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<DATE>2012-01-09</DATE>
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<NAME>Jayanthi Reddy</NAME>
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<DIV1 TYPE="title page">
<PB REF="1" MS="y">
<P>A Copy of a LETTER Written to an OFFICER OF THE ARMY BY A true <HI>Commonwealths-man,</HI> and no <HI>CO&V;RTIER,</HI> Concerning The Right and Settlement of our pre&s;ent GOVERNMENT and GOVERNORS.</P>
<P><HI>LONDON,</HI> Printed by <HI>Tho. Newcomb,</HI> over again&s;t <HI>Bainards</HI>-Ca&s;tle in <HI>Thames-&s;treet.</HI> 1656:</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="preface">
<PB REF="2">
<PB N="1" REF="2">
<OPENER><SALUTE>SIR,</SALUTE></OPENER>
<P>_IF we look into our Stories from the <HI>Con|queror,</HI> (from whom the whole race of our Kings &s;ince have derived their Titles and Claims) we &s;hall finde it evident, that tho&s;e that were originally the great Council of this Land, were originally &s;uch as had been Commanders under, and had holpen that fir&s;t <HI>William</HI> to the Soveraignty of this Kingdom: who, having now through his means obtained &s;o great a &s;hare in the wealth of the Nation, &s;eemed mo&s;t likely to be regardful as well of his, as of the general &s;afety and good thereof. To you therefore I &s;hall make this my humble Appeal concerning the rea&s;onablene&s;s of that Letter which I formerly addre&s;&s;ed unto tho&s;e that la&s;t of all &s;ate as a Parliament among&s;t us; leaving it to you to determine whether they had not pre&s;idents, as well as rea&s;on, &s;ufficient to have led them to the e&s;ta|bli&s;hment of this Government in a more &s;etled way then now it is. For we &s;hall find that (all along) this great Council or Parliament have ever &s;etled the &s;ucce&s;&s;ion on him that had the pre&s;ent power, although others might in legal appearance have a better title, and that confirmed by their own oaths al&s;o. Thus we find the &s;aid <HI>William</HI> the Fir&s;t generally obeyed by the <HI>Engli&s;h</HI> after the con|que&s;t of <HI>Harold,</HI> even as <HI>Harold</HI> was before; notwith&s;tanding <HI>Edgar Etheling</HI> had the indubitable right from both, according to the then e&s;tabli&s;hed Laws. And &s;o again were the po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion and hereditary right of his &s;ucceeding &s;ons, <HI>William</HI> and <HI>Henry</HI> the Fir&s;t, &s;worn to and maintained by the Peers and others; notwith|&s;tanding al&s;o that the&s;e two, be&s;ides the claim of the &s;aid <HI>Edgar,</HI> might be al&s;o ju&s;tly reputed &V;&s;urpers again&s;t the right of their elder Brother <HI>Robert</HI> yet living. The Soveraignty being next
<PB N="2" REF="3"> &s;ei&s;ed on by <HI>Stephen</HI> again&s;t the direct lineal right of the I&s;&s;ue of <HI>Maud</HI> the Empre&s;s, unto whom the &s;aid Peers had al&s;o &s;worne faith and allegiance; yet &s;hall we again find them &s;wearing to be faithful to him and his i&s;&s;ue, and both they and others of the Na|tion generally taking his part again&s;t the &s;aid <HI>Maud</HI> and her children.</P>
<P>To in&s;tance in all, would be too tedious: But it is apparent through the whole Story, that all Parliaments both before and after the addition of the Hou&s;e of Commons, have ever confirmed and &s;etled the &s;ucce&s;&s;ion in him who&s;e Writs they obeyed in their Sum|mons, however a more apparent Title might &s;eem to re&s;t in &s;ome other per&s;on yet living. In which doing it could not yet be expected, but &s;ome mutterings and in&s;urrections mu&s;t ari&s;e from &s;ome par|ticular per&s;ons, as well &s;uch as had been of the &s;ame party with the pre&s;ent Prince, who (like &s;ons of <HI>Zerviah</HI>) out of di&s;content at their own &s;maller &s;hare of preferment, or the greater favor ca&s;t to|wards others then they thought fit, will thereupon be keeping the terms of <HI>War</HI> in time of <HI>Peace,</HI> and &s;o di&s;like of their Princes enter|tainment of any that have (like <HI>Abner</HI>) been of a contrary party, although their u&s;efulne&s;s and fidelity be now apparent: As al&s;o of &s;ome again, who (like <HI>Shimei</HI>) out of &s;ome more particular love and relation to the depo&s;ed Family,<NOTE PLACE="marg">2 Sam. <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">6.5, 6, 7, 8. 1 Sam. 20 14, 15, 42. 1 Sam. 2<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">.2<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">, 22. 2 Sam. 3.1.</NOTE> will be prone to ca&s;t the odium of blood and u&s;urpation upon the per&s;on po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed; especially if from a mean degree he have come to the Throne, and had al&s;o taken an oath of fidelity to the former Prince and his family, as in the ca&s;e of <HI>David</HI> to <HI>Jonathan</HI> and <HI>Saul;</HI> when as yet it was plain enough that <HI>Saul</HI> was not &s;lain by <HI>David,</HI> but by the <HI>Phili&s;tines:</HI> And for that war between their hou&s;es, in which it is &s;aid, <HI>The hou&s;e of</HI> David <HI>waxed daily &s;tronger and &s;tronger, and the hou&s;e of</HI> Saul <HI>weaker and weaker;</HI> it is to be looked upon as the joint a&s;&s;o|ciation of the&s;e of <HI>Judah</HI> al&s;o; who, having now &s;ubmitted to an|other Head, oppo&s;ed the other as a common enemy.</P>
<P>And if we look into the latter times for the care taken by the then good Commonwealths-men in &s;etling this great affair, even to the time of Queen <HI>Elizabeth,</HI> we &s;hall find the fir&s;t Parliament humbly to &s;ollicite her to marry betimes.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Annal. Eliz. fol. <HI>25.</HI></NOTE> <Q>The Parliament (&s;ays Mr. <HI>Cambden</HI>) being to be di&s;&s;olved, they all thought good that the Third E&s;tate or Lower Hou&s;e &s;hould advi&s;e the Queen to marry
<PB N="3" REF="3"> betimes: yet would not the Temporal Lords join with them, le&s;t any of them might &s;eem to propound it in hope to prefer him&s;elf.</Q> And it's like, both they and all former Peers were al&s;o willing to have the Crown hereditary, le&s;t they might al&s;o &s;eem to be ambitious of &s;uc|ce&s;&s;ion them&s;elves; as though they had been rather <HI>Pares</HI> as to the Soveraignty, then as a true Senate of <HI>Patres</HI> or <HI>Peres</HI> as to the Nation. Some words then u&s;ed by the Speaker I &s;hall particularly &s;et down, that we may &s;ee how antient Parliaments differed from &s;ome of late, they having as great a care to build and to e&s;tabli&s;h, as the&s;e to pull down. <Q>There is nothing which with more ardent affection we beg of God in our daily prayers, then that our happi|ne&s;s hitherto received by your mo&s;t gracious Government, may be perpetuated to the Engli&s;h Nation to all eternity. While&s;t in our minds and cogitations we ca&s;t many ways how this may be effect|ed, we can find none at all, unle&s;s your Maje&s;ty &s;hould either reign for ever, (which to hope for is not lawful) or el&s;e by marriage bring forth Children, heirs both of their Mothers vertue and Empire (which God Almighty grant.)</Q></P>
<P>And in the Parliamnt held in the ninth year of her Reign, when, through difference of Religions which then were, men began to propound to them&s;elves &s;ometimes one, and &s;ometimes another to get the Soveraignty, in ca&s;e &s;he &s;hould die without a certain Suc|ce&s;&s;or:<NOTE PLACE="marg"><HI>fol.</HI> 84.</NOTE> <Q>Therefore <HI>(&s;ays my Author)</HI> the Higher Hou&s;e be&s;ought the Queen with all earne&s;tne&s;s, by the mouth of <HI>Bacon</HI> L. Keeper, their Speaker; according to the duty which they owe to God, the allegeance to their Prince, and love to their Country; that fora&s;much as by her they now quietly enjoyed all the benefits of Peace, Ju&s;tice and Clemencie, both they and their po&s;terity might &s;ecurely and always enjoy the &s;ame by her. But <HI>(&s;ay they)</HI> they cannot enjoy the &s;ame, unle&s;s &s;he marry, and withall de&s;ign a Suc|ce&s;&s;or. Above all things therefore they do wi&s;h and pray her, that &s;he will join her&s;elf in the &s;acred bond of marriage, to whom&s;oever, where&s;oever, and how&s;oever it may plea&s;e her, to the end &s;he may have Children to be pillars of the Realm; con&s;titute and appoint a Succe&s;&s;or if &s;he or her children (which God forbid) &s;hould die without i&s;&s;ue. That they &s;hould &s;o earne&s;tly beg this, which is &s;o mainly nece&s;&s;ary, there are <HI>(&s;ay they)</HI> many cau&s;es; to wit, the fre&s;h fear which invaded all men, when very lately her health
<PB N="4" REF="4"> was indangered; the opportunity of the times, when the E&s;tates of the Realm were now a&s;&s;embled, who would maturely delibe|rate of &s;o weighty matters; the terror which &s;he &s;hould &s;trike in|to her adver&s;aries, and the immortal joy wherewith &s;he would repleni&s;h all her Subjects. They commend the Examples of her Ance&s;tors, which in &s;uch ca&s;es have prudently provided for the &s;ecurity of their Po&s;terity; condemning that &s;peech of <HI>Pyrrhus,</HI> who &s;aid, <HI>He would leave the Kingdom to him which had the &s;harpe&s;t &s;word.</HI> Moreover they propound, how great a &s;torm of calamities would hang over <HI>England,</HI> if &s;he &s;hould put off her mortality, de&s;igning no certain Succe&s;&s;or; That &s;editious and Civil Wars would break forth, wherein the Victory it &s;elf were mo&s;t mi&s;erable: That Religion would be aboli&s;hed, Ju&s;tice &s;mo|thered, the Laws trodden under feet, When there &s;hould be no certain Prince, which is the &s;oul of the Law; and that the King|dom would fall as a prey to Foreiners. And other calamities of that &s;ort they reckon up and exaggerate, wherein all men would be included, if &s;he &s;hould die without i&s;&s;ue. Out of the &s;acred Scriptures al&s;o they mode&s;tly join hereunto precepts, coun&s;els, and examples.</Q> <HI>At which time al&s;o the Lower Hou&s;e were more vehement in their expre&s;&s;ions to the &s;ame purpo&s;e.</HI></P>
<P>The&s;e things have been the more largely collected and &s;et down, that we might &s;ee the difference between Parliaments then, and &s;ince: For they were &s;o far from u&s;urping authority to them&s;elves to alter the &s;ucce&s;&s;ion of the Prince in po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion which had Heirs, under colour of their power of Election during the life of the Prince, that they claimed not a right to con&s;titute an Heir or Succe&s;&s;or unto him that had Children of his own. Even as in the time of <HI>Henry</HI> the Eight, they had (at his motion) &s;etled the Crown &s;ome|times upon the i&s;&s;ue by one wife, and &s;ometimes upon another; and at last <HI>left it to &s;uch as he &s;hould give it by his la&s;t Will and Te&s;tament.</HI> The&s;e Parliaments of <HI>Q Elizabeth</HI> con&s;i&s;ting then of Papi&s;ts chiefly, might more ju&s;tly then now have &s;u&s;pected an aver&s;ne&s;s from the Religion profe&s;&s;ed or e&s;tabli&s;hed,<NOTE PLACE="marg"><HI>fol.</HI> 16.</NOTE> e&s;pecially in Fundamentals. <Q>But on the other hand <HI>(&s;ays my Author)</HI> &s;he was much troubled at the impatience of &s;ome Mini&s;ters of the Word, who cho&s;e rather to forerun then expect Laws, and began to &s;ow abroad the Doctrine of the Gospel more freely, fir&s;t in private
