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<DATE>2007-03-29</DATE>
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<NAME>Emma Leeson Huber</NAME>
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<DIV1 TYPE="title page">
<PB REF="1" MS="y">
<P>A SOVERAIGNE SALVE
TO CVRE THE BLIND.
<HI>OR,</HI>
A Vindication of the Power and Priviledges
claim'd or executed by the LORDS and COMMONS in
PARLIAMENT, from the Calumny and Slanders of
men, who&s;e eyes (their Con&s;cience being before
blinded) ignorance or malice hath
hoodwinckt. Wherein the fallacie and fal&s;ity of the Anti-parliamen|tary
party is di&s;covered, their plots for introducing <HI>Popery</HI> into
the CHURCH and <HI>Tyranny</HI> into the STATE are manife&s;ted:
The pretended fears of danger from <HI>Seperati&s;ts, Browni&s;ts,</HI> &amp;c.
blowne away. And a right way propo&s;ed for the ad|vancing
the ju&s;t Honour of the King, the due
reverence of the Clergy, the Rights and
<HI>Liberty of the people: and the renew|ing</HI>
a GOLDEN AGE. By <HI>J. M.</HI> E&s;quire.</P>
<Q><L>Salus populi e&s;t Lex &s;uprema.</L>
<L>Salus Parliamenti &s;upremum privilegium.</L></Q>
<P>LONDON:
<HI>Printed by</HI> T. P. <HI>and</HI> M. S. 1643.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="to the reader">
<PB REF="2">
<P>REader, if thou expecte&s;t here a polite &s;tile or
fluent phra&s;e, thou wilt be deceived in thy ex|pectation:
it is not Rhetorick but rea&s;on can &s;atis|fie
the judgment (which this Author intended) the
former may cozen the con&s;cience, and dazle &s;imple
men: the latter onely can &s;atisfie the Wi&s;e, and
lead to truth. A rough Diamond is precious, when
the be&s;t wrought gla&s;&s;e is de&s;picable; the painted
Oratory (which be&s;t plea&s;eth the vulgar) ill &s;uits
with the well becoming gravity of a Stati&s;t. The
right &s;tating of many que&s;tions in the in&s;uing Trea+ti&s;e
hath nece&s;sitated the dilating of &s;ome &s;entences
more then may &s;tand with a plea&s;ing &s;tile: yet it
is not doubted but the lovers of Truth will find
that performed which is promi&s;ed. Farwell.</P>
</DIV1>
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<BODY>
<DIV1 TYPE="text">
<PB N="1" REF="2">
<P>SO many excellent Treati&s;es as have been &s;ent abroad to
unblind the hoodwinkt world, and all clearing this truth
<HI>(That the Parliament is and ought to be &s;upreme Judge)</HI> might
make this &s;eem needle&s;&s;e, but as for a &s;turdy &s;ore, many plai|&s;ters
are but &s;ufficient; &s;o will it not be mi&s;-&s;pent time by the
clear demon&s;trations of truth and right rea&s;on to beat down
that wall of the too-much-loved-ignorance which hitherto
hath kept rhe divine light of the truth from entring into the
dark (&amp; therfore mi&s;erable) &s;ouls of tho&s;e deluded ones who
with &s;o much earne&s;tne&s;&s;e lay out their e&s;tates, expo&s;e their
families to a thou&s;and mi&s;eries, nay &s;pend even their deare&s;t
bloud to in&s;lave them&s;elves and po&s;terity. Love and duty
to religion and my countrey, now flaming with the fire the&s;e
men have kindled, &amp; yet give fuell to, yea even pitie to the&s;e
men hath inforc'd a pen ever before &s;till to expo&s;e it &s;elfe to
publike cen&s;ure, and if by this poor labour of mine any of
the&s;e ignorantly erring men may be reduced, I have my end;
as for tho&s;e who inraged with malice willingly oppo&s;e the
truth, God hath provided her another champion, even the
&s;word, to vindicate her &s;elfe from the violence of tho&s;e
men on whom the power of rea&s;on hath no effect.</P>
<P>To attain this our end, what readier way have we then
1. To di&s;cover the fal&s;ity of tho&s;e pretences by which tho&s;e
men are deluded, the mi&s;eries they bring them&s;elves and po|&s;terity
into if they yet per&s;i&s;t: 2. To di&s;cover the way to re|gain
our now almo&s;t lo&s;t liberty and religion: 3. To free us
from the pretended fears of the inva&s;ion of our liberty by the
Parliament, or of our religion by Browni&s;ts, Anabapti&s;ts, and
the like. And here &s;o many of the&s;e men who hitherto
through ignorance, pa&s;&s;ion and mi&s;take have been enemies to
the Parliament, and in them to their religion, countrey, and
them&s;elves, I &s;ay &s;o many of the&s;e as by Gods providence
this little Treati&s;e &s;hal com unto, are wi&s;hed out of due care &amp;
love to the Prote&s;tant Religion &s;o de&s;perately undermined by Je&s;uiti|call
plots, out of love to their poor countrey, laws and liberty, now at
<PB N="2" REF="3">
the la&s;t ga&s;p as it were either to &s;tand or fall, out of pitie to them|&s;elves
and their po&s;terity, de&s;igned even to Turki&s;h &s;lavery, they
would lay a&s;ide all prejudicate thoughts, and &s;eriou&s;ly lay to heart the
evidences of truth, love, and labour to defend it where&s;oever they find
it: and in hopes they will do this, I will proceed according to the me|thod
propo&s;ed, which was fir&s;t to di&s;cover the deceit of that &s;ophi&s;try
by which the&s;e truth-haters delude their followers &amp; to clear the pro|ceedings
of the Parliament from all a&s;per&s;ions of wrong or inju&s;tice:
but becau&s;e their arts of deceiving are many, and it would require too
much time to an&s;wer particulars, therefore I &s;hall endeavour to draw
them to &s;ome few generals. The fir&s;t then we have to deal withall is
this, <HI>The &s;overaigne power claimed by the Lords and Commons in
Parliament to provide for the Kingdomes &s;afety is an intrenching on
His Maje&s;ties ju&s;t Rights, and contrary to the knowne Lawes,</HI> &s;ay tho&s;e
deceivers. To an&s;wer this, and in this the whole bulk of their obje|ctions
again&s;t the Parliament, I &s;hall fir&s;t propo&s;e this to your con&s;i|deration:
Whether if the King having his royall name and authority
abu&s;ed by tho&s;e about him, or mi&s;led by his own pa&s;&s;ion or mi&s;take, do
command and act things pernicious and de&s;tructive to the people, reli|gion,
liberty and lawes, contrary to the end and tru&s;t of the fir&s;t in&s;ti|tutors
of this Monarchy, and to the contract at his coronation, and
convert the power of the people it &s;elf to back and carry on tho&s;e de|&s;ignes,
refu&s;ing to hearken to the petitions of his people, or Remon|&s;trances
of the great Councell of the Kingdome (if in this ca&s;e the
people be remedile&s;&s;e) con&s;ider whether the condition of a free nation
be not wor&s;e then that of a mo&s;t mi&s;erable &s;lave, and whether the fra|mers
of this Monarchy have not provided better for the means, then
for the end it &s;elf, the peoples welfare, which is the end of all govern|ment.
For fir&s;t, being before in a free and happy e&s;tate every way, it
mu&s;t bring it &s;elf into &s;ervitude, and each man make one another mu|tually,
and tho&s;e he holds deare&s;t, and his Countrey it &s;elf &s;laves, and
mu&s;t expo&s;e his own life, that he may take the lives of who&s;oever re|fu&s;eth
&s;lavery. Secondly, be&s;ides thus each man being one anothers
mutually, and all their countreys executioners, each mu&s;t be bound to
expo&s;e all he hath, and his life as much as In him lieth, to procure or ad|vance
the means of damnation of tho&s;e he holds deare&s;t, nay of innu|merable
others, and of him&s;elfe (Religion being part of the ca&s;e.) Thus
whereas it &s;eems &s;ufficient to the con&s;titution of a &s;lave, not to have
power to di&s;po&s;e of him&s;elf, or of what he hath in a pa&s;&s;ive way one|ly,
in this ca&s;e men mu&s;t be po&s;itively active again&s;t them&s;elves.</P>
<P><PB N="3" REF="3">
Thirdly and la&s;tly, a whole Nation cannot fly, or run away
from a condition &s;o mi&s;erable, and by any other meanes unavoida|ble,
as a particular &s;lave may.</P>
<P>More might be &s;aid in this point, but what needed thus much, were
not their Judgements with whom we deale as turbu<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">ent as the wa|ters
they have troubled; which &s;ort a po&s;&s;ibilitie of delu&s;ion, that
yet may partly hoodwinke them, mu&s;t di&s;tingui&s;h from the other
part among them, whom malice hath made utterly rea&s;on, and reli|gion
proofe; and therefore their &s;en&s;es, who&s;e &s;oules &s;eeme nothing
els, are to be dealt with in another method.</P>
<P>But to the point; the premi&s;es and con&s;equence being utterly ab|&s;urd,
incon&s;i&s;tent, contradictory, again&s;t rea&s;on and nature, Princes
being in&s;tituted for the peoples happines, and &s;o rather <HI>publici &s;ervi,</HI>
as <HI>regnum &s;plendida &s;ervitus:</HI> and &s;ince there is provi&s;ion again&s;t the
danger of the minoritie of a Prince, who can be onely po&s;itively ill,
it being <HI>&agrave; fortiori</HI> rea&s;onable, that it &s;hould not be wanting again&s;t
the perill from &s;uch a Prince, as we propound, who by meanes of a
greater maturitie and authoritie, may concurre more actively, and
con&s;equently more perniciou&s;ly to the greate&s;t evill, the people in
our ca&s;e, if or when the King makes &s;uch attempts in rea&s;on cannot
be without meanes of remedy. It were perhaps &s;o were a King in|&s;tituted
in an immediate miraculous extraordinary manner by God
him&s;elfe, then a lower power could not di&s;anull the act of the high|er;
or perhaps there were colour, if the people it &s;elfe had ab&s;olutely
given or entru&s;ted it &s;elfe to the power or Provi&s;ion of the Prince at
the fir&s;t in&s;titution, or framing of the Monarchy. But with us the
lawes, cu&s;tomes, priviledges, power, and u&s;e of Parliaments &amp;c.
argue, or rather are limitations, re&s;trictions, conditions, or re&s;erva|tions
made upon the originall tru&s;t, commi&s;&s;ion, or delegation from
the people, or after upon occa&s;ion, which it keeps in its owne power,
or re&s;erves to it &s;elfe, as the &s;upreame re&s;ort for extraordinary emer|gents.
