<!DOCTYPE ETS PUBLIC "-//UMDLPS//DTD EEBOPROOF 2.0//EN">
<ETS>
<TEMPHEAD>
<REVDESCR>
<CHANGE>
<DATE>2007-06-19</DATE>
<RESPSTMT>
<NAME>Angela Berkley</NAME>
<RESP>MURP</RESP>
</RESPSTMT>
<ITEM>Added TYPEs to DIVs in order to validate. Proofed title page(s). Checked for N=""s. Checked for GROUP tags. Checked ^s. Reviewed structure. Checked division-marking material at heads and feet of divisions (HEADS,  CLOSER, OPENER, ARGUMENT, EPIGRAPH, SIGNED, BYLINE, etc.). Checked for signatures. Checked placement and completeness of PBs. Checked for damage GAPs, #s, @s, --s, and UNCLEARs. Corrected ** $s and $word$s etc. of **. Converted __ $$s to GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="[vendor name]". Checked spacing of foreign GAPs.  Checked for LBs. Checked for startqs, endqs, oes, q;s, and Qs. Checked proofsheets and made corrections found there.  Checked for FIGUREs and decorated initials. Checked for missing-page GAPs. Revalidated. </ITEM>
</CHANGE>
</REVDESCR>
</TEMPHEAD>
<EEBO>
<IDG S="marc" R="UM" ID="A87136">
<STC T="W">H819</STC>
<STC T="T">E980_6</STC>
<BIBNO T="umi">99862817</BIBNO>
<VID>168557</VID>
</IDG>
<TEXT LANG="eng">
<BODY>
<DIV1 TYPE="commentary">
<PB N="1" REF="1" MS="y">
<HEAD>Pour enclouer le Canon.</HEAD>
<P>IT is obvious and apparent unto &s;en&s;e, That <HI>Venice, Hol|land, Switz,</HI> are not mole&s;ted with civil War, Strife or Sedition, like <HI>Germany, France, Spain</HI> and <HI>England;</HI> yet will men have a Commonwealth to be a confu&s;ion. What confu&s;ions we have had in <HI>England;</HI> while the Norman Line &s;trove for ab&s;olute power, while the Barons &s;trove for anci|ent Liberty, while the Hou&s;es of <HI>York</HI> and <HI>Lanca&s;ter</HI> &s;trove for Royal Dignity; and la&s;t of all, during the&s;e eighteen years, in the Wars that have been between the King and the People, in the difference of Judgment both concerning Re|ligion and Government, and under the perfidious yoke of the late Tyranny, is known. At the apparition, or but name of a Commonwealth, and before any &s;uch Orders are introduced, or perhaps truly under&s;tood, all men, or the mo&s;t of them, are upon a &s;uddain agreed that there be a good and perfect Fixation of the Army unto the Old Cau&s;e; and that the remnant of the Long Parliament be a&s;&s;embled: &s;o we have this for a ta&s;t or reli&s;h of a Commonwealth, that of the eighteen, the pre&s;ent year is already the mo&s;t unanimous. Nor can this be attributed unto Chance; &s;eeing the wit of man, our ca&s;e con&s;idered, could not, I think, have invented a more natural and nece&s;&s;ary way of launching into the Orders of a Commonwealth, then fir&s;t by Fixation of the Army &s;o, as no Council en&s;uing may have any ambitious party on which to &s;et up: and then to a&s;&s;emble that Coun|cil which hath given te&s;timony of it &s;elf, to have been the mo&s;t popularly addicted. By the&s;e it is no le&s;s then demon|&s;trated, that the Army is faithful, and the people (for the
<PB N="2" REF="2">
mo&s;t active part of them, which in like ca&s;es cometh to more then all the re&s;t) is wi&s;e. Be it granted, that the far greater part of them <Q><HI>(Libertatis dulcedine nondum experta)</HI></Q> would force us unto the continuation of Monarchy, if they could; this is the old temper of a people in like ca&s;es: thus the Romans, upon the death of <HI>Romulus,</HI> forced the Senate, who would have introduced a Commonwealth, to elect <HI>Numa</HI> with the &s;ucceeding Kings; and could not be brought unto the abolition of Monarchy, till it was impo&s;ed upon them by <HI>Brutus</HI> to abjure it. Neverthele&s;&s;e, this people having once ta&s;ted of liberty, were of all others the mo&s;t con&s;tant A&s;&s;ertors of the &s;ame. It cau&s;eth with the be&s;t Politicians de&s;pair, and, as it were, a kinde of tearing them&s;elves, that the people, even where Monarchy is apparently unpracti|cable, and they have no way but a Commonwealth or confu|&s;ion, hold their ancient Laws and Cu&s;toms unalterable, and per&s;ecute &s;uch as advi&s;e the nece&s;&s;ary change of them, how plainly &s;oever demon&s;trated, as Authors of Innovation, with hatred, if not in tumult and with violence, as when <HI>Lycur|gus</HI> in a like a&s;&s;ault lo&s;t one of his eyes. Here is <NOTE PLACE="inter">See M. B. <HI>1</HI> c. <HI>9.