edification.</HI></P>
<P>XXXIV. In the third place I affirm, That the
<HI>Moral Precepts of the New Te&s;tament</HI> are the &s;ame,
according to their &s;ub&s;tance, with the Morals of
the Old Te&s;tament; and they are both of them to
be reduced to the <HI>Law of Nature,</HI> which is contai|ned
in the ten Commandements; as <HI>omnia Entia
realia,</HI> all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predi|caments.
But the Precepts of Chri&s;t in the new
Law, as the holy Fathers of the Church do every
where acknowledge, are in many things far more ex|cellent
than the Precepts of <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> in the old Law,
not onely in that re&s;pect, that they are propounded
more fully and clearly, but becau&s;e they a&s;cend al&s;o
higher, and do advance the true Chri&s;tian to a more
eminent degree of perfection, and that with mo&s;t
<PB N="143" REF="84">
effectual inducements on both &s;ides, the pa&s;t Ex|ample
of Chri&s;t being propounded to him on the
one &s;ide, and the ine&s;timable reward to come in
the Kingdom of Heaven on the other. And this
mo&s;t clearly may appear in tho&s;e two great Duties
of a Chri&s;tians life commanded in the new Law,
<HI>viz.</HI> of <HI>loving our enemies,</HI> and <HI>taking up the cro&s;s;</HI>
For as &s;ome have dreamed, the&s;e are not &s;o onely
to be e&s;teemed, as if they were onely Coun&s;els to a
more perfect life, propounded to all men under the
condition of a more large reward, and oblige no
man under &s;in and puni&s;hment, but tho&s;e onely who
by a vow have obliged them&s;elves to the ob&s;ervati|on
of them: But they expre&s;ly in them&s;elves are
Precepts, and properly &s;o called, and univer&s;ally
obliging, to the ob&s;ervation whereof all tho&s;e who
profe&s;s the Name of Chri&s;t are bound under the
guilt of the mo&s;t grievous &s;in; to wit, the abnega|tion
of Chri&s;t, and the puni&s;hment of eternal dam|nation
unle&s;s they truly do repent. And thus much
concerning <HI>the &s;econd Light of the mind.</HI></P>
<P>XXXV. The third remaineth, which we call the
<HI>light acquired;</HI> which &s;urely is nothing el&s;e but an
addition or increa&s;e of that light (whether of <HI>Na|ture</HI>
or <HI>Revelation</HI>) which was before in the minde,
to &s;ome more eminent degree of clearne&s;s; as
when the will of God, the knowledge whereof hath
hitherto &s;hined into our minds (whether internally
imprinted by the light of Nature, or externally re|vealed
by the Word) or whether by our own me|ditation,
or by the in&s;titution of others, is now
more excellently, and more illu&s;triou&s;ly made ma|nife&s;t
unto us. The chief <HI>Helps</HI> or <HI>Mediums</HI> there|unto
are the <HI>Di&s;cour&s;e of Rea&s;on</HI> and <HI>Authority;</HI> the
<PB N="144" REF="84">
la&s;t of which is the Judgement, and the Practice of
the Church; of which neither doth the time permit
to &s;peak much, neither doth it &s;elf require that
many things &s;hould be &s;poken of it. From <HI>the Law of
Nature</HI> many partic<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">lar Propo&s;itions of things to be
done, like &s;o many <HI>Conclu&s;ions</HI> from their <HI>Principles,</HI>
are deduced by the <HI>di&s;cour&s;e of Rea&s;on</HI> to the u&s;e of
the Con&s;cience; In which, unle&s;s we orderly proceed
from the fir&s;t unto the la&s;t, we &s;hall be apt to erre,
as already I have expre&s;&s;ed; we mu&s;t therefore be
very carefull, that in every part of the <HI>Di&s;cour&s;e</HI> the
proceeding be legitimate, that tho&s;e things that
follow, may aptly depend upon tho&s;e which go be|fore,
and that the con&s;equence be nece&s;&s;ary; le&s;t the
Con&s;cience being mi&s;-led, do not dictate <HI>this</HI> or <HI>that</HI>
or otherwi&s;e to the <HI>will</HI> than what it ought to do.
It is again to be feared, le&s;t we erre al&s;o in applying
the holy Scripture unto the u&s;e of the Con&s;cience,
unle&s;s a due regard of <HI>Rea&s;on</HI> be had unto <HI>Rea&s;on,</HI>
and of <HI>Authority</HI> unto <HI>Authority.</HI> The Papi&s;ts, while
they be&s;tow all their &s;tudies that nothing be taken
away from the <HI>Authority</HI> of the Church, they give
but little unto <HI>Rea&s;on.</HI> The Socinians on the other
&s;ide, whiles rejecting all <HI>Authority,</HI> they do mea|&s;ure
<HI>Faith</HI> by <HI>Rea&s;on</HI> onely, they do onely attain
unto this, that they grow <HI>mad with rea&s;on.</HI> Both
have the &s;ame errour, but it variou&s;ly deceiveth;
And both rocks &s;hall not more ea&s;ily be avoided,
than if <HI>Authority</HI> with Rea&s;on, and <HI>Rea&s;on</HI> with
Authority &s;hall hand&s;omely and prudently be con|joyned.</P>
<P>XXXVI. What place either of them ought to
have in the right and orderly unfolding and apply|ing
the holy Scripture, it is not for this time, or my
<PB N="145" REF="85">
pre&s;ent purpo&s;e to repre&s;ent unto you; I &s;hall touch
upon it in few words: There is e&s;pecially a two|fold
U&s;e of <HI>Rea&s;on</HI> in relation to the Scriptures, <HI>Col|lative</HI>
and <HI>Illative; Collative,</HI> diligently to compare
tho&s;e divers places of Scripture, e&s;pecially tho&s;e
which &s;eem to bear a remarkable corre&s;pondence,
or repugnancy among&s;t them&s;elves. <HI>Illative,</HI> the pro|priety
of the words, the context and the &s;cope
being found out, effectually and artificially to infer
Doctrines; being in the mean time not forgetfull
that we mu&s;t attribute, &s;o much the more, to humane
<HI>Rea&s;on</HI> in things to be done, than in things to be be|lieved,
as the <HI>my&s;teries of Faith</HI> do more exceed the
capacity of natural under&s;tanding than the <HI>Offices of
Life.</HI></P>
<P>XXXVII. The chiefe&s;t u&s;e of <HI>Authority</HI> is to
beat down the boldne&s;s of Hereticks and Impo|&s;tor,
who indeavour to ca&s;t a mi&s;t over the cleare&s;t
te&s;timonies of the Scripture, and to elude the force
of them with their &s;ubtilties and di&s;tinctions; who&s;e
mouths you can no better &s;top, nor more effectual|ly
pre&s;erve your &s;elves and others from the contagi|on
of them, than by oppo&s;ing unto their Sophi&s;ms
and Deceits, the <HI>Judgement</HI> and Practice, not of
one, or of a few men, not of one Age, or of one
corner of the Church, but of the whole Catholick
Church, of all places, and all times, &s;pread
over the whole face of the Earth; &s;o heretofore
tho&s;e great Advocates of the Chri&s;tian Faith, <HI>Ire|naeus,
Tertullian, Vicentius,</HI> and others; judged it to
be their &s;afe&s;t cour&s;e to deal with their Adver&s;a|ries
by the <HI>right of pre&s;cription;</HI> which how ad|vantagious
it hath been to Chri&s;tendome, the event
hath taught. But tho&s;e things which de&s;erve a lar|ger
<PB N="146" REF="85">
con&s;ideration, I am now forced to omit, being
mindfull of the time, of you, and of my &s;elf, and
to defer unto another day what remaineth to be
&s;poken concerning the <HI>Obligation</HI> of <HI>Humane
Laws.</HI></P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="5" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="147" REF="86">
<HEAD>THE
FIFTH LECTURE,
In which the Que&s;tion is thorowly
handled, concerning the Obliga|tion
of Humane Laws in
general.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>ROM. 13. 5.</BIBL>
<Q>Wherefore you mu&s;t be &s;ubject, not becau&s;e of an|ger
onely, but for con&s;cience &s;ake.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_HAving begun the la&s;t Term to treat
of the <HI>pa&s;&s;ive obligation of Con&s;ci|ence,</HI>
I proceeded &s;o far, that
having di&s;covered and di&s;claimed
tho&s;e <HI>&s;ubterfuges,</HI> in which a &s;edu|ced
generation of men do vainly
fl<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">ter them&s;elves, that there is &s;ome excu&s;e or
protection either for the fruit of their Con&s;ciences,
as to things already done, or &s;ome &s;ecurity for
things that <HI>remain to be done,</HI> for the <HI>Intention</HI> of a
<PB N="148" REF="86">
<HI>good end</HI> or by the authority of another <HI>mans exam|ple,</HI>
or <HI>judgment;</HI> I have proceeded, I &s;ay, &s;o far as to
examine and repre&s;ent unto you that proper and
<HI>Adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience</HI> to which ab&s;olutely
and &s;imply it ought to conform it &s;elf, where in
the fir&s;t place I &s;hewed you that God only hath an <MILESTONE N="1">
ab&s;olute and direct command over the Con&s;ciences
of men. Secondly, that the next, and immediate <MILESTONE N="2">
Rule of Con&s;cience, is the light with which the
mind at that pre&s;ent is endued, or (to &s;peak after
the Schoolmen) <HI>Ultimum judicium Intellectus pra|ctici;
The la&s;t judgment of the practical under&s;tand|ing.</HI>
Thirdly, that the written word of God, is <MILESTONE N="3">
indeed the &s;upreme and <HI>primary,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">.</NOTE> but not the <HI>Adae|quate
Rule of Con&s;cience.</HI><NOTE N="*" PLACE="marg">4.</NOTE> Fourthly, that the <HI>pro|per</HI>
and <HI>Adaequate Rule of Con&s;cience</HI> is the <HI>will of
God,</HI> which way &s;oever it be revealed, or (which
is the &s;ame again) <HI>the Law impo&s;ed by God upon
the rea&s;onable Creature;</HI> Moreover, (that more
fully and more di&s;tinctly we may under&s;tand what
<HI>this will of God is,</HI>) I made manife&s;t unto you, that
Almighty God did lay open his <HI>Will</HI> unto mankind
by a threefold means. Fir&s;t, by the Law of Na|ture,<MILESTONE N="1">
which con&s;i&s;teth of certain practical Principles
known by them&s;elves, which is called the Law of
God written in our hearts, <HI>Rom.</HI> 2. 15. Which is
with an inward light, and of the &s;ame o<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">iginal as
our minds; Secondly by the written word of God,<MILESTONE N="2">
which is contained in both the volumes of the holy
Writ, and is an <HI>external light</HI> &s;upernaturally re|vealed,
and infu&s;ed into our minds; Thirdly by a
knowledge obtained from both the former, either <MILESTONE N="3">
by our own meditation, or from the In&s;truction
and In&s;titution of others, and this as it were by an
<PB N="149" REF="87">
<HI>acquired light,</HI> the chief helps and introductions
whereunto, are the <HI>Di&s;cour&s;e of Rea&s;on,</HI> and the
Authority, that is to &s;ay, the <HI>Judgment</HI> and the
<HI>practice</HI> of the univer&s;al Church.</P>
<P>II. I al&s;o did adverti&s;e you (to make &s;ome way
to this following Treati&s;e) that be&s;ides the Law of
God, which ab&s;olutely by its &s;elf, and by its own
peculiar power doth oblige the Con&s;ciences of all
men, and that in the <HI>highe&s;t Degree,</HI> there are al&s;o
many others which do carry an obligation with them,
but inferiour to the former, and do oblige the Con|&s;cience
not <HI>primarily</HI> and by <HI>them&s;elves,</HI> but <HI>&s;econda|rily</HI>
and by <HI>con&s;equence,</HI> not <HI>ab&s;olutely,</HI> but <HI>relative|ly,</HI>
not by its <HI>own power,</HI> but by the vertue of &s;ome
<HI>divine precept</HI> or <HI>In&s;titution</HI> on which they are groun|ded;
which although they do all agree in this, that
what&s;oever power of obligation they have, they al|together
acknowledge it as proceeding from the
Law of God; <HI>For the fir&s;t in every kind what&s;oever
it be is the cau&s;e of the re&s;t,</HI> neither would the Law of
God (as already it is &s;tated) be the <HI>Adaequate
Rule of Con&s;cience,</HI> if it &s;hould oblige any beyond it
&s;elf, which it did not oblige by vertue of it &s;elf;
yet the&s;e things (as I have &s;aid) that do &s;o agree
in one, do notwith&s;tanding every one of them differ
among&s;t them&s;elves, not only in the <HI>Species</HI> by rea|&s;on
of the diver&s;ity of the matter, but al&s;o in the
<HI>Degree</HI> according to the <HI>efficacy of the obliging;</HI> and
they chiefly con&s;i&s;t in a threefold difference, for
&s;ome of them do oblige <HI>con&s;tantly,</HI> of which there
<MILESTONE N="1"> are two kinds, The one in reference to tho&s;e things
who&s;e obligation doth ari&s;e from the power of an|other,
as <HI>humane Laws,</HI> the Commandements of
<MILESTONE N="2"><HI>Parents, Ma&s;ters,</HI> and the like; The other in re|ference
<PB N="150" REF="87">
to tho&s;e, who&s;e obligation doth ari&s;e from
the free <HI>election of the will it &s;elf,</HI> As Vows, Oaths,
Contracts, Promi&s;es and the like; Somthings again <MILESTONE N="3">
do only oblige <HI>by accident</HI> and as it were cur&s;orily,
according to <HI>Time</HI> and <HI>Place</HI> and the exigence of o|ther
circum&s;tances, as the <HI>Law,</HI> or <HI>Rea&s;on of</HI>
Scandal.</P>
<P>The privilege and priority of order and method
do require that we begin with <HI>humane Laws,</HI> con|cerning
the obligation whereof tho&s;e things which
at this time &s;hall be &s;poken of, may all of them be
reduced to the&s;e two que&s;tions. 1. Whether <HI>hu|mane
Laws do oblige the Con&s;ciences,</HI> and &s;econdly,
<HI>how far they do oblige them.</HI> The determining of
mo&s;t of the <HI>particular ca&s;es</HI> do pertain chiefly to the
latter Que&s;tion, which, God willing, &s;hall be the
Subject of our following Lecture, we &s;hall only at
this time touch upon the fir&s;t,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Delectus vim in le|ge ponimus <HI>Cicero</HI> 1. de legibus.</NOTE> which is, <HI>Whether
humane Laws do oblige the Con&s;ciences.</HI> The Subject
of the que&s;tion needeth not any large expo&s;ition.
<HI>Lex</HI> or the Law is fir&s;t &s;o called in an <HI>active</HI> con|&s;truction,
<HI>a legendo,</HI> id e&s;t <HI>eligendo,</HI> from choo&s;ing, as <MILESTONE N="1">
<HI>Cicero</HI> will have it; becau&s;e the Lawgivers do make
choyce of tho&s;e things which they conceive to be
mo&s;t profitable to the Common-wealth. Or &s;e|condly <MILESTONE N="2">
as others will have it, <HI>Lex,</HI> or the Law, is &s;o
called <HI>a legendo,</HI> from <HI>reading,</HI> and that in a pa&s;&s;ive
con&s;truction; becau&s;e the Laws after they were
Enacted were engraven in Tables of Bra&s;&s;e, or o|therwi&s;e
legibly written, and fa&s;tned unto Pillars <MILESTONE N="3">
to be read in publick by the people;<NOTE PLACE="marg"><HI>Aquin,</HI> 1. 2. quae&s;t. 90. Arti 16. <HI>Biel.</HI> 3. di&s;t. Arti 1.</NOTE> Or la&s;tly, ac|cording
to other mens <HI>derivation. Lex</HI> is &s;o called
<HI>a ligando</HI> that is <HI>from binding;</HI> becau&s;e it doth bind
the Subjects to the ob&s;ervation of it; but in the
<PB N="151" REF="88">
<HI>Genus</HI> of it, it is nothing el&s;e, than <HI>a Rule of acting
impo&s;ed on the Subject by the Superiour being impower|ed
thereunto.</HI> They are called <HI>humane Laws</HI> in op|po&s;ition
to Divine; for as <HI>tho&s;e Laws</HI> are called <HI>Di|vine,</HI>
which immediately are con&s;tituted by the au|thority
of God him&s;elf, whether they be Laws <HI>Na|tural,</HI>
or Laws <HI>Po&s;itive,</HI> &s;o tho&s;e Laws are &s;aid to
be <HI>Humane,</HI> which although they have an authori|ty
derived to them from God, yet they are <HI>immedi|ately</HI>
commanded by <HI>men,</HI> and impo&s;ed on their
Subjects.</P>
<P>III., The <HI>Law of man</HI> is thus defined by <HI>A|quinas,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">3. 1 <HI>a. 2. ae.</HI> quae&s;t. 90 arti 4.</NOTE>
It is <HI>the ordination of Rea&s;on to a common
good promulgated by him who hath the care of the
Commonalty.</HI> His words are, <HI>Lex humana e&s;t Rati|onis
ordinatio ad Bonum Commune, ab eo qui curam
Communitatis habet promulgata.</HI> By others it is
defined otherwi&s;e, they differ in the words, but
almo&s;t all of them doe agree in the &s;en&s;e; and well
&s;o they may, for this Definition is very &s;uitable to
the <HI>publick Law</HI> which is the mo&s;t known and the
mo&s;t u&s;ual acceptation of that word. And &s;o we u&s;e
to &s;peak, <HI>Analogum per &s;e po&s;itum pro famo&s;iore
&s;ignificato prae&s;umitur, an Analogick being placed
by it &s;elf is pre&s;umed to &s;tand for that which is the
mo&s;t remarkable in the &s;ignification;</HI> But in this
pre&s;ent que&s;tion, and to our pre&s;ent purpo&s;e, Un|der
the Notion and Name of Humane Laws, the
<HI>publick Lawes</HI> of Cummonalties are not only to be
under&s;tood (although mo&s;t chiefly they are, and
primarily) but even the particular Commands of
<HI>Parents, Ma&s;ters, Magi&s;trates,</HI> and all other Supe|riors,
impo&s;ed on their Children, Servants, or
their People; for when both of them are a kind of
<PB N="152" REF="88">
<HI>Precept,</HI> in this one thing e&s;pecially there is a
Difference betwixt a <HI>Law</HI> properly &s;o called,
and a <HI>Mandate;</HI> for a <HI>Mandate</HI> or <HI>Command</HI> is
but the <HI>Precept</HI> of a private per&s;on inve&s;ted with a
private Authority; but the <HI>Law</HI> is a publick pre|cept
of a per&s;on indued with a publick Authority.
In all other con&s;iderations there is but little diver|&s;ity.
Certainly, as to the effect, and force of ob|liging,
&s;ince it is apparent by the tenth ver&s;e of
this Chap. that all Legitimate Power what&s;oever it
be, not only <HI>publick,</HI> (which notwith&s;tanding I
mu&s;t confe&s;s to be the only meaning of the Apo&s;tle
in that place) but al&s;o all <HI>private power</HI> is con&s;titu|ted
of God, and the Command of a Father to his
Son, is no le&s;&s;e a <HI>Rule for acting,</HI> than the Law of the
Prince to his Subject; all tho&s;e things which I &s;hall
now di&s;cour&s;e of concerning the obligation of hu|mane
Lawes, are &s;o to be under&s;tood, (and let this
one premonition &s;uffice) that the <HI>mandates</HI> of pri|vate
per&s;ons be comprehended in the <HI>publick
Lawes,</HI> and <HI>oeconomical Commands</HI> with <HI>Politick</HI>
Con&s;titutions, and others of the like nature, as
far as the Cour&s;e, and Con&s;ideration of the Ana|logy
will permit. And thus much be &s;poken of
the Subject of the Que&s;tion: The <HI>Praedicate</HI> fol|loweth.</P>
<P>V. The <HI>Praedicate</HI> of the Que&s;tion is the <HI>obligation
of the Con&s;cience.</HI> Now what <HI>Con&s;cience</HI> is, and what
is an <HI>Obligation</HI> in the generality of it, hath largely
enough been already unfolded by me, neither is
there any need of repetition; When we &s;ay the
Law doth oblige we mean nothing el&s;e than that
the Law doth impo&s;e on the Subject <HI>a Nece&s;&s;ity</HI> of
ob&s;erving and obeying it.</P>
<P><PB N="153" REF="89">
<MILESTONE N="1"> You are to know that the Law of its own Na|ture,
and as it is a <HI>Law,</HI> doth cary in it &s;elf a dou|ble
force or nece&s;&s;ary effect, <HI>that is,</HI> the force of
directing, from whence it is called a <HI>Canon</HI> or a
<HI>Rule,</HI> as it layes open to the Subject the will of
the Superiour, and &s;heweth what it is that he
would have to be performed by him; and a power
of obliging (by which it differs from <HI>Coun&s;el</HI> and
<HI>Admoni&s;hment,</HI>) becau&s;e it commandeth the Sub|ject
to obey his will, and doth &s;o oblige him to the
performance of it, that if he doth not obey him,
he doth &s;in or erre, for Sin is nothing el&s;e but an
aberration or a receding from that <HI>Rule</HI> or <HI>Law</HI>
which we ought to follow, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
&s;o Mon&s;ters by receding from the ordinary Law of
Nature, are &s;aid to be the <HI>&s;ins of Nature.</HI> In the
<MILESTONE N="2"> &s;econd place you are to know, that the effect of
this Law, that is <HI>the obligative power</HI> of it, is groun|ded
on the <HI>Will,</HI> and the <HI>power of the Lawgiver,</HI> &s;o
that to &s;peak properly, the <HI>Law</HI> it &s;elf doth not
bind &s;o <HI>effectually,</HI> as the <HI>Will</HI> and <HI>Power</HI> of the Law|giver,
by cau&s;ing and inducing an obligation by the
means of the <HI>efficient Cau&s;e;</HI> but it may be &s;aid, and
indeed u&s;ually &s;o it is, that the Law doth oblige
<HI>terminatively,</HI> that is, as a Term of obligation, and
by the vertue of an <HI>exemplar Cau&s;e,</HI> becau&s;e it is
that, to which a man is &s;o obliged, that he may
work according to the Rule of it; as an Arti&s;t in
working is directed by the Copy that is propound|ed
<MILESTONE N="3"> to him. In the third place it is to be ob&s;erved,
that to <HI>oblige the Con&s;cience,</HI> is &s;o to bind a man up
unto obedience under <HI>a mortal fault</HI> (as the School|men
&s;peak it) that if he prove di&s;obedient, he is
not only lyable to a <HI>temporal puni&s;hment,</HI> either or|dained
<PB N="154" REF="89">
by the Lawes, or to be inflicted according
to the &s;entence of the Magi&s;trate, but he is de&s;erv|edly
checked by his own Con&s;cience, as guilty of
the neglect of his <HI>Duty,</HI> and thereby of the Anger of
God contracted on him.</P>
<P>V. The &s;en&s;e therefore of the Que&s;tion is, Whether
Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Con|&s;ciences
of tho&s;e men to whom they are exhibited,
in the &s;ame way as I have now explained; among&s;t
the Prote&s;tants <HI>Calvin</HI> doth deny it (as <HI>Bellarmin</HI>
at lea&s;t doth object again&s;t him) it is denyed al&s;o
by <HI>Beza</HI> and many others; Among&s;t the Papi&s;ts it
is denyed by <HI>Ger&s;on (Bellarmin</HI> him&s;elf confe&s;&s;ing
it) and by <HI>Almain;</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><HI>Bellarm.</HI> 3 de laic. 9.</NOTE> And as &s;ome affirm by <HI>Na|varrus.</HI>
Among&s;t the Prote&s;tants again it is affirm|ed
by <HI>Mu&s;culus, Ur&s;ine,</HI> and others; And among&s;t
the Papi&s;ts it is confirmed by the Je&s;uits, and a
great number of the Schoolmen; Some there are
who do di&s;tingui&s;h on it,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Rom. 13.</NOTE> as <HI>David Paraeus</HI> and o|thers;
And it mu&s;t needs indeed be acknowledged,
if by the heat of too much oppo&s;ition, and the
affectation of contradiction, they had not on both
&s;ides erred, this controver&s;y had long ago been ca&s;t
out of the world; In di&s;putations &s;uch as the&s;e, I
oftentimes do call that to mind, which when I was
a young man, I did read in <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">.
<HI>It is manife&s;t that it is &s;o, but not
why another doth di&s;pute it &s;o,</HI> In which place he
di&s;putes, <HI>An principia &s;unt contraria?</HI> Whether
Principles are contrary? <HI>An detur infinitum?</HI>
Whether there be an infinitene&s;&s;e or not? and the
like, And therefore in the&s;e doubts (for this is the
true &s;en&s;e and reading of that place in the third of
the <HI>Phy&s;icks</HI>) we had more need of an Arbitrator
<PB N="155" REF="90">
(who may reconcile both opinions differing rather
in &s;hew than in &s;ub&s;tance) than of a Judge, who
while he determins one part doth condemn the o|ther;
And this indeed would prevail much in a great
part of the controver&s;ies which with &s;uch contenti|on
of minds and bitterne&s;&s;e of &s;tile are now among&s;t
parties carried on in the Chri&s;tian world, if Divines
would not &s;uffer them&s;elves to be &s;wayed rather by
faction than affection. Indeed in this pre&s;ent
que&s;tion (as far as I can judge by the peru&s;al of
tho&s;e few books which the infirmity of my health,
and the &s;treightne&s;&s;e of my time doth permit to
look over) the height of the Spirit of contention
being on both &s;ides taken away, they neither
of them do &s;eem to me to be in any great errour;
but I conceive that tho&s;e who <HI>affirmatively</HI> have
defined this que&s;tion (to &s;peak freely what I think)
have &s;poken more commodiou&s;ly to the <HI>in&s;titution</HI>
of our lives, &amp; more carefully &amp; &s;afely to avoid the
danger of <HI>error,</HI> and more properly to the form of
<HI>&s;ound Doctrine,</HI> than tho&s;e who have defined it <HI>ne|gatively.</HI>
But that more di&s;tinctly I may propo&s;e
unto you what I conceive is to be determined in
this que&s;tion, I will as briefly, and as cleerly as I
can, with &s;ome Conclu&s;ions comprehend and termi|nate
the whole Subject; I will confim my own o|pinion
with &s;ome rea&s;ons, as need &s;hall require,
and I will an&s;wer the arguments which commonly
are alleged by the adver&s;e party.</P>
<P>VII. The fir&s;t Conclu&s;ion is, <HI>that Humane Laws if
inju&s;t do not oblige unto obedience;</HI> The thing is ma|nife&s;t
enough, if the words be rightly under&s;tood,
and that no man might give a mi&s;under&s;tanding to
them, we are to be adverti&s;ed, that a <HI>Law</HI> may be
<PB N="156" REF="90">
&s;aid to be <HI>unju&s;t</HI> either in re&s;pect of the <HI>End,</HI> or the
<HI>Manner,</HI> or of &s;ome <HI>Circum&s;tance extrin&s;ecal</HI> to the
<HI>Law it &s;elf,</HI> or in re&s;pect of the <HI>Matter</HI> and <HI>Ob|ject</HI>
of the <HI>Law;</HI> For it differeth, if that be com|manded
which is manife&s;tly <HI>unju&s;t,</HI> or whether
<HI>that</HI> which peradventure is not otherwi&s;e <HI>unju&s;t,</HI>
be yet unju&s;tly commanded. That kind of In|ju&s;tice
which adhereth to the Law it &s;elf, <HI>per &s;e,</HI> that
is, of it &s;elf in re&s;pect of the thing <HI>commanded</HI>
doth take away the obligation; but it taketh not
away that obligation which commeth unto it <HI>ex|trin&s;ecally,</HI>
and as it were by accident, that is to
&s;ay, by the fault of the Commander; For &s;up|po&s;e
that a Prince &s;hould by a Law made com|mand
&s;omething to be done, the doing where|of
of <HI>it &s;elf</HI> were not unlawfull to be done; or
&s;hould forbid that to be done which were not &s;im|ply
nece&s;&s;ay; And &s;uppo&s;e withall, there &s;hould be no
&s;uch ju&s;t cau&s;e why he &s;hould command this, or for|bid
that, being induced to it either by the de&s;ire of
filthy Lucre, or the meer Lu&s;t of exerci&s;ing his Tyran|ny,
or by &s;ome other depraved affection of his mind,
this Law is unju&s;t indeed on the part of the King
that did command it, but the Subject neverthe|le&s;&s;e
is obliged to the obedience of it. The Rea|&s;on
is, becau&s;e that Inju&s;tice doth hold altoge|ther
on the part of the <HI>party commanding,</HI> and not
of the thing commanded; So that although the
King could not without &s;in make &s;uch a Law, yet
the Subject without &s;in could perform that which
by that Law is commanded; And what&s;oever the
Subject can perform without &s;in, he is bound if
commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience&punc;
Let the Prince him&s;elf look to it by what Coun&s;el
or Intention <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e inacted &s;uch a Law, It doth not
<PB N="157" REF="91">
belong to me who am but his Subject to examine
it, neither &s;hall it be imputed unto me if he hath
offended in it, but as long as nothing is command|manded
but what Lawfully may be performed, it
&s;hall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Du|ty,
and &s;hall not obey him.</P>
<P>VIII. Moreover, I add this al&s;o, if the Law
it &s;elf either in re&s;pect of the <HI>Object</HI> or the <HI>Matter</HI>
be peradventure unju&s;t, and grievous to the Sub|ject,
as for examples &s;ake, if he demands the pay|ment
of a greater Sub&s;idy than the occa&s;ion doth
require, the Con&s;cience of the Subject is not here
freed from the obligation; But here again we are
to di&s;tingui&s;h; For a thing may be &s;aid to be un|ju&s;t,
either as it is unfit or grievous to be born, or
unlawful to be done; In the fir&s;t Interpretation,
if it be unju&s;t what by the Law is commanded, that
is if it be unequitable and not di&s;hone&s;t, yet if it be
done, it is the fault only of him who doth com|mand
it, He that obeyeth the Command is &s;o far
from fault, that he &s;hould be a great Tran&s;gre&s;&s;or
if he did not obey it; But in the latter &s;en&s;e, if
any thing what is commanded be unju&s;t, that is
not only grievous to be born, but al&s;o &s;hamefull to
be done, and notwith&s;tanding it is done, the Sin
lyes heavy on both, Fir&s;t on the Magi&s;trate who
commanded an unju&s;t thing, Secondly, on the
Subject, who acted an unlawful one. The &s;en&s;e
of the Conclu&s;ion is this, Where&s;oever the <HI>Law</HI> by
its Command doth <HI>forbid</HI> any thing to be done
which is &s;o <HI>nece&s;&s;ary</HI> that it cannot be omitted by
the Subject without Sin, or where&s;oever the <HI>Law</HI>
doth <HI>Command</HI> any thing to be done which is &s;o
<HI>unlawful</HI> that i<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> cannot be put in execution without
<PB N="158" REF="91">
Sin, that <HI>Law</HI> doth not oblige in Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>IX. My fir&s;t rea&s;on is,<NOTE PLACE="marg">De jura. praelec. 2.</NOTE> Becau&s;e (as el&s;ewhere I
have fully explaned) there is <HI>no obligation for an
unlawful Act.</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Sect. 13.</NOTE> <MILESTONE N="2"> Secondly (becau&s;e as there al&s;o
I have expre&s;&s;ed) the <HI>fir&s;t Obligation doth prejudge
the following;</HI> in&s;omuch that a new obligation con|trary
to the former cannot be &s;uperinduced; Now
any Law commanding a thing unlawful, as <HI>homi|cide,
Perjury, Sacrilege,</HI> or forbidding a nece&s;&s;ary
duty, as the <HI>wor&s;hip of the true God,</HI> or the <HI>per|formance
of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents &amp;c.</HI>
doth exact that of us which is contrary to our
former obligation, by the vertue of which divine
Precept we were before obliged; therefore that
<HI>humane Law</HI> cannot induce any obligation on us;
<MILESTONE N="3"> The third Rea&s;on is, Becau&s;e that no man can at the
&s;ame time be obliged to <HI>Contradictories,</HI> but if
that Law were obligatory, it would oblige to
the performance of that thing which the Law of
God at the &s;ame time doth oblige to the not per|formance
of it; Now <HI>to do and not to do</HI> are Contra|dictories.<MILESTONE N="4">
The fourth Rea&s;on is deduced from
the examples of godly men, who have been always
&s;o in&s;tructed by the principles of their Faith, that
with a cheerfull &s;pirit they have undertaken, and
performed the grievous but not di&s;hone&s;t <HI>Com|mands
of the Emperours;</HI> But if any thing though
by the authority of Law was required of them
which was again&s;t <HI>Faith,</HI> or <HI>good manners,</HI> or any
ways repugnant to common hone&s;ty, they openly
and couragiou&s;ly did deny the Command, and for
the fear of God de&s;pi&s;ed all humane Laws, and in|&s;titutions.
The Decree being made at <HI>Babylon,</HI>
that the concent of mu&s;ick being heard, they all
<PB N="159" REF="92">
&s;hould wor&s;hip the great golden Image which the
mo&s;t mighty monarch had &s;et up, and a mo&s;t &s;e|vere
puni&s;hment threatned to tho&s;e who &s;hould do
otherwi&s;e, the three young men of the Hebrews
would not &s;uffer them&s;elves to be obliged by that
Law; <HI>Dan.</HI> 3. Becau&s;e an unlawful thing, the
wor&s;hiping of an Idol, was commanded. In the
<HI>Law</HI> again of the Per&s;ians it being comman|ded,
that no man for certain days &s;hould make a
Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the
King of Per&s;ians only, <HI>Daniel</HI> did not obey that Law,
but as his Cu&s;tom was, at his &s;et houres he prayed
unto God, <HI>Dan.</HI> 16. And <HI>Peter</HI> and <HI>John</HI> being
forbidden to &s;peak any more in the Name of <HI>Je&s;us,</HI>
they not only di&s;obeyed the Command; but confi|dently
an&s;wered; Whether it be right in the &s;ight
of God to obey you rather than God judge yee.
<HI>Acts.</HI> 4. The Rea&s;on indeed was, becau&s;e the
things that were forbidden were nece&s;&s;ary, <HI>viz.</HI>
The wor&s;hip of the true God, and the preaching of
the Go&s;pel committed to their Chatge.</P>
<P>X. The &s;econd Conclu&s;ion. The Law of man
prohibiting a thing <HI>&s;imply</HI> evil; as <HI>Theft, Adultery,
Sacrilege,</HI> or commanding a thing good and <HI>ne|ce&s;&s;ary,</HI>
as the <HI>wor&s;hip</HI> of God, <HI>the di&s;charge</HI> of
Debts, the <HI>Honour of Parents,</HI> doth induce a new
obligation in the Con&s;cience. <MILESTONE N="1"> My fir&s;t rea&s;on is,
becau&s;e the <HI>proper Cau&s;e</HI> being given, the nece&s;&s;ary
effect of it will follow, unle&s;s it be hindred by
&s;ome other means; But an <HI>obligation</HI> is &s;o nece&s;|&s;ary
an effect of the Law, that &s;ome have thought
that the very Name of the Law hath received its
derivation from it, as already I have men<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ioned;
And nothing &s;eems to be here a&s;&s;igned which may
<PB N="160" REF="92">
hinder the con&s;ecution of its effect. The &s;econd
rea&s;on is a <HI>Minori ad majus,</HI> from the <HI>Le&s;s</HI> to the
<HI>Greater.</HI> By the confe&s;&s;ion of all men, a Law pro|hibiting
a thing otherwi&s;e <HI>Lawful,</HI> or commanding a
thing otherwi&s;e <HI>free</HI> doth oblige; therefore much
more prohibiting a <HI>thing unlawful,</HI> or commanding
a <HI>thing free.</HI> But &s;omething there appears that may
be objected to both the&s;e rea&s;ons, <HI>viz. Non e&s;&s;e
multiplicanda Entia &s;ine nece&s;&s;itate; Beings are not
to be multipled without nece&s;&s;ity;</HI> For every man by
the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the
performance of what is nece&s;&s;ary, and the e&s;chew|ing
of what is unlawful, the &s;ame obligation doth
exclude that, which we think to obtain by <HI>humane
Laws,</HI> as &s;uperfluous, as water praeexi&s;tent in a full
ve&s;&s;el doth hinder the infu&s;ion of new moy&s;ture;
And it &s;eemes that <HI>two obligations</HI> to the &s;ame thing
can no more be admitted in one Con&s;cience, than
can two <HI>Accidents</HI> of the &s;ame <HI>Species</HI> in one Sub|ject.
To this I an&s;wer, that it is u&s;u<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ly &s;poken,
and indeed truly enough, <HI>Obligationem priorem
praejudicare po&s;teriori, The former obligation doth
prejudice and take place of the po&s;terior,</HI> which Ar|gument
we our &s;elves have even now made u&s;e of
for the confirmation of the former Conclu&s;ion;
But this <HI>Saying</HI> hath place only among&s;t tho&s;e ob|ligations
which are De&s;tructive to one another, and
who&s;e effects have &s;o great a Contrariety, and Re|pugnancy
among&s;t them&s;elves, that one being ad|mitted,
the other of nece&s;&s;ity mu&s;t be taken away;
Notwith&s;tanding this doth not hinder, but that an|other
and a new obligation may come unto the
former, provided it be of the &s;ame <HI>reference,</HI> and
can be con&s;i&s;tent with it. Neither, in this con&s;i|deration,
<PB N="161" REF="93">
is that of any moment as is alleged of
water in a full ve&s;&s;el, for the impediment why the
full ve&s;&s;el admits of no more liquor, doth not
con&s;i&s;t in the part of the liquor, but proceeds from
the incapacity of the <HI>ve&s;&s;el,</HI> and the nature of the
<HI>place,</HI> which cannot at once receive more bodies;
And nothing hindreth but there may be many <HI>Acci|dents</HI>
of the &s;ame <HI>Species</HI> in one and the &s;ame <HI>Subject,</HI>
provided they be <HI>Relative</HI> and not <HI>Ab&s;olute;</HI> as
&s;uppo&s;e that <HI>Socrates</HI> had ten Sons, there mu&s;t be
in <HI>Socrates</HI> ten <HI>Paternities,</HI> for relations are mul|tiplied
according to the multiplication of their
<HI>Terms;</HI> And we &s;aid but even now, that the Law
did oblige according to the manner of the <HI>Term.</HI>
Therefore &s;eeing that every Law, according to the
nature of it, and as it is a <HI>Law,</HI> is an Inductive to
an obligation, there will be &s;o many obligations as
there are Lawes being corre&s;pondent to them as to
their Terms; Neither is this <HI>Multiplicare entia &s;ine
nece&s;&s;itate,</HI> to multiply Beings without nece&s;&s;ity, for
the cau&s;es being multiplied, it is nece&s;&s;ary that the
effects of tho&s;e cau&s;es &s;hould be multiplied al&s;o;
And that it may &s;eem incredible to none, we may
behold it, or &s;omething very like unto it, to come
to pa&s;&s;e every day, both in <HI>things natural</HI> and <HI>moral;</HI>
It is evident to the &s;en&s;e that a man may be tyed to
a Pillar with two or three cords, as <HI>Peter. Acts,</HI>
12. 6. He &s;lept <GAP DESC="foreign">,
bound with two chains; And it is to be doubted
by none, but that a man having obliged him&s;elf to
the performance of &s;uch a duty which by the Law
of God was incumbent on him, he (notwith&s;tand|ing
that fir&s;t obligation) may again oblige him&s;elf
by <HI>Vow,</HI> or <HI>Oath,</HI> or <HI>Promi&s;e,</HI> to render that obli|gation
<PB N="162" REF="93">
the more effectual. Thus <HI>Jacob</HI> the Patri|arch
vowed that <HI>Jehovah</HI> &s;hould be his only God,
<HI>Gen.</HI> 28. 21. And <HI>David</HI> &s;wore that he would
keep the righteous Judgments of God, <HI>P&s;al.</HI> 119.
106. And all of us who are Chri&s;tians, when we
were &s;prinkled at the Fount, did by a new Cove|nant
of Bapti&s;m bind our &s;elves to Faith in Chri&s;t,
to renounce the <HI>Devill,</HI> the <HI>World,</HI> and the <HI>Fle&s;h,</HI>
and to keep the commandements of God, to the
performance of all which duties mo&s;t &s;ure it is that
we were obliged before.</P>
<P>XI. The third Conclu&s;ion. <HI>Humane Lawes
(whether things unlawful, or nece&s;&s;ary, or things in|different
be commanded) being made by a &s;ingle Per|&s;on
or by a Commonalty not having a lawful power, do
not oblige in Con&s;cience.</HI> As if the Mayor of this
City &s;hould impo&s;e Laws on this Univer&s;ity, or my
next Neighbour &s;hould command my &s;ervant to
yoak my Oxen to bring in his harve&s;t, &amp;c. Or as if a
company of &s;editious Per&s;ons being met in &s;ome
one County of <HI>England</HI> (as they did heretofore
under the conduct of <HI>Ket</HI> in <HI>Norfolk,</HI> and many
times in other places) &s;hould demand of the in|habitants
a certain Sum of money, or &s;hould pub|li&s;h
Edicts to exact a &s;ervitude of their per&s;ons not
due unto them, and by force of Armes &s;hould
compel them to obedience, although it peradven|ture
were lawful for them to do as they were com|manded
(it being found they were unable to make
re&s;i&s;tance) yet certainly their commands &s;hould
oblige no man in Con&s;cience to the ob&s;ervation of
them;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Aquin. 1. 2. quaest. 96. art. 4.</NOTE> Fir&s;t, becau&s;e the &s;aid Laws are Laws only
in name, and <HI>aequivocally;</HI> But in deed, and in
earne&s;t they are rather <HI>violences</HI> than <HI>Laws,</HI> and
<PB N="163" REF="94">
an <HI>aequivocal Cau&s;e</HI> doth inferr no effect; as a
&s;entence &s;poken by one who is no <HI>Judge</HI> doth not
oblige the Parties; And Secondly, Becau&s;e the
Power of obliging (as already hath been menti|oned)
is not <HI>effectively</HI> derived from the Law it
&s;elf, but from a will joyning with the power of
the Law-maker; therefore where <HI>Power</HI> is wanting,
the <HI>Cau&s;e</HI> that is properly the efficient of that obli|gation
is wanting al&s;o, and the <HI>proper Cau&s;e</HI> being
defective, it is nece&s;&s;ary that its <HI>Effect</HI> &s;hould be
deficient al&s;o; And this is ea&s;ie to be collected by
the words of the Apo&s;tle in this place, who dedu|ceth
the Duty of obedience on the part of the Sub|ject
from the Power of Juri&s;diction in the Magi|&s;trate;
from whence it is, no man is bound to <HI>obey</HI>
him who hath not the Right of <HI>Commanding.</HI></P>
<P>XII. If you &s;hall object, that an un<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">uly multi|tude
of factious per&s;ons, &s;uch as before I have made
mention of, have the <HI>Power of Commanding,</HI> becau&s;e
they can compel tho&s;e to the performance of their
commands, over whom they exerci&s;e their Tyran|ny;
I an&s;wer that the <HI>Power</HI> of which I &s;peak, and
on which <HI>Obligation</HI> doth depend, is not that Power
which the Greeks call <GAP DESC="foreign">, that is <HI>Might</HI>
or <HI>Pui&s;&s;ance</HI> (which by mo&s;t is u&s;ed in this &s;en&s;e)
by which a man is potent to give &s;uch an effect to
his Intention that it <HI>finally</HI> cannot be hindered, but
that Power, which the Greeks call <GAP DESC="foreign">, that
is a lawful Power, which cometh by &s;ome Right of
<HI>Nature,</HI> or of <HI>Nations,</HI> or by a <HI>Civil Right,</HI> in re&s;pect
both of the per&s;on who bears it, and of tho&s;e who
are any wayes &s;ub&s;tituted under him. This Power
in this pre&s;ent Argument the Apo&s;tle doth &s;o much
pre&s;&s;e, that in the &s;pace almo&s;t of three Ver&s;es
<PB N="164" REF="94">
he names it five times, and makes not the lea&s;t
mention of the other.</P>
<P>XIII. But you will allege, that tho&s;e, who in the
time of the Apo&s;tles were the &s;upreme Governors,
did a&s;cend unto the height of the Empire, not by
any Right of Inheritance, nor by the free Suffra|ges
of the people, or any lawful Authority, but
by Force and Treachery, or military Tumult, and
yet the Apo&s;tle notwith&s;tanding doth expre&s;&s;ly at|tribute
an <GAP DESC="foreign">, that is a lawful Authority to
them, as unto legitimate Magi&s;trates, and impo|&s;eth
on their Subjects a nece&s;&s;ity of obeying them,
and that not for <HI>fear of Puni&s;hment,</HI> but for <HI>Con&s;ci|ence
&s;ake.</HI> We mu&s;t confe&s;&s;e indeed, that the fir&s;t
Emperors of <HI>Rome,</HI> after the ever&s;ion of the Com|mon-wealth,
did not attain unto the Empire by a|ny
great lawfulne&s;&s;e of Right, yet withall we mu&s;t
confe&s;s, that they were inve&s;ted with the <HI>Right of
the Sword,</HI> and a legitimate Juri&s;diction, to which all
who&s;oever were under the Roman Power ought to
be &s;ubject, for there was not then any &s;ingle per&s;on
that could challenge it as due unto him by more
Right, and the <HI>Senate, and People of Rome</HI> in who&s;e
Power not long before, and for many Ages al&s;o
was the chief Command, what by fear, and what
by ob&s;equiou&s;ne&s;s, did give way to the lo&s;&s;e of their
Privileges, and acknowledged tho&s;e for their law|ful
Princes, who had obtained the Empire by un|lawful
Acts. This being granted, which certainly
in my opinion can no wayes be denyed, there can
remain no other doubt concerning the <HI>nece&s;&s;ity of
obeying.</HI> But in a dubious ca&s;e, what is the duty
of a Chri&s;tian, whether and how far he is obliged
in the <HI>Court of Con&s;cience</HI> to give way unto the
<PB N="165" REF="95">
Times, and to accommodate him&s;elf to the pre&s;ent
manners, and be obedient to the Lawes, the E|dicts,
and the Commands of one who in his Judg|ment
at lea&s;t hath attained to the Soveraignty <HI>de
facto,</HI> that is by Power and by no Right at all, it is
no ea&s;y thing to judge, neither is it the part of a
wi&s;e man to determine any thing on &s;o great, and
&s;o high a Point.</P>
<P>XIV. I here therefore do conclude on nothing
po&s;itively; but that I may not be cen&s;ured to be
wanting in my duty, or at lea&s;t to your expecta|tion,
if I &s;hould make mention of a Que&s;tion, and
give you not the lea&s;t &s;atisfaction in it, I will in a
a few words expound unto you what &s;eemeth to
me (having been very &s;erious hereupon) to be
mo&s;t con&s;entaneous to true rea&s;on, unle&s;s perad|venture
&s;ome circum&s;tances, as oftentimes it
comes about in &s;uch deliberations, &s;hall grow too
much upon my Judgment. In the fir&s;t place there|fore
I &s;ay, That he who <HI>de facto</HI> is chief Magi&s;trate
in a City, or Nation, although he hath attained to
that power by evil Arts, is neverthhele&s;s to be e|&s;teemed
by the Citizen as his lawful Prince, and
by the obligation of his Con&s;cience he is accord|ingly
bound to obey him, provided there be no
ju&s;t cau&s;e of any doubt to the contrary; And in
this ca&s;e, this &s;eems to be the only and ju&s;t
<HI>cau&s;e</HI> of doubt, when mo&s;t certainly it is manife&s;t,
or at lea&s;t when it &s;eems very probable to the Ci|tizen,
that there is &s;ome other per&s;on to whom <HI>the
chief power</HI> is due by <HI>greater right.</HI> If this be not &s;o,
the Citizen cannot in a good Con&s;cience refu&s;e
the commands of the pre&s;ent <HI>Po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or;</HI> For ordi|narily,
it doth not belong unto a Citizen too cu|riou&s;ly
<PB N="166" REF="95">
to enquire by what right the po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or doth
po&s;&s;e&s;&s;e, it may &s;uffice him for the &s;ecurity of his
Con&s;cience that he doth po&s;&s;e&s;&s;e <HI>de facto,</HI> and there
is no other man, at lea&s;t &s;o far as he knows, who
ought by right to po&s;&s;e&s;&s;e that place; And be&s;ides
that which I have already &s;poken concerning the
Roman Emperors, the Government of that Com|mon-wealth
being &s;ubverted; to this the whole Hi|&s;tory
almo&s;t of all the Kings of <HI>I&s;rael</HI> doth pertain,
many of whom relyiug not &s;o much as on the lea&s;t
&s;haddow of Right, but having obtained the King|dom
by unju&s;t Arms, and nefarious wickedne&s;&s;e
(the Royal off-&s;pring of their Predece&s;&s;ors being
utterly extingui&s;hed, that not one of them might re|main
to &s;ucceed in their Fathers Dignities) did a&s;|cend
the Royal Throne, and governed the Kingdom,
by a full and as it were a proper Power, and the
people rendred obedience to them no otherwi&s;e
than if they had been inve&s;ted in it by the greate&s;t
right; Neither do we find that the people were e|ver
blamed for it, But right rea&s;on rather per|&s;waded
that it &s;o ought to be done; For it concer|ned
the publick &s;afety, that there &s;hould be one
who &s;hould &s;it at the Helm of Government,
and it could not otherwi&s;e be better provi|ded
for the affairs of his people, and him&s;elf,
than that he &s;hould be e&s;teemed to have the great|e&s;t
right, who as a true po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or had no right at all;
And by the Law of Nations, tho&s;e things which
belong to none, do pa&s;&s;e into the right of the pre|&s;ent
po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ors of them.</P>
<P>XV. In the &s;econd place I &s;ay, That in an Here|ditary
Kingdom, where the right is doubtful be|twixt
two or more <HI>Competitors,</HI> it is the part of
<PB N="167" REF="96">
a good Citizen whiles the contention is yet depen|ding,
and the right to be de&s;cerned by a friendly
treaty, or by war, to obey him as his lawful
Prince who is in pre&s;ent po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion of the Soveraign
command. Of this Hi&s;tories can every where
afford us very many examples; among&s;t tho&s;e
which are mo&s;t remarkable, are the many differ|ences
which happened among&s;t the competitors of
the Kingdom of <HI>Portugall</HI> after the death of King
<HI>Seba&s;tian;</HI> And the &s;ix conte&s;tations at lea&s;t for
the Kingdom of <HI>Scotland</HI> after the death of <HI>Alex|ander</HI>
the King; And the mo&s;t fierce and la&s;ting
contention for the Government of the Engli&s;h
Nation between the mo&s;t noble families of <HI>York</HI>
and <HI>Lanca&s;ter;</HI> Mo&s;t certain it is, by the con&s;ent
of all nations throughout the world, that the Law
did alwayes favour the Per&s;on po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ing; And in
the&s;e Ca&s;es that remarkable &s;aying of the Civilians
always prevailed, <HI>In rebus dubiis melior e&s;t conditio
po&s;&s;identis,</HI> In doubtful things the condition of the
Po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or is always the better.</P>
<P>XVI. But again, the lawful Prince and Heir
of the Kingdom being forced away by the Power
of Arms, or being &s;o oppre&s;&s;ed that he cannot pro|&s;ecute
his own Right, If any per&s;on what&s;oever
(the &s;aid Prince yet living) &s;hall violently take in|to
his own hands the Reigns of Government, and
deport him&s;elf as a King, when he is more truly an
U&s;urper, &s;o that now it is no longer a <HI>doubtful right,</HI>
but an <HI>open injury;</HI> If you demand of me what a
good Ci<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">zen &s;hall do in this condition, who per|adventure
hath taken the Oath of Allegiance in the
b<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">hal<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> of his lawfull Prince, or if he hath not, yet
he is no le&s;&s;e indutyed to him, than if he had taken
<PB N="168" REF="96">
it, I &s;ay in the third place, that a good Citizen
may not only lawfuly obey the Laws of him who
Governs <HI>de facto,</HI> and not <HI>de jure,</HI> that is, <HI>by
pre&s;ent power,</HI> and not <HI>by right,</HI> and perform all his
commands (provided there be nothing in them
that is <HI>uniu&s;t,</HI> or <HI>foul,</HI>) but according to the
condition of humane affairs, there may be &s;uch an
exigence of nece&s;&s;ity (as oftentimes it &s;o comes to
pa&s;&s;e) that he may be adjudged to fail even in his
duty, if he doth not do it. It may be objected,
that but even now it was &s;aid, <HI>that Laws made by
one who hath no lawful power do not oblige in Con|&s;cience;</HI>
It was &s;o &s;aid indeed, and it was truly
&s;aid &s;o, and I believe what I have now propo&s;ed is
not repugnant to it; For &s;uppo&s;e that a Subject be
obliged to perform what by the Law is forbidden,
yet he is not bound to the <HI>Law,</HI> but to <HI>him&s;elf</HI>
and to his Country. The obligation is annexed to
that Law which is <HI>truly &s;o of it &s;elf,</HI> &amp; as it is a <HI>Law,</HI>
and it nece&s;&s;arily followeth it, as the Effect follow|eth
its Cau&s;e. We have already &s;aid, that a Law
made by one who hath no <HI>right</HI> unto the Govern|ment
is not a Law <HI>properly</HI> but <HI>aequivocally,</HI> &amp; ther|fore
hath no power to oblige; Therefore what&s;o|ever
obligation doth from hence appear to charge
the Con&s;cience of the Subject, doth ari&s;e from
another account, and not from the Law it &s;elf
to whom this obligation comes <HI>extrin&s;ecally</HI> and
only by accident, as if a profe&s;&s;or of Mu&s;ick
&s;hould act the part of a Ma&s;on.</P>
<P>XVII. You will demand, If not from the Law,
from whence then proceedeth this obligation of
the Subject? I an&s;wer; It being the part of a pi|ous
and prudent man, not only to attend on that
<PB N="169" REF="97">
which is lawful, but al&s;o to ob&s;erve what becom|eth
him&s;elf, and is expedient for others; A good
Citizen may be obliged to do that for the advan|tage
of him&s;elf, and his fellow-Citizens, to the
performance whereof he is not upon any ac|count,
or by any right obliged. For this obligation
doth ari&s;e from that double part of duty, by which
every man is a debtor to him&s;elf, and a debtor to
his Country; In the fir&s;t place it belongs to a <HI>pru|dent
man</HI> to provide for him&s;elf, and for his own
affairs, and it belongs to an <HI>hone&s;t man</HI> to con&s;i|der
in what pre&s;ent condition he is; For no man
will deny, even by the Dictates of Nature, but that
all mu&s;t endeavour by all lawful ways and means, to
defend their lively-hood, and them&s;elves, and &s;o
to deport them&s;elves, that they may live &s;afely, and
in peace, to have and to hold to them&s;elves their
own Fields, Hou&s;es, and po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ions, and be care|ful
not to offend tho&s;e who at their plea&s;ure can
take from them both their lives and their fortunes;
And from hence is the fir&s;t nece&s;&s;ity of obedience,
which our Apo&s;tle therefore doth not &s;o much urge
as &s;uppo&s;e, becau&s;e that every man is endued with
the &s;en&s;e thereof by Nature;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Rom. 13. 5.</NOTE> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>not only for wrath,</HI> as if it were not the part of a di&s;|creet
man ra&s;hly to provoke his wrath who hath
the power of the Sword in his own hand, and by
his contumacy to incurre his di&s;plea&s;ure upon no
occa&s;ion; It &s;hould become him for the advantage
of his own &s;afety, to endure many affronts, to obey
Laws, and as much as can be without Sin, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
to &s;ubmit to the pre&s;ent
powers; and thus, though he cannot &s;hake off the
yoak, yet by well enduring it, to make it more
gentle, and more ea&s;y.</P>
<P><PB N="170" REF="97">
XVIII. But he who&s;oever he is who from a Po|litick
Government &s;hall diligently ob&s;erve with
him&s;elf what good from thence may be derived to
his Country, &s;hall find him&s;elf bound to the per|formance
of this, with another, and a &s;tronger
obligation, and which more properly pertaineth
to the Con&s;cience; and &s;o indeed St. <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome</HI>
in this place doth interpret tho&s;e words of the A|po&s;tle
<GAP DESC="foreign">, as if the Apo&s;tle
chiefly attended to the benefit received by that
protection which a Civil Government conveyeth
to the Subject; As if he &s;hould have &s;aid, Seeing
that every Citizen is con&s;cious to him&s;elf how
many benefits he doth enjoy under a <HI>politick Go|vernment,</HI>
he mu&s;t know, that for the requital of &s;o
many and &s;o great favours, he is bound by a cer|tain
Law of gratitude to pay due obedience to him
who is inve&s;ted with the highe&s;t Authority, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
as <HI>Chry&s;o|&s;tome</HI>
there &s;peaks in a &s;en&s;e not much incommo|dous,
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> un&s;uitable to the meaning of the Apo&s;tle,
as by <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> by we &s;hall repre&s;ent unto you; I ac|knowl<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">dge
the truth of that which by <HI>Tacitus</HI> is ob|&s;erved,
<HI>Raro fieri ut quis imperium flagitio quae&s;i|tum
bonis artibus exerceat;</HI> It &s;eldom comes to
pa&s;&s;e, that any man with good Arts doth exerci&s;e
the ruling of an Empire which he hath obtained
with wicked artifices, for with what Arts that Em|pires
have been gained, by the &s;ame for the mo&s;t
part they are pre&s;erved, and wickedne&s;s is to be de|fended
by wickedne&s;&s;e; Neverthele&s;&s;e that it may
be done, the examples of <HI>Hiero</HI> the <HI>Sicilian,</HI> and
of <HI>Edgar</HI> King of <HI>England,</HI> and of many others do
&s;ufficiently declare, who mode&s;tly have mannaged
<PB N="171" REF="98">
the Government of a Nation which not &s;o rightly
they had obtained; But how&s;oever a Prince doth
mannage his affairs, he can never &s;o abu&s;e his pow|er,
as <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> in the mean time to be <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>the Mini&s;ter of God, for good,</HI> as the
Apo&s;tle <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="3 letters">aketh in the fourth ver&s;e of that Chap|ter;
for there cannot be &s;o great a Tyranny which
doth not retain &s;ome &s;hew of a ju&s;t Government,
and doth not, at lea&s;t a little, conduce to maintain the
&s;ociety of men, as <HI>Calvin</HI> rightly on this Text ob|&s;erveth
it. Seeing therefore that we are Ma&s;ters of
our own E&s;tates, and do live &s;afe from &s;laughter, and
rapine, &amp; &s;eeing that even that we live is a Debt
we do owe to the chief Powers (without which
there would be no defence or remedy again&s;t the
lu&s;ts, fury, and injuries of wicked per&s;ons) a mo&s;t
rea&s;onable and righteous thing it is, that at lea&s;t
we &s;hould return &s;omthing for &s;o many benefits.