Nor let any thinke that the King having taken his oath for
the keeping him&s;elfe within his bounds, or for the ob&s;erving the
lawes, liberties, priviledges, or the like, that he is hereupon onely left
to God and his con&s;cience, and the people without humane remedy,
if he exorbitate; for they ought not to pre&s;ume, but to prove &s;trong|ly
(if they could) this, which were for the di&s;advantage of the peo|ple
&s;o mainely, for who&s;e good all was intended at the fir&s;t in&s;titu|tion
of the Monarchy; and the peoples happines ought to be rather
<PB N="4" REF="4">
favoured and preferred in the interpretation of a doubtfull matter
(were this &s;uch) as a&s;&s;uredly according with the fir&s;t in&s;titutors in|tention:
and I thinke it is not &s;o apparent (if it be apparent at all)
that the King is &s;o left to God onely, as it is that the &s;afetie and hap|pines
of the people is <HI>L<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">x &s;uprema,</HI> and the end of all, which is out of
doubt; and therefore by this tye of an oath, and all other &s;itting
ties, power, and meanes al&s;o intended to be procured, and &s;ecured;
and all oft little enough (though &s;uch power is unle&s;&s;e upon nece&s;&s;i|tie
not onely not to be exerci&s;ed, but al&s;o to be kept as &s;ecret, as may
be, that the Princes authoritie in as much as it may make for the
good of the people, may be kept up.) And perhaps the oath the peo|ple
hath taken to the King, e&s;pecially as the people is repre&s;ented in
Parliament, may (re&s;pecting at this time this rea&s;on onely) inferre
as well on the peoples &s;ide, that it is left to God onely thereupon, and
&s;o &s;upreame in point of judgement and power: but allowing, or ra|ther
under&s;tanding truly &s;uch power to be in the people, and from it
in the Parliament (as hereafter may further appeare wee are to doe)
is not this way the peoples libertie, rights, happines, &s;afer and better
a&s;&s;ured, together with the Kings ju&s;t power or prerogative, &s;ince the
Parliament is not capable (could it be willing) to u&s;urpe upon either
(as after may be &s;hewed) then imagining &s;uch &s;upreame power to
be inve&s;ted in the King, either the peoples right or the Kings ju&s;t
power it &s;elfe can be; &s;eeing no man will deny but Kings are &s;ubjects
capable of arbitrary or tyrannicall power oft times willing and gi|ving
the attempt, and &s;ometimes actually prevailing. So, if the fra|mers
of this Monarchy had intended &s;uch paramount power &s;hould
be &s;till in the King; and that in &s;uch extraordinary emergents as now
appeare in <HI>England,</HI> they had been more &s;olicitous of, and provided
better far for one meanes of diver&s;e ordeined to an end, then for the
very end it &s;elfe, the peoples happines, which they had left &s;till de|pending
dangerou&s;ly on one mans con&s;cience, or will, as it &s;hould at
any time happen to change, when &s;o <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">ure and &s;afe a provi&s;ion offe|red
it &s;elfe el&s;e-where, (as before is pa<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="3 letters">y touched) and had prefer|red
the meanes before the end: and &s;o doe all the de&s;perate malig|nants,
and the di&s;orderers of our times &amp; State, which is retrograde
to rea&s;on: others may better enforce this point touching the intent
of the fir&s;t in&s;titution, and adde expre&s;&s;e authorities perhaps out of
the Lawes to this end, or the practi&s;e of Parliaments in &s;uch times
(if &s;uch have ever before been) or otherwi&s;e proceed by analogie
and good con&s;equences of rea&s;on.</P>
<P><PB N="5" REF="4">
If it be &s;aid, that by &s;uch a provi&s;ion of remedie for the people in
danger, as above&s;aid, a dangerous pre&s;ident of di&s;obeying, and
weakning the Ki<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">gs authority is introduced, which may worke
even danger of di&s;&s;olution of the Monarchy. Admitting but not
granting, that upon &s;uch a pre&s;ident, once made, upon an extraor|dinarie
cau&s;e, and that by an orderly way (and which once done
may well prevent all future need of making any more &s;uch pre&s;i|dents)
admit &s;uch a danger even to the Monarchy followed there|upon
(which yet will not be made good in our pre&s;ent ca&s;e, as after
will appear) then here now is the point. Among divers forms of
government, whereby a people may be governed, that it may be
happie, which is the end and ayme of every &s;uch form, this Na|tion
cho&s;e one particular one, which it judged fitte&s;t to compa&s;&s;e
that end (as indeed Monarchy duely tempered is the be&s;t, but
di&s;tempered by tyranny the wor&s;t, the advantage of union, or uni|tive
power, which it hath above other forms &s;trengthening to evill,
when it degenerates, as it did to good, while&s;t it &s;tood incorrupt)
but if this objection were of weight it would follow, that it were
more rationall, that the peoples felicity, which is the &s;upreme end,
to which all good forms of government are ordained and tend,
&s;hould rather &s;uffer, then a particular form or fa&s;hion of govern|ment,
of which there are choice, and any of which are but one
meanes, or way to compa&s;&s;e that end if it continue incorrupt, but if
corrupted to de&s;troy the end: and &s;o one meanes to the end, nay in
our ca&s;e a meanes if not rectified wholly to fru&s;trate the end, &s;hould
be preferred before the end it &s;elf, which it ought onely to &s;erve,
nor can it be &s;aid the remedie were wor&s;e then the di&s;ea&s;e; for what
remedie can be &s;o ill, as that di&s;ea&s;e; a free, a glorious, a nob<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">e Na|tion
to fall to &s;ervitude &s;pirituall and temporall from a long enjoyed
Liberty in both kinds, and our &s;elves the in&s;truments? though to
go on in &s;uch a ca&s;e, the remedie might not prove &s;o ill, or difficult,
if men would pay obedi<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="3 letters"> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">uely there where rea&s;on tells them
they owe it; And &s;houl<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter"> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">ere be no &s;uch remedie for the people,
or <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">or con&s;ervation of the frame of the government the con&s;titu|tion
of this Monarchy, which the King declareth he admireth &s;o
much, were mo&s;t deficient in the mo&s;t principall point of all, name|ly,
the defending and pre&s;erving it &s;elfe, the very foundation and
ground-work, as the end of all, otherwi&s;e provi&s;ions orders, Laws,
without which what were they but folly and phanta&s;ie? Nay were
<PB N="6" REF="5">
not the folly of the fir&s;t in&s;titution rather to be as much admired
(as rai&s;ing an in&s;trument utterly unfit for the purpo&s;e it was meant
for: had it left the maine end of all, that is, the peoples &s;afetie, liber|tie,
happine&s;&s;e in &s;uch a ca&s;e as ours, without all po&s;&s;ible, nay with|out
any provi&s;ion expre&s;&s;e or imployed by common intendment,
or analogie of rea&s;on, or rule of Law, though the true, the naturall,
the be&s;t, or the onely provi&s;ion, or remedie to keep Prince and
people in their due temper, were &s;o at hand, &s;o facile, &s;o offering it
&s;elf, and if not before u&s;uall, yet u&s;ed po&s;&s;ibly at the very time of
&s;uch an in&s;titution, and for that very purpo&s;e, namely, a Parliament
or other meeting of the like nature, without provi&s;ion, I &s;ay, again&s;t
the greate&s;t publick mi&s;chief of all, that <HI>ultimum malum Reipublicae</HI>
(as divine <HI>Plato</HI> termes it) arbitrary power, or tyranny, and that a
mi&s;chief, &s;o likely to happen; more, &s;o oft attempted, nay actually
happening. But he that implores force (not now to &s;peak of what is
pretended herein by words) and that though but to re&s;i&s;t the orders
of that power, who&s;e part alone it is to remedie the people in our
ca&s;e, doth in fact deny that this Monarchy hath made &s;uch provi|&s;ion,
or hath that power &s;o nece&s;&s;ary to help and defend it &s;elf, or
that the people in this ca&s;e is remediable, for by &s;uch having re|cour&s;e
to force or warre, though but defen&s;ive, he challengeth and
a&s;&s;umeth all the power from the people to him&s;elf, making him&s;elf
&s;upreme Judge of all upon the la&s;t re&s;ort, of which &s;omewhat more
&s;hortly. But the King cannot be &s;o in our pre&s;ent ca&s;e, in which he
is a party in as much as the evill proceeds from ill coun&s;ell prevailing
with him; For to bring the hypothe&s;is to a The&s;is, and not to &s;tand
alway on &s;uppo&s;ition taking it as a &s;uppo&s;ition) that a king &s;educed
may, <HI>de facto,</HI> make &s;uch attempts as are above put, it is more evi|dent
of it &s;elf then that we need look on the fall of Liberty in <HI>France;</HI>
if not from the King, nor Coun&s;ell, about him con&s;equently, then
whence is the remedie for our lo&s;&s;e? from the Judges? what ever
their will may be they want power, a<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters"> <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">twith&s;tanding they &s;till
were pre&s;ent the mi&s;chief grew on: <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 span"> be then from the two
Hou&s;es of Parliament onely (unle&s;&s;e you would have the whole
Nation a&s;&s;emble per&s;onally, as in the Vale of <HI>Jeho&s;aphat,</HI> if you &s;up|po&s;e
it po&s;&s;ible, and if po&s;&s;ible fit for any thing but confu&s;ion, ex|cept
perhaps force) the king having (to &s;peak with what reverence
we can) in this ca&s;e excluded him&s;elf, and the Clergie ju&s;tly being
excluded, from &s;uch temporall di&s;tractions, that it may attend the
<PB N="7" REF="5">
better and advance the cele&s;tiall, and eccle&s;ia&s;tick, more then enough
to take up the able&s;t men wholly, and not a little hindered and di&s;|credited
by their &s;o great greedine&s;&s;e after worldly matters: let
them do their dutie, let them teach truly, live exemplarily, like pro|fe&s;&s;ors
of mortification, this will render the people &s;o devoted to re|ligion,
to them, that they may &s;ecurely tru&s;t the Parliament with
all that touches them, and &s;afely make it their proxy, them&s;elves
being ab&s;ent; and while&s;t thus &s;pirituall matters are the better &s;er|ved
and attended, the&s;e, and the temporall both receive the greater
ble&s;&s;ing: but &s;uch diffidence and &s;u&s;pition in the Clergie (if it &s;hould
not be pre&s;ent in Parliament) argues ill de&s;erving, &s;ince the ju&s;tice
and wi&s;dom of the Parliament, as principles of this government
ought not to be que&s;tioned: but how much more is the Clergie to
receive at the hands of the Parliament, that <HI>fuora, i. preti, i. e.