<PB N="5" REF="4"> hou&s;es, then in Churches; and the people greedy of novelty, began to flock unto them in great numbers:</Q> It might have been objected, that &s;he was a Woman, and &s;o unfit to be acknowledged Head of the Church; which authority had been in the time of her Father &s;etled upon the Imperial Crown of this Realm; A thing &s;coffed at as well by them which &s;eemed more &s;trictly zealous, as by the Pa|pi&s;ts them&s;elves: And they might al&s;o, and with more right have in&s;i&s;ted upon an Act of Parliament, whereby &s;he &s;tood di&s;abled from the Government, and that as one declared illegitimate, and who&s;e Mother had been condemned and executed for Adultery, Even by an Act of a Parliament con&s;i&s;ting of King, Lords and Commons, and not made by a <HI>piece of a piece</HI> of a Parliament only.<NOTE PLACE="marg">Camb. Annal. fol. <HI>18.</HI></NOTE> <Q>Where|upon <HI>(&s;ays my Author)</HI> &s;ome &s;editious per&s;ons afterward took occa&s;ion thereby to attempt dangerous matters again&s;t her, as being not lawful Queen, albeit the Engli&s;h Laws have long &s;ince pronounced, that the <HI>Crown once worne quite taketh away all defects what&s;oever.</HI></Q> And as this unrepealing of that Act, and this Maxim of the Law, was then imputed to <HI>Bacons</HI> wi&s;dome, (on whom as an Oracle of the Law the Queen wholly relied in &s;uch matters) &s;o (for further &s;atisfaction of mens mindes concerning the undoubted obedience which is due to the Po&s;&s;e&s;&s;or, in que&s;tions of like kinde) I &s;hall &s;et down the determination of him, who by Lawyers them&s;elves is accompted an Oracle of the Law &s;ince, namely my Lord <HI>Cook,</HI> who in the <HI>3. part</HI> of his <HI>In&s;titutes, f. 6, 7.</HI> in the Title of <HI>Trea&s;on,</HI> expounding the words of <HI>Nre Seignior le Roy,</HI> &s;ays, that by <HI>le Roy</HI> is to be under&s;tood a <HI>King regnant,</HI> and not of one that hath but the <HI>name of a King.</HI> And then al&s;o he alleadges the in&s;tance of <HI>Q. Mary,</HI> on whom, as having indeed the &s;overaign power, the word <HI>le Roy</HI> was appropriate, although &s;he were a woman, and her Husband at the &s;ame time &s;tiled King of <HI>England.</HI> After|wards he quotes in the margent the Statute of <HI>11 Henry 7.</HI> enact|ing, That none &s;hall be condemned for any thing done in obedience to the pre&s;ent King or Soveraign, (for &s;o the words of the Statute are, <HI>King or Soveraign;</HI>) He further &s;aith, <Q>This Act is to be under&s;tood of a King in po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion of the Crown and Kingdom: For if there be a King regnant in po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion, although he be <HI>Rex de facto, &amp; non de jure,</HI> yet is he <HI>Seignior le Roy</HI> within the purview of this Statute; and the other that hath right, and is out
<PB N="6" REF="5"> of po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion, is not within this Act. Nay, if Trea&s;on be committed again&s;t a King <HI>de facto, &amp; non de jure,</HI> &amp; after the King <HI>de jure</HI> cometh to the Crown, he &s;hall puni&s;h the Trea&s;on done to the King <HI>de facto</HI> and a Pardon granted by a King <HI>de jure,</HI> that is not al&s;o <HI>de facto,</HI> is void.</Q> By all which it will appear, that the Law directs our fidelity to <HI>Nre Seignior, our Soveraign Lord;</HI> not confining it to the &s;tile and title of <HI>le Roy</HI> or <HI>King,</HI> to whom it is only due, as being actually <HI>Nre Roy,</HI> our Soveraign Lord the King. And indeed it would have &s;eemed &s;trange, if what by the Law is due to inferior powers, (as Lords of Manors, or the like) &s;hould have been denied to the chief: For in that ca&s;e, the exception of a <HI>Di&s;&s;ei&s;or</HI> again&s;t the right Heir, is not available to abate any Ser|vice or Acknowledgment which ought to come from a Tenant or Homager.</P>
<P>Having thus (Sir) as &s;hortly as I could, cleered my way of &s;ome mo&s;t material doubts, I &s;hall now crave your patience to peru&s;e the following <HI>Letter;</HI> be&s;eeching God to direct and ble&s;s you in the &s;et|ling of the peace and good of the&s;e Nations. Which is the daily prayer of</P>
<CLOSER><SALUTE>SIR,</SALUTE>
<SIGNED>Your mo&s;t affectionate Friend and Servant.</SIGNED></CLOSER>
</DIV1>
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<PB N="3" REF="5">
<OPENER><SALUTE>SIR,</SALUTE></OPENER>
<P>_YOu may plea&s;e to remember, that upon &s;ome late di&s;cour&s;es which pa&s;&s;ed between us concerning &s;ome things relating to the pre&s;ent e&s;ta|bli&s;hment in our Government, and of that que&s;tion of Hereditary or Elective &s;ucce&s;&s;ion; I did then trou|ble you with the relation of my o|pinion therein, and give you &s;uch rea&s;ons and arguments as did then occur, for the e&s;tabli&s;h|ment of both: And which might &s;erve by way of an&s;wer to tho&s;e ordinary objections made to the contrary, which in malicious Pamphlets or otherwi&s;e were vulgarly &s;pread a|broad, both to di&s;affect the people, and to breed a di&s;ta&s;te and jealou&s;ie both in Parliament and Army again&s;t the <HI>Pro|tector</HI> and his &s;ettlement and proceedings. But having now &s;ince had time more &s;eriou&s;ly to con&s;ider of the nature and con&s;equences of the thing, both as it is in it &s;elf, and as it doth relate to the con&s;titution of the&s;e Nations, and the pre&s;ent &s;tate of publique affairs therein &s;etled, I found my &s;elf on all hands &s;o throughly &s;atisfied with the inconveni|encies that would accompany Election, and with the falla|cies of all tho&s;e &s;pecious arguments u&s;ually given for it, that I conceived it lay upon me as a duty, as well for your own farther &s;atisfaction, as for that &s;atisfaction you might here|in give to others, both in the Hou&s;e and Army, to give un|to you a more full and regular accompt of my conceptions herein: To the end that the prejudices of all unbia&s;&s;ed peo|ple may be herewith &s;o far &s;atisfied, that through murmure and ingratitude we do not again provoke God to de&s;i&s;t in that cour&s;e of e&s;tabli&s;hment he hath now put us, and &s;uffer us again to relap&s;e into our former way of divi&s;ion and di&s;|order; whil&s;t, at once, we &s;hould &s;hew our &s;elves as well unju&s;t and ingrateful towards him, as towards that his Mi|ni&s;ter whom he hath made &s;o highly in&s;trumental in &s;o great a mercy.</P>
<PB N="4" REF="6">
<P>So far as this de&s;ign of Election &s;avours of inju&s;tice and ingratitude towards our pre&s;ent Superior, I &s;hall de&s;ire you (Sir) fir&s;t to con&s;ider, that as ambition and covetou&s;ne&s;s are vices to all men more or le&s;s incident, &s;o in tho&s;e or &s;uch like alterations of State as have happened to us, it cannot be ex|pected that the acqui&s;itions of the prevailing party, either for honour or riches, can be &s;o equally or in &s;uch &s;ort &s;hared as to find general &s;atisfaction. For as each one is then ready to &s;et the highe&s;t rate he can on his own de&s;erts and endea|vours in the Common cau&s;e, even &s;o mu&s;t he con&s;equently as much repine at the portions of others above him, and which are greater then his own, as to be thereby prompted to find out and promote all the ways he can both for abating from them, and for reducing them to an equality with him&s;elf: And if this cannot be effected, then at lea&s;t to abridge them of continuance herein, that he al&s;o, as in right of election, may have his turn in tho&s;e honours and e&s;tates which are highe&s;t. And this is al&s;o to be expected from &s;uch as have for a long time together made to them|&s;elves a way of trade and gain by means of that &s;upreme and uncontrollable power and tru&s;t they then executed: when now being debarred of the perpetuity of their mi&s;u&s;ed power, they are bu&s;ie to vent abroad their angry and re|vengeful declamations as well again&s;t his power that hath done it, as his continuance therein; and to make it take the better, to palliate it with the &s;hew of publike good.</P>
<P>They &s;ay, that &s;ince all in the late engagement have run equal hazard, and have jointly adventured their lives and fortunes, why &s;hould any one per&s;on or family be &s;uffered to ingro&s;s all the prize to them&s;elves? That the Cau&s;e they undertook was that which was common, and for the good of the whole people, and to render them happy, not the &s;ingle advantage and preferment of any one man or his po|&s;terity. And if any one man &s;hould claim advantage or pre|ferment above the re&s;t, as having been (for his part) mo&s;t eminent and active in the pro&s;ecution and danger thereof, yet why his &s;on or po&s;terity, who (perhaps) were not all,
<PB N="5" REF="6"> or very little meritorious therein? Will not the &s;ame ju&s;tice and rea&s;on of eminent de&s;ert that preferred the Father to others of le&s;s de&s;ert then him, claim precedence for other per&s;ons of more pre&s;ent de&s;erts and hopes before the&s;e al&s;o? Mark the di&s;pen&s;ations of Providence and Nature; &s;ince they entail not Vertue and Wi&s;dom to a Family, what is it but on purpo&s;e to advi&s;e us to a di&s;creet liberty of choo&s;ing him that is be&s;t out of all, and not &s;ervilely to &s;ubject our &s;elves to &s;uch hazards and inconveniences as may accom|pany any one? In &s;uch &s;ort as &s;ometimes a per&s;on notori|ou&s;ly wicked, and &s;ometimes (to the heightening of our woe) a Child &s;hall be left to rule over us. That it is the &s;tronge&s;t allurement to undertake acts of Tyrannie and In|ju&s;tice; &s;ince now they know they cannot be amoved, be they what they will: Nor will they at all &s;tudy the content and &s;atisfaction of the people, &s;ince they know they came in, and can continue therein without them. Whereas he that con&s;iders that his election comes from, and is made by the people, will probably, as in gratitude and kindne&s;s to them, &s;tudy all ways to plea&s;e and oblige them</P>
<P>With the&s;e and &s;uch like di&s;cour&s;es and arguments I find the ambitious heads of &s;ome per&s;ons (di&s;affected to the pre&s;ent Government, or indeed to any Government ar all) have of late &s;ought, not only to e&s;trange the minde of both Parliament and Army one towards another, but to &s;pread an univer&s;all jealou&s;ie and di&s;gu&s;t again&s;t him that is now our <HI>higher Power:</HI> That &s;o as under the odium and &s;u&s;pition of that arbitrary Government which may be acted by one per&s;on, them&s;elves may, more certainly, and in grea|ter numbers, both at Committees and el&s;where, by ve<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">tue of the glorious title and countenance of a Parlament, &s;til retain to them&s;elves an unlimited power to &s;ettle and di&s;po&s;e of the Liberties and fortunes of others as they &s;hall &s;ee good. And although, for the pre&s;ent there may not be &s;o much fear of impre&s;&s;ion upon a ju&s;t con&s;ideration of the appro|ved moderation and di&s;cipline of the whole Army (the like whereunto I may confidently &s;ay no &s;tory can make in|&s;tance
<PB N="6" REF="7"> in) yet, con&s;idering them as mortal in their particu|lar members, and how that hereafter the hope of &s;ucce&s;&s;ion (a contrivance purpo&s;ely brought in to engage and di&s;affect &s;ome of them) may work upon more ambitious and cove|tous heads, I have thought good to offer the&s;e Con&s;idera|tions following, as highly con&s;iderable, both in re&s;pect of Ju&s;tice and gratitude to the per&s;on now in po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion, and al&s;o in reference to the future good and tranquility of the three Nations.</P>
<P>Fir&s;t, I &s;ay, that in this great change in the face of pub|lick affairs which hath hapned and been brought about, all that have been active have not run equal hazards. For, as it is apparent that the Souldier hath run more hazard then others; &s;o, among&s;t them again, although it be true, that as to the &s;hock of a battail, the common Souldier is in equal or greater peril of his life, then his Captain or Colonell, yet &s;ince in the defeat of an Army, it is much the le&s;&s;er patt that peri&s;h in the field; but the re&s;t coming to be made pri|&s;oners, and &s;o left to the u&s;age of the Conqueror, it is not then to be thought but that the leader and Commander is more in danger of &s;evere and exemplary puni&s;hment then the other. Be&s;ides which, in all Proclamations of pardon, which are the u&s;uall fore-runners of open warr or &s;ett battailes, an offer of indemnity and grace u&s;eth to be made as to the body and ordinary &s;ort of the adver&s;e party and army, and onely &s;ome few, and it may be but the Generall him&s;elf to &s;tand excepted. And therefore I would de&s;ire tho&s;e that be now Commanders in this pre&s;ent army to lay the&s;e things to heart, and to mea&s;ure the ca&s;e of their pre&s;ent Generall by that Go&s;pel rule of <HI>doe as thou woulde&s;t be done unto.</HI> Doe they not really believe that in ca&s;e the King had prevailed, them&s;elves &s;hould have undergone higher Cen&s;ure and Puni&s;hment then tho&s;e of inferior ranke that &s;erved under them? and that, not onely as having greater fortunes then them to lo&s;e, but al&s;o as having been more eminent and active again&s;t him then they. And doe they not farther believe that their pre&s;ent Generall, as