The old form of Trafficking (an excellent Law of
<HI>good</HI> and <HI>right</HI>) doth exact the &s;ame of us, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>Give &s;omething, and take &s;omething;</HI>
And certainly it argueth a mo&s;t perver&s;e mind, to
be willing to live under the protection of his
Government whom you are unwilling to obey, and
to refu&s;e his commands, under the umbrage of
who&s;e patronage you do find your &s;afety.</P>
<P>XIX. Moreover, &s;ince no man is born only for
him&s;elf, but for publick profit, and for mankind in
general, there ari&s;eth from hence a third nece&s;&s;ity
of obeying the <HI>pre&s;ent power,</HI> although it hath been
procured by never &s;uch indirect means. From
hence al&s;o it may in &s;ome manner appear what
mea&s;ure, and what bounds are to be given to that
obedience which by the duty of Con&s;cience is to
<PB N="172" REF="98">
be given to him who uniu&s;tly &s;its in the
throne of &s;upremacy; For what&s;oever is to be
done in a peculiar reference to its end, ought &s;o
to be done, as &s;hall appear mo&s;t nece&s;&s;ary and
profitable for the obtaining of that end; Now the
end of Civil Government and of the obedience due
unto it, is the tranquillity and &s;afety of Humane &s;o|ciety;
As far therefore as the peace and &s;afety of
that &s;ociety of which that Citizen is a Member
doth require, &s;o far he is bound to obey the com|mands
of that per&s;on, who <HI>de facto</HI> is the chief Ma|gi&s;trate
in that &s;ociety. Now for the pre&s;ervation
of Humane &s;ocieties there are three things very ne|ce&s;&s;ary;
The fir&s;t, <HI>the defence of our Country</HI> again&s;t
all Forein force, and endeavours of our Enemies.
Secondly, <HI>the admini&s;tration of right,</HI> that due re|wards
may be given to de&s;erving Citizens, and pu|ni&s;hments
to the bad which is the office of <HI>di&s;tribu|tive
Ju&s;tice.</HI> Thirdly, the care of Commerce, and
Merchandize, concerning buying, &s;elling, exchange|ing,
and all manner of contracts, which belongs un|to
<HI>Ju&s;tice Commutative;</HI> In the&s;e three the &s;afety
of mankind is &s;o contained, that unle&s;s they be exe|cuted,
it cannot be but all things pre&s;ent|ly
will run to ruine, all things and all places
will be filled with Plunder, Slaughter, Deceit and
Injuries, the lives of the mo&s;t innocent Citizens,
their Wives and Fortunes will become a prey, and a
&s;port unto the lu&s;ts of our armed Superiours; to pre|vent
which calamity, and that the petulancy of wick|ed
men may timely be re&s;trained, the only remedy
is for good Citizens to remember that it belongs
unto them in all things pertaining to the publick
&s;afety, to be obedient to their Laws, and Com|mands,
<PB N="173" REF="99">
by who&s;e Sword, &amp; authority they are defend|ed
from the injuries &amp; the violence of the Spoylers.</P>
<P>XX. But that no man may give a fal&s;e interpre|tation
to what here is &s;poken, they are to pay only
&s;uch an obedience, that at the &s;ame time they are to
remember, that they are no further obliged to it,
than either the account of gratitude, or the &s;afety
of the publick do require; And the Laws of an U&s;ur|per
are to be ob&s;erved, not as obligatory by any right
of the Commander,<NOTE PLACE="marg">1. a 2. ae. quae&s;t. 96. art. 4.</NOTE> but as <HI>Aquinas</HI> rightly hath it, to
<HI>avoid offence,</HI> and the <HI>trouble of the Common-wealth.</HI>
In which ca&s;e he &s;aith we ought to depart from our
own right, and he proves it out of the words of
Chri&s;t, <HI>Mat. 5. 40, 41. Ei qui vult tecum liti|gare,
et tunicam tuam capere, dimitte et pallium, Et
qui te angariabit ad miliare unum, abi cum eo duo,
If any man will &s;ue thee at the Law, and take away
thy coat, let him have thy cloak al&s;o; And who&s;o|ever
&s;hall compell thee to go a mile, go with him
twayn.</HI> A man therefore may, and if occa&s;ion &s;o
requires, he ought to depart from his own right
for his own peace, but much more for the publick
tranquillity, and obey him who hath no lawful pow|er
to command; But above all he mu&s;t have this
Re&s;erve, &s;o to depart from his own right, that by
&s;o doing, he taketh not any thing away from the
right of another; And <HI>Abraham</HI> in this did ju&s;tly
and wi&s;ely, <HI>Gen.</HI> 14. who though he made the King of
<HI>Sodom</HI> partaker of the &s;poils which by the right of
war was his portion from the five Kings that were
overthrown, yet he cautelou&s;ly provided, that
both the Prie&s;t &s;hould have his <HI>Tenths,</HI> and his
three A&s;&s;ociates in the War &s;hould not want of their
full proportions. In the like manner obedience is
<PB N="174" REF="99">
&s;o to be payed to an U&s;urper, that the fidelity due
unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated, and that
<HI>his right</HI> &s;uffers no prejudice by it.</P>
<P>XXI. But it may be objected; How can this be
done? That which is grateful to an U&s;urper cannot
but be mo&s;t ungrateful to the lawful Prince? No
man can &s;erve two Ma&s;ters that look &s;o contrary,
all who&s;e Votes,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Mat. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</NOTE> Studies and Coun&s;els are violent|ly
carryed on to the ruine and de&s;truction of one an|other.
I an&s;wer, the account being well compu|ted,
there is no rea&s;on that we &s;hould think that
this ob&s;equiou&s;ne&s;s of the Citizen, &s;o ordered, and
bounded, as we before have delivered, &s;hould be
unplea&s;ing to the lawful Prince, but altogether to
the U<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">urper; nay we may pre&s;ume that with the
con&s;ent of the true Prince him&s;elf, it ought to be
&s;o; For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be
accounted to have a&s;&s;i&s;ted &s;o much the unju&s;t Po&s;|&s;e&s;&s;or
as the whole Commonalty, or Republick,
the &s;afety whereof doth no le&s;&s;e concen the
true Heir, than the unju&s;t Po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or: Nay per|adventure
much more; becau&s;e being the true
Father of his Country he is to be believed to
love it &s;incerely, &amp; to wi&s;h it more happine&s;&s;e, than
the other, who (having excluded him) hath thru&s;t
him&s;elf into his hou&s;e, and hath excerci&s;ed a com|mand
over his Family; and by how much the affecti|ons
of a Mother to her Children are more pure, &amp;
vehement, than a Step-mothers, as may appear
by that remarkable conte&s;tation of the two Harlots
before <HI>Solomon,</HI> the true Mother who knew the
Child to be her own de&s;iring the &s;afety of it, and
that it &s;hould be given rather to another, nay, unto
her Adver&s;ary, than that it &s;hould peri&s;h by the
<PB N="175" REF="100">
Sword; &s;o it is mo&s;t likely, and it is to be pre&s;umed&punc;
that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the &s;afety
of his people (whom although for the pre&s;ent under
the yoak of a Stranger, yet he doth acknowledge them
to be his own, &amp; hopeth well that in time they will
prove profitable to him) than he who having newly
u&s;urped the &s;upreme Magi&s;tracy will be more care|ful,
it is likely, to e&s;tabli&s;h his newly acquired Great|ne&s;s,
than to procure the &s;afety of the publick, and
therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as mo|de&s;tly
as they could they &s;hould accommodate them|&s;elves
to the pre&s;ent affairs for their own &s;afety,
than to run into a certain de&s;truction, by making an
un&s;ea&s;onable, and an un&s;ucce&s;sful oppo&s;ition again&s;t
one that overpowers them. And thus I have given
you my opinion concerning this mo&s;t difficult and
high que&s;tion, determining <HI>po&s;&s;itively</HI> of nothing,
but being ready, if any man &s;hall render more cer|tain
rea&s;ons, to correct what hath been &s;poken, and
to jump in to the &s;ame Judgment with him.</P>
<P>XXII. The fourth Conclu&s;ion followeth, <HI>Hu|mane
Laws concerning things not unlawful, do by
them&s;elves, and directly, in the general oblige the
Con&s;cience.</HI> Which is as much as to &s;ay, This gene|ral
precept, that Subjects &s;hould obey humane
Laws being duly made, is <HI>obligatory directly and by
its &s;elf;</HI> And this <HI>Calvin</HI> him&s;elf, who doth not
u&s;e to attribute too much to humane con&s;titutions,
doth acknowledge, who in the 4 In&s;titute, 10. &sect;. 5.
doth advi&s;e that &s;uch a di&s;tinction be made <HI>inter
Genus et Speciem,</HI> betwixt the <HI>General,</HI> and the
<HI>Special,</HI> that although it be denied that Laws in
the <HI>Special</HI> do oblige the Con&s;cience, yet it mu&s;t
be granted, that they have an obliging power in the
<PB N="175" REF="100">
<HI>General.</HI> The rea&s;on is per&s;picuous, for this ge|neral
precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine
Law, every part whereof doth <HI>directly,</HI> and by it
<HI>&s;elf,</HI> and not only by <HI>con&s;equence,</HI> oblige our Con&s;ci|ences.
It pertains to the Law of God in a double
re&s;pect; Fir&s;t, Becau&s;e natural Rea&s;on dictates,
that <HI>Peace</HI> and <HI>Order,</HI> which is the Soul of Com|mon-wealths,
and of all humane Societies, cannot
be pre&s;erved but by an Obedience to the Lawes, ac|cording
to the &s;olemn Con&s;titution of them. Se|condly,
Becau&s;e that God in the Holy Scripture
doth command us to be &s;ubject unto tho&s;e who are
over us, in that Order as God hath appointed, and to
obey <GAP DESC="foreign">, he Higher Powers,
as may appear in the fir&s;t, and &s;econd ver&s;es of this
Chapter, and not to draw back our necks from
their yoaks, upon a bare pretext, that they are
meet men,<NOTE PLACE="marg">2 Pet. 2. 13.</NOTE> and Creatures &s;uch as we are, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
the Sons of <HI>Adam,</HI> of the &s;ame <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ace
of mankind, and &s;ubject to the &s;ame Affections,
Sufferings, In<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">irmities, and Ca&s;ualties as our &s;elvs,
but rather being mindful, that Almighty God by a
delegated Power, did &s;et them over us as his
Vicegerents on Earth, and hath been plea&s;|ed
to vouch&s;afe them &s;o much honour, as to com|municate
his own Name unto them as to &s;o many
vi&s;ible and mortal Gods,<NOTE PLACE="marg">P&s;al. 82. 6.</NOTE> <HI>I have &s;aid you are Gods,</HI>
we &s;hould reverence, honour, and obey them with
the greate&s;t Reverence, and though not for their
own &s;akes who are but men as we are, nor com|po&s;ed
of better Clay, yet in re&s;pect to the Divine
O<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">dination, who making them to b<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> Pr<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">nces, hath
preferred them into a higher place abov<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> other men,
and in &s;ome mea&s;ure made them Partakers of his
<PB N="176" REF="101">
own Power, <GAP DESC="foreign">, according to the Lord
as the Apo&s;tle S<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">. <HI>Peter</HI> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">n another place, and by
con&s;equence <GAP DESC="foreign">, <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ccording unto Con|&s;cience,
as the Apo&s;tle S<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">. <HI>Paul</HI> hath it in this place.</P>
<P>XXIII. The fifth Conclu&s;ion. <HI>Humane Lawes,
according to the &s;olemn Con&s;titution of them, doe oblige
the<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">&s;cience, even in particular, and although not
directly and by them&s;elves, yet by Con&s;equent, and by
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> of the general Divine Commandment.</HI> I &s;ay in
the fir&s;t place <HI>Lawes &s;olemnly and rightly con&s;tituted,</HI>
that is, both by rea&s;on of the <HI>efficient Cau&s;e,</HI> be|ing
made by him, who is indued with lawful Power&punc;
and by rea&s;on <HI>of the matter,</HI> commanding nothing
unlawful, di&s;hone&s;t, or filthy, or any wayes un|worthy
the Duty of a Chri&s;tian; For we already
have a&s;&s;erted, that the Lawes which do offend in ei|ther
of tho&s;e two &s;en&s;es, are not obligatory. I
&s;ay in the &s;econd place, <HI>In the particular,</HI> that is, to
a particular Determination, <HI>in things</HI> of a middle
Nature, and in others; As what, and how much tri|bute
is to be paid; What merchandi&s;e is lawful, and
what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in
&s;uch and &s;uch a Country; What habits are &s;uitable
to &s;uch and &s;uch degrees in an Univer&s;ity; What
Statutes are di&s;pen&s;able, and what not, &amp;c. I &s;ay
in the third place, that &s;uch Lawes doe not ob|lige
by them&s;elves, and directly; I prove fir&s;t
becau&s;e, that God alone is that Law-maker,
who hath a mo&s;t peculiar and direct Command o|ver
the Con&s;ciences of men. <HI>There is but one Law-giver,
who is able to &s;ave and de&s;troy, James</HI> 4. 12.
In things of a middle nature, &amp; which are indifferent
(which for the mo&s;t part are the &s;ubjects of hu|mane
Laws) we do &s;uppo&s;e that God made no Law
<PB N="177" REF="101">
in <HI>particular,</HI> but left them all to the arbitration of
tho&s;e who are his Vice-gerents on Earth. It is
proved thus in the &s;econd place, becau&s;e that tho&s;e
things only do oblige <HI>directly, and by them&s;elves,</HI><MILESTONE N="2">
which oblige by rea&s;on of the <HI>matter</HI> as of an in|ternal
Cau&s;e, without any re&s;pect to the external
Cau&s;es, the <HI>Efficient</HI> and the <HI>Final,</HI> which would
have obliged of them&s;elves, if they had not been
commanded by Men; But things indifferent, and of
a middle Nature, determined by a particular and po|&s;itive
humane Law, when they are &s;o qualified in
them&s;elves, that before the Determination of
them, they may freely be made, or nor be made
by any, they doe not oblige in re&s;pect of the <HI>matter,</HI>
therefore <HI>not of them&s;elves.</HI> I &s;ay in the third place,
that the &s;ame Lawes notwith&s;tanding doe oblige in
particular by the <HI>Con&s;equent</HI> and by Vertue of the <MILESTONE N="3">
<HI>general Divine Commandement;</HI> And becau&s;e in
this la&s;t po&s;ition, the hindge of the whole contro|ver&s;y
is turned, I will more plainly propound the
Conclu&s;ion, which by and by I will more fully con|firm;
The Conclu&s;ion is this, <HI>Po&s;itive humane
Laws</HI> being rightly and lawfully con&s;tituted, which
contain particular determinations concerning things
of a middle Nature and in them&s;elves indifferent,
and which before they are determined are free to
be made, or to be unmade, do by the vertue of
of the Divine Commandement (by which we are
bound to obey tho&s;e who are &s;et over us by God) &s;o
oblige the Con&s;ciences of the Subjects to perform o|bedience
to them, that they are bound under the pe|na<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ty
of mo<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">tal Sin, and the fear of Gods di&s;plea&s;ure,
to give obedience to the &s;aid Laws, and if they &s;hall
fail in the performance thereof, they &s;hall endure
<PB N="178" REF="102">
the checks and &s;<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ings of their accu&s;ing Co~&s;ciences.</P>
<P>XXIV. This Conclu&s;ion is confirmed by di|vers
Rea&s;ons, the fir&s;t whereof is taken from this
pre&s;ent Text, <HI>we mu&s;t therefore be &s;ubjected, not only
for wrath, but for Con&s;cience &s;ake.</HI> The words in
them&s;elves are per&s;picuous enough; In the former
ver&s;es the Apo&s;tle had largely in&s;i&s;ted upon the ne|ce&s;&s;ity
of <HI>Chri&s;tian Subjection,</HI> which he urged chiefly
by two Arguments, the one from the In&s;titution,
and the Ordination of God, in the two fir&s;t ver&s;es,
and the other from the fear of the Puni&s;hment of
man, in the two ver&s;es following; In the way of
recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argu|ment,
and repeateth them in this fifth ver&s;e, and
(as it is very u&s;ual in the Scripture) in an <HI>order in|verted,</HI>
beginning the repetition from the latter,
and the next member; As if he &s;hould have &s;aid, A
great nece&s;&s;ity of Obedience doth lye upon you in
both re&s;pects, whether the fear of puni&s;hment
may deterr you, or the Con&s;cience of the Duty
may incite you; If you de&s;pi&s;e the Power and
Authority of the Lawes, and do evil, con&s;ider with
your &s;elves, that the Magi&s;trate who is &s;et over you
is the Mini&s;ter of God, the Revenger of your ne|glected
Duty, and ready to draw the Sword
(with which God hath intru&s;ted him) to inflict a
corporal puni&s;hment due to the de&s;pi&s;ers of his
Lawes. But if the&s;e things move you not, being
deluded by a vain hope to find out one &s;ubter|fuge
or another to e&s;cape the force of his Arm, yet
think on God the ju&s;t Remembrancer of a<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">l Acts
committed, whether they be good or evil, &s;tand in
awe of him as of a ju&s;t Judge, Fear your own Con|&s;ciences,
tho&s;e &s;evere accu&s;ers, tho&s;e faithful wit|ne&s;&s;es,
<PB N="179" REF="102">
and importunate Tormentors; you cannot
avoid them by any Artifices, not elude them by a|ny
Inventions. From the &s;cope of this place, the Ar|gument
is thus framed; Tho&s;e things, which being
violated, do leave a Remor&s;e upon the Con&s;cience,
do oblige the Con&s;cience, for &s;o it mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily
be, that all remor&s;e or reproof of Con&s;cience
mu&s;t proceed from the &s;en&s;e of &s;ome obligation, as
all other effects do follow their cau&s;es; but humane
Laws being violated, do leave a remor&s;e upon the
Con&s;cience, for that is the expre<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">e &s;en&s;e of tho&s;e
words in the Text, <HI>Nece&s;&s;e e&s;t &s;ubjici propter Con|&s;cientiam,
You mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity be &s;ubject for
Con&s;cience &s;ake,</HI> you cannot keep your Con&s;cien|ces
upright, and &s;afe, unle&s;&s;e you be &s;ubjected;
Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>XXV. But &s;ome there are who to un-nerve the
force of this Argument, do in this place give ano|ther
Interpretation unto <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> and chiefly
herein they defend them&s;elves by the Authority of
<HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome,</HI> as if no, other Con&s;cience was to be
under&s;tood in this place, but a Con&s;cience only of
benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the
<HI>Political Government;</HI> I have made mention of this
heretofore, and pray&s;ed it; for the &s;en&s;e, I con|fe&s;&s;e,
is pious, though not &s;o genuine; And I have
thus much again&s;t it; For in the fir&s;t place among&s;t
the Ancients <HI>Chy&s;o&s;tome</HI> is &s;ingular in this Interpre|tation,
whom hardly one or two among&s;t &s;o many
Interpreters have followed, <HI>Theophy<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">act</HI> only, and
<HI>Oecumenius</HI> excepted, Who are not to be repu|ted
in the number of witne&s;&s;es, for they &s;o tread
in the foot&s;teps of <HI>Chry&s;o&s;tome,</HI> that all three of
them do make only but one witne&s;&s;e. Secondly,
<PB N="180" REF="103">
<MILESTONE N="2"> No place can be aleged in the Scripture, in which
either St. <HI>Paul,</HI> or any other of the Apo&s;tles have
made u&s;e of the word Con&s;cience, in that &s;en&s;e as
<HI>Chry&s;ostome</HI> here doth feign unto him&s;elf. Third|ly,
<MILESTONE N="3"> the Apo&s;tle in this place (as it is very manife&s;t)
would induce &s;omething which &s;hould be of more
moment, and more effectual to &s;tir up the minds of
men than <HI>temporal puni&s;hment;</HI> for which end it was
better to affright them with the fear of the Divine
anger, than to admoni&s;h them of any benefits receiv|ed
<MILESTONE N="4"> from men. Fourthly and la&s;tly, the Apo&s;tle here in
a &s;hort repetition of tho&s;e rea&s;ons before alleged,
would conclude his di&s;cour&s;e of Chri&s;tian Subjecti|on;
now in the two fir&s;t Ver&s;es of this Chapter
he did bring the rea&s;on, not from the <HI>Con&s;cience of
the benefit,</HI> but of <HI>the duty.</HI></P>
<P>XXVI. The &s;econd rea&s;on followeth, from the
<HI>u&s;e</HI> and the <HI>end</HI> of the Laws; It being mo&s;t nece&s;|&s;ary
that they &s;hould be made and ob&s;erved, for the
pre&s;ervation of humane &s;ocieties in peace, and
publick tranquillity, for otherwi&s;e there would be
no certain <HI>rule</HI> of Contracts, no <HI>mea&s;ure</HI> of Faith,
and Civil Ju&s;tice, which are the firme&s;t bands of Ci|ties,
and &s;ocieties; for the <HI>natural,</HI> and the <HI>writ|ten
Law</HI> of God, although both of them by them|&s;elves
are mo&s;t perfect in their own kind, and being
joyned do contain the particular Principles of &s;u|pernatural
faith, and the general Principles of
things to be done, accommodated to all parts of
life, yet neither of them doth de&s;cend to all tho&s;e
particulars, which either may be, or for the mo&s;t
part are nece&s;&s;ary for the pre&s;ervation of Peace and
Order, in Cities, and Governments. For exam|ples
&s;ake, the <HI>Law of rea&s;on,</HI> which is the
<PB N="181" REF="103">
&s;ame with the <HI>Law of Nature</HI> doth dictate, and the
Scripture al&s;o in the next ver&s;e of this Chapter
doth teach, that Tribute is to be paid for the main|tainence
of Princes, and of the charges of Wars,
and other publick u&s;es, but unle&s;&s;e it be by a L<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">w
determined, how much is to be payed, and by
what proportion, and by whom, and in what
&s;pace of time, and other circum&s;tances, either th<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">
payment will mi&s;carry, or not be made timely e|nough,
or el&s;e it will not be enough for the u&s;e;
of the Common-wealth; If you &s;ay, that by this&punc;
Argument the nece&s;&s;ity of Laws is proved indeed,
but the obligation of them is not determined, for
Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">|nunciation
of puni&s;hments; We confe&s;&s;e indeed
the truth of this, if we &s;hould go no higher, but it
furthermore we &s;hall con&s;ider without &s;elves how
headlong man is burryed to forbidden &s;ins, and how
bold to venture through them all, &amp; how <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
a Keeper <HI>Fear,</HI> is of <HI>Duty,</HI> unle&s;&s;e that withall there
be &s;ome &s;en&s;e of Religion to contain men in their
duties, it will mo&s;t ea&s;ily appear how wi&s;ely&punc; Al|mighty
God, the mo&s;t prudent Moderator of all
things, hath provided for the affairs of men, who
hath endued their Con&s;ciences with a certain reli|gious
reverence to the Law, which doth grow up
together with their u&s;e of Rea&s;on: From hence
it comes to pa&s;&s;e, that among&s;t the Heath<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="3 letters"> igno|rant
of the true God, there were &s;carce any one
found of the antient Legi&s;lators but pretended to
the people, that the Laws which <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e made were
delivered to him by &s;ome God; to <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
need not give you the names of <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
<HI>Lycu<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">gus,</HI> and many others who<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> the <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">;
<PB N="180" REF="104">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="181" REF="104">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="182" REF="105">
make mention of, it being a truth &s;o well known
to all.</P>
<P>XXVII. The third argument is this; What is to be
done <HI>for the Lord,</HI> we are bound in Con&s;cience to the
performance of it; But we are bound to be &s;ub|ject
to Humane Laws rightly e&s;tabli&s;hed (that is,
&s;o con&s;tituted by the &s;upreme power, or by others
receiving their Authority from it) for the Lord,
<HI><GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> Pet. 2. 13. Be &s;ubject to every Ordinance of man
for the Lords &s;ake, whether it be to the King,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>as the Supreme</HI> (which &s;ufficiently ex|pounds
the meaning of St. <HI>Paul</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>the Higher Powers,</HI> in the fir&s;t ver&s;e of <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> Chap|ter)
<HI>or unto Governours, as unto them that are &s;ent
by him, &amp;c.</HI> And that the&s;e words <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>For the Lord, or for the Love of God</HI> (as the French
Tran&s;lation hath it) doth imply the obligation of
<MILESTONE N="1"> Con&s;cience, is manife&s;t in the fir&s;t place by the u&s;e of
the &s;ame expre&s;&s;ions in other places of the Scrip|ture,
as <HI>Eph.</HI> 6. 1. where &s;peaking of the Duty of
Children towards their Parents, the words of the
Text are, <HI>Liberi obedite Parentibus ve&s;tris</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>in Domino; Children obey your Parents in the Lord;</HI>
And by the Duty of Servants to their Ma&s;ters, in the
&s;ame Chapter <HI>v. 7. With good will</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<HI>&s;erving the Lord and not men,</HI> which in the third
of the <HI>Col. v.</HI> 23. is <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>as to the Lord and not
to Men,</HI> as if he &s;hould &s;ay, <HI>For Con&s;cience and
not for Wrath only,</HI> or for the fear of God, rather
<MILESTONE N="2"> than the dread of Men. It is manife&s;t, Secondly,
from the following words in that place of St. <HI>Peter,</HI>
<GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>for &s;o is the will of God;</HI>
And <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">o St. <HI>Paul</HI> in the &s;aid &s;ixth chapter of the
<HI>Ephe&s;ians,</HI> and the &s;ixth ver&s;e, &s;peaking of the Duty
<PB N="183" REF="105">
of Servants, he exhorts them to obey their Ma|&s;ters
in the &s;incerity of Heart <GAP DESC="foreign">,
doing the will of God from the Heart; Now
the <HI>will of God</HI> is the very &s;ame Rule of Con&s;cience
which I have &s;aid to be the Rule Adaequate.</P>
<P>XXVIII. The fourth Argument; What <HI>Natu|ral
Rea&s;on</HI> doth &s;o pre&s;cribe to be done, that
both the fault and the guilt of the fault are con|tracted,
if it be not done, we are without all doubt
obliged in Con&s;cience to the doing of it; For &s;ince
the <HI>&s;en&s;e of Sin</HI> pertaineth to the Con&s;cience, as al|&s;o
doth the <HI>fear of Puni&s;hment</HI> which ari&s;eth from it,
what&s;oever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth
doth induce the &s;tain of a fault, and a guilt of
puni&s;hment for that fault, it doth directly appertain
to the obligation of the Con&s;cience; Now Natural
Rea&s;on (who&s;e Judgement cannot be indirect)
doth &s;o far command us to obey <HI>Humane Laws,</HI>
that if that obedience be not performed, we are
immediately con&s;cious to our &s;elves, that it is
meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty.</P>
<P>XXIX. The fifth Argument; <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">he Violation of
that which nece&s;&s;arily draweth along with it the
Violation of the Laws of God, doth oblige the Con|&s;cience
(becau&s;e no man with a &s;afe Con&s;cience can
viol<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">te the Law of God which is the Rule of the
Con&s;cience) but the violation of every particular
Law &s;olemnly con&s;tituted by Men, doth nece&s;&s;ari|ly
draw along with it the violation of the Law of
God, to wit, of that General Commandment by
which God commandeth obedience to the Magi|&s;trate;
Therefore the &s;aid Violation of the particu|lar
Law of Men doth oblige the Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>XXX. The &s;ixth Argument; We are bound in
<PB N="184" REF="106">
Con&s;cience not to Act that, which (if it were
acted) is in a manner to re&s;i&s;t God him&s;elf; For
we are bound to be &s;ubject, and to &s;ubmit our
&s;elves unto God, and therefore not to re&s;i&s;t him,
for <HI>Subjection</HI> and <HI>Re&s;i&s;tance</HI> are contrary unto one
another, neither can any Man at the &s;ame time, be
&s;ubject unto, and re&s;i&s;t the &s;ame per&s;on; But not
to obey Humane Laws &s;olemnly con&s;tituted, is, in|terpretatively,
to re&s;i&s;t God; For he who obeyeth
not the Laws, doth di&s;obey the Legi&s;lative power
of the Magi&s;trate, which who&s;oever he is that doth
it (the &s;aid power being ordained by God) he doth
oppo&s;e him&s;elf again&s;t Gods Ordinance, and by
Con&s;equence &amp; interpretatively he doth oppo&s;e God
him&s;elf, which is the Determination of St. <HI>Paul</HI> in the
&s;econd ver&s;e of this chapter, and from whence he or|derly
concludes the nece&s;&s;ity of Subjection <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">ccording to Con&s;cience, in this ve<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">&s;e.</P>
<P>XXXI. From what hath been already &s;poken, it
will be no great difficulty to an&s;wer to the Argu|ments
which commonly are objected by the Ad|ver&s;aries
to this Truth: The fir&s;t and chiefe&s;t where|of,
is taken from <HI>Chri&s;tian Liberty,</HI> and to the Confir|mation
of it, many places of Scripture are alleged
with much pomp &amp; circum&s;tance, which &s;eem to ad|&s;tipulate
to that <HI>Liberty;</HI> And many are the objecti|ons
w^c^h^. from hence do take their Ri&s;e. They allege,
it is written by St. <HI>Paul, 1 Cor. 7. 23. Yee are bought
with a price, be yee not made the Servants of men;</HI>
And ag<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">in <HI>Gal. 5. 6. Stand firm in that liberty in
which Chri&s;t hath &s;et you free, and be not intangl|ed
again with the yoak of bondage.</HI> And again <HI>Col.
2. 16. Let no man judge you in meat or drink
&amp;c.</HI> and other places to the &s;ame effect. They
<PB N="185" REF="106">
di&s;pu<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e al&s;o that it is not likely that Chri&s;t at la&s;t
&s;hould have freed us &s;o from the po&s;itive Laws of
God him&s;elf, which were certainly mo&s;t ju&s;t, to
leave us captivated under the &s;lavi&s;h Bondage of the
Laws of Men.</P>
<P>XXXII. I will an&s;wer to all the&s;e places, but
I would have you fir&s;t preadverti&s;ed, &s;eeing that
there are many Texts and heads of Chri&s;tian liber|ty,
that we diligently do take heed not too ra&s;h|ly
to confound them, neither rudely and unskil|fully
to wre&s;t and cite tho&s;e places of Scripture
which pertain to one kind of Liberty to another
kind to which they do not belong; which <HI>tran&s;i|tion
to another kind</HI> is not only the perpetual and
Solemn vice of the <HI>Antinomians,</HI> and the <HI>Anab<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">p|ti&s;ts,</HI>
but of many others who would be e&s;teemed
the Reformers of this age; and this as they often
put in practice in other di&s;putations, &s;o mo&s;t
e&s;pecially in tho&s;e where the debate is concerning
the Rites of the Church; having thus pread|moni&s;hed
you of their Errors, I now proceed
to the &s;olution of their Arguments. In that
Text to the <HI>Corinthians</HI> the Apo&s;tle would ex|hort
the faithful, that in what&s;oever place God
had con&s;tituted them, and with what&s;oever gifts
he had indued them, that contented in that Sta|tion
they would mode&s;tly contain them&s;elves
within their own limits, mea&s;uring them&s;elves by
the gifts, and calling of God, and acordingly
accommodate their lives and actions, whether they
be &s;ervants or free, and not &s;o in&s;lave and emanci|pate
their Con&s;ciences to the Judgment and com|mand
of any Man, as wholly to depend upon his
<HI>Will</HI> and <HI>Opinion,</HI> but being mindfull that he is the
<PB N="186" REF="107">
&s;ervant of God, and of the Lord Je&s;us, &s;o to &s;tudy
to plea&s;e men, and to be &s;ub&s;ervient to their af|fections
and commands, as to do nothing unworthy
of a man who profe&s;&s;eth him&s;elf to be the Servant
of God and Chri&s;t; And this being the certain
&s;en&s;e of the Apo&s;tle in that whole di&s;cour&s;e, we
may mo&s;t truly conclude from hence, that we
ought not to be obedient to the plea&s;ures of Ma&s;t|ers,
Parents, or Princes, or any Mortals what|&s;oever,
if they command any thing to be done
which is wicked, or unlawful, for in&s;tead of being
the Servants of God, this were to make them&s;elves
the Servants of Men; But he, who out of Con&s;cience
doth obey the ju&s;t, hone&s;t, and profitable Con&s;tituti|ons
of Men, is &s;o far from being thought, that he is
therefore the Servant of Men, that by the two chief|e&s;t
of the Apo&s;tles, he is expre&s;&s;ely &s;aid <HI>to &s;erve the
Lord God, and not Men. Eph. 6. 7. Col.</HI> 3. 23. and
1. <HI>Pet.</HI> 2. 16. In this Text, <HI>To &s;erve the Lord and
not Men,</HI> the particle of Negation (as u&s;ually in
other places) is taken comparatively, that is to
&s;ay, <HI>rather</HI> God than Men, he &s;erveth God for him|&s;elf,
and Men for God; He &s;erveth Men, as he
performeth what is commanded by them, and he
&s;erveth God, as he doth it out of the Con&s;cience
of his Duty.</P>
<P>XXXIII. That other place to the <HI>Galathians</HI> is
be&s;t of all to be under&s;tood by the whole &s;cope of
the Epi&s;tle; Some fal&s;e Apo&s;tles in the Churches
of <HI>Galatia,</HI> being either Jews, or Judaizing Chri|&s;tians,
did violently contend (contrary to the in|&s;titution
of the Apo&s;tles in the Council at <HI>Jeru&s;a|lem</HI>)
that the Gentiles newly converted to the
Faith, &s;hould not only be baptized but circumci|zed
<PB N="187" REF="107">
al&s;o; And tho&s;e Impo&s;tors, as their cu&s;tom
is, under the pretence of piety, and a wicked dili|gence
among&s;t the credulous vulgar, did &s;o wonder|fully
prevayl, that they had drawn many into &s;o
great an errour, that they thought they could never
attain unto everla&s;ting happine&s;&s;e, unle&s;&s;e they
&s;uffered them&s;elves to be circumcized; The Spirit
of the ble&s;&s;ed Apo&s;tle not induring this wretched
and growing Impo&s;ture, doth inveigh again&s;t the
gro&s;&s;ene&s;&s;e of the error of it, with more than ordi|nary
Indignation throughout the whole cour&s;e al|mo&s;t
of the Epi&s;tle; And among&s;t other Arguments
he admoni&s;heth the <HI>Galatians</HI> of that liberty, by
which Chri&s;t after his comming did free his Church
from the unprofitable burden and yoak of the <HI>Mo|&s;aick</HI>
Ceremonies, and doth exhort them con&s;tan|ly
to maintain the liberty obtained by the death of
Chri&s;t, and not to &s;toop their necks again unto the
yoak of &s;lavery, which they &s;hould altogether do,
if they &s;hould believe the ritual ob&s;ervation of the
dead letter of the Law to be nece&s;&s;ary. Now how
incongruou&s;ly this is by the Anabapti&s;ts applyed
to the Laws of Men, profitable and nece&s;&s;ary for the
Commonwealth, from which the Scriptures do no
where tell us that Chri&s;t hath freed us, he is wilful|ly
blind that doth not di&s;cern it.</P>
<P>XXXIV. The third place taken out of the Epi|&s;tle
to the <HI>Colo&s;&s;ians,</HI> doth not at all appertain to Hu|mane
Laws rightly con&s;tituted concerning things of
a middle nature, but to the Doctrines of Impo|&s;tors,
who dogmatically propounded to the peo|ple
of God &s;ome things to be nece&s;&s;ary, which God
never commanded (which was the Cu&s;tom of the
Traditionary Phari&s;ees, whom Chri&s;t <HI>Mat.</HI> 15.
<PB N="188" REF="108">
reprehends upon that account for making the Com|mandements
of God of no effect by their Traditi|on)
or clean contrary, they as dogmatically did for|bid
other things as unlawful, which God never did
prohibit, injoyning the people as to &s;uch, and &s;uch
things, <HI>Touch not, ta&s;te not, handle not.</HI> The A|po&s;tle
admoni&s;heth the <HI>Colo&s;&s;ians</HI> to have a care of
&s;uch dogmatizing Teachers, and not &s;uffer any
&s;nare to be thrown upon their Con&s;ciences by the&s;e
Impo&s;tors; Magi&s;trates therefore in a political Go|vernment
do not offend, who in things of a middle
nature, do either command or prohibit any thing
to the people for Profit, Hone&s;ty, Decency, or
for Orders &s;ake, but without any opinion of ne|ce&s;&s;ity
on either &s;ide, which belongeth to the thing
it &s;elf that is commanded or forbidden; Tho&s;e pit|tiful
Mini&s;ters (I may more truly call them Ma|gi&s;trates,
&s;o Magi&s;terially they do pronounce all
things do rather offend, who &s;o importunately
vex and inveigh again&s;t the harmle&s;&s;e Laws of Ma|gi&s;trates,
and exerci&s;e a Tyranny o<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">er the Con&s;ci|ences
of the people, and what&s;oever is di&s;ta&s;tful
to them, is pre&s;ently condemned for Impiety, or
at lea&s;t for Super&s;tition.</P>
<P>XXXV. That which in the fourth place they do
allege, tha<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> becau&s;e Chri&s;t hath freed us from the
po&s;itive Laws of God, therefore much more from
the Laws of Men, is in many re&s;pects erroneous,
<MILESTONE N="1"> and ab&s;urd; For in the fir&s;t place it is not truly &s;aid,
that Chri&s;t hath freed us from the po&s;itive Laws of
God, by which we never were bound; For the po|&s;itive
Laws of God, or Men, do only oblige tho&s;e
on whom they are impo&s;ed; Now tho&s;e Laws of
God which they call <HI>po&s;itive,</HI> and from which they
<PB N="189" REF="108">
would have us freed by the death of Chri&s;t, whe|ther
they be <HI>ritual</HI> or <HI>judicial</HI> were only impo&s;ed
on the Jews, but not on us who are Chri&s;tians. A|gain,<MILESTONE N="2">
where it is manife&s;t what God would have
done, it doth not belong to us by any collation of
Comparatives too &s;aucily to determine what ought
to be done; Now it is manife&s;t that God would
have both, he would have that his po&s;itive Laws
delivered to the I&s;raelits by <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> &s;hould not oblige
the Chri&s;tians, and that the Laws of men rightly
and &s;olemnly con&s;tituted by the Magi&s;trates &s;hould
oblige the people under their Authority. Thirdly,<MILESTONE N="3">
If this Argument indeed were of any force, tho&s;e
that make u&s;e of it do not ob&s;erve, that by it they
do not only take away the <HI>obligation,</HI> but altogether
the <HI>u&s;e</HI> al&s;o of all humane Lawes; For Chri&s;t hath no
otherwi&s;e freed us from the obligation of the <HI>Mo|&s;a<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ck</HI>
Laws, than &s;o by taking away the u&s;e of them,
that by us they are no more to be e&s;teemed as Laws.
Therefore if in the &s;ame manner he would have us
to be free from the obligation of humane Laws, it
mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity follow, that he would have no hu|mane
Laws to be any longer extant among&s;t us. So
wild a propo&s;ition is this of the Anabapti&s;ts and o|ther
fanatick per&s;ons, neither is it admitted by
them&s;elves who do propound it.</P>
<P>XXXVI. Again, they object that of Saint <HI>James,</HI>
Chapter the fourth, <HI>there is but one Law-giver,</HI> to
wit <HI>God</HI> and <HI>Chri&s;t,</HI> who is only Lord of the Con|&s;cience;
He is an invader thereof of Chri&s;ts right,
and thru&s;ts him&s;elf into the Throne of God, who|&s;oever
he is that a&s;&s;umeth unto him&s;elf a power of
obliging the Con&s;ciences of other men. I an&s;wer,
There is indeed but one &s;upreme Law-giver, who
<PB N="190" REF="109">
hath a direct and Soveraign command over the
Con&s;ciences of men, as <HI>by him&s;elf</HI> and by his own
virtue and authority to oblige them, which Law-giver
is God and Chri&s;t, as the Apo&s;tle hath it; But
this hinders not, but that there may be other Law-givers
of an inferiour order and degree, who by a
power granted and derived to them from that &s;u|preme
Lawgiver, have of them&s;elves a right of
making Laws which may con&s;equently oblige the
Con&s;cience; Ju&s;t as a King who &s;olely in his own
Kingdom hath a peculiar Legi&s;lative power, yet
notwith&s;tanding by his Charter he may give to &s;ome
College or Corporation, a right of making Laws,
which may oblige all the members of that body,
not by their own power, but by the force of the roy|al
Donation, and the Authority granted to them
from the King; Our Univer&s;ities (as you all know)
are happy and rejoice in this privilege, that in a
Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws
which we call Statutes, and ordain puni&s;hments
for Delinquents, and if it be expedient, they may
abrogate again and cancel the &s;ame Statutes; Now
there is no man of a &s;ober under&s;tanding who will
conceive that the excerci&s;e of this power doth any
wayes derogate from the Legi&s;lative right of the
King, or can be any deceit, or prejudice unto it,
unle&s;s it be extended beyond the limits of the Do|nation
defined in the Charter; Nay it is rather an
excellent, and a &s;ingular mark of the royal <HI>autocra&s;y,</HI>
that the King hath not only the Legi&s;lative power
him&s;elf, but that he can vouch&s;afe it unto others to
be had and u&s;ed, his own right being notwith&s;tand|ing
&s;afe and entire into him&s;elf.</P>
<P>XXXVII. The other objections relying on one
<PB N="191" REF="109">
&amp; the &s;ame Foundation may be re&s;olved by one a
and the &s;ame labour; I will briefly run them over.<MILESTONE N="3">
In the third place they object, that the Civil power
is meerly <HI>temporal,</HI> &amp; therefore belongeth not unto
the Con&s;cience which is <HI>&s;piritual.</HI> Fourthly, the end <MILESTONE N="4">
of Humane Laws is the <HI>external</HI> peace of the Com|mon-wealth,
and not the <HI>internal</HI> peace of the
Con&s;cience; therefore the Laws them&s;elves do only
oblige the outward man, and not the Con&s;cience
which lyeth within. Fifthly, the Magi&s;trate cannot <MILESTONE N="5">
judge of Con&s;ciences, and therefore can make no
Laws over them, it being the &s;ame extent of power,
to give Laws, and to judge according to them.
Sixtly, the Magi&s;trate in making of Laws hath no <MILESTONE N="6">
intention of binding the Con&s;ciences of the people,
but only to oblige them to perform that which the
Law commandeth, which if it be done, it is all one
to the profit of the Commonwealth, whether it be
done out of any Con&s;cience of duty or not, and it is
enough if the effects of <HI>Actions</HI> be commen&s;urated
to the intention of the <HI>Agents,</HI> and they ought not
further to be extended.</P>
<P>XXXVIII. I an&s;wer, and fir&s;t <HI>univer&s;ally</HI> to
them all; By all the&s;e Arguments, this only is ob|tained,
that humane Laws do not oblige <HI>directly</HI> and
<HI>by them&s;elves,</HI> or by their proper force, which of our
own accord we grant; for we a&s;&s;ert no other obli|gation
but what comes to them <HI>ex con&s;equenti,</HI> by
Con&s;equence, and by the virtue of the general
command of God of rendring obedience to the
higher powers; And from this ground, I an&s;wer
to the particular objections; And as the to third, I
&s;ay, that the Civil power being meerly temporal,
cannot of it &s;elf, and in re&s;pect of the Object in
<PB N="192" REF="110">
which properly and immediately it ver&s;eth, have a
&s;piritual effect, and therefore of it &s;elf cannot in|duce
a &s;piritual obligation; neverthele&s;&s;e by con&s;e|quence
it may have a &s;piritual effect, by a derivati|on
from the power of &s;ome &s;uperiour cau&s;e, in the
virtue whereof it worketh; Now every Magi&s;trate,
as long as rightly and d<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ely he doth exerci&s;e the
Legi&s;lative Power which God hath put into his
hands; he worketh in the virtue of God him&s;elf,
and by ordination of him who is him&s;elf a <HI>Spirit,</HI>
and as the Lord and Father of <HI>Spirits</HI> hath a Com|mand
over the <HI>Spirits of men.</HI></P>
<P>XXXIX. I an&s;wer to the fourth; that although
<HI>peace</HI> be an external ble&s;&s;ing of a Commonalty, yet
the internal Con&s;cience is obliged to the uttermo&s;t
to the procuring and pre&s;erving of it by all lawful
and hone&s;t means, becau&s;e that God the Lord of
Con&s;cience hath commanded us to love and follow
<HI>peace,</HI> and if private, certainly much more publick
peace. Neither is it any way incon&s;i&s;tent, that al|though
Con&s;cience be internal, yet it is obli|ged
to a thing external; for the obligation of Con|&s;cience
doth not ari&s;e from the Nature, or any con|dition
of the <HI>thing</HI> or <HI>Object</HI> into which it is carry|ed,
but from the <HI>will</HI> of him who hath the right of
obliging, that is God him&s;elf.</P>
<P>XL. I an&s;wer to the fifth; that the Legi&s;lative
and Judicial power doth <HI>originally</HI> pertain to the
&s;ame per&s;on, that is, to him who hath the &s;upreme
juri&s;diction over the Subjects; neverthele&s;s <HI>di&s;pen|&s;atively</HI>
and by the will of the &s;upreme Magi&s;trate
it may both of them and both ways be admini&s;tred
by other per&s;ons, as he &s;hall think expedient. There|fore
although God alone hath in him&s;elf a peculiar
<PB N="193" REF="110">
power over the Con&s;ciences of the Creature, and
maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original, pro|per,
and ab&s;olute right, yet according to his good
plea&s;ure he may either delegate a di&s;pen&s;ation of
either power to another, or he may re&s;erve it to
him&s;elf; Therefore it would not be ab&s;urd if any
man &s;hould grant that God in &s;ome mea&s;ure hath
delegated a Legi&s;lative power to the Magi&s;trate of
obliging Con&s;ciences, but hath re&s;erved the Judicial
power over them entire unto him&s;elf; But there
is no nece&s;&s;ity that compelleth us to grant <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">, or
to u&s;e any expre&s;&s;ions that may be helped although
by never &s;o gentle an interpretation; For we do
not &s;ay this, that God hath given to the Magi&s;trate
a power to oblige by his Laws the Con&s;ciences of
tho&s;e that be under him, but this rather (which is
a more wary and a more commodiou<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> kind of &s;peak|ing)
that God hath given to the Magi&s;trate a power
of making Laws, which (but by the only Autho|rity
of God him&s;elf) do oblige the Con&s;ciences
of his Subjects; For to &s;peak properly, the Magi|&s;trate
doth not oblige the Con&s;cience to obey the
Law, but God obligeth the Con&s;cience to obey the
Magi&s;trate.</P>
<P>XL. And by this, a way is made for an <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> to
the la&s;t objection. I do grant indeed <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
<HI>effects</HI> of <HI>Actions</HI> ought not to be extended <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">
the <HI>intention</HI> of the <HI>Agents,</HI> neverthele&s;s where
there are more <HI>Agents &s;ubordinate</HI> there is <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">
hindreth but that the effect may be extended be|yond
the intention of the <HI>inferiour Agent,</HI> provided
it doth not exceed the Intention of the <HI>princip<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters"> A|gent;</HI>
As in the generation of a Mon&s;ter (which
being but boyes we have learned from <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>)
<PB N="194" REF="111">
the effect, which is the production of the Mon&s;ter,
is be&s;ides the intention of the <HI>&s;econd cau&s;e,</HI> or as
they &s;peak it, of <HI>Nature natured,</HI> that is to &s;ay, of the
per&s;on that begets or brings it forth, but it is not
be&s;ides the intention of the fir&s;t Cau&s;e, or of <HI>Na|ture
naturing,</HI> that is, Almighty God. Therefore al|though
the Magi&s;trate in the making of a Law hath
no explicit intention of obliging the Con&s;ciences,
yet by in&s;tituting the Law, he doth in&s;titute that,
which by the intention, &amp; ordination of God, hath
an implicit force of obliging them, &amp; which nece&s;|&s;arily
is conjoyned to him. And this may &s;uffice to
be &s;poken of the obligation of Humane Laws in
general; I will &s;hortly proceed to the Que&s;tions,
or particular doubtful Ca&s;es, if God &s;hall permit,
and my health be more con&s;tant to me.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="6" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="195" REF="111">
<HEAD>THE
SIXTH LECTURE,
Of the Obligation of Humane Laws
in reference to their material Cau&s;e.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>PROV. 8. 15.</BIBL>
<Q LANG="lat">Per me reges regnant, et Legum conditores
ju&s;ta decernunt.</Q>
<Q>By me, Kings reign, and the makers of Laws
do decree Ju&s;tice.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_I Have reduced to two general
Que&s;tions, or to two <HI>heads,</HI>
what I have propounded to be
&s;poken concerning the obligation
of humane Laws; The fir&s;t is,
<HI>whether humane Laws do oblige
the Con&s;ciences of Subjects?</HI> Concerning which in
the former Lecture I have expounded to you what
was my Judgment of it; The other Que&s;tion is, <HI>How
they oblige?</HI> To which que&s;tion, I have told you, there
<PB N="196" REF="112">
belongeth the de<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">ding of &s;ome <HI>Ca&s;es</HI> and <HI>Doubts</HI>
which mee<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> in this <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ubject; And becau&s;e they are
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> few, no<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> of one kind, therefore to avoid Con|fu&s;ion,
and that we may proceed in &s;ome Order
and Method to that which is to be &s;poken, I have
thought is not impertinent to give you a rough Re|pre&s;entative
of the whole Treati&s;e now in hand;
And that Method which mo&s;t of you do remember, I
ob&s;erved in tho&s;e my former exercitations concer|ning
the <HI>obligation of an oath,</HI> I here conceive it very
nece&s;&s;ary for me to u&s;e again, that tho&s;e things may
all of them be reduced to the <HI>four kind of Cau&s;es</HI>
which I conceive may commodiou&s;ly be referred to
them&punc; But becau&s;e I do find many things to remain
which cannot ea&s;ily be included in tho&s;e bounds, we
will a&s;&s;igne them their &s;everal <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">la&s;&s;es; And they are
chiefly two, the fir&s;t of <HI>Per&s;ons</HI> who are under the
obligation of tho&s;e Laws; and the other in the
<HI>comparing</HI> of the <HI>obligatory Vertue</HI> which is in
Humane Laws, with that which ari&s;eth from the
Judgement of the Con&s;cience, by Vowes, Oaths,
Promi&s;es, Contracts, and from the Law of Scan|dal,
or if there be any thing el&s;e which el&s;e|where
obligatory, for the&s;e two obligations do
&s;eem to be in a conte&s;tation and (ju&s;tling for prece|dency)
to &s;trive which of them &s;hould give place un|to
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">. To add the third Cla&s;&s;is for &s;ome cer|tain
<HI>&s;pecies of Laws</HI> which &s;eem to contain in them|&s;elvs
&s;omthing &s;ingular to them&s;elvs, &s;uch as are
Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws Penal Laws, &amp; the local &s;tatu<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">es
of Colleges, and le&s;&s;e &s;ocieties, will not peradven|ture
be very nece&s;&s;ary &s;eeing in &s;ome manner they
may be reduced to &s;omthing in <HI>the four kinds of
Cau&s;es,</HI> and though not &s;o aptly as to &s;atisfy the
<PB N="197" REF="112">
curious, yet &s;o fully as to &s;erve our pre&s;ent purpo&s;e;
for whil&s;t our hearers under&s;tand what it is we &s;peak
of, we have never taken any great care in what me|thod
we have gone. We will in the fir&s;t place there|fore
(if God &s;hall grant life, health, and oppor|tunity
to accompli&s;h what we have propounded)
&s;peak of the obligation of the Laws as to the four
kinds of Cau&s;es; In the &s;econd place of the per|&s;ons
who are obliged to the ob&s;ervation of tho&s;e
Laws; And la&s;tly, of the <HI>compari&s;on</HI> of the <HI>ob|ligations</HI>
which quarrel among&s;t them&s;elves, giving
you before-hand one or two di&s;tinctions which will
be of great concernment in the whole manage|ment
of this di&s;cour&s;e.</P>
<P>II. We mu&s;t under&s;tand therefore in the fir&s;t
place, Seeing that to the end of Political Govern|ment
and order, there is a two-fold power in tho&s;e
who are inve&s;ted with Soveraign Authority, A
<HI>directive power,</HI> by which the Subjects may un|der&s;tand
what they have to do, and a <HI>Power Co|active</HI>
or <HI>Coercitive</HI> (for, by rea&s;on of the Analogy,
it is better &s;o to call it than Coercive) by which
the Subjects may be compelled to the performance
of tho&s;e things that are commanded, if of their own
accords they &s;hall refu&s;e to give obedience to them,
both which are &s;o contained in the Laws, that the
one con&s;i&s;teth mo&s;t in precepts, and the other is
mo&s;t to be &s;een in puni&s;hments; there ari&s;eth
from this double power of the Magi&s;trate, a dou|ble
duty of the Subject which an&s;wereth to that
double power; The duty of Obedience in refer|ence
to the Directive power, and the duty of Sub|jection
in reference to the power Coercitive; I
here under&s;tand <HI>&s;ubjection</HI> as it is properly &s;o cal|led
<PB N="198" REF="113">
by an appellation Generical, which as el&s;e|where
it often comes to pa&s;&s;e, is re&s;trained to one
certain <HI>Species;</HI> For obedience al&s;o is a <HI>Species</HI> of
Subjection largely taken; The Apo&s;tle compre|hends
both tho&s;e duties, <HI>Heb.</HI> 13. 17. and &s;ig|nifies
them in tho&s;e two words <GAP DESC="foreign">
<HI>Obey them that have the over&s;ight of you, and &s;ub|mit
your &s;elves;</HI> The fir&s;t whereof pertaineth to
the Duty of <HI>obedience,</HI> or of performing that
which is commanded by a lawful Superior, the o|ther
to the Duty of <HI>Subjection,</HI> or of induring
what by him &s;hall be inflicted. Furthermore, As
from a double Power, there ari&s;eth a double Duty,
&s;o from a double Duty, there ari&s;eth a double Ob|ligation,
for every Duty doth infer an Obligation,
and every Obligation doth &s;uppo&s;e a Duty; There|fore
one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws, is
that, by which Subjects are bound to obey the
precepts of the Law it &s;elf, and the other, by
which they are bound to &s;ubmit them&s;elves to the
power of the Law-giver, one of the Obligations
belongeth to <HI>Active Obedience,</HI> the other unto that
Obedience which is called <HI>pa&s;&s;ive,</HI> and to which
we give the Name of <HI>Submi&s;&s;ion.</HI></P>
<P>III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane
Laws can oblige the Con&s;ciences of the Subject;
It is to be &s;aid in the fir&s;t place, that all Laws made
by one inve&s;ted by a lawful Power, do oblige to
Subjection, &s;o that it is not lawful for a Subject to
re&s;i&s;t the Supreme Power by force of Arms, whe|ther
things ju&s;t or unju&s;t be commanded. This
w<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters"> evermore the mind, and practice of the Chri|&s;tians
in the fir&s;t Age of the Church, living under
the mo&s;t griev<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">us Tyranny of the greate&s;t Enemies
<PB N="199" REF="113">
to the name of Chri&s;t; &amp; to make no mention herein
of the Conduct, and the in&s;tinct of <HI>Nature,</HI> and the
light of <HI>right Rea&s;on,</HI> this is mo&s;t manife&s;t by the
Doctrine of the two chiefe&s;t of the Apo&s;tles. For &s;o
<HI>Peter</HI> the Apo&s;tle of Circumci&s;ion&punc; doth diligently
in&s;truct the Jews; And &s;o <HI>Paul</HI> the Doctor of the
Gentiles, doth as carefully in&s;truct the Gentiles;
St. <HI>Peter</HI> in the fir&s;t book and &s;econd chapter, com|mands
Servants to be &s;ubject to their Ma&s;ters, not
only good and gentle Ma&s;ters, but tho&s;e &s;everer
ones, who would puni&s;h them with Scourges,
when they had not de&s;erved it. Saint <HI>Paul, Rom.</HI>
13. doth urge in many words the nece&s;&s;ity of Sub|jection,
but granteth unto none the Liberty of
Re&s;i&s;tance, be their ca&s;e, or their pretence, never &s;o
good. In the &s;econd place, I &s;ay, That although
this Subjection is <HI>&s;imply nece&s;&s;ary,</HI> yet it is not &s;a|tisfactory
as to <HI>Duty,</HI> unle&s;&s;e the command of the
Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin,
And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience
in Con&s;cience, in all things that are lawful and ho|ne&s;t.