Prie&s;ts void the roome,</HI> u&s;ed by that Councel in <HI>Venice,</HI> of which <HI>Bodin</HI>
in the third book <HI>De republic&acirc;,</HI> the 3. Chapter, then, when they
&s;hall be found in life and doctrine un&s;ound, ill affected to the publick
good, acce&s;&s;arie to the evill to be remedied, nay ardent to bring in,
or maintain either Papi&s;try, and idolatrie, or at lea&s;t a mo&s;t &s;canda|lous
&s;ymbolizing with it in temporall pride, riches and greatne&s;&s;e,
and even Antichri&s;tian domination through the breaches and ruins
of their Countrey, rather then even a Parliament &s;hall que&s;tion it.
The Parliament then, and under this notion of the two Hou&s;es in
the&s;e times under&s;tood, being our onely remedie, or rather Phy&s;i|tian,
it follows it may and is to be Judge of the danger or di&s;ea&s;e,
and that of power which is to remedie if it be &s;o, is to try whether
it be &s;o; for without judgement or knowledge of the di&s;ea&s;e how
can there be remedie? or how &s;hall the Phy&s;itian know, what, when
and how to apply? If it be the onely competent Judge of this our
dangerous di&s;ea&s;e, and of the meanes to meet with, or expell it (the
knowledge of the remedie depending e&s;&s;entially upon the know|ledge
of the Maladie, and receiving thence its Judications) it hath
con&s;equently power to execute, or act, or cau&s;e to be executed or
acted, what it hath, or &s;hall judge or ordain nece&s;&s;ary for the cure,
el&s;e &s;uch power to judge were vain, and it would &s;till return that the
people were remedile&s;&s;e. But WISDOM or Judgement and POWER,
as they are divine coincidents, and all one really and naturally where
they are &s;upreme, and e&s;&s;entiall as in the Divine nature, it being but
our weakne&s;&s;e of under&s;tanding to conceive them disjoyned &s;o
<PB N="8" REF="6">
(for principles of one facultie que&s;tioned are to be enforced from an
higher facultie) even in this &s;upreme power on earth (which as farre
as frail mortalitie can bear imitates, and repre&s;ents that above) they
ought not to be by us apprehended &s;eparate, but mutually pre&s;up|po&s;ing
or inferring one the other. Let us adde to make up this ter|re&s;tiall
trinity; <HI>Goodne&s;&s;e,</HI> which la&s;t may be under&s;tood in our pre|&s;ent
ca&s;e, a doing no unju&s;t, or di&s;honourable thing, but wholly in|tending
the publick good, according to the peoples tru&s;t. And it
were an arch here&s;ie in the policy of this Monarchy to disjoyn in
our beleef or opinion, the third from the two former. And the Law
&s;aying, no di&s;honourable thing is to be conceived of the Parlia|ment,
it &s;eems all one as to have &s;aid in other termes, that it is the
&s;upreme Judge of the la&s;t re&s;ort (and that even without the king,
if he hath excluded him&s;elf as above, which is more then if he were
far per&s;onally ab&s;ent, or otherwi&s;e ca&s;ually di&s;enabled, and as much
as if no king at all were for the time) where all appeals are to re&s;t,
and determine, all men to <HI>acquie&s;&s;e,</HI> binding all from que&s;tioning
what is there done; and inferres the &s;upreme power there to re&s;ide,
as being the whole kingdome (in which it is radically and funda|mentally
by repre&s;entation: &s;uch power to be exerted and u&s;ed,
when it judges nece&s;&s;arie, and that (if the nature of the occa&s;ion &s;o
requires) with the &s;u&s;pen&s;ion of the power of the &s;upreame, ordi|nary
Delegate, or Magi&s;trate, during that parenthe&s;is of &s;tate; for
the kingdome having entru&s;ted the Parliament with all it holds
precious, the effect of the Commi&s;&s;ion upon the matter being, that
it provide <HI>ne quid re&s;publica detrimenti capiat,</HI> it hath con&s;equently
tru&s;ted it with its power, which is the &s;upreme, that it may be en|abled
to perform and execute the tru&s;t, when it judgeth, this cannot
be made good, without u&s;ing that power. But to return; the Law
&s;aith al&s;o, <HI>That the King can do, or doth no wrong&punc;</HI> but it denieth not,
but ill Coun&s;ell about him may: or perhaps the Law intends the
king as he is in his great Coun&s;ell, where he is as <HI>Sol in Leone,</HI> or any
Planet (as they &s;ay) in his proper hou&s;e; of farre greater vertue and
power, then otherwi&s;e. But however, Rea&s;on tells us, that a Prince
or a few of his Cabinet coun&s;ell, may far more ea&s;ily erre in judge|ment,
or po&s;&s;ibly in point of will, then the multitude of a Parlia|ment
(&s;o many whereof are &s;elected out of the whole Kingdom by
the people) in point of Judgement, much more of will, or well
willing to the publique (whereof them&s;elves are &s;o great a part):
<PB N="9" REF="6">
and this much the rather, in that it is to be feared, that oftentimes,
tho&s;e privadoes of the Prince, finding out cunningly the Princes
will, inclination, or humour, before they advi&s;e, and, further to in|gratiate
them&s;elves, &s;econding it, much that there is agitated, be|comes
to be upon the matter the judgement or will but of the
Prince alone.</P>
<P>Well, I hope we are now come &s;afe to this pa&s;&s;e, that the Parlia|ment
may and ought in our ca&s;e to defend the people, or kingdoms
rights, u&s;e the peoples power which is the &s;upreame, (as others have
proved to cleare pa&s;&s;ionate men, rather then to &s;atisfie any judicious
man, who will not require proofs in a point plain enough of it &s;elf)
ever re&s;ident in the people, and &s;o in the Parliament, though dor|mient,
till it be by the Parliament thought fit to be wakened, which
&s;hould it not now be done, &s;uch a &s;eeming-&s;ecure, and &s;upine &s;leep
might have proved a mortall lethargy. But here the&s;e Sophi&s;ters
think to enter upon us, and to take the benefit of their own wrong;
for &s;eeing they have brought the Kingdom to this pa&s;&s;e, that unle&s;&s;e
the Parliament take the power of the kingdom into the kingdoms
or its own hands, it cannot defend it &s;elf, or the kingdoms rights,
or rather re&s;cue them; they would cunningly prepare tho&s;e, whom
they intend to make &s;laves, by fir&s;t making them &s;uch fools, as to
beleeve, that the Parliament intends a change of the Monarchicall
form of government, and to oppre&s;&s;e King and people by I know
not what new kind of Arbitrarie tyrannicall government. I be|leeve
the King and Parliament will &s;oon be attoned, if any can &s;hew
the Parliament by what other way it can di&s;charge its tru&s;t and
dutie in this con&s;titution of the times, without the power it hath
a&s;&s;umed But what if it &s;hall appear (I &s;hould make &s;cruple to u&s;e
the word &s;hall, as if it did not appear alreadie without the&s;e weak
offers, had we not to do with &s;uch as &s;eem to have found out &s;ome
new kind of rea&s;on, or having antiquated the old, which differenced
man from irrationall creatures, to have &s;ub&s;tituted pa&s;&s;ion, or idle
phanta&s;ie in the roome of it; the be&s;t method indeed for them af|terward
on as good or the &s;ame proportion of rea&s;on, to advance
the power of the King into the place of the power of the whole
people or Kingdom; it is their own manner of &s;peech and practi&s;e
as &s;ound and good as their own Method, to make &s;uch di&s;tinction
and difference betwixt King and kingdom) what if it &s;hall appear,
time bringing every day truth to light, and perhaps even to there
<PB N="10" REF="7">
men &s;ome <HI>dilucida intervalla,</HI> that there is not the lea&s;t probabilitie,
that the Parliament can have &s;uch a thought of u&s;urpation, as the&s;e
men would impo&s;e or &s;eem to &s;uppo&s;e; much le&s;&s;e was it ever
heard that any free Parliament, actually made any the lea&s;t attempt
to that effect, &s;o far is it, that ever it effected it: Whereas on the
other &s;ide, ill Coun&s;ell about Princes have attempted oft, and <HI>de
facto,</HI> &s;ometimes performed the turning of a well poy&s;ed or tem|pered
Monarchy, into an arbitrarie tyrannicall power and publique
oppre&s;&s;ion; by which change, &s;uch ill in&s;truments appear the onely
gainers; and the malignant &s;pleen &s;wels in a mi&s;erable con&s;umed
bodie, the head not exempt, and yet the very &s;welling a dangerous
di&s;ea&s;e even to the &s;pleen it &s;elf at la&s;t. Unle&s;&s;e &s;uch mon&s;trous
times did priviledge, it were high pre&s;umption to think it were not
all &s;ufficient to &s;top &s;uch mouthes to &s;ay it is a Parliament, and it
were di&s;honourable for it to do as they calumniate, and therefore
not to be imagined. This maxime or ground being no more to be
denied, or que&s;tioned in this Monarchy, then that the earth is round