<PB N="7" REF="7"> having mo&s;t of all been eminent and forward in this whole enterpri&s;e, was not thereupon, proportionably in greate&s;t danger of all? Therefore if they think it rea&s;onable that tho&s;e &s;tates and honours which by means, and as in reward of their publique imployment are come into their hands, &s;hould now remain as hereditary to their po&s;terity, in like manner as they did to others before, they mu&s;t, upon the &s;ame rule of equity determine that the like is mo&s;t ju&s;tly due to the Protector &amp; his family al&s;o. If any of them by means of his own military and publick imployment, have encrea&s;ed his e&s;tate or degree &s;o far as to be brought up to the ranke and title of E&s;quire, will he be content that nothing of this &s;hall de&s;cend to his &s;onne? Or if he have gotten the propriety of &s;ome Mannor, and through that the juri&s;diction and Honour which belongs to a Lord thereof, will they be content to exerci&s;e and enjoy al this but during life onely, and then &s;uffer both the acquired e&s;tate and Lord&s;hip to re&s;t at the di&s;po&s;e of the Tenants, or tho&s;e that have &s;erved under him? whereby the&s;e, as renouncing that their own former and proper relations and conditions of Tenancy and Obedience, &s;hould now take upon them to di&s;po&s;e, as they think good of the heir; and to &s;hare and di&s;tribute, as they plea&s;e, all that belonged to the Father? And all this upon allegation it was a joynt and publike cau&s;e which they all undertooke, and that the&s;e honours and Revenews being parcels of, and belonging unto that Com|monwealth, for which they &s;erved, there was no rea&s;on that one &s;hould engro&s;s and appropriate that for which all had run like hazard and &s;ervice: If they think this Levelling plea fit in this ca&s;e to take place, there will then indeed be &s;ome equality though little di&s;cretion. But if they on their parts, like not to be reduced to this condition, but do rather judge it rea&s;onable that &s;ince that Commonwealth, for who&s;e &s;ake and &s;afety they have undertaken all this pains and hazard, hath belonging unto it, and to the nece&s;&s;ary &s;upport and management thereof divers hereditary Offi|cers, preferments, and Revenues, it is but ju&s;t that tho&s;e
<PB N="8" REF="8"> per&s;ons that have been mo&s;t eminently faithful and active above others in the &s;upport of it and them, &s;hould by good equity be e&s;tated in tho&s;e places and powers which are of greate&s;t tru&s;t and benefit. For if this plea be not good, there are examples and pre&s;idents enow to be fetched out of for|reign parts both for levelling of Gentry and Nobility, and al&s;o to make them mortal with the parent, and to depend on the arbitrary di&s;po&s;al of others. But if they would not, for their parts, have it well taken to have alterations pur|po&s;ely devi&s;ed and &s;et on foot to take from them and theirs what they had &s;o highly de&s;erved, &s;o can they not but judge it as hard and unequal u&s;age towards others. For, did any of them ever hear or read that the Soveraignty of this place was ever elective? If not, doe they indeed think that this man that now hath it, is, for his part, &s;o much the wor&s;t and mo&s;t unde&s;erving of any that ever yet ruled, that, for his exemplary infamy and di&s;grace, a particular law mu&s;t be brought in to the prejudice of his po&s;terity? I would fain demand of any of them that are fathers of children; Was not the honor &amp; advancement of their hou&s;e one great mo|tive to this undertaking? Did they not beforehand know, that if they had been overcome, the infamy and lo&s;s accom|panying Traitors and Trea&s;on (ever imputed to the weaker &s;ide) would have light on their po&s;terity as much or more then them&s;elves? And therefore &s;ince the&s;e their children (e&s;pecially of &s;uch as have been eminent) have run their &s;hares in the hazard of that &s;hame and lo&s;s which did attend the &s;ucce&s;s, and the greate&s;t &s;hare too in the perpetuity thereof; they cannot therefore but conclude, that not only their own, but the race of tho&s;e al&s;o that are above them, mu&s;t, by good right, claim to be e&s;tated and &s;etled in all &s;uch hereditary Offices as their father &s;tood &s;ei&s;ed of, in reward or acknowledgment of their pa&s;t &s;ervice. There can be no man &s;o weak of judgment or experience, but may ea&s;ily conceive there would have been a more high mea&s;ure of contempt and puni&s;hment inflicted on the po&s;terity of the <HI>Protector</HI> then of any other, in ca&s;e he had been overcome:
<PB N="9" REF="8"> Nor &s;urely can any be &s;o devoid of rea&s;on or con&s;cience, as not to determine that by good con&s;equence they doe there|upon de&s;erve al&s;o to be continued in the highe&s;t preferment that doth belong to that Commonwealth who&s;e cau&s;e they maintained, and for who&s;e &s;afety they were put into &s;uch hazard.</P>
<P>But to come yet nearer to them in their Propo&s;als for Equality: Do they think &s;it indeed, that every per&s;on and every family engaged in this Cau&s;e, &s;hould enjoy an arith|metical proportion of power and advantage with that of their &s;uperiors, both in electing and being elected? Why, then mu&s;t the poore&s;t Cottager and Mechanick of all come in with their equal voice to choo&s;e, and al&s;o with his equal turn for being cho&s;en, without any put-off for want of birth or breeding, or other per&s;onal endowment or fitting quali|fication which was not at his hand to be expected But if they cannot think it po&s;&s;ible that this way could afford turns e|now for the hundreth family in a Kingdom that have en|gaged; nor do think it farther nece&s;&s;ary to erect an Heralds Office to regi&s;ter all that fir&s;t ventured and acted in that Cau&s;e, with their &s;everal di&s;cents and pedigrees; then do they proceed partially according to their own rule, making an unequal choice among&s;t tho&s;e that have equally en|gaged: Becau&s;e equality of honor and preferment being due to that fir&s;t equality of de&s;ert, and engagement in the Father only, how can it be forfeited by any accidentall in|feriority or impediment in the Son hapning &s;ince? Will they wave this &s;uppo&s;ition of equall engagement and claim due unto all Families, and confine both the Electors and E|lected unto &s;ome rank or order of men, and &s;o by an exact pair of Sizers cut a Nation into two equalities; one that &s;hall be equally and altogether uncapable of having voice or &s;hare in the Government, and the other of being con|&s;tantly and equally capable of both (as in all elective Mo|narchies is practi&s;ed) then by the &s;ame rule of ju&s;tice that they ob&s;erve a di&s;tance, and exclude tho&s;e below from ha|ving an equality with them in &s;ome places of command or
<PB N="10" REF="9"> profit; he that is uppermo&s;t of all, may, as I &s;aid, exclude them again in that which is highe&s;t. For it may well be pre&s;umed, that he is as much above them of the highe&s;t rank of equality, as they again are above tho&s;e that are below. If we look to the examples of <HI>Germany</HI> and <HI>Poland</HI> (the two onely places where there is a &s;overaign Magi&s;trate ele|cted with any competent power) we &s;hall find that <HI>Germany</HI> hath &s;carcely made any choice but out of their four great Families of <HI>Franconia, Swevia, Bavaria,</HI> and <HI>Au&s;tria,</HI> &s;till making choice of one of tho&s;e Dukes for Emperor; which they did not neither, till there was a failer in the family of <HI>Charls the Great,</HI> which was above them all. And as for <HI>Poland,</HI> their Stories tell us, That they have had Forty per|&s;ons &s;ucce&s;&s;ively Raigning of one and the &s;ame Family: the like whereunto cannot be &s;aid of any hereditary Monarchy that I know of.</P>
<P>And, Sir, if you would be &s;atisfied with pre&s;idents as well as Rea&s;on, for this hereditary &s;ucce&s;&s;ion among&s;t our &s;elves, you &s;hall finde it adju&s;ted even from the Founders and Ori|ginals of our Engli&s;h Nation. For did not tho&s;e Armies of the <HI>Saxons</HI> that had holpen the people of this Land again&s;t their Enemies, think it afterwards rea&s;onable, that &s;ince them&s;elves had &s;hared in mo&s;t of the great places of Tru&s;t and Command, and that al&s;o in the &s;ame way of approbation and hereditary right they found them po&s;&s;e&s;t by others before, &s;o al&s;o to &s;ettle their Generals and their Heires in that place and degree of power which was highe&s;t of all? and this they did, although in their own Nation that Office did then pa&s;s by Election. And it will be al&s;o found that both <HI>Dane</HI> and <HI>Norman</HI> coming with their Ar|mies afterwards, did, upon their &s;ucce&s;s, &s;ettle them&s;elves and their Chieftains in like manner.</P>
<P>If we look abroad we &s;hall finde, Sir, that as the&s;e <HI>Saxons</HI> did in <HI>England,</HI> &s;o the <HI>Francks</HI> (another people of <HI>Germany</HI>) did al&s;o &s;ettle their Leaders in the Kingdom of <HI>France;</HI> and although they had called them&s;elves <HI>Francks,</HI> as impatient of the &s;ubjection of any other, yet did they mo&s;t willingly
<PB N="11" REF="9"> &s;ubmit to the Head of their own party. And mark tho&s;e &s;everall lines of Kings that have therein &s;wayed, and you will finde that the &s;everall Families of <HI>Meroveus, Charles the Great,</HI> and of <HI>Capet,</HI> were &s;uch as by their own policy and prowe&s;s, and by the help of a powerfull party had bin advanced from the degree of Subjects to become ab&s;olute Kings, upon the expul&s;ion of tho&s;e that were their former Ma&s;ters, and had the Title. Nay, look to <HI>Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, Hungary,</HI> and all the world over, and you &s;hall &s;till finde, that in all tho&s;e State-alterations that have been made by a prevailing party, either dome&s;tick or foraign, the Head and Leader of that party hath &s;till had the Diademe, or chief place of Authority &s;etled on him and his Family. Neither <HI>Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Huns,</HI> or any people whatever but acted accordingly: and how|ever they were Nations mo&s;t fond of the name of Liberty, as it is ob&s;erved that all Northern people are, and might al|&s;o be otherwi&s;e governed at home; yet, in this ca&s;e, they &s;till held it equitable, that &s;ince them&s;elves had every one, by the conduct of their Chieftain, bettered his Fortunes, in po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ion of the Inheritances of per&s;ons of inferior Ranks, &s;o proportionally &s;hould their Generall be &s;etled in that which was highe&s;t. And as the examples of Republicks, or of elective Monarchies have been few, and al&s;o incon&s;ide|rable, either for eminence or durance, in compari&s;on of Mo|narchies, and tho&s;e hereditary (which in mo&s;t places hath always &s;o continued without alteration, whereas no one place that hath been Republick or Elective, but what hath been longer and more eminent otherways) &s;o is it farther ob&s;ervable, That when <HI>Greeks, Romans, Germans, Poles,</HI> or any other have erected Commonwealths, or made their Princes elective, it hath never been done after a Civill con|te&s;t, and where one party hath gotten the better of the other by way of conque&s;t, but was &s;till done in peace, and by an unanimous con&s;ent of the whole Nation, and when there was no alteration of private mens Fortunes and con|ditions; and where al&s;o there was a failer in the Line of