</HI></NOTE>the di&s;couragement; the Many through diver&s;ity, of Opinions, want of reach into the principles of Government, and unacquaintance with the good thar may by this means be acquired, are never to be agreed in the in|troduction of a new form: but then there is al&s;o this con&s;o|lation, that the Many upon introduction of a new form, co|ming once to feel the good, and ta&s;te the &s;weet of it, will ne|ver agree to abandon it. This is all the comfort that Poli|ticians, in like ca&s;es, have been able to give them&s;elves upon con&s;ideration of the nature of the people in general. But if we con&s;ider the nature of the people of <HI>England,</HI> I am much deceived, or the con&s;olation of knowing men, and good Pa|triots, may yet be far greater. For though the people of <HI>England</HI> may be twenty to one for Monarchy, they are but deceived by the name, &s;eeing they having of late years been more arbitrarily governed then formerly, de&s;ire no more un|der this name, in the truth of their meaning, then not to be at the will of men, but return unto the Government of Laws;
<PB N="3" REF="2">
for the late Monarchy being rightly con&s;idered, was indeed no more then an unequal Commonwealth; onely here is the fault of all unequal Commonwealths: they pretend to be Governments of Laws, and at the &s;ame time defer unto &s;ome one, or few men, &s;uch power, prerogative and prehe|minence, as may invade and oppore&s;s Laws; which fault was the cau&s;e of perpetual feud, or at lea&s;t jealou&s;ie between our Kings and our Parliaments. But there is in relation unto the people of <HI>England,</HI> yet a greater encouragement unto Com|monwealths-men: for though if we look upon the true cau&s;e of Popular Government, the Balance hath been many years in turning, yet &s;ince it came to be &s;o perceivable as to cau&s;e any mention of a Commonwealth, it is but a &s;hort time. Should we go &s;o far as to compute it from the beginning of the late War, it exceedeth not eighteen years, in which the eyes and affections of the people are &s;o wonderfully opened and extended, that I do not think there are fewer then fifty thou&s;and of the more active and knowing, that drive vigo|rou&s;ly at a Commonwealth; while the re&s;t are not only calm and pa&s;&s;ive, but mature for any good impre&s;&s;ion without dan|ger, or indeed appearance of any War or Tumult that can en&s;ue upon the introduction of a new form: nor is there the lea&s;t improbability that an equal Commonwealth may be received with embraces, &s;eeing a Tyranny came not only in, but was &s;upported without blood. But if people for the ex|tent of their Territory, and for their bulk or number &s;o great as this of <HI>England,</HI> &s;hould fall (to take a larger compa&s;s then I hope we &s;hall need) within the &s;pace of thirty years, out of Monarchy, to which they have ever been accu&s;tomed, into a Commonwealth of which they have had no experience nor knowledge, and that (except in the ruine of Monarchy, which how infirm &s;oever, u&s;eth not to expire otherwi&s;e) with|out rapine, War, or indeed without any great confu&s;ion, I doubt whether the world can afford another example of the like natural, ea&s;ie and &s;uddain tran&s;ition of one Government into another. Yet ere two parts in three of this time be ex|pired, men can be de&s;pairing. In what (&s;ay they) have you &s;hewn us that we mu&s;t nece&s;&s;arily be a Commonwealth? Why