in naturall Philo&s;ophy, as neer as morrall Philo&s;ophy may arrive at
naturall in point of certitude: though &s;hould we grant them that a
Parliament may erre, nay do wrong to Prince, people, or particu|lars,
yet that would not follow upon this which they would mali|ciou&s;ly
inferre, and ayme at; for none but it &s;elf, or another Parlia|ment
were to correct, or rectifie what a Parliament &s;hould have
done ami&s;&s;e, and not the King or any other per&s;ons any way what|&s;oever,
much le&s;&s;e by force or warre: for he that is allowed to
judge or correct, is allowed thereby at lea&s;t an equall (if equality for
&s;uch an intent can be conceived &s;ufficient po&s;&s;ibly): but &s;uch equa|lity
of power in two di&s;tinct Magi&s;trates (for &s;o we mu&s;t di&s;tingui&s;h
King and Parliament here) of different natures, and touching one
and the &s;ame point or matter in controver&s;ie, cannot be in one and
the &s;ame &s;tate, then &s;uch a corrector mu&s;t be allowed &s;uperiour and
the corrected &s;ubordinate, but &s;uch the King cannot be in our ca&s;e,
as above is partly &s;hewed, and &s;hall be further afterwards. How
then can force or warre on his &s;ide for this cau&s;e be rationall, and
ju&s;t? nay though it &s;hould be but defen&s;ive, much le&s;&s;e if offen&s;ive,
or inferred? Since even bare re&s;i&s;ting the ordinances of the Parlia|ment,
is or pre&s;uppo&s;es an a&s;&s;uming of the &s;upreme power to judge
and condemne, &s;uch re&s;i&s;tance being the execution of the &s;en|tence.</P>
<P><PB N="11" REF="7">
But we &s;hall not carry it away &s;o ea&s;ily that the Parliament will
not be unju&s;t to any, holding &s;uch power, &s;trong temptations of
profit corrupt: too oft, where one, or a few are ordinary Judges;
as a little water &s;tanding &s;ooner is putrified, but multitude of the&s;e
Judges are like the Sea incorruptible: But moneys received, profits
and emoluments accrewing, (it were a &s;hame not without a certain
mixture of pre&s;umption to in&s;i&s;t on &s;uch ba&s;e imputations here,
had not frontle&s;&s;e and mon&s;trous malice been &s;o incredibly auda|cious,
as actually to rai&s;e them) may make a dividend &s;ufficient to
draw to &s;ome uniu&s;t act each man or the maior part of &s;uch a mul|titude,
very likely; and to draw the more matter of profit, we &s;ee
how by frequent orders they invite private cau&s;es; and do they give
any publique account of the moneys they receive from the people,
more then the Malignants could have done for Ship-money? But
we erre; they give publique account: but it is to get credit onely
with the people, that they may be in their &s;ini&s;ter practi&s;es and ma|chinations
the le&s;&s;e &s;u&s;pected, and better &s;erved: But &s;tay; how
can they have ill ends at all on foot or in agitation, &s;ince of all their
particular actions and proceedings, of mo&s;t moment, from time to
time, they by their Declarations, or the like, give no le&s;&s;e then of
the moneys an account to the world, except they be evident of
them&s;elves? Should they do that they cannot give rea&s;on for, but
&s;uch malicious vigilance, as we deal with, when it might in parti|culars
charge them, and article again&s;t them upon truths, would
never be driven to the ba&s;e and mi&s;erable &s;hifts of the&s;e generals, and
the like mo&s;t ridiculous impudent tran&s;parent calumnies for want
of matter to work on; and did not the people &s;ee clearly, they have
rea&s;on, and that their ends are meerly the publique good, it would
de&s;ert them; loo&s;ing patience upon the &s;ence of the pre&s;ent evils,
which (like the &s;ickne&s;&s;e, which, even the be&s;t phi&s;ick, before it
can induce a finall &s;etled &s;tate of health, works in a patient, chiefly
if di&s;orders, during the cure, al&s;o foment the peccant humours)
through the malignant traver&s;es of our Calumniators, both people
and Parliament are of nece&s;&s;itie to pa&s;&s;e through: and were it not
&s;o, though the King cannot di&s;&s;olve the Parliament, yet the people
po&s;&s;ibly might recall their elections in each County, &s;ince the Par|liament
doth but <HI>populo volenti imperare;</HI> which if then it doth not
do, what ever &s;ome few incon&s;iderable and incon&s;iderate particu|lars
may have attempted here and there, it appears the major part
<PB N="12" REF="8">
at lea&s;t approves what pa&s;&s;eth, and that &s;ufficeth: but let us take
heed we traduce not the&s;e traducers; they have a more honourable
conceit of the Parliament: it is not ba&s;e profit onely, but places of
honour, &s;uch as are mentioned in their Propo&s;itions to the King,
or the like they look at, and travail for: but there may be hope,
that the&s;e that direct, correct the Parliament in all things, will here
tell them, that they are out of their way, and that their neare&s;t
way had been to have complied with the King, which &s;eeing the&s;e
would &s;eem to imagine the Parliament &s;o unju&s;t and di&s;honourable
they need not doubt, they would follow: and by this cour&s;e bring|ing
in an arbitrary government; in which ca&s;e (as before is &s;aid)
the ill Coun&s;ellors, e&s;pecially being authors or in&s;truments of the
change, carry away the advantage or the gain, and &s;poyls of the
people, tho&s;e their places would be farre more imperious, ab&s;olute
arbitrary on the oppre&s;&s;ed people (we may in&s;tance in the Starre|chamber)
or more beneficiall, as le&s;&s;e obnoxious to &s;trict &s;yndica|tions,
then they can be the other way, they now hold; in everie re|gard
&s;o accountable; the King in all pre&s;umption like to be eagerly
vigilant over them; and the&s;e Malignants them&s;elves, grown yet
more malicious and venemous, if po&s;&s;ible, by &s;eeing the tables &s;o
turned, and what they have been thus enormou&s;ly wicked to com|pa&s;&s;e,
po&s;&s;e&s;&s;ed by tho&s;e they hate, that may be the in&s;truments to
puni&s;h them for &s;uch their wickedne&s;&s;e; be&s;ides the Parliaments
ever hanging over their heads; and &s;o highly intere&s;ted in the de|meanors
of tho&s;e they have made choice of; and perhaps the next
Parliament may con&s;i&s;t of other Members then this pre&s;ent doth,
and &s;o&punc; as &s;trangers to tho&s;e &s;o cho&s;en, le&s;&s;e &s;ubject to favour them,
if this were any thing to &s;atisfie the in&s;atiate malice of tho&s;e who
under colour of &s;eeming &s;u&s;picious of the integritie of this Parlia|ment,
would through the &s;ides of it, &s;trike at the heart and autho|ritie
of all future Parliaments: &s;o upon the matter, by this cour&s;e
the Parliament now holds in &s;uch their propo&s;itions, the people and
kingdom are like to be the onely gainers, as the&s;e publique mi&s;chiefs
grew from ill Coun&s;ellours and Officers. But have not &s;ome of the
principall Worthies of this Parliament quitted or indangered
places of greater moment (be&s;ides the generall lo&s;&s;e common I fear
to the mo&s;t or all of them through the neglect of their private af|fairs,
while&s;t they are thus wholly taken up with the publique) as
their Countreys confe&s;&s;ors if not Martyrs, then they can any way
<PB N="13" REF="8">
expect by the cour&s;e they hold? are not examples of &s;uch, as &s;uffer|ing
them&s;elves to be taken off from &s;uch &s;ervices (on which they
purpo&s;ely &s;eemed the more &s;harp, that they might be &s;o taken off)
have grown almo&s;t as much in greatne&s;&s;e, thereby, as they lo&s;t in
goodne&s;&s;e, are not &s;uch in&s;tances as vulgar as the &s;pirits that furni&s;h
us with them? More might be &s;aid and much better herein by bet|ter
Judgements, but a weak one may &s;uffice &s;o &s;trong a cau&s;e: there
being good rea&s;on to be &s;hort and &s;light in an argument or point
that could afford no ju&s;t rea&s;on to have begun at all, did not &s;uch
mon&s;ters of men urge it; Le&s;&s;e can it be conceived that hope, in|tention,
or fruition of uncontroulled di&s;&s;olute licentiou&s;ne&s;&s;e or
plea&s;ures, by means of the capacitie they now &s;tand in, or as they
are a Parliament can be a motive to them to continue the power,
or place they have, longer then the publique nece&s;&s;itie or good re|quires,
or convert it to any other u&s;e then it for which they were
and are by the people entru&s;ted with &s;uch power, &s;uppo&s;ing they
were no better then our Calumniators, that where there were a
motive or <HI>cui bono</HI> it would prevail with them to do evill, had in|tention
of &s;uch licentiou&s;ne&s;&s;e been one of the principles that mo|ved
them, what meant they without any nece&s;&s;itie not onely to
give publique &s;ignifications, that they meant to induce a &s;trict re|formation