<PB N="12" REF="10"> their la&s;t conquering Prince: at which time it is not to be &s;uppo&s;ed, that the Nobles or Senators would in their parity one to another, be content to &s;ubmit to the con&s;tant Regi|ment of any third per&s;on and family among&s;t them&s;elves. For &s;o in <HI>Greece</HI> they &s;et up their Commonwealths, when the <HI>Heraclidae,</HI> (that race of Kings among&s;t them that de|&s;cended from their famous Warrior and defender <HI>Hercules</HI>) became extinct. And &s;o they did in <HI>Germany</HI> and <HI>Poland,</HI> upon failer of the Lines of <HI>Charlemain</HI> and <HI>Lechus.</HI> Or el&s;e (as in <HI>Rome</HI>) where the whole people did joyn in that di&s;content, and in &s;eclu&s;ion of their Kings, and had no pre|cedent Civill war thereabouts, or about the exerci&s;e of the Civill power. For had it &s;o been, that &s;ide that had under a <HI>Ce&s;ar</HI> been victorious, and thereupon &s;eated them&s;elves and families in the honors and po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ions of the adver&s;e party, would certainly, in honor and gratitude, have made him and his i&s;&s;ue <HI>Imperatores</HI> in the Civill State, who had all that while been <HI>Imperatores</HI> in the Field. And if we look to our Neighbors of the <HI>Low-Countries</HI> (a People that our Nation hath no rea&s;on to reckon as gratefull to their Protectors) yet we &s;hall finde that they having in their U|nion again&s;t their King the King of <HI>Spain,</HI> been victorious through the conduct and a&s;&s;i&s;tance of the Prince of <HI>Orange,</HI> have thereupon confirmed unto the &s;ame Family the chief Office of Honor and Command heretofore executed among them: Under which, as they have hithetto thriven, &s;o is it highly probable that the &s;eclu&s;ion thereof, may prove the &s;eclu&s;ion of all farther peace and happine&s;s from that people,</P>
<P>And now, Sir, after all this travail in foraign Stories, to return home, and home to your &s;elf too, let me appeal to you as a Member of a Parlament of <HI>England;</HI> Did you ever read of any Parlament that did not &s;ettle the Govern|ment on the po&s;terity of him that was po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed, and who&s;e Writs they obeyed in their Summons? And therefore, Sir, &s;ince there is no competent example to be fetched herein out of any foraign Story, and &s;ince no one &s;ort of people at
<PB N="13" REF="10"> any time inhabiting or po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ing this Land, did ever in any age attempt to make this Government elective; &s;uch a thing to be at this time attempted, and towards &s;uch an one that hath in particular &s;o well de&s;erved, will &s;eem a thing mo&s;t of all unrea&s;onable, as well as ungrateful.</P>
<P>When I have &s;aid &s;o much to you (Sir) on the behalf of the General, to &s;erve as an <HI>Anti-Memento</HI> again&s;t the in|&s;inuations of &s;uch as would have the Army believe that the power and &s;ettlement of him and his family would prove an un&s;etling of them: I &s;hall now on the contrary de&s;ire you to con&s;ider how the e&s;tabli&s;hment of this one per&s;on and his family will be, under God, the mo&s;t nece&s;&s;ary and likely way to draw on their &s;ecurities al&s;o; and that, even from the afore&s;aid arguments of mo&s;t prime and principal en|gagement of the &s;ame cau&s;e. For &s;ince he and his have herein already &s;o far adventured, as to be mo&s;t of all un|capable of reconcilement and forgivene&s;s, they may then be mo&s;t &s;ure that both he and his in order to their own de|fence and &s;ecurity, (which is no way el&s;e to be had but by the &s;teady a&s;&s;i&s;tance of the Army) will be mo&s;t intent and &s;tudious of all and every one of their &s;everal preferments and good wills, in &s;uch &s;ort as not to make any the lea&s;t alteration among&s;t them without nece&s;&s;ary and ju&s;t cau&s;e. Whereas another per&s;on or family that may hereafter be elected, and it may be contrary to their intere&s;t and liking, cannot be pre&s;umed to carry &s;o ready and great a re&s;pect towards them and theirs, as experience doth warrant this man to have done. For if the power of election &s;hall re&s;t in &s;uch men as are not members of the Army, it is then likely, out of that enmity which u&s;ually pa&s;&s;eth towards martial men, from &s;uch as are not of like quality or de&s;cent, all their former &s;ervices may come to be forgotten, and them&s;elves put off with contempt, as being now of no further u&s;e. And farther, it may be &s;uch an one &s;hall be cho&s;en as hath not been at all, or very little active in the &s;ame Cau&s;e with them; in which ca&s;e their danger will al&s;o increa&s;e through that greater likelihood of his compliance
<PB N="14" REF="11"> with the adver&s;e party: For how ea&s;ie a matter may it be for &s;uch an one to be taken into favor there, and for &s;ome eminent breach of tru&s;t have &s;uch high dignity and reward promi&s;ed and &s;etled upon him and his, as may by far coun|tervail that momentany title which he now holdeth? The which can never be feared from him that is of the &s;ame qua|lity and engagement with them&s;elves, and that is hereditari|ly fixed in this place; who being at the height already, and &s;o &s;etled, nothing can be offered him valuable to his re&s;ignati|on. And having &s;o far &s;poken of the&s;e things as they carry a more particular concern to the Army, in an&s;wer to tho&s;e that would di&s;affect them from their own General; I &s;hall now an&s;wer tho&s;e arguments whereby they endeavour to di&s;affect the whole Nation again&s;t the pre&s;ent Settlement, under the pretence of the good of the Common|wealth.</P>
<P>You are hereupon, Sir, de&s;ired to con&s;ider, That when you di&s;cover in any men more then ordinary preten&s;ions of zeal to the publique good, and for advancement of the Li|berties of the people; and, on the contrary, as &s;trong inve|ctives again&s;t Tyranny and Arbitrary government; and do withall finde them offering and giving in &s;trange propo&s;als for the e&s;tabli&s;hment of the one, and the prevention of the other, you may then, I &s;ay, be &s;ure that that party from whom all this proceeds is &s;uch an one as mi&s;likes his pre&s;ent condition; and, for the amendment of his fortune, doth either expect to be bribed by preferment from making any di&s;turbance; or el&s;e he hopes, that, from the new &s;huffling of affairs in the alteration of State, he may have a better game dealt him then before. In the mean time all mode&s;t and judicious men doe look upon mankinde under Govern|ment, as in all other his worldly conditions, &s;till &s;ubject and liable to many mi&s;chiefs and inconveniences. And there|fore although each &s;ort of &s;etled Government carry with it &s;elf a certain benefit, even as Government; and that Monarchy and hereditary Monarchy, as the mo&s;t &s;etled form, is mo&s;t preferrible to the re&s;t, in re&s;pect of Divine
<PB N="15" REF="11"> appointment and in&s;titution, and of politicall practi&s;e and accommodation; yet, to &s;uppo&s;e that any thing, &s;ubmitted to the managery and accidents of humane frailty, can be thereupon found otherwi&s;e then liable to adver&s;e accidents, beyond the cure of any mortall contrivance, will (as I &s;aid) argue an ambitious arrogance in the propo&s;er, and al&s;o a credulous folly in the receiver. Be&s;ides, when I finde God both puni&s;hing and threatning to puni&s;h people by &s;ending &s;uch Princes as they de&s;erve, what doth this invention of Election but look like a contrivance to defeat the decrees of Heaven in either of tho&s;e ways of puni&s;hment, by a Childe or an evil Prince? and what doe they de&s;erve, that take this cour&s;e either in di&s;tru&s;t of Gods providence, or in prevention of their own puni&s;hment, but to finde a remedy wor&s;e then the di&s;ea&s;e, and to be liable to certain evils, to avoid contingent ones? For, let us &s;uppo&s;e our &s;elves even in the wor&s;t of the&s;e chances, either faln under an evill or a childi&s;h heir, and yet we &s;hall herein finde it equall with that which is Elective. For, fir&s;t, if a Childe be left to &s;ucceed, then is it perfectly in the &s;ame condition; becau&s;e of that per&s;on who is elected to rule in his &s;tead, as his Pro|tector and guardian. And this apparent advantage is then al&s;o u&s;ually found, that being done by the Father, who had more intere&s;t in the good of the publique then any other, is not only done without danger of Civill war, but with due and unbya&s;&s;ed re&s;pect to the &s;ufficiency of the per&s;on. In which ca&s;e al&s;o the highe&s;t per&s;on and neare&s;t of blood, is commonly cho&s;en. Whereupon, by rea&s;on of his native high quality, the Subjects pay their obedience more readily then they would to a new rai&s;ed per&s;on: And then, he and his Family having greater and more certain intere&s;t in the Commonwealth then any other, will, in that re&s;pect, be more careful to advance the good thereof then any other al&s;o.</P>
<P>As for that inconvenience, That a wicked Son may be heir to the Crown, and &s;o leave a Kingdom nece&s;&s;arily &s;ubjected to &s;uch a Ruler; whereas in elective Monarchies
<PB N="16" REF="12"> there is a liberty to choo&s;e the mo&s;t vertuous and fit per|&s;on out of any family: It might be hereunto fir&s;t an&s;wered, that in ca&s;e of apparent unfitne&s;s in the elder, the Father (who can better judge thereof then others) will doubtle&s;s leave the Kingdom to &s;ome other &s;on more fit, or el&s;e ap|point &s;uch as Tutors and Guides over him, that his Kingdom and Family (things to be &s;uppo&s;ed of more concern to him then any el&s;e) &s;hall not be hazarded by any of his vices or indi&s;cretion: and there are not wanting pre&s;idents of this kind. But, to affirm that this cour&s;e of Election is hereby made a con&s;tant way of prevention of all tho&s;e mi&s;chiefs that may come from the hands of evil Governors, is a beg|ing of the que&s;tion, upon the&s;e and like &s;uppo&s;itions. As fir&s;t, That each per&s;on hath his abilities, inclinations, and moral habits &s;o apparent, as not to endanger tho&s;e that are to make u&s;e of him, through di&s;&s;imulation. The next is, that all and each one of the Electors (to make it a free and di&s;creet choice) are not only endued with an infallibility for the di&s;covery of good and bad in the general, but al&s;o can di&s;tingui&s;h and choo&s;e according to &s;uch particular ver|tuous habits as are mo&s;t fit for him that is to execute the place of Governor in chief; and this as knowingly as the Carpenter can by &s;ight tell the nature and kind of that wood he is to make u&s;e of. Next, and beyond this again, it mu&s;t be pre&s;umed that, be&s;ides this knowledge, there mu&s;t be in all and each of the Electors &s;o much con&s;cience and integrity adjoined, as to cau&s;e them con&s;tantly to choo&s;e each per&s;on for publike regard &s;ake only, and not according to any particular relation, or private liking or intere&s;t. Now &s;ince upon the failing of any one of the&s;e &s;urmi&s;es, it is apparent that the con&s;tancie of their promi&s;ed benefit mu&s;t fail al&s;o, &s;o much more upon the failing and uncertainty of all of them, (as is mo&s;t evident they doe) there can nothing of certainty be expected from this their promi&s;ed benefit, as every man in his own judgment may pre&s;ently conclude. For fir&s;t, there is nothing that fals out more common within our notice, then the daily practice of