Hence it is, that this word <HI>be Obedient</HI> is &s;o
often, and &s;o expre&s;&s;ely inculcated by the Apo&s;tle.
<HI>Eph. 6. Col.</HI> 3. and in other places. In the third
place, I &s;ay, Where the precept of the Law cannot
be ob&s;erved without &s;in, if the Subject &s;hall pati|ently
&s;ubmit him&s;elf to the Power of the Law-gi|ver,
he hath &s;atisfied his Duty, and is not obli|ged
in Con&s;cience to perform that which the Law
commandeth; nay, he is obliged not to do it; for
there can be no Obligation to things unlawful; It
is alwayes nece&s;&s;ary therefore to be &s;ubject, but
not alwayes nece&s;&s;ary to obey.</P>
<P>IV. Furthermore, &s;eeing both are certain, that
<PB N="198" REF="114">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="199" REF="114">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="200" REF="115">
the Con&s;ciences of Men are free,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Servitus in totum hominem uon de|&s;cendit. <HI>Sen. de Bencf.</HI> 20.</NOTE> and ought to be
&s;o, which Liberty no Humane Power can, or may
infringe; And that an <HI>Obligation</HI> is a kind of a
Bond, and doth induce a nece&s;&s;ity, which &s;eemeth
to be oppo&s;ite, and to fight with <HI>ju&s;t Liberty</HI> (for
neither is he any wayes free who is bound, neither
can he be free to both, who by &s;ome nece&s;&s;ity is
bound to either) that it plainly may appear that
this Obligation of Con&s;cience, of which we now
do treat, may con&s;i&s;t with the ju&s;t Liberty of Con|&s;cience,
we mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily in this place give you
another di&s;tinction, which is, that the <HI>Precepts</HI> of
Humane Law may be taken two wayes, either <HI>for|mally</HI>
for the <HI>Act</HI> it &s;elf of giving the precepts, or
<HI>materially</HI> for the <HI>thing precepted;</HI> If the Law-giver
therefore &s;hould intend an Obligation, or impo&s;e
on the Subject a nece&s;&s;ity of obeying, from giving
the Precept of his Law taken <HI>materially,</HI> that is,
from the nece&s;&s;ity of the thing it &s;elf which is pre|cepted,
which notwith&s;tanding in the truth of the
thing, was not nece&s;&s;ary before that Law was made,
he in that very fact &s;hould lay a force upon the Con|&s;cience
of the Subject, which &s;hould be repugnant
to the Liberty of it; But if he &s;hould derive his Obli|gation
from giving the precept of his Law taken <HI>for|mally,</HI>
th<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="2 letters"> is from the legitimate Authority with w^c^h^.
he him&s;elf is inve&s;ted that gives it (a moral indiffe|rency
of the thing precepted in the mean time re|maining,
and in the &s;ame &s;tate in which it was before
the Law was made) although the obligation fol|loweth
which impo&s;eth on the Con&s;cience a nece&s;|&s;ity
of obeying, yet the inward Liberty of the Con|&s;cience
remaineth uninjuried and intire.</P>
<P>V. If this &s;eems ob&s;cure to any, I will illu&s;trate
<PB N="201" REF="115">
it unto him by an Example; A Civil Law being
made, that no man &s;hould eat fle&s;h during all
the time of Lent, if the Law-giver either in the
preface or in the body of that Law &s;hould &s;ignify
that he laid this Command upon his Subjects, be|cau&s;e
it were ungodly, and unlawful for them in
that time to eat fle&s;h, This were to throw a Snare
on the Con&s;ciences of his Subjects, &amp; as much as in
him lay to weaken their Liberty; But if expre&s;&s;ely he
&s;hould &s;ignify, that the thing being otherwi&s;e free
in it &s;elf, he did &s;o ordain it for the profit of the
Commonwealth, that his Subjects according to the
Example of the antient Church, &s;hould thereby
take an occa&s;ion to exerci&s;e a more ab&s;temious and
&s;everer Di&s;cipline; or if by the words of the Law
it &s;elf, or el&s;ewhere it might appear, that the
Law-giver intended not by that Law to fa&s;ten any
opinion of nece&s;&s;ity on the thing &s;o commanded,
there would on this account no injury be done to
the Con&s;ciences of the Subjects, and the liberty
thereof. For there is a great difference, when one
thing is commanded by the Magi&s;trate, becau&s;e it is
thought to be nece&s;&s;ary, oris prohibited, becau&s;e it is
conceived to be unlawful, And when another thing
begins then only to be thought nece&s;&s;ary and law|ful,
after that it is commanded by the Ma|gi&s;trate,
and unlawful, becau&s;e it is forbidden by
him. The fir&s;t Nece&s;&s;ity which anteceded the Law,
and is &s;uppo&s;ed by it to be &s;ome cau&s;e of it, is con|trary
to the liberty of the Con&s;cience; but the
other, which followeth the Law, and proceedeth
from it as an e&s;&s;ect thereof is not repugnant to it;
The rea&s;on of this difference is, becau&s;e the ante|cedent
nece&s;&s;ity which the Law &s;uppo&s;eth, doth
<PB N="202" REF="116">
nece&s;&s;arily require &s;ome a&s;&s;ent of the <HI>practical
judgement;</HI> but to the following nece&s;&s;ity which
proceedeth from the Law, the con&s;ent of the will
is &s;ufficient to the performance of that outward
work which by the Law is commanded. Now an
<HI>Act</HI> of the <HI>Will</HI> cannot prejudice the liberty of Con|&s;cience,
as an <HI>Act</HI> of the <HI>judgment</HI> doth, for the
<HI>Act</HI> of the <HI>Will</HI> doth follow the dictates of the Con|&s;cience
as the <HI>effect</HI> followeth its <HI>cau&s;e,</HI> but the
<HI>Act</HI> of the <HI>Judgment</HI> doth precede tho&s;e Di|ctates,
as the <HI>Cau&s;e</HI> goeth before its <HI>effect.</HI></P>
<P>VI. The&s;e di&s;tinctions being premi&s;ed, I pro|ceed
unto the <HI>Doubts,</HI> where in the fir&s;t place tho&s;e
which we meet with concerning <HI>the material Cau&s;e</HI>
&s;hall be examined and di&s;cu&s;&s;ed at this time. The
fir&s;t doubt is <HI>De materia impo&s;&s;ibili, of a matter in
it &s;elf impo&s;&s;ible,</HI> concerning which I &s;ay in the fir&s;t
place, That no Law ought to be made concerning a
matter altogether impo&s;&s;ible; If &s;uch a Law be
<MILESTONE N="1"> made, it is tyrannical, and by right null, and ob|ligeth
no man in Con&s;cience; The fir&s;t rea&s;on is,
becau&s;e that Laws are made in relation to <HI>Acts,</HI> as,
to be acted by a man who is a free Agent; now
liberty &s;peaketh a power unto both, but in things
impo&s;&s;ible there is no &s;uch liberty of power, as by
<MILESTONE N="2"> it &s;elf is manife&s;t. Secondly, No man by right can be
obliged to the performance of that, the omi&s;&s;ion
whereof cannot be imputed as a <HI>fault</HI> unto him, nor
ought to be imputed to him for <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> (for e|very
obligation is either to a <HI>fault,</HI> or to a <HI>puni&s;hment,</HI>
or to both) but the omi&s;&s;ion of a thing impo&s;&s;ible
cannot be imputed to any man for a fault, nor ought
it to be imputed to any one for a puni&s;hment: <HI>Er|go
&amp;c.</HI> But that there is no obligation of a thing
<PB N="203" REF="116">
impo&s;&s;ible (whether it be impo&s;&s;ible by the Nature
of the thing, or by circum&s;tances,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Praelect. 2. Sect. 12.</NOTE> or any other
way) hath already by me been proved in my trea|ti&s;e
of <HI>the obligation of an oath,</HI> and there is no need
of repetition.</P>
<P>VII. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place; A Law which is
po&s;&s;ible to &s;ome, but &s;eemeth to any other, or to
but few, or peradventure but to one or two to be
impo&s;&s;ible, may lawfully be made, if it be u&s;eful to
the Common-wealth, but not unle&s;s there be &s;ome
extraordinary great cau&s;e, and a manife&s;t nece&s;&s;ity
doth require it; but being made it doth oblige all
tho&s;e who are able to keep it, but not tho&s;e who
cannot keep it; as if &s;ome great Tribute were com|manded
for the nece&s;&s;ary u&s;e of the Common-wealth,
for the payment whereof &s;ome of the Sub|jects
are nothing &s;o able as others, Tho&s;e who are
&s;o poor that they cannot pay the &s;um which the
Law lays upon them, are not bound in Con&s;cience
to do that which they are unable to perform, as is
already apparent by the propo&s;ition above mentio|ned;
Neverthele&s;&s;e they are obliged to make their
addre&s;&s;es to tho&s;e who are over them,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>Nazianz. Orat.</HI> 9. Debeone omittere quod po&s;|&s;um, quo|niam quod debeo mi|nime po&s;|&s;um. <HI>Bernard?</HI></NOTE> and openly,
and &s;incerely, and without the lea&s;t fal&s;hood, to
profe&s;&s;e the &s;lenderne&s;&s;e of their E&s;tate, and unle&s;s
they can prevail to be quite exempted from the
Law, or to procure a remi&s;&s;ion of &s;ome part of the
&s;um with which they are taxed, they are to bring
into the publick as great a part of it, as po&s;&s;ibly they
can; for he who cannot do what he ought to do, he
yet ought to do what he is able to do.</P>
<P>VIII. The &s;econd <HI>doubt is,</HI> concerning a thing
commanded by the Law, not impo&s;&s;ible, but very
grievous, and very burthen&s;ome, and which the
<PB N="204" REF="117">
Subject cannot perform without great inconveni|ence,
lo&s;&s;e, danger of life, and the ruine of hi<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">
whole E&s;tate; I &s;ay in the fir&s;t place, That in this
ca&s;e the Law-giver (if he fore&s;eeth this will come
to pa&s;&s;e) ought to u&s;e &s;ome caution in the clau&s;es of
that Law, and as conveniently as he can, he is to
provide a remedy for this Evil; And if it cannot &s;o
well be done in the form of the Law it &s;elf (le<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">t
&s;ubtile and deceitful Knaves, and too much intent
to their own profit may thereby find a hole to e|&s;cape,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. I&s;ae <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">s ap. Stob. <GAP DESC="foreign">.</NOTE>
and &s;o elude the force of the Law) yet
what po&s;&s;ibly in him lyeth, he ought to provide,
that in the execution of that Law &s;ome qualificati|on
may be had, le<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">t a Law otherwi&s;e profitable and
nece&s;&s;ary may become a &s;n<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">re or a detriment to a|ny
hone&s;t man. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, That the
Subject, though &s;o heavily taxed, is neverthele&s;&s;e
bound in Con&s;cience to obey that Law, although
with the ruine of his whole E&s;tate, if any evident
or nece&s;&s;ary Cau&s;e for the good of the Common-wealth
doth &s;o require. For example, &s;uppo&s;e a
ho&s;tile Army be invading the Kingdom, if a Law
be made that all the corn in the Fields, for &s;ome
miles, not far from the Shore, be &s;poiled, and all
the Corn in the Barnes or Ricks which cannot be
carried away, be burned, and that all the Hou&s;es
in the Suburbs be pulled down, and that all the Slu|ces
thereabouts &s;hall be opened, and the Fields be
drowned, every Citizen and Subject is directly
bound to obey this Law, and cheerfully, and wil|lingly
to obey the Commands thereof, and with the
lo&s;s of his own goods to redeem the publick &s;afety,
&amp; not only upon that account, that his Country be|ing
betrayed to his Enemies by his un&s;ea&s;onable
<PB N="205" REF="117">
par&s;imoniou&s;ne&s;s, it is &s;ure enough that every
private per&s;on will be &s;uddenly &s;en&s;ible of the en|&s;uing
calamity, but e&s;pecially out of the Con&s;ci|ence
of his duty; becau&s;e that every good man is
to prefer<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> the publick above all private intere&s;ts;
I &s;ay in the third place, That a Subject, unle&s;&s;e &s;ome
remarkable nece&s;&s;ity doth appear or fear of publick <MILESTONE N="3">
danger, is ordinarily not obliged to obey a Law
that is &s;o extremely burthen&s;ome as to bring with
it the certain ruine of his whole E&s;tate, or the im|minent
danger of his life; But he is bound, as ge|nerally
hath been already &s;poken, (and which almo&s;t
in all ca&s;es I would have you to ob&s;erve, that we
may need not any more to repeat it to you,)
to make not the lea&s;t re&s;i&s;tance, but patiently to en|dure
what&s;oever injury or contumely &s;hall be
brought upon him by the &s;uperiour powers.</P>
<P>IX. The third doubt, is concerning things nece&s;|&s;ary,
as if the Law of men &s;hould command any
thing which was nece&s;&s;ary before, and commanded
by the Law of God, or forbid any thing which
was before unlawful and prohibited by the Law of
God; What is the obligation in this ca&s;e? I an|&s;wer
briefly, That the Subject by this Law is ab&s;o|lutely
obliged; For fir&s;t, the obligation which was <MILESTONE N="1">
in force before the Law of God doth not hinder
the effect of the Law of man by excluding a new
obligation, for a man by many bonds may be obli|ged
to the performance of one and the &s;ame duty,
as I have already declared in the former Lecture;
to which rea&s;on we may al&s;o adde another, which
is that oftentimes the Law of man doth adde &s;ome|thing
to the Law of God, to wit, by determining
the Act, as to the &s;ub&s;tance of it commanded by
<PB N="206" REF="118">
the Law of God, and therefore nece&s;&s;ary, as to
the <HI>manner, quantity</HI> or &s;ome other <HI>circum&s;tance<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"></HI>
of it which was free before, or by adding &s;ome de|termination
to the Law of God prohibiting a thing
unlawfull, as to the <HI>degree</HI> of the <HI>Crime,</HI> or the
<HI>manner of the puni&s;hment,</HI> or the <HI>mea&s;ure</HI> of it,
or other things of the like nature; for examples
&s;ake, it is by Divine right that there &s;hould be
publick congregations to perform the duties of Di|vine
wor&s;hip, but at what hour the people &s;hall
meet, and in what place, what form of words are to
be u&s;ed, and what mu&s;t be the ge&s;ture of the body
the &s;everal parts of the &s;ervice, and other things
of the &s;ame nature, are all of them to be determined
by Humane con&s;titutions. In the &s;ame manner,
the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited,
but what kind of Theft is to be animadverti&s;ed a|gain&s;t
with &s;uch a puni&s;hment, and what with ano|ther
puni&s;hment, is from the Laws of man; From
this determination of a <HI>general thing</HI> and undeter|mined
by the Law of God, the Law of man hath
this privilege, that it can induce a new obligation
on the Con&s;cience of the Subject, not only
different from the fir&s;t obligation in <HI>number,</HI> and
in re&s;pect of the <HI>Term,</HI> becau&s;e it is of another de|pendency,
but al&s;o diver&s;e in the Species, and in
re&s;pect of the matter, becau&s;e it is exerci&s;ed on ano|ther
<HI>object;</HI> for the fir&s;t obligation, which ari&s;eth
from the Law of God is to the thing it &s;elf as it is
a <HI>&s;ub&s;tance,</HI> but this obligation which the Lawes
of men do &s;uper-induce, is to the <HI>manner</HI> of the
thing or to the <HI>circum&s;tance</HI> of it.</P>
<P>X. The fourth <HI>Doubt,</HI> is of a thing that is foul
and unlawful, which is indeed a Doubt of great
<PB N="207" REF="118">
moment, and containeth many ca&s;es: for almo&s;t all
the Conditions which are required to the right Con|&s;titution
of Lawes,<NOTE N="a" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. A|ri&s;tot. 5. Ethic. 3</NOTE> are reduced to Ju&s;tice alone;
And not only for that rea&s;on that <HI>univer&s;al Ju&s;tice</HI>
doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues, but e|&s;pecially
for this rea&s;on, that <HI>particular Ju&s;tice,</HI> and
more &s;pecifically that Ju&s;tice which is called <HI>Legal
Ju&s;tice,</HI> is above all other Vertues the <HI>chief and the
only Pillar</HI> of Common-wealths and all humane So|cieties.
Concerning this <HI>Doubt,</HI> In the fir&s;t place
it is que&s;tioned, Whether an unju&s;t Law ought to be
made for the publick profit; Of which opinion was
<HI>Nicho. Machiavel,</HI> who affirmed, that the due
matter of Laws, whether ju&s;t, or unju&s;t, was that
which was mo&s;t commodious for the pre&s;erving &amp;
the encrea&s;ing of a politick State; for when, in his
opinion, the end of Civil Power is the pre&s;ervation
of it &s;elf, and the encrea&s;e of Soveraignty, which
Power cannot vigorou&s;ly be pre&s;erved, much le&s;s
the Soveraignty enlarged, if all the Lawes, and
Councils of Princes were examined according to
the exact Rule of Ju&s;tice, and Hone&s;ty, It con|cerned
tho&s;e who &s;ate at the Helm, &s;o to bend
(as occa&s;ion &s;hould require) the <HI>Rule</HI> of <HI>Hone&s;ty,</HI>
as to make it &s;ub&s;ervient to the publick advantage;
for the <HI>end</HI> in all things is to know how be&s;t to mea|&s;ure
tho&s;e things that are of a <HI>middle nature;</HI> what
&s;o ever was the opinion of <HI>Machiavel,</HI> this was
certainly the Judgment of a per&s;onage of great ac|count
among&s;t the Lacaedemonians, who openly pro|nounced,
that was mo&s;t hone&s;t to the Spartans
which was mo&s;t profitable to them; To confirm
this opinion that of <HI>Horace</HI> is alleged, <HI>Ip&s;a utilitas
ju&s;ti prop&egrave; mater et aequi&punc;</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Hor. 1 <GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">a|<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">yr. 3.</NOTE> <HI>Profit almo&s;t the very mo|ther
<PB N="208" REF="119">
of Ju&s;tice and Equity;</HI> And how thriving a
Principle this is, may be proved by the Example
and &s;ucce&s;&s;e of the Turks, who relying on this Foun|dation,
mo&s;t happily have far and near extended the
bounds of their Empire throughout <HI>A&s;ia, Africa,</HI>
and <HI>Europe.</HI> And to &s;peak the truth, had not &s;ome
men (who above all others do profe&s;&s;e them&s;elves
to be Chri&s;tians, nay the only Chri&s;tians, and de|light
to be called the Reformers, and the Re&s;torers
o<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> the purer Religion) made a great u&s;e of this
mo&s;t wicked principle, the Chri&s;tian World had
not every where groaned under &s;o many Sacrileges,
Perjuries, Seditions, Warrs, Tumults, and
Tyrannies.</P>
<P>XI. But on the other &s;ide; Princes on earth
ought not to abu&s;e that power which they have re|ceived
from God, again&s;t his will, or otherwi&s;e
than he intended, for this power is not given them
&s;o much as to Lords, as it is intru&s;ted&punc; to them by
God as his Mini&s;ters, <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>Rom.</HI>
13. 4, 6. It is intru&s;ted to them upon that account,
that they &s;hould work righteou&s;ne&s;&s;e, and not ex|erci&s;e
Tyranny, and an unju&s;t Domination: And
this is manife&s;t by the very words of the Text;
<HI>By me Kings Reign, and Princes decree ju&s;t things;</HI>
As if to Reign, and truly to be a Prince, were no|thing
el&s;e but to decree tho&s;e things which are ju&s;t
and righteous; And the Prophets do every where
denounce the mo&s;t &s;evere anger,<NOTE PLACE="marg">E&s;ai. 10. 1.</NOTE> and vengeance of
God again&s;t tho&s;e Kings &amp; Princes who had decreed
unju&s;t Judgements,<NOTE PLACE="marg">P&s;al. 94. 20.</NOTE> and had meditated iniquity as
a Law. Neither is the inlargement of Empire, the
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">nd of Civil Power, as the Politicians of this
world do affirm, but the pre&s;ervation of the peo|ple
<PB N="209" REF="119">
in Tranquillity, and peace, with all Godline&s;&s;e
and Hone&s;ty, 1 <HI>Tim.</HI> 2. 2. For Ju&s;tice (if there be
any other) is the be&s;t pre&s;erver of the publick peace;
And as the Righteou&s;ne&s;s of Faith doth procure
and con&s;erve the inward peace of the Con&s;cience,
&s;o legal Ju&s;tice doth pre&s;erve the outward peace of
the Common-wealth,<NOTE PLACE="marg">E&s;ai. 32. 17.</NOTE> <HI>the fruit of Ju&s;tice,</HI> &s;aith the
Prophet,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Pinda<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</NOTE> <HI>&s;hall be Peace,</HI> and the <HI>Theban</HI> Poet, cal|leth
Quietne&s;&s;e the Daughter of Ju&s;tice; Neither
is that the meaning of <HI>Horace,</HI> as if Hone&s;ty were
meerly to be mea&s;ured by profit, the &s;cope of his
&s;en&s;e is far otherwi&s;e, to wit, that men wild at
fir&s;t, and wandring, by the ob&s;ervation of the publick
profit, and the common good, were brought at the
la&s;t to draw together into one Body, and maintain
Societies, and by ju&s;t Laws and Puni&s;hments to re|&s;train
injuries, and wickedne&s;&s;e. The Arguments
drawn from the Turks (whom it appears that God
e&s;pecially had rai&s;ed up, and made them as his
Scourge to correct the great perfidiou&s;ne&s;&s;e, and
other Sins of the Chri&s;tians) or from any others,
to maintain a bad Cau&s;e by the pro&s;perous &s;ucce&s;&s;e
that did attend it, do favour rather of the <HI>Alcoran</HI>
of &s;ome abhominable mi&s;creant, than of the Purity
of the Go&s;pel of our Saviour Chri&s;t.</P>
<P>XII. The &s;econd Que&s;tion is, Whether an unju&s;t
Law (though it ought not to be made, yet being
made) may oblige the Con&s;cience of the Subject
&s;o far, as to be bound to ob&s;erve it? For many
things there are which ought not to be done, yet
being done are valid; And it may &s;o come to pa&s;&s;e,
that what could not without &s;in be commanded,
yet without &s;in may be performed, as abun|dantly
we have confirmed in our fore-going
<PB N="208" REF="120">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="209" REF="120">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="210" REF="121">
Lectures. The rea&s;on of this doubt is, Becau&s;e
that true obedience is no Di&s;putre&s;&s;e; for the pra|ctice
of obedience doth properly con&s;i&s;t in this, to
&s;ubject ones &s;elf to the will of another without the
lea&s;t murmur or di&s;pute; <HI>Nimis delicata e&s;t obedi|entia,</HI>
&s;aith Bernard, <HI>quae tran&s;it in genus cau&s;ae de|liberativum;
That Obedience is too delicate when it
comes once to be &s;o deliberate, as to inquire after the
Cau&s;e thereof.</HI> But I an&s;wer briefly, the Con&s;ci|ence
of the Subject is not bound by that Law; It
was my fir&s;t Conclu&s;ion in the former Lecture, and
confirmed by many Arguments, and if any man be
yet un&s;atisfied, it may be further proved; For no
inferior power can oblige again&s;t the will of the &s;u|perior
power; therefore the power of God being
above all the power of Men, there is no power of
any man what&s;oever that can oblige again&s;t the will
of God, who by his Law hath forbidden all wick|ed
and filthy things; from whence is that of Saint
<HI>Augu&s;tin, There can be &s;een no Law which is not ju&s;t;</HI>
And by this rea&s;on, the Argument drawn from that
of obedience is an&s;wered, by granring that the Sub|ject
ought to &s;ubmit him&s;elf without di&s;pute to the
will of his Superior, <HI>to wit,</HI> the &s;upreme &s;uperior,
into who&s;e will, all obedience is ultimately re&s;ol|ved;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Quod ju|bet homo, prohibet Deus: &amp; ego audi|am homi|nem, &s;ur|dus Deo? <HI>Be<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">nard. Epi&s;t.</HI> 7.</NOTE>
and not of the &s;ubordinate Superior, if it
appeareth that his will is aver&s;e to the &s;upreme &s;u|perior;
Now, God is ab&s;olutely the chief Com|mander,
the bare &s;ignification of who&s;e will is &s;uf|ficient
to induce an obligation of Obedience, e&s;pe|cially
&s;ince it is mo&s;t certain, that his will cannot be
unju&s;t; Therefore <HI>Abraham</HI> obeyed God com|manding
tho&s;e things, which if God him&s;elf had
not given him the charge, might &s;eem not only to
<PB N="211" REF="121">
be hard, and unju&s;t, but impious and full of wicked|ne&s;&s;e;
To wit, that his Father, his Country and kin|dred,
being all abandoned, he &s;hould become a poor
bani&s;hed Man, and travel into a remote, and an
unknown Country, nay, that with his own hand he
&s;hould cut the throat of his own Son, in whom alone
was not only all the Comfort, and the Succour of
his Age, but all the Hope of the Promi&s;es of God,
and that he &s;hould lay him on the Altar, and offer
him as a Sacrifice to that God who commanded of
him &s;uch cruel things. He did rightly indeed, and as
it became a man who de&s;erved to be called the <HI>Fa|ther
of the Faithful,</HI> and to be the &s;ingular Exam|ple
of an un&s;haken Faith to all the world; without
the lea&s;t hae&s;itation and with a mo&s;t willing obedi|ence
he made him&s;elf ready to put in Execution the
Commands of God; But as for the Command|ments
of men, &s;eeing that every man is lyable to Er|rour,
and &s;in, and <HI>his Will</HI> may be depraved, it
is very lawful, nay where there is a ju&s;t Cau&s;e
of &s;u&s;pition, it is needful al&s;o, to examine and to
try them. That admonition of the Apo&s;tle, 1. <HI>The&s;s.
5. 2. Try all things, and keep that which is good,</HI> may
with great right and as fitly be applyed to the com|mands
of the Superiors, as to the In&s;tructions of
Teachers, of whom notwith&s;tanding St. <HI>Paul</HI> in
that place doth e&s;pecially &s;peak. Away then
with the haughtine&s;s and proud commands of over|lording
Spirits; <HI>&s;ic volo, &s;ic jubeo; This will I have,
This I do command;</HI> Away with the ba&s;e flattery
of the Papi&s;ts, who think it a &s;in for any man in a|ny
manner what&s;oever, to &s;u&s;pect the Dictates of
their Lateran <HI>Jove:</HI> Away with their blind obedi|ence,
by which tho&s;e that enter into their Religi|ous
<PB N="212" REF="122">
Hou&s;es do by a vow oblige them&s;elves to obey
their Superiors in every thing, and in all things
without di&s;tinction.</P>
<P>XIII. In the third place it is propounded; Whe|ther
it be Lawful for a Subject to depart from his
own right,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Pura ma|la, ut nun|quam ju|&s;t&egrave; juberi, &s;ic nec li|cite po&s;|&s;unt fieri. <HI>Bernard. Epi&s;t.</HI> 7.</NOTE> and although he be not obliged, yet of
his own accord to obey &s;uch an evil Law? I an|&s;wer,
it is not lawful; for the law of God doth
&s;imply oblige to the not doing of any thing that is
evil, or unlawful; Therefore an unju&s;t Law (I un|der&s;tand
<HI>unju&s;t</HI> in that &s;en&s;e in which we now
&s;peak, as unju&s;t in relation to the matter) cannot
lawfully be kept, becau&s;e God cannot lawfully be
offended; For what&s;oever is repugnant to the Law
of God, or to the light of Nature known and
written in our hearts, or revealed in the written
word, is not to be admitted by a Chri&s;tian, either
to avoyd any particular detriment what&s;oever, or
the &s;candal of our Neighbours, or to promote the
favour, or to decline the hatred of our Superiors;
<HI>Daveniam Imperator&punc; tu Carcerem, ille Gehennam,</HI>
were the words of the primitive Chri&s;tians, <HI>Ex|cu&s;e
us Emperor, you can only condemn us to pri&s;on,
but God unto Hell.</HI> And &s;o before them, &s;aid the
Apo&s;tles of our Lord Je&s;us Chri&s;t, <HI>Whether it be
right in the &s;ight of God,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Act. 41. 9.</NOTE> <HI>to hearken unto you rather
than unto God, judge yee;</HI> And before them, the
three young men of the Hebrews in the third of
Daniel;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Dan. 3. 18.</NOTE> <HI>Be it known unto thee O King, that we will
not &s;erve thy Gods, nor wor&s;hip the Golden Image
which thou ha&s;t &s;et up.</HI></P>
<P>XIV. In the fourth place, it is demanded, What
Law is to be thought &s;o unju&s;t, that it is not only
not obliging, but moreover it is unlawful to obey
<PB N="213" REF="122">
it? I an&s;wer, a Law may be &s;aid to be unju&s;t for
manifold con&s;iderations; Fir&s;t if it be made by <MILESTONE N="1">
one who is not inve&s;ted with a lawful power, and
&s;o it is unju&s;t <HI>Proper defectum Ju&s;titiae Commutati|vae,
for the defect of Ju&s;tice commutative,</HI> becau&s;e
the Lawgiver a&s;&s;umeth more than is due or by right
doth belong unto him, it doth not therefore ob|lige
the Subject to obedience, neverthele&s;&s;e the
Subject if it &s;eems expedient to him, and he be
not otherwi&s;e hindred, may depart from his own
right, and obey that Law. Secondly in con&s;ider|ation <MILESTONE N="2">
of the <HI>Final cau&s;e,</HI> if it doth not tend to the
publick good, nor pre&s;erve the rights due unto the
Commonalty; And this Law is unju&s;t by rea&s;on
of the defect of that Ju&s;tice which they call <HI>Legal,</HI>
which alwayes intendeth the common good, and
that the republick may receive no detriment;<NOTE N="a" PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ho|mer. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">. ad <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</NOTE> But
this Law, how&s;oever it be unju&s;t, doth notwith&s;tand|ing
oblige the Subject, for the Subject is no compe|tent
nor fit Judge of <HI>Legal Ju&s;tice,</HI> and if by his
obedience any thing doth follow which is either in|commodious,
or noxious to the Commonwealth,
it is not to be imputed to him, who per|formed
his part well enough, but to the Supreme
Magi&s;trate, who&s;e duty it was to provide for the
pre&s;ervation and advancement of the publick good.
Thirdly in con&s;ideration of the <HI>Formal Cau&s;e,</HI> if <MILESTONE N="3">
the Law by an unequal proportion, and not by
merit of the Citizens, doth di&s;pence and di&s;tr|bute
Burdens and Favors, P<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ni&s;hments and Re|wards,
This Law is unju&s;t by rea&s;on of the defect
of <HI>Ju&s;tice di&s;tributive,</HI> which commandeth to
give all things by equity to every one, as every one
hath de&s;erved; And this Law, how&s;oever it be un|ju&s;t,
<PB N="214" REF="123">
doth notwith&s;tanding oblige, as well as that, of
which but now I &s;poke of, and for the &s;ame
Cau&s;e; for the di&s;pen&s;ation of the&s;e things doth
not belong to the office of a Subject, but of the Su|preme
Magi&s;trate. Fourthly, in con&s;ideration of
<MILESTONE N="4"> the <HI>material Cau&s;e,</HI> of which we do now di&s;cour&s;e;
if the Law doth command any thing that is ba&s;e,
di&s;hone&s;t, or any wayes unlawful, the &s;aid Law is
unju&s;t, for the defect of that Ju&s;tice which is called
<HI>Univer&s;al,</HI> which requireth a due rectitude in eve|ry
Action; And this alone is &s;o far from obliging
the Subject to obedience, that it doth altogether
oblige him to render no obedience to it.</P>
<P>XV. It is demanded in the fifth place, What
Ju&s;tice is required, and how much of it will &s;uf|fice
as to this, that a Law may be &s;aid to be ju&s;t,
and e&s;teemed obligatory? For an&s;wer, I &s;ay in the
fir&s;t place, It is not nece&s;&s;arily required, that what
by the Law is commanded, &s;hould be <HI>ju&s;t po&s;itive|ly,</HI>
which the Philo&s;ophers call <HI>Hone&s;t,</HI> that is,
that it may be an Act of &s;ome Virtue, but it doth
&s;uffice, if it be <HI>ju&s;t negatively,</HI> that is, if it be not
unju&s;t, or &s;hameful, as are the Acts of all Vices;
Otherwi&s;e there could no Laws be made of things
of a middle nature, or of things indifferent, which
notwith&s;tanding (as by and by &s;hall be manife&s;t)
are the mo&s;t apt matter of Laws. I &s;ay in the
&s;econd place, Grant that &s;ome Law be unju&s;t, in
regard of the <HI>Cau&s;e efficient,</HI> or the <HI>final,</HI> or the
<HI>formal Cau&s;e,</HI> in any of tho&s;e re&s;pects newly mentio|ned,
yet if there be no defect of Ju&s;tice in re&s;pect
of the <HI>material Cau&s;e,</HI> that is, If by the force &amp; pow|er
of the Law the Act to be performed by the Sub|ject
be &s;uch that he may put it in Execution with|out
<PB N="215" REF="123">
any &s;in of his own, that Ju&s;tice of it is &s;uffici|ent
to induce the obligation.</P>
<P>XXVI. But le&s;t the Subject (too licentiou&s;ly to
withdraw him&s;elf from the yoak of the Law) &s;hould
give &s;ome pretence for his di&s;obedience (as it is a
wonder to &s;ee how many men do &s;uffer them&s;elves
to be deceived by this paralogi&s;m) and &s;hould al|lege
that the Law doth &s;eem too unju&s;t unto him,
and which with a good Con&s;cience he cannot obey,
&amp; therefore ought not to obey, for this they &s;ay
were to <HI>obey</HI> with a doubting Con&s;cience, which can|not
be without Sin, as the Apo&s;tle, teacheth <HI>Rom. 14.
23. For what&s;oever is not of Faith, is Sin;</HI> It is nece&s;|&s;ary
therefore in the &s;ixth place, to inquire farther,
and to demand, What certainty is required to know
whether <HI>any Law</HI> be unju&s;t or not, that &s;o a Subject
may be &s;ecure in his Con&s;cience whether he be
bound or not bound to the ob&s;ervation of it. I an|&s;wer <MILESTONE N="1">
in the fir&s;t place; If the Law be manife&s;tly, &amp;
notoriou&s;ly unju&s;t, it is certain that the Subject is
not bound to the ob&s;ervation of it, which is al&s;o to
be affirmed, if by any <HI>moral certainty</HI> (after &s;ome due
diligence in &s;earching out the Truth) he judgeth it to
be &s;imply unju&s;t. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place; If out of
any confirmed Error of his Judgement, which it is <MILESTONE N="2">
not ea&s;y for him to leave, he thinks the Law to be
unju&s;t, when indeed it is not, yet for all that Er|ror
in his mind, the obligation of the Law doth
&s;till remain, in&s;omuch that he is guilty of Sin, if
he doth not obey it; but &s;hould Sin more grievou&s;ly,
if, that Error not yet left off, he &s;hould obey it; Of
this <HI>Ca&s;e</HI> we &s;hall have a greater opportunity to
&s;peak, when (if God &s;hall permit) we &s;hall come
to the Compari&s;on of both the &s;orts of obligati|ons.
<PB N="216" REF="124">
<MILESTONE N="3"> I &s;ay in the third place; If out of &s;ome light
<HI>doubt</HI> or &s;cruple he &s;u&s;pects it may be &s;o, that the
Law is unju&s;t, that &s;cruple is to be contemned, &amp; the
Law altogether to be obeyed, And no man under the
pretence of his tender Con&s;cience, is to excu&s;e him
&s;elf from the nece&s;&s;ity of giving obedience to it.</P>
<P><MILESTONE N="4"> XVII. I &s;ay in the fourth place (And I would
to God that tho&s;e who&s;e Cu&s;tom it is to defend
their gro&s;&s;e di&s;obedience under the pretence of
their tender Con&s;ciences, would give due attenti|on
to it) If becau&s;e of &s;ome probable Rea&s;ons
appearing on both &s;ides, the Subject cannot ea&s;ily
determine with him&s;elf whether the Law be right
or not, in&s;omuch that his mind is in a great incer|tainty,
and knows not which way to incline, he is
bound in this ca&s;e, <HI>actually</HI> to obey it, &s;o that he &s;in|neth
if he obeyeth it not, and doth not &s;in if he o|beyeth
<MILESTONE N="1"> it. My rea&s;on is; Fir&s;t, Beca<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">&s;e by the <HI>Rule
of Equity, In dubiis potior e&s;t conditio<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">o&s;&s;identis,
In doubtful things the Condition of the Po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or is the
better.</HI> Therefore when there is a Ca&s;e at Law be|twixt
the Law-maker, and the Citizen, unle&s;&s;e
there be &s;ome apparent rea&s;on to the contrary, it
is pre&s;umed alwayes to be on the &s;ide of the Law-maker
again&s;t the Citizen, as being in the <HI>Po&s;&s;e&s;&s;i|on
of Right;</HI> But if there appears any &s;ound rea&s;on
to the contrary, the Ca&s;e is altered, becau&s;e it is
again&s;t the &s;uppo&s;ition of Rea&s;on; for we then &s;up|po&s;e
that they contend in Law, one having as much
Right as the other. The &s;econd Rea&s;on ari&s;eth
<MILESTONE N="2"> from another Rule of Law; <HI>In re dubia tutior pars
e&s;t eligenda, In a doubtful Ca&s;e, the &s;afer part is to be
cho&s;en;</HI> And its &s;afer to <HI>obey</HI> the Con&s;cience doubting,
than the Con&s;cience <HI>doubting not to obey;</HI> Becau&s;e
<PB N="217" REF="124">
it is &s;afer, in the honor due unto Superiors, to ex|ceed
in the mode that is due unto them, than to
be defective in it. The third Rea&s;on proceedeth <MILESTONE N="3">
from the &s;ame Rule; for generally it is &s;afer for a
Man to &s;uppo&s;e him&s;elf to be obliged, when he is
free, than to &s;uppo&s;e him&s;elf free, when he is in|deed
obliged; For &s;eeing by the inbred depravati|on
of the Heart of Man, we &s;in oftner by too much
Boldne&s;&s;e, than by too much Fear, and are more
prone than it becomes us, to the licentiou&s;ne&s;&s;e of
the Fle&s;h, and le&s;&s;e patient to bear the burthen,
unle&s;&s;e we were throughly before hand re&s;olved to
obey tho&s;e Laws which are not apparently unju&s;t,
the <HI>Wi&s;dom of the fle&s;h,</HI> &amp; the <HI>Craft of the old Serpent,</HI>
would &s;ugge&s;t unto us excu&s;es enough which would
retard and hinder us from the performance of our
Duties. And &s;o much of the fourth doubt.</P>
<P>XVIII. The fifth followeth; <HI>Of the permi&s;&s;ive
Law of Evil;</HI> Wether it be lawful, and how
far lawful? And whether it be obligatory, and
how far obliging? Where in the fir&s;t place we are
to ob&s;erve; That an evil thing may three wayes
be admitted by the Law, that is to &s;ay, <HI>privative|ly,
negatively, and po&s;itively.</HI> Privatively to be <MILESTONE N="1">
<HI>permitted</HI> is the very &s;ame, which is <HI>pretermitted</HI> by
the Lawgiver; And in this &s;en&s;e all tho&s;e things
are permitted, concerning the forbidding of which,
or the Puni&s;hing of which, the Laws do determine
nothing. That negatively is permitted, the excerci&s;e <MILESTONE N="2">
whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain
bounds, within which tho&s;e are &s;afe and without
fault, who do contain them&s;elves, but tho&s;e who
do exceed them, are to be puni&s;hed by the Law;
And in this &s;en&s;e&punc; the Laws of mo&s;t Nations do
<PB N="218" REF="125">
<MILESTONE N="3"> permit of <HI>U&s;ury.</HI> Thirdly, that is permitted
po&s;itively, the excerci&s;e whereof is tolerated un|der
a certain pay of &s;ome Tribute; and thus hou&s;es
of Incontinence are permitted at <HI>Rome.</HI></P>
<P>XIX. This di&s;tinction being permi&s;ed; In the
<MILESTONE N="1"> fir&s;t place I affirm, That <HI>privatively</HI> many Evils are
nece&s;&s;arily tolerated in all Common-wealths; for it
is impo&s;&s;ible that the Laws &s;hould extend them|&s;elves
to all the Species and kinds of vitious Acts, or
that all kind of Sin &s;hould be re&s;trained by humane
Laws; <HI>The Law of God</HI> hath this only which is admi|rable
and peculiar to it &s;elf, that it alone com|mandeth
all things that are to be done, and for|biddeth
all things that are to be avoyed. Now in
this permi&s;&s;ion there is no place for obligation, for it
is nece&s;&s;ary that every obligation &s;hould ari&s;e from
<MILESTONE N="2"> &s;ome <HI>Act,</HI> and not by the <HI>privation</HI> of <HI>an Act,</HI> or a
<HI>Non-Act.</HI> I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, That the nega|tive
permi&s;&s;ion of evil may be lawful; For if there
be &s;ome evils that cannot be quite taken away
without &s;ome great Inconvenience to the publick,
it pertaineth to the <HI>political prudence</HI> of Govern|ment,
&s;o to moderate the u&s;e of it, and circum|&s;cribe
it within certain bounds, as to make it
&s;ub&s;ervient to the Publick profit; And this by the
Example of God him&s;elf, who permitted the Di|vorce
of Wives to the people of <HI>I&s;rael,</HI> to that
purpo&s;e, as Chri&s;t the mo&s;t excellent Interpreter
of the Law expounds it,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Mat. 19. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</NOTE> <HI>Le&s;t by the hardne&s;&s;e of
their hearts, and the unbridled roughne&s;&s;e and cruel|ty
of Husbands to their Wives, there &s;hould ari&s;e</HI>
<MILESTONE N="3"><HI>more grievous inconveniences.</HI> I &s;ay in the third
place; That by this Law, there is no man not|with&s;tanding
obliged to perform that which this
<PB N="219" REF="125">
Law permitteth, for the end of permi&s;&s;ion is, not
that that be done which by this Law is permitted,
but that nothing be done beyond that which the
&s;aid Laws permit. Therefore as the permi&s;&s;ion it
&s;elf is only <HI>negative,</HI> &s;o it induceth only a nega|tive
obligation; That is, the Subject is obliged
to do if he plea&s;eth what the Law permitteth, and
not to exceed the bounds which that Law pre&s;cri|beth.
I &s;ay in the fourth place, That the po&s;itive <MILESTONE N="4">
permi&s;&s;ion of Evil is not lawful, if there be more,
or more grievous Evils which follow that permi&s;&s;i|on,
than tho&s;e are for the remedy whereof it was
pretended; e&s;pecially if to the permi&s;&s;ion and im|po&s;ition
of a filthy thing, there is added a &s;u&s;piti|on
of filthy lucre. I &s;ay in the fifth place, That
by &s;uch a Law, no man is bound to the performance <MILESTONE N="5">
of that which is permitted, nay for all the per|mi&s;&s;ion
of that Law, every man is obliged to a
non-performance; My Rea&s;on is, as to the for|mer
part; Becau&s;e it is again&s;t the Nature of a
<HI>permi&s;&s;ion</HI> to oblige, for a permi&s;&s;ion granteth Li|berty,
and every obligation is a kind of a Bond.
As to the latter part, Becau&s;e we &s;uppo&s;e that
what by the Law of man is &s;o permitted, is of it
&s;elf evil, and by the Law of God, we are obli|ged
not to do Evil; The permi&s;&s;ion therefore of
Evil, as it is a bare permi&s;&s;ion, doth oblige no
man to the performance, but as it is the permi&s;|&s;ion
of Evil, it doth oblige every man not to do
that which is permitted.</P>
<P>XX. But it hath often heretofore been &s;poken,
that every Law hath a power obligative, which &s;o
individually doth accompany it, as but to grant
the Law, the obligation mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily follow,
<PB N="220" REF="126">
and take away the obligation you take away al&s;o
the Law with it; It may therefore be objected&punc;
that we mu&s;t hereupon either deny the permi&s;&s;ive
Law to be a Law, or acknowlege it doth oblige.
To an&s;wer to this objection, we need not fly &s;o
far as to deny the <HI>Law permi&s;&s;ive</HI> to be a Law,
which we do acknowledge not only to be a Law,
but a Law properly &s;o called; Certainly that Mo|&s;aical
Law of Divorce mentioned. <HI>Mat.</HI> 19.
Though it comes by name of permi&s;&s;ion, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
in the eighth ver&s;e, yet in the &s;eventh ver&s;e of
the &s;ame Chapter it is called a <HI>command,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">.
What, &amp; is not the very name of a Law eve|ry
where given to it, &amp; is not the Definition of that
name as congruous to it as to a <HI>Law</HI> either <HI>command|ing</HI>
or <HI>forbidding</HI> &s;omething to be done, &s;o that it
cannot be denyed but that the Law is predicated of
them all <HI>univocally</HI> and as a <HI>Genus</HI> in reference to its
<HI>Species?</HI> it is not then to be granted, that the
Subject by this Law is obliged; I do &s;o conceive
it altogether to be granted; which that it
may more rightly be under&s;tood to be not incohae|rent
with tho&s;e things which have been already &s;po|ken
<MILESTONE N="6"> of a <HI>permi&s;&s;ive Law,</HI> I &s;ay in the &s;ixth place,
That every Law permi&s;&s;ive, as it is a Law, doth ob|lige
the Subject in his Con&s;cience to the ob&s;ervation
of it. The rea&s;on is manife&s;t; for an obligation
(as often it hath been already &s;poken) is a nece&s;|&s;ary
effect of the Law, and not to be &s;evered
from it; Which that it may not &s;eem to be quite
contrary to what now hath been delivered, the&s;e
two things are to be ob&s;erved, which therefore
the more remarkably I &s;hall give unto you; The
<MILESTONE N="1"> fir&s;t, that I &s;aid the permi&s;&s;ive Law doth oblige to
<PB N="221" REF="126">
the ob&s;ervation of it; Now it is one thing that the
Subject is obliged to the ob&s;ervation of the Law,
which I &s;till affirm, and another thing that the Sub|ject
is o<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">liged to do that which the Law permit|teth,
which I have before denyed, and do deny it &s;till.
The &s;econd, that I &s;aid the permi&s;&s;ive Law as a Law <MILESTONE N="2">
doth oblige, which is true, but I did not &s;ay it did
oblige, as it was permi&s;&s;ive, for that is fal&s;e; becau&s;e
we are to know, that the force of a permi&s;&s;ive Law,
as it is a Law, doth not con&s;i&s;t in the permi&s;&s;ion it
&s;elf, which being <HI>differentaa divi&s;iva,</HI> but a <HI>divi&s;ive
difference</HI> of the Law, it mu&s;t needs come in order
after it, as every <HI>difference divi&s;ive</HI> is by nature in
a po&s;terior place to the <HI>Genus</HI> which doth divide it
and pre&s;uppo&s;e it, but is for the mo&s;t part expre&s;&s;e|ly
or at lea&s;t virtually contained in that <HI>praeception</HI>
which is as it were the <HI>con&s;titutive</HI> and <HI>formal</HI>
difference of the Law, and in the very words of the
Law it &s;elf; For this preception is that from
whence the obligation of the Subject doth fir&s;t a|ri&s;e,
and to which his obedience is ultimately ter|minated;
I will make it manife&s;t unto you by ex|ample.
By rea&s;on of the nece&s;&s;ity of borrowing of
money, the maker of the Law permitteth of U&s;ury
in a moderate proportion among&s;t the Citizens, a
puni&s;hment being denounced to tho&s;e who &s;hall ex|ceed
by taking more u&s;e than the Law allowes. I
will not here define whether U&s;ury be &s;imply, and
in every kind of it, unlawful or not, neither doth it
belong to my pre&s;ent purpo&s;e, neverthele&s;s this is
certain, that were it never &s;o lawful&punc; no man
by that permi&s;&s;iou is obliged to the exerci&s;ing of it,
But in this Law be&s;ides this permi&s;&s;ion which obliges
no man, there are two things which belonging to
<PB N="222" REF="127">
the Precept of the Law, have thereupon from the
Intention of the Law-giver a force of obliging the
Citizens to the ob&s;ervation of them; One whereof
is enjoyned formally and in expre&s;s words, to wit&punc;
That no man exact monies beyond the allowance
pre&s;cribed in the Law, the other virtually and by
Con&s;equence, That no man be puni&s;hed for trading
in u&s;ury as it is by that Law permitted; To con|clude
therefore in a word, the Precept or Injuncti|on
of the permi&s;&s;ive Law doth oblige all Subjects,
but the Permi&s;&s;ion no man.</P>
<P>XXII. The <HI>&s;ixth doubt</HI> is of things indifferent,
and of a middle nature; Now the&s;e things indiffe|rent,
or of a middle nature are &s;uch, all the <HI>Species</HI>
whereof are neither commanded nor forbidden by
any Divine Law, (natural, or po&s;itive.) They are
therefore of them&s;elves, and of their own nature,
lawfull to be ob&s;erved as they are not forbid|den,
and free to be ob&s;erved as they are not comman|ded.
There were &s;ome of an opinion that there ought
no Laws of man to be made concerning things indif|ferent,
but of tho&s;e things only which are of a natu|ral,
or a divine right, and thereupon they &s;aid, That
Civil Laws were not &s;o much the Con&s;titutives of
a new Law, as the Declaratives of the old, and ex|plications
and evolutions of the Divine will; But
what need we to confute an opinion &s;o abhorring
from all &s;ound rea&s;on, that rather to the contrary
we may rightly judge, that <HI>the&s;e things indifferent</HI>
are the mo&s;t proper and the only mo&s;t fit matter of
Humane Laws? For we are bound to the ob&s;erva|tion
of tho&s;e things which God hath commanded,
although the commands of all men what&s;oever, are
either &s;ilent, or do contradict them; And as for tho&s;e
<PB N="223" REF="127">
things which by God are forbidden, we are obliged
to the not performance of them, the Laws of men
being &s;ilent, or never &s;o importunately command|ing
them. Therefore <HI>the&s;e things indifferent</HI> do
remain, as a large Field in which the power of man
might exerci&s;e it &s;elf, and put forth its force by in|ducing
an obligation where there was none before.