<PB N="4" REF="3">
in this, (&s;ay I) that you cannot &s;hew me how we &s;hould be any thing el&s;e. In what po&s;ture (&s;ay they) do we &s;ee the people to give us this hope? VVhy in the very be&s;t (&s;ay I) that in this &s;tate of Affairs a people (if you con&s;ider their hu|mour or nature) could have ca&s;t them&s;elves into. This po|&s;ture to return is thus, or at lea&s;t thus I take it to be: The Armies of this Nation by re&s;titution of their old Officers, are fixed, re&s;olved upon, and encouraged by the mo&s;t active part of the people towards the pro&s;ecution of the Old Cau&s;e, or introduction of a popular form: the framing of this form is mode&s;tly and dutifully defer'd by them unto the civil pow|er in the re&s;titution of the Long Parliament, in that rem|nant of the &s;ame which declared for, and obliged them&s;elves unto this end.</P>
<P>Now putting this to be the ca&s;e, I come to the &s;cope of this Paper, which is to di&s;cour&s;e upon this po&s;ture; in which to my under&s;tanding, there are but three things that can inter|po&s;e between us and a Commonwealth, and but two more that can interpo&s;e between us and an equal Commonwealth, The things that may interpo&s;e between us and a Common|wealth, are &s;uch Monarchy, as can no otherwi&s;e get up then by &s;orraign Inva&s;ion; or Tyranny, which at the &s;tronge&s;t a|mong us was not of any duration, and which changing hands mu&s;t &s;till be weaker: of the&s;e two, they being onely po&s;&s;ible, and no whit probable, I &s;hall &s;ay no more. But the third thing which can interpo&s;e between us and a Commonwealth is Oligarchy, which in like ca&s;es hath been more probable and incidental, then I conceive it to be at the pre&s;ent: &s;uch a thing if it be introduced among us, is mo&s;t likely to be of this form.</P>
<P>It may con&s;i&s;t of a Council not elected by the people, but obtruded upon us, under the Notion of a Senate or a Ba|lance, or of Religion; and it may be for life, or for &s;ome certain or pretended term, with a Duke or Princely Pre&s;i|dent at the head of it, or without one.</P>
<P>The power at which &s;uch a Council doth naturally drive, is to call Parliaments, and to govern in the intervals: but the &s;ucce&s;s of &s;uch a Council, will be, that if in calling Par|liaments,
<PB N="5" REF="3">
it do not pack them, it will be forthwith ruined; and if it do pack them, then the ca&s;e of &s;uch a Councel and a Parliament will be no otherwi&s;e different from the ca&s;e of a &s;ingle per&s;on and a Parliament, then that more Ma&s;ters le&s;s able to &s;upport their greatne&s;s, &amp; who&s;e greatne&s;s we &s;hall be le&s;s able to &s;upport, will be a burden by &s;o much more heavy, then one Ma&s;ter more able to &s;upport his greatne&s;s, and who&s;e greatne&s;s we were more able to &s;upport. But this will either not be, or be of no continuance.</P>
<P>The things that can interpo&s;e between us and an equal Commonwealth, are either a Senate for Life, or an Optimacy.</P>
<P>The &s;eventy elders in I&s;rael, were a Senate for life; this though con&s;titutively elected by the people, became after the captivity, or in the <HI>Jewi&s;h</HI> Commonwealth (how anci|ently is uncertain) meer Oligarchy, by the means of Ordina|tion; no man being capable of Magi&s;tracy except he were a Presbyter, no man being made a Presbyter but by laying on of Hands, and the Prince with the Senate engro&s;&s;ing the whole power of laying on of Hands.</P>