of manners, but even amid &s;o great and dangerous di|&s;tractions
to begin to &s;et it on foot, not without &s;ome further dan|ger
from tho&s;e that hate it: As for any plea&s;ures they may hereby
pretend, they &s;eeme to be no other then their indeficient and admi|rable
pains, dangers and indignities (let me adde and ba&s;e <HI>ingrati|tudes,</HI>
a ble&s;&s;ed condition to fain teares and dangers that they may
continue in it) their noble con&s;tancie judging <HI>pro Deo &amp; patria dulce
periculum,</HI> for all which whereas it appears they have no earthly re|ward
propounded to them (the like may be &s;aid of all tho&s;e that
adhere to the Parliament) but the con&s;cience of having done nobly
in &s;erving God and their Countrey and defending it, did the King|dome
give what it could afford it were &s;hort of them, and it mu&s;t be
an higher kingdome that can indeed equall them and &s;uch a change
of the kingdome, and no &s;uch as our Malignants would have us
fear, they appear to ayme at and affect; and could they would they
ayme at a tyranny for them&s;elves, what need they have laid &s;uch
a block in their own wayes, as a voluntary oath generally taken for
the con&s;ervation of the Kings ju&s;t authoritie, and &s;o many Decla|rations,
<PB N="14" REF="9">
and publique prote&s;ts to that purpo&s;e, which they de&s;i&s;t not
from upon all occa&s;ions yet to do, when as, had not their re&s;oluti|ons
been thus fixed, divers free late declaring them&s;elves to that ef|fect,
&s;pecially &s;ince matters of difference have arrived at this height,
and the Parliament &s;o &s;trong, and &s;o many other circum&s;tances <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">it|ting,
might have been forborn. But to leap over all the&s;e barres in
imagination (for in Rea&s;on we never can) &s;uppo&s;e the Parliament
may effect a change of the Monarchy, what form of government
could they bring in in&s;tead of it (for they will not &s;ay Anarchie nor
I deny a mixed government, for &s;uch is our Monarchy reduced to
his right temper) <HI>Democracy?</HI> Then through perjury, great inju|&s;tice,
and danger, they pur&s;ue their own ruine: For Democracy
where the people or multitude governs is enemy to the Nobilitie
and Gentrie, whereof chiefly or &s;olely the Parliament con&s;i&s;ts,
bringing all to a parity, and making all men alike in power, or ra|ther
taking away eminent per&s;ons quite, as envious or jealous of
them; whereas &s;uch have priviledges over the vulgar in a ju&s;t Mo|narchy:
What then doth the Parliament affect <HI>Ari&s;tocracy?</HI>
(where the Nobility, or chief govern) but the multitude or people
whom the Parliament hath been charged to court, in which multi|tude
re&s;ides or con&s;i&s;ts the maine &s;trength, and who choo&s;e the
Commons Hou&s;e, and mu&s;t execute chiefly what the Parliament
orders, without which their orders are nothing, after Democracy
or Monarchy before Ari&s;tocracy: And doth not the Parliament
(as above is &s;aid) from time to time give particular accounts of their
actions to the world? doth there appear any previous preparing
the way or di&s;po&s;ing the people for &s;uch a change? which were ne|ce&s;&s;arie,
were it intended? at lea&s;t after &s;o long a time, they would
have begun to carry their de&s;igne outward, and the people having
found it, would more and more have fallen off: but we &s;ee the con|trary,
and the people every day more and more &s;atisfied and a&s;&s;u|red
of the integritie of their intents. But were the two Hou&s;es a
&s;ubject po&s;&s;ibly capable of <HI>Ari&s;tocracy,</HI> would the Lords of the up|per
Hou&s;e concurre to it, which would reduce each of them to a
parity in power with each Member of the Hou&s;e of Commons, as
Democracy would equall them both with the multitude, for unle&s;&s;e
the Lords would loo&s;e by granting this, &s;hould the Commons get
any thing (if this yet be any thing) by this imaginary if po&s;&s;ible
change?) yet how could they continue, or hold it without the con|&s;ent
<PB N="15" REF="9">
of the multitude or people? And &s;hould the people unanimou&s;|ly
concurre to the erecting of this or any other forme of govern|ment,
who &s;hould oppo&s;e it? But how fooli&s;h were it for a people
to feare that which can never be unle&s;&s;e it &s;elfe will? and the Parlia|ment
hath found it a long time &s;trangely infatuated, in&s;en&s;ible, un|willing
to &s;tirre (till time and experience had given too good atte|&s;tation
to the Parliaments next to divine fore&s;ight) even when it
hath made appeare to them their owne rights, liberties, and implo|red
defence: and could the Parliament pre&s;ume to finde them to
concurre actively to an unju&s;t and unrea&s;onable thing, the erecting
a new tyranny, not without great danger over them&s;elves, contra|ry
to the oaths and perpetuall Prote&s;tations of the Parliament.</P>
<P>And the <HI>Scots</HI> in the like occa&s;ion we &s;ee did not bring in any of
the&s;e new governments: nay, were the Parliament po&s;&s;ibly capable
of &s;uch tyranny, yet it being in the hands of &s;uch a multitude, and
that again&s;t the good will of the people, (for &s;o we mu&s;t here &s;up|po&s;e)
they were ea&s;ily divided, and &s;o the tyranny di&s;&s;olved, e&s;pe|cially
there never wanting a minor part contrary to the re&s;t, and
contrarietie being the cau&s;e of di&s;&s;olution&punc; but &s;o were not a tyranny
in the hands of one, and in him e&s;tabli&s;hed by the good will of a po|tent
faction of malignants: unitie which chiefly makes a Monarchy,
duely tempered the be&s;t forme of government (as above was &s;aid)
making the arbitrary or tyranny of one upon the &s;ame rea&s;on, as
the wor&s;t of all, &s;o mo&s;t hardly di&s;&s;olvible.</P>
<P>Wee may adde to all, that this Parliament having pre&s;&s;ed for, and
obtained trienniall Parliaments, whereby their actions, and demea|nours
in this pre&s;ent Parliament, are &s;ubjected to frequent and cer|taine
examens, &s;hould or could they give cau&s;e, and that perhaps by
Parliaments con&s;i&s;ting of other members then the&s;e (not to &s;peake
of other accidents that may procure &s;uch a change) &s;hould the peo|ple
not be &s;atisfied with what the&s;e doe in this pre&s;ent Parliament:
it plainely argues, that out of the clearene&s;&s;e of their intentions, acti|ons,
and con&s;ciences, they are content, nay de&s;ire to leave their acti|ons
to the cen&s;ure of any: their per&s;ons, as concerning future electi|ons,
to the opinion of the people upon their demerits; if the King
plea&s;e not to come among them, and looke to their doings, as they
de&s;ire: If then upon the&s;e rea&s;ons and much more that might be of|fered,
the Parliament cannot have any &s;uch end of e&s;tabli&s;hing in
them&s;elves any arbitrary tyranny, or of their owne private emolu|ment,
<PB N="16" REF="10">
with the hurt of their Countreys; What can their ayme be
all this while but the publique good, the ju&s;t defence and a&s;&s;erting
of their Countreys rights and honour, by the ju&s;t regulating and re|ducing
the Monarchy to the due temper? which is all the change of
the government they &s;eeme to affect (the &s;ame holds in all tho&s;e
that adhere to the Parliament, and in it de&s;ert not them&s;elves) from
which it had e&s;pecially through want of due Parliaments exorbita|ted
&s;o dangerou&s;ly, that had not this like another <HI>Mo&s;es</HI> beene &s;ent
by our gracious God to redeeme or re&s;cue us rather then to defend
us, and that with an out-&s;tretched arme, forcing the malignants to
it, who as they ever &s;hunned it by all meanes, now deadly hate it, as
fearing it, and in that feare confe&s;&s;ing tacitly, that &s;ame politick om|nipotence
of it, which is now a&s;&s;erted, a wor&s;e then <HI>Aegyptian</HI> &s;ervi|tude
in humane probabilitie had overwhelmed us, and con&s;equently
the true principle or end that moves the malignants, cannot be a true
feare of any arbitrary power to be e&s;tabli&s;hed in the Parliament,
though they &s;o pretend, to divert us by fooli&s;hly fearing an imagina|ry
impo&s;&s;ible danger, from looking to and timely oppo&s;ing the true
reall danger imminent and evident, nay to draw us to concurre to
the bringing of it in with our own hands, which is an arbitrary go|vernment
at di&s;cretion, which the malignants them&s;elves would e|&s;tabli&s;h,
and that by a civill warre, to the ruine of all that is precious
with hone&s;t men, or men of honour: They have had &s;uch power
in manner already in their hands; and that which the King is indu|ced
by them to challenge at this pre&s;ent, amounts to no le&s;&s;e in effect
as &s;hall appeare, the Parliament yet in vigour; what then may we