<PB N="17" REF="12"> the art of di&s;&s;imulation; even &s;o, that tho&s;e that have high|e&s;t de&s;ign and intention to gain to them&s;elves any advan|tage by the over-reaching of others, are thereby al&s;o ren|dred the mo&s;t &s;tudious and able proficients therein, and this mo&s;t e&s;pecially where ambition bears &s;way; for as then the aim is higher, &s;o is this humor u&s;ually incident to per&s;ons of more then ordinary abilities: The which cannot again but tell them, that as all men do &s;ubmit to Government but as out of nece&s;&s;ity, and that &s;ince we cannot ab&s;olutely avoid the being under the government of &s;ome, and &s;o con&s;e|quently of being &s;ometimes and in &s;ome things re&s;trained of our wils, (to the end that others that would el&s;e in this time of general liberty injure us, may thereupon be re&s;train|ed al&s;o) it comes therefore to pa&s;s that tho&s;e that are mo&s;t de&s;irous and like to prevail in the obtaining of places of &s;u|preme power and command, do, for acceptance and general approbation &s;ake, frame their outward behaviour in com|pliance to this humour: They not only put on a face of &s;obriety, meekne&s;s and clemencie, whereby vulgarly to plea&s;e, but more particularly to ingratiate with the Electors them&s;elves, (who they know would have been ab&s;olutely governing &s;till, had it not been for the fear of others) They make &s;emblance to each party and per&s;on among&s;t them of a great &s;ympathie and liking they have to them in their &s;everal wayes and opinions, in &s;uch &s;ort as in effect to per&s;wade them, that to choo&s;e him to be their chief Ruler, is but the &s;ame as to rule in chief them&s;elves by his means. Even as <HI>Marius</HI> and <HI>Silla,</HI> as they &s;everally thought them mo&s;t powerful to &s;et them up in &s;upreme authority, &s;o did they &s;everally court and comply with the humors of the people or Nobility; and during the time that the more popular part did bear &s;way, &s;ome in that &s;tate, the better to ingratiate them&s;elves and obtain their election, have re|nounced their noble birth and quality, and cau&s;ed them|&s;elves to be adopted by &s;ome inferior per&s;on. So that, in a word, as every man is to the world a di&s;&s;embler in re&s;pect of his inward inclinations and faults, &s;o from men of the
<PB N="18" REF="13"> highe&s;t aims are practi&s;es of this kind to be mo&s;t expected. Whereupon it mu&s;t fall out that he that can (<HI>Tiberius</HI>-like) mo&s;t di&s;&s;emble, &s;hall be mo&s;t &s;ure of this honour: From whence it comes to pa&s;s, that it is ordinarily a peoples hap|pine&s;s to be deceived in the qualities of the party. For the vulgar &s;ort choo&s;ing according to meekne&s;s and &s;oftne&s;s of &s;pirit only, are ready to conclude, that he governs all be&s;t, that governs all lea&s;t: whereas the Electors again, being di|vided by factions among&s;t them&s;elvs, would have their oppo|&s;ites to be by him governed too much, and them&s;elves not at all. Whereupon it will appear, that this fancied benefit leaves us but at as great or greater uncertainty then we were be|fore; until they can prove that the art of di&s;&s;imulation and the art of Regiment proceed from the &s;ame ability, and do always accompany one another in the &s;ame per&s;on. And if we look to our own Story, it was certainly a happine&s;s to tho&s;e that then lived, that by the right of de&s;cent they &s;tood obliged to accept of <HI>Henry</HI> the fifth; one that neither for his vertuous life, or any other apparent behaviour, was &s;o likely el&s;e to have been elected, as was <HI>Henry</HI> the &s;ixth his &s;on, being a Prince of more meek and pious behaviour. So hard a thing it is to di&s;cover and di&s;tingui&s;h between tho&s;e endowments and vertues, which are mo&s;t proper to com|pleat a good man and a good Prince. For he that is mo&s;t accompli&s;hed in his Ethicks, may be as far to &s;eek in his Politicks. Of which we have yet a more fre&s;h in&s;tance in the per&s;ons and reigns of <HI>Richard</HI> the 3. and that of our late King <HI>Charls.</HI> When were the people in greater fear of &s;e|vere u&s;age, then at the entrance of the one; or did expre&s;s greater joy and expectation, then at the entrance of the other? in&s;omuch as I believe that there is &s;carce any one even of tho&s;e that have mo&s;t oppo&s;ed him, but had he been then free to choo&s;e, would have given his voice for him. And yet it hath plea&s;ed God &s;o far to deceive humane judg|ment and expectation, as to cau&s;e the&s;e Nations to undergo the greate&s;t &s;hare of Civil calamities and changes in the time of this la&s;t: whereas in the time of the other the peo|ple
<PB N="19" REF="13"> enjoyed a continual &s;ecurity and quiet; and during that &s;horter time he did reign, there were yet more good laws made then in the reign of any Prince be&s;ides. Nay, I think I may boldly &s;ay, that upon the examination of our own Chronicles, or any el&s;e, it will be found that tho&s;e per&s;ons that people have received or elected as their greate&s;t dar|lings, have in their governments proved to them mo&s;t fatal; and, on the contrary, &s;uch as they have been mo&s;t afraid of, and have &s;ubmitted unto only as out of &s;en&s;e of duty, have proved mo&s;t fortunate: As it were on purpo&s;e to in&s;truct and advi&s;e us, that the mo&s;t high God and di&s;po&s;er of Kings and Kingdoms, will, as he &s;ees good, make them in&s;trumen|tal for infliction of his wrath, or of his ble&s;&s;ing to any peo|ple; and, by that u&s;ual deception of ours, in the judging of &s;uch as be either good or bad, doth thereby teach us, neither to tru&s;t in the&s;e things to the arm of fle&s;h and our own judgment and contrivances, nor to ca&s;t &s;o much di&s;tru&s;t to|wards him and his care of us, as to refu&s;e tho&s;e per&s;ons he hath by his providence, and u&s;ual way of di&s;pen&s;ation in that kind, &s;et over us. For as he did never &s;et up any government but Monarchy, nor did ever give that, or any &s;etled office to any per&s;on, but he did withall give it to his po&s;terity; &s;o is it to be left to him alone to find out the means to change the &s;ame from family to family, as he &s;hall really know the de&s;erts both of the one and the other; and not leave it to us to contrive and &s;et up elective Monarchies upon any &s;uch fond &s;uppo&s;itions. For if &s;uch a con&s;ideration had been valuable to have made places of &s;upreme tru&s;t and power elective, then certainly the High-Prie&s;thood, re|quiring far more per&s;onal execution, and that in more divine affairs then that of King, (who was the fir&s;t e&s;tabli&s;hed Officer in Civil affairs) &s;hould not al&s;o have been entailed to a &s;ingle family. In which kind notwith&s;tanding it was &s;till &s;etled, and &s;o to continue, till God by him&s;elf or by his Vicegerent &s;aw ju&s;t cau&s;e for alteration thereof. In which ca&s;e as there were others ready &s;till to &s;upply tho&s;e defects which childhood or other in&s;ufficiencie might occa&s;ionally
<PB N="20" REF="14"> make in the highe Prie&s;t hood, &s;o may there be in the Civil Magi&s;tracie al&s;o, without running into danger of civil war through the abdication of a family of known de&s;ert, and &s;till be but at the &s;ame hazard for goodne&s;s or &s;ufficiencie in the choice of another.</P>
<P>If we appeal from di&s;cour&s;e and argument to matter of experience and practice, in this que&s;tion of the benefit of Election, we &s;hall al&s;o find things to fall out quite contrary to their imagination and promi&s;es; and that, upon exami|nation of foreign &s;tories, and comparing the vertues and good government of &s;uch as have ruled in places elective, with the vertues and good rule of &s;uch as reigned in places heredit<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">ry; we &s;hall truly find the people in a much happier condition under the la&s;t then under the fir&s;t. For where &s;hall we pick out any in&s;tance for a &s;ucce&s;&s;ion of Princes, &s;o notoriou&s;ly wicked, and in &s;o great a number, as was in the Roman Empire after the Souldiery and Senate would there take upon them to make that Government elective, and neglect that more direct line of &s;ucce&s;&s;ion and that he|reditary right which belonged to the i&s;&s;ue of their brave and victorious Chieftain <HI>Cae&s;ar?</HI> What think we of <HI>Cali|gula, Nero, Otho, Vitellius, Caracalla, Heliogabalus,</HI> and other unmatchable examples both for ill life and ill go|vernment? And when we have pitcht upon the be&s;t of them, it will not be any encouraging example for Chri&s;tians to &s;et up their Governor by election, &s;ince on their &s;core we may ju&s;tly lay the greate&s;t part of tho&s;e mo&s;t bloody per&s;ecuti|ons made again&s;t them: which until the time of <HI>Con&s;tantine</HI> the Great, who, with his Chri&s;tianity, did again e&s;tabli&s;h an hereditary &s;ucce&s;&s;ion, and &s;o &s;omewhat more increa&s;e and &s;ettle the glory of that Empire, the poor Chri&s;tians found little joy or intermi&s;&s;ion. So ea&s;ie and u&s;ual a thing it is for di&s;&s;imulation, force or bribery to prevail in this kind.</P>
<P>And if you will imploy your thoughts upon the collecti|on of &s;uch Princes as have been highly illu&s;trious and emi|nent either in &s;acred or prophane &s;tory, I do not think you will find any one that came in by election only, (in &s;acred
<PB N="21" REF="14"> &s;tory I am &s;ure you will not) that de&s;erves to be put either in the fir&s;t or &s;econd rate. No, tho&s;e Princes that were &s;o glorious in conque&s;ts as to e&s;tabli&s;h the three fir&s;t Monar|chies of the world, were all of them &s;uch as were heredi|tary: Nay, that which we call the fourth Monarchy, (be|cau&s;e it was longe&s;t a Monarchy, and under that govern|ment it was longe&s;t, and had under it both ri&s;e and perfe|ction, being from the Creation but 480 years a Common|wealth) doth owe unto hereditary Monarchy its chief and fundamental laws, and al&s;o that warlike di&s;cipline by means whereof it became &s;o great and victorious afterwards. For all which, Sir, there is a rea&s;on at hand: Even becau&s;e the foundation and atchievement of greatne&s;s and empire, re|quiring a foregoing de&s;ign and councel, and that which is made upon experience al&s;o; and requiring a foregoing &s;tock of Trea&s;ure, Navy, and other warlike ammunition and preparations together with a well di&s;ciplined and obe|dient Amry &amp; la&s;tly, requiring a good proportion of time for the pro&s;ecution and fini&s;hing thereof, it is not to be &s;up|po&s;ed that the life of any one per&s;on can be &s;ufficient both to continue and perfect things of &s;uch length and difficulty: but rather, upon the&s;e con&s;iderations, it is to be conceived that every elective Prince will be di&s;couraged from &s;uch attempts; not only becau&s;e of danger and hard&s;hip, but al&s;o becau&s;e he &s;hall venture and labour for what &s;hall not accrue to his family, and it may be that the glory and profit of all his works may come to be enjoyed by &s;uch a &s;ucce&s;&s;or as is his enemy. And &s;o again, in ca&s;e any &s;uch enterpri&s;e &s;hould have been &s;et on foot, it is as vain a thing to &s;uppo&s;e that the emulation that doth u&s;ually attend Princes of this condition (and tho&s;e that are be&s;t of them too) will let the &s;ucce&s;&s;or contribute towards the accompli&s;hment of any work begun by another, but rather to contrive one of his own, and that contrary al&s;o, to the increa&s;e of his own glory by the others di&s;grace. So that it being probable that his predece&s;&s;or was not allied to him, but of another party or faction, tho&s;e that were Enemies to the other are but &s;o