<P>Nor were the people thus excluded, and trampled upon by the Phari&s;ees under other colour then that of Religion, or tradition derived in their Oral Law or Cabala from <HI>Mo|&s;es,</HI> in who&s;e Chair they &s;at, and not only pretended their Government to be a government of Saints, but in &s;ome things bade fairer for that title then others, who a&s;&s;umed it afterwards: for that they did miracles, is plain in the&s;e words of our Saviour, unto them: <HI>If I by Beelzebub ca&s;t out Devils, by whom do your children ca&s;t them out? therefore they &s;hall be your judges,</HI> Mat. 12. 27. By which I may believe that Miracles them&s;elves do not in any wi&s;e oblige us to hope that &s;uch a &s;tate of Government can be Religious or hone&s;t: much le&s;s, where there are no miracles, nor any &s;uch certain di&s;tinction to be outwardly made between a Saint and an Hypocrite, as may &s;ecure us that we &s;hall not have Hypocrites impo&s;ed upon us for Saints. The &s;ure&s;t te&s;timony of Saint&s;hip in Rulers, is, when they are willing to admit of &s;uch orders in Government, as re&s;train the power
<PB N="6" REF="4">
to do wickedly, or of lording it over their brethren.</P>
<P>Upon the pattern of the High-prie&s;t, and the &s;eventy El|ders, aro&s;e the government of the Pope and his &s;eventy Car|dinals, pretending al&s;o unto Saint&s;hip; which neverthele&s;s is as little yeelded unto them, as they a&s;&s;ume that a Councel of &s;eventy for life, is a good guard of the liberty of Con|&s;cience.</P>
<P>The next Senate for life, was that of <HI>Lacedemon,</HI> con&s;i&s;ting of two Kings hereditary, and twenty eight Senators elective. The&s;e notwith&s;tanding they were not eligible but by the people, and at the &s;ixtieth year of their age, and by the Ba|lance or equal Agrarian of their Commonwealth, could not any one of them excel the meane&s;t Citizen in their lot, or &s;hares in Land; &s;o vigorou&s;ly attempted to draw the whole re&s;ult of the Commonwealth unto them&s;elves, that if the people had not &s;triven as vigorou&s;ly for the pre&s;ervation of their right, they had been excluded from making their own Laws. The expedient found out by the people in this exi|gent, was their election of five annual Magi&s;trates out of their own number, called the <HI>Ephori,</HI> with power to try, condemn and execute any of their Kings or Senators which thenceforth &s;hould go about to &s;ubvert the fundamental Laws of their Government, by which it belonged unto the Senate to debate and propo&s;e only, and unto the a&s;&s;embly of the people to re&s;olve. Without this expedient (which in another Commonwealth not planted upon a like Agrarian, would have availed little, as the <HI>Roman</HI> people found after|wards by their Tribunes) had the people of <HI>Lacedemon</HI> through a Senate for life been deprived of their liber|ties.</P>
<P>The <HI>Roman</HI> Commonwealth was al&s;o founded upon a Se|nate for life; which though fir&s;t in&s;tituted by election of the people, came afterwards to be &s;uch into which their children found other admittance, in &s;uch manner as from hence grew a <HI>Patrician</HI> order, ingro&s;&s;ing not only the Senate, and exclu|ding the people from bearing Magi&s;tracy in the Common|wealth, but oppre&s;&s;ing them al&s;o by an heavy yoke of Tyran|ny,
<PB N="7" REF="4">
which cau&s;ed perpetual fewd between this Senate and the People, and in the end the ruine of the Commonwealth. Yet entitled this Nobility them&s;elves unto the&s;e preroga|tives, no otherwi&s;e then by &s;uch religious rites, as among them were believed to confer Saint&s;hip, and thereby to inti|tle them unto Dominion over the people, in which they were al&s;o aided by the Optimacy.</P>
<P>Now examples of a Senate for Life being of like nature and nece&s;&s;ary con&s;equence, it is my hope and prayer, that never any &s;uch be introduced in <HI>England.</HI></P>
<P>But in ca&s;e of an Optimacy, a Commonwealth, though not admitting of a Senate for Life, may yet be unequal.</P>