expect if they &s;hould prevaile by force, which now their fallacies and
deluding rea&s;ons are plainely di&s;covered they flie unto: What but
that the Court and Para&s;ites of it, &s;hould wallow and revell in all li|centiou&s;ne&s;&s;e,
luxury, exce&s;&s;e, with pride, avarice, and tyranny pro|portionable,
while&s;t the re&s;t langui&s;h under oppre&s;&s;ion, &s;lavery, po|verty,
di&s;grace, perpetuall indignities or feares, accompted as their
bea<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">s to labour for them, and &s;o mediocritie a State, which the wi|&s;e&s;t
of men prayed for, no where to be found, but a deluge of vices
fro<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter"> co<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">trary cau&s;es, till generall ruine involve altogether; vertue
and the glory of the Nation before extinct. For we mu&s;t not thinke
tha<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter"> the&s;e which love their Countrey &s;o well (for which to doubt
to dye were di&s;honour) that they will not be quiet and &s;it &s;till to
&s;ave it (for this much onely may &s;uffice from the multitude of them,
<PB N="17" REF="10">
the heads and leaders excepted) nay can be content to ruine the glo|ry,
libertie, &s;afetie of it, even with the hazard of their e&s;tates, lives,
honours, &s;oules, &s;o they may in &s;ome proportion &s;hare the &s;poiles of
their Countrey, and grow fat with the bloud and teares of the op|pre&s;&s;ed
people: We mu&s;t not thinke they can doe thus, but to the
end to have greater meanes and power to beget more mon&s;trous in
all villany if it were po&s;&s;ible. The&s;e can fight again&s;t their Countrey
to make them&s;elves &s;laves to a few above them, that the re&s;t of their
oppre&s;&s;ed Countrey may be &s;laves to them, &s;laves of &s;laves: but I
doubt not, but the&s;e mon&s;ters, unle&s;&s;e rea&s;on transforme them, &s;hall
meete with their <HI>Hercule&s;&s;es,</HI> hone&s;t men and men of honour, <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">eady
to die for their Countrey, if need require, judging &s;uch a death infi|nitely
to be preferred before the lives of the chiefe&s;t of the&s;e, &s;hould
they obtaine what they &s;eeke.</P>
<P>But let us end this patheticall flying out, though it be hard for the
inferiour faculties &s;ometimes not to &s;tirre, when the under&s;tanding
&s;omewhat inlightened hath inflamed the will.</P>
<P>On the other &s;ide, &s;o divine a gift as this Parliament thankfully
recognized and made u&s;e of duely, and the ju&s;t power and dignitie
of the Parliament, and therein all our happine&s;&s;e wi&s;ely and man|fully
now once a&s;&s;erted, moderation and mediocritie induced, the
Monarchy duely tempered, may be in humaine probabilitie perpe|tuall,
and all the &s;urfet become Phy&s;icke. And this violent Feaver
of the State having amazed and drawne to an head all the malig|nant
humours before di&s;per&s;ed all over the body, and lying dange|rou&s;ly
hidden, and &s;et on fire, con&s;umed and expelled them (like the
filth of an hou&s;e &s;wept into an heape and burnt) the whole body
may be much clearer &s;ounder and better di&s;po&s;ed, then had not &s;uch
a di&s;temper ever beene.</P>
<P>I hope it appeares already were there no more then the&s;e pre&s;en|ted
weake rea&s;ons to an ordinary rationall man (if far better from o|thers
be too meane for his Maje&s;tie) what way he is to take that all
may be well; and &s;eeing but one &s;ide can be tru&s;ted with the power
of the Kingdome, which of them is mo&s;t unlikely to tyrannize, or
reduce all to arbitrary government, or which will mo&s;t probably u&s;e
it to the publique good onely, or whether in &s;uch extraordinary
times it doe not mo&s;t &s;afely repo&s;e where it is originally, naturally
inherent, <HI>viz.</HI> in the peoples owne hands, and &s;o in the Parliaments:
Nay were the ca&s;e hitherto dubious, yet &s;ince libertie fir&s;t made ap|pointed
<PB N="18" REF="11">
limitted prerogative; for they confine together, as the peo|ple
(in whom is the radicall, primary &s;upreame power, and who
made Kings, not Kings people) thought be&s;t, when it fir&s;t made
choice of, or in&s;tituted this one forme of government among divers
others, which we call Monarchy, and whereof there are &s;undry de|grees
in &s;undry States, &s;ome more &s;ome le&s;&s;e tru&s;ted, or limited, as
the fir&s;t founders plea&s;ed, (els why are they not all equall &s;ince free
and voluntary agents worke or doe onely &s;o much, or &s;o far as they
plea&s;e; and the various &s;ubordinate degrees or kinds of the creatures
prove the divine Maje&s;tie to be <HI>agens liberrimum,</HI> els the creatures
would be all equall: an involuntary or naturall agent (as Philo&s;o|phy
termes it) ever working as much as it can, or to the utmo&s;t ex|tent
or &s;phere of its power and activitie, and &s;o an equalitie in the
effects) &s;ince I &s;ay, libertie or the people fir&s;t created (as I may &s;ay)
Prerogative, and that &s;o tempered, modified, or graduated, as it
thought mo&s;t conducible to its owne happine&s;&s;e (for the &s;upreame
power ever worketh for it &s;elfe rather then for the &s;ubordinate or
inferiour, as being the end; the efficient and finall cau&s;es being here
co-incidents) it is ju&s;t, that this, namely, libertie, judge and give law
to that; and that this, if an unnaturall jarre fall out, gaine and pro|&s;per
rather then the other; and &s;ince the people re&s;erved ever in its
owne hands, and &s;aved to it &s;elfe upon the tru&s;t to the Monarchy,
what priviledges, right of Parliament, or liberties, &amp;c. (parcell of
the originall power naturally in the people, and which may draw
backe to the fountaine the derivative power, as the bloud and &s;pirits
to the heart, when there is cau&s;e) it thought be&s;t, &s;urely it mu&s;t doe
this with purpo&s;e to &s;ee them con&s;erved as &s;afely as may be, and up|on
occa&s;ion to make u&s;e of them and enjoy them, which could not
be &s;urely done without a power re&s;erved to judge of the &s;tate of
them, and when they were to be u&s;ed, and the like, (for if the Prince
be tru&s;ted touching the keeping him&s;elfe within his limits, he may
even as well be tru&s;ted ab&s;olutely without limits:) nor &s;uch power
to judge of them is to any purpo&s;e, as above-&s;aid, without power to
execute what is judged hereupon fit. So the Parliament judgeth in
this ca&s;e as the fir&s;t authour, and &s;uperintendent of the intent, and is
not as a partie to be judged.</P>
<P>Further, were the matter yet dubious, yet &s;eeing the Prote&s;tant
Religion, the power being in the Parliaments hand, is far more out
of the reach of danger then the other way, even without calling his
<PB N="19" REF="11">
Maje&s;ties good meaning into que&s;tion therein, as I hope anon will
appeare it ought to put it out of all que&s;tion, how wee are to range
our &s;elves in the&s;e times. The Parliament having (our ca&s;e &s;o &s;tand|ing)
&s;uch power as is deduced, what&s;oever would &s;eeme to oppo&s;e
that power and &s;tand in their way, as they defend and a&s;&s;ert the pub|lique
good &s;o invaded, mu&s;t be voidable: and u&s;uall ordinary known
lawes or cu&s;tomes made or in u&s;e &s;uppo&s;ing, or while&s;t the Prince
kept duely within his bounds (which the King &s;peakes &s;o much of,
&s;aying, that he will ever governe by them, and hold all to them)
but ever intending the publique good, are no way to bound or tye up
the tran&s;cendent power of the Parliament, when it &s;hall encounter
new and never before heard of exorbitances or inva&s;ions of the pub|lique
good, which the times that made tho&s;e knowne Lawes never
heard of, &s;o never provided again&s;t. But by proportion of rea&s;on this
Parliament may and ought as well provide by new Ordinances or
orders for &s;uch new evills as they encounter, as the former did for
what they then met with: for they had their originall al&s;o <HI>(ex ma|lis
moribus b<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">nae leges)</HI> and had tho&s;e times had &s;uch cau&s;es offered,
as the&s;e have, they would have provided remedies of a nature like
tho&s;e this Parliament hath done, the power and generall intentions
of all times, or the univer&s;all ground being &s;till the &s;ame, that is, to
defend and vindicate, or procure the publique good: and to tye them
to the knowne or old Lawes in this ca&s;e, where the letter might kill,
were irrationall; for &s;o the fir&s;t breaker of the Lawes might take the
priviledge of the Lawes, and advantage of his owne wrong, and un|der