<PB N="22" REF="15"> much the more likely to expect favour and protection, in &s;tead of war and conque&s;t from him. And it is farther con|&s;iderable, that it will al&s;o require a good &s;pace of time for every new elected Prince to under&s;tand the &s;tate of his own affairs; and both to &s;ettle them, and &s;ecure him&s;elf again&s;t tho&s;e of other parties and factions which he mi&s;tru&s;ts, and have oppo&s;ed him at home, before he can have time and opportunity to think of, and make provi&s;ion for conque&s;ts abroad, (which then al&s;o mu&s;t be &s;uppo&s;ed the more &s;hort, for that Princes are not elected young.) So that we are then only to expect &s;uch glorious and great acts to be at|chieved by any one &s;uch per&s;on as a <HI>Solomon</HI> or an <HI>Alexan|der,</HI> when they have &s;ucceeded as heirs to a <HI>David</HI> or a <HI>Philip;</HI> who, as well in love and care to their Kingdoms, as to their po&s;terity that &s;hall enjoy them, have been &s;o provident and indu&s;trious in laying up all &s;ort of provi&s;i|ons, and making &s;uch preparations and beginnings as are unto the accompli&s;hment of &s;o great works nece&s;&s;ary. And it is very ob&s;ervable, that when God hath any great and glorious act or change to make in the world, or in any one Nation, he doth then al&s;o not only rai&s;e up a new fa|mily, like tho&s;e of <HI>Cae&s;ar</HI> and <HI>Pepin,</HI> (for the greater mani|fe&s;tation of his power and appearance) but doth al&s;o ble&s;s the &s;ame with an <HI>Augustus</HI> or a <HI>Charlemain;</HI> &s;uch a fa|mous heir and &s;ucce&s;&s;or, as may &s;erve for compleating and fini&s;hing the work: To the end that all the glory might not be appropriate to one neither. In which con&s;ideration, Sir, why may we not pre&s;ume that as our pre&s;ent Protector hath been by his power and pre&s;ence &s;et up and made pro|&s;perous for &s;ome great and glorious end (of which we have been prudent foundations already laid,) &s;o al&s;o that the full perfection and &s;ettlement of the work is to be ex|pected from his heir. And more apparent hope may we have hereof al&s;o, then could at fir&s;t be conceived of <HI>Henry</HI> the 5. lately mentioned; who yet &s;ucceeding a father, the fir&s;t of his family, and rai&s;ed by the &s;word, did make &s;o good u&s;e of that e&s;tabli&s;hment and tho&s;e preparations he had
<PB N="23" REF="15"> made at home, that, to the great honor of this Nation, he became the mo&s;t renowned Prince of any before or &s;ince.</P>
<P>Where it is objected, Sir, that hereditary &s;overaignty renders men more inclined to acts of tyranny and oppre&s;&s;i|on, becau&s;e he is not in fear to be called to accompt: It may be an&s;wered, that he that fears to be called to accompt, will be by &s;o much the more provoked to de&s;troy and op|pre&s;s tho&s;e that he thinks will be mo&s;t in&s;trumental therin. For, Tyrannie being nothing el&s;e but Soveraign revenge upon &s;uch as may or have oppo&s;ed and cro&s;&s;ed them; and Subjects being to be pre&s;umed more ready and daring in that kind again&s;t him that was but lately their fellow, and who&s;e anger they fear not (becau&s;e of that accompt he is to make) then again&s;t him that is their Prince born, who there|upon is not &s;o likely to conceive cau&s;e of hatred, and &s;o to proceed to acts of tyrannie. Be&s;ides, from the very act of Election it &s;elf, there mu&s;t be cau&s;e of di&s;content and re|venge admini&s;tred to &s;uch like Princes; and that, from all &s;uch as have not been of his party, or have oppo&s;ed, or not &s;o &s;trongly abetted his claim as he &s;aw fit. Which provo|cations can never happen to the other; who, as in heredi|tary right, comes in without any &s;uch oppo&s;ition. And it is al&s;o to be con&s;idered, that a Prince elected for term of life is as little in fear of being called to accompt as the other, if he be a Soveraign Prince: if not, he is (as I &s;aid) for that rea&s;on mo&s;t like to tyranni&s;e and oppre&s;s. And we &s;hall therefore find Tyrannie to be mo&s;t cryed out upon by the people under Elective governments, and In&s;urrection and Civil war oftene&s;t rai&s;ed upon that &s;core.</P>
<P>And la&s;tly, whereas it is affirmed, that Princes elected, will, as in requital of that courte&s;ie, be more kind and lo|ving to the people then &s;uch as are hereditary; for that the&s;e, on the other &s;ide, may &s;eem more neglectful of them, as claiming their admittance of right, and not of favour: It may be an&s;wered, that this very thing (if well con&s;idered) is al&s;o an inconvenience which follows Election. For, unle&s;s
<PB N="24" REF="16"> they can &s;uppo&s;e that any Kingdom hath but one per&s;on fit or ambitious enough to &s;tand for this choice, they mu&s;t then next &s;uppo&s;e, that the party cho&s;en will be &s;o far from being kind or grateful to &s;uch as were not of his party and did not joyn in his election, as he will be their enemy. Again it may be asked where they find the&s;e elections ever referred to the people in general, &s;o as to induce him to kindne&s;s and acknowledgment towards them, and not &s;till referred to &s;ome few certain Electors, as in <HI>Germany</HI> to &s;ix, nor but to a few in <HI>Poland,</HI> the Commons in both places being wholly excluded? Whereupon when the number of di&s;&s;enting E|lectors &s;hall be taken out of the roll of kindne&s;s, it may well on the other &s;ide be concluded, that Election doth prompt Princes to be carele&s;s of the good of their people in general, and to carry &s;o partial a re&s;pect towards &s;ome few friends and favorites that have holpen him to his &s;overaignty, and can continue him &s;till in power, as to neglect and de&s;pi&s;e all the re&s;t. So that equal ju&s;tice being not to be expected from him in his publique admini&s;trations, it were much better for a Prince to think he holds his power from and under God, and is to him alone accomptable, then by &s;uch like devi&s;es to bribe or terrifie him that is to execute the place of a Judge, and &s;o <HI>lay a &s;tumbling block for him that reproveth in the gate.</HI></P>
<P>By this time, Sir, I hope I have made good what I affirm|ed in the beginning, That all their arguments were but the in&s;inuations of ambitious and factious heads, clouded under the &s;pecious &s;hews of publique good and equal ju&s;tice. For it plainly appears, that in&s;tead of avoidance (as they pre|tend) their Propo&s;als would nece&s;&s;arily bring us into &s;la|very and oppre&s;&s;ion, by making our Princes (as of cour&s;e) partial, unju&s;t, and tyrannical. If they be then to &s;eek in what they mo&s;t rely upon, what will they an&s;wer to tho&s;e more great and more certain mi&s;eries which are &s;o con&s;tant|ly attendant on the other form? all of which are &s;o nece&s;|&s;arily leading to faction and &s;iding, and to the un&s;etling of all e&s;tates and conditions, that no man regardful of publique
<PB N="25" REF="16"> peace and content, and careful to avoid the danger of Civil war, Anarchy and confu&s;ion, can deliberately carry a wi&s;h that way. For &s;ince there cannot be any Political Govern|ment longer then there is an apparent Soveraignty &s;ome|where abiding; from who&s;e re&s;idence in one, few, or more per&s;ons, it comes to be called of this or that form; what &s;hall we &s;ay of this Government, upon the death of the la&s;t elected Prince? If the &s;upreme power be in the Electors, then is it now an Ari&s;tocracie: And why is it not to be feared that they may not proceed to election at all; but, by a kind of complot, keep it in their own hands? To think of &s;etting up &s;ome other per&s;on or order to &s;ee them ob|&s;erve due time and method herein, is again to &s;uppo&s;e the &s;overaignty not in them neither: for if they may be hindred from doing ill, &s;o al&s;o from doing well, or not doing at all. And then how could the decea&s;ed Prince have &s;overaign power derived from his election, (&s;uppo&s;ing they gave it to him during life) if not they, but &s;ome others then had it? If, according to the fancied way of Coordination, the So|veraignty were partly in the Electors, and partly in the Third Order, then mu&s;t both agree in the election, or el&s;e it will come to nothing. And this they will doubtle&s;s do in ca&s;e they be friends and of one intere&s;t and opinion, or el&s;e are afraid of each others power. In which ca&s;e, as Coordi|nation will at be&s;t prove fruitle&s;s, becau&s;e they are as like to comply in an ill choice as a good, &s;o again, if they be ene|mies, that Commonwealth mu&s;t run the&s;e two mo&s;t certain perils; not only, through their contention, to be deprived of a good choice, when it is made; but be drawn into the mo&s;t dangerous condition of Civil war, as being wholly engaged in two contraty parties. For, do greatne&s;s &amp; &s;overaign power u&s;e to be &s;lighted and unregarded, as that tho&s;e that have it &s;hould be more ready to re&s;ign then increa&s;e it? Do men rather cho&s;e &s;ubjection, then principality; to be in the con|dition of beggers for favors, then be able to do them? Have we not &s;een a Parliament de&s;igning to make them&s;elvs ever|la&s;ting? and may we not hereafter fear that a Councel may
<PB N="26" REF="17"> doe &s;o too? And therefore it mu&s;t needs be, that upon the death of every Elected Prince, the whole State and Go|vernment, and every mans fortune therein, mu&s;t be left in tottering condition; whil&s;t (during that inter-regnun) <HI>Eve|ry man may doe what &s;eems good in his own eyes;</HI> and &s;o be as in a &s;tate of Anarchy. The which unhappy condition we finde attributed to the I&s;raelites before they had the Scepter hereditarily &s;etled (as was promi&s;ed) in the Tribe of <HI>Judah,</HI> but were &s;ubject to the like Cha&s;mes in government. And if any would know how it can be imagined that every man could be permitted to doe what was right in his own eyes, or be in a &s;tate of Anarchy, where there is a &s;tanding Law for direction what to doe, and &s;tanding Judges and Officers to &s;ee it done; and where, la&s;tly, there is a &s;tand|ing high Court or Councell above all. So that the I&s;rae|lites having at that time all the&s;e, that is, the Law of <HI>Mo|&s;es,</HI> the Prie&s;ts and Levites, and other ordinary Judges; and having al&s;o their Sanhedrim or great Councell of Elders, and prime men of their Tribes, we mu&s;t therefore conceive that by every mans doing what &s;eemed good in his own eyes, is not meant that every individuall per&s;on did &s;o to every man el&s;e; but the heads and leaders in the&s;e &s;everall Tribes whereof the Sanhedrim con&s;i&s;ted, being divided a|mong&s;t them&s;elves by faction, and con&s;equently drawing all tho&s;e of their Tribe and party &s;everally after them, it there|upon came to pa&s;s that every man being thus divided from every man, as under the&s;e &s;eparate a&s;&s;ociations, they did every man unto every man, what &s;eemed good in their own eyes. And this befell them becau&s;e there was no <HI>King or Judge in tho&s;e dayes to judge between blood and blood, and plea and plea;</HI> that is, &s;uch <HI>matters</HI> as happened to fall out between the Elders and great ones; and &s;o too <HI>hard in judgment</HI> to be determined in the ordinary Courts, or re|conciled in that higher Court either: &s;ince the&s;e Elders were both judges and parties therein.</P>
<P>And therefore, Sir, if there be &s;o muce danger of divi&s;ion and Civill war dependant on Elective principalities (even
<PB N="27" REF="17"> becau&s;e they are Elective) what may we more ju&s;tly fear to be the event of &s;uch things in this Nation; where now, more then ever, every man &s;tands from every man &s;o much divided in Civill intere&s;t, but much more in matters of Reli|gion? If there were one man <HI>Micha</HI> found among&s;t them, &s;etting up a <HI>Teraphim</HI> and a Prie&s;t to him&s;elf, while there was no King there; what think we of our &s;elves, that have lately had &s;o many <HI>Micha</HI>'s &s;etting up their &s;everall Tera|phims in every corner, and that with &s;uch extravagant affe|ctation of di&s;&s;ent from what is e&s;tabli&s;hed, that they per|&s;wade them&s;elves, that to be heterodox is to be orthodox? Will it not in this ca&s;e highly concern us as we love our peace and quiet, to keep con&s;tant to one per&s;on and family of mo&s;t moderate principles, and which is well known to carry a tender and univer&s;all regard to all, and &s;o mo&s;t likely in good time to bring us to a happy union again; then, after his decea&s;e, to ca&s;t the Commonwealth into the danger of a new &s;torm and &s;hipwrack, by awaking the hopes of all that be heads and leaders in tho&s;e &s;everall &s;ects and fa|ctions that be among us, to be putting in for them&s;elves, or &s;ome great favorer of their party? for if we finde &s;uch pack|ing and &s;iding for election of Parlament men, or the like, what &s;tirs may we look for at the choice of a Protector? Out of which conte&s;t and di&s;pute, &s;uppo&s;e we &s;hould be &s;o happy as to winde our &s;elves without open War, and have one per&s;on at la&s;t cho&s;en and agreed upon by the Major part of the appointed Electors; and &s;uppo&s;e yet farther, that the pre&s;ent Army &s;hall therein con&s;ent too, or el&s;e re&s;t quiet; why yet &s;ince that per&s;on cho&s;en mu&s;t him&s;elf be of &s;ome party or another, and could not therefore come in by a joynt or univer&s;all con&s;ent, will it not hence come to pa&s;s (as before&s;aid) that he being now in power, &s;hall be natu|rally provoked to acts of puni&s;hment and revenge towards &s;uch as have oppo&s;ed, or have not, to his content and expe|ctation, taken part with him? Whereupon, all that are of different parties from him mu&s;t expect to live as in a &s;tate of per&s;ecution, or endanger a new civill War by joyning