That manife&s;tly it may appear that the civil Magi|&s;trate
in things <HI>indifferent,</HI> and which before any
Act of his were <HI>free to both,</HI> may &s;tate and decree
&s;omething on either &s;ide, by determining that indif|ferency,
which may oblige the Con&s;ciences of his
Subjects to obedience; For as in Meat and Drink,
and Plea&s;ures, as al&s;o in <HI>giving</HI> and <HI>receiving,</HI> the
<HI>moral prudence</HI> of a privare per&s;on, by allowing un|to
him&s;elf a golden mediocrity, doth &s;o far advance
his natural and indifferent Acts beyond their &s;tate
and native Condition, that from thence they begin
to be Acts of Vertues, to wit, of <HI>Temperance,</HI> and
<HI>Liberality;</HI> &s;o a per&s;on inve&s;ted with the publick
Authority doth by his politick prudence in giving
certain bonds of mediocrity to his Subjects con|cerning
things free, and of a middle nature, &s;o ad|vance
tho&s;e Acts enjoyned in his Laws beyond the
degree of their former State, that they now begin
to be Acts of virtues, to wit, of <HI>Obedience</HI> and <HI>Le|gal
ju&s;tice.</HI></P>
<P>XXIII. A thing mo&s;t plain, and which would have
found no Adver&s;ary, if &s;o manife&s;t a truth had not
pre&s;tringed &s;ome Reformers of our age, nay, and
of our own Nation, who to make a way to that
wild Reformation for which they &s;o much conten|ded,
had rather again&s;t common &s;ence to take
away from the world all indifferency, than
<PB N="224" REF="128">
to grant unto the Magi&s;trate any power of determin|ing
of <HI>Rites</HI> &amp; <HI>Laws,</HI> Altogether like that Macedonian
who with his Sword did cut that Gordian knot a|&s;under,
which by no Art he was able to untye; In
this, as in many other things the true Di&s;ciples
of the old Stoicks, who a&s;&s;erted that there was no|thing
indifferent to a wi&s;e man, but that he manna|geth
all things from the greate&s;t to the lea&s;t, &amp; even
to the paring of his nayles, with the highe&s;t point of
di&s;cretion; But they &s;o took away this <HI>indifferency
out of affairs</HI> with words only, that at la&s;t being en|forced
to it by the rea&s;ons of their adver&s;aries, they
<HI>in deeds</HI> did grant it, having invented &s;ome frivolous
di&s;tinctions, more hone&s;tly to hide their errour, that
they might not &s;eem to have erred at all. But there
have been found &s;ome among&s;t us, who have been &s;o
bold as to defend their odious, &amp; exploded Doctrine
in their publick writings, &amp; that more pertinaciou&s;ly
than the Stoicks them&s;elves did heretofore. Two e|&s;pecially,
the one of them a <HI>Divine,</HI> a man of &s;ome
account among&s;t tho&s;e of his own party, the other
a <HI>Lay-man,</HI> &amp; one of the Peers of the Land, both of
them now dead, with whom, becau&s;e I believe their
Doctrine to be dead al&s;o, and not ea&s;ily to be re|ceived
into the belief of &s;ober men, much le&s;&s;e to
find a patron among&s;t them, I think it not worth my
labour to in&s;i&s;t on the confutation of it.</P>
<P>XXIV. I do receive therefore as granted, that
there are <HI>things</HI> and <HI>actions indifferent,</HI> at lea&s;t in
their own nature, and in the Species of them which
I believe there is no man &s;o Stoicized that will de|<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">y;
Of which in reference to our pre&s;ent purpo&s;e,
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">is is next to be adverti&s;ed, that an Act indifferent
in its own nature, that is, in re&s;pect of the matter
<PB N="225" REF="128">
or the object of it, if it be commanded by the Law,
from <HI>good and lawful,</HI> doth become <HI>hone&s;t</HI> and <HI>ne|ce&s;&s;ary,</HI>
and if it be forbidden by the Law, from
<HI>good</HI> and <HI>lawful,</HI> it becomes <HI>evil,</HI> and <HI>unlawful;</HI>
which come<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> not to pa&s;&s;e by rea&s;on of any change
made of the <HI>thing</HI> it &s;elf, (which whether it be
commanded or forbidden, both <HI>phy&s;ically,</HI> and
<HI>morally</HI> doth remain the &s;ame as it was before, for
there is no re&s;pect that alters nature) but proceed|eth
from that obligation which the Law induceth;
From whence it is, that being before, both in <HI>na|ture</HI>
and <HI>of it &s;elf,</HI> &s;o al&s;o in <HI>u&s;e</HI> and <HI>as to us,</HI> free un|to
both, the authority of the Law being added to it,
it becomes in the u&s;e of it, and as to us, no longer
free, but it is either nece&s;&s;ary, or unlawful accord|ing
to the exigence of the Law.</P>
<P>XXV. If it be demanded, &s;eeing the Law ap|peareth
to have an equal power on either &s;ide, how
comes it to pa&s;&s;e, that the Law by forbidding an
Act, can make it of being good and lawful, to
become evil, and unlawful, but the &s;ame Law,
(as heretofore we have denyed it) cannot by com|manding
an Act, make it from being evil &amp; unlawful,
become good, and lawful; I an&s;wer, the rea&s;on
of the difference is mo&s;t manife&s;t, from that mo&s;t
known <HI>Axiome, Bonum ex cau&s;<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> integr&acirc;, malum
ex quolibet defectu;</HI> An Act therefore that is evil in
its own Species, and in the re&s;pect of the object of
it, mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity be always evil, neither in any
exerci&s;ing of it, be the circum&s;tances what they
will, may it be made good, by rea&s;on of the defect
of goodne&s;s <HI>in the part of the object,</HI> which defect is
&s;ufficient to corrupt the whole Act; But an Act,
good in its own kind, or at lea&s;t not evil, if it be at|tended
<PB N="226" REF="129">
but with &s;ome one circum&s;tance that is in|direct,
it becometh wholy vitious, by rea&s;on of
the defect of a due rectitude in that circum&s;tance;
From whence ari&s;eth another difference betwixt an
<HI>affirmative,</HI> and a <HI>negative</HI> Humane Law, or a Law
commanding, or forbidding; For a Law affirma|tive
doth not give any <HI>goodne&s;s</HI> to the Act which it
commandeth, if it be otherwi&s;e evil in any part of
it; But a Law negative doth contribute <HI>evilne&s;&s;e</HI> to
the Act which it forbiddeth, although it be other|wi&s;e
good in every part of it; Or, which is the &s;ame
again, a Humane <HI>Precept affirmative</HI> doth make that
nece&s;&s;ary which it finds to be good, a humane pre|cept
<HI>negative</HI> doth make that unlawful which it
found to be good, both of them what they found
evil do leave it to be evil as they found it; Notwith|&s;tanding
both do oblige in their manner and as to
us, <HI>this,</HI> to the doing of that which by command|ing
is now made nece&s;&s;ary, and <HI>that</HI> to the not do|ing
of that which by forbidding is now made un|lawfull.</P>
<P>XXVI. The &s;eventh Doubt remaineth of Eccle|&s;ia&s;tical
Lawes in <HI>Special.</HI> By Lawes Eccle&s;ia&s;ti|cal
I do not under&s;tand tho&s;e Lawes which are
con&s;tituted by Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Per&s;ons without the
Authority of the Civil Magi&s;trate, (which con&s;i|deration
pertains not to this ca&s;e, but to a Cau&s;e of
an other kind, to wit, the Cau&s;e efficient) but tho&s;e
which, being made by any lawful Power, doe treat of
Eccle&s;ia&s;tical things, for at this pre&s;ent we di&s;pute
only of the <HI>material Cau&s;e.</HI> I have never heard of
any be&s;ides tho&s;e two above named who denyed all
Indifferency, or who would not grant to the poli|tical
Magi&s;trate &s;ome Power in things indifferent,
<PB N="227" REF="129">
meerly political; But we meet every where with
a great number of Innovators, who would take
from men all Power of making Rites and Cere|monies
in the publick wor&s;hip of God, be&s;ides
tho&s;e which are pre&s;cribed by Chri&s;t and his Di&s;ci|ples
in the Go&s;pel; But &s;incerely I profe&s;&s;e, that
to give &s;atisfaction to my &s;elf and to others in this
particular, Having peru&s;ed many Books written by
many Authors, but e&s;pecially of our own Nation,
concerning this Subject, I find not any one, that
can produce any ju&s;t or any likely Rea&s;on of <HI>Differ|ence,</HI>
why there may not be a <HI>Power</HI> of ordaining
and determinating concerning things indifferent,
as well in Ca&s;es Eccle&s;ia&s;tical as Political; For the
Arguments which are urged from <HI>Scandal</HI> and <HI>Chri|&s;tian
Liberty</HI> and other common Places of the &s;ame
Nature doe equally fight again&s;t the Lawes, and
Con&s;titutions of both Kinds, and do overthrow them
both, or neither of them. Tho&s;e which are thought
to carry a peculiar force again&s;t Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws
and Rites are four, which as the time will permit, I
will briefly, and orderly examine, they are derived
1. <HI>From Chri&s;t the Lawgiver; 2. From the perfection
of the Scripture; 3. From the nature of holy Wor&s;hip;
4. From the example of the antient Church.</HI></P>
<P>XXVII. In the fir&s;t place they object that of
the Apo&s;tle <HI>James, 4. 12. There is one Lawgiver
who can &s;ave and de&s;troy;</HI> In the reign of <HI>Elizabeth</HI>
many who were the <HI>Coriphaei</HI> of that Di&s;ciplinary
Faction did make very much of this argument as the
foundation of their whole Cau&s;e; They alleged
that Chri&s;t was the only Prince, and Legi&s;lator of
his Church; And the Laws which he made did
oblige the Church to a perpetual ob&s;ervation of
<PB N="228" REF="130">
them, and that no other Laws ought to be admit|ted,
nor any other Legi&s;lator acknowledged; who|&s;oever
&s;hall pre&s;ume to make any other Lawes be|&s;ides
tho&s;e which Chri&s;t made, &s;hall act the part of
Anti-Chri&s;t, and declare him&s;elf a ra&s;h Invader in|to
the Office of Chri&s;t. We have di&s;cour&s;ed on
this place, and expounded it already as occa&s;ion
did require, e&s;pecialy where it was to be proved,
that God only and his Chri&s;t did exerci&s;e an
ab&s;olute and a direct Command on the Con&s;ci|ences
of Men; But that this hath no great|er
a place in Lawes politick, than in Eccle&s;ia&s;tick,
he mu&s;t needs be blind that doth not ob&s;erve it.
For why can the obligation of humane Laws in civil
things con&s;i&s;t with the legi&s;lative Power of Chri&s;t
alone, and why cannot there be the &s;ame con&s;i|&s;tence
in Lawes Eccle&s;ia&s;tical? Who can di&s;cover
or produce the lea&s;t &s;hadow of any difference from
that Text. Be Chri&s;t the Law-giver of the
Chri&s;tian Church, Is he not as well the Law-giver
of the Chri&s;tian Common-wealth? But the Apo&s;tle
in that place made not the lea&s;t mention of the
Church, nor in&s;tituted the lea&s;t di&s;putation con|cerning
things Eccle&s;ia&s;tical, neither doth he treat
there at all, of Political Lawes or Rites but of the
Cen&s;ures of Private Men. He would have the faith|ful
admoni&s;h<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">d to be mindf<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">l of Chri&s;tian Charity,
and that they &s;hould forbear from pa&s;&s;ing a ra&s;h
Judgment on their Brothers, for God was only
the Judge of Con&s;ciences, who alone made that Law
by which every man in the la&s;t Day &s;hall be judged.
This is the true &s;cope of that place, This is the
mind of the Apo&s;tle. What is here I pray you, that
tendeth to the condemning of Humane Lawes? or
<PB N="229" REF="130">
if to the condemning of them, why of Eccle&s;ia&s;ti|cal
Lawes, more than Civil? Neither of which, ei|ther
the one, or the other, are a&s;&s;erted by us, by
them&s;elves, and of their own Vertue to oblige the
Con&s;cience.</P>
<P>XXVIII. In the &s;econd place they object the
Perfection of the Holy Scripture. This they &s;ay is
the Rule both of Life, and Manners, and which can
make a man of God wi&s;e to every good work, to
which if any man &s;hall adde any thing of his own,
he &s;hall commit a mo&s;t remarkable tre&s;pa&s;&s;e again&s;t
God, and pull mo&s;t heavy puni&s;hments on him&s;elf.
All this is mo&s;t certain: But if the Scripture in all
con&s;iderations be the ab&s;olute rule of our lives, &amp; of
all things what&s;oever to be done, and (if we may be|lieve
the&s;e Stoicks) it extends to the &s;lighte&s;t things,
in&s;omuch that it is not lawful to take up a &s;traw,
unle&s;&s;e it be by the pre&s;cribed word of God, will
it not &s;uffice as well for the regulating of things
Civil as Eccle&s;ia&s;tical? or how can the Laws of <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">he
Church derogate more from the perfection of the
Scripture, than the Laws of the Commonwealth?
or who is he who rightly can &s;ay that he hath added
&s;omething to the word of God, who for Hone&s;ty
and Orders &s;ake, did make the Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws,
&s;eeing he propounded not his Laws unto the peo|ple
as the word of God, and God in his word
hath commanded that all things in the Church &s;hall
be done <HI>hone&s;tly</HI> and in <HI>order?</HI></P>
<P>XXIX. In the third place they object the Na|ture
of wor&s;hip, to wit, that the wor&s;hip of God
is a thing &s;acred, in which wor&s;hip all things are to
be done by the Command of God, and all Hu|mane
inventions are to be driven far away as &s;u|per&s;titious,
<PB N="230" REF="131">
nay plainly Idolatrous, and traditio|nary
<HI>Rites;</HI> Indeed the wor&s;hip of God is a &s;a|cred
thing, neither is it lawful for man to in&s;titute
any other wor&s;hip be&s;ides that which God hath or|dained;
But becau&s;e there is an Ambiguity in the
word, we are to di&s;tingui&s;h of the wor&s;hip of
God, which is taken in a threefold con&s;ideration;
<MILESTONE N="1"> And fir&s;t of all, the wor&s;hip of God properly &s;o
called, and the chiefe&s;t, is that inward word&s;hip
of the mind, which con&s;i&s;teth in the exerci&s;e of
inward Vertues, as of <HI>Faith, Hope, Love, Invoca|tion,
<MILESTONE N="2"> Confidence, &amp;c.</HI> Secondly, tho&s;e out|ward
Acts by which that inward wor&s;hip of the
mind is partly expre&s;&s;ed, and partly helped, and
fo&s;tered, &s;uch as are <HI>publick Prayers, Singing of
P&s;alms,</HI> the <HI>Hearing of the word,</HI> and the <HI>parti|cipation
of the Sacraments, &amp;c.</HI> may <HI>reducibly,</HI>
and le&s;&s;e <HI>properly</HI> be called, and oftentimes are
called the <HI>wor&s;hip of God,</HI> as they are the outward
Te&s;timonies and Helps of that wor&s;hip which &s;o
properly is called. Thirdly, Seeing it is impo&s;&s;ible
that any outward action, e&s;pecially if it be a &s;olemn
one, &s;hould be performed without &s;ome Circum|&s;tances,
either more, or le&s;&s;e, of <HI>Time, Place,</HI> and
<HI>Gesture,</HI> from whence it comes to pa&s;&s;e, that the
very &s;ame Circum&s;tances (which if e&s;tabli&s;hed by
<HI>Laws or Cu&s;tomes,</HI> are called al&s;o <HI>Rites</HI>) do &s;ome|times
receive the appellation of wor&s;hip, although
very improperly, and only for that Concomitancy
which they have to that outward wor&s;hip, which
it &s;elf al&s;o is improperly called a wor&s;hip. It is
therefore to be affirmed, That the <HI>inward primary
wor&s;hip,</HI> &amp; properly &s;o called, doth only &s;o acknow|ledge
God to be the only Author of it, that it is
<PB N="231" REF="131">
not lawful for any man either to in&s;titute a new
wor&s;hip, or being in&s;tituted by God, to exhibit it
to any other be&s;ides God him&s;elf. We are to
affirm al&s;o, That the outward wor&s;hip, according to
its <HI>&s;ub&s;tantials,</HI> is in&s;tituted only by God; but
there is a far different account to be made of the
circum&s;tances which are acce&s;&s;ary to this outward
wor&s;hip, and tho&s;e which do accompany it, If there
be any who will Honor them al&s;o with the Name
of wor&s;hip. For &s;eeing that the outward wor&s;hip
of God cannot be performed without Circum&s;tan|ces,
and God in the Go&s;pel hath not given any cer|tain
particular Circum&s;tances perpetually to be ob|&s;erved
in &s;acred A&s;&s;emblyes, but only hath lay'd
down &s;ome Generals as may conduce to Order,
Hone&s;ty, and Edification, it mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily
follow, that the Determination of the &s;aid Cir|cum&s;tances,
which are but <HI>Accidental</HI> to the wor|&s;hip
it &s;elf, and mutable according to the re&s;pect
of Times, Places, and Occa&s;ions, mu&s;t pertain un|to
tho&s;e, who under Chri&s;t have a Right and Pow|er
of Governing the Churches, which that they may
be impo&s;ed by tho&s;e, who in the &s;everal Churches
are inve&s;ted with publick Authority, and being
impo&s;ed, may Religiou&s;ly be ob&s;erved by all the
Members of the &s;aid Churches; the nature of Holy
wor&s;hip doth not forbid, but Solemnity rather, &amp; De|cency
doth require; We ob&s;erve al&s;o, that even
tho&s;e Men them&s;elves who &s;o Lordly &amp; bitterly do
inveigh again&s;t the Canons, and Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Con&s;ti|tutions,
yet as often as they plea&s;e, do u&s;e tho&s;e
Rites in the outward wor&s;hip of God no where
pre&s;cribed by Chri&s;t or his Apo&s;tles, as the lifting
up of their hands in the taking of an Oath, the un|covering
<PB N="232" REF="132">
of the Head in the Holy Conventions, and
many other things, which becau&s;e we dayly ob&s;erve
to be done, it is unnece&s;&s;ary to rehear&s;e them.</P>
<P>XXX. In the fourth place they object, that
<HI>Mo&s;es,</HI> the pattern of the old, that is, of the
Jewi&s;h Church, who was given by God to the peo|ple
of the Jews to be their Lawgiver, did not only
by his Law define the <HI>Sub&s;tantials</HI> of the Jewi&s;h
wor&s;hip, but according to that fidelity which was
in him, he omitted not the lea&s;t Circum&s;tances,
and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a
Type of the Chri&s;tian Church, he mo&s;t compleat|ly
and perfectly fini&s;hed all things according to the
<HI>Idaea</HI> of the Example which was propounded to
him in the Mount; And now if Chri&s;t the-Lawgi|ver
of the new Te&s;tament &s;hould not have pre&s;cri|bed
all things, and every thing even to the lea&s;t
Circum&s;tances which are to be performed in the
Eccle&s;ia&s;tical wor&s;hip, it may ju&s;tly be believed
(to &s;u&s;pect which is near to Bla&s;phemy) that he
was le&s;&s;e faithful in the Hou&s;e of God than <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI>
and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and con|tumely
done unto Chri&s;t&punc; if any new Rites never
in&s;tituted by him &s;hould by humane Authority be
brought into the Church, or be received by the Chri|&s;tian
common people. But they who do object the&s;e
things, ought in the fir&s;t place to have con&s;idered
that by this Argument, all humane political Laws
are no le&s;&s;e everted than Ecle&s;ia&s;tical, for <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> by
the commandement of God did give unto the peo|ple
of <HI>I&s;rael,</HI> a certain, and a defined Law, not
only of tho&s;e Rites which belonged to the wor&s;hip
of God, but al&s;o of tho&s;e Decrees, and Judg|ments,
which belonged to the Admini&s;tration of
Civil Government.</P>
<P><PB N="233" REF="132">
XXXI. In the &s;econd place, it is a wonder
moreover, that they ob&s;erved not that by this
compari&s;on of that fidelity which was in both Law|givers,
<HI>Mo&s;es</HI> and Chri&s;t, that they could not
more importunately have alleged any thing that
could bring a greater dammage to their own Cau&s;e,
or more &s;trongly have confirmed ours; For, as
from that, that <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> both in <HI>rituals</HI> and <HI>judicials</HI>
did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews,
we do truly collect it was the will of God, that
the people of the Jews &s;hould be &s;o re&s;trained in
their duties under that paedagogy, and <HI>Mo&s;aick</HI>
Di&s;cipline, as under a Yoak of &s;ervitude, &s;o that
very few things &s;hould be free unto them; &s;o from
that al&s;o, that Chri&s;t the mo&s;t faithful Interpreter of
his Fathers Will, did give unto the Chri&s;tian
Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies, we do
truly collect that it is the will of God, that the Ma|gi&s;trates,
and Chri&s;tian people, &s;hould be permit|ted
in tho&s;e things to their own Liberty, &s;o that
it is now free for any private Man of his own ac|cord
(no command, or prohibition of a &s;uperior in|tervening)
to do as &s;hall &s;eem in his own Judge|ment
to be mo&s;t expedient, and to the &s;everal Chur|ches,
and their Governors, to pre&s;cribe tho&s;e things
which according to the condition of the time
and place &s;hall &s;eem to them to be mo&s;t &s;ub&s;ervient
to Order, Hone&s;ty, Edification, and Peace.</P>
<P>XXXII. Moreover, Tho&s;e who do make u&s;e of
this Argument, ought in the third place to have
con&s;idered, that under that Paedagogy of <HI>Mo&s;es,</HI>
the Jews them&s;elves had not all the Liberty of
Rites in things pertaining to the wor&s;hip of God &s;o
take away, that it was not lawful for them by their
<PB N="234" REF="133">
own Authority, to ob&s;erve and to in&s;titute tho&s;e
things, which it is manife&s;t were never command|ed
either by God him&s;elf or by <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> his Servant.
Of many take the&s;e few in&s;tances; Fir&s;t, the &s;o|lemn
fea&s;t of the Pa&s;&s;over which by the Law of
<MILESTONE N="1"><HI>Mo&s;es</HI> was commanded &s;hould be ob&s;erved but
&s;eaven dayes, was by a &s;pecial Law of <HI>Hezekias</HI>
(who received a &s;ingular te&s;timony of his piety
from God him&s;elf) and by the con&s;ent of the peo|ple,
continued &s;eaven dayes longer; The Hi&s;tory
<MILESTONE N="2"> is extant 2. <HI>Chron.</HI> 30. Secondly <HI>E&s;ther</HI> and <HI>Mor|decay</HI>
did in&s;titute that the &s;ea&s;t of <HI>Purim</HI> &s;hould
be yearly celebrated in memory of that Deliverance
which God vouch&s;afed to the Nation of the Jewes
under <HI>Aha&s;uerus</HI> King of the Per&s;ians, <HI>E&s;ther.</HI> 9.
<MILESTONE N="3"> Thirdly when <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> commanded but one day only
in the year to be ob&s;erved in the &s;eaventh month
for a &s;olemn Fa&s;t, the Kings and Magi&s;trates of
that people (for what cau&s;es it is not known, but
likely in the remembrance of &s;ome remarkable
Judgements of God) did by their own Authority
in&s;titute annual &s;olemn Fa&s;ts, in&s;omuch, that in
the dayes of the la&s;t of <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">he Prophets, there were
four &s;olemn Fa&s;ts kept every year, <HI>viz,</HI> three
others be&s;ides that of the &s;eventh month, in
the fourth, fifth, and tenth month, of all which
<MILESTONE N="4"> mention is made, <HI>Zach.</HI> 8. 19. Fourthly, the Fea&s;t
of the Dedication of the Altar, called <HI>Encoenia,</HI>
was in&s;tituted by the <HI>A&s;amonians</HI> without any
command of God; The Hi&s;tory is to be read;
<HI>Maccab.</HI> 4. 59. And by the Judgement of the mo&s;t
and be&s;t Interpreters, Chri&s;t him&s;elf is thought not
only to have approved of it, but to have honoured
<MILESTONE N="5"> it with his pre&s;ence, <HI>Joh.</HI> 10. 20. Fifthly, we find it no
<PB N="235" REF="133">
where to be enjoyned by any Commandment of
God, that in &s;olemn <HI>Fa&s;ts</HI> and penitential mourn|ing,
they &s;hould put on Sack-cloth, and &s;trew
A&s;hes on their hair, but among&s;t the Jews for
&s;ome Ages pa&s;t, the long cu&s;tom was &s;o received,
and &s;o obtained the force of a Law, that Chri&s;t him|&s;elf
did u&s;e that manner of Speech, as from the
cu&s;tom of that Nation, and &s;howed not the lea&s;t
di&s;like of it; <HI>Mat.</HI> 11. 21. Sixthly, it is manife&s;t <MILESTONE N="6">
by the writings of the <HI>Rabbins;</HI> that it was the man|ner
al&s;o of the Jews before the &s;upper of the Pa&s;&s;e|over,
that the Ma&s;ter of the Family &s;hould &s;toop
&s;olow, as to wa&s;h the feet of tho&s;e of his own
hou&s;hold, which although commanded by no Law
of God, we find it to be ob&s;erved by Chri&s;t, as it
is manife&s;t in the Hi&s;tory of the Go&s;pel, <HI>John</HI> 13.
Why &s;hall I here number up the Synagogues every
where builded in &s;o many Cities, and Towns, for
the Conveniency of &s;acred Conventions, and many
other things, a long Catalogue, whereof the Jew|i&s;h
Commentaries doe afford us; From all which
this may be concluded, If &s;o many things pertain|ing
to the wor&s;hip of God were lawful for the Jews
to alter under that yoak of Severer Di&s;cipline,
there can no probable Argument be derived from
their Example to overthrow the force of Eccle|&s;ia&s;tical
Humane Laws.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="7" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="236" REF="134">
<HEAD>THE
SEVENTH LECTURE
Concerning the obligation of humane
Laws, in relation to the Effici|ent
Cau&s;e thereof.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>PROV. 8. 15.</BIBL>
<Q LANG="lat">Per me reges regnant, et Legum conditores
ju&s;ta decernunt.</Q>
<Q>By me, Kings reign, and the makers of Laws
do decree ju&s;t things.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_IN the la&s;t Term we did treat of
the obligation of humane Laws,
both in the <HI>Generality of</HI> them, to
wit, that Laws rightly con&s;titu|ted
do oblige the Con&s;ciences of
the Subjects to obedience, &s;o al&s;o
in the <HI>Species</HI> as to tho&s;e doubts which &s;eemed pro|perly
to pertain to the material cau&s;e, to wit, how
humane Laws do oblige them. Fir&s;t, we treated of
<PB N="237" REF="134">
things impo&s;&s;ible; Secondly, of things po&s;&s;ible but
very burthen&s;ome; Thirdly, of things nece&s;&s;ary;
Fourthly, of things unlawfull and di&s;hone&s;t; Fifth|ly,
of Evils to be permitted; Sixthly, of Things of
a middle Nature, &amp; indifferent in general; Seventhly,
of Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Rites in Special; of all the&s;e things
which have been &s;poken (that I may not appear too
tedious in repetition) the Sum is this; That Sub|jects
are obliged to obey ju&s;t Laws, but they are
not obliged to obey Laws that are unju&s;t; And &s;o
<HI>Solomon</HI> in this Text requireth of the makers of
Laws, that they do decree nothing but what is ju&s;t.
I mu&s;t now proceed to pro&s;ecute tho&s;e things
which are yet remaining to be &s;poken of; In the
handling of which I will u&s;e as much brevity as the
&s;ubject will permit, that &s;o in its due time I may
fini&s;h the whole work, or at lea&s;t &s;o much of it as
pertaineth to the obligation of Laws.</P>
<P>II. In the order of Cau&s;es (according to the
method which I have el&s;ewhere ob&s;erved) the
Efficient Cau&s;e doth follow next to the Material;
And the Formal next to that, the Final Cau&s;e is the
la&s;t of all, and doth both head the Rear, and &s;huts
it up. Concerning the Efficient Cau&s;e of Laws,
I have already &s;ufficiently &s;hewed, in the <HI>third
Conclu&s;ion of the fifth Lecture,</HI> That humane Lawes
do not oblige unle&s;s they are made by a per&s;on in|ve&s;ted
with a legitimate Authority. This in the
fir&s;t place is now remaining to be con&s;idered of, In
whom is the ju&s;t and lawful power of making of
Laws, or who are tho&s;e makers of Laws, to whom
according to the mind of <HI>Solomon,</HI> The Right of di&s;|cerning
righteous things belongeth. To give a full
An&s;wer to this fir&s;t <HI>doubt,</HI> which is the chiefe&s;t of all
<PB N="238" REF="135">
by farr in this kind of Cau&s;e, two things are to be
&s;uppo&s;ed; In the fir&s;t place, I &s;uppo&s;e the legi&s;la|tive
power, to be the power of a Superior, as to give
a Command (in which appellation, I do al&s;o com|prehend
a <HI>Prohibition</HI>) which is a proper <HI>Act</HI> of the
Law, to be the Act of a Superior. You are to ob&s;erve,
that in this con&s;ideration there is not a little dif|ference
betwixt the&s;e three; <HI>A Promi&s;e, A Peti|tion,</HI>
and <HI>a Command.</HI> Without the lea&s;t di&s;tincti|on
it is common to all <HI>Superiors, Inferiors,</HI> and
<HI>Equals,</HI> to promi&s;e; For a Father may promi&s;e
&s;omething to his Son, and the Son to the Father,
and the Brother, or a Neighbour, to his Brother, or
to his Neighbour; But to Crave, or to Petition,
belongeth properly to Inferiors, and &s;ometimes
in &s;ome re&s;pect to <HI>Equals,</HI> As the Son be&s;eecheth
his Father, or the Neighbour his Neighbour, to
excu&s;e him, or to receive the acknowledgment of
his thankfulne&s;&s;e, but this belongeth not unto Supe|riors,
unle&s;&s;e it be very improperly, and by di&s;|cending
to a lower degree than their condition is;
But it is &s;o peculiar to Superiors, and of Men pla|ced
in a preheminence of Dignity to Command,
that he would be altogether ridiculous who&s;oever
he is, whether an <HI>Equal</HI> or an <HI>Inferior,</HI> that &s;eri|ou&s;ly
&s;hould command his <HI>Superior</HI> or <HI>Equal</HI> to the
performance of any thing; For every <HI>Act</HI> doth re|quire
a <HI>Beginning proportionated to it, And an E|qual
hath no Command on an Equal.</HI></P>
<P>III. Now as to an obligation concerning the&s;e
three, it is thus to be Stated; He who craveth
one thing of another man, obligeth by that
petition, neither him&s;elf, nor the party of whom
he craveth it: for it is a petition, and a petition is
<PB N="239" REF="135">
an Act of Indigence, and not of power, who&s;e
<HI>effect,</HI> becau&s;e it depends on another, and proceeds
not from the Agent it &s;elf, cannot induce any ob|ligation.
But he who promi&s;eth &s;omething to
another man, doth by his promi&s;e oblige him&s;elf,
but he obligeth not him to whom the promi&s;e is
made; for a promi&s;e being the Act of a free will,
every man as he is a <HI>free Agent,</HI> and hath a power
over his own will, as the Apo&s;tle &s;peaketh, 1
<HI>Cor.</HI> 7. 37. can exerci&s;e on him&s;elf that
Right and Power which he hath over his own will,
but not on another; For by the force of <HI>Free will,</HI>
a man is ma&s;ter only of his own will, and of his own
Acts, and not of anothers; Now on the contrary,
he who layes a precept upon, or who doth com|mand
another, if he hath right to command, he
obligeth by commanding that man whom he com|mandeth,
but he doth not oblige him&s;elf; Be|cau&s;e
a command is an Act of power and Autho|rity,
and of <HI>right</HI> upon another; and is fit and pro|per,
unle&s;s peradventure there be &s;omething that
hinders it, to induce an obligation; &s;o the Father
with Authority commands the Son, the Ma&s;ter the
Servant, the General the Souldier, the King the
people, and God as a Superior commandeth
man to &s;uch and &s;uch duties, and by commanding
doth oblige him to the performance of them.</P>
<P>IV. In the &s;econd place I &s;uppo&s;e, that the
Legi&s;lative power is a power of publick Juri&s;dicti|on:
for it &s;ufficeth not to the power of making
Laws, that a man hath a Right, and power over
others to pre&s;cribe unto them what is to be done,
unle&s;s he be inve&s;ted with an external power to
compel them to the performance of it, and to af|flict
<PB N="240" REF="136">
puni&s;hments on the Refu&s;ers; <GAP DESC="foreign">
&s;aith <HI>Ari&s;totle, Ethick.</HI> 10.
The Law hath a nece&s;&s;itating power; The School|men
therefore do di&s;tingui&s;h that power which a
Superior hath over an Inferior, into that power
which they call <HI>Dominative,</HI> or the power of
Ma&s;terdome, and the <HI>power</HI> of <HI>Juri&s;diction;</HI> The
fir&s;t whereof is le&s;s and more private, and not ad|mitting
an external Juri&s;diction, the other greater
and of a more inforcing Authority. The&s;e two
powers do not a little differ between them&s;elves,
<MILESTONE N="1"> and that in a three-fold con&s;ideration. Fir&s;t in
re&s;pect of the <HI>matter</HI> or <HI>object,</HI> for the <HI>Power Do|minative</HI>
or of ma&s;tery, is properly exerci&s;ed on
the more imperfect and private Commonalty,
as a Hou&s;e, a School, or a Family, but the power
of Juri&s;diction on the more perfect and publick
Commonalty, as a City, an Army, a Common-wealth.
<MILESTONE N="2"> Secondly in re&s;pect of the <HI>End,</HI> for the
power Dominative, by it &s;elf, and Primarily is
ordinated to the profit of the per&s;on indued with
that power, that is the ma&s;ter, and but Second|arily
and by Con&s;equence to the good of the Com|monalty,
as it is profitable for a Family that the
ma&s;ter of it &s;hould grow rich; Now the power of
publick Juri&s;diction is Primarily ordinated to the
publick good of the Commonalty it &s;elf, and but
Secondarily, and Con&s;equently to the good of the
per&s;on indued with that power, which is the Ma|gi&s;trate
him&s;elf, it being profitable for a Prince
that the Common-wealth &s;hould flouri&s;h. Thirdly
<MILESTONE N="3"> in the re&s;pect of the more effectual Admini&s;tration,
which is greater in the <HI>power of juri&s;diction</HI> than
in the <HI>Power Dominative,</HI> by rea&s;on of a greater
<PB N="241" REF="136">
coactive Power; for examples &s;ake, The Ma&s;ter
of a Family cannot &s;o efficaciou&s;ly prevail that his
Commands may be put in Execution by his Sons,
or Servants, whom he cannot correct but with a rod,
or Cudgel, as may the civil Magi&s;trate, who by
his Power may enforce his Subjects to Obedience,
by impri&s;onment or bani&s;hment, by confi&s;cating
their Goods, or by Death it &s;elf; <GAP DESC="foreign">,
The fatherly Authori|ty
hath nothing in it that is enforcing, nothing that is
nece&s;&s;ating, &s;aith <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> in the place newly quo|ted.
Therefore to the making of Laws every &s;uperi|ority
is not &s;ufficient, but be&s;ides that <HI>Dominative,</HI>
there is required the power of Juri&s;diction &s;o proper|ly
called, for the Laws cannot be made or e&s;tabli&s;hed,
unle&s;s by a Per&s;on that hath a publick coactive pow|er;
by this time you under&s;tand I believe (that I may
need no more to admoni&s;h you of it) that what here
hath been &s;poken by me concerning Laws, doth ab&s;o|lutely
pertain to the chief Laws of a Nation, and not
to any others unle&s;s <HI>analogically,</HI> &amp; after their way &amp;
the proportion that is due unto them, as they come
near or are more remote from their perfection.</P>
<P>V. To the&s;e two &s;uppo&s;itions (which to what
&s;en&s;e they tend, you &s;hall ea&s;ily under&s;tand from
tho&s;e things which pre&s;ently I &s;hall repre&s;ent unto
you) I in the third place do now adde a <HI>re&s;pon&s;ive</HI>
po&s;ition, <HI>viz. That the power Legi&s;lative is a pow|er
autocra<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ical,</HI> That is, the power of making Laws,
which may oblige the Commonalty, doth con&s;i&s;t in
him alone (whether he be a &s;ingle per&s;on, as in the
&s;tate of Monarchical Government, or whether they
be more, as in other Governments) who exerci|&s;eth
the chief power over the whole Commonalty;
<PB N="242" REF="137">
I will in the fir&s;t place explane this po&s;ition, and
afterwards I will confirm it; And for the explica|tion
of it we are in the fir&s;t place to under&s;tand, that
for the happine&s;s of humane &s;ocieties, and the more
commodious Admin&s;tration of Commonwealths,
it hath plea&s;ed Almighty God, the Author of Or|der,
not only to con&s;titute a political Government,
that there may be Magi&s;trates to be &s;et over the
people, but al&s;o in that very Government to con|&s;titute
a political Order, that among&s;t the Magi|&s;trates
them&s;elves there might be divers degrees, as
well of Dignity, as of Power; And it is likely that
the military word of <GAP DESC="foreign">, which the A|po&s;tle
u&s;eth in the <HI>Romans,</HI> hath a relation to this
&s;ence, to &s;how that there is not only an ordination
of Magi&s;trates from God, but a &s;ubordination al&s;o,
&s;uch as is &s;een in a military Army.</P>
<P>VI. In the &s;econd place we are to know, that in
all things in which there is <HI>order,</HI> to avoid a <HI>proceed|ing</HI>
to an <HI>infinitene&s;&s;e,</HI> which Nature doth abhor,
we mu&s;t at the la&s;t come nece&s;&s;arily to &s;omething
which is the fir&s;t and chiefe&s;t in that Order, where
we are to make a &s;tand. Therefore &s;eeing that Ma|gi&s;trates
of the &s;ame Commonalty are &s;ome of
them &s;uperiour unto another in Dignity and power,
it mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity &s;o come to pa&s;&s;e, that &s;ome one
of them mu&s;t be tran&s;cendent above the re&s;t, that the
others may depend on him, and he on none; In the
&s;ame con&s;truction, the head is the highe&s;t in the
body, the Admiral in a Fleet, and the Emperour
in an Army. The &s;upreme Magi&s;trate is only le&s;s
than God him&s;elf, and in governing the people
committed to his charge, hath neither a <HI>Superiour</HI>
nor an <HI>Equal;</HI> St. <HI>Peter</HI> calls him <GAP DESC="foreign">, the Su|periour;
<PB N="243" REF="137">
St. <HI>Paul</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">, the higher power,<NOTE PLACE="marg">1 <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span"> 13.</NOTE>
and <GAP DESC="foreign">,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Rom. 13. 1.</NOTE> the man in Authority; And the
Schoolmen,<NOTE PLACE="marg">1 Tim. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">&punc; 2.</NOTE> <HI>caput communitatis, the head of the
Commonalty,</HI> in whom &s;olely the chief command,
and the Maje&s;ty of the Empire doth con&s;i&s;t, and to
whom all inferiour Magi&s;trates do owe all that
power which they do exerci&s;e over the people, <GAP DESC="foreign">,
as being &s;ent from him, 1 <HI>Pet.</HI> 2. 14.</P>
<P>VII. In the third place we are to know, that
this <HI>&s;upreme power,</HI> which we call Maje&s;ty, or <HI>Au|tocratical,</HI>
that is governing all by it &s;elf, according
to the diver&s;e form of Commonwealths, is placed
either in &s;ome one per&s;on, or in more; In a popu|lar
&s;tate which is called <HI>Democraty,</HI> the chief and
Soveraign power con&s;i&s;teth in many Magi&s;tra<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">es,
yearly cho&s;en by popular Suffrages, or by certain o|ther
Intervalls of time, and this heretofore was the
&s;tate of the people of <HI>Rome,</HI> when they were govern|ed
by Con&s;ulls, Praetors, Tribunes of the people,
Aedils and other yearly Magi&s;trates, and from hence
proceed tho&s;e Expre&s;&s;ions which oftentimes we find
in <HI>Tully, Populi Romani Maje&s;tas, lae&s;a populi Ma|je&s;tas,
Vi&s;um e&s;t Senatui, populo&abque; Romano; The
Maje&s;ty of the Romane people, The injured Maje|&s;ty
of the people; it &s;eemed good to the Senate, and
the people of Rome &amp;c.</HI> In a &s;tate <HI>Ari&s;tocratical,</HI> the
&s;ame Maje&s;ty re&s;ideth among&s;t &s;ome of the Lords,
and Nobles, whom in &s;ome places they call <HI>Illu|&s;tri&s;&s;imoes,</HI>
in others the Peers of the Land, and in
other places again, they receive other titles and ap|pellations,
according to the cu&s;tom of the Nation;
Among&s;t whom, although peradventure but one
(as in the Common-wealth of <HI>Venice</HI>) or more of
them may have a preheminence of place and digni|ty
<PB N="244" REF="138">
above the re&s;t, being as it were <HI>a certain Prima|cy
of Order</HI> (which heretofore was the Honour of the
Bi&s;hops of <HI>Rome,</HI> and &s;ome Patriarchs in their
Councils) yet no man was &s;o &s;uperiour above the
re&s;t in power, that by his own authority he could
judge any one of them, neither could he him&s;elf
be judged unle&s;&s;e it were by all of them altogether;
Some form of this Government is &s;till retained by
our Mayors and Aldermen in our Cities, and by
the Heads and Fellows of Colleges in our Univer|&s;ities,
and although as it were but in a &s;hadow, yet
in &s;ome manner they do repre&s;ent it to us; But in
a Monarchial Government (as the Name it &s;elf im|plies)
the chief Power is re&s;ident in the Per&s;on of
the King alone, whereupon St. <HI>Peter,</HI> a mo&s;t ex|cellent
Interpreter of St. <HI>Paul,</HI> doth admoni&s;h the
Chri&s;tian People to obey the King, as their &s;uperi|or,
that no man might any more doubt of whom
St. <HI>Paul</HI> &s;peaketh when he maketh mention of the
<HI>higher Powers Ro. 1. 3. 1. Samuel</HI> al&s;o the Prophet
of God doth &s;o propound unto the people the fulne&s;s
of the Kingly Power to be con&s;idered of, by them, 1
<HI>Sam.</HI> 8. That if a King, the &s;upreme in his King|dom,
&s;hould act all tho&s;e things which in that Chap|ter
it is manife&s;t that it is lawful for him to do, upon
no ju&s;t Cau&s;e but upon the meer de&s;ire of Dominati|on,
and to &s;how him&s;elf a Tyrant, and not a King,
although he wanted not Sin before God, yet he
ought not to have any force to be put upon him by
the People, neverthele&s;s he may ju&s;tly be &s;aid to
have <HI>abu&s;ed his Power</HI> but <HI>his own Power.</HI> Among&s;t
us Engli&s;h, what more certainly or more cleerly can
appear (unle&s;s at noon we choo&s;e rather to be blind
than open our eyes) than that the &s;upreme Power
<PB N="245" REF="138">
of the three Kingdoms doth intirely appertain to
the Kings mo&s;t excellent Maje&s;ty, whom we are
accu&s;tomed to render more remarkable by the title
of Maje&s;ty, not only according to the common u&s;e
of &s;peaking, but in our &s;olemn Ordinances, and in
all our forms &amp; actions of Law, &amp; in the taking of an
oath, laying our hands upon the Go&s;pel of the eternal
God we acknowledg <HI>him</HI> the &s;upreme yea &amp; the
only &s;upreme Governour of all per&s;ons and Cau&s;es
in his Kingdoms.</P>
<P>VIII. In the fourth place we are to under&s;tand,
That when we &s;ay, the Power of making Lawes is
in the King alone, It is not &s;o to be under&s;tood,
as if we meant that what&s;oever the King is plea&s;|ed
to command &s;hall immediatly obtain the force
of a Law, for by and by I will &s;how unto you that
&s;ome Con&s;ent of the People them&s;elves, and ma|ny
other things are required to the Con&s;titution of
Law, but this is that, which I would hold forth un|to
you, that the Coun&s;els of the People &amp; Senate,
and other Demands of the Peers, People, or a|ny
whom&s;oever, doe not oblige the Subjects, nor
do carry with them the Power of a Law, unle&s;&s;e
they are &s;trengthened and e&s;tabli&s;hed by the Autho|rity
of the King, to which being maturely and due|ly
prepared, as &s;oon as the Con&s;ent of the King ac|cedeth
they immediatly receive the Name, the
Form, and Authority of a Law, and forthwith be|gin
as &s;oon as they are publi&s;hed, to oblige the
Subjects; Therefore, &s;eeing that only is to be
e&s;teemed to be the <HI>Principal</HI> and the <HI>efficient,
Cau&s;e</HI> of any thing, which by it &s;elf, and imme|diatly
produceth, and into a prepared matter in|troduceth
that Form which giveth to that Thing
both the <HI>Name</HI> and the <HI>Being,</HI> although other things
<PB N="246" REF="139">
ought to concurre to the production of that Effect,
or to go before it as &s;o many praevious di&s;po&s;itions,
that &s;o the matter may be rendred more apt to re|ceive
the Form intended by the Agent, It is mo&s;t
manife&s;t, what&s;oever tho&s;e things are which antece|dently
are required to the Con&s;titution of a Law,
yet the will of the Prince, from who&s;e Arbitration
and Command alone, all <HI>Rogations</HI> of Lawes are
either e&s;tabli&s;hed, or made void, is the only adae|quate,
and efficient Cau&s;e of Publick Laws.</P>
<P>IX. The&s;e things being premi&s;ed, The Po&s;ition is
confirmed by many Arguments, And fir&s;t by the Te&s;|timony
of Holy Scripture; Fir&s;t, <HI>Gen.</HI> 49. 10. in that
remarkable Te&s;tament of the Patriarch <HI>Jacob</HI> being
about to dye, <HI>The Scepter &s;hall not be taken away
from</HI> Judah, <HI>nor a Law-giver from his Thigh&punc;</HI> is a
Prophecy of the future Royal Dignity of that Tribe,
which the holy old man doth periphra&s;tically de|&s;cribe,
and to the Confirmation of it, he menti|oned
the <HI>Scepter,</HI> the mo&s;t remarkable witne&s;&s;e of
Kingly Authority, and the Legi&s;lative Power the
chiefe&s;t Perogative of it: Secondly <HI>Deut. 33. 4,
5. Mo&s;es</HI> was &s;aid to be a King in <HI>I&s;rael,</HI> becau&s;e
having gathered together all the Tribes of the Peo|ple,
he gave them a Law to ob&s;erve. Thirdly <HI>P&s;al.
60. 7. Judah is my Law-giver,</HI> that is, King. And
the vulgar Interpretation reads it, <HI>Judah</HI> is my
King. In the Text now in hand, <HI>Prov. 8. 15. By
me Kings reign, and the makers of Laws do decree
ju&s;t things,</HI> where (which is u&s;ual with <HI>Solomon</HI> in
the whole Book of the <HI>Proverbs,</HI> that the latter part
of the ver&s;e doth contain an Amplification or An|tithe&s;is)
the very &s;ame Per&s;ons who in the begin|ning
of the ver&s;e are called Kings, in the latter
<PB N="247" REF="139">
part by way of Amplification are called, <HI>Makers</HI> of
<HI>Lawes.</HI> Fiftly, In the new Te&s;tament St. <HI>James</HI>
al&s;o maketh mention <GAP DESC="foreign"> of the Royal Law.</P>
<P>X. Secondly, It is confirmed by the Te&s;timo|nies
of Philo&s;ophers, and Hi&s;torians, and by the
Authority of the Civil Laws, and the municipal
Laws of our Nation. The thing being &s;o manife&s;t
we &s;hall be content to give you but few Examples;
<HI>Ari&s;totle, Plutarch,</HI> and almo&s;t an infinit Number
of other Authors of great E&s;timation do all affirm,
that we mu&s;t have a Law, and the <HI>Law of the
Prince;</HI> But that of <HI>Ulpian,</HI> is very remarkable
which he hath in his Book of the Roman Laws;
<HI>Quod principi placuit Legis vigorem habet; What
plea&s;eth the Prince hath the force and Vigor of a
Law;</HI> which le&s;t it may &s;eem to make a way for
tyrannical Domination being ill under&s;tood, hath
heretofore been thus expounded by our Country|man
<HI>Bracton, What plea&s;eth the Prince,</HI> that is, not e|very
thing which headily and out of the heat of his
troubled mind is &s;uddenly conceived, and re&s;olved
upon, but that which by the Coun&s;el of his Peers,
(his Royal A&s;&s;ent giving Authority unto it) and de|liberation,
and a debate being had thereon, &s;hall
maturely and rightly be defined.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Cui <GAP DESC="foreign"> legibus ip|&s;is legum vim impo|nendi po|te&s;tatem Deus de|dit. <HI>Finch. Nomo|tech. in Epi&s;t. de|dic.</HI></NOTE> And in our Laws,
In the dayly proceedings in our Courts of <HI>Pleas,</HI>
the Laws, according to the &s;olemn Form of Ap|pellation,
are called the <HI>Kings Lawes,</HI> for no other
Cau&s;e, as our Lawyers have informed us, but be|cau&s;e
the Kings of <HI>England</HI> are the Fountains of Ju|&s;tice,
and Laws, and (the Laws them&s;elves in
the reading of them profe&s;&s;ing it) becau&s;e from Al|mighty
God they have granted to them an <HI>autocra|tical</HI>
or a &s;elf-Ruling Power of giving force unto
<PB N="248" REF="140">
the Laws them&s;elves, that they may pa&s;&s;e for, and be
e&s;teemed as Laws; This is &s;o plain, that we need not
take any further pains in producing more witne&s;&s;es.</P>
<P>XI. And indeed this were enough, and might give
abundant &s;atisfaction, were it not for the impu|dence
of an idle per&s;on that conceals his own Name,
who by a ruinous and a na&s;ty fiction, and which
was never heard off in the world before the&s;e un|happy
times, hath endeavoured to ca&s;t a mi&s;t over &s;o
clear a light, by rai&s;ing an Invention of I know not
what <HI>coordinate Power:</HI> And to flatter the nefarious
Coun&s;els and Endeavours of &s;ome <HI>Neotericks</HI> in
the&s;e dayes, which being de&s;titute of all defence of
Right, were neverthele&s;s for the time to be &s;up|ported
by &s;ome &s;pecious pretence although never &s;o
weak and &s;lender, he doth in a Book publi&s;hed for
that purpo&s;e, earne&s;tly labour to make the people
&s;en&s;ible of that wild Philo&s;ophy which hither
to had been impo&s;ed on them by way of contra|diction,
viz. <HI>That the King being &s;upreme and
having no equal, is notwith&s;tanding at the &s;ame
time not &s;upreme, and hath an equal:</HI> yet is it
not &s;o much to be admired, as lamented,
that there were found &s;ome who greedily
&s;natched at and imbraced this ridiculous Invention,
as &s;lid down from heaven, and indeed becau&s;e it
concerned their Intere&s;t, that the people &s;hould
be &s;educed into &s;uch a fal&s;e Belief, they therefore
&s;uffered them&s;elvs to be &s;o in&s;nared by this gro&s;&s;e
<HI>Sophi&s;m,</HI> as to become guilty of the foule&s;t Perjury:
For what can de&s;erve to be called Perjury, if this
be not Perjury in the highe&s;t Nature? As to ac|knowledge,
and con&s;titute a Power equal to him in
his Kingdom, whom in expre&s;&s;e words you have
<PB N="249" REF="140">
&s;worn to be the only and the &s;upreme Power in the
Kingdom. Away then with this our &s;o ab&s;urd <HI>Coordi|nator,</HI>
and with all his portentuous Jugglings, and ha|ving
&s;o cleanly rid our hands of him, let us proceed.</P>
<P>XII. The &s;aid po&s;ition or Conclu&s;ion is thirdly
proved by rea&s;on; the chiefe&s;t Act of Governing
doth require the chiefe&s;t Power, for every Act being
the exerci&s;e of &s;ome Power doth pre&s;uppo&s;e in the
Agent a Power proportionate to it; <GAP DESC="foreign">, or the
making of Laws is the &s;upreme, &amp; chief Act of Go|verning;
It cannot therfore be excerci&s;ed unle&s;s by a
per&s;on who is inve&s;ted him&s;elf, or who by his virtue
and authority doth derive unto another the &s;upreme
power and juri&s;diction over the Commonalty &s;ub|jected
to him; For &s;eeing there are two mo&s;t no|ble
parts and Species of juri&s;diction and publick
power, and remarkable above the re&s;t, <HI>viz.</HI> the <HI>Le|gi&s;lative
power,</HI> and the <HI>power Judicial,</HI> both of
which con&s;i&s;t in <HI>jure dicundo,</HI> that is in pronouncing
the Law, from whence the name of juri&s;diction doth
proceed, but with this difference, that the <HI>juri&s;dicti|on</HI>
of the <HI>Judge,</HI> is the &s;peaking of a Law only as it
is already given, or exhibited, but the <HI>Juri&s;diction</HI> of
the <HI>Lawgiver,</HI> is the &s;peaking of a Law that is as
yet unmade, and remaineth &s;till to be exhibited,
it followeth, that the power of the Judge is
far more narrow, and not of &s;uch a noble exten&s;ion
as that of the Law-giver. It is the office of the
Judge to &s;peak and give Laws unto the people by a
Law already made, but it is the office of the Law|giver,
to give Laws unto the Judge him&s;elf, and
to ordain a new Law which may be a Rule unto him
in his &s;eat of Judicature; the Judge is obliged to
<HI>pronounce</HI> according to the pre&s;cript of the Law
<PB N="250" REF="141">
con&s;tituted, The Law-giver out of the plenitude
of his power doth pre&s;cribe and con&s;titute the Law,
which the inferiour Judge is no le&s;&s;e bound for the
future to ob&s;erve than the people them&s;elves; It
is therefore no wayes inexpedient that the judicial
power being a power of an inferiour nature be ordi|narily
exerci&s;ed by an inferiour per&s;on, but it is as
nece&s;&s;ary as expedient, that the <HI>&s;upreme</HI> &amp; <HI>architecto|nical</HI>
power of making Laws &s;hould be excerci&s;ed by
none but only by that per&s;on who hath in his hands
the &s;upreme power; and &s;o much of the fir&s;t Doubt.</P>
<P>XIII. The &s;econd demand or Quaere is, Whe|ther
the con&s;ent of the people be required to the
obligation of the Law? For by what hath been al|ready
&s;poken, a man may peradventure conceive,
that the power of making Laws doth pertain unto
a Prince by &s;o ab&s;olute and full a power, that the
Subjects have no part in this great affair, and in
what&s;oever he determineth there remaineth no|thing
for the people to do but to perform his com|mands,
and to humble their necks under the yoak of
his obedience; And indeed according to the lu&s;ts
of tho&s;e who heretofore bore &s;way, it may appear
by their <HI>&s;ic volo, &s;ic jubeo,</HI> that this exce&s;&s;e of com|mand
did take &s;uch place among&s;t the Kings of
former ages, when the meer arbitrations of Princes
&s;tood for Laws, that the name of a Tyrant, of an
innocent, at the fir&s;t, and of an hone&s;t &s;ignification,
did grow at the la&s;t into a great ignominy by the foul
abu&s;e of &s;o &s;aving a power, and even in our days
it doth convey &s;omthing that is horrid into our
ears as often as we hear it &s;poken. But that &s;ome
con&s;ent of the people is at lea&s;t required, I have both
heretofore manife&s;ted, and it is granted by all of
the mo&s;t approved Authors that I have read; In&s;o|much
<PB N="151" REF="141">
much that the Je&s;uits them&s;elves, the mo&s;t &s;tout De|fenders
of the Popes <HI>oecumenical</HI> omnipotence, and
which by them is by no limits to be included, do yet
hold, that many in <HI>Germany</HI> and other places are to
be excu&s;ed for the non-ob&s;erving of the Laws of the
Council of <HI>Trent,</HI> and the Bulls of the Sea of <HI>Rome,</HI>
only upon this Account, that tho&s;e Laws were
never received into u&s;e among&s;t tho&s;e Nations; I af|firm
therefore, and it is the common received opi|nion,
that the Laws propounded and in&s;tituted by a
Prince, or the Head of a Commonalty, do not
oblige the Subjects, nor have the Power of a Law,
unle&s;s they be received by the Commonalty them|&s;elves,
and are allowed by the Cu&s;toms and Suffra|ges
of tho&s;e that u&s;e them. According to <HI>De|mo&s;thenes,</HI>
the Law is <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>The Com|mon
Ingagement</HI> of a City, and if peradventure his
authority be of le&s;&s;e value, becau&s;e he lived in the
popular Common wealth of the <HI>Athenians,</HI> will
you be plea&s;ed to hear the great Lawyer <HI>Julian,</HI> who
lived when the Roman Emperours had the fulne&s;s
of command? his words in his two and thirtieth
Book <HI>de legib.</HI> are the&s;e, <HI>Ip&s;ae Leges nulla alia ex
cau&s;a nos tenent quam quod judicio populi receptae &s;unt,
The Laws do oblige us for no other cau&s;e, than that
they are received by the judgement of the people.</HI></P>
<P>XIV. But though all acknowledge the nece&s;&s;i|ty
of that reception or con&s;ent, yet all men do not
derive it from the &s;ame Fountain. There are &s;ome
who think that the con&s;ent of the People is there|fore
required in the making of Laws, becau&s;e that
Princes have all their power flowing to them from
the people, which if they do abu&s;e (as they are to
be e&s;teemed to abu&s;e it, if they &s;hall extend it fur|ther
or longer than it &s;hall plea&s;e the people) the
<PB N="252" REF="142">
people by their own right may again re-a&s;&s;ume that
power which before they had granted to them. This
is a mo&s;t erronious and a dangerous po&s;ition, and
which all tho&s;e who are not enemies to mankind and
the publick peace ought de&s;ervedly to abhominate;
All their rea&s;on relyeth on a double foundation, but
both of them very weak, and abhorring to &s;ober
&s;ence; The fir&s;t is, that Princes do owe unto the
people for all their power; the other, that who&s;o|ever
he is who granteth power to another, it lyeth
in his power to revoke that power when he plea&s;eth.