<P><HI>Athens</HI> con&s;i&s;ted of a Senate upon annual Rotation; yet through the Optimacy which was in&s;tituted by <HI>Solon,</HI> came under &s;uch a yoke of the Nobility, and upon victory obtained in the battel of <HI>Plataea,</HI> they took the opportunity to throw off, and reduce the Commonwealth unto more equality.</P>
<P>An Optimacy is introduced, where a people is not onely divided by Tribes according to their habitation; but every Tribe into Cla&s;&s;es, according unto their e&s;tates or different mea&s;ures in riches; as if you &s;hould ca&s;t all that have above two thou&s;and pounds a year into one Cla&s;&s;is; all that have above one thou&s;and pounds a year, into another; all that have above five hundred, into a third; and &s;o forth, for as many Cla&s;&s;es as you like to make.</P>
<P>Now if in this ca&s;e the fir&s;t and &s;econd Cla&s;&s;es may give the &s;u&s;&s;rage of the whole people, as in <HI>Rome;</HI> or that the&s;e only may enjoy the Senate, and all the Magi&s;tracies, though but upon Rotation, as in <HI>Athens;</HI> yet the people, as to the&s;e parts being excluded, the Commonwealth mu&s;t needs re|main unequal: wherefore this al&s;o ought to be forewarned, to the end that it may be prevented.</P>
<P>To conclude, if we in <HI>England</HI> can have any Monarchy, we &s;hall have no Commonwealth; but if we can have no Monarchy, then bar but a Senate for Life, and an Optimacy, and we mu&s;t have an equal Commonwealth. Succe&s;&s;ive Parli|aments, whether immediately, or with Councels in the inter|vals,
<PB N="8" REF="5">
and like fancies, will be as void of effect, as of example, or rea&s;on.</P>
<P>But an abundance of things is tedious; we would have &s;uch a Commonwealth as may be dictated in a breath. Thus then: Let a Senate be con&s;tituted of Three hundred, and a Popular A&s;&s;embly of One thou&s;and and fifty, each for the term of three years, and to be annually changed in one third part. But in ca&s;e a Commonwealth were thus briefly di|ctated, what would this abate of tho&s;e many things which mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;ity go unto a like &s;tructure, that it may be equally and methodically brought up from a firm and proper foundation? there is no way of dictating a Commonwealth unto facile practice, but by the &s;eeming difficulty of the whole circum&s;tances requi&s;ite, even to a tittle. Neverthele&s;s to try again: Let the Lands throughout <HI>England</HI> be all ca&s;t into &s;ome Pari&s;h. Let every Pari&s;h elect annually a fifth Man; let every hundred of the&s;e fifth men, with the places of their habitation, con&s;titute one hundred; then ca&s;t twenty of the&s;e hundreds into one Tribe or Shire. Putting the ca&s;e the Tribes or Shires thus &s;tated amount unto fifty, let the fifth men or Deputies in every Tribe or Shire, elect annual|ly two out of their own number, to be Senators for three years, and &s;even to be of the a&s;&s;embly of the people for a like term, each term obliging unto an equal interval: which the Senate being for the fir&s;t year con&s;tituted of three hundred, and the A&s;&s;embly of the people of one thou&s;and and fifty, gives you tho&s;e bodies upon a triennial Rotation, and in them the main Orders of an equal Commonwealth. If you mu&s;t have a Commonwealth, and you will have an equal Commonwealth, then (pardon my boldne&s;s) after this or &s;ome like manner mu&s;t you do, becau&s;e like work never was, nor can be done any otherwi&s;e.</P>
<CLOSER><DATELINE><DATE><HI>May</HI> 2. 1659.</DATE></DATELINE>
<SIGNED>J. Harrington.</SIGNED></CLOSER>
</DIV1>
</BODY>
<BACK>
<DIV1 TYPE="colophon">
<P><HI>London,</HI> Printed for <HI>Henry Fletcher.</HI> 1659.</P>
</DIV1>
</BACK>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