<PB N="28" REF="18"> in oppo&s;ition. So that, if we be not actually broken one again&s;t another, yet advantage will be hereby &s;till offered and encrea&s;ed; and the whole Nation continually e&s;pou&s;ed into &s;everall feuds and factions, to the overthrow of all charity and brotherly love. And if, to avoid this mi&s;chief, &s;ome way of re&s;traint &s;hould be thought upon, by having a third E&s;tate (like that in <HI>Poland</HI>) to bear a controule over their Kings actions; this, although it might, at &s;ome times, and for a while keep the &s;ore from breaking out, yet would it but encrea&s;e the &s;welling and di&s;temper again&s;t a fit op|portunity, by that encrea&s;e of Opinions which &s;hould fol|low this generall freedom and toleration; as he experience of tho&s;e many more Religions and Opinions in the &s;ame <HI>Poland,</HI> then el&s;where, doe witne&s;s to be the fruits of Ele|ctive and much limited Princes. Which is a cour&s;e that cannot at all allay the di&s;contents of tho&s;e that live under his Government, and &s;tand divided in intere&s;t or opinion. For &s;ince he mu&s;t yet have &s;ome power left him to Rule with, he will &s;till be as &s;ubject to be accu&s;ed, by tho&s;e that finde them&s;elves cro&s;&s;ed for having tran&s;cended his limits in that little Tru&s;t, as if he had had more. The which jealou&s;ie will be al&s;o increa&s;ed, as well from that in&s;olence which doth u&s;ually accompany per&s;ons newly preferred, as al&s;o, from that degree of impatience which u&s;eth again to be ca&s;t towards &s;uch as were lately but of equal condition with us, and are by our &s;elves &s;et up. Whenas, in Princes born, the&s;e things are not only patiently undergone, as out of &s;en&s;e of duty, but are al&s;o more tolerable and milde; as coming from &s;uch as were from their Cradles bred to &s;way Scep|ters, and had been accu&s;tomed to &s;uch like honors and ad|dre&s;&s;es.</P>
<P>As thus, Sir, Elective and limited Monarchies doe nou|ri&s;h qarties and factions, for want of a common center of Union among&s;t them&s;elves, &s;o the generality of the &s;ubjects and people doe in them live in the highe&s;t degree of &s;ervi|tude. Becau&s;e tho&s;e that call them&s;elves the Free Princes and Nobility (as in <HI>Germany, Poland, Denmarke, &amp;c.</HI>)
<PB N="29" REF="18"> making it part of their freedom to debarr their Emperors and Kings from intermedling in their Juri&s;dictions, or from hearing the appeals or addre&s;&s;es of their Subjects (which they arbitrarily govern according to their own privat laws, and not after the common law of the Empire and King|dom) they mu&s;t thereupon be by &s;o much the more en&s;la|ved, as their Emperor or King is le&s;s powerfull. And that which yet makes their ca&s;e more hard, is, that &s;ince they are al&s;o liable to more Taxes then others, paying not onely to the &s;upport of their own Lords what they &s;hal think fit, but al&s;o to the &s;upport of the Empire and Kingdom upon all publique Levies, they are thereby unrea&s;onably put to maintain a power that cannot protect them.</P>
<P>And from the foregoing grounds it is, found that, as Elective governments may be ob&s;erved more &s;hort-lived then Hereditary; &s;o al&s;o, of tho&s;e that have or doe conti|nue, there may be a daily le&s;&s;ening and d<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="1 letter">clen&s;ion ob&s;erved in them; by &s;uffering &s;everall parcels to be taken away by their Neighbours, or el&s;e to &s;tand upon terms of ab&s;olute independency; as may be &s;een by tho&s;e &s;everall petit States of <HI>Italy</HI> and el&s;where, canton'd off from the <HI>German</HI> Em|pire. For why &s;hould tho&s;e ab&s;olute Princes and Lords, that have their peculiar Seignories and power, be &s;o much concerned herein as to undergoe the charge and hazard of recovering tho&s;e Territories and Dominions to a common Soveraignty only, whereof them&s;elves have &s;o little honor or benefit? and why &s;hould the Emperor or Prince (who holds but for life) endanger or impoveri&s;h him&s;elf herein, &s;ince he &s;hall &s;till keep on the &s;ame rank and title; and have, it may be, a good &s;um for his connivance.</P>
<P>And &s;o again, for that very time they doe continue, they come to owe their pre&s;ervation more to outward occur|rences and good luck, then their inward prudence or policy. As for example, the German Empire is beholding to the <HI>Turk,</HI> and to the Chri&s;tian Princes its Neighbors for their agreement; who, by their continuall fears from abroad, keep them united and in peace at home. And by the like
<PB N="30" REF="19"> accident is the Kingdom of <HI>Poland</HI> often kept from Civill War al&s;o: and al&s;o by keeping clo&s;e to one family; which cannot afford many per&s;ons at once, whereby to make civil di&s;turbance about Election. Be&s;ides, the <HI>German</HI> Empire is al&s;o kept in &s;ome agreement by that re&s;pect therein given to the <HI>Papall</HI> Sea. For the <HI>Pope</HI> having, by much &s;trugling and policie, pulled down the power of tho&s;e Emperors, and by his golden Bull &s;etled it as now it is (having half the Electors Bi&s;hops) hath &s;till kept up &s;uch a power and reve|rentiall re&s;pect among&s;t them, as to awe any one there, from making him&s;elf &s;o great and ab&s;olute, as to be again in competition with him for ma&s;tery: or, (on the other &s;ide) to &s;uffer the Electors or other E&s;tates to invade or dimini&s;h that greatne&s;s and glory left him; lea&s;t al&s;o that honour of his own &s;hould abate in the lo&s;s of &s;o honourable a &s;ervant. And &s;ince the time of <HI>Luther</HI> it hath been pre&s;erved by the policie of the <HI>Au&s;trian</HI> family; who ever &s;ince getting their &s;ons &s;etled in their life times, have kept it from tho&s;e di&s;tractions which might accompany new choice.</P>
<P>Another inconvenience attending elective Soveraignties, is decay of publique Revenue, and provi&s;ions of all kinds both for war and peace. For how &s;hall it be thought that tho&s;e that hold but for his life, &s;hould either repair what was done by another, or attempt the erection of &s;uch mag|nificent works and foundations, which could not likely be in that time accompli&s;hed; and which, in the doing al&s;o, mu&s;t rob his family of &s;o much in propriety, as that co&s;t would have come to? So that the&s;e things having their rea&s;ons apparent, I &s;hall forbear examples therein, as I have done in many things foregoing, and &s;hall do in mo&s;t that follow; fearing al&s;o, Sir, that I have already made too great an a&s;&s;ault on your patience, and tran&s;cended the allowable bulk of a Letter. But, Sir, &s;ince all mens reading and expe|rience do inform them that money hath been and will be the u&s;ual purcha&s;er of preferment, it mu&s;t be pre&s;umed that the per&s;on aiming at this greatne&s;s, doth intend that the publick &s;tock &s;hall again make good his disbur&s;ment.
<PB N="31" REF="19"> But, may &s;ome think, the Princes and Nobles, or tho&s;e in power, will look to all exorbitance in this kind. No, Sir, they will rather encourage it: for they were the per&s;ons that were fir&s;t bribed for his entrance, and &s;o cannot in ju|&s;tice but &s;ee him (at lea&s;t) repay him&s;elf again. Be&s;ides, they being but few, and bearing no great proportion in their own particulars, towards publick levies, may be &s;u|&s;pected le&s;s careful of what is done therein, and may al&s;o have their good will purcha&s;ed by part thereof. As the ne|ce&s;&s;ity of compliance with the great ones that holp him in and do &s;upport him, mu&s;t thus exhau&s;t the publick &s;tock, &s;o al&s;o the care and thought for pre&s;ervation and main|tenance of his own family and other dependents, mu&s;t cau&s;e him to imploy that &s;tudy and endeavour which &s;hould be intent to advance the publick &s;tock as his own, to &s;eek to take from it all he can, that it may be &s;o indeed. So that if we &s;hould &s;till make change of families for our Governor, and pick out of any according as one happened to have a fitter per&s;on then another, it mu&s;t be &s;uppo&s;ed that the &s;ame &s;um that would &s;uffice for the maintenance of one fa|mily, would not, by much, be &s;ufficient to afford proportions to advance and ennoble a great many, in &s;uch &s;ort that they may carry a continual &s;hew and rank an&s;werable to that place which was once executed by their ance&s;tor. And if we think of putting the election and power of comptroll in more per&s;ons (as in the people, in Parliaments, or the like) as thinking a multitude of &s;uffrages and con&s;ents are not &s;o ea&s;ily purcha&s;ed; we might yet be herein mi&s;taken al&s;o, &s;ince we are informed that <HI>Cae&s;ar</HI> and others could tell how to bribe whole Commonwealths (or tho&s;e that bore the name thereof) both to be elected and kept Dicta|tors, or the like offices: And that Senators or Parliament-men may be drawn by money, preferment, or other relation or intere&s;t, is but too truly known. If, Sir, you &s;hould think fit to choo&s;e but out of &s;ome few more Noble families, to avoid the impoveri&s;hing of the common &s;tock by enriching &s;o many little ones, as they do in <HI>Germany;</HI> then how will
<PB N="32" REF="20"> you do to pick out &s;uch in <HI>England,</HI> as now it is, without di&s;content and danger too, to ari&s;e from tho&s;e that are &s;e|cluded? Will you keep to one family, as they in <HI>Poland</HI> have done? why, this is yet better. But the be&s;t cour&s;e of all is to do as they do now in <HI>Germany,</HI> and as hath been ever practi&s;ed in the&s;e Nations, to keep not only to one fa|mily, but to ob&s;erve the &s;ame order of de&s;cent in this chief place of authority, as is by the law of God and the Land ob&s;erved in other families in the inheritance of all things el&s;e. Sir, when you have thus done, you and the re&s;t of the Hou&s;e may then, and not till then, re&s;t a&s;&s;ured that you have an&s;wered that great tru&s;t repo&s;ed in you, The peace and &s;ettlement of the&s;e Nations. For to &s;ettle us otherwi&s;e, were but to un&s;ettle us by that &s;ettlement.</P>
<P>And this, Sir, I may al&s;o pre&s;s upon you as a duty you owe to tho&s;e you repre&s;ent, even the &s;atisfaction of the de&s;ires of the people in generall, which I may con|fidently affirm is &s;trongly enclined to that only form of Go|vernment they have heretofore &s;o long and &s;o happily lived under, And which upon a ju&s;t conference with that di&s;pa|rity which is between us and tho&s;e other places where Ele|ction is practi&s;ed, cannot with &s;afety be altered.</P>
<P>For Sir, &s;ince we have no &s;uch &s;tanding rank of Gentry, Nobility, and free Princes, as in <HI>Venice, Poland, Germany,</HI> &amp;c. which &s;hould hereditarily make up the body of a &s;tanding &s;upreme Councell; nor doe not now &s;o much as allow of that ancient right of Peerage in our Parlaments, but have levelled all to the order of Commons: and &s;ince we do not, like other places, ca&s;t any &s;uch reverentiall fear towards <HI>Pope</HI> or any Foraign prince, from whom, as from an Um|pire our differences might receive ready reconciliation; and we being al&s;o an I&s;land, are not like other places, &s;o much in danger of Foraign &s;urprize and inva&s;ion, whereby to be frighted to agreement, in ca&s;e we &s;hould fall out about the per&s;on or the power of the Prince to be elected. It is there|fore much more, on our parts, to be feared, that upon the death of every Protector, a general jealou&s;ie and fear of