O mo&s;t egregious Sophi&s;try! if this were &s;o, Were
<HI>Samuel</HI> more to be condemned for his Oratory, who
the more to affright the people being weary of their
<HI>Theocracy,</HI> or Government immediately from God,
and to deterre them from their perver&s;e affectation
of innovation, had enough to do to lay before their
eyes the va&s;t extent of the power of Kings; Or
were the people of <HI>I&s;rael</HI> more to be condemned
for their folly, who ignorant of their own right
would &s;uffer them&s;elves to be circumvented and
baffled by &s;o gro&s;s a pretence, and return nothing
back unto the Prophet, no not &s;o much as a word?
Were they all &s;o dumb, and &s;tupid, and void of
re&s;olution as well as under&s;tanding, that not one in
&s;o great a multitude could be found, as had either
&s;o much acutene&s;s or confidence, as readily to make
an&s;wer to the&s;e objections of <HI>Samuel,</HI> it being
&s;o ea&s;y for them to give &s;uch a &s;udden check unto
them? <HI>Tell Boys the&s;e tales who have the lei&s;ure
to hear them, and not the wit to under&s;tand them;
We, if (our King &s;hall thus begin to domineer)
will u&s;e our own privileges, and pre&s;ently take away
that right from him which we have given to him.</HI> In
<PB N="253" REF="142">
how few words had they done the whole work, and
&s;topped for ever the mouth of the Prophet, if the&s;e
fictions of new Magi&s;trates had been &s;o much belie|ved
in former ages, as they now are confident|ly
&s;ugge&s;ted to new Di&s;ciples, and willingly en|tertained
by the unadvi&s;ed multitude.</P>
<P>XV. But to be in earne&s;t, and to draw more
near unto the thing it &s;elf,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ho|mer. in hymn.</NOTE> I &s;ay in the fir&s;t place,
That the power of Governing in a Common-wealth,
by what means &s;oever men arrive unto it, proceed|eth
only and immediately from God him&s;elf. The
Te&s;timonies of holy Scripture to prove this are mo&s;t
manife&s;t:<NOTE N="b" PLACE="marg">Non a|lio animo populus rectorem &s;uum intu|etur, qu&agrave;m &s;i Dii im|mortales pote&s;tatem vi&s;endi &s;ui faciant. <HI>Seneo. 1. de clem<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters"></HI> 19.</NOTE> <HI>By me Kings reign, Prov.</HI> 8. That is by
my authority alone, and not by any authority of
men; <HI>The Powers ordained, are ordained by God,</HI>
and not by the people, <HI>Rom.</HI> 13. 1. The Magi|&s;trates
them&s;elves which are &s;et over the people are
the Mini&s;ters of God, <HI>Rom.</HI> 13. 4, 6. And there|fore
they are called Gods, <HI>P&s;al.</HI> 82. 6. becau&s;e they
are his Vice-gerents on Earth; God him&s;elf, and
not the &s;uffrages of any people conferring this ho|nour
on them; <HI>I have &s;aid you are Gods.</HI> Can any
people con&s;titute Gods unto them&s;elves without
the filthy Crime of Idolatry? Seeing it belongs to
men by their own authority to make choice of their
own Vice-gerents and to intru&s;t them with places
and power according to their own, and not anothers
arbitration. Will any mortal man be &s;o bold as to
arrogate that right unto him&s;elf, as to affirm
that the Mini&s;ter of God on Earth, and as it were a
Vice-God, is made &s;o by his authority, and by a
power which his wretchedne&s;s hath conferred on
him? although peradventure there may be &s;ome re|ferences
or parts of the people concerning the per|&s;on
<PB N="254" REF="143">
of the King as he is the Subject of Power, as
by and by you &s;hall &s;ee, ju&s;t &s;o as in the Generation
of natural things there are &s;ome praevious alterati|ons
which may prepare and di&s;po&s;e of the matter
to receive the Form to be introduced, yet the
conferring of the Kingly Power, and the applica|tion
of it to the Per&s;on, is not the work of the
People, but immediatly of God him&s;elf, as the
<HI>Production of a Form</HI> into the matter &s;ubjected is
the immediate work of the Agent or Per&s;on gene|rating.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Lib. 5. contra haere&s;. cap. 20.</NOTE>
That is elegantly &s;poken of <HI>Irenaeus, Cujus
ju&s;&s;u homines na&s;cuntur, hujus ju&s;&s;u et Reges con|&s;tituuntur;
By who&s;e Command men are born, by his
Command Kings are al&s;o con&s;tituted.</HI></P>
<P>XVI. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place (to point di|rectly
to the Fountains Head) that <HI>political Domi|nation
at the beginning</HI> was only the off-&s;pring of
<HI>paternal power;</HI> Tho&s;e who have the lei&s;ure to look
more diligently after the beginning of things, will
find that the Nations did not grow up into King|doms
and Commonwealths by the mutual con&s;ent
of the people, but that all Empire among&s;t the
po&s;terity of <HI>Noah,</HI> did for a while con&s;i&s;t within
the bounds of paternal Authority. At that time
there were neither Kings, nor petty Kings, much
le&s;&s;e Monarchs of va&s;t Continents, nor &s;o much as
the lea&s;t &s;ignes of any Ari&s;tocratical Government,
or popular State, a word not heard of throughout
all the world in tho&s;e antient times, and fir&s;t of
all brought into <HI>Greece</HI> (a moving Nation, and
de&s;irous of novelty) by the ambition or fury of
&s;ome who indu&s;triou&s;ly affected new things. All
Domination at that time con&s;i&s;ted in the power of
Heads of Familyes, among&s;t which he who was
<PB N="255" REF="143">
the fir&s;t born of every Family,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ari|&s;tot. 7. Eu|dem. 10. <GAP DESC="foreign">. Id. 1. Polit. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</NOTE> without any &s;uf|frages
or election, was by a certain Right and
privilege of Nature, the Governour of all things
both <HI>Holy</HI> and <HI>Civil,</HI> and as it were the Prince of all
that alliance, who according to his Arbitration,
did cha&s;ti&s;e Delinquents, fir&s;t with moderate pu|ni&s;hments,
and Families afterwards increa&s;ing in|to
greater multitudes, he afflicted the guilty with
more grievous Cha&s;ti&s;ements, till at the la&s;t, the
numbers of Men &s;till increa&s;ing, and Vices increa|&s;ing
with them, there was a nece&s;&s;ity of condem|ning
notorious Offenders unto Death; From
hence it came to pa&s;&s;e, that heretofore the Father
had the power of <HI>Life</HI> and <HI>Death</HI> over his Children,
and his Family,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Pater ju&s;|&s;i. Hoc no|men <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">mni lege Ma|jus e&s;t. Jus nobit vitae neci&s;|que con|ce&s;&s;um e&s;t. <HI>Quintil. declam.</HI> 6.</NOTE> of which power there remained
a long time &s;ome Impre&s;&s;ions after the Con&s;tituti|ons
of Kings among&s;t the Nations: And from hence,
among&s;t the <HI>Per&s;ians,</HI> the too much &s;everity of the
power of the Fathers over their Children was &s;o
much ob&s;erved, but neverthele&s;s di&s;proved by <HI>Ari|&s;totle;</HI>
And that old and &s;olemn form of the Ro|mans
of arrogating their Children which <HI>Aulus
Gellius</HI> maketh mention of, <HI>Noct. Attic. lib. 5.
cap. 19. UTI. EI. VITAE. NECIS. QUE.
IN. EO. POTEST AS. SIET. That he hath the
power over him both of Life, and Death, &amp;c.</HI>
From the&s;e beginnings, by the increa&s;e of Families,
Kingdoms by degrees did every where ari&s;e; And
tho&s;e who commanded over them were called
Kings, and in their Dominions (although but of
a &s;hort extent, peradventure but one little City
with the Hamlets and Villages b<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">longing to it) they
exerci&s;ed an ab&s;olute Authority and Command,
<HI>Principio rerum, gentium Nationumque Imperia
<PB N="256" REF="144">
penes Reges erant, In the beginning of things the
Governments of People and Nations were in the Power
of Kings,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Ju&s;tin. 1. hi&s;t. 1. Cic. 3. Legib. <GAP DESC="foreign">. Ari&s;t. 1. Polit.</NOTE> &s;o <HI>Ju&s;tine</HI> begins his Hi&s;tory; And
<HI>Cicero</HI> before him &s;aith, <HI>Omnes antiquae Gentes re|gibus
quondam paruerunt, All antient Nations did
heretofore obey Kings;</HI> And <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> more antient
than both of them doth te&s;tify, that tho&s;e Cities
which were free in his times (he means the Ci|ties
of <HI>Greece,</HI> and others which followed their
Examples) were at the fir&s;t under the Command
of Kings. Among&s;t many other things, this is no
light Argument of this original which I have &s;po|ken
of, that the Dominions of Kings were hereto|fore
inclo&s;ed in &s;uch narrow limits, that in <HI>Canaan</HI>
alone, which is no great Country, we do read
that there were one and thirty Kings overthrown
by <HI>Jo&s;uah</HI> the Captain General of the Ho&s;t of <HI>I&s;ra|el,
Jo&s;.</HI> 12. And probably we may conjecture, that
he left above as many more unfought with, for not
long after the death of <HI>Jo&s;uah,</HI> we find that <HI>Adoni|bezek</HI>
did exerci&s;e a barbarous cruelty on &s;eventy
Kings whom he had Conquered, <HI>Judg.</HI> 1. 7. What
need many words? &s;o little is the difference be|twixt
the Prince of a great Family, and a King of
a &s;mall Territory,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Gregor. Presb. in vita Greg. Na|zianzeni.</NOTE> that they &s;eem to differ more
in Name, and Bulk, than in Deed, and Power, &s;o
that it is not to be doubted (if a true Calculation
be made) but that the Domination of a Family in
the proce&s;&s;e of Time, did by degrees, and by an un|perceived
inlargement, grow up into a Kingly
Name, and Power; And the Original of the great|e&s;t
Empire, is no where el&s;e to be extracted, but
from this Head. And thus far there is nothing
more plain, nothing more &s;ure, than that in the con|ferring
<PB N="257" REF="144">
of Kingly power, the people had no part
at all, neither indeed could have.</P>
<P>XVII. From the&s;e things (as I conceive) we
&s;afely may conclude (to note that by the way which
is worthy your ob&s;ervation) That the form of Go|vernment,
by which the fir&s;t-born of the whole
Family doth &s;ucceed into his Fathers rights, as the
next Heir, is ju&s;tly to be preferred above the re&s;t, for
many con&s;iderable rea&s;ons, but e&s;pecially for this,
becau&s;e it be&s;t of all an&s;wers to that Original, to
which it &s;eems that Nature it &s;elf in &s;ome &s;ort hath
made man; From which mo&s;t antient and congru|ous
<HI>Form</HI> of Nature, when once we have departed
(the impotent and unruly lu&s;t of Domination at|tempting
forbidden wayes to a&s;cend to the height
of Soveraignty) all things are thereby laid open to
Tyranny, and popular Indeavours; For they who
arrive to Soveraignty otherwi&s;e than by a legiti|mate
&s;ucce&s;&s;ion, mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily be promoted to
it by one of the&s;e three ways, either by <HI>open
Force,</HI> and <HI>&s;trength of Arms,</HI> or by <HI>Craft and Po|licy,</HI>
or thirdly by a <HI>free Election;</HI> Tho&s;e who by
force of Arms have obtained the Soveraign Power,
whether it were by meer U&s;urpation, without a|ny
pretence of Right, or by War made upon their
Enemies, who unju&s;tly have provoked them (for
both wayes it comes to pa&s;&s;e) it is certain do
owe no more their Authority to their Subjects,
than tho&s;e who &s;ucceed in their Kingdoms by He|reditary
Right, nay much le&s;s, For the one do
govern over their willing Subjects, and u&s;ed to the
yoak, and the other over an unwilling people, and if
they were equal to him in &s;trength, ready to make
re&s;i&s;tance, and to fight again&s;t him; So that in
<PB N="258" REF="145">
this con&s;ideration al&s;o, in conferring of the chief
Power, the people have no intere&s;t at all.</P>
<P>XVIII. But in the e&s;tabli&s;hing of the Power of
tho&s;e Men, who by Tyranny and Deceit, do
exerci&s;e a Tyrannical Power, it cannot be denyed,
but that the people have a great intere&s;t. For tho&s;e
who affect Tyranny, are accu&s;tomed above all
things to court the favor of the people, <HI>potentiam ex
vulgi adulatione quaerentes, &s;eeking after power by
flattering of the Vulgar.</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Ju&s;tin. 13. 3.</NOTE> The Hi&s;tories of divers
Nations do afford us many Examples to confirm
this Truth, I will make u&s;e only of the Abridge|ment
of <HI>Trogus Pompeius,</HI> where we may find by
what Arts <HI>Pi&s;i&s;tratus</HI> of the <HI>Athenians,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Ibid. 2. 8.</NOTE> <HI>Clearchus</HI>
of the <HI>Heraclians,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Ibid. 16. 4.</NOTE> <HI>Diony&s;ius Junior</HI> of the <HI>Sicili|ans,</HI>
and others of other Countryes did allure the
people to &s;ide with their factions;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ibid. 21. 1.</NOTE> With invective
and envious orations, they would incen&s;e the Spi|rits
of the credulous multitude again&s;t the be&s;t of
the Citizens; they would Act and Inact many
things publickly to be pray&s;ed, and which carried
a face of <HI>Clemency, Ju&s;tice,</HI> and <HI>Benignity</HI> to the peo|ple;
they would in&s;inuate them&s;elves into the
affections of the Citizens (as if they were the only
a&s;&s;ertors, vindicators, and patrons of the publick
liberty) with all kind of flatteries, and allure|ments
with which the Vulgar love, and are accu&s;to|med
to be trepanned. Their pretences and di&s;|&s;embling
of duties, their often-repeated promi&s;es,
the hopes they throw in, of happier times, and of
the change of Government into a better, are tho&s;e
egregious artifices by which they who by deceit do
ari&s;e to Soveraignty, do &s;olicite, and bend, and
lead which way they will, the moving and unwary
<PB N="259" REF="145">
people, flattering them with fair words to &s;erve
their foul Ambition; And <HI>H&ograve;s equidem per-rar&ograve; haec
alea fallit, The&s;e are the men who have the Dice
that alwayes run upon the Sice;</HI> for relying on the
favour of the people, and being a&s;&s;i&s;ted with their
&s;tocks, and their indeavours, they at la&s;t a&s;cend
to that height of Honour, and imperial Dignity,
to which their Ambition did &s;o long a&s;pire.</P>
<P>XIX. But how little this availeth to prove the
legitimate power of the people, in conferring of
the Soveraign command, he may ea&s;ily ob&s;erve,
who&s;oever &s;hall con&s;ider, that Fir&s;t, it was alwayes <MILESTONE N="1">
e&s;teemed a weak way of argumentation, to di&s;pute
<HI>a facto ad jus; From the Deed to the Right of it;</HI> Se|condly,<MILESTONE N="2">
that which was done by the people in this
Nature, was not according to Judgment, not in a
quiet and a well-tempered mind, but clouded and
to&s;&s;ed with violent affections; And when the <MILESTONE N="3">
Tempe&s;t &s;hall be a little a&s;&s;waged, and the people
at la&s;t, though too late, &s;hall find them&s;elves
to be circumvented, and over-reached by policy,
they will repent of what they have done, they will
be a&s;hamed of their too forward credulity, and
they will condemn their own ra&s;hne&s;s, and impru|dency,
who being tempted by a greedy Hope of
encrea&s;ing their Liberty, have wi<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">h their own hands,
and of their own accords delivered up them&s;elves
into the &s;ervitude of a tyrannical Domination. All
the&s;e things do breath forth a meer impotency,
and a weakne&s;s of mind, &s;o, that he mu&s;t be an
admirable Arti&s;t who confideth that from hence he
can extract any Argument for any <HI>true Right,</HI> or
legitimate Power of the People.</P>
<P>XX. There remaineth therefore but one only
<PB N="260" REF="146">
Form of a Common-wealth in which there appear|eth
any &s;hew of popular Right, for the con&s;tituting
of a Prince, and that is a <HI>Kingdom elective,</HI> when in
the Place of the decea&s;ed Prince, a new King &s;uc|ceedeth
to be cho&s;en by the free Suffrages of the
People; And here prolixly we profe&s;s, that the
People have their &s;hare, and which indeed is law|ful,
and by <HI>good Right</HI> due unto them; but this
notwith&s;tanding is not any ways to be granted,
that thereupon the whole power of the elected
King, doth depend upon the people, or that it
ought to be acknowledged to be due unto them;
For it is one thing to con&s;titute a power, and ano|ther
thing to elect a per&s;on, that is to exerci&s;e
that power; Neither is it only another thing, but for
the mo&s;t part, it belongs al&s;o to another Intere&s;t.
The Mayor or Bayliff of &s;uch a Town or City, is
yearly cho&s;en by the Towns-men, or the Burgers,
and being cho&s;en, he exerci&s;eth a kind of Juri&s;|diction
within the Subburbs and Precincts of that
place, which it were not lawful for him to exerci&s;e,
unle&s;s he had been &s;o elected. In the &s;ame manner
among&s;t the Fellows of Colleges, as often as the
Pre&s;ident&s;hip is vacant, they have the Right to chu&s;e
a new Pre&s;ident, to whom being &s;o cho&s;en,
by vertue of the &s;aid Election, the whole Go|vernment
of that College doth pertain; In both
places, the right of per&s;ons electing, doth con&s;i&s;t
wholy in the de&s;ignation of the per&s;on to be elect|ed,
who is to exerci&s;e the power due unto his Of|fice,
not as derived from the per&s;ons electing, but
as granted to him upon another account; For the
chief Magi&s;trate of a City, oweth not that power
which he exerci&s;eth in the City, to tho&s;e fellow
<PB N="261" REF="146">
Citizens of his who made choice of him for that
year to &s;it at the Helm of Government, but to the
<HI>Royal Charter,</HI> which according to the favour of it
hath indulged to the City with &s;uch a privilege; nei|ther
doth the Ma&s;ter of College receive the Au|thority
which he obtaineth in it from the Fellows,
by who&s;e &s;uffrages he is elected, but from the
Founder, &amp; from his Statutes, who hath given that
Authority to him. In a word, where the electi|on
of a Prince is received from the people, either
by Laws, or Cu&s;toms, there the people indeed
do de&s;ign, and nominate the per&s;on of him who
Governeth, but God alone doth confer upon
him the Authority of Governing.</P>
<P>XXI. But let us grant to the Flatterers of the
people, this their Suppo&s;ition, a little to gratulate
their Importunity, it will notwith&s;tanding nothing
prevayl, unle&s;&s;e we &s;hall grant this al&s;o, which
they had rather take, than &s;olidly prove, That
who&s;oever conferreth a Power on any one, it is
lawful for him, as often as he thinks fit, to take
from him that power which he hath given him,
and to re&s;ume it into his own hands; And this is
that which mu&s;t never be granted; for all Rea&s;on,
and Laws, and Courts of Judicature, are directly
and Loudly again&s;t it; They declare That all lawful
Contracts are not to be broken, And that a <HI>Dona|tion</HI>
ab&s;olutely made,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Populus in cum omne &s;uum im|perium &amp; pote&s;tarem tran&s;tulit <HI>Ulpian.</HI> F. de constit princip.</NOTE> and without any condition,
cannot be revoked, neither in the whole, nor in
part, for the right which before the election was
fully in the per&s;ons electing, the election being
made, doth pre&s;ently and in that very deed pa&s;&s;e
into the per&s;on elected; and many other things,
to the &s;ame purpo&s;e, are over the whole world the
<PB N="162" REF="147">
mo&s;t received Dictates of nature, and of rea&s;on,
and approved and confirmed by the con&s;ent of all
Nations, as by the u&s;e of daily ob&s;ervation may a|bundantly
appear. The &s;even Princes of <HI>Germany</HI>
have a full power to elect an Emperour, but to re|move
him from the Empire being elected, they
have no power; The Commonalty of all the Coun|ties
and Boroughs of <HI>England,</HI> that is all the Inha|bitants
and Free-holders (as we &s;peak it) be|neath
the degree of the Nobility of the Land, have
a right by common Suffrages to elect <HI>Knights, Bur|ge&s;&s;es,</HI>
and in their name to &s;end them to the high
Court of Parliament, as their Repe&s;entatives, and
to intru&s;t them with a power in their &s;teed, and
in their behalf to debate of the publick affairs of
the Kingdom; but to abrogate the power which is
once committed to them being elected, although
peradventure they an&s;wer not the expectation of
tho&s;e who did elect them, they have no right at all.
The &s;ame account is to be given of tho&s;e men in
who&s;e power there is a right of electing a Mayor of
a City, or a Pre&s;ident of a College, or the head of a|ny
other civil Corporation, who, the election being
ended, have no more to do at all, the right &amp; antho|rity
of Governing being tran&s;lated into the per&s;ons
elected, who&s;e power they are afterwards bound
to obey, and to accquie&s;ce in the election which
they have made, and if the per&s;on elected
&s;hall deport him&s;elf unworthy of his place, they
are not to impute it to any but them&s;elves.</P>
<P>XXII. The&s;e things I confe&s;&s;e might longer be
in&s;i&s;ted on, and indeed it would be worth the labour
to proceed further in the proof thereof, and to
pluck up out of the minds of men all the &s;trings of
<PB N="263" REF="147">
&s;o dangerous a root, and &s;o much tending unto &s;e|dition,
did not the reguard of the time, and my in|tentions
call me back from whence I have di|gre&s;&s;ed;
And peradventure there is no great
need of any longer di&s;cour&s;e on this &s;ubject,
&s;eeing out of the things already &s;poken, I be|lieve
it is manife&s;t enough, how ra&s;hly, and
how dangerou&s;ly al&s;o, this &s;o va&s;t a power
is attributed to the people; Neverthele&s;s there be
other con&s;iderable rea&s;ons to be alleged, which
vehemently may per&s;wade us, that the peoples
con&s;ent and approbation is to be had in the
making of Laws. Fir&s;t, becau&s;e the Law ought to <MILESTONE N="1">
be as a <HI>mind void of any extravagancy of de&s;ire:</HI> but
the Laws of Princes ra&s;hly &s;ent forth to the un|wary
Subjects,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ari&s;tot. 3. Polit.</NOTE> in the favour and on the behalf of
Courtiers and Flatterers, are oftentimes corrup|ted
with the depraved de&s;ires of impotent affecti|ons.
Secondly, becau&s;e tho&s;e Laws which are not
allowed when propounded to the Subjects, to &s;peak <MILESTONE N="2">
morally, are pre&s;umed to be either unju&s;t in them|&s;elves,
or too burden&s;ome to the Subjects, or at
lea&s;t unprofitable to the publick; And therefore it
is expedient that they &s;hould not be enacted, it
being very incommodious to the Common-wealth,
that Laws &s;hould be multiplyed without a ne|ce&s;&s;ity.
Thirdly, becau&s;e it is manife&s;t, that Laws <MILESTONE N="3">
rightly con&s;tituted, may be &s;o abrogated by a <HI>Con|trary
Cu&s;tome,</HI> that they cea&s;e any longer to oblige,
which Cu&s;tome is nothing el&s;e, than a conjoyned
con&s;ent of the people, neglecting to ob&s;erve that
Law as being unprofitable, together with the con|&s;ent
of the Prince not exacting an ob&s;ervation of
it; Therefore it being in the &s;ame power to <HI>de&s;troy,</HI>
<PB N="264" REF="148">
as it is to <HI>make,</HI> the force of the Laws do &s;eem not
a little to depend on the approbation, and con&s;ent
<MILESTONE N="4"> of the people. Fourthly and cheifly, becau&s;e the
con&s;ent of the people in the making of Laws, and
their concurrence with the power of the Prince,
doth &s;o much conduce both to the publick peace of
the whole Kingdome, and the &s;afety and &s;ecurity
of the people, that there can be nothing more;
For mo&s;t likely it is, that all Subjects, will not
grievou&s;ly, but readily and cheerfully obey, both
tho&s;e Kings who de&s;ire their con&s;ent, and tho&s;e
Laws to which they them&s;elves &s;hall give their con|&s;ent;
Neither is it to be feared, that the Su|preme
and Legi&s;lative power of the King, &s;hall
by this means &s;uffer any diminution, which is the
only argument that the adver&s;e party do object a|gain&s;t
it: for that the&s;e two, I &s;ay, the <HI>con&s;ent of
the people,</HI> and the <HI>&s;upreme power of the Prince</HI> in
making Laws, may friendly, and at once con&s;i&s;t
together, (be&s;ides that there &s;eems to be no repug|nancy
in the things them&s;elves) may appear by
this, that our Kings of <HI>England,</HI> who&s;e &s;upreme
power the Inhabitants of this Kingdom before
the&s;e late unhappy times, have mo&s;t fully always,
and mo&s;t freely acknowledged, did notwith&s;tand|ing
never &s;o exerci&s;e their Legi&s;lative power,
as to impo&s;e any Laws on their Subjects without
their own con&s;ent.</P>
<P>XXIII. We conceive it therefore to be granted,
that at the lea&s;t &s;ome con&s;ent of the people is to be
required in the making of tho&s;e Laws which in Con|&s;cience
may oblige the Subjects.<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">.</NOTE> But it may be here
doubted,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ari&s;tot. 1. Polit 6.</NOTE> and that not unju&s;tly, (I &s;hall therefore
make this the third Doubt or Demand) how great,
<PB N="265" REF="148">
and how much of the con&s;ent of the people may be
required to this, that the <HI>placit</HI> of the Prince may
have the vigour of a Law? I an&s;wer, in this con|&s;ent
of the people of which we now treat,
two things are to be con&s;idered, <HI>viz.</HI> the <HI>time</HI> and
<HI>manner</HI> of con&s;enting; And both the&s;e do fall a|gain
under a twofold con&s;ideration; For either
the Law is con&s;ented to, as to the time, that is be|fore
the promulgation of it, or after; or as to the
manner, that is, with an expre&s;&s;e con&s;ent, or <HI>&s;uf|frages,</HI>
or with a tacit con&s;ent, or <HI>cu&s;tomes.</HI> From
the complexion of the&s;e there do proceed four &s;orts
or degrees of popular con&s;ent.</P>
<P>XXIV. The fir&s;t and the lowe&s;t, and lea&s;t de|gree
of all, is the tacit or &s;ilent con&s;ent before the
publication or asking of the Law, which is, when a
people have &s;o put them&s;elves, and all that they
have, in the power of the Conquerour, or by a long
cu&s;tome of obedience, have &s;o entirely &s;ubmitted
them&s;elves to the will of the Prince, that what&s;oever
he determineth, they do yield unto it; And this may
come to pa&s;&s;e both ways, for by the Law of Nati|ons,
that power of the Prince is ju&s;t, which is either
obtained by a ju&s;t War, or confirmed by a continu|ed
&s;ucce&s;&s;ion as by a right of prae&s;cription; And this
<HI>degree</HI> indeed, although not very profitable to the
people, if the Prince be plea&s;ed to turn his power
into tyranny, yet it will &s;o far &s;uffice, that the peo|ple
cannot complain of any injury done unto them,
if it &s;hould &s;o fall out that the Prince &s;hould deter|mine
any thing too &s;everely again&s;t them, which
peradventure is not unju&s;t, but &s;uch a thing as they
would not willingly have to be done. As among&s;t us
many of the Presbyterians do importunatly (as
<PB N="266" REF="149">
their Cu&s;tom is) and unju&s;tly complain that the e|lection
of Parochial Pa&s;tors is unlawfully taken a|way
from the People, when tho&s;e who ought to
be cho&s;en to that Office by the Pari&s;honers, are pre|&s;ented
by &s;ome private per&s;on, or by &s;ome College
under the name of a Patron without their Con&s;ent;
not dreaming all the while, that the right of Elect|ing,
if the People heretofore had any, (which
is very uncertain, and if denyed can never be pro|ved)
for &s;ome certain Cau&s;e from the begin|ning,
but by the long pre&s;cription of Time now
unknown, was long agoe conveyed unto tho&s;e whom
they call the Patrons of Benefices, and &s;o in the e|lection
made by the Patrons, the Con&s;ent of the
People is virtually involved and contained; which
an&s;wer, if it be of no force among&s;t men that are ob|&s;tinate
in their own opinions, yet of this at lea&s;t
they are to be adverti&s;ed, which may be enough to
&s;atisfie the mo&s;t importunate Adver&s;ary, which is,
that the Rights of <HI>Patron&s;hips,</HI> and the Advowzons
or Advocations of Churches were long agoe e&s;ta|bli&s;hed
by Authority of Parliament, that is, by the
common and full Con&s;ent of the whole People.
And therefore what is done in this Ca&s;e by a legiti|mate
Patron, the People have already con&s;ented that
it is lawful for him to do it.</P>
<P>XXV. The &s;econd <HI>Degree</HI> is the &s;ilent Con&s;ent
of the People to &s;uch a Law after the promulgation
of it, that is, when the People do not contradict
the Law, made and publi&s;hed by the King, but
rather do approve it by their Deeds, by conforming
them&s;elves to the will of the Prince, and by ob&s;er|ving
that which is commanded by the Law; for if he
who but holds his peace doth &s;eem to con&s;ent,
<PB N="267" REF="149">
much more is he pre&s;umed to con&s;ent,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Leges con|&s;tituuntur cum pro|mulgantur firmantur cum mori|bus uten|tium ap|probantur <HI>Di&s;tinct. 4. Sect.</HI> in i&s;tis.</NOTE> who ex|pre&s;&s;eth
an actual obedience. Of this degree of
Con&s;ent thus &s;peaketh <HI>Julian</HI> again in the place a|bove
cited. <HI>Quid intere&s;t &s;uffragio Populus volun|tatem
&s;uam declaret, an rebus et facto? What differ+ence
is it if the People do declare their Con&s;ent by
&s;uffrages, or by deeds and Acts?</HI></P>
<P>XXVI. The third <HI>Degree</HI> is the expre&s;&s;e Con|&s;ent
of the People, to a Law propounded to them
by the Prince, and they con&s;ent unto it being asked,
that is, when a Prince having prepared at home
the matter of the Law by the Coun&s;el of wi&s;e men,
and though not perfectly drawn it up, yet he hath
run it over, and put it into &s;ome Form, and tran&s;|mitted
it to his Subjects to be further examined,
that nothing may openly be contained in it that is
either inconvenient, or ab&s;urd, requiring withall
that they, or a great part of them, if they find it
to be advantagious to the Common-wealth, would
confim it with their Suffrages, that &s;o by their Con|&s;ents
it may pa&s;s into a Law, and this, in &s;ome
manner, was heretofore the Cu&s;tom of the Ro|mans,
their Common-wealth yet &s;tanding, And
from this <HI>asking,</HI> the Rogation of their Laws re|ceived
its original, A word mo&s;t frequent among&s;t
the be&s;t of the Writers of the Roman affairs.</P>
<P>XXVII. The la&s;t, and highe&s;t <HI>Degree,</HI> which
is the greate&s;t and indeed the true Liberty of the
People, by which we <HI>Brittans</HI> have &s;o long been
happy even unto envy under excellent Kings, and <MILESTONE N="3">
had we not out of our &s;tupid Ingratitude made our
&s;elves unworthy of &s;o great a ble&s;&s;ing, we had con|tinued
&s;till mo&s;t happy, is the expre&s;&s;e Con&s;ent of
the People before the enacting of the Law, when the
<PB N="268" REF="150">
pre&s;cribed Form thereof (a ju&s;t and deliberate De|bate
being fir&s;t had of the words, and the matter
of it, and approved by the Hou&s;e of Peers, the
Suffrages of the Hou&s;e of Commons conjoined
with them) is at la&s;t exhibited to the Kings Ma|je&s;ty,
to whom alone the chief Power of making
Laws doth belong, that being by him confirmed
if it &s;eem good unto him, it may have the Power
and Vertue of a Law, or otherwi&s;e it may be made
void, and be e&s;teemed no Law; which manner of
enacting of Laws being mo&s;t prudently devi&s;ed by
our Forefathers, and brought even unto our times by
&s;o long a <HI>Series</HI> of Kings and years, hath been found
by the U&s;e and Experience of all Ages pa&s;t, &s;o pro|fitable
to the Common-wealth, that if un&s;ea&s;on|able
Coun&s;els had not been taken (to &s;peak no more
of it) for the removing of the old <HI>Marks</HI> and <HI>Li|mits</HI>
from their right Places, our Churches, Uni|ver&s;ityes,
The King, The People, The Common-wealth,
and every private Family had by the ble&s;|<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">ng
of God yet flouri&s;hed, which now by his mo&s;t
ju&s;t Judgment do goe to wrack, and every day do
&s;uffer more and more. And I do believe that
a better way cannot ea&s;ily be thought upon by the
wit of man, to moderate on the one &s;ide the Power
of Kings, and to check, and to re&s;train on the other
&s;ide the Licence of the People.</P>
<P>XXVIII. The fourth Doubt followeth of the
Laws of le&s;&s;e Commonalties, for examples &s;ake of
Cities, Univer&s;ities, Colleges, and Schools, which
be&s;ides the Laws common to all the Subjects of
the Kingdom, do rejoice in their own private Laws,
Rights and Statutes. The Que&s;tion is, to what
<HI>Per&s;ons</HI> the <HI>Power</HI> of making their Laws doth per|tain,
<PB N="269" REF="150">
and being made, <HI>whom</HI> and to <HI>what</HI> they ob|lige?
The an&s;wer is not difflcult, I &s;ay therefore
in the fir&s;t place, the&s;e Societies, Corporati|ons,<MILESTONE N="1">
and Colleges being all Members of the great
Body of the Kingdom, and are contained in it as
the inferiour <HI>orbes</HI> of the Heavens are contained in
the Superiour, it is not lawfull for any College or
Society, or for the Governours or Over&s;ers of them,
to make <HI>private</HI> Laws for their own u&s;e, which may
be contrary or any ways prejudicial to the publick
Laws of the whole Kingdom; I &s;ay in the &s;econd <MILESTONE N="2">
place, that &s;eeing by the grant of Princes, and their
&s;pecial grace, and indulgence, the&s;e &s;ocieties are
incorporated, &amp; enjoy no other Rights, Privileges, or
prerogatives be&s;ides tho&s;e which it is manife&s;t have
been granted to them by a long prae&s;cription of
time, or by the Charters &amp; Letters Patents of the
King, it is to be concluded, that all the <HI>Legi&s;lative
power</HI> which is derived from them, is a derived, &amp;
not a <HI>primitive</HI> power, &amp; is at la&s;t to be re&s;olved into
the &s;upreme power of the King as the true original
of it, and therefore the &s;aid Societies and Gover|nors
of them cannot according to their own will ei|ther
con&s;titute or actually exerci&s;e any power in
the making of Laws, unle&s;&s;e according to the <HI>man|ner</HI>
and the <HI>mea&s;ure</HI> of that power vouch&s;afed by
the indulgence of the Prince. I &s;ay in the third
place, that Laws made by private Colleges and
corporated Societies, according to the tenor of the
power granted them by the King, do oblige all the
Members of the &s;aid Societies, and of all tho&s;e that <MILESTONE N="3">
are under their juri&s;diction or Government, and
none but tho&s;e, <HI>directly of it &s;elf,</HI> and by its <HI>own
force,</HI> but by the Virtue of the <HI>Kings &s;upreme Ma|je&s;ty</HI>
<PB N="270" REF="151">
on who&s;e authority they rely, and from which
they receive all their force, they do in &s;ome &s;en&s;e,
and indirectly oblige all and every Subject of the
whole Kingdome; but there is not the one and &s;ame
<HI>account,</HI> nor degree of the&s;e two obligations; For
the&s;e Laws oblige tho&s;e of their own Society to the
diligent ob&s;ervation of them, but the others unto
this, that they do no ways violate, or dimini&s;h them,
or hinder the ob&s;ervation of them.</P>
<P>XXIX. The fifth Doubt is of Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws
in the <HI>Species</HI> of them; And that new Laws may
be made concerning <HI>Rites,</HI> and <HI>Eccle&s;ia&s;tical</HI> things
and <HI>per&s;ons,</HI> and of all Circum&s;tances of outward
external wor&s;hip belonging to Order, Hone&s;ty,
and Edification, be&s;ides tho&s;e delivered by Chri&s;t
and his Apo&s;tles in the word of God, is a thing &s;o
manife&s;t, and con&s;entanious to Rea&s;on, that he will
hardly clear him&s;elf from the &s;u&s;pition of a per|ver&s;e
and ob&s;tinate Spirit, who being dry, and &s;ober
will deny it; but &s;ince the time that the Divines have
divided them&s;elves into &s;everal parties, it cannot
ea&s;ily be agreed upon among&s;t them to under&s;tand
unto whom it doth belong to make Eccle&s;ia&s;tical
Laws. The Papi&s;ts who would have the Clergy
to be exempted from all juri&s;diction of the Civil
Magi&s;trate (of which controver&s;y we cannot here
di&s;pute) do affirm that <HI>Bi&s;hops</HI> only, and a|mong&s;t
them the chief <HI>Bi&s;hop</HI> e&s;pecially, whom
they call the <HI>Bi&s;hop Oecumenical,</HI> hath the right and
power to make Laws, which may not only ob|lige
the Con&s;ciences of the Clergy, but of the La|ity
al&s;o, and that without any con&s;ent, or licence
of the <HI>politick Magi&s;trate.</HI> There are &s;ome who
(the per&s;on only, but not the opinion being chan|ged)
<PB N="271" REF="151">
do embrace this <HI>Tenet,</HI> as al&s;o many others
of the Papi&s;ts, who notwith&s;tanding do profe&s;&s;e
them&s;elves mo&s;t bitter enemies unto Popery, but
in the mean time the <HI>Di&s;ciplinary Reformers</HI> our
new <HI>Davu&s;&s;es</HI> do di&s;turb all things, and having taken
away all Power, Authority, and Eccle&s;ia&s;tical juri&s;|diction
from the King, they do challenge it only to
them&s;elves, and to their own <HI>Cla&s;&s;es</HI> and <HI>Conventi|ons.</HI>
The <HI>Era&s;tians</HI> on the other &s;ide, and our new
Reformers no le&s;&s;e than they, under the pre|tence
of Reformation, having altogether di&s;inve&s;ted
the Clergy of all Eccle&s;ia&s;tical juri&s;diction, do who|ly
attribute the univer&s;al right of the external Go|vernment
of the Church to the Civil Magi&s;trate;
And moreover as for the&s;e our own <HI>Di&s;ciplinarians</HI>
at home, Good God! what Mon&s;ters of names and
opinions, as full of <HI>Deformity</HI> as of <HI>Difformity</HI> have
the&s;e la&s;t &s;even years fruitful of prodiges brought
forth, and nur&s;ed under the pretence of Reforma|tion.</P>
<P>XXX. I have neither the lei&s;ure nor re&s;olution
(unle&s;s I &s;hould appear too trouble&s;om to you) to
grapple at this time with both the&s;e Adver&s;aries;
But in the&s;e (as in many other Debates) that opi|nion
&s;eemeth to be the truer, and is truly the &s;afer,
which is lodged in the middle betwixt the two ex|tremes,
and I am confident you will be &s;o much
the more willing to imbrace it, by how much it is
more agreeable to the Doctrine of the Engli&s;h
Church, as al&s;o to the Laws of the Kingdom, which
is, That the Right of making Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws is
in the Power of Bi&s;hops, Elders and other Per&s;ons
duely elected by the Clergy of the whole Kingdom;
But &s;o neverthele&s;s that the Exerci&s;e of the &s;ame
<PB N="272" REF="152">
<HI>Right</HI> and <HI>Power</HI> in all Chri&s;tian Common-wealth<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">
ought to depend on the Authority of the <HI>&s;upreme
Magi&s;trate,</HI> both <HI>a Parte ante</HI> (as the Schoolmen have
it) &amp; <HI>a parte po&s;t,</HI> on the part <HI>precedent,</HI> &amp; on the part
<HI>&s;ub&s;equent,</HI> to wit, that they ought not of them&s;elves
to a&s;&s;emble for the making of Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Ca|nons,
&amp; Laws, unle&s;s they be called to it by his <HI>Man|date</HI>
or Command, or at lea&s;t defended by his Au|thority;
a f<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ll &amp; free leave being both a&s;ked, &amp; ob|tained,
and being thus called and warranted, their
Laws or Canons to which they have con&s;ented, are
not ratified, not have any Power of obliging, untill
the A&s;&s;ent of the &s;upreme Magi&s;trate be obtained,
by who&s;e approbation, and Authority, as &s;oon as
they are confirmed they are pre&s;ently to pa&s;s for
Laws, and do oblige the Subject; And the&s;e
things may &s;uffice to be &s;poken of the Cau&s;e Effi|cient.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="8" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="273" REF="152">
<HEAD>THE
EIGHTH LECTURE
Of the Obligation of Humane Laws
from the Formal Cau&s;e: where,
<LIST>
<ITEM>Of
<LIST>
<ITEM>1 The Promulgation of Laws,</ITEM>
<ITEM>2 Of Laws Penal.</ITEM>
</LIST></ITEM>
</LIST></HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>Ezra 10. 7, 8.</BIBL>
<Q><P>7. And they made proclamation throughout
<HI>Judah</HI> and <HI>Jeru&s;alem,</HI> unto all the Children of
the Captivity, that they &s;hould gather them&s;elves
together unto <HI>Jeru&s;alem.</HI></P>
<P>8. And that who&s;oever would not come within
three days, according to the Coun&s;el of the Princes,
and the Elders, all his &s;ub&s;tance &s;hould be for|feited.</P></Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_OF the obligation of humane Lawes,
as to their <HI>material</HI> and <HI>efficient</HI>
Cau&s;es, we have &s;poke enough, and
as much as conduceth to our pre|&s;ent
purpo&s;e, in tho&s;e points which
have already been handled by us.
In this place we are to &s;peak of &s;uch as may
be reduced to the <HI>Formal kind of Cau&s;es,</HI> and al|though
peradventure not &s;o properly, (if examined
according to the acurate and exact Method) yet in
<PB N="274" REF="153">
my Judgment not altogether incongruous to our
Di&s;cour&s;e on this pre&s;ent Subject. They may all of
them be reduced to two Heads, The one of the
<HI>publication of Lawes,</HI> and the other of the <HI>penalty</HI>
adjoined to them to be inflicted on Delinquents.