the colours of the Lawes fight again&s;t and overthrow them, or
the rule, rea&s;on, or intention that cau&s;ed them at fir&s;t.</P>
<P>If it be &s;aid, nothing was done by the King of publique con&s;e|quence,
but by advice of the Judges, it may be an&s;wered, that the
Parliament is the onely competent Coun&s;ell &amp; Judge in ca&s;es neere|ly
concerning the publique, and people in generall, which the King
is entru&s;ted upon &s;uch occa&s;ions to call, that the whole people may
not but upon extraordinary cau&s;es be troubled to elect for Parlia|ments,
and attend that &s;ervice: But in &s;uch a ca&s;e as ours by virtue
of the legi&s;lative power re&s;iding in the Parliament it may make new
Ordinances, at lea&s;t for the time, as it &s;ees occa&s;ion and judges to be
in order to that &s;upreame and immutable Law, or Law of Lawes,
and end of them all; <HI>Salus populi &s;uprema lex,</HI> and that power even
of making new Lawes is ever upon the matter in both Hou&s;es of
<PB N="20" REF="12">
Parliament, and that even when the King keepes him&s;elfe within
his due bounds, and is a&s;&s;i&s;tant in Parliament (how much more then,
as before is &s;hewed, if he &s;hall by exorbitating dangerou&s;ly bring
him&s;elfe within the compa&s;&s;e of our ca&s;e?) and that the Kings con|&s;ent
to what the Parliament propounds to him, to be enacted for
Law, ought not to be denyed, may appeare by comparing this fol|lowing
part of the Oath, which the Kings of <HI>England</HI> at their Coro|nation
take, or ought to take, cited in the Remon&s;trance of the
26^t^h of <HI>May, in haec verba: Concedis ju&s;tas leges, &amp; con&s;uetudines e&s;&s;e
tenendas, &amp; permittis per te eas e&s;&s;e protegendas, &amp; ad honorem Dei corro|borandas
quas vulgus elegerit &s;ecundum vires tuas? Re&s;pondebit (Rex)
Permitto, &amp; concedo.</HI> Comparing this part of the Oath with the
clau&s;e of the preamble of a Statute there al&s;o cited, intimating that
the King is bound by his oath to remedy by Law &s;uch inconvenien|ces,
as the Kingdome may &s;uffer in the future, as well as to keepe
and protect Lawes already in being; for then either tho&s;e Latine
words here cited, or &s;ome part of them, and that the latter, namely,
<HI>Quas vulgus elegerit,</HI> are to be under&s;tood of Lawes futurely to be
made, or el&s;e it cannot be &s;hewed by what part of the Oath, as the
&s;aid preamble affirmes, the King is bound by Law to remedy the
mi&s;chiefs that happen from time to time to his Realme. Nor will
the Lawes of Grammer, or u&s;e of &s;peech, or cu&s;tome of phra&s;e tole|rate,
that, <HI>Elegerit,</HI> without the conjunction, <HI>Si,</HI> or the like prece|ding,
or regulating it (though we pa&s;&s;e not by uncon&s;idered the rude
&s;peaking of tho&s;e times) can ever be taken for <HI>Elegit,</HI> the preter|perfect
ten&s;e: but as it &s;tands in the fore-cited place, mu&s;t of nece&s;&s;i|tie
participate a future nature, and &s;ignifie preci&s;ely, <HI>&s;hall have cho&s;en;</HI>
that is, that the King a&s;&s;umeth to confirme &s;uch Lawes, as the peo|ple
&s;hall have cho&s;en; it being to be conceived, that the people, or
Parliament fir&s;t among&s;t them&s;elves, mu&s;t have debated of, cho&s;en
and agreed upon them, before they pre&s;ent them to the King to be
confirmed. Be&s;ides, if tho&s;e cited words, <HI>Et permittis per te e&s;&s;e pro|tegendas,
&amp; ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas populus elegerit,</HI> &s;hould
not referre to future elections, but to pa&s;t onely, they were &s;uperflu|ous
and vaine: the words precedent, <HI>Concedis ju&s;tas leges &amp; con&s;uc|tudines
e&s;&s;e tenendas</HI> (which pre&s;uppo&s;e nece&s;&s;arily, and cannot be un|der&s;tood
without a precedent election and con&s;ent of the people to
them) expre&s;&s;ing &s;ufficiently Lawes and cu&s;tomes elected, already
confirmed and in u&s;e. And the Kings an&s;wer to the&s;e cited words,
<PB N="21" REF="12">
being <HI>bimembris,</HI> or two-fold, <HI>Concedo &amp; permitto</HI> (all the other an|&s;wers
of the King to the other Que&s;tions in the Oath, cited in the
&s;aid Remon&s;trance, becau&s;e the que&s;tions are meerely &s;imple and
&s;ingle, conteined in one word only, as to one que&s;tion onely; <HI>Servabo</HI>
to another onely; <HI>faciam</HI> being al&s;o &s;ingle, and in one word) argues
the que&s;tion to be double, as is &s;aid. And that the King is not bound
onely in generall thus to remedy the particular wayes or meanes left
to his choice; &s;ee the &s;aid Remon&s;trance, <HI>folio</HI> 8. which ought to
have it &s;elfe &s;ufficed without &s;uch poore gleanings, as the&s;e, or the
like: If then by the&s;e and other better rea&s;ons which others have
pre&s;ented, the Parliament hath &s;uch a legi&s;lative power, even where
the King di&s;chargeth his office, as upon the matter to make &s;uch
Lawes as it judgeth be&s;t for the publique good; where through the
prevalence of ill men about him, it is not done, but the contrary,
and &s;o the danger is from him, &s;hall not power be in them to make
new Ordinances, or provi&s;ionall Lawes, for the timely remedying
&s;uch publique mi&s;chiefs, at lea&s;t for the time, and to &s;u&s;pend &s;ome of
tho&s;e in being, if they judge fit? How much more then to judge of,
declare, or interpret tho&s;e that &s;eeme dubious, ranging and making
all to be &s;ub&s;ervient to the &s;upreame Law <HI>Salus populi,</HI> the rule and
rea&s;on of all Lawes, as was ever intended at the making of all parti|cular
Lawes. Hath not even the Lord Chancellour a little touch of
&s;uch a power upon the Common Law? What then may we thinke
a Parliament hath, and that when the very publique is in danger?
And if the whole people unanimou&s;ly con&s;enting, upon a Princes
not performing what he is bound unto, may po&s;&s;ibly change the ve|ry
forme of that limitted government, which it fir&s;t in&s;tituted, how
much more may it con&s;erve or defend that temper or kinde of go|vernment,
which it hath erected by regulating the enormities of
the Prince, by maintaining and holding what they have re&s;erved
out of that which was all theirs at the fir&s;t, or their owne rights?
How many degrees then are they off from being bound to become
them&s;elves the in&s;truments to overthrow them? how &s;trongly are
they bound to the contrary? And indeed were not the Parliament
the &s;upreame Judge in all the &s;aid que&s;tions, or of like nature, (if we
may call it a Parliament at all, not having this power) it could not
po&s;&s;ibly &s;ave the people, when ill men prevailing upon the King
would oppre&s;&s;e it; for while they carry on by degrees, and mature
by little and little &s;uch their my&s;ticall and pernicious de&s;ignes (which
<PB N="22" REF="13">
mu&s;t be met with betimes in &s;uch tender and jealous matters, be|fore
they advance and grow &s;trong, when caution comes too late,
and oppo&s;ition out of &s;ea&s;on doth but exa&s;perate and increa&s;e the
evill) they will cau&s;e the King by fit in&s;truments for the purpo&s;e, to
pronounce, judge, or interpret each &s;uch degree or gaining a new
and further point, &s;till lawfull, and not &s;ubject to que&s;tion, how|ever
dangerous to the people in it &s;elf, and of wor&s;e con&s;equence, till
the my&s;terie at la&s;t unmask, and all be de&s;perate.</P>
<P>It may be &s;uperadded, that &s;hould the Parliament be more jea|lous
of the Prince then there were rea&s;on, (which yet as I hope hath
appeared is not to be imagined of the wi&s;dom and Ju&s;tice of the
Parliament) yet it were the farre le&s;&s;e evill, that the Prince, being
but for the people, &s;hould &s;omewhat &s;uffer by &s;uch the Parliaments
jealou&s;ie (which were but <HI>peccare in meliorem, &amp; &s;ecuriorem partem)</HI>
then that by the Parliaments too much &s;ecurity and beleeving in the
Prince, the people or whole kingdome &s;hould be endangered, or op|pre&s;&s;ed
for who&s;e good they both are ordeined, as means for the
end: Be&s;ides that the authority and politique infallibilitie of the
Parliament mu&s;t be by all that love their Countrey, not blemi&s;hed
but held &s;acred and inviolate, as &s;upreame. The King indeed &s;aith
he will defend and maintain, the Laws, Liberties, properties of Sub|jects,
ju&s;t priviledges of Parliament, but even in &s;aying this he &s;eems
to violate them, if the thereby a&s;&s;ume the &s;upreame Judgement of
them to him&s;elf, which, as already partly hath appeared, and fur|ther
hereafter may do, cannot be; Admit this Trojan hor&s;e into
your walls, allow this, all of them may ea&s;ily re&s;olve into nothing.