<PB N="33" REF="20"> what &s;hall next happen will amu&s;e and di&s;turb every one, as not knowing whether they &s;hall continue under the &s;ame laws and form of government they were before. For fir&s;t, &s;uppo&s;e it to be in the interval of Parliament, and &s;o the chief power and command being in the Councel, may they not by the &s;ame power they command them in all other things, forbid the Keepers of the Great Seal for making out Writs, or the Sheriffs for making Elections? What likeli|hood that either will oppo&s;e a power in being, and able to reward as well as protect them; upon fear that a power may ari&s;e to puni&s;h them, but cannot do it till they be called, nor be called till them&s;elves &s;hall think fit? In which ca&s;e to &s;uppo&s;e the Army, &s;uch an one as may be then in being, &s;hall lay a&s;ide all con&s;ideration of advantages to them&s;elves, likely to be offered from &s;uch a Councel as may be al&s;o, and on the contrary, to be ready to compel tho&s;e that are their legal Superiors to proceed to election, or calling of a Par|liament, is as far unlikely. Or &s;uppo&s;e the Protector &s;hould die, the Parliament fitting; why then this being the &s;upreme power, is it not to be pre&s;umed they will take to them&s;elves as much power in matters of government as other Parlia|ments have done, and &s;o re&s;cind what was before e&s;tabli&s;h|ed as an impeachment to their perpetuity, even the power of a Protector and his Councel? Now as the&s;e confu&s;ions and alterations of the Government as now e&s;tabli&s;hed, are more to be feared from us then in other places, both for want of practice in the &s;teering and dividing of our duties among&s;t &s;uch like Coordinate powers, and for want of one only &s;tanding &s;upreme Council to direct, without fear of a dormant higher power to &s;ucceed; &s;o is it much more on our parts to be feared, that through that &s;iding and inter|medling which an Army may hereafter make between the&s;e juri&s;dictions, both the government may be changed, and the publique peace hazarded. For it being evident, that in all tho&s;e places where the Soveraign Magi&s;trate and the per&s;on of the highe&s;t rank is elective, and &s;o the Govern|ment &s;ubject to intervals, there tho&s;e of the next Order are hereditarily &s;ei&s;ed of the Soveraignty as in fee, until they
<PB N="34" REF="21"> &s;hall again lea&s;e the &s;ame out to another for life; and &s;o again, where the Soveraignty is hereditary in one family, there on the other &s;ide tho&s;e next &s;ubordinate Officers to be imployed in the Government are elective and dependent on him: It mu&s;t therefore come to pa&s;s, that if this Council or Order of men that is to have power in the <HI>interregnum</HI> &s;hould be elective al&s;o, then mu&s;t that Government depend upon contingencies; becau&s;e there may not be enow of them, or enow rightly cho&s;en to compleat &s;uch an a&s;&s;embly. Now &s;ince with us there is not (as I &s;aid) &s;uch a &s;tanding Order or Council claiming power by birth, but it is in &s;ome &s;ort nece&s;&s;ary and convenient that the Officers of the Army &s;hould be taken in as members both of Council and Parlia|ment, it will follow, that in ca&s;e the Council &s;hould con&s;i&s;t mo&s;tly of &s;uch, there were no likelihood that a Parliament &s;hould be called. But if the Parliament &s;hould have more or other then tho&s;e that made up the Council, then is it again to be feared, that in order to the continuance of their own power, they would cau&s;e both the power of Council and future Protectors to be voted down al&s;o. For how can it be imagined, that in this vici&s;&s;itude and &s;liding from one Ma&s;ter to another, they &s;hall be &s;o equally favoured and u&s;ed by Protector, Parliament and Council, in their &s;everal turns of power, as to &s;tand on all hands &s;o indifferently en|gaged to all and each of them, that they <HI>&s;hall not cleave to the one, and hate and de&s;pi&s;e the other;</HI> but &s;hall, to a man, be one day for the Council again&s;t all other, and on the morrow when the Parliament &s;hall &s;it, do the like for them? If things do not happen ju&s;t &s;o, then will one Coordinate overthrow the other, by their partial and unequal &s;iding; Or that which is yet wor&s;e, by their divi&s;ion hereabout they will involve us into a &s;tate of Civil war. And truly, Sir, although from &s;uch an Army, &s;uch a Council, and &s;uch a Parliament as we now have, encroachments and ju&s;tlings on one another are not to be much feared; yet, Sir, that there may be ju&s;t ground given to &s;u&s;pect &s;uch events for the future, will be very apparent to him that &s;hall reflect on tho&s;e &s;ad con&s;equences which might have been the i&s;&s;ue of
<PB N="35" REF="21"> &s;uch high and turbulent agitations and endeavours as were by &s;ome fiery &s;pirits &s;et on foot in the begining of this very Parliament. You are not &s;ure, Sir, that the Protector and the General &s;hall always be the &s;ame man, or that he &s;hall be of equal prudence and reputation with this; &s;o as by his di&s;cretion &amp; authority, all &s;uch mi&s;chief may be pre<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="3 letters">ted. And therefore, Sir, &s;ince our future peace and e&s;tab<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="4 letters">ent ought chiefly to be provided for, I pray think in h<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="UOM" EXTENT="2 letters"> un|certaine a condition you leave us, if you leave all to depend on election; and that election to be or not be, to be wel and orderly done or ill done, as the parties therein entru&s;ted &s;hall be faithful and able, or bia&s;&s;ed and ignorant. For it is not enough in &s;uch a ca&s;e to propound things fit to be done by any, unle&s;s there be withall &s;ome others appointed to &s;ee them do it: the which al&s;o may faile in their tru&s;t, and &s;o need others again to &s;ee them doe their duties: and then it will come to pa&s;s that tho&s;e that are la&s;t tru&s;ted will be chiefly or fir&s;t tru&s;ted, whereas that high tituled officer that was fir&s;t tru&s;ted wil be lea&s;t tru&s;ted, and &s;o come to be lowe&s;t of all. And by this &s;ettling of watchmen upon watchmen, you will bring all bu&s;ine&s;s to a &s;tand, whil&s;t tho&s;e officers that are to act &s;hall have no power to act, and tho&s;e that are not to act &s;hall have all.</P>
<P>But &s;ince experience doth make it manife&s;t, that at la&s;t &s;ome per&s;ons mu&s;t be tru&s;ted, and that for &s;ome time al&s;o; in order to reconcile publick differences, how madly doth it look to take &s;uch a middle cour&s;e herein, as &s;hall neither attain the good, nor avoid the evil intended? They that will tru&s;t a man for his life, doe run the utmo&s;t minute of hazard he hath to do it in; and do then &s;et the gap open again, for Civil combu&s;tion about the next Election, when as his heir may prove as good as another. And they that will not afford their Prince &s;o much power as to be in all cau&s;es, and over all per&s;ons &s;upreme, doe not only &s;till want a decider of quarrels among&s;t them&s;elves, but do al&s;o therby add &s;uch new occa&s;ion of quarrels about power as they may afterwards have with him. And therefore &s;ince Election cannot a&s;&s;ure us of goodne&s;s; nay, &s;ince good Princes may
<PB N="36" REF="22"> change to ill (as <HI>Nero</HI> that for 5 years was the be&s;t, &amp; after|wards the wor&s;t of any) 'tis be&s;t to make &s;ure of that certain benefit of publick peace, by keeping clo&s;e to one family, and by allowing &s;ufficiency of power, then increa&s;e the di&s;ea&s;e by tho&s;e remedies of election of per&s;ons, and limitation of his power.</P>
<P>Sir, there was a time indeed when Monarchy and Ty|rannie, Parlaments and Liberty were thought to be the &s;ame, but the experience of our condition under that long, long, long, Parliament, a and that little once &s;ince; hath rectifyed our judgements, and brought us to look on that Text as Canonical, and on him as a wi&s;e man that &s;aid, <HI>For the wic|kedne&s;s of a Land many are the Princes thereof, but by a man of under&s;tanding the &s;tate thereof is pre&s;erved, Prov.</HI> 28.2. We do acknowledge that <HI>in the multitude of Councellors there is &s;afety, Prov.</HI> 11.14. but we look for no &s;uch matter from a multitude of Controlers. So that <HI>Vox populi</HI> being now <HI>Vox Dei,</HI> we hope you will, in your debates of Go|vernment, <HI>Ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, that we may finde re&s;t for our &s;ouls, Jer.</HI> 6.16. In this Sir, we &s;hall not contend with you for names, but things. If you will have our Soveraign Magi&s;trate to be called Protector, we like it well: it is an Office we want, and do therefore de&s;ire he may have that power left him as will enable him to perform it: &s;uffer him to wear a &s;word Sir, or el&s;e he can neither protect us nor him&s;elf. And if again, you will have our former great Councel called by the An|cient name of Parliament, we pray you al&s;o, that the thing may be again reduced: and made agreeable to the name; let them have freedom to &s;peak their minds, but not to do them. No more of that Sir. For it is a yoak which our Fathers never knew of, nor are we able to bear. And there|fore as you and the re&s;t do now repre&s;ent us, and are to make known our grievances, we do de&s;ire that you would take notice of this as a great one. For you may re&s;t a&s;&s;ured that, were this Nation poled, not one in twenty but would de&s;ire their old Government again.</P>
<PB N="37" REF="22">
<P>But it is now time, Sir, to de&s;ire &s;omething for my &s;elf; namely, your pardon for the tediou&s;ne&s;s and extravagancie of the pa&s;&s;ed di&s;cour&s;es, and al&s;o your favorable con&s;truction of my meaning in them, which was not to find fault with any thing already done, or to in&s;truct you what to doe. No, Sir, as you have always known me a quiet man un|der Government, and re&s;pectful to my pre&s;ent Su|periors therein; &s;o I be&s;eech you to believe that I am &s;o far from intending a Cen&s;ure of any thing this way e&s;tabli&s;hed, that my drift hath been to de|fend it again&s;t all others; e&s;pecially that part which is mo&s;t malign'd, as having mo&s;t tendencie towards Monarchy. For, finding (as I &s;aid) many Pam|phlets of late thrown abroad to render that Form odious and di&s;advantagious to the people, that thereby you might be prejudiced and affrighted from making any farther &s;ettlement that way, I have thereupon pre&s;umed it expedient, even for your own and publick &s;atisfaction, that &s;omething &s;hould be al&s;o &s;aid on the other &s;ide; that &s;o you might be again brought to &s;ome even poize in your judgments, before you come to determination in this great affair. And therefore, as they would have had the World believe that you had not re|&s;pected the peoples welfare, if you had &s;etled the Protector and his I&s;&s;ue; &s;o have I endeavoured to make it appear, that you cannot doe the Nation a better courte&s;ie then by &s;o doing. The which coming from one &s;o di&s;intere&s;&s;ed as I am to him and his family by any relation, will the &s;ooner, I hope, find acceptance as a word &s;poken in &s;ea&s;on:
<PB N="38" REF="23"> Nay farther, Sir, He is one that I never received courte&s;ie and encouragement from in the lea&s;t kind; and as for his Children, I know not the face of one of them. What I have &s;aid, Sir, hath been that which in my judgment is mo&s;t for the general be|nefit: And hath been the &s;udden i&s;&s;ue of mine own brain, as by the indige&s;tion both of method and matter will be but too apparent. The Author having nothing to boa&s;t of, but that he is</P>
<CLOSER><SALUTE>SIR,</SALUTE>
<SIGNED>Your most affectionate Servant.</SIGNED></CLOSER>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
<PB REF="23">
</DIV1>
</BODY>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