Both of which as they are expre&s;sly contained in the
Text above cited, (The Publication of the Law in
the &s;eventh ver&s;e, and the penalty of it in the eighth
ver&s;e) &s;o the u&s;e of them is very nece&s;&s;ary, both by
the <HI>Nature</HI> of the Law it &s;elf, and to obtain the
<HI>Effect</HI> of the Law; For &s;eeing the Law by its own
Nature, and as it is a rule of things to be done,
ought to have a double Power, <HI>viz.</HI> A Power of
<HI>Directing,</HI> by &s;hewing unto the Subjects what is to
be done, and what is not to be done, and a Pow|er
of obliging, by &s;ugge&s;ting into their minds a ne|ce&s;&s;ity
of obeying; The Law could not duely, and
effectually exerci&s;e this twofold Power, unle&s;s the
Subject were informed what is the will of the Prince,
which is done by <HI>publication,</HI> and under&s;tood withall
by the penalty annexed to it, how much it doth con|cern
him to perform it.</P>
<P>II. Concerning the Publication of the Law; the
fir&s;t Doubt is, Whether this publication be meerly
on the Account of, and as it were intrin&s;ecal to the
Law? That is to enquire, Whether, that as the
Law hath the Power of <HI>directing</HI> and <HI>obliging,</HI>
the promulgation of it be &s;o nece&s;&s;ary that it wanteth
of that Power unle&s;s it be promulgated; Now in all
this Di&s;cour&s;e you are to under&s;tand, that I take not
this word <HI>Promulgation</HI> as it is u&s;ed in <HI>Cicero</HI> &amp; other
Roman writers, but according to the received manner
of &s;peaking among&s;t the Schoolmen &amp; the Canoni&s;ts
of the latter Ages; for in that <HI>Promulgation</HI> of the
<PB N="275" REF="153">
Antients, the Law not yet e&s;tabli&s;hed, or fully
made, was propounded to the people publickly on
three Market days of their approbation of it; But
the Publication of which we now &s;peak, is the Pro|mulgation
of a Law already made, that the People
may take notice of it. I therefore &s;hall briefly an|&s;wer
to the Doubt propo&s;ed, and &s;ay, That this
Publication is &s;o nece&s;&s;ary and &s;o intrin&s;ecal to the
Law, that in &s;ome manner it may be called the <HI>Form</HI>
of it, and thereupon among&s;t many Authors it is a
part of the Definition of it; and indeed it is
ab&s;olutely nece&s;&s;ary to this, that the Law may ex|erci&s;e
the Office of a Law, which is to direct, and
to oblige the Subjects, whom it cannot direct, much
le&s;s oblige, although made by never &s;o ju&s;t, and un|doubted
Authority, unle&s;s it be known to them, and
it cannot be known unle&s;s it be publi&s;hed; For that
which properly induceth the obligation, is the <HI>Will</HI>
and <HI>Authority</HI> of the Prince or Governor, not as a
&s;ingle, but as a publick Per&s;on, and the Head of
the Commonalty; But unle&s;s by &s;ome publick
means he &s;hall cau&s;e his Will to be propounded, and
made known unto the People, it cannot by any Law
be manife&s;t (at lea&s;t according to the interpretation
of the Law) that it is his Will, and proceedeth from
his Authority as he &s;u&s;taineth a publick Per&s;on;<NOTE PLACE="marg">Di&s;t. 4. Sect. In i&s;<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">is.</NOTE>
And from hence is that of the Canon Law, <HI>Leges
con&s;tituuntur c&ugrave;m promulgantur, Lawes are constitu|ted
when they are publi&s;hed,</HI> And that al&s;o of the Ci|vil
Law, <HI>Leges quae con&s;tringunt vitas hominum ab
omnibus intelligidebent, The Laws which do bind
the lives of men ought to be under&s;tood by all;</HI> which
being approved by the Common Con&s;ent of all
Doctors, and the Dictates of Rea&s;on, we need
<PB N="276" REF="154">
not here, for the confirmation of i<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">, to in&s;tance the
Example of God him &s;elf &s;olemnly pronouncing his
Law unto the <HI>I&s;raelites</HI> from the Mount of <HI>Sinai,</HI> or
the Practice of the mo&s;t flouri&s;hing Common-wealths
and Cities in the whole world, who as
&s;oon as their Laws were made, did in the mo&s;t pub|lick
places expo&s;e them to the ob&s;ervation of the
people engraven in Tables of Bra&s;s or Wood; the
words are mo&s;t known which every where we meet
with among&s;t antient Authors, and to this cla&s;&s;is
pertain the <GAP DESC="foreign">, and the <GAP DESC="foreign">, which
&s;ignifie nothing el&s;e but the Tables in which the A|thenians
wrote their Laws. Of the &s;ame nature
were the twelve Tables of the Romans, and others
of other Nations, concerning which let tho&s;e men
who have the lei&s;ure to be curious of &s;uch antiquities
con&s;ult with the <HI>Philologers,</HI> and the writers of
Dictionaries of both languages; we mu&s;t proceed
to other things.</P>
<P>III. The nece&s;&s;ity of the publication of Laws
being thus granted and determined, there ari&s;eth a
&s;econd Doubt, What this promulgation of the Law
ought to be, that it may pa&s;s for lawfull, and in|ferre
an obligation? In an&s;wer to which I &s;ay in
the fir&s;t place, that the manner, and the rea&s;on of
publi&s;hing a Law, as to the particular <HI>Rites</HI> and <HI>Cir|cum&s;tances,</HI>
may be varyed according to the Cu&s;toms
of diver&s;e Nations; But all do agree in this, and by
common u&s;e it is required, that the Law-giver take
ca<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e to have his <HI>will</HI> &s;o propounded, and manife&s;ted
to his Subjects by &s;ome external &s;ign, that it may
publickly be known unto them all, &s;o that none of
tho&s;e who are bound to ob&s;erve the Law maybe ig|norant
that the &s;aid Law is extant, and this is there|fore
<PB N="277" REF="154">
required, becau&s;e the power of directing is in|trin&s;ecal
and e&s;&s;ential to the Law, &amp; Subjects cannot
direct their actions according to the will of their
Prince, unle&s;&s;e they know what his will is, &amp; how can
they know it unle&s;&s;e by proclamation, or by writing,
or in&s;culpture, or &s;ome other outward &s;ign it be
&s;ufficiently expo&s;ed, and manife&s;ted to them?</P>
<P>IV. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, To the publication
of a Law to oblige the Subjects, it is not only requi|red
that the Lawgiver doth publickly &s;ignifie his will
unto them, but he is to proceed further, that is,
to have it done in a &s;olemn manner, or at lea&s;t that
it be &s;o done (which is even as much as a &s;olemn
Right) that it may be &s;ufficiently te&s;tified and
made known unto his Subjects, that the Law-giver
intended, that this <HI>will</HI> of his may have the power
of a Law, and that it may oblige them; the rea&s;on
is, becau&s;e, not every will of the Superiour,
although known unto the Subject, doth pre&s;ently,
and <HI>in ip&s;o facto</HI> oblige him, unle&s;s withall it be ma|nife&s;t,
that the Superiour had an intention that it
&s;hould oblige him; For every Superiour endued
with a Legi&s;lative power, and &s;u&s;taining a double
per&s;on, the one <HI>private,</HI> as a <HI>&s;ingle man,</HI> the other
<HI>publick,</HI> as a <HI>Lawful Superiour,</HI> doth come un|der
a double con&s;ideration. In the mid&s;t of the&s;e
late tumults, the unhappy caprichiou&s;ne&s;s of &s;ome
wits did put me to this new di&s;tinction, concerning
the <HI>per&s;onal,</HI> and <HI>political Capacity</HI> of a King. The
Di&s;tinction in my judgment is &s;omething more
proper to our pre&s;ent bu&s;ine&s;s, than to the Subject
then in hand; It is this, the will of a Prince, (if a
Prince: be con&s;idered as in his per&s;onal capacity)
that is as he is a &s;ingle, and as it were a private per|&s;on,
<PB N="278" REF="155">
carries not with him the re&s;pect of a Law, and
obligeth not his Subjects to direct their Actions
according to it; Therefore to oblige the Subjects,
It is not enough for a Prince any way to &s;ignify
unto them, that he will have <HI>this</HI> or <HI>that</HI> done,
unle&s;&s;e upon &s;ome other account it be manife&s;t,
that it is his will to have it &s;o done, as he is in his
<HI>Political Capacity,</HI> that is, as he is a Prince, and
the Head of the Commonalty, and as he &s;u&s;tain|eth
a publick per&s;on with a <HI>Legi&s;lative Power,</HI>
which &s;eeing it cannot be made manife&s;t enough
by the bare &s;ignification of his Will, it is need|ful
that by &s;ome more publick, and &s;olemn Cere|mony,
it &s;hould be atte&s;ted unto tho&s;e whom it
concerns to have the knowledge of it, le&s;t any
man, for the excu&s;e of his Di&s;obedience, might
pretend that rotten, and that vulgar one, <HI>I had
not thought of it.</HI></P>
<P>V. I &s;ay in the third place, In large Empires
which contain many Provinces, it is requi&s;ite that
the publication of a new Law be made in every
Province of the Empire. Some there are who
think this to be &s;imply nece&s;&s;ary, and to be requi|red
from the nature of the Law, which doth not
oblige, unle&s;&s;e it be received of the people; And
therefore if be only publi&s;hed in a Princes Court,
or in the <HI>Metropolis</HI> of the whole Kingdom, or
&s;ome chief Cities thereof, the promulgation of it is
no way &s;ufficient to oblige tho&s;e who do live in
the more remote places, and provinces; But al|though
this be not ab&s;olutely nece&s;&s;arily (neither
doth the nature of the Law &s;eem to require it, and
the common opinion of the Doctors, as well as the
common practice of mo&s;t Nations are of another
<PB N="279" REF="155">
Judgment, yet it is profitable that it &s;hould be done,
that &s;o the Law, to which all men are bound, as
much as may be, may come to the knowledge of
all men; which by how much the more ea&s;ily it
may be done in our times, than in Ages heretofore,
before the Art of printing was found out, by &s;o
much the more inexcu&s;able is the neglect; But to
make no digre&s;&s;ion, The manner of <HI>publi&s;hing our
Laws</HI> which is received among&s;t us, doth not on|ly
&s;eem to be the mo&s;t &s;ufficient, but the mo&s;t ea|&s;y
and commodious of all others, <HI>viz.</HI> that the
Laws &s;igned and pa&s;&s;ed by the King, by the con|&s;ent
of the Repre&s;entatives of the whole Kingdom
in the Hou&s;es of Parliament, the Parliament be|ing
di&s;&s;olved, be committed to the pre&s;&s;e, and
printed by the Kings Printer, and in a known Cha|racter,
that no man may doubt, but that the &s;aid
Laws are lawfully made, and &s;ufficiently publi&s;hed.</P>
<P>VI. The third Doubt, It being &s;uppo&s;ed, that
the Law is &s;ufficiently publi&s;hed; When doth i<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">
begin to oblige the Subjects, pre&s;ently after the
publication of it, or &s;ome time afterwards? I
an&s;wer in the fir&s;t place, that it is beyond all con|trover&s;ie,
that tho&s;e Laws, in which a certain <MILESTONE N="1">
time of obligation is defined, As &s;oon as that
time is arrived, the &s;aid Laws begin pre&s;ently to
oblige, and the obligation of them is perpetual,
unle&s;s there be a time for the obligation of them,
which in the &s;ame Laws is expre&s;&s;ed, or they be|come
to be abrogated by a new Law, or by a con|trary
cu&s;tome. And hence it is, that according to
the common con&s;ent of the Civil Lawyers, the
Laws of the Emperour being newly made, do not
oblige the Subjects of the &s;aid Empire, unle&s;s af|ter
<PB N="280" REF="156">
the &s;pace of two months after the promulgation
of them, becau&s;e that this time <HI>by &s;ome Authority
in the Novels,</HI> as in all other of their Laws is to be
ob&s;erved, is univer&s;aly prefixed &amp; defined, &amp; for this
intent, that it is pre&s;umed, that in the &s;pace of two
months the knowledge of the &s;aid Law may ea&s;ily
be brought unto all the Subjects. I &s;ay in the &s;econd
place, That in the Kingdoms, and Common-wealths,
where nothing of any certainty is either defined by
Law, or received by cu&s;tome, concerning the
time in which Laws new made do begin to oblige,
the &s;aid Laws having no certain time of obligation
affixed to them, do pre&s;ently as &s;oon as ever they
are publi&s;hed, according to the manner of the
Country, oblige all tho&s;e Subjects to who&s;e notice
they are arrived, or where it was not in the fault of
the Lawmaker, but that they might have come to
the knowledge of them. For &s;eeing the obligation
of the Law dependeth on the will of the Law-giver,
and not on the notice of the Subject, it
followeth, that the obligation of the Law is of
force, when the Law-giver hath &s;ufficiently ex|pre&s;&s;ed
his will to his Subjects by &s;ome outward
&s;ign, whether it were made known to all his
Subjects, or whether it &s;o fell out that &s;ome
of them peradventure were ignorant of it; For
grant but the Law, and the obligation is granted,
which hath its dependency on the Law, as it is a
Law, and nece&s;&s;arily followeth it, as every ne|ce&s;&s;ary
Effect doth follow its proper Cau&s;e, as al|ready
we have often mentioned. Therefore there
being nothing wanting to a Law that is required to
the compleating of its e&s;&s;ence, after that it is made,
and &s;ufficiently publi&s;hed, it altogether followeth
<PB N="281" REF="156">
that a Law &s;o made and publi&s;hed, ought pre&s;ent|ly
to inferre an obligation; neither is it any wayes
inconvenient, that an obligation be made, and be|come
ours by the <HI>will</HI> only &amp; <HI>Act</HI> of another, we not
knowing it, if the &s;aid obligation doth carry with
it the nature &amp; con&s;truction of a <HI>moral Debt,</HI> as the
Schoolmen &s;peak it; Although from obligations and
debts w^c^h^. ari&s;e from contracts, the ca&s;e is otherwi&s;e.</P>
<P>VII. The <HI>fourth</HI> Doubt; How the Law doth
reach unto tho&s;e, who though after a &s;ufficient
publication of it, and the elap&s;e of the time pre|fixed
by the Law, have not yet <HI>actually</HI> any know|ledge
of it? Which is to demand, whether he to
whom the Law is not actually known, be &s;o guilty
of the fault, that he tran&s;gre&s;&s;eth, if he doth any
thing again&s;t it, and thereupon de&s;erveth that
puni&s;hment which that Law inflicteth on the
tran&s;gre&s;&s;ors of it? The rea&s;on of this <HI>Doubt</HI> is,
on the one &s;ide, becau&s;e that obligation is vain,
or rather none at all, which obligeth neither to the
<HI>fault,</HI> nor to the <HI>puni&s;hment;</HI> And on the other &s;ide,
both becau&s;e it is ab&s;urd to be bound to that
which is impo&s;&s;ible; but to ob&s;erve a Law which
we know not, is certainly impo&s;&s;ible; as al&s;o,
becau&s;e from the two Offices of the Law above
&s;pecified, it is nece&s;&s;ary that the power of <HI>direct|ing,</HI>
as fir&s;t by Nature, mu&s;t go before the
other power of <HI>obliging,</HI> &s;o that the Law cannot
oblige any, but whom it directeth, and it cannot
direct any, but tho&s;e to whom it is known. This
being laid down in the fir&s;t place, which admits of
no <HI>&s;cruple, viz.</HI> that the Subject to whom the Law
is known, is obliged both to the <HI>fault,</HI> and to the
<HI>puni&s;hment;</HI> As for tho&s;e that know not the Law,
<PB N="282" REF="157">
I an&s;wer to the propounded <HI>doubt,</HI> and &s;ay in the
fir&s;t place, that he who by his gro&s;&s;e negligence is
ignorant of the Law, when it proceeds from his
own <HI>fault</HI> that he is ignorant of it, is no le&s;&s;e, or
at lea&s;t not much le&s;&s;e guilty of the <HI>fault,</HI> and de|&s;erveth
<HI>puni&s;hment</HI> as well as he who doth know
the Law, and doth it not. For the Ignorance of
that thing which every man ought to know, and
may know, doth excu&s;e no man; And in the in|terpretation
of the Law, there is no great diffe|rence
betwixt a <HI>wilful Ignorance,</HI> and a <HI>fault com|mitted.</HI></P>
<P>VIII. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, That he who is
therefore ignorant of the Law, becau&s;e he was a
little more carele&s;&s;e, or negligent, than in a bu&s;i|ne&s;&s;e
of that moment he ought to be, although
the <HI>fault</HI> be never &s;o <HI>light,</HI> as the <HI>Civilians</HI> term it,
yet becau&s;e it is manife&s;t, it was done by a <HI>fault,</HI>
and by his <HI>own Fault,</HI> he is not altogether free
from the obligation of the Law. My Rea&s;on is,
becau&s;e that Ignorance was <HI>vincible,</HI> as the School|men
&s;peak, that is, which could be overcome,
for if the Subject had been &s;o diligent as he ought
to have been, and as the dignity of the cau&s;e re|quired,
and as wi&s;e men u&s;e to be in their imploy|ments
of greater weight, he could not be igno|rant,
it is pre&s;umed, of the promulgation of the
Law; Now his Ignorance of that Law, according
to which every man is bound to direct his Actions
being in him an ignorance that might have been
helped, this Ignorance cannot be but culpable, and
if culpable, in whatoever degree it be, it cannot
but accordingly be inexcu&s;able. It may be argued;
But by how much the lighter the fault is, the Igno|rance
<PB N="283" REF="157">
in both Courts, is &s;o much the more excu&s;a|ble,
and among&s;t the equal Arbitrators of things,
doth de&s;erve a more ea&s;y pardon. It is to be an|&s;wered,
that he was before obliged by the Law,
although he was ignorant of it; And it is manife&s;t
by this, becau&s;e as &s;oon as ever, by the Te&s;timony
of &s;ome man of Reputation, he under&s;tood that
the Law was publi&s;hed, he immediately in his
own Con&s;cience judged him&s;elf to be obliged by
that Law, now there could ari&s;e no obligation from
a new report, or by the Te&s;timony of this man,
neither is there any power of obligation either in
him&s;elf, or in his Te&s;timony, therfore without doubt
he was obliged before by that Law, although he
had neither <HI>notice</HI> of the <HI>Law,</HI> nor any <HI>Con&s;cience</HI>
of the <HI>Obligation.</HI></P>
<P>IX. I &s;ay in the third place; He who in <HI>earne&s;t</HI>
and <HI>invincibly,</HI> either by accident or any other im|pediment,
and by no neglect of his own, is igno|rant
of the promulgation of a Law, as if any man
&s;hould be vi&s;ited with madne&s;s, or labour under
&s;ome long or grievous di&s;ea&s;e, or being newly re|turned
from forein Countries, &s;hould never hear
of the publication of &s;uch a Law, nor indeed could
hear of it, he is not by that Law obliged either un|to
the fault, or any puni&s;hment of the fault &s;o
properly named; Neverthele&s;s by the &s;ame Law
which he is invincibly ignorant of, he may become
&s;o far lyable to a <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> improperly &s;o called,
that is to &s;ome <HI>lo&s;&s;e</HI> to be &s;u&s;tained. The fir&s;t part
of this po&s;ition is thus proved; No man commit|teth
a fault, or de&s;erveth puni&s;hment who doth
not Sin; but he who keeps not a Law, of which
he is invincibly ignorant, doth not Sin (for if he
<PB N="284" REF="158">
&s;hould &s;in, he were obliged to that which is im|po&s;&s;ible)
therefore he cannot de&s;ervedly be bla|med,
nor ju&s;tly puni&s;hed; But that he may be obliged
to &s;ome dammage to be &s;u&s;tained by that Law (which
is the other part of our a&s;&s;ertion) &s;hall appear to be
mo&s;t clear by this example. Suppo&s;e there be a Law
prohibiting &s;ome certain kind of Tra&s;&s;iquings and
Contracts, by which Law, among&s;t other things, it is
decreed that all &s;uch contracts, made one month af|ter
the promulgation of the &s;aid Law, &s;hall be alto|gether
void, and of no effect; If any man after that
month is run out, being in good earne&s;t, and in|vincibly
ignorant of the promulgation of that Law,
&s;hall &s;trike &s;uch a bargain, which is by the &s;aid Law
forbidden, he will be clear indeed from the fault,
by rea&s;on of his invincible Ignorance which was
impo&s;&s;ible to be helped, and con&s;equently he ought
to be free from the puni&s;hment, which ju&s;tly is due
to no man, but for the fault; neverthele&s;&s;e he
&s;hall not only &s;u&s;tain the Dammage, by rea&s;on of
the <HI>nullity</HI> of the Contract, which he entred into,
but he is bound al&s;o to &s;u&s;tain it according to Con|&s;cience;
both by the force of obedience, which is
due unto the Law; and by his reflection on the
publick profit; The like is to be determined in ma|ny
other Laws of the like nature; For examples
&s;ake, In tho&s;e Laws by which per&s;ons are di&s;abled, &amp;
by which privileges are revoked, In tho&s;e Laws by
which U&s;ury is moderated, and in tho&s;e by which
certain prices of things to be &s;old are con&s;tituted,
and in the like, of which the Canoni&s;ts and the Di|vines
do treat at large. Neither ought this &s;eem to
be unju&s;t to any man; for although a Dammage be
&s;ometimes called a Puni&s;hment, it is only <HI>analogi|cally,</HI>
<PB N="285" REF="158">
and very <HI>improperly,</HI> for otherwi&s;e there is a
great difference betwixt a Dammage, and a Penalty
or puni&s;hment properly &s;o called; If an innocent
per&s;on be puni&s;hed, a great injury is done unto him;
but often it comes to pa&s;&s;e, that an innocent per|&s;on
may be dammaged, and yet no great injury done
unto him. And thus much as conduceth to our
pre&s;ent purpo&s;e, may &s;uffize to be &s;poken of the
promulgation of the Law.</P>
<P>X. In the next place we are to &s;peak of the <HI>penal
Law,</HI> in which many things being omitted which
unprofitably are accu&s;tomed to be di&s;puted
by many of the Ca&s;ui&s;ts, and which pertain rather
to the external and pleading Courts, as that of the
Canoni&s;ts and Papi&s;ts, than to the internal Court
of Con&s;cience, we &s;hall be contented to give a
view unto you of &s;ome few, and the mo&s;t remark|able
of them, and which mo&s;t neerly we conceive
do conduce to the Government of Con&s;cience: In
this kind we meet fir&s;t of all with this doubt; Whe|ther
the Con&s;titution of the puni&s;hment doth any
wayes pertain to the E&s;&s;ence of the Law. I an|&s;wer;
It &s;eemeth that it doth, not as &s;omething
that is <HI>extrin&s;ecally</HI> requi&s;ite to compleat the E&s;|&s;ence
of it, &s;o that the Law were not a Law, if
the penalty were not annexed to it, but only <HI>con|&s;equently,</HI>
as &s;omething nece&s;&s;ary to this, that the
Law may <HI>effectually</HI> obtain the end which it inten|ded;
For the <HI>Form</HI> and <HI>E&s;&s;ence</HI> of the Law con|&s;i&s;teth
in the <HI>Precept</HI> of it: I here under&s;tand <HI>Pre|cept</HI>
as it is largely taken to comprehend a <HI>prohibi|tion</HI>
with it, as in the Scriptures are the words
<GAP DESC="foreign"> and <GAP DESC="foreign">, and among&s;t the Divines, as well
Negative Commandments, as Affirmative, are
<PB N="286" REF="159">
commonly called <HI>Precepts;</HI> And from this <HI>Precept</HI>
alone, both the powers do depend, which we have
&s;aid to be in the Law, <HI>viz.</HI> the power of directing
the Action, and of obliging the Con&s;ciences of
the Subjects; For the Subject hath a &s;ufficient
Rule, according to which he ought to direct his
Actions, and to the ob&s;ervation whereof, unle&s;&s;e
he will be wanting in his duty, he is bound in
Con&s;cience, as &s;oon as he under&s;tands that his
lawful Superior hath commanded <HI>this</HI> or <HI>that</HI> by
Law, whether there be any puni&s;hment annexed
to that Law, or not; Therefore this nece&s;&s;ity of
annexing the puni&s;hment doth not ari&s;e from the
Nature of the Law it &s;elf, which con&s;i&s;t|eth
in the meer <HI>Precept,</HI> but (that the <HI>Precept</HI>
which of it &s;elf would not barely &s;uffice,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Tatit&egrave; permitti|tur, quod &s;<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ne ulti<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">|ne prohi|betur. <HI>Tert. 1. contra Marcion.</HI> 26.</NOTE> may with
the greater vigour obtain its effect) from another
double <HI>Hypothe&s;is,</HI> the one of the <HI>Subject,</HI> the o|ther
of the <HI>End;</HI> For it is expedient that the Laws
&s;hould be mo&s;t religiou&s;ly ob&s;erved, which is the
<HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> in re&s;pect of the <HI>End,</HI> neverthele&s;&s;e the
inbred Depravity of mans heart being &s;uppo&s;ed
(w^c^h^. is another <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> in re&s;pect of the <HI>Subject</HI>)
it can very hardly or almo&s;t never come to pa&s;&s;e,
but that the mo&s;t profitable Laws will be de&s;pi&s;ed,
either by the negligence, or the perver&s;ene&s;&s;e of
mo&s;t men, unle&s;&s;e by fear they are contained with|in
their bounds,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Qui ratio|ne traduci ad meliora non po&s;|&s;unt, &s;olo metu con|tinentur. <HI>Quintil. 12. In&s;tit.</HI></NOTE> who make but a mock of the
Dictates of Con&s;cience. From this double <HI>Hypo|the&s;is,</HI>
it comes to pa&s;&s;e that the wi&s;e&s;t Law-ma|kers,
have alwayes judged it nece&s;&s;ary, and &s;aving
to the Common-wealth, to add more force to the
ob&s;ervation of the Laws, by the fear of puni&s;h|ments,
and that after the example of God him|&s;elf,
<PB N="287" REF="159">
who pronounced not the fir&s;t Law which he
gave to man, without the threatning of a puni&s;h|ment,
<HI>Gen.</HI> 3. Some good Citizens peradventure
(who&s;e number are but few) induced only by the
Con&s;cience of their Duty, and their Love unto
Virtue, and their Country, would render O|bedience
unto the Laws, although there were no
puni&s;hment propounded, but the <HI>Turba,</HI> or the
greate&s;t number, are inforced only by the fear of
puni&s;hment to the performance of their Duties;
It is manife&s;t hereby, that the Con&s;titution of pu|ni&s;hments
in the making of Laws, is nece&s;&s;ary.</P>
<P>XI. The &s;econd <HI>Doubt</HI> is, concerning the obliga|tion
of the penal Law, as to the exten&s;ion of it,
whether the penal Law doth oblige only unto the
penalty, or whether it obligeth unto the fault al&s;o?
Which is to demand, if a Subject may &s;o &s;atisfie
the Law, and his Duty, if being prepared to un|dergoe,
and by undergoing the penalty con&s;tituted
by the Law, he may be no longer guilty of the Delin|quency,
although he ob&s;erveth not the command of
the Law; Or whether, for all that, he is not bound in
Con&s;cience to the performance of that, which is
by the is Law commanded. That more clearly and
di&s;tinctly we may an&s;wer to this doubt, it being
a Que&s;tion of great Moment, and of which in the
Common Lives of Men, there is a mo&s;t frequent u&s;e;
It will not be ami&s;&s;e, the better to unfold it, to pre|mi&s;e
&s;ome things which are very profitable before
hand to be known. We are to under&s;tand therfore in
the fir&s;t place, that that <HI>po&s;itive Humane Law,</HI> ought
only to be called <HI>Penal,</HI> which by the will of the
Legi&s;lator, doth expre&s;ly determine &s;ome <HI>temporal</HI>
puni&s;hment for the <HI>Tran&s;gre&s;&s;ors</HI> of it; And in all
<PB N="286" REF="160">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="287" REF="160">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="288" REF="161">
this di&s;cour&s;e, as often as mention is made of pu|ni&s;hment,
you are to under&s;tand no other, but only a
<HI>Temporal puni&s;hment.</HI> This word <HI>Temporal puni&s;hment</HI>
is taken in a twofold Con&s;ideration, either as 'tis
oppo&s;ed to the <HI>Spiritual,</HI> or as it is oppo&s;ed to
<HI>Eternal puni&s;hment,</HI> And for the mo&s;t part in com|mon
di&s;cour&s;e they are taken as Members contradi|&s;tinct
to one another, &s;ometimes <HI>Spiritual</HI> oppo&s;ed
to <HI>Temporal,</HI> and &s;ometimes <HI>Eternal</HI> unto <HI>Temporal;</HI>
there are therefore three kinds of puni&s;hments, or,
if you will, you may call them, <HI>Species,</HI> or man|ners
of puni&s;hments, or degrees of puni&s;hments;
For what&s;oever comes under the name of puni&s;h|ment; <MILESTONE N="1">
is fir&s;t, Either a &s;piritual puni&s;hment, as the
<HI>lo&s;&s;e</HI> or the <HI>deprivation</HI> of <HI>Grace,</HI> &amp; of the friend&s;hip
of God, or of that inward joy, and con&s;olation,
which ari&s;eth from the &s;ence of his <HI>Grace</HI> and <HI>Love.</HI>
<MILESTONE N="2"> Or &s;econdly, it is <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">n Eternal puni&s;hment, which
con&s;i&s;teth partly in the <HI>Eternal Deprivation</HI> of the
beatifical vi&s;ion of God and Chri&s;t, and partly,
<MILESTONE N="3"> in the eternal <HI>Torments</HI> of <HI>Hell.</HI> Or thirdly, it is
a temporal puni&s;hment, di&s;tingui&s;hed from both
the former, which pertaineth to the &s;tate of this
pre&s;ent life, and hath relation only to the body,
and external things, neither doth it take away <HI>of
it &s;elf</HI> and <HI>nece&s;&s;arily</HI> either the &s;ence of the Grace
of God, or the <HI>Hope</HI> of everla&s;ting life; Tempo|ral
puni&s;hments of this nature are the lo&s;&s;e of mo|ney.
Bani&s;hment, Impri&s;onment, or <HI>Fines</HI> &s;et
on the head of any one, courgings, and many of the
like; and la&s;tly death it &s;elf. Tho&s;e puni&s;hments
which are the chiefe&s;t and of mo&s;t frequent u&s;e
may be reduced to the&s;e heads, <HI>Death, Bani&s;h|ment,
Confication of goods,</HI> and <HI>Impri&s;onment.</HI></P>
<P><PB N="289" REF="161">
XII. In the &s;econd place we are to under&s;tand,
that <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> as it is oppo&s;ed to the <HI>fault,</HI> is taken
again two wayes; For &s;ometimes it is taken <HI>largely,</HI>
and <HI>materially,</HI> as it is oppo&s;ed to it in a contrary
oppo&s;ition, that is, as it is another <HI>Species</HI> condi|viding
the &s;ame <HI>Genus;</HI> And &s;o every <HI>Evil</HI> that be|falleth
any man, which is not <HI>malum culpae,</HI> the
<HI>Evil</HI> of the <HI>fault,</HI> is called a <HI>puni&s;hment,</HI> or <HI>malum
Poene,</HI> the <HI>Evil</HI> of <HI>puni&s;hment,</HI> although it be not
inflicted on him who indureth it for any <HI>fault</HI> go|ing
before, but ca&s;ually or by injury it may happen
to him; &s;o a &s;uddain Di&s;ea&s;e, mony taken away by
theft, a Wound given by a thief, goods lo&s;t by fire,
or Shipwrack, and all kind of <HI>Hurt</HI> or <HI>Dammage</HI>
which is grievous to indure, is to be numbred
among&s;t things penal, and to come under the name
of <HI>puni&s;hment;</HI> Sometimes the word <HI>puni&s;hment</HI>
is taken more <HI>&s;trictly,</HI> and as it were <HI>formally,</HI> as it
is oppo&s;ed to the <HI>fault</HI> in a relating oppo&s;ition, that
is, as it is inflicted on a man for a preceding <HI>fault;</HI>
As if a man &s;hould be mulcted fourfold for the
goods of another taken away by Theft, or &s;hould
be bani&s;hed for &s;edition; And this is the proper,
the former the improper &s;ignification of the word
<HI>penalty</HI> or <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> for <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> is improperly
&s;o called, when no <HI>fault</HI> did go before it; From
hence proceeded that mo&s;t known Definition of
<HI>puni&s;hment,</HI> that it is, <HI>Supplicum quo quis proper
delictum afficitur; It is a puni&s;hment with which any
man is inflicted for a fault.</HI> Secondly, in this pre|&s;ent
di&s;putation we intend to debare on both the
&s;ignifications of the word, as the nature of the
di&s;cour&s;e &s;hall require; But the la&s;t is the chiefe&s;t,
for it is called a <HI>penal Law,</HI> not &s;o much in the re|&s;pect
<PB N="290" REF="162">
of the <HI>Da~mage,</HI> or the <HI>Hurt</HI> w^c^h^. can come un|to
any man by occa&s;ion of the Law (&amp; that peradven|ture
ju&s;tly, <GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">hough without any fault of his) as in re|&s;pect
of the puni&s;hment, w^c^h^. by the determination
of the Law is appointed for tho&s;e who do trangre&s;s it.</P>
<P>XIII. In the third place we are to know, That
in penal Laws, &s;ome are purely penal, and others
mixed, <HI>A Law purely penal</HI> is, when in the <HI>&s;imple
ordination of it,</HI> it only appoints the puni&s;hment,
and neither by commanding, or forbidding doth
expre&s;&s;ly enjoyn any thing. For examples &s;ake,
&s;uppo&s;e there be a Law which giveth power to the
Inhabitants of any City or Town, to choo&s;e eve|ry
year one of the mo&s;t remarkable of the Citizens
to be their Mayo<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">, or Bayliff, this clau&s;e being added
to the find Law, <HI>The Citizen who is cho&s;en, and
&s;hall refu&s;e the place, &s;hall be fine&agrave; one hundred
pounds,</HI> This Law is purely penal, becau&s;e it or|dains
a puni&s;hment for tho&s;e who &s;hall refu&s;e to
undertake that office, neverthele&s;s it command|eth
no man to undertake it, nor forbiddeth any
man to refu&s;e it. <HI>A penal Law that is mixed,</HI> is, when
it commandeth any thing to be done, or forbideth
any thing, the penalty being added that is to be in|flicted
on the Tran&s;gre&s;&s;ors. For Examples &s;ake, let
us &s;uppo&s;e a Law to be declared in this or the like
Form, <HI>Let no man pre&s;ume to tran&s;port any of the
Merchandize of this Nation into a forain Kingdom,
or to &s;ell any forain Merchandize in any place of this
Kingdom, unle&s;s be paeyeth the accu&s;tomed Tribute, he
who &s;hall <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> otherwi&s;e &s;hall &s;uffer the lo&s;s of the Mer|chandize
he vendeth.</HI> This is a penal Law, becau&s;e it
hath a penalty annexed to it, neverthele&s;s it is not
purely <HI>penal,</HI> but <HI>mixed,</HI> for under that <HI>penalty</HI> it
<PB N="291" REF="162">
commandeth the <HI>Cu&s;toms</HI> to be paid, and forbid|deth
the exportation, or the &s;elling of Wares, the
Cu&s;toms not payed. Some there are who think
that there is a third kind of a <HI>penal Law</HI> to be ad|ded
to the&s;e two, which containeth at once both the
command and the puni&s;hment, but neither of them
<HI>po&s;itively</HI> and <HI>&s;pecially,</HI> but both of them <HI>disjunctive|ly</HI>
and <HI>indifferently;</HI> For examples &s;alte, let there
be a Law under this Form, <HI>Being cho&s;en by the Com|monalty
of the City, either undergoe the Office of the
Mayor, or chief Magi&s;trate, or pay a hundred pound;</HI>
There needs not for this cau&s;e that any new <HI>Species</HI>
&s;hould be added; For the <HI>Species</HI> of things are
not to be multiplyed without nece&s;&s;ity; And this <HI>dis|junctive
Form</HI> of propounding the Law, ought to be
referred to that which is <HI>purely penal,</HI> for in it &s;elf it
containeth no ab&s;olute command; if you allege;
Of the&s;e two things, though neither of them is com|manded
<HI>definitely,</HI> yet both of them are commanded
<HI>indefinitely;</HI> I ea&s;ily may reply, to command <HI>indefi|nitely,</HI>
and under a <HI>disjunction</HI> (to &s;peak properly) is
no more to command, than to &s;ay that the picture of
a man, i<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> a man; This <HI>disjunctive Law</HI> therefore (as I
have &s;aid) is purely <HI>penal,</HI> which is manife&s;t by the
compared Form of the examples. For if the Law-maker
&s;hall put forth the Edict in this manner, <HI>He
who being elected &s;hall refu&s;e the Mayoralty, &s;hall
pay one hundred pound,</HI> or in this manner, <HI>being elect|ed,
either be Mayor, or pay one hundred pounds,</HI> it
is all one; There is, in both, the &s;ame &s;ence, the &s;ame
force of the words, and one &amp; the &s;ame ob<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">igation.</P>
<P>XIV. In the fourth place, we are to know, that
between an obligation to the <HI>fault,</HI> and an obliga|tion
to the <HI>temporal puni&s;hment,</HI> there is no <HI>ne|ce&s;&s;ary
<PB N="292" REF="163">
Connexion,</HI> or certainly not &s;o neee&s;&s;ary
that it may be al&s;o reciprocal; There is a nece&s;&s;a|ry
Con&s;equence indeed from a <HI>Temporal puni&s;hment</HI>
properly &s;o called, to the <HI>fault;</HI> And this Argu|ment
therefore is of force, <HI>Peter</HI> is to be puni&s;hed
by the Law, therefore <HI>Peter</HI> hath committ<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">d a fault;
But from a temporal puni&s;hment, properly &s;o cal|led,
&s;uppo&s;e any dammage or the like, the fault
is not nece&s;&s;arily inferred; For a man without any
fault of at all his own may be obliged to a lo&s;&s;e, as
already we have &s;aid. Neither is the Con&s;equence
<HI>reciprocal</HI> from the fault to the temporal puni&s;h|ment;
For it may &s;o come to pa&s;&s;e, that a man
may be obliged to the fault, and yet not be obliged
to the puni&s;hment, I mean a temporal puni&s;h|ment,
for the account is far otherwi&s;e of the
<HI>Spiritual</HI> and <HI>Eternal puni&s;hment.</HI> For examples
&s;ake, &s;uppo&s;e a man hath committed a fault, as
he hath told a lye, or betrayed the &s;ecrets of his
friend, or hath privately detracted from the good
name of his Neighbour, for which the Laws of
men do appoint no puni&s;hment, he therefore can|not
be puni&s;hed by man with any temporal puni&s;h|ment,
neither is it nece&s;&s;ary that God &s;hould
temporally afflict him. But that no man may too
boldly flatter him&s;elf, &amp; a&s;&s;ume unto him&s;elf here|by
a greater liberty of &s;inning, becau&s;e he thinks
him&s;elf free from temporal puni&s;hment, he ought
duly to call to mind, that he is neverthele&s;s ob|liged
to a far more grievous puni&s;hment, which
is a <HI>Spiritual,</HI> and an <HI>Eternal puni&s;hment,</HI> Both
which puni&s;hments are &s;o nece&s;&s;arily, and &s;o re|ciprocally
conjoyned with every fault, that the
puni&s;hment doth alwayes pre&s;uppo&s;e a fault going
before it (for God puni&s;heth no man that de&s;erves
<PB N="293" REF="163">
it not) and at the la&s;t the de&s;erved puni&s;hment
mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily follow the fault, unle&s;s it be pre|vented
by the mercy of God remitting the fau<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">t in
Chri&s;t by Faith, and by Repentance.</P>
<P>XV. The&s;e things thus premi&s;ed, to an&s;wer to
the propounded <HI>Doubt,</HI> I will inferre &s;ome Con|clu&s;ions;
And in the fir&s;t place we mu&s;t judge,
How the penal Law doth oblige the Subject in
Con&s;cience by the mind and Intention of the Law-maker,
If it be manife&s;t that there is any certainty
of it that is, if it be certain that the Law-maker
did intend to oblige the Subjects, not only to the
<HI>penalty,</HI> but to the fault al&s;o, they are undoubt|edly
obliged to ob&s;erve that which is commanded
by the Law, and do not &s;atisfie their Duty if they
are prepared to undergo the Penalty ordained by
the Law; But if it be manife&s;t that he intended
not to oblige them, but only to the Penalty, it is
certain that the Subjects are not bound beyond that
Penalty. The Rea&s;on is, becau&s;e the Foundation
or Ground of the Obligation of the Law (as el&s;|where
is &s;hewed) is the manife&s;ted will of the
Law-maker inve&s;ted with a Lawful power,
Therefore where the Will of the Law-maker
which is the <HI>adaequate Mea&s;ure</HI> of that Ob|ligation
which the Law induceth, is manife&s;t;
we need not to make any further doubt concerning
the extent of the Obligation.</P>
<P>XVI. Peradventure, you will demand, what a&s;|&s;urance
may &s;uffice, that a Subject may be &s;ecure
in his Con&s;cience, that &s;ufficiently he under&s;tands
the mind, and intention of the Law-maker? I an|&s;wer,
<HI>that a mathemat calcertitude,</HI> which is mani|fe&s;t
by Demon&s;tration, and impo&s;&s;ible to be fal&s;e, is
in va<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">n to be expected <HI>in morals,</HI> by rea&s;on of the in|finite
<PB N="294" REF="164">
variety of Circum&s;tances, and uncertainty of
Humane affairs, neverthele&s;s a certain <HI>logical</HI> certi|tude
may oftentimes be had of the Intention of the
Law-maker, which is to be collected from the words
of the Law it &s;elf, from which, his Intention may &s;o
per&s;picuou&s;ly appear, that there needeth not any
further Evidence. The mind of the Legi&s;lator may be
manife&s;ted, partly by the form and manner of the
Precept he enjoyneth, and partly by the greatne&s;s
of the Puni&s;hment that is to be inflicted, but e&s;pe|cially
from the Preface of the Law it &s;elf, in which
that it may be more acceptable to the people, he
u&s;eth to declare the cau&s;es and rea&s;ons that do in|duce
him to the making of that Law, as al&s;o how ju&s;t
it is, and nece&s;&s;ary for the taking away of abu&s;es, and
for the advantage of the Common-wealth; From
all which being rightly weighed together by com|paring
of the circum&s;tances, it will be no great
difficulty for a wi&s;e and apprehen&s;ive man, &s;o
to learn the meaning and intention of the Lawgiver,
and to have &s;uch a &s;ufficient <HI>moral</HI> certitude thereof,
(for in morals, a moral certitude is &s;ufficient) as
to conclude, that undoubtedly he intended &s;uch a
thing in the making of it; But if the Subject be not
of &s;o great an apprehen&s;ion and Judgment, as duly
to examine all the importances of the rea&s;ons, or if
he be afraid (&s;ince every man is not a Competent
Judge in his own Cau&s;e) left he might interpre|tate
the mind of the Law-giver more favourably on
his &s;ide than he ought to do, it would be his be&s;t
cour&s;e (if it be a bu&s;ine&s;s of &s;o great Importance,
that it will be very uncommodious or trouble&s;ome
to him to ob&s;erve that which by Law is command|ed)
to addre&s;&s;e him&s;elf to &s;ome man of approved
<PB N="295" REF="164">
Piety and Prudence, and plainly, and &s;incerely to
declare his mind unto him, and to acquie&s;ce in his
opinion, and his judgment.</P>
<P>XVII. But becau&s;e it may be, and oftentimes it
&s;o comes to pa&s;&s;e, that after all diligence there can
be obtained but little certainty of the mind of the
Law-maker from the Law it &s;elf, or not &s;o much
as the Con&s;cience of a good man may &s;afely acqui|e&s;ce
therein; We mu&s;t &s;eek further in &s;o doubtfull
a ca&s;e, &amp; examine what interpretation we are to fol|low
in &s;o doubtfull a ca&s;e, whether that which is the
more large &amp; favourable, as many will have it, or as
others, the &s;tricter interpretation; <HI>Martin Navar</HI>
a man of great authority among&s;t the Canoni&s;ts, is
&s;aid to be of an opinion, that he thought no pe|nal
Law did oblige to the <HI>fault, by it &s;elf,</HI> but only
to the <HI>penalty.</HI> Other Authors have been of another
judgment, and have taught, that every penal Law, un|le&s;s
by the mind of the Law-maker it was manife&s;t
to the contrary, did oblige to the fault al&s;o. I mu&s;t
confe&s;s that the <HI>extremes</HI> of both opinions have
been always &s;u&s;pected by me, &amp; it may &s;o come to
pa&s;s, that as &s;ome have &s;poken too favourably, &s;o
others too &s;everely. That therefore in a thing So
dubious we may have &s;omething to follow which is
certain, let this be the &s;econd Conclu&s;ion, <HI>A Law
purely penal, doth by it &s;elf, and ordinarily, oblige
only unto the penalty, and not unto the fault.</HI> I &s;ay in <MILESTONE N="1">
the fir&s;t place a Law purely penal, whether it be
<HI>categorically</HI> taken or <HI>disjunctively.</HI> I &s;ay in the &s;e|cond <MILESTONE N="2">
place, <HI>by it &s;elf,</HI> for by accident, and by the &s;up|po&s;ition
of a former obligation, it may oblige to
the <HI>fault</HI> al&s;o; for a penal Law is made to that end,
that Subjects by fear of puni&s;hment be compelled
<PB N="294" REF="165">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="295" REF="165">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="296" REF="166">
to their Duties, to which they were bound before
by a former Law, <HI>divine, natural,</HI> or <HI>humane,</HI> &s;o
tho&s;e penal Laws (he that killeth a man let him
&s;uffer the pains of Death; He that tran&s;porteth
Merchandize beyond the Seas, let him either pay
the Cu&s;tom, or lo&s;e his Merchandize) do oblige
to the fault, &s;o that who&s;oever &s;hall undergo
the puni&s;hment &s;hall not clear his Con&s;cience
thereby, unle&s;s he &s;hall obey the precept of the Law,
but they do not bind &s;o, <HI>by them&s;elves</HI> and by <HI>their
own virtue,</HI> but by the force of a precedent obliga|tion
that taketh its ri&s;e from the command of a
former Law. For the Subject was obliged before
that Law (according to our &s;uppo&s;ition,) was made,
both by the Law of God not to commit murder,
and by the Law of his Country to pay cu&s;tomes,
<MILESTONE N="3"> and taxes. I &s;ay in the third place, <HI>Ordinarily,</HI>
becau&s;e it may be done <HI>extraordinarily,</HI> the pre|&s;ent
&s;tate and condition of things &s;o requiring, &s;o
that what otherwi&s;e was free, and might be omit|ted,
may in an exigence fall out &s;o nece&s;&s;ary to be
done, that he may offend, and fail in his office if
he doth not do it, but <HI>ordinarily,</HI> the&s;e extraordi|nary
ca&s;es being excepted, he who is prepared to un|dergo
the puni&s;hment impo&s;ed by the Law, is no fur|ther
bound by that Law, if the Law be purely penal.</P>
<P>XVIII. The rea&s;on of the whole Conclu&s;ion is,
becau&s;e the maker of Lawes doth not oblige but by
commanding, and therefore a <HI>&s;imple ordination</HI>
which commandeth nothing doth no more oblige
of it &s;elf, than the Coun&s;el of a friend, or the ex|hortation
of a grave man; For as he who giveth
Coun&s;el to another, or doth exhort him to do <HI>this</HI> or
<HI>that,</HI> doth declare what it is that he de&s;ireth him
<PB N="297" REF="166">
to do, but doth neither oblige him to it, nor intend
to oblige him: &s;o a <HI>Legi&s;lator</HI> in that Law in which he
commandeth not any thing of the Subject, but only
&s;hews him what he would have him to act, under the
Condition of a propo&s;ed puni&s;hment, is to be pre&s;u|med
not to have a will to oblige him further, but only
to the penalty he propo&s;ed; For if he had an Intenti|on
to oblige him to the <HI>fault</HI> al&s;o, it had been
mo&s;t ea&s;y for him by adding a command to &s;ignifie
his intention &s;o unto him. Therefore &s;eeing that a
&s;imple and bare ordination doth not <HI>it &s;elf</HI> oblige
unto the fault, and the addition of a <HI>temporal penalty</HI>
cannot of it &s;elf oblige but only to the undergoing
of the <HI>temporal penalty,</HI> it is manife&s;t, that a Law
<HI>purely penal,</HI> which containeth nothing <HI>in it &s;elf</HI> be|&s;ides
a <HI>bare ordination</HI> and temporal penalty annex|ed
to it, neither of which is obligatory to the fault,
cannot of it &s;elf oblige unto the fault, but unto the
<HI>puni&s;hment</HI> al&s;o. And the &s;ame is to be &s;poken of
tho&s;e Laws which are called <HI>conventional,</HI> which
example I the more willingly do u&s;e, becau&s;e it &s;er|veth
not only to confirm, but excellently to illu&s;|trate
our Conclu&s;ion To which al&s;o may be added
the will of the Te&s;tator, and many other things,
which as to the power of obligation are all of a
like nature. The Inhabitants of &s;ome Town, who
have not the power to make Laws, properly &s;o call|ed,
do yet in the <HI>Court of the Lord of the Mannor</HI>
(for &s;o they term it) debate and agree among&s;t
them&s;elves concerning &s;ome things conducing to
the keeping of <HI>peace</HI> and <HI>ju&s;tice</HI> among&s;t their
Neighbours, and under the <HI>name of penalty,</HI> a <HI>pecu|<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">iary
mulct</HI> is impo&s;ed on tho&s;e who &s;hall violate
the <HI>agreement,</HI> the&s;e conventions are called the
<PB N="298" REF="167">
<HI>Laws of the Inhabitants,</HI> and in our own language
<HI>BY LAWES,</HI> for learned men and skilful in
antiquity, do note that in the antient language of
the Saxons, the mono&s;yllable <HI>BY,</HI> doth &s;ignifie
a habitation; We with many others, for informa|tions
&s;ake, do call the&s;e Laws <HI>conventional Laws,</HI>
for although they be contracts only, and conven|tions
among&s;t private per&s;ons, and to &s;peak pro|perly,
not Laws, by rea&s;on of the defect of the
publick Authority, yet they are commonly called
Laws, by rea&s;on of the Analogy which they have
with Laws properly &s;o called, and as to tho&s;e two
effects of the Laws, of <HI>directing</HI> and <HI>obliging;</HI> for
as the Lawes do direct the Subjects, &s;o tho&s;e Con|ventions
do direct the Per&s;ons confenting in the act|ing,
and do oblige them to the performance of what
they are to act, and certain it is, that in the&s;e Con|ventions
the per&s;ons contracting did not intend mu|tually
to oblige them&s;elves to the <HI>Fault,</HI> but only
to the Penalty; For Example &s;ake, The <HI>Inhabi|tants</HI>
of &s;ome village do agree among&s;t them&s;elves,
that the Ma&s;ters of every Family in that village &s;hall
every year in the Month of <HI>May</HI> work in their own
per&s;ons three days for the repairing of the High|wayes,
and they who &s;hall not do &s;o, (&s;uppo&s;e
here that every days work is valued at ten pence)
&s;hall have a <HI>mulct</HI> upon them to pay twenty pence;
It is certain by this conventional Law, that the per|&s;ons
who did contract it, did chiefly intend the year|ly
repairing of the High-ways, &amp; moreover they wil|ed,
that every Ma&s;ter of his Family &s;hould labour in
his own per&s;on for &s;o profitable a work, otherwi&s;e
they would not agree upon a mulct, that they who
refu&s;ed &s;hould pay as much again as the days work
<PB N="299" REF="167">
came unto; And as certain it is on the other&s;ide,
that they intended not mutually to oblige them
&s;elves any further than to the paying of the im|po&s;ed
<HI>mulct,</HI> if any one of them either by the rea&s;on
of other imployments could not, or upon any o|ther
pretences what&s;oever, would not in his own
per&s;on perform that work.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Imperia mortuo|rum. <HI>Senec. 3. Contr. v.</HI> 9. Legatum est quod legis modo te&s;tamento relinqui|tur VLV. <HI>In&s;titu. Cap.</HI></NOTE> So in Wills and Te&s;ta|ments
(for Te&s;taments are as a Law al&s;o,
both to direct and to oblige the Executors
and tho&s;e thar are to receive the Legacies.) <HI>Caius
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">lleth that his Wife Caia, while &s;he remaineth a
Widdow, &s;hall retain the hou&s;es with the adjacent
lands which he bought of Titius, but if &s;he marryeth
he is to lo&s;e them,</HI> It is manife&s;t, that it is the Will
of <HI>Ca<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ias,</HI> that his wife &s;hould remain a widdow, and
&s;hould not marry again, for in that <HI>Intention</HI> he
annexed that <HI>Condition</HI> by the fear of the Dam|mage
to deterre his wife from a &s;econd Mariage,
And by in&s;erting that Condition, he intended not,
and indeed could not intend to oblige his wife to
the <HI>Fault,</HI> as to have offended if &s;he &s;hould have
marryed another Husband.</P>
<P>XIX. But you will allege, Agreements do ob|lige,
and Wills and Te&s;taments do oblige to the
<HI>fault,</HI> for he offendeth who &s;tandeth not to the A|greement
he hath made, And tho&s;e offend who do
otherwi&s;e than by the will of the Dead is ordered;
I an&s;wer, that the Ca&s;e is far different to violate
Contracts, Laws, or the Wills of the Dead, and
to infringe the <HI>will</HI> of a Legi&s;lator, or a Te&s;tator
made under a Condition; How great the difference
is, the Examples which before we have produced
will be&s;t of all inform us. He doth not pre&s;ently
tran&s;gre&s;&s;e again&s;t that conventional Law of work|ing
<PB N="300" REF="168">
for three days under a pecuniary Mulct, who
refu&s;eth to work, unle&s;&s;e he refu&s;eth al&s;o to pay
the Mulct; For he &s;tands to what was agreed
upon, if he performeth either, and that al&s;o accor|ding
to the intention of tho&s;e who made the agree|ment,
who intended indeed mutually to oblige
them&s;elves to the performance of that work, but not
&s;imply &amp; ab&s;olutely, but under the condition above
&s;pecified; So in that <HI>Te&s;tamentary Law</HI> of <HI>Caia</HI> marry|ing
another Husband, <HI>Caius</HI> being dead, &s;he offendeth
not by marrying, although it be certain that the Te&s;ta|tor
had rather, and indeed willed (for he who <HI>had
rather, willeth</HI>) that &s;he &s;hould not marry, yet not|with&s;tanding
&s;he &s;hould undoubtedly offend if be|ing
now marryed unto another, &s;he &s;hould &s;till re|tain
the Lands and Hou&s;es upon &s;uch a condition
bequeathed to her in the Will, and &s;hould not re|&s;tore
them to the Heir. The rea&s;on of both the
examples is the &s;ame, becau&s;e in both of them the
obligation was not <HI>pure, &s;imple,</HI> and <HI>ab&s;olute,</HI> but
only <HI>conditinal;</HI> For always a <HI>condition</HI> of its own
nature, doth &s;u&s;pend the <HI>obligation,</HI> &s;o that the
condition being kept, the obligation immediately,
as if the Bonds were loo&s;ed, doth fall to the
Ground. The Ca&s;e is the very &s;ame in Laws that
are purely penal, as to the <HI>manner,</HI> and <HI>mea&s;ure of
obliging,</HI> which they will ea&s;ily under&s;tand who have
the will and the lei&s;ure to compare the&s;e con&s;idera|tions
among&s;t them&s;elves, &s;o that we need not any
longer to in&s;i&s;t in the explication of them.</P>
<P>XX. But peradventure &s;ome one may yet in|&s;tance,
that no man can be obliged to the <HI>Puni&s;h|ment,</HI>
but he mu&s;t be obliged to the <HI>Fault</HI> al&s;o,
for a <HI>Penalty</HI> cannot ju&s;tly be impo&s;ed on any, un|le&s;s
<PB N="301" REF="168">
for &s;ome antecedent <HI>Fault,</HI> according to that of
St. <HI>Augu&s;tin, Omnis poena &s;i ju&s;ta e&s;t, peccati poena e&s;t;
Every puni&s;hment, if it be ju&s;t, is the puni&s;hment of
&s;ome &s;in.</HI> The &s;econd objection is derived from
the Nature of the Law, they urge, which is to com+mand
&s;omething, therfore that Law which we have
&s;aid is <HI>purely penal,</HI> hath not the Nature of a Law if it
commands nothing, or if implicitly at lea&s;t it con|taineth
&s;ome Command, it mu&s;t al&s;o oblige unto
the <HI>Fault,</HI> for a fault is nothing el&s;e but a Tran&s;|gre&s;&s;ion
or a Violation of a ju&s;t Command.</P>
<P>XXI. To the fir&s;t objection we may an&s;wer &s;e|veral
ways, For in the fir&s;t place it may truly be
&s;aid, that indeed <HI>eternal Puni&s;hment</HI> as it is under
the ab&s;olute Notion of Puni&s;hment, and cannot o|therwi&s;e
be con&s;idered but in the true Nature of Pu|ni&s;hment,
mu&s;t therfore nece&s;&s;arily &s;uppo&s;e &s;ome
antecedent fault which hath de&s;erved it, and for
which without any other re&s;pect what&s;oever, he
who is guilty of that Fault, is afflicted with the Pu|ni&s;hment,
but there is not the &s;ame con&s;iderati|on
in all <HI>&s;piritual Puni&s;hments,</HI> much more in
<HI>temporal Puni&s;hments;</HI> For although both of them
as it is a Puni&s;hment, doth &s;uppo&s;e &s;ome precedent
fault worthy of &s;uch a Puni&s;hment, for otherwi&s;e
it would not be ju&s;t, yet becau&s;e they may be o|therwi&s;e
con&s;idered, than under the bare notion
of a puni&s;hment, <HI>viz.</HI> In re&s;pect to the <HI>End</HI>
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ntended by the <HI>party puni&s;hing</HI> (that is, not &s;o much
as ordinated to revenge a fault pa&s;t, as to pre|vent
a fault to come) it comes thereupon to pa&s;&s;e,
that neither God him&s;elf when he afflicts a man
either with a &s;piritual or a temporal puni&s;hment,
neither man when he inflicts upon a man a tempo|ral
<PB N="302" REF="169">
puni&s;hment, doth always preci&s;ely re&s;pect their
Sins or offences, but very often they do propound
other ends unto them&s;elves. To this purpo&s;e
belongeth that an&s;wer of our Saviour, when
his Di&s;ciples asked him concerning the blind man,
whether it were for his Sins, or his Fathers that he
was born blind? <HI>Joh.</HI> 9. 3. His an&s;wer was, that
neither his Sins, nor his Fathers were the occa&s;ion
of his blindne&s;&s;e, <HI>but that the works of God might be
manife&s;ted in him;</HI> The rea&s;on is, becau&s;e in <HI>morals,</HI>
the E&s;timation of things, and the Denomination
of them, is taken rather from the <HI>final,</HI> than
from the <HI>efficient,</HI> and <HI>meritorious Cau&s;e.</HI></P>
<P>XXII. Secondly, it may be &s;aid, that the rela|tion
of a <HI>temporal puni&s;hment</HI> to a Sin, doth pro|perly
con&s;i&s;t only in that puni&s;hment which <HI>rela|tively</HI>
is oppo&s;ed to the Sin, and not in that puni&s;h|ment
which only <HI>contrarily</HI> is oppo&s;ed to it, which
is the loo&s;er and more improper &s;ignification of
<HI>the word.</HI> We have heretofore made u&s;e of this
di&s;tinction, and explained it in the &s;econd <HI>Praecogni|&s;ance</HI>
to this <HI>Doubt,</HI> therefore there needs no repe|tition
of it; It may &s;uffice to put you in mind, that
the <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> affixed to the Law that is <HI>purely
penal,</HI> is not called a puni&s;hment, <HI>&s;trictly,</HI> and
<HI>properly,</HI> but <HI>improperly,</HI> and more <HI>largely,</HI> as it
&s;ignifies another kind of <HI>Evil,</HI> diver&s;e from the
<HI>Evil</HI> of the <HI>Fault,</HI> which kind of puni&s;hment may
be infflicted on a per&s;on without any legal inju&s;tice,
and for a <HI>profitable end,</HI> as to avoid &s;ome publick
Inconvenience, without the delinquency of the
per&s;on &s;uffering, for the word <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> &s;o
taken doth contain all <HI>lo&s;&s;es, m<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">fortunes,</HI> or <HI>ad|ver&s;ities,</HI>
or what&s;oever befalls a man which he
<PB N="303" REF="169">
de&s;ireth might never have to come to pa&s;s.</P>
<P>XXIII. If the&s;e things &s;hall not &s;atisfie the Read|er,
yet this will be very remarkable which here in
the third place I &s;hall propound unto you, and
which will quite remove all this Doubt, and very
aptly meet with another objection, which is, that
the Intent of a penal Law (of which we now &s;peak)
being to <HI>oblige the Subject,</HI> and yet but <HI>condition|ally</HI>
to oblige him, may be con&s;idered two or three
ways; Fir&s;t, preci&s;ely, as <HI>to that to which</HI> it intendeth <MILESTONE N="1">
to oblige under &s;uch a condition to be done. Se|condly,<MILESTONE N="2">
as preci&s;ely to the condition it &s;elf, by
which it intendeth to oblige, the one whereof con|taineth
the ordination of the Law, and the other
the puni&s;hment annexed to it. Thirdly, as to the <MILESTONE N="3">
whole <HI>aggregate,</HI> that is the whole Law it &s;elf,
which at once con&s;i&s;teth of the complexion of
them both. This di&s;tinction being laid down, I
&s;ay in the fir&s;t place, that that part of the Law
which containeth only the condition or the puni&s;h|ment
doth not of it &s;elf oblige <HI>unto the fault,</HI> for a
bare condition is of no prevalence, as all do grant,
and it is manife&s;t of it &s;elf; He doth not therefore
tran&s;gre&s;s, nay rather he very well performs his of|fice,
who avoids the penalty of the Law, provided he
performeth that which the Law ordaineth. Second|ly,<MILESTONE N="2">
I affirm, that that part of the Law which con|tains
the ordination, doth not of it &s;elf oblige un|to
the fault, for no Law obligeth beyond the in|tention
of the Law-giver, &amp; certain it is that the <HI>Le|gi&s;lator</HI>
by that part of the Law did not intend, <HI>per
&s;e</HI> or <HI>by it &s;elf,</HI> to oblige the Subject <HI>to the fault,</HI> for
then it had intended to have <HI>obliged him &s;imply,</HI> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">r
that part, taken <HI>preci&s;ely</HI> and by it &s;elf, doth contain
<PB N="304" REF="170">
no condition in it; but by the condition of the Law
added in the other part, it is manife&s;t that he did
not intend <HI>&s;imply to oblige</HI> to the doing of <HI>that</HI>
which the Law ordaineth, but under a condition
in that Law expre&s;&s;ed. I &s;ay thirdly, that a <HI>pe|nal</HI><MILESTONE N="3">
<HI>Law</HI> taken <HI>wholy</HI> and <HI>joyntly</HI> doth oblige to the
<HI>Fault,</HI> in this &s;en&s;e, that he is guilty of the Fault,
and &s;inneth again&s;t the Law, who when he ought
to ob&s;erve both parts, performeth neither; For as
among&s;t <HI>Logicians,</HI> the truth of a di&s;junctive pro|po&s;ition
depends upon the truth of &s;ome one part
of it, &s;o that it is all of it <HI>true,</HI> if either of the
parts of it be <HI>true,</HI> and not fal&s;e unle&s;s both parts
of it be fal&s;e; So in <HI>morals,</HI> he ob&s;erveth a di&s;junct|ive
Law (and every Law <HI>purely penal</HI> is <HI>di&s;junctive,</HI>
or <HI>formally,</HI> or <HI>equivalently,</HI>) who performeth
one of the two parts propounded, and he doth
not violate the Law, unle&s;s he doth neglect
them both.</P>
<P>XXIV. This which was to be &s;poken of the ob|ligation
of a Law <HI>purely penal,</HI> being as I conceive
&s;ufficiently unfolded, let us now pa&s;&s;e to the
con&s;ideration of a <HI>penal Law mixed;</HI> Concerning
which I make this my third conclu&s;ion; <HI>A penal
Law mixed</HI> (to wit, which openly commandeth
&s;omething to be ob&s;erved, and that it more dili|gently
may be performed which is commanded,
doth appoint a penalty to the tran&s;gre&s;&s;ors) doth
oblige both to the <HI>fault,</HI> and to the <HI>puni&s;hment,</HI>
in&s;omuch that he neither &s;atisfies the <HI>Law,</HI> nor
his <HI>Con&s;cience,</HI> who undergoes the puni&s;hment,
unle&s;s he doth perform that al&s;o which is com|manded
by the Law. There is none can doubt
that &s;uch a Law doth oblige to the <HI>puni&s;hment,</HI>
<PB N="305" REF="170">
for otherwi&s;e of what u&s;e would the puni&s;h|ment
be that is added to it; And it is manife&s;t that
it obligeth to the <HI>fault,</HI> becau&s;e it containeth a
manife&s;t command; And every command obli|geth
to the <HI>fault.</HI> For a Fault, or a Sin, is nothing
el&s;e but the tran&s;gre&s;&s;ion of &s;ome precept, 1 <HI>Joh.</HI>
3. Neither can that be probably &s;poken, which is
&s;aid to be the opinion of <HI>Navarr,</HI> that the Law-maker
by in&s;erting the puni&s;hment, doth &s;ignify,
that he hath no intention of obliging, but only to
that <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> which is annexed. Ob&s;erve I pray
you, how perver&s;e it is, &s;o to interpret the appoint|ing
of a puni&s;hment, which it is certain is for that
end annexed to the precept, that the &s;aid precept
by the fear of puni&s;hment, might more diligently,
and more accurately be ob&s;erved, as to make
weak, and take-away the obligation of the &s;aid
precept. Numberle&s;&s;e are the Laws which
throughout the world are made again&s;t Thieves,
Murderers, perjured Per&s;ons, and other wicked
and nefarious people; God al&s;o gave a Law to
our fir&s;t Parents, by which he forbad them to eat
of the fruit of the Tree which was in the mid&s;t of
Paradi&s;e, having annexed to the prohibition, the
puni&s;hment of death, if they &s;hould eat thereof;
<HI>Gen.</HI> 2. Can any man be found &s;o d<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">&s;titute of
rea&s;on as to think that <HI>Adam</HI> was obliged by this
<HI>Divine Law,</HI> and that others are obliged by <HI>Hu|mane
Laws,</HI> to the <HI>puni&s;hment</HI> only, and not unto
the <HI>fault?</HI> Who will affirm (to omit humane
Laws) that <HI>Adam</HI> was not obliged in Con&s;cience
by that Divine Law to ab&s;tain from the forbidden
fruit, but to this only, that if he did eat thereof,
he &s;hould be ready to undergoe the &s;etence of
<PB N="306" REF="171">
death? The opinion therefore of <HI>Navarre</HI> being
exploded as dangerous, and by all men confuted,
(if indeed the opinion was his, which I &s;hall hardly
believe, he being a man of &s;o reverend a fame) we
are to affirm, that a penal Law mixed, being both pe|nal,
and preceptive, doth oblige both to the puni&s;h|ment,
and to the Fault, to the puni&s;hment as it is
penal, and to the Fault as it is preceptive.</P>
<P>XXV. The third Doubt remaineth; How,
and how far the tran&s;gre&s;&s;or of a penal Law is
bound to undergoe the puni&s;hment in the fact it
&s;elf that is appointed by the Law? I mu&s;t make
ha&s;te, I will therefore be as &s;hort as I can; I &s;ay
therefore in the fir&s;t place, if the puni&s;hment ap|pointed
<MILESTONE N="1"> by the Law be &s;uch that it impo&s;eth not
any thing upon the tran&s;gre&s;&s;or to be either done
or &s;uffered by him, but con&s;i&s;teth rather in an <HI>in|ability</HI>
to do &s;omething which was commodious
for him to do, or in an incapacity of receiv|ing
&s;omthing which would be profitable for
him, he is guilty of the Law &s;o violated,
and is bound <HI>ip&s;o facto</HI> to undergo the puni&s;hment.
There are many Laws which do forbid tran&s;gre&s;|&s;ors,
to do this or that, as the Civil Laws for certain
cau&s;es do forbid <HI>tran&s;lationem Dominii, the alteration
of power or free-holds;</HI> There are al&s;o many Laws
which for &s;uch a certain time, do make Delinquents
incapable of &s;uch a place, or dignity; As if a Di&s;turber
of the peace, by a &s;tatute of the Univer&s;ity, be pro|hibited
to have his <HI>Grace</HI> propounded in the Con|gregation
Hou&s;e for the &s;pace of two years after
the fault committed; In &s;uch &amp; the like ca&s;es, where
the puni&s;hment con&s;i&s;teth only in the <HI>Inability,</HI> or
the <HI>In<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">pacity,</HI> becau&s;e to undergoe this puni&s;hment
there is no <HI>Cooperation</HI> required of the per&s;on to be
<PB N="307" REF="171">
puni&s;hed, but rather a certain Ce&s;&s;ation of <HI>opera|ting,</HI>
He who hath violated the Law, is obli|ged
willingly to &s;uffer the puni&s;hment, al|though <MILESTONE N="2">
he be not required; I &s;ay in the &s;econd
place, if the puni&s;hment appointed by the Law be
&s;uch, that a <HI>cooperation</HI> of the per&s;on offending be
nece&s;&s;arily required to the Execution of the Law,
that is, that he who is to be puni&s;hed is to
act &s;omething him&s;elf in his own puni&s;hment,
he is not obliged <HI>ordinarily</HI> to undergoe the &s;aid
puni&s;hment <HI>ip&s;o facto,</HI> before the Judge hath
pronounced the &s;entence, or which is the &s;ame,
before the puni&s;hment be exacted of him, by
a per&s;on to that purpo&s;e inve&s;ted with lawful
Authority; The guilty per&s;on is bound indeed
to &s;uffer the puni&s;hment, but if he called to it,<MILESTONE N="3">
otherwi&s;e he is not bound. I &s;ay in the third
place, that a guilty man, after the &s;entence pro|nounced
by the Judge, or after he is required to it
by a per&s;on inve&s;ted with lawful Authority, is ob|liged
to a willing undergoing of the puni&s;hment,
yea, and with &s;ome Cooperation of his own,
if this Cooperation be not again&s;t the Laws
of humanity, though otherwi&s;e very grievous,
and extremely painful. For examples &s;ake,
If an offendor be commanded to pay a great
&s;um of money, under the name of penalty,
or to depart the Kingdome, he is bound by
the power of the Law to the performance of
it: but if the puni&s;hment impo&s;ed be not on|ly
grievous, but &s;omething al&s;o that is in|humane,
as if a malefactor be commanded to
&s;courge him&s;elf, to cut off his own hand,
to drinke poy&s;on, or the like, in the&s;e ca&s;es
the guilty per&s;on is obliged to undergoe the
<PB N="308" REF="172">
puni&s;hment <HI>pa&s;&s;ively,</HI> but he is not obliged <HI>actively</HI>
to cooperate in it, w^c^h^. he knows to be ordained by
the Law, and which by his default he hath de&s;erved;
And let this &s;uffice to be &s;poken of the nece&s;&s;ity of
the Promulgation of Laws, and of the Obligation of
tho&s;e <HI>penal Laws</HI> which may &s;eem to have any
reference with the Formal Cau&s;e of Laws.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="9" TYPE="lecture">
<PB N="309" REF="172">
<HEAD>THE
NINTH LECTURE
Of the Obligation of Humane Laws,
in re&s;pect of the Final Cau&s;e
thereof.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>1 TIM. 2. 2.</BIBL>
<Q>For Kings, and for all that are in Authority,
that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in
all Godline&s;&s;e and Hone&s;ty.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_IN our former Lectures we have
treated of the Obligation of
<HI>Humane Laws,</HI> as to their <HI>Ma|terial,
Efficient, and formal
Cau&s;es,</HI> in &s;ome places perad|venture
more largely, and in
others again peradventure more conci&s;ely
than was requi&s;ite; It remaineth, that we &s;hould
proceed to the explication of tho&s;e things which
do pertain to the <HI>final Cau&s;e</HI> of Laws; But before
<PB N="310" REF="173">
we do come to di&s;&s;olve the&s;e doubts, we are fir&s;t to
premi&s;e, and pronounce as an undoubted Truth,
<HI>That the ultimate end of the Laws, is the good of the
<MILESTONE N="1"> Commonalty,</HI> or the publick peace and tranquillity;
This is proved fir&s;t from tho&s;e very words of the
Apo&s;tle, <HI>that we may live a quiet &amp; a peaceable life.</HI>
The Apo&s;tle doth here exhort, that both private|ly,
but e&s;pecially in publick Congregations (for &s;o
I conceive this place to be under&s;tood, and the
be&s;t Interpreters are of the &s;ame opinion with me)
Reque&s;ts, Prayers, and Supplications, with
thanksgivings, may be made, as fir&s;t for all men in
general, out of Charity, and in order to a Spiritu|al
end, <HI>viz.</HI> Eternal happine&s;s in the life to come,
as they are men, and either in <HI>Act,</HI> or in <HI>Power,</HI>
Members of the my&s;tical Body of Chri&s;t, &s;o more
e&s;pecially for Kings and others inve&s;ted with &s;u|preme
Authority, and this out of Prudence, and
in order to a Temporal end, to wit, external fe|licity
in this pre&s;ent life, as they are the chief
Members of the <HI>body politicks,</HI> from who&s;e le|gi&s;lative,
and executive power, accordingly as
they have admini&s;tred it, whether rightly or un|ju&s;tly,
either the chief happine&s;s, or unhappine&s;s
of the re&s;t of the Members, and by con&s;equence
of the whole Body, doth depend; <HI>Therefore the
making of Laws being the chief Act of the &s;upreme
political Juri&s;diction,</HI> that which is the &s;u|preme
<HI>End</HI> of that &s;upreme <HI>Juri&s;diction,</HI> is al&s;o
the &s;upreme <HI>End</HI> of the making of Laws, to wit,
<MILESTONE N="2"> the good of the Commonalty; It is proved &s;e|condly,
from the Nature of the <HI>End,</HI> as by a De|mon&s;tration
<HI>a priori;</HI> That, in its order, is the <HI>ul|timate
End</HI> of everything, to which all the <HI>Acts</HI>
<PB N="311" REF="173">
of that thing are reduced,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ari&s;t. 8. Ethic. 11.</NOTE> as to their fir&s;t <HI>regula|tive
principle,</HI> and to which they are referred as to
that for who&s;e &s;ake they are <HI>ultimately</HI> ordained,
Therefore the Final Cau&s;e is commonly called by
<HI>Ari&s;totle That for which;</HI> But all the <HI>Acts</HI> of Laws,
are regulated by the <HI>Common good,</HI> as by their
fir&s;t Rule and Principle, and are referred to the
<HI>Common good,</HI> as to that for who&s;e &s;ake they are
made, as may appear by running over the &s;everal
<HI>Acts,</HI> Therefore, <HI>&amp;c.</HI> For wherefore are good
things commanded, or evil ones forbidden, and
things indifferent, and of a middle Nature per|mitted?
Or wherefore are Rewards decreed to
men that have de&s;erved well of the Common-wealth?
or wherefore are puni&s;hments appointed
to the Violators of Laws? or wherefore are the
Laws in the Courts indifferently pleaded unto
both? of which tho&s;e are the <HI>fir&s;t Acts</HI> of
Laws, and by the way of <HI>Form,</HI> and the other
more <HI>remote,</HI> and by the way of <HI>Effect;</HI> Is it not for
that end, that the Common-wealth may flouri&s;h in
peace and &s;afety, and that private men according
to their mea&s;ure and degrees, may partake, rejoyce,
in the publick happine&s;&s;e, in a word, that they
may be all in&s;ervient to the <HI>Common good?</HI> Thirdly,
it is proved <HI>a po&s;teriori,</HI> from the <HI>po&s;terior,</HI> by the
&s;ence and con&s;ent of all men; For the Law-makers
who do decree ju&s;t judgements, do indeed appear,
and tho&s;e who meditate on <HI>Evil</HI> as a <HI>Law,</HI>
do notwith&s;tanding de&s;ire to &s;eem to have an Eye
to the <HI>Common good</HI> and profit in the making of
their Laws, and to preferr the publick intere&s;t a|bove
their own; Whether they &s;incerely intend,
or craftily pretend, they all profe&s;&s;e that in
the making of their Laws, their chiefe&s;t In|tention
<PB N="312" REF="174">
was the publick Good.</P>
<P>II. This foundation of the pre&s;ent di&s;cour&s;e
being laid, to wit, That the End of Laws is the
good of the Common-wealth, I proceed to the
<HI>Doubts,</HI> whereof let this be the fir&s;t, Whether
there be any nece&s;&s;ary u&s;e at lea&s;t of Humane
Laws? And indeed we &s;hould not have needed
to have made any <HI>Doubt</HI> of it, did not the mad er|rors
of the Anabapti&s;ts, and &s;ome others of their
faction, make this bu&s;ine&s;&s;e for us, from who&s;e
Principles, &s;eeing they affirm, it is not lawful for
a man that is a Chri&s;tian to be a Magi&s;trate, or to
contend by war, or by &s;utes in Law, to &s;wear, or to
admini&s;ter an oath to any one, it &s;eems to follow,
that there is no need at all of Humane Laws;
For take away but Juri&s;diction, there will be no
man to make Laws, and take away the Seats,
and Courts of Ju&s;tice, there will be no man that
will fear them. What need &s;ad complaints, if the
offence be not redre&s;&s;ed by puni&s;hment, what
will vain Laws profit without the execution of
them? The Directive power of the Law mu&s;t of
nece&s;&s;ity fall unto the ground, if the Coactive
power doth not a&s;&s;i&s;t it. The rea&s;on of this Doubt
is, for the Law of Nature may &s;uffice to leave the
Gentiles inexcu&s;able, which dictates to them to
e&s;chew all Sins, and tre&s;pa&s;&s;es, to injure no man,
and the like; But if that be defective, the Chri&s;t|ian
hath at hand a more &s;ublime, and a more
perfect Law, to wit, the Law of Faith, Ju&s;tice,
and Charity, made by our Saviour Je&s;us Chri&s;t,
whom St. <HI>James</HI> acknowledgeth to be the only
Judge and Law-giver.<NOTE PLACE="marg">James. 4. 12.</NOTE> This place in my Judge|ment,
doth neerly touch our Innovatours, who
have derived and drawn mo&s;t of their opinion
<PB N="313" REF="174">
from the unclean wells of the Anabapti&s;ts, whil&s;t
they collect from that place of the Apo&s;tle, that
it is lawful for no man be&s;ides Chri&s;t alone to
make Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws, for it no wayes appear|eth
either by the force of the words, or by the
&s;cope and order of the whole <HI>perioch,</HI> that the
Apo&s;tle hath &s;poke more there of <HI>Eccle&s;ia&s;tical
Laws,</HI> then of <HI>Civil;</HI> And unle&s;s they had ra|ther
deal <HI>unfaithfuly</HI> and <HI>deceitfuly</HI> with us, than
be ruled by rea&s;on, they mu&s;t do one of the&s;e two
things, which they plea&s;e, either turn ab&s;olute
Anabapti&s;ts, and take away altogether from
mankind all the power of making Laws, or grant
unto &s;upreme Magi&s;trates, as it is fit they &s;hould,
the power of making Eccle&s;ia&s;tical Laws.</P>
<P>III. But how the&s;e our Brethren can di&s;intangle
them&s;elves from the &s;nares of the Anabapti&s;ts, it
doth not much concern us, let them look unto it
them&s;elves; We ea&s;ily do an&s;wer, that the Law
of Nature is written in our hearts, and the Law of
Chri&s;t is revealed in the Go&s;pel, and that both of
them in their kind are mo&s;t perfect, but &s;o, that
for all that, it is mo&s;t manife&s;t that the profit of hu|mane
Lawes is very great, and their u&s;e as nece&s;&s;a|ry.
Becau&s;e tho&s;e divine Laws do contain only
<HI>general Principles</HI> of things to be done, From
which, as <HI>Conclu&s;ions</HI> from their <HI>Principles,</HI>
more <HI>&s;pecial Rules</HI> are to be deduced, accommoda|ted
to the right In&s;titution of <HI>publick Societies,</HI> &amp; of
the manners of &s;ingle per&s;ons. Neither is it any way
to be feared that it may derogate at all from the
perfection of the Law of God; For the makers of
humane Laws do not go about to add any new &s;tock
to the mo&s;t rich Trea&s;ure of the divine Law, but
they rather take from thence what they judge mo&s;t
<PB N="314" REF="175">
profitable to them&s;elves, and to their people, and
the good of the Common-wealth; Humane Laws
therfore, if they are ju&s;t, are nothing el&s;e but the
Relicts of the Law of God, that is, particular de|terminations
of the <HI>general Rules</HI> which the Law of
Nature, and the word of God have exhibited in|determinatly,
wi&s;ely accommodated to the Con|dition
&amp; Utility of certain people, according to the
con&s;ideration of Times, and Places. For Examples
&s;ake, The Law of Nature doth teach in general,
that we are to offer an Injury to no man, and he
who doth &s;o is bound to make re&s;titution; but to de|&s;cend
to the &s;pecialty, what injury he hath done un|to
his neighbour who hath broke down the Hedge,
and let in his Cattel into his Grounds, and what is
the re&s;titution to be made for &s;uch an Injury, is
not determined by the Law of Nature, but by the
Civil Law; And the Scripture doth openly hold
forth, that wicked men are to be puni&s;hed by the
Magi&s;trate. <HI>Rom.</HI> 13. 4. and in other places;
But what kind of wickedne&s;&s;e the Magi&s;trate
is to puni&s;h, what puni&s;hment to afflict, and
after what proportion, is no where defined in
the Law of God; Power being tran&s;mitted to
Princes &amp; Law-makers, by God, to define of them|&s;elves,
by Laws well con&s;tituted, what accord|ting
to their wi&s;dome they &s;hall find mo&s;t &s;afe and
profitable to the Common-wealth; The Rights
therefore and the Laws of God, and of a Legi&s;la|tor,
and a Judge, are di&s;tinct, and proper to them|&s;elves,
and di&s;po&s;ed in &s;o excellent an order, that
the Precepts and Commandments of God, which
are general, and indeterminate, are by the Law-maker
determined, and accommodated to certain
Species of per&s;ons, and actions, and being &s;o de|termined
<PB N="315" REF="175">
by the Laws, the Judge doth effectually ap+ply
them to the particular cau&s;es of per&s;ons, &amp; acti|ons;
&s;o that if a Legi&s;lator &s;hould make a Law
which is not complacent to the Law of God, he is
to be adjudged to have made an unrighteous Law,
and if a Judge in any particular Cau&s;e &s;hall pro|nounce
Sentence which is not congruous to the
Law con&s;tituted by the Prince, he is to be judged
him&s;elf to have pronounced an unju&s;t Sentence.</P>
<P>IV The &s;econd Doubt is, whether a Law-maker
be obliged, if po&s;&s;ibly he can effect it, to com|mand
all the acts, and offices of all Virtues, and
to forbid all Sins of what&s;oever nature they are,
or if he cannot all, whether he be bound to com|mand
and forbid as many of both kinds as po&s;&s;ibly
he can? The Rea&s;on of the Doubt is, becau&s;e
there is nothing more conducing to the proper
end of the Law, which is the <HI>common good,</HI> than
as much as po&s;&s;ibly may be, that all the Citizens
may be good, and none of them evil. Therefore
it is the part of a Law-maker, who always is to have
before his eys this end which is the common good,
to take all po&s;&s;ible care he can, to command the prac|tice
of all <HI>Acts</HI> of all Vertues, that &s;o all his Citizens
may be good, &amp; to forbid all Sins what&s;oever, that
there be no unrighteou&s;ne&s;&s;e among&s;t them; and the
two chief of the Apo&s;tles doe &s;eem to require this of
the political Magi&s;trate, <HI>Rom.</HI> 13. 3, 4. St. <HI>Paul</HI> hath
the&s;e words, <HI>Do good and thou &s;halt have Prai&s;e,
but if thou dost evil, fear, for the Magi&s;trate is
a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil,</HI>
that is, on him who doth any manner of evil; And
St. <HI>Peter</HI> in his fir&s;t Epi&s;tle, &s;econd Chapter, and
fourteenth ver&s;e <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<PB N="316" REF="176">
<HI>for the puni&s;hment of evil doer<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">,
but the Prai&s;e of them that do well,</HI> that is, of all well-doers,
and of all evil-doers; For that which is pro|nounced
<HI>indefinitely</HI> is <HI>equipollent</HI> to an <HI>univer&s;al</HI> &amp;
it is con&s;onant to the Rule of the <HI>Logicians,</HI> (in a
nece&s;&s;ary matter) and to the will of God, who for|biddeth
the Magi&s;trate the acceptation of Per|&s;ons.</P>
<P>V. For an&s;wer, I &s;ay fir&s;t, and generally that
the Law-maker is bound to u&s;e his utmo&s;t Indea|vour
that his Citizens be all of them good men,
and none of them evil, and by con&s;equence to
command all Acts of Vertues, and to forbid all
Vices &s;o far, as the Rea&s;on of the <HI>Beginning from
whom, and the End for which</HI> he worketh, doth re|quire,
but beyond that he hath no obligation at all;
For the <HI>Beginnining</HI> and the <HI>End</HI> in the operations
of all, work they naturally, or work they freely,
are the adaequate mea&s;ure of all <HI>Intermedial Acts,</HI>
&s;o far as tho&s;e Acts are proportionate, &amp; conform|able,
with the Beginning from whence they pro|ceed,
&amp; with the End to which they tend. The Acts
therefore of <HI>Commanding</HI> and <HI>Forbidding,</HI> and o|thers
in which the Exerci&s;e of the <HI>legi&s;lative Juri&s;|diction</HI>
doth con&s;i&s;t, mu&s;t be proportionated both
to their <HI>Beginning</HI> in who&s;e Vertue they are done,
to wit, the Higher Powers granted by God, and
to their <HI>End</HI> for who&s;e &s;ake they are done, to wit,
the <HI>Common Good.</HI> A Law-maker therefore ought
&s;o far to <HI>command, prohibit, permit,</HI> and to per|form
all other Dutyes, as they are agreeable to the
power granted to him by God, and is expedient
for the Commonalty which God hath committed
to his change.</P>
<P><PB N="317" REF="176">
VI. But the&s;e con&s;iderations are general, and
indefinite; To &s;atisfie therefore the <HI>Doubt</HI> pro|pounded,
we mu&s;t de&s;cend to &s;omething which is
more particular, but which how&s;oever may rely on
this general foundation. I &s;ay therefore in the &s;econd
place, the <HI>acts</HI> of Virtues and Vices, &s;ome of them
being internal, of which nature are the freer <HI>acts</HI> of
the <HI>Will,</HI> as <HI>to will</HI> and not <HI>to will,</HI> and the movings
of the affections, to love, to hate, to grieve, and
if there be any other cogitations, and intentions of
the heart, and mind; and &s;ome of them being ex|ternal,
of which &s;ort are all the commanded acts
of the will, and the indeliberate motions of the
affections, which are exerci&s;ed by <HI>bodily Organs,</HI> as
to <HI>&s;ee,</HI> to <HI>&s;peak</HI> to <HI>&s;trike,</HI> to <HI>plunder,</HI> and innumerable
others; the Legi&s;lative power is only exerci&s;ed on
the <HI>outward acts,</HI> but not on the <HI>inward.</HI> A Law-ma|ker
may therefore command the payment of a debt,
the re&s;titution of &s;tollen goods, and the outward
wor&s;hip of God; He al&s;o may forbid Theft, Adul|tery,
Man&s;laughter, Bla&s;phemy, and the like;
But he cannot command the loving of his Neigh|bour,
the confidence to be had in God, the con|tempt
of the world, nor prohibit the coveting of
his Neighbours goods, uncha&s;t cogitations, the
hate of his Neighbour, and the Athei&s;m of the
heart. The rea&s;on is, becau&s;e to determine of in|ternal
actions is neither proportionate to the <HI>be|ginning
from which,</HI> nor to the <HI>end for which</HI> the
Legi&s;lator worketh; For Almighty God hath only
permitted to the Magi&s;trate the Government of the
<HI>external man,</HI> and hath re&s;erved to him&s;elf alone
the knowledge and judgment of the <HI>inward actions,</HI>
and the in&s;pection into the hearts of men; for the
<PB N="318" REF="177">
<HI>Legi&s;lator</HI> and the <HI>Judge</HI> is the &s;ame, as we have al|ready
proved by the te&s;timony of St. <HI>James,</HI> and
the Legi&s;lative power would be altogether ineffec|tual
to obtain its propo&s;ed <HI>end</HI> if it were only <HI>di|rective</HI>
<MILESTONE N="1"> and <HI>coactive.</HI> Fir&s;t therefore, &s;eeing an exter|nal
Court cannot under&s;tand, nor judge of inward
<MILESTONE N="2"> actions; And &s;econdly, &s;eeing it were a vain thing
to command or prohibit that by a Law which
<MILESTONE N="3"> when it is committed we are not able to puni&s;h;
And thirdly, &s;eeing the external operation of good
works, and the external declination of evil ones
doth &s;uffice to the outward felicity of a Republick,
it followeth, that a Legi&s;lator, or a Law-maker,
neither wi&s;ely can, nor rightly ought, either to
command, or to forbid the internal actions of
<HI>Virtues</HI> or <HI>Vices.</HI> In which regard, as in many o|thers,
the Law of <HI>God</HI> and <HI>Chri&s;t</HI> which requireth
Truth, Purity, Sincerity, in the inward parts,
and re&s;traineth and checketh the highe&s;t and fir&s;t in|ordinate
motions of the Will, and puni&s;heth as
well Sins thought on, as Sins committed, doth mo&s;t
infinitely excell the mo&s;t excellent Laws of men;
And therefore <HI>David</HI> in the 19 <HI>P&s;alm</HI> &s;aith, that the
Law of God is perfect and undefiled, and the Law
of Chri&s;t, is as the maker of it is de&s;cribed to be
in the fourth of <HI>Hebrews, A word lively and mighty
in operation, and &s;harper than a two-edged Sword,
and entreth through, even to the dividing a&s;under of
of the heart and Spirit, and of the Joynts and Mar|row,
and is a Di&s;cerner of the thoughts and inten|tion
of the hearts.</HI></P>
<P>VII. I &s;ay in the third place,, that Humane
Laws may <HI>de Jure,</HI> or <HI>by Right</HI> command
all the <HI>outward Acts</HI> of all Vertues, and forbid all
<PB N="319" REF="177">
the outward works of &s;in, but they cannot do it <HI>de
facto.</HI> The Rea&s;on of the fir&s;t member is, becau&s;e
there is no external Act of Vertue or of Vice, in
the whole Nature, and in every Species of, it &s;o
di&s;po&s;ed, but that the commanding or the forbid|ding
of it (according to the Condition of <HI>Affairs</HI>
and <HI>Times</HI>) may be <HI>ordinated</HI> to the <HI>publiek good.</HI>
Therefore not only the Acts of Ju&s;tice, properly &s;o
called, (as &s;ome will have it) but the acts al&s;o of
all other Vertues what&s;oever may become the due
object, and matter of the Law; And this I re|member
to be the ob&s;ervation al&s;o of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI>
and if I be not much mi&s;taken, he giveth In&s;tan|ces
of it in the Acts of <HI>Fortitude</HI> and <HI>Temperance;</HI>
As if, by a military Law it were ordained, that none
of the Souldiers &s;hould run from his Colours, or
from his ingaging with the Enemy, or throw away his
Arms, or as if, by another a Law of frugality, or mode|ration,
the exce&s;s in banquetting were prohibited
or as if, there were a Command that none &s;hould;
exceed in the bravery of his habit, or in the great|ne&s;s
of his retinue, or in the Ornaments of his
Hou&s;e. The Rea&s;on of the latter member is, be|cau&s;e
there is &s;o great a variety even of the <HI>Species</HI>
them&s;elves, much more of the <HI>Degrees,</HI> both of
the Offices of Vertues and the <HI>Acts</HI> of Sin, that
if the Law-makers &s;hould provide a Caution for e|very
one of them, the very multitude of the Laws
would be a burthen to the Common-wealth not to
be endured.</P>
<P>VIII. I &s;ay in the fourth place, that a Law-maker
is not obliged to <HI>this, viz.</HI> To forbid all the <HI>evil</HI> that
he can forbid, or to command all the <HI>good:</HI> It will &s;uf|fice,
that the greate&s;t and mo&s;t remarkable of both
<PB N="320" REF="178">
kinds are to be contained in the Laws, and which
are &s;o conjoyned with &s;ome extraordinary pub|lick
profit, that unle&s;s &s;omthing were determined
of them, there mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily follow &s;ome great
and grievous Evil which would prove extremely in|commodious
to the Common-wealth; for among&s;t
the lu&s;ts of the Fle&s;h, the Allurements of the world,
the temptations of the Devil, and the di<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">po&s;itions
of men &s;o fruitful of all manner of Iniquities, may
we &s;o much as dream of a <HI>Platonick</HI> or an <HI>Eutopian</HI>
Commonwealth; we are to think we have done well
enough, if we &s;tick not too deep in the mire; For
it is nece&s;&s;ary that in every Common-wealth &s;ome
evils &s;hould not be prohibited, but tolerated, and
many good things not commanded, but left to eve|ry
mans di&s;cretion, and that many things of both
kinds &s;hould be pa&s;&s;ed by, by the Laws, le&s;t be|ing
too un&s;ea&s;onably active to remove one evil,
we peradventure make way for more and greater
to ari&s;e.</P>
<P>IX. The third Doubt is, concerning the <HI>Inten|tion</HI>
of the Law-giver, <HI>whether,</HI> and <HI>how far</HI> it is
required to the effect of obliging? Which is to de|mand,
If a Prince, out of no fore&s;ight, or intent to
Ju&s;tice, or to the publick good at all, being either
carryed away by hatred, or ambition, and the meer
lu&s;t or ruling, or by avarice, or any other depraved
de&s;ire of an impotent mind, &s;hould give a Law to his
Subjects, whether they are bound in Con&s;cience to
obey it? The an&s;wer is ea&s;y, they are obliged to
obey it, if there be no other impediment, that is,
if he who made the Law hath a lawful Power, and
the Law it &s;elf be otherwi&s;e ju&s;t, and according to
the Law of the Nations duely debated, and &s;uf|ficiently
<PB N="321" REF="178">
promulgated; I &s;ay therefore in the fir&s;t
place, that as in <HI>Artificials,</HI> the End of the work,
and of the per&s;on wotking, is not always the &s;ame;
as in the building of a Hou&s;e, the End of the work
(that is of the Hou&s;e) is that it may be a commo|dious
habitation for the ma&s;ter of it; but the End
of the Carpenter is, that he may get &s;ome gain there|by;
Ju&s;t &s;o in a Common-wealth, it may come to
pa&s;&s;e, that the Law-maker may intend his own ad|vantage,
and yet the Law it &s;elf may tend to the
publick Good.</P>
<P>X. Peradventure you will object, that an indirect
End or Intention doth always corrupt the work,
and therefore the evil Intention of the Law-maker
doth vitiate the Law which was his work. To an|&s;wer
this objection, I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, that
an evil intention doth always blemi&s;h the work as
the work &s;peaketh the <HI>action</HI> of the <HI>per&s;on working,</HI>
but it doth not always blemi&s;h the work as it is the
<HI>effect of the operation.</HI> The&s;e two therefore, the <HI>Ac|tion</HI>
it &s;elf, and the <HI>Perfection</HI> of it, differ not a little
among&s;t them&s;elves, although they are commonly
called by the &s;ame Name; In the &s;ame manner as
the <HI>Effecting</HI> and the <HI>Effect</HI> it &s;elf. The building of
the Hou&s;e, and the Hou&s;e builded, are both of
them called the work of the Carpenter, although
the one of them is but an <HI>action tran&s;ient,</HI> and the
other, after the hou&s;e is fini&s;hed, an <HI>action permanent.</HI>
A bad Intention therefore doth corrupt the work
of the Lawmaker, <HI>that is,</HI> his own Act which makes
the Law, and which for the defect of a good end is
not without fault, but it corrupts not the work of
the Legi&s;lator, that is the Law made by him, if that
which is commanded by the Law is reducible to the
<PB N="322" REF="179">
<HI>Common good,</HI> So, for all the evil intention of the
Judge, a Sentence pronounced by him either for
favour, or for hatred, is firm and valid, if the &s;aid
&s;entence in it &s;elf con&s;idered, appeareth not to be
unju&s;t. For as rightly St. <HI>Augu&s;tine</HI> hath it, <HI>pote&s;t
ex libidine imperantis &s;ine libidine obtemperari, We
may without any lu&s;t, obey the lu&s;t of the Commander.</HI></P>
<P>XI. I &s;ay in the third place; Suppo&s;e that a
Law be not only made with an evil intention, but
unprofitable to the publick, nay in &s;ome &s;ence ob|noxious,
yet the Subject is bound to obey it, pro|vided
it be made by ju&s;t Authority, and the mat|ter
of the Law, or the thing commanded, be &s;uch
that it may be done without Sin: The rea&s;on is, be|cau&s;e
every man ought to be careful and diligent
in the performance of that which belongs to his own
part,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Gal. 6. 5.</NOTE> and not too &s;crupulous of what concerns ano|ther;
<HI>For every man &s;hall bear his own Burthen.</HI> If
a Law-giver &s;hall be wanting in his Duty, what is
that to you? Do you perform your Office how&s;o|ever;
As for his intentions whether they be right
or not, let him&s;elf look to it, for he mu&s;t give to
God an account of all his actions and intentions;
And do you look to your &s;elf, for if you &s;hall re|fu&s;e
to obey him, you &s;hall give to the &s;ame God
an account of your di&s;obedience.</P>
<P>XII. The fourth Dout, of <HI>the Changing of
Laws,</HI> if they &s;eem to be unprofitable or obnoxi|ous
to the Common-wealth; <HI>whether,</HI> and <HI>how
far</HI> the Change of them is either to be attempted by
the Prince, or to be required, and urged by the
People? The rea&s;on of the <HI>Doubt</HI> in one re&s;pect
is, becau&s;e in a body Civil, as in a body natural,
every change, e&s;pecially if it be &s;udden and great, is
<PB N="323" REF="179">
dangerous, and on the other &s;ide, becau&s;e it con|cerns
the Common-wealth that the Laws be ac|commodated
to the <HI>Times</HI> and <HI>Cu&s;tomes,</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. Ari&s;tot. 4. Phy&s;. text. 128.</NOTE> and if
the one doth change, that the other be changed with
them; For an&s;wer to this, I &s;ay in the fir&s;t place,
it is certain that the Laws may be changed, yea, and
&s;ometimes that they ought to be changed, for they
have heretofore been changed with great profit to
the Common-wealth, therefore they may now be
changed again, and may be &s;o in all future times,
if occa&s;ion &s;hall require, &amp; it &s;hall be found profita|ble
to the Commonwealth; And why may not that
be lawful to be done again which hath been law|ful
heretofore? There are every day new emergen|cies,
new inconveniencies, new evils, and if there are
not new Laws made to redre&s;&s;e them, there will be
no remedy.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ari&s;t. 2.</NOTE> And all men &s;aith <HI>Aristotle</HI> &s;eek not
<GAP DESC="foreign">.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Polit. 8.</NOTE> And if heretofore it were
expedient that a Law &s;hould be made becau&s;e it
was profitable to the Commonwealth, it being
found afterwards by the change of the conditions of
Times and manners to become unprofitable, why is
it not expedient that it &s;hould be taken away again?</P>
<P>XIII. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place; That the change
of particular Laws is not without danger, and there|fore
not to be attempted unle&s;&s;e it be upon &s;ome
great and urgent nece&s;&s;ity. <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> acutely and
briefly as his cu&s;tom is produceth divers rea&s;ons,
2. <HI>Poli.</HI> 8. The&s;e three are the chiefe&s;t, <GAP DESC="foreign">.
The&s;e often changes do very much dero|gate
from the authority of the Law, and the Law-giver;
As we conceive that per&s;on to be of a very
&s;lender and weak judgement, who for no &s;ound or
evident rea&s;on, is ea&s;ily enduced to change his Opi|nion,
<PB N="324" REF="180">
Secondly <GAP DESC="foreign">,
It maketh the people wanton and petulant
(This is true enough, we not long &s;ince have had
the experience of it) and apt to fly at any thing, if
they &s;hall find their Law-giver ea&s;y on this ac|count,
and departing from his own right to hu|mour
the Votes and un&s;atisfied de&s;ires of the peo|ple;
Therefore the chief Philo&s;opher mo&s;t grave|ly
and de&s;ervedly doth reprove the Law of <HI>Hippo|damus</HI>
a Law-maker of <HI>Miletum, viz. That who|&s;oever
had di&s;covered or found out &s;omething pro|fitable,
to the City, &s;hould be recompenced for his
good &s;ervice, with a publick reward.</HI> This Law
was &s;pecious enough at the fir&s;t &s;ight, and plau&s;ible
to the people, but look throughly into it, and you
will find nothing in it either of <HI>prudence,</HI> or <HI>&s;afety,</HI>
or <HI>Advantage;</HI> For what could be found more
dangerous to di&s;turb the publick Peace, than that
factious men and of a turbulent and cunning Spirit,
under the &s;haddow of a publick good, &s;hould not on|ly
occa&s;ion the &s;ubver&s;ion of the Laws, but al&s;o call
in que&s;tion the <HI>Form</HI> of the whole <HI>Civil Govern|ment,</HI>
and obtrude unto the State a new Idaea of
Government, according to the humour of their
own Invention. Do you hear, I be&s;eech you, a
Philo&s;opher famous in his times, or rather a Pro|phet,
and a foreteller of the manners, and the times
in which now we live?<NOTE PLACE="marg">Grav<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ora in&s;erre vulnera, dum mi|no<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="2 letters">bus mede<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">i de|fid<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> amus. <HI>Ambro&s;. 2. O<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">&s;ic.</HI> 2.</NOTE> Thirdly the Innovation of
Laws being ordained for the removing of &s;ome pre|&s;ent
Inconvenience, and being it may come to
pa&s;&s;e, and oftentimes it doth &s;o come to pa&s;&s;e, that
from this &s;uddain Immutation, many and more
grievous Inconveniencies may ari&s;e, though not per|adventure
at the fir&s;t di&s;covered, the mo&s;t grave
<PB N="325" REF="180">
Philo&s;opher did judge it to be far &s;afer to tolerate &amp;
endure &s;ome Inconveniencies, and tho&s;e not &s;light
ones neither, in a Common wealth (which may
be avouched of the Church al&s;o which is a kind of a
Common-wealth) than in pretence of Reformation
either Eccle&s;ia&s;tical or Political to cancel old Laws,
&amp; Statutes, &amp; turn all things up&s;ide down; Of a far
different judgment to tho&s;e of our times were the
wi&s;e men of former Ages, who&s;e Rules &amp; Principles
were as are here the&s;e folowing <GAP DESC="foreign">;
<HI>Malum ben&egrave; po&s;itum non e&s;t movendum; Imperiti
medici e&s;t pejus malo remedium adhibere; an Evil well
placed is not to be removed; It is the part of an unskilful
Phy&s;ician to apply a Remedy wor&s;e than the di&s;ea&s;e.</HI></P>
<P>XIV. I &s;ay in the third place, That although
the changing of Laws may &s;eem to be nece&s;&s;ary,
by rea&s;on of &s;ome great, and evident Cau&s;e, yet
it is not to be attempted by the people, without
the con&s;ent of the Prince, but mode&s;tly they
are to crave, and patiently to expect it of him;
and this may aptly be collected from the <HI>Analogy</HI>
of the <HI>Head,</HI> and the <HI>Members,</HI> for how like a
mon&s;ter were it, and de&s;tructive to the whole
body, if the Arms, the Brea&s;t, or the Feet
&s;hould a&s;&s;ume unto them&s;elves the office of the
Head? This is abundantly enough demon&s;trated
in tho&s;e things which not long &s;ince we declared
to you, when we &s;pake of the <HI>efficient Cau&s;e</HI> of
Laws, <HI>viz.</HI> That the principal Act of Juri&s;|diction,
cannot be exerci&s;ed but by him only who
is the <HI>Head,</HI> and <HI>chief</HI> of the whole Commonalty;
Therefore the Con&s;titution, the abrogation, and
any Immutation of Laws what&s;oever, which are
all of them the <HI>principal</HI> Acts of the chiefe&s;t <HI>Juri&s;|diction</HI>
<PB N="326" REF="181">
cannot pertain unto the people, unle&s;s
where the people are Prince, as in a <HI>State Demo|cratical,</HI>
but to <HI>him</HI> only, who doth exerci&s;e a
Soveraignty of Dominion over the whole Com|monalty,
in a State Monarchical, and who hath
the undoubted power of a tran&s;cendent Com|mand
by him&s;elf; In a bu&s;ine&s;&s;e of &s;o great an im|portance,
the duties of the people are the&s;e,
&s;incerely, and openly, but with all due reve|rence,
to pre&s;ent their ju&s;t grievances to their
Prince, and faithfully to lay before him with what
pre&s;ent remedies they may cure tho&s;e evils that
oppre&s;s them; and humbly to be&s;eech him, that
he would be plea&s;ed to conde&s;cend to the peti|ons
of his Subjects, as he &s;hall judge it to be mo&s;t
&s;afe and advantagious to the Commonwealth, and
confirm the grant of them with his Royal hand.
And if he being thus petitioned to &s;hall refu&s;e,
they are to de&s;i&s;t for that time from their purpo|&s;es,
and to be content with their pre&s;ent affairs, and
Laws, and that without all murmuring or the lea&s;t
&s;ign of force, until their Prince being throughly
per&s;waded by his Council, and Intreaties of
&s;ome friends; or induced by the arguments of
Rea&s;ons &s;hall renounce that pertinaciou&s;ne&s;&s;e of
his Spirit, and give an open Ear to the de&s;ires of his
Subjects.</P>
<P>XV. The Fifth Doubt, Seeing that the <HI>Com|mon
good</HI> is not only the <HI>End</HI> of the Laws, but of
the whole politick Government, Is it lawful out of
any fore&s;ight or pretence of the <HI>Common good</HI> to
change the pre&s;ent form of Government, or to
attempt the change thereof, and <HI>how far,</HI> and to
whom is it lawful? For Examples &s;ake, Is it law|ful
<PB N="227" REF="181">
for the people to change a Monarchical Govern|ment
into an Ari&s;tocratical, or into a Democratical,
or on the contrary? A Que&s;tion of great difficulty, &amp;
concernment, e&s;pecially in the&s;e times, &amp; manners,
in which we live. For my part I will faithfully repre|&s;ent
unto you what I think of it, and will leave
unto every man the liberty to think what he plea|&s;eth;
I &s;uppo&s;e only what is already granted by
many, and what cannot ea&s;ily be denye, <HI>dviz.</HI> that a
Monarchy by Inheritance, or a &s;ucce&s;&s;ive King|dom,
is ab&s;olutely the be&s;t among&s;t all the forms
of Common-wealth, and highly to be preferred a|bove
the other two; This being granted, I think
in the fir&s;t place, that the people, if they plea&s;e,
may change a Democratical into an Ari&s;tocratical,
or into an Monarchical Government; Fir&s;t, be|cau&s;e
it &s;eemeth to be a change for the better;
moreover in Democracy, the chief Command is
in the Power of the people, &s;o that they may de|termine
of them&s;elves as they them&s;elves plea&s;e,
provided that no Injury be done to any man; Now
it is mo&s;t certain, that by this Change no Injury
is done by the people unto any one; It cannot
be to any other, for no Injury can be done to any
man in any thing to which he hath no <HI>Right,</HI> nei|ther
can any Injury be done herein to them&s;elves
who of their own accord do make this Change, for
no Injury can be ever done to a willing Per&s;on.<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">.</NOTE> I
think in the &s;econd place, that for all the&s;e rea&s;ons
the Peers of a Land al&s;o may turn their Ari&s;tocra|tical
Government,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ari&s;t. 5.</NOTE> into a Monarchical one; For
it is a change into the better,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ethic. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"></NOTE> and by &s;o doing,
no injury is done to any man; But I cannot &s;o ea&s;i|ly
re&s;olve you this <HI>doubt,</HI> whether it be as lawful
<PB N="228" REF="182">
for them to convert an Ari&s;tocracy into a Demo|cracy,
for although they have power to do it, and
it may be done by them without any injury, yet
it &s;eems not to be a <HI>Commutation into a better State;</HI>
Thirdly, I believe, that the Monarchy of an e|lective
Kingdom, may be changed peradventure into
any form of Government, but e&s;pecially into an he|reditary
and a &s;ucce&s;&s;ive Kingdom, and that for
almo&s;t the &s;ame Rea&s;ons above alleged, neverthele&s;s
this ought not to be done, unle&s;&s;e the Kingdom
by the death of him that la&s;t Reigned be vacant, for
otherwi&s;e it would be an injury to the pre&s;ent
King; And Secondly, it ought not to be done, un|le&s;&s;e
by the joynt con&s;ent of the Peers of the King|dom,
and People, and of tho&s;e per&s;ons who have
the right of electing. I think fourthly, that a Mo|narchy
by inheritance cannot lawfully be changed
into an Elective Kingdom, or into any other form
of Government, either by the people alone, or
by the joynt con&s;ent of People, Peers, and King,
which is the whole people in their greate&s;t lati|tude,
unle&s;&s;e peradventure there &s;hall be &s;uch a
defect in the Royal Progeny, that there is not one
of them remaining to challenge the Kingdom due
by inheritance to him. The Rea&s;ons of this opini|on
are, Fir&s;t, Becau&s;e according to our former
&s;uppo&s;ition, it were a change from a better to a
wor&s;e; Secondly, Becau&s;e by rea&s;on of that ex|change,
an apparent injury would be done to the
lawful Heir; Thirdly, Becau&s;e that not only the
Exchange, but becau&s;e &s;uch a de&s;ire, and in|deavour,
doth &s;eem to be quite contrary to
the words of <HI>Salomon, Prov. 24. 21. My Son fear
God, and the King, and have nothing to do with
<PB N="329" REF="182">
them who affect new things.</HI> What before I &s;aid,
I mu&s;t in this place again repeat, <HI>viz.</HI> I do not urge
this as too confidently to affirm it, or to cau&s;e a di&s;|putation
with any man in the proof of this particu|lar,
if he be of another judgment.</P>
<P>XVI. The &s;ixth <HI>doubt,</HI> How may that be un|der&s;tood
which &s;o commonly is &s;poken, <HI>Salus p<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">|puli
e&s;t &s;uprema Lex, The &s;afety of the People is
the &s;upreme Law;</HI> The rea&s;on of the <HI>doubt</HI> doth
proceed, from that which we propounded, and pro|ved
in the beginning, <HI>viz.</HI> That the <HI>End</HI> of Laws is
the <HI>publick good;</HI> From hence on one &s;ide it &s;eems
to follow, that the &s;afety of the Common-wealth
doth depend on the &s;trict ob&s;ervance of the Laws,
and on the other &s;ide, that all ob&s;ervancy of the
Laws ought to give place to the &s;afety of the Com|monwealth;
And from hence, &s;ome who within
the&s;e few years have brought a new Divinity, and a
new policy into the Church and Common-wealth,
have no le&s;&s;e confidently, than perver&s;ely collected
and &s;ugge&s;ted, that the <HI>Liberty</HI> which they call the
<HI>Right of the Subjects</HI> (for &s;o they interpret the
<HI>Safety of the People</HI>) is to be preferred above the
<HI>prerogatives</HI> of Kings, or the enacting, or e&s;tabli&s;h|ing
of Laws, and therefore all Regal Power and
Authority of the Laws is to &s;toop unto it. For
the re&s;olution of this doubt, you are to know,
that all the deceit almo&s;t on this vulgar Axiom, doth
ari&s;e from the <HI>Equivocation</HI> which lyeth hid in the
Terms, e&s;pecially in that word <HI>People;</HI> For the
people being a kind of a Metaphorical Body, may
be taken two wayes, as the word <HI>Body</HI> may it &s;elf,
<HI>Collectively</HI> as it &s;ignifies the whole Commonalty
of the Republick, that is both King and Subjects,
<PB N="330" REF="183">
and <HI>Di&s;cretively,</HI> as it &s;ignifies the Subjects preci&s;ely
by them&s;elves, and &s;evered from the King; As when
we &s;ay the King, and the people; So in the word <HI>Body</HI>
&s;ometimes the other <HI>Members</HI> are to be under&s;tood
with the <HI>Head,</HI> as when we &s;ay the <HI>Soul</HI> and the
<HI>Body,</HI> And &s;ometimes the <HI>Members</HI> only are
preci&s;ely to be under&s;tood &amp; the <HI>Head</HI> to be taken
by its &s;elf, as when we &s;ay the <HI>Head</HI> and the <HI>Body.</HI></P>
<P>XVII. Fir&s;t therefore I &s;ay, that mo&s;t preci&s;ely
and by a very evil Coun&s;el, that is wre&s;ted, which is
&s;poken of the people in the fir&s;t &s;ence to be accom|modated
to them in the latter. There is no &s;o|ber
man will deny, that the <HI>&s;afety of the people,</HI>
that is of the <HI>whole Commonalty,</HI> as that word com|prehends
the King, together with the Subjects, is
the <HI>&s;upreme Law;</HI> But that the <HI>Safety of the Peo|ple,</HI>
that is, of the Subjects, the King being ex|cluded,
is the <HI>&s;upreme Law,</HI> there is no man will
affirm it, unle&s;s he be a fool, or an Impo&s;ter; A fool,
if he doth believe what he him&s;elf &s;aith, and an Im|po&s;ter,
if he doth not believe it. But if any man will
&s;eriou&s;ly look into the original of this Aphori&s;m,
I do believe he will more ea&s;ily grant, that it ought
more preci&s;ely to be under&s;tood of the &s;afety of the
Prince, than of the &s;afety of the Subjects. This &s;ay|ing
&s;o to&s;&s;ed up and down in the mouths of all men
came to us from the Romans, and was then u&s;ed
by them when their Republick did flouri&s;h mo&s;t
of all under a popular State: And there is no great
Rea&s;on that any man &s;hould wonder, that the peo|ples
Safety was the &s;upreme Law with them, with
whom the people them&s;elves were the &s;upreme
Power; In the Judgment therefore of tho&s;e wi&s;e
Antients, who were the fir&s;t Authors of this Apho|ri&s;m
<PB N="331" REF="183">
the &s;afety of the <HI>&s;upreme Power</HI> was the &s;u|preme
Law, of the people indeed in a <HI>Democracy,</HI>
but of a King in <HI>Monarchy.</HI></P>
<P>XVIII. I &s;ay in the &s;econd place, it being ad|mitted,
but not granted, that this Aphori&s;m is pro|perly
under&s;tood of the <HI>Safety of the People,</HI> that is,
of the Subjects, it is neverthele&s;s perver&s;ly wre&s;t|ed
to the prejudice of Regal Dignity, which even
&s;o doth render its Power more ample and illu&s;tri|ous.
In this &s;ence. A King that gives <HI>Lawes</HI> and <HI>Sta|tutes</HI>
to his people will not be &s;o bound up by
his Laws, that it &s;hall not be lawful for
him, the Safety of the Common-wealth being in an
apparent danger, to provide for the Safety of
Kingdom and people committed to him by God,
even again&s;t the words of the Law; Not that it is
lawful for Subjects under the pretence of the de|fence
of their liberty to break all the bonds of Laws
and fidelity, and by an intollerable pre&s;umption to
trample on the Authority of their King, but that it is
lawful for the Prince, in the pre&s;ervation of his own
&amp; his Subjects Safety, to lay a&s;ide for a while all
&s;trict ob&s;ervance of the Laws, &amp; to make u&s;e a little
of an arbitrary Right, le&s;t by a too un&s;ea&s;onable, and
&s;uper&s;titious Reverence of the Laws, he may &s;uff|er
both his own per&s;on, and his people that are
&s;ubject to him, and even the Laws them&s;elves,
to fall into the Power of his Enemies.</P>
<P>XIX. I &s;ay in the third place, it being again ad|mitted,
but not granted, that by this Aphori&s;m
&s;ome licence were indulged to the Subjects them|&s;elves,
as nece&s;&s;ity &s;o requiring, to lay by the
Laws to provide for the publick Safety, yet from
hence that cannot be inferred, which may would
<PB N="332" REF="184">
conclude; For it is not lawful for the Subjects, when
they find their liberty in any thing to be injured, or
when they cry out they are &s;en&s;ible of it, to break
through all Bars of Laws and Duty, and without the
knowledge of their Prince, to have immediately
their recour&s;e to Arms, and to fill all things with tu|mults
&amp; &s;editions But when the defence of their Prin|ces,
&amp; their own liberties, again&s;t all forein or dome&s;|tick
Enemies, upon an urgent nece&s;&s;ity doth &s;o call
them to it, that a pious &amp; a prudent man would make
no doubt of it, but if the Law-maker him&s;elf was pre|&s;ent
he would di&s;pen&s;e with his own Laws, it is then
lawful for the Subjects to have a greater regard of
the Common &s;afety, which is the &s;upreme Law, and
the end of all Laws, than to be fearful to prejudice
any particular Laws, which were therefore made
to be &s;ub&s;ervient only to the publick &s;afety.</P>
<P>XX. The &s;um of all is, The <HI>&s;afety of the Common-wealth,</HI>
that is to &s;ay, of the Prince and of the Sub|jects,
is the <HI>&s;upreme Law,</HI> to which all inferiour Laws
are &s;o to &s;ubmit, that pre&s;ent nece&s;&s;ity &s;o requiring,
it is lawful for the Prince by the prerogative of
his own power, yea and it is lawful for the Sub|jects,
the con&s;ent of their Prince being according
unto rea&s;on pre&s;umed, to recede &s;ometimes from
the words of particular Laws, to a&s;&s;i&s;t their indan|gered
Country, and to be careful of its &s;afety as
the &s;upreme Law, but &s;o, that unle&s;s the will and
con&s;ent of the &s;upreme power be expre&s;ly obtain|ed,
or according unto rea&s;on pre&s;umed, they are
not to attempt any thing under the pretence of the
publick &s;afety and liberty, but what the Laws do
permit them to.</P>
<P>XXI. There are not a few Doubts, that are
<PB N="333" REF="184">
yet remaining, which in &s;ome manner do pertain
to this <HI>Final Cau&s;e,</HI> as concerning <HI>Privileges</HI> and
<HI>Di&s;pen&s;ations,</HI> and the <HI>Relaxation</HI> of the <HI>obligation,</HI>
in the danger of life, and others of the &s;ame nature,
which unto &s;ome may peradventure appear not al|together
to agree with the <HI>End</HI> of <HI>Humane Laws;</HI>
The Solution whereof I have thought it more expe|dient
for to deferre unto another time, although ne|ver
&s;o long, than by too much prolixity, to tire and
to torment &s;o attentive and &s;o courteous an Au|ditory.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 N="10" TYPE="lecture">
<PB REF="185">
<HEAD>THE
TENTH LECTURE
In which that mo&s;t vulgar Speech
(The &s;afety of the People is the Su|preme
Law) is more largely ex|amined,
and unfolded, that it
may more rightly be un|der&s;tood.</HEAD>
<EPIGRAPH>
<BIBL>1 TIM: 2. 2.</BIBL>
<Q>For Kings, and for all that are in Authority,
that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in
all Godline&s;s and Holine&s;s.</Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
<P>_I At this time and place, if peradven|ture
you do remember it (Cour|teous
Readers) did intend to fi|ni&s;h
&amp; compleat this Treati&s;e, con|cerning
both the obligations of
Con&s;cience, to wit, the <HI>Pa&s;&s;ive,</HI> and
the <HI>Active;</HI> In the unfolding of the former, having in
<PB N="335" REF="185">
fir&s;t place, and in a Schola&s;tical manner excu&s;&s;ed the
<HI>Definition of Con&s;cience,</HI> I was as elabourate as I
could be in examining, and di&s;covering that pro|per,
and <HI>Adequate Rule of Con&s;cience,</HI> from the
directions whereof, it ought to exerci&s;e all, and
every one of its <HI>Acts,</HI> both of <HI>Dictating,</HI> and
<HI>Judging.</HI> It was then repre&s;ented to you, that
the <HI>Holy Scripture</HI> was the <HI>principal</HI> part of that
<HI>Rule</HI> we held forth, but the <HI>Adaequate</HI> part was
that <HI>Will</HI> of God (which the School-men call <HI>the
Will of the &s;ign</HI>) in &s;ome degree made manife&s;t to
every man, whether, fir&s;t, by <HI>an inbred light,</HI> by <MILESTONE N="1">
Practical Principles pre&s;erved in the <HI>Syntere&s;is,</HI> and
known <HI>by them&s;elves,</HI> which the Philo&s;ophers <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">
<HI>Common Notions,</HI> and the Apo&s;tle, the Law
of God written in our hearts; Or &s;econdly, by an <MILESTONE N="2">
inferred <HI>Light,</HI> by &s;ome external Revelation,
partly <HI>extraordinary,</HI> and private, to &s;ome &s;ingle
per&s;ons, by vi&s;ions, dreams, &amp;c. at &s;undry times,
and in &s;undry manners; Partly <HI>ordinary,</HI> and made
publick to all mankind in the written word; Or
la&s;tly, by <HI>an acquired light,</HI> by conclu&s;ions rightly <MILESTONE N="3">
and duely drawn from tho&s;e <HI>practical principles,</HI> or
from the <HI>written word of God,</HI> or from our own
meditations, or the In&s;titution of other men.</P>
<P>II. I affirmed, that all the&s;e, and every one of
them do oblige the Con&s;ciences of men, and on|ly
the&s;e, <HI>ab&s;olutely</HI> and <HI>primarily by them&s;elves,</HI>
and by their proper virtue: for all the&s;e, and the&s;e
alone do exhibite to us the will of God, who a|lone
of him&s;elf, hath an ab&s;olute, and a direct com|mand
over the Con&s;ciences of men; But I gave
you to under&s;tand, that there were many other
things which <HI>Secondarily,</HI> and <HI>relatively,</HI> and by
<PB N="336" REF="186">
Virtue of the Law, or the <HI>Divine will</HI> in which
they are founded, do in their manner oblige the
Con&s;ciences; And all of them do agree in this,
that they owe all the force of obliging which they
have to the <HI>Divine will,</HI> for otherwi&s;e the Divine
Law would not be the <HI>Adaequate Rule</HI> of Con&s;ci|ence;
neverthele&s;s they do all differ among them|&s;elves,
both in the <HI>Species,</HI> by rea&s;on of the diver|&s;ity
of the matter, and al&s;o in the <HI>degree,</HI> accor|ding
to the power of obliging. Moreover, there
are three degrees of <HI>tho&s;e</HI> who do thus oblige.
<MILESTONE N="1"> The fir&s;t is of tho&s;e things who&s;e obligation doth
ari&s;e from the Authority of another having <HI>a right
or power,</HI> in which number are Humane Laws.
<MILESTONE N="2"> The &s;econd is of tho&s;e things who&s;e ob|ligation
doth ari&s;e from a free act of the <HI>proper
will,</HI> &s;uch as are <HI>Vowes, Oathes, Promi&s;es, and</HI>
<MILESTONE N="3"><HI>Spontaneous Contracts.</HI> The third degree is of tho&s;e
things who&s;e obligation doth ari&s;e from the intui|tion
of <HI>brotherly Charity,</HI> in which cla&s;&s;is is ranked
the Law, or the Con&s;ideration of <HI>Scandal,</HI> or <HI>offence.</HI></P>
<P>III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws, I
have &s;poken much more than at the fir&s;t I propound|ed
to my &s;elf, yet it may be much le&s;s than the
weight of the thing de&s;erved (of which in our day|ly
Conver&s;ations there is a mo&s;t frequent U&s;e) or
the Abundance and Variety of tho&s;e Doubts requi|red,
which might ca&s;t a &s;cruple into the minds of
men; In the re&s;olution where of I proceeded &s;o far
in the former Terms, that having gone over tho&s;e
difficulties which I thought could not improperly
be reduced to the <HI>material, efficient,</HI> and <HI>formal Cau|&s;es
of Laws,</HI> in my la&s;t Lecture I came to treat of
tho&s;e which more properly did pertain to their <HI>final
<PB N="337" REF="186">
Cau&s;e;</HI> where at fir&s;t having laid this foundation for
the whole following Di&s;cour&s;e, That the <HI>good of
the Commonalty,</HI> or which is the &s;ame, that the
<HI>publick Peace and Happine&s;&s;e</HI> is the End of <HI>Humane
Laws,</HI> with what brevity and per&s;picuity that I could
I an&s;wered to the &s;ix following Que&s;tions. Fir&s;t,<MILESTONE N="1">
Whether there be any U&s;e, or at lea&s;t any nece&s;&s;ary
U&s;e of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in or|der
to the Common Good? Secondly, It belong|ing <MILESTONE N="2">
to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reve|renced,
and Vices re&s;trained, whether a Law-maker
could command all the Acts, and Offices of all
Vertues, and prohibit all Vices, and Enormities
what&s;oever? Which if he were not able to per|form,
whether he were at lea&s;t bound to command
and prohibit as many as he could of either kind, by
Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Con|&s;ciences?
Whether, and how far it be required to <MILESTONE N="3">
the effect of the obliging of the Subjects, that the
Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick
Good? Fourthly, If the Laws made already &s;hall
appear le&s;s profitable to the publick, whether, and <MILESTONE N="4">
how far the change of them is either to be attempt|ed
by the Prince, or to be urged by the Subject,
Fifthly, The <HI>Common good</HI> being the end of Laws,<MILESTONE N="5">
and even of Government it &s;elf, whether it be law|ful,
and how far lawful, for the &s;aid Common good,
to change the form it &s;elf of the whole Government,<MILESTONE N="6">
or to attempt the change thereof? La&s;tly how that
common &s;aying, <HI>The &s;afety of the People is the
&s;upreme Law</HI> is to be under&s;tood.</P>
<P>IV. The&s;e things I thought nece&s;&s;ary to repeat
more fully to you, that after &s;o long an interruption
of Academical exercitations, my whole proceed|ings
<PB N="338" REF="187">
in the&s;e Lectures, and the order I have ob&s;er|ved
therein, might better appear unto you, and
that I might recall into your memory the heads of
tho&s;e things which having heard before with &s;o
much humanity, I ju&s;tly do believe that in &s;o long
an interval of time, you have almo&s;t forgotten. You
will expect I conceive, and not unde&s;ervedly, that
I &s;hould now proceed in my intended cour&s;e, and
go directly on to tho&s;e next <HI>Doubts</HI> which yet re|main
to be re&s;olved; As of tho&s;e of <HI>Privileges,</HI>
of <HI>Di&s;pen&s;ations,</HI> and to others which &s;ome ways
do belong to the final kind of a Cau&s;e. I do con|fe&s;s
it indeed and I ought to do it; But my friends
do interrupt me, they advi&s;e, me that the &s;tubborn
and intolerable boldne&s;&s;e of &s;ome men do rather
efflagitate, that &s;eeing &s;o preci&s;ely and &s;o impudent|ly
they abu&s;e the Aphori&s;m to the publick ruine,
although I expounded it but in my la&s;t Lecture in
the former Term, yet that I would take it under
examination again, and open the genuine &s;en&s;e
thereof more clearly and fully than before I had
done; This in my Con&s;truction was nothing el&s;e
but in a new pomp of words, to do over that,
which I had done before, and to the loathing of
your Stomacks to give you that meat you before
were cloyd with. This de&s;ire was not plea&s;ing to
me, but they did grow upon me with new impor|tunities
to take it in hand again. It will be your
humanity to re&s;ent and excu&s;e that mode&s;ty which
I granted to my per&s;i&s;ting friends, e&s;pecially having
u&s;ed &s;uch a prevalent Argument to overcome me
to it, not doubting but it would be grateful to the
mo&s;t of you, if I &s;hould again undertake it.</P>
<P>V. It is therefore my pre&s;ent bu&s;ine&s;&s;e to de|clare
<PB N="146" REF="187">
unto you what is the meaning of that com|mon
Axiom, <HI>The &s;afety of the people is the &s;upreme
Law,</HI> and how it is to be under&s;tood. Some men
within the&s;e few years, not well imployed, have in|vented,
and brought at la&s;t into the Common-wealth
a new &s;tate of Government, as before they
had brought into the Church a new Religion, and
as they have earne&s;tly endeavoured under the <HI>pre|tence
of Con&s;cience,</HI> or of <HI>Chri&s;tian liberty,</HI> to over|throw
all the force and frame of the <HI>Eccle&s;ia&s;tick
Government,</HI> &s;o under the pre<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ence of <HI>Civil liber|ty,</HI>
or the <HI>liberty of the Subject,</HI> they labour in this
confu&s;ion of times, and with incredible heat of
&s;pirit, and military terrour, to &s;hake, and from the
very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick
of the <HI>Government of State.</HI> The&s;e as often as
they are accu&s;ed of the Royal Dignity trod under
feet, of the de&s;pi&s;ed Authority of all holy Laws, of
the di&s;turbance of the publick peace, of an unbrid|led
and horrible tyranny exerci&s;ed on their fellow
Subjects, all barrs of Right and Ju&s;tice being broken
down, of an affected parity in the Church, and in
the Common-wealth, all difference of birth, and
honours, and States being taken away, and many
more &s;uch Anabapti&s;tical impieties, they pre&s;ent|ly
defend them&s;elves, and their manners, with this
<HI>&s;afety of the people,</HI> as with a Buckler, and think this
alone to be preferred to all Laws, Kings, Ordinan|ces,
and Cu&s;toms what&s;oever.</P>
<P>VI. From &s;o loo&s;e and dangerous an Interpre|tation
of this vulgar Axiom, not only a window,
but a &s;pacious door being opened to &s;editious tu|mults,
and all manner of popular licence; It is
manife&s;t that they who defend their horrible wick|edne&s;&s;e
<PB N="340" REF="188">
with this forbidden buckler, do not en|tertain
the pure and genuine con&s;truction of that
Axiom, but do feign another to them&s;elves, which
by an inforced Interpretation, may give &s;ome
&s;hew of Patronage to their depraved Coun&s;ails,
and their Cau&s;e; For as often as any man to &s;erve
his Avarice, Ambition, Hatred, or Anger &s;hall
attempt new de&s;igns, and fill all things with Ra|pine,
Blood, and Plunder, he incontinently may
pretend the Safety of the People for his nefarious
Villanie. Examine I pray you the Annals, and
Chronicles of all times throughout the world, both
&s;acred, prophane, antient, modern, exotick,
or our own, you &s;hall every where find that the
<HI>Catilines,</HI> and <HI>Cethegi</HI> of all times, and places, did
con&s;tantly practi&s;e the&s;e things, under the pretence
of liberty, and popular &s;afety, <HI>&s;o that he may &s;eem to
have a Melonin &s;tead of a Heart,</HI> (they are <HI>Tertulli|ans</HI>
own words) that will &s;uffer him&s;elf to be thus
Circumvented, and deluded; But whether un|warily,
hath this Tempe&s;t hurried me, whiles I
let loo&s;e the reigns to my ju&s;t Indignation? I
therefore do contain my &s;elf, and that I may ap|pear
a Di&s;putant, and not an Orator, I return to
the matter in hand.</P>
<P>VII. Where in the fir&s;t place this is to be con|&s;idered,
what in that vulgar Axiom is meant by
the word <HI>Safety;</HI> For it any man finds his dignity,
or liberty, affronted, or injured in &s;ome &s;mall
thing, nay, and if it be a great one, he is not pre|&s;ently
to complain that he hath endangered, or
lo&s;t his Safety; For every <HI>Hurt,</HI> or <HI>Blemi&s;h</HI> is not
directly <HI>oppo&s;ed</HI> to the <HI>Safety</HI> of any thing, or per|&s;on,
but the <HI>Ruine or De&s;truction</HI> of it. It is al|together
<PB N="341" REF="188">
the &s;ame thing (a due Analogy being re|&s;erved)
in a body Politick and Republick, as
it is in a humane body, and a &s;ingle per&s;on; By
rea&s;on of the jarring of the contrary qualities in a
mans body, becau&s;e of the defect or exce&s;&s;e of in|ward
Heat, and Cold, and a various Immutation
of extrin&s;ecal Accidents, it may &s;o come to pa&s;&s;e
that a man may hardly enjoy his health, but very
often in one part or other of his body, he may en|dure
that, either within, or without, which may
be very trouble&s;ome to him, it may al&s;o come to
pa&s;&s;e, that by the Stone, the Tooth-ach, or the
Gou<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">, or by &s;ome other di&s;ea&s;e in &s;ome other
part, he may feel an extreme pain, or be &s;o &s;ick
in every part that he may lye down, yet in the
mean time it may be neither nece&s;&s;ary, nor &s;ea|&s;onable,
to have recour&s;e unto extraordinary Re|medies,
as if he were in apparent danger of his life,
and &s;afety. So in a Common-wealth, we mu&s;t not
pre&s;ently attempt again&s;t the Laws, and Ordinan|ces;
We mu&s;t not gather together a rabble of the
vulgar, and rai&s;e tumults; we mu&s;t not pre&s;ently
cry out <HI>Arms Arms</HI> for the &s;afety of the people,
as &s;oon as any popular Souldier, or bold Babler,
&s;hall complain unto the people, and accu&s;e the
Prince, the Peers, the Magi&s;trates, and Judges,
or their Mini&s;ters, or any one of them, of viola|ting
the Laws, doing Injurie, or neglecting their
duties, although peradventure they have de&s;erved
it. There ever were, and will be under the be&s;t
Kings, and the be&s;t govern'd Common-wealths,
&s;ome oppre&s;&s;ions of the meaner Citizens, proceed|ing
from the abu&s;e of Power, and many other
grievances, for the preventing or redre&s;&s;ing of
<PB N="342" REF="189">
which, no care or indu&s;try of the Governours, no
&s;everity of the Laws could prevail, for if it &s;hall be
lawful for the factious Citizens, as &s;oon as ever
they &s;ee one or another example of this nature, to
de&s;pi&s;e all Laws and Ordinances, and under the
pretence of the <HI>publick &s;afety,</HI> to revenge them|&s;elves
upon the oppre&s;&s;ors by force of Arms;
Kingdoms and Common-wealths will never be
free from troubles and tumults; Our Saviour
&s;aith, <HI>Luke. 17. 1. It cannot be avoyded but that
offences will come,</HI> and we mu&s;t go out of the world,
as the Apo&s;tle &s;aith, 1 <HI>Cor.</HI> 5. 10. or &s;eek &s;ome
Eutopia or Platonick Common-wealth to pre&s;erve
us, if we &s;hall make &s;uch an Interpretation of the
&s;afety of the people, that unle&s;s every one of the
lowe&s;t degree of Citizens be altogether &s;ecure from
all unju&s;t force, and unrighteous Domination of
&s;ome Superiour or other, there &s;hall be no pub|lick
peace at all. The &s;afety of the Common-wealth
is then indeed in danger, when by the in|cur&s;ions
of Exotick Enemies, or by the depraeda|tions
of wicked Citizens, the affairs are brought
into &s;o manife&s;t a danger, that unle&s;s &s;ome timely
help be provided, the City and Country undoubt|edly
will be de&s;troyed.</P>
<P>VIII. We have &s;een what our Innovators do
mean by the word <HI>Safety;</HI> In the next place we are
to ob&s;erve how rightly that word <HI>People</HI> is interpre|ted
by them. The People as St. <HI>Augu&s;tine</HI> defines
them from the lo&s;t books of <HI>Cicero</HI> in his <HI>Repub.</HI> is
<HI>Coetus multitudinis Hominum juris con&s;en&s;u &amp; utili|tatis
Communione Sociatus;</HI><NOTE N="*" PLACE="marg">De <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 span">.</NOTE> <HI>A multitude of men a&s;|&s;ociated
by the con&s;ent of Law and Right, and the
Communion of profit;</HI> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word"> in this appellation of
<PB N="343" REF="189">
<HI>people,</HI> all the Roman Citizens of every Order and
Condition were contained; For be&s;ides Kings in
their fir&s;t times, and Emperors in their la&s;t, the
Romans had a threefold degree of di&s;tinction;
<HI>Patricians, Knights,</HI> and the <HI>Common people;</HI> But in
what a latitude this word is to be received among&s;t
the Latine writers where&s;oever it is found, the
Reader may collect by the adjoyned circum&s;tan|ces,
which for the mo&s;t part for a mo&s;t &s;ure argu|ment
for this purpo&s;e may be&s;t be done by tho&s;e
words which are annexed, <HI>viz.</HI> the oppo&s;ite Terms.
The word <HI>People</HI> is taken three wayes by the
Roman Writers; Fir&s;t (and of all the mo&s;t unu|&s;ual)
it is taken for the Common People alone,<MILESTONE N="1">
which was the lowe&s;t order of the People of <HI>Rom<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">,</HI>
as in that of <HI>Martial,</HI>
<Q LANG="lat">Dat populus, dat gratus eques, dat thura Senatus.</Q>
Where the word <HI>People</HI> being oppo&s;ed to the Se|nate,
and the Knights, can &s;ignifie nothing but
the Common-People. Secondly, for both the in|ferior
orders of People, <HI>viz.</HI> the Common People,<MILESTONE N="2">
and the Knights together, the Supreme or Patri|cian
order being excluded; For in the beginning
of the con&s;titution of that Common-wealth, the
Kings being expelled, the Fathers thought good
to retain among them&s;elves, a kind of Prerogative
of Honour, and Dignity above other Citizens,
and for the &s;ignification of it, to &s;eparate them|&s;elves
by that name from the re&s;t of the <HI>Turba</HI>
of the People; From whence came tho&s;e &s;olemn
Forms; <HI>The Senate, and the People of</HI> Rome; <HI>It
&s;eemed good to the Senate, and the People of</HI> Rome;
<PB N="344" REF="190">
In which the name of <HI>People</HI> doth comprehend all
the other Citizens, both Knights, and Common-People,
<MILESTONE N="3"> the Senate excepted. Thirdly, it is ta|ken
for all the Citizens of all degrees without dif|ference,
both <HI>Fathers, Knights,</HI> and <HI>Common-People,</HI>
for of the&s;e three orders, after that
Kings de&s;i&s;ted, and there were as yet no Em|perors,
the whole City did con&s;i&s;t; And in this
&s;ence (for in the whole duration of that Common-wealth,
the State was popular) the Roman wri|ters
are to be under&s;tood, as often as they make
mention of the pre&s;erving of the <HI>Safety, Dignity,</HI> and
<HI>Maje&s;ty,</HI> of the people.</P>
<P>IX. I have the more diligently expounded the&s;e
things, not only becau&s;e the proper &s;ignifications
of many words of this kind do depend on the u&s;e
of that people, from whom the words them&s;elves
are derived to us, but for another two fold Cau&s;e;
The one, that we &s;uffer not our &s;elves to be decei|ved
<MILESTONE N="1"> and circumvented by a le&s;&s;e proper interpreta|tion
of a doubtful word; The other, that in the
<MILESTONE N="2"> bare appellation of the word <HI>people,</HI> there may be
no force to the prejudice of him who is Prince of
the Commonalty, and the head of the people;
Either of which, of what moment they are to our
pre&s;ent purpo&s;e, you &s;hall pre&s;ently under&s;tand by
tho&s;e things which I am to prefer unto you.</P>
<P>X. I &s;ay therefore that this word <HI>people</HI> (as ma|ny
other words, &s;ignifying an aggregate multitude)
<MILESTONE N="1"> may be taken two wayes; Either <HI>collectively,</HI> as it
&s;ignifieth the whole Commonalty of the Repub|lick,
<MILESTONE N="2"> that is the Prince and Subjects together, or
<HI>di&s;cretively</HI> and <HI>preci&s;ely,</HI> as it &s;ignifieth the Sub|jects
only, and &s;evered from the King; In the ve|ry
<PB N="345" REF="190">
&s;ame manner, as the Body either implyes the
re&s;t of the Members with the Head, or the re&s;t
of the Members without the Head; And the ap|pellation
of a Family, doth &s;ometimes compre|hend
all who are within one Hou&s;e, Wife, Chil|dren,
Servants, and the Ma&s;ter of the Family him|&s;elf,
who is over them all, and &s;ometimes again
tho&s;e only who are under his command, and of
whom he hath care; And in the name of an Ar|my,
&s;ometimes the General is comperhended
with the Souldiers, &s;ometimes he is not compre|hended;
And the like is to be ob&s;erved in the
words of <HI>Parliament</HI> or <HI>Kingdom,</HI> and other words
of the &s;ame kind, which &s;ignifie indeed a collection
of many, but with order and reference to one as
their principal, or their Head. Therefore if not
with a malignant intent, yet certainly by a mo&s;t
dangerous Error it comes to pa&s;&s;e, that that which is
&s;poken of the <HI>people collectively</HI> in the former &s;en&s;e,
inclu&s;ively to comprehend the whole Commonalty,
that is, the Prince with the Subjects, &s;hould be &s;o
wre&s;ted, that it &s;hould be applyed to the people
in the latter &s;en&s;e, that is, to the Subjects alone,
the King excluded.</P>
<P>XI. But you will &s;ay, how may it appear to us
that the Appellation of people in the fir&s;t &s;ence,
may in that Axiom be under&s;tood <HI>collectively</HI> for the
King and people, and not <HI>di&s;cretively,</HI> in the
later &s;ence for the common people alone? I an|&s;wer,
that mo&s;t manife&s;tly it doth appear by the
common u&s;e of &s;peaking, and the Analogy of o|ther
words of the &s;ame &s;ignification; In which the
mo&s;t certain rule of Interpretation is, that words
<HI>collective</HI> are alwayes to be taken <HI>collectively,</HI> un|le&s;&s;e
<PB N="346" REF="191">
the Adjunct which is oppo&s;ite to it, doth re|quire
it. For examples &s;ake, where it is &s;aid, 1
<HI>Col. 1. 18. Chri&s;t is the Head of the Body of the
Church;</HI> It is manife&s;t by the Adjunct oppo&s;ite to
it, to wit, the mention of the <HI>Head,</HI> to which
the Body is there relatively oppo&s;ed, that the word
<HI>Body</HI> is there taken <HI>di&s;cretively</HI> for the other
Members of the body, preci&s;ely &s;evered from the
<HI>Head;</HI> So if any man &s;hould &s;ay that the General
had advanced with his Army into the Fields, or
had &s;ent them to their winter quarters, or that the
Ma&s;ter of a Family had forbad any belonging to
him to go out of his doors at twelve of the Clock
at night; Or what is written of <HI>David,</HI> That
what&s;oever the King did, was acceptable to the
<HI>people;</HI> It is manife&s;t by the Adjunct every
where oppo&s;ed, that in the word <HI>General,
ma&s;ter,</HI> and <HI>King,</HI> tho&s;e collective words of
<HI>Army, Family,</HI> and <HI>Subjects,</HI> are not to be under|&s;tood
<HI>collectively,</HI> but <HI>di&s;cretively</HI> and <HI>exclu&s;ively</HI>
that is, by the appellation of the Army, the Soul|diers
are only comprehended, and not the Gene|ral,
and by the appellation of Family, the Servants
or Children are comprehended, and not the Ma|&s;ter
him&s;elf, and by the appellation of people, the
Subjects are only comprehended, and not the
King; The rea&s;on is, becau&s;e the <HI>Oppo&s;ite,</HI> which
is one of the <HI>correlatives,</HI> being adjoyned, doth ne|ce&s;&s;arily
imply the word <HI>collective,</HI> an&s;wering on
the other &s;ide, and relatively oppo&s;ite unto it, to
contain preci&s;ely its <HI>correlative,</HI> that is, the mul|titude
only annexed and conjoyned to the <HI>Head,</HI>
and <HI>chief,</HI> and not the whole Commonalty aggre|gated
as it were from both the <HI>Terms correlative.</HI></P>
<P><PB N="347" REF="191">
XII. But when an Oppo&s;ite is not added which
may nece&s;&s;arily carry its &s;ignification to the other
part of the Relation only, it were incongruous to
&s;ence and rea&s;on to take the <HI>word collective.</HI> other|wi&s;e
than <HI>collectively,</HI> and in its ju&s;t latitude, &s;o that
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">t may thereby comprehend both the Terms of the
<HI>Relations,</HI> e&s;pecially when the &s;peech is concerning
<HI>&s;afety, profit,</HI> or any other good or advantage
which is or mat be common to them both; for
examples &s;ake, if it were commanded that to+morrow
the camp &s;hould march becau&s;e the Army
&s;hould not be invironed by the Enemy, or that
Corn &s;hould be bought for the pre&s;ent u&s;e of a Family,
Orectes him&s;elf would &s;wear that the man
was not of a &s;ober under&s;tanding, who &s;hould ap|prehend
that what was &s;poken either of the Army
or the Family had relation only to the good of the
Souldiers, and the Servants, no account or care
being had of the General who commanded the Ar|my,
nor of the Ma&s;ter who governed the Family;
which is all one as if a &s;ick man being admoni&s;hed
by the Phy&s;ician to have a greater care of his body
for the future, &s;hould with a great diligence be|gin
to keep warm his Brea&s;t, and his Thighs, and
other members beneath his neck, but take no care
at all to provide for his head, becau&s;e the Phy&s;ici|tian
did only put him in mind of his body but not
of his head.</P>
<P>XIII. But I come yet nearer to the point in
hand, if Peradventure a whole company of com|mon
Souldiers &s;hould affirm that <HI>the &s;afety of the
Army was the &s;upreme Law military,</HI> but they had
a General who did put them upon &s;uch hard &s;er|vice,
by his un&s;ufferable commands that unle&s;&s;e
<PB N="348" REF="192">
they timely &s;hould &s;hake off the yoak of obedience
to him, the whole liberty of the Army would be
in great danger to be lo&s;t, and thereupon from this
Principle of a&s;&s;erting their own liberties by force
of Arms, they &s;hould con&s;ult and agree among&s;t
them&s;elves, no longer to obey his commands, but to
take away the life of their General; Or if hou&s;e|hold
Servants, (whom the Apo&s;tle 1 <HI>Peter</HI> 2. 18.
would have obedient not only to tho&s;e who are
good, and favourable to them, but to tho&s;e al&s;o
who are rough and rigorous,) &s;hould combine a|mong&s;t
them&s;elves, to refu&s;e his commands as too
burthen&s;ome, and therefore becau&s;e too in&s;olently
he domineereth over them to drive him out of his
hou&s;e, to &s;eize upon his Keys, Truncks, and all
his goods, and to mannage them&s;elves the Govern|ment
of the Family at their own plea&s;ure, under
this pretence only, that <HI>The &s;afety of the Family is
the &s;upreme Law oeconomical,</HI> There is no man but
will confe&s;&s;e but that the&s;e wicked and nefarious
Coun&s;els, may by &s;ome lawful con&s;equence be de|duced
from the&s;e Principles, which Principles be|ing
rightly under&s;tood are mo&s;t true and profitable;
And yet an egge is not more like unto an egge,
than the Arguments of tho&s;e men, who by pretend|ing
the peoples &s;afety fill all things with &s;edition,
are to this wild kind of rea&s;oning, as if (and that
very eminently al&s;o,) the &s;afety of the General
were not contained and included in the &s;afety of
the Army; and the &s;afety of the Ma&s;ter in the
&s;afety of his Family, and the &s;afety of a Prince in
the &s;afety of his people. To be &s;hort, we mu&s;t ac|knowledge,
<HI>the &s;afety of the People,</HI> that is of
the King and People together, is the &s;u|preme
<PB N="349" REF="192">
Law, but the &s;afety of the People, that is, of
the Subjects, the King being excluded, is not &s;o.</P>
<P>XIV. In the &s;econd place I am to add &s;ome|thing
more; And though I conceive that I have
clearly enough proved, that in this Axiom by the
word <HI>People</HI> neither the Subjects without the
Prince, nor the Prince without the Subjects ought
preci&s;ely and by them&s;elves to be under&s;tood, but
both of them conjunctively, yet if any man will
more exactly con&s;ider either the dignity of the
per&s;ons, or the original of this Aphori&s;m, he will
willingly grant it to be under&s;tood more preci&s;ely
of the &s;afety of the King, than preci&s;ely of the &s;afe|ty
of the People; For fir&s;t, that the Kings Maje&s;ty
is &s;acred hath not been only mo&s;t copiou&s;ly ac|knowledged
by all the Fathers of the Church even
at that time when there were no Chri&s;tian Kings,
who have reverenced them as men &s;econd to God,
and le&s;&s;e only than God him&s;elf, and have offered
Vows, and Prayers unto God for their &s;afety, and
have taught that on their &s;afety, the &s;afety and hap|pine&s;&s;e
of the whole people did depend; But God
him&s;elf (as largely may be &s;hown if need requi|red)
hath been plea&s;ed that abundantly it &s;hould
be te&s;tified in the holy Scriptures; From whence
it came to pa&s;&s;e, that all good Subjects and endued
with a right under&s;tanding, in the height, and heat,
and the extreme&s;t danger of Battel, have judged
that the &s;afety of the King alone, was to be pre|ferred
above the &s;afety to them all, which as it be|came
good Subjects, tho&s;e I&s;raelites gallantly pro|fe&s;&s;ed,
who at the time of the execrable Con&s;piracy
of <HI>Ab&s;olon,</HI> pre&s;erved their fidelity which they vow|ed
to King <HI>David, 2 Sam.</HI> 18. 3. And of the &s;ame
<PB N="350" REF="193">
mind were they, who (not ba&s;ely flattering a mor|tal
man for their own profit, but &s;peaking accord|ing
to the Dictates of the Spirit of God) have cal|led
the King the breath of their no&s;trils, for &s;o that
godly Prophet, and &s;anctified from his mothers
womb, the Prophet <HI>Jeremy</HI> &s;peaketh it, <HI>Lamen.</HI>
4. 20. In a mo&s;t apt &s;ignification, That breath
which is attracted, and emitted through the no&s;trils
being that vital breath,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Animus R<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">publi|ca tu es: illa corpus tuum. <HI>Senec. 1. de clem.</HI> 5.&mdash;Ille spiritus vitalis, quem haec tot millia trabunt. <HI>Ibid. c.</HI> 4.</NOTE> with which the &s;oul as with
a Bond is united to the Body, and which failing, the
living Creature mu&s;t forthwith nece&s;&s;arily expire
and peri&s;h; His Breath goeth forth, he returneth to
his Earth, <HI>P&s;al.</HI> 146. 4.</P>
<P>XV. This al&s;o is worthy your ob&s;ervation, that
the Axiom of which we now treat, hath been
brought unto us from the Roman Nation, and
then in u&s;e with them, when <HI>Rome</HI> did mo&s;t flou|ri&s;h
in a popular &s;tate. And there is no rea&s;on we
&s;hould wonder, <HI>That the &s;afety of the people was to
them a &s;upreme Law, to whom the people them&s;elves
were the &s;upreme Power. The Lawes</HI> were then the
<HI>Peoples,</HI> the <HI>judgments</HI> the <HI>Peoples,</HI> the whole <HI>ju|ri&s;diction</HI>
the <HI>Peoples,</HI> the entire Government and
<HI>autocratical Maje&s;ty</HI> was the <HI>Peoples.</HI> And from
hence it is, that among&s;t all the Hi&s;torians, and
in <HI>Cicero</HI> al&s;o and other Writers of that age, &s;o fre|quent
a mention is made of the maje&s;ty of the Ro|man
people, as being in a &s;tate <HI>Democratical,</HI> which
in a &s;tate <HI>Monarchical</HI> is not the <HI>Peoples</HI> but the
<HI>Kings.</HI> Therefore, as much as the &s;afety of the
People was to them, with whom was the Maje&s;ty
of the People, which how much it was, by the
Aphori&s;m they would it &s;hould be te&s;tified to the
world, &s;o much unto us if we will make u&s;e of
<PB N="351" REF="193">
of that Aphori&s;m (an Analogy in the &s;o different
forms of both Republicks being rightly ob&s;erved,
as fit it &s;hould be &s;o) &s;hould be the &s;afety of our
Kings who acknowledge no other maje&s;ty but the
Kings, only.</P>
<P>XVI. From the&s;e things which have been &s;po|ken,
I believe it is manife&s;t enough, that neither
in the appellation of <HI>Safety,</HI> nor in the appellation of
<HI>People</HI> there is any force at all in this vulgar Axi|om,
as to wre&s;t it to the prejudice of Kingly dignity,
unle&s;s with the greate&s;t injury that can be done unto
it; And if the two other remaining words of it, <HI>viz.</HI>
The <HI>&s;upreme Law</HI> &s;hould be rightly weighed, they
would acknowledge I believe if they had but any
Mode&s;ty, or Rea&s;on, that nothing can be &s;poken in
this Axiom which is more ample and illu&s;trious to
e&s;tabli&s;h the &s;overaign Power of Kings; For the&s;e
words the <HI>&s;upreme Law</HI> do &s;uppo&s;e that in every
Common-wealth there ought nece&s;&s;arily to be
&s;omewhere a &s;overaign Power which is above all
humane Laws po&s;itive,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>Ari&s;t. 5. Ethic.</HI> 14. Nulla tan|ta provi|dentia po|tuit e&s;&s;e e|orum qui leges com|po<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ebant, ut species criminum complecte|rentur. <HI>Quinti<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">. declam.</HI> 331.</NOTE> to which he ought to look,
and by his Authority to take care, that neither by the
defect of Laws, or the too &s;uper&s;titious ob&s;ervance
of them, the Common-wealth may receive any dam|mage.
And the rea&s;on of this is plain enough, for
the wi&s;e&s;t Law-maker cannot &s;o fore&s;ee all circum|&s;tances
of events to come, neither can he make &s;uch
a &s;ufficient precaution by the Laws, as to prevent
all tho&s;e Evils, &amp; inconveniencies which he &s;u&s;pects
may come to pa&s;s; and this is not by the fault of the
Laws, or of the Law-makers, but as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> hath
excellently ob&s;erved it, it is by rea&s;on of the nature
of tho&s;e things that are to be defined by the Laws
<PB N="352" REF="194">
which being indefinite by Rea&s;on of their variety,
and uncertain,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign"> Ibid.</NOTE> becau&s;e depending on futurity,
cannot be comprehended within &s;ome certain Rules
of Limitation. The Law-maker therefore hath di&s;|charged
his part, if by his Laws he hath ordained
tho&s;e things which are for the mo&s;t part ju&s;t,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ari&s;tot. 1.</NOTE> and
profitable to the Commonalty,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ethic. 14.</NOTE> although it may &s;o
fall out, as indeed often times it doth, that on
&s;ome &s;uddain and unexpected Emergencies, tho&s;e
Laws may be defective in &s;ome particular ca&s;es not
fore&s;een; And in this Ca&s;e, if there be not a per|&s;on,
or&s;ome per&s;ons to exerci&s;e a kind of an arbi|trary
Power, there will be no other effectual Re|medy
to relieve the endangered Country, and pro|vide
for the publick &s;afety; And this is the rea&s;on
why wi&s;e men have always determined, and Rea|&s;on
al&s;o per&s;wadeth to it, that in exigent points of
nece&s;&s;ity, Legal Ju&s;tice ought to give place to Equity,
Equity according unto <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> being nothing el&s;e
then the rectifying,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign"> Ari&s;t. ib<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">d.</NOTE> or the <HI>correcting of legal ju&s;tice,</HI>
or even of the Law it &s;elf, (as pre&s;ently afterwards
he explains that Definition) by &s;upplying its defect
in particular ca&s;es, in which it comes to pa&s;s that
by too much generality it falls &s;hort of either <HI>Ju|&s;tice,</HI>
or the <HI>publick Profit;</HI> For it is nece&s;&s;ary that
Laws &s;hould be con&s;tituted <HI>generally</HI> out of a re|&s;pect
to tho&s;e things, which generally, and for the
mo&s;t part are done, but not out of a re&s;pect to all
tho&s;e things which may be contingent in <HI>particulars,</HI>
in many of which, if Laws were &s;trictly and by a
<HI>prae&s;<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ript of words</HI> accommodated, they mu&s;t nece&s;|&s;arily
be defective al&s;o, and fall &s;hort of either <HI>mo|ral
Ju&s;tice,</HI> or of <HI>Common Profit,</HI> or of both of them.</P>
<P>XVII. This being then granted, that the <HI>&s;afety of
<PB N="353" REF="194">
the People,</HI> that is, <HI>the publick profit</HI> doth require,
that there be &s;ome Authority in the Common-wealth
which is to be above the Laws, and to &s;up|ply
the defects thereof, it will nece&s;&s;arily follow
by Con&s;equence,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Ai&s;tot. 3.</NOTE> which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> a&s;&s;erteth in his
politicks,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Polit II.</NOTE> that this &s;upreme Authority cannot ap|pertain
to any one el&s;e than to him alone who is &s;et
over the whole Commonalty, and inve&s;ted with the
chiefe&s;t Power, Whether he be a &s;ingle per&s;on, as
in a monarchial Government, or many, as in other
Forms of Common-wealths: Shall it be lawful
therefore now for Subjects, under pretence of
of publick liberty and &s;afety, to break all the Bonds,
Ordinances, Laws, and Fidelity, and by an in|tolerable
rage of Pride,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">,</NOTE> to tread under their Feet,
the Authority of Laws and Princes, and for the
Defence of &s;o great a Villany, impudently to abu&s;e
and pervert that Aphori&s;m, which tho<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">e factious
men are always boa&s;ting of and repeating to one an|other,
<HI>viz. Salus populi e&s;t &s;uprema Lex;</HI><NOTE PLACE="marg">Homer. Illiad. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">.</NOTE> <HI>The &s;afety
of the people is the &s;upreme Law;</HI> How comes it to
pa&s;s, that on the contrary, they will not under&s;tand,
that even by the very &s;ame <HI>Axiom</HI> it is acknowledg|ed,
that the Prince hath a Power even over the Laws
them&s;elves; &s;o that it is lawful for him out of the
fulne&s;&s;e of his Power, if nece&s;&s;ity compels, and
the Affairs admit of no delay for the defence of
his own, and his Peoples &s;afety again&s;t forein or
dome&s;tick Enemys, to lay a&s;ide for awhile the &s;trict|er
ob&s;ervation of the Laws, le&s;t by a too &s;uper&s;ti|tious,
and too unrea&s;onable Reverence of them, he
&s;uffers both him&s;elf, and his people, and at la&s;t
the Laws them&s;elves to fall into the power of his
Enemies.</P>
<P><PB N="354" REF="195">
XVIII. As to that Que&s;tion, whether a Ptince be
free him&s;elf from the Laws he hath made, &amp; which
are confirmed, and approved by the Con&s;ent of the
People, &amp; received by common U&s;e, and how far he
is bound, <HI>ordinarily,</HI> to ob&s;erve them, I &s;hall hereaf|ter
(God willing) give you my Judgement therein;
It is now only here demanded, whether it be
lawful for him, <HI>without order,</HI> and in <HI>ca&s;e of nece&s;&s;ity,</HI>
for the defence of his Country, to do &s;ome thing
either be&s;ides, or again&s;t the <HI>Law it &s;elf?</HI> That it is
lawful for him &s;o to do, and that in good Con&s;ci|ence
<MILESTONE N="1"> he may do it, it is fir&s;t proved by the Examples
of the be&s;t Kings, and by the Hi&s;tories of all Nations
<MILESTONE N="2"> that have been remarkable throughout the world.
And &s;econdly, Rea&s;on it &s;elf doth dictate it from
<HI>the defect of the Laws in respect of the whole,</HI> and from
the uncertainty and multiplicity of particular events,
<MILESTONE N="3"> both which but even now I mentioned. And third|ly,
tho&s;e things do &s;ufficiently prove it which are
all<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter">ged by <HI>Sam.</HI> on the Right of Kings, 1. <HI>Sam.</HI> 6. &amp;
which cannot well be interpreted otherwi&s;e, al|though
many in vain have attempted &s;o to do. But
that the lea&s;t &s;cruple may not ari&s;e, nor remain from
any thing which hath here been &s;poken, and is mi&s;|under&s;tood,
Give me leave I pray you to call back
this &s;o divulged an <HI>Axiom</HI> to its fir&s;t <HI>Original;</HI>
And if I &s;hall not &s;o perform it, that you your
&s;elves may confe&s;&s;e, that the <HI>Care of the publick
&s;afety,</HI> the Laws &s;omtimes laid a&s;ide doth accor|ding
to the meaning and &s;ence of the <HI>Axiom</HI> it &s;elf,
depend wholly on the will of the Prince, and no|thing
at all on the will of the People, proclaim me
to grow dark in the cleare<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> light, and that I have
hitherto been not the Defendor, but a Prevarica|tor,
<PB N="355" REF="195">
and Betrayer of the be&s;t of Cau&s;es.</P>
<P>XIX I have declared already, that this <HI>Axiom</HI>
was derived from the Romans unto us; I &s;hall now
add that which <HI>fir&s;t of all</HI> (as I know of) is written
in the fir&s;t Book of <HI>Marcus Cicero de Legib.</HI> But by
him&s;elf as he affirmeth taken out of the antient
Laws of that Nation, and de&s;cribed by him in the
very word of the Law it &s;elf; Having therefore in
the former explained the Laws belonging to Religi|on,
and the wor&s;hip of the Gods, in his third
Book he proceeds to give an account of tho&s;e which
belong to the Magi&s;trates, and Common-wealth.
Where among&s;t other things he hath the&s;e words,
I mu&s;t be&s;eech you to give due attention to them,
<Q LANG="lat"><HI>Regio Impereo duo &s;unto: ii&abque; praecundo, judicando,
con&s;ulendo, Praetores, Judices, Con&s;ules appellantor.
Militiae &s;ummum jus habento; Nemini parento; Ol|lis
Salus Populi &s;uprema Lex e&s;to.</HI></Q> <Q><HI>Let there be
two in the Soveraign Command, and for their going
before, Ruling or Judging and Coun&s;elling, let them be
called Praetors, Judges, and Con&s;uls; Let the chief
Right of the Militia be theirs; let them be under none;
Let the Safety of the People be a &s;upreme Law unto
them;</HI></Q> <HI>To them,</HI> that is, to them that are inve&s;ted
with the &s;overaign Command, who had the chief|e&s;t
Power of the Militia, and acknowledged not
any Power above their own to which they were
to be obedient; That is, to the two Con&s;uls, who
although by the Con&s;titution of that Common-wealth
did exerci&s;e only a yearly Magi&s;tracy, yet
for that time, they had the chiefe&s;t Power over the
City, &amp; the greate&s;t part of the world, which was in
Subjection to the Roman Empire; Come hither all
you, who&s;oever you are, who among&s;t the&s;e or o|ther
<PB N="356" REF="196">
Nations are a&s;&s;ertors and Patrons of <HI>popular
Licence;</HI> Read, and<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 letter"> read overagain every period
weigh every &s;entence, clau&s;e, and point Examine
every word, &s;yllable, and tittle. Where will you
find, the Prince being unwilling, the lea&s;t &s;ign of any
Power granted to the Subject, either of judging
of the &s;afety of the People, or of acting, or de|terminating
any thing again&s;t the Laws? Doth not
the whole cour&s;e of the words in <HI>Cicero</HI> openly pro|nounce,
that the &s;upreme Authority, which is
above all Laws, and the whole Care of the publick
&s;afety, doth properly belong to him who hath the
Regal Command, and the chief Right of the Militi|a,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Salutem Reipublicae nulli magis convenire, quam Cae|&s;ari.</NOTE>
and a tran&s;endent Power to be &s;ubject unto none?
And that to prove this truth you may have the Con|&s;ent
of the mo&s;t excellent Writers both Greek and
Latin, <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> doth expre&s;s the &s;ame in the&s;e
words, 3. <HI>Polit.</HI> 2. <GAP DESC="foreign">,<NOTE PLACE="marg">Paulus. l. 3. F. de off. praef. vig.</NOTE> That is, He who is &s;et over
the Common-wealth, whether he be a &s;ingle per|&s;on
or more, hath the Arbitration and Power of de|termining
tho&s;e things of which the Laws cannot
accurately, <HI>that is,</HI> &s;peak of in particular, becau&s;e it
is no ea&s;y task univer&s;ally to comprehend parti|culars.</P>
<P>XX. Some peradventure will except again&s;t this,
and &s;ay; It goes very ill with mankind, if the &s;afe|ty
of all mu&s;t depend on the Arbitration of one,
when in a ca&s;e of the highe&s;t nece&s;&s;ity, it is not law|ful
for any man to provide for his own and the pub|lick
&s;afety without his Coun&s;el. What, if by &s;ome
&s;udden and unexpected ca&s;ualty the affair will not
<PB N="357" REF="196">
admit the delay of one day? Whiles we are going,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><GAP DESC="foreign">, Eurip. ap. ap. Stob. <GAP DESC="foreign">. 1. 10.</NOTE>
coun&s;elling, and returning, the Common-wealth
may be de&s;troyed, what will you advi&s;e us to, if it be
nece&s;&s;ary in &s;uch a &s;traight of <HI>time,</HI> and di&s;tance <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="tech" EXTENT="1 word">
<HI>place</HI> to expect the leave, and con&s;ent of the King?
I an&s;wer, in this nature, the Subjects may be per|mitted
to act &s;omething of them&s;elves, and with|out
the Princes con&s;ent, if an urgent and unavoid|able
nece&s;&s;ity doth require, for <HI>nece&s;&s;ity</HI> as the Pro|verb
&s;peaks it, <HI>hath no Law.</HI> I deny neverthele&s;s,
that from this a&s;&s;ertion that may be done which
&s;ome would have to be done. I &s;ay therefore in <MILESTONE N="1">
the fir&s;t place, that what&s;oever right can accrew
unto the Subjects upon this a&s;&s;ertion, <HI>viz.</HI> That
all Laws being neglected they &s;hould them&s;elves
provide for the publick &s;afety, doth come unto
them upon another account, for it can no ways re|ly
on the authority of this pre&s;ent Aphori&s;m as on
its foundation which leaves unto the Prince alone
the care of providing for the publick &s;afety, and
doth not permit it to the people; Again, it is one <MILESTONE N="1">
thing to attempt a thing again&s;t the publick Laws
the Prince not knowing it, and another thing
to do it, the Prince not willing to it, for one of
the two may lawfully be done upon due conditions,
but the other is ab&s;olutely unlawful. I &s;ay in the <MILESTONE N="2">
&s;econd place, that if the Subjects will attempt any
thing in order to the publick &s;afety, <HI>two things</HI> above
all other mu&s;t mo&s;t preci&s;ely be ob&s;erved, and he
who &s;hall neglect either of them cannot defend
him&s;elf by any excu&s;e of nece&s;&s;ity, and how religi|giou&s;ly
they have ob&s;erved them, who have been
the Authors or Fomentors of the mo&s;t deplorable
troubles in this Kingdom, I forbear in this place
<PB N="385" REF="197">
to make mention of, let them look to that them|&s;elves;
The two conditions are the&s;e; Fir&s;t that no
thing be done, or attempted to be done, to the pre|judice
of the Prince, who&s;e per&s;on &amp; who&s;e dignity
it pertains to the publick &s;afety to be mo&s;t careful
to pre&s;erve inviolable; Secondly, that nothing like|wi&s;e
be attempted again&s;t the Laws and Rights of
the Kingdom,<NOTE PLACE="marg">In mani|fe&s;tis non opus e&s;t in|terpretati|one, &s;ed executio|ne. <HI>Aquin. 2. 2 qu. 120. art.</HI> 2.</NOTE> but by the Princes con&s;ent, either his
expre&s;s con&s;ent, where conveniently it may be
had, or at lea&s;t <HI>rea&s;onably pre&s;umed;</HI> if he be at a
great di&s;tance, and the affair admits of no delay,
the con&s;ent of the Prince is then <HI>rea&s;onably pre&s;u|med,</HI>
when the nece&s;&s;ity is &s;o great and evident that
no wi&s;e or &s;ober man can doubt, but if the
Prince him&s;elf were pre&s;ent he would grant
unto his Subjects a relaxation of that Law.</P>
<P>XXI. The&s;e two conditions being ob&s;erved, un|le&s;s
there ari&s;eth no impediment from particular
Circum&s;tances,<NOTE PLACE="marg">certum est omnia li|cere pro patria. <HI>Quintil. declam.</HI> 369.</NOTE> I &s;ay it is lawful for Subjects for the
defence of the <HI>&s;afety of the Prince, &amp; of them&s;elves,</HI>
if it be again&s;t the Inva&s;ion of Forein, or the In&s;ur|rection
of Dome&s;tick Enemies, to look more to the
common profit which is <HI>the &s;upreme Law,</HI> than to
the letter of particular Laws, which are therefore
made to &s;erve the publick profit, and not to preju|dice
it; The rea&s;on is evident, for <HI>middle things</HI>
are for the <HI>end,</HI> and not the <HI>end</HI> for <HI>middle things,</HI>
and therefore the&s;e <HI>middle things</HI> ought to be &s;ub|&s;ervient
to the <HI>end,</HI> and not the <HI>end</HI> to them; there|fore
&s;eeing the <HI>publick &s;afety</HI> hath under it the con|&s;ideration
of the <HI>End,</HI> and the Laws, but the con|&s;ideration
of <HI>middle things,</HI> and &s;eeing it is certain,
that in the Intention of the <HI>Agent,</HI> the <HI>End</HI> is be|fore
and more to be re&s;pected than all <HI>middle things</HI>
<PB N="359" REF="197">
are or can be, it mu&s;t follow, both that the com|mon
profit of our Country is to be preferred above
all particular Laws, and that rightly it is to be pre|&s;umed,
that the Prince is of the &s;ame opinion,
who is <HI>Principal Agent</HI> in making of Laws, and
therefore what&s;oever herein is done in his ab&s;ence,
or to be done, he tacitely doth con&s;ent unto it,
(provided his own <HI>Dignity</HI> and <HI>Right</HI> being &s;a|ved)
a manife&s;t nece&s;&s;ity doth exact it for the
publick &s;afety.</P>
<P>XXII. The Hi&s;tories are full of examples to
prove this, but the rea&s;on of it being &s;o manife&s;t, I
purpo&s;ely pa&s;s them by as &s;uperfluous; I will only
produce one, but an Illu&s;trious one, and worthy to
be in&s;erted into the Annals of this Nation for the
eternal memory of the Gentleman, and which was
done al&s;o in this age, and in the memory of &s;ome
here pre&s;ent; It was the remarkable act of the
high Sheriff of <HI>Worcester&s;hire;</HI> To put the Laws in
execution, and chiefly for the pre&s;ervation of the
publick peace, there is an yearly Magi&s;trate called
a high Sheriff, &s;et over all the Shires of <HI>England,</HI>
to this Magi&s;trate for the undergoing of &s;o great
an Office, there is granted by the Laws of the
Land, the power of &s;ummoning the trained Bands
to a&s;&s;i&s;t him as often as need requireth, to go
with him, to di&s;cover and &s;uppre&s;&s;e any Tumults,
and Di&s;orders, that may happen in any place of his
County, but &s;o, that it is not lawful for him to go
with the &s;aid trained Bands beyond the Terms and
bounds of his own County; After that by the
great and wonderful mercy of God the Powder
Trea&s;on was di&s;covered, &s;ome who were con&s;cious
<PB N="360" REF="198">
of that Con&s;piracy, and one or two of the chiefe&s;t
of them did fly into <HI>Worce&s;ter&s;hire;</HI> the high She|riff,
a gallant and prudent man, did follow them
as they fled from place to place with the trained
Bands, and being come to the uttermo&s;t confines
of his County, he feared if he &s;hould make a halt
there, and pur&s;ue them no further, by rea&s;on of the
fear of the Laws, they might e&s;cape away, he
was therefore &s;o venturous that for all the Law
he brought the trayned Bands into the County that
was contigious to it, where having overtaken the
Traitors, he reduced them unto his Power, and
took along with him the Ringleaders of them, with
the re&s;t of that de&s;perate Rabble; He conceived
to him&s;elf (as indeed he ought to do) if he &s;hould
throughly perform the duty of a good Subject, he
could never expre&s;s it in a more honourable &s;er|vice,
and in that point of Nece&s;&s;ity the more &s;trict
ob&s;ervance of the Laws was un&s;ea&s;onable, he was
therefore to obey the <HI>&s;upreme Law,</HI> that is to &s;ay,
<HI>the &s;afety of his Country,</HI> and to di&s;regard all things
in re&s;pect to the <HI>publick profit.</HI> The Bu&s;ine&s;s be|ing
thus di&s;patched according to his own De&s;ire,
the wi&s;e and active Gentleman, lea&s;t the Authority
of the Laws &s;hould be di&s;paraged by his Example,
which indeed was to be imputed to Nece&s;&s;ity, and
being &s;en&s;ible withal to how greivous a Puni&s;h|ment
they are lyable in the <HI>Rigor</HI> of the <HI>Law</HI> who
are the violators of it, believed he had not done e|nough
to acquie&s;ce in the con&s;ciou&s;ne&s;&s;e only of
what he had atchieved, unle&s;&s;e withal he had made
a provi&s;ion for his &s;afety for the Time to come, and
took as much care as in him lay, that no man &s;hould
<PB N="361" REF="198">
abu&s;e his Example, by (peradventure) too bold|an
undertaking of any new De&s;ign. He therefore
po&s;ts away unto King <HI>James</HI> of happy memory,
and pro&s;trating him&s;elf at his feet, he humbly cra|ved
pardon for the violation of the Law, and as
he de&s;erved, he not only from the mo&s;t prudent
King obtained <HI>pardon</HI> for the not ob&s;ervance of
the Law, but <HI>prai&s;e</HI> for preferring the publick &s;afe|ty
above it.</P>
<P>XXIII. To give &s;atisfaction to &s;ome friends, I
have here (my Auditors) expounded to you a little
more largely then my Cu&s;tome is, what is the &s;ence
of that <HI>Axiom Salus populi &s;uprema Lex. The
&s;afety of the people is the &s;upreme Law,</HI> and to &s;top
withal, the Mouths of &s;ome importunate Men,
who to &s;peak with <HI>Solomon</HI> do force blood from
the too much wringed No&s;e, that is, by mi&s;inter|preting
a pious <HI>&s;aying,</HI> and indeed (if it be rightly
under&s;tood) &s;alubrious to the <HI>publick,</HI> they per|ver&s;ly
render it impious, and de&s;tructive unto <HI>man|kind.</HI>
To be &s;hort the &s;um of all is this, If &s;ome
private per&s;ons be hurt or injured, If the Subjects
have &s;ome publick Grievances of which they ju&s;tly
may complain, they mu&s;t not pre&s;ently have a re|cour&s;e
(as if the &s;afety of the people were in the
extreme&s;t Jeopardy) to extraordinary Remedyes,
and which are <HI>contrary to the Laws;</HI> But if there
be a ju&s;t fear that the Common-wealth will be rui|nated,
either by forein Enimyes, or &s;editious
Subjects, unle&s;s &s;omthing be effected which is not
permited by the Laws, It is then lawful for the
<HI>Prince</HI> by the <HI>Prerogative</HI> of his own Power, nay,
it is lawful for the <HI>Subjects</HI> by the <HI>pre&s;umed Will</HI> of
<PB N="362" REF="199">
their Prince (provided nothing be acted to
his prejudice, and the pre&s;ent exigence of
Nece&s;&s;ity &s;o requireth) to recede from the
word and &s;ence of particular Laws to a&s;&s;i&s;t
the <HI>endangered Country,</HI> and to be &s;ervice|able
to the <HI>&s;afety</HI> thereof, as to the <HI>&s;upreme&s;t
Law.</HI> I &s;hall &s;uddenly proceed to pro&s;ecute
the re&s;t, as God &s;hall permit and oppor|tunity
&s;hall inable me. <HI>The Grace of our Lord
Je&s;us Chri&s;t &amp;c.</HI></P>
<P>Thus far I have committed the Sayls unto
the Winds, although in a blu&s;tring &s;ea&s;on,
and the face of Heaven being masked with
many Clouds, (yet God being my Pilot)
I &s;afely proceeded in my intended cour&s;e,
and now I did begin to &s;tand more off to
Sea, being re&s;olved if the Times would give
me leave, to have reached the de&s;ired Port,
when behold a &s;uddain and over-powering Tem|pe&s;t
did over my head admoni&s;h me, that
for the time to come it would be very un|&s;afe
to adventure further, or to continue
ploughing through the&s;e unquiet Deeps, I percei|ved
therefore that new Coun&s;els were forthwith
to be taken, and unle&s;s I would be come the re|proach
and &s;port of the Winds, I mu&s;t no
longer &s;tay on &s;uch a dangerous and &s;uch a
vaunting Sea; I &s;uddenly therefore tacked a|bout,
and timely brought my Ship into the
Haven, for it &s;eemed to me more honourable
gradually to retreat, than to be beaten back
by force, and more profitable for my affairs
to live within my own doors with <HI>ea&s;e</HI> and
<PB N="363" REF="199">
<HI>umbrage,</HI> than to be &s;een in the Market
place, or on the Theatre, attended with <HI>noy&s;e,</HI>
and <HI>fear,</HI> and <HI>envy.</HI></P>
<EPIGRAPH>
<Q LANG="lat">Hinc eadem <HI>FINIS</HI> di&s;criminis, at&abque; laboris,</Q>
<Q><L>Therefore till Heaven &s;ome calmer days &s;hall &s;end,</L>
<L>The Work, and Dangers, here together <HI>END.</HI></L></Q>
</EPIGRAPH>
</DIV1>
<TRAILER>THE END.
<PB REF="200">
<PB REF="200" MS="y"></TRAILER>
</BODY>
<BACK>
<DIV1 TYPE="modern bookplate">
<PB REF="201">
<PB REF="201" MS="y">
<P><FIGURE>
<HEAD>THE FOLGER SHAKESPEARE LIBRARY</HEAD>
</FIGURE></P>
</DIV1>
</BACK>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