Con&s;ider well, what Judgement hath been made of the Laws, the
libertie, the property of the Subject, before this Parliament, while&s;t
a future Parliament was doubted and feared, and therefore kept off
as long as the&s;e Malignants could, (but their fear and hate &s;hews
what we ought ardently to de&s;ire, and love) while&s;t &s;o many Mo|nopolies,
Loane, Conduct, Coat, Ship-money, and the like grie|vances
were brought upon us (our per&s;ons not going Scotfree) as
con&s;i&s;ting well, and compatible with our laws, liberties, properties,
and adjudged lawfull, which yet what did they, or ere long going
on at lea&s;t would they have wanted of making them all meerly at
di&s;cretion, plea&s;ure, and will, the meer names of &s;uch things remai|ning,
and u&s;ed indeed, as Trophees of their Conque&s;t, and monu|ments
of our <HI>quondam</HI> felicity, and at lea&s;ure to be lamented folly
<PB N="23" REF="13">
and eternall &s;hame. The danger of our Religion is not forgotten,
becau&s;e not ranked in mention with the re&s;t, it &s;hall have a better
place by it &s;elf, as a Queen &s;itting alone.</P>
<P>The Judgement made of priviledges of Parliament during this
Parliament &s;eem to have come little &s;hort of the Judgements made
of our liberties, properties, &amp;c. and if it be duely weighed. Fir&s;t,
that they will have the King to be judge of them, then what Judge|ment
hath been lately made, both in fact and in words, or Declara|tions
of them, a man meanly penetrant will find them re&s;olved by
the po&s;itions of the&s;e Malignants into next to nothing: and all this
while the Parliament was and is in vigour, vindicates, and a&s;&s;erts
them, and likely to call the&s;e men to account, what will they make
of them, &s;hould they through the authority, and reputation of this
Parliament, which is the e&s;&s;ence of it, peirce at once the heart of all
future: for a Parliament not free were no Parliament, and if the
King be allowed judge of priviledges of Parliament, where any new
ca&s;e happens which may touch the very e&s;&s;ence of it (if it be any
thing el&s;e then the priviledges) will it not come to this, that the
Judges he appoints, or rather &s;uch in&s;truments, as the Malignants
about him plea&s;e to &s;et over us, &s;hall upon the matter judge the
Parliament, which is to Judge their Judges, making it and the Laws
what they plea&s;e, and to re&s;train the power and freedome of it, as of
the Laws, as they think fit; whereupon would follow even the
&s;ame inconveniences, which were before mentioned, &s;uppo&s;ing the
King the &s;upreame Judge of the Laws, namely, that the Parliament
&s;hould be di&s;enabled to defend the people, or indeed it &s;elf if incroa|ched
on, or oppre&s;&s;ed upon the &s;ame rea&s;ons in that place expre&s;&s;ed.
But it &s;eems more rationall, that &s;ince the Parliament is to be Judge
of the Laws (as is above &s;hewed) nay even may make them, at lea&s;t
in &s;ome ca&s;es; it may judge as well of its own priviledges: neither
appears it in the Kings power to make them, what he plea&s;es, &s;ave
onely thus: if he doth not exorbitate, nor innovate any thing a|gain&s;t
them, neither can the Parliament de&s;ire any alteration of
them in any point, betwixt it and the King, concerning them. But
in ca&s;e of extraordinarie emergents of never-before-heard of at|tempts
on his part, whither by any verball declaration, or by fact,
whereby the priviledges, authority or very being (for it may trou|ble
a good School-man to di&s;tingui&s;h clearly betwixt the&s;e three)
it &s;elf of the Parliament is indangered, it is rea&s;on, that the privi|ledges
<PB N="24" REF="14">
now become any thing that the Parliament judges fit for the
con&s;ervation of it &s;elf. For the maine end and intent of the fir&s;t,
ancient, ordinary, and u&s;uall priviledges of Parliament, being to
enable, and qualifie it for the due attending, defending or advancing
the publique good (for which purpo&s;e they were judged &s;ufficient
by the fir&s;t In&s;titutors, not &s;u&s;pecting &s;uch new inva&s;ions, or at|tempts
on them, or on Parliaments as &s;ince have happened in more
corrupted times, but thinking them rather &s;ecure, as part of the
Laws, or cu&s;tomes which Kings are bound to keep inviolate) why
&s;hould not the &s;ame end and intent, which ever remains in equall
force, immortall, and immovable, work and move, as well to the
in&s;tituting even of new ones, if new cau&s;es happen, and without
&s;uch new ones the Parliament &s;hall remain di&s;enabled to procure
the publique good, for which it was ordained? and if the Parliament
may in extraordinarie times as now make new Ordinances for the
con&s;ervation of the people, it may make (if need require) new Or|dinances
or Priviledges (which are but the private Laws of or con|cerning
the Parliament) for its own con&s;ervation, without which
they cannot defend or con&s;erve the people; and in vain had it power
to make new Ordinances upon new occa&s;ions for the publique
good, if it have no inherent power to make new priviledges or or|dinances
upon new emergent dangers to &s;ave it &s;elf, <HI>Po&s;&s;e</HI> naturally
and nece&s;&s;arily pre&s;uppo&s;ing <HI>E&s;&s;e,</HI> as grounded on it; <HI>Qui dat finem,
dat nece&s;&s;aria ad finem:</HI> the priviledges being to defend and main|tain
the Parliament as the Laws the people, and as <HI>Salus populi</HI> is <HI>lex
&s;uprema,</HI> as before, &s;o it may as well be &s;aid, <HI>Salus Parliamenti &s;u|premum
privilegium.</HI> If it may work new, it may much more inter|pret,
declare, and judge of the old on occa&s;ion; and are no more to
be held to the old, u&s;uall, known, priviledges, when new extraordi|narie
attempts, or affronts happen, then to the old known Laws
onely in the ca&s;e above &s;poken of, and upon the &s;ame ground and
analogy of rea&s;on. And here we are fallen unawares on the old Lord
Trea&s;urer <HI>Burleigh,</HI> who we need not &s;ay was a great State&s;man,
who was wont to &s;ay, <HI>He knew not what a Parliament might not do:</HI>
not much unlike the Archbi&s;hop <HI>Bancroft</HI> (a great State&s;man) who
would tremble (as is &s;aid) at the mention of a Parliament, as know|ing,
or rather not knowing the power of it; and had not they both
taken the word <HI>Parliament</HI> in our acception, they had told us no
news. It is one effect of ill Coun&s;ell about a Prince (in the con&s;e|quence
<PB N="25" REF="14">
&s;omtimes better then in their intentio~) to mini&s;ter occa&s;ions
to the people by inva&s;ion of their rights, to look narrowly into the
nature of the Princes prerogative, when by the power of truth, it oft
loo&s;eth of the former reputation (which liberty gains): a more dubi|ous
light &s;etting it of better, and ignorance begetting here devotion,
and admiration, of what is unknown; &amp; hence it is perhaps, that in
the&s;e times as more polite and penetrant, then many former ages,
Prerogative is &s;aid generally to loo&s;e in Chri&s;tendome, the better
thus fortified again&s;t the &s;o great, and growing danger from the
Common enemy the Turke, and other great <HI>Mahometan</HI> Princes
the great bulwark of Chri&s;tendome, <HI>Germany,</HI> now &s;o torne the
more requiring it) by &s;o maine a di&s;parity in matter of liberty (the
Mahometans u&s;ing their Subjects, as their bea&s;ts, or &s;laves) as well
as of Religion. But to our way from this Digre&s;&s;ion. We may from
this place take a pro&s;pect another way into the plot of the&s;e Malig|nants;
being by a crew of our own Nation but unnaturalized, part|ly
not penetrating their deluding pretences by rea&s;on, as naturally
&s;imple, partly having their under&s;tandings debauched by a will in|&s;tantly
&s;olicited, or over-ruled by enormous affections, and pa&s;&s;ions:
which &s;econd kind may con&s;titute a middle degree between malice
and &s;imple ignorance (might this &s;imple tractate gain one of the
fir&s;t &s;ort, the pains taken were a plea&s;ure, but &s;hould it hope to win
one of the &s;econd degree, this pre&s;umption might make bare par|don
too much for it.) There is a third &s;ort in whom their under|&s;tandings
and con&s;ciences though having perfect light and cleerly
di&s;cerning the truth, and right, yet are like &s;laves forced, and drag|ged
by a Diabolicall will (affections in this degree not mentioned,
as arguing gro&s;&s;e carnality, or corporealne&s;&s;e: but the&s;e are <HI>&s;piritua|les
nequitiae)</HI> by &s;uch a &s;ociety, while&s;t they &s;peciou&s;ly pretend to de|fend
priviledges of Parliament, Laws of the Land, liberty, property
of the Subject, &amp;c. but whereof the King mu&s;t be &s;upreame Judge
(for in this point lyeth all the my&s;tery, and <HI>Cabala)</HI> through this
mortall wound of the authority and e&s;&s;ence of the Parliament, the
true, and onely Judge, and con&s;equently defender of them all (as
above is &s;hewed) to &s;trike the heart of them all, leaving us onely
<HI>tenues umbrae,</HI> or <HI>manes,</HI> or apparitions of them, to pur&s;ue, di&s;tract
and torment us, as acce&s;&s;aries to the murder, or rather principals
(&s;ince no acce&s;&s;ary in Trea&s;on) if we pa&s;&s;ively concurre, much more
if we help to act it, thus the matter being di&s;po&s;ed they may intro|duce
<PB N="26" REF="15">
the form (the perfection of the work) and the &s;tate at their di&s;|cretion,
and the way of the Lord Pope prepared, and his crooked
paths made &s;traight, they may ea&s;ily bring him in, as after we may
endeavour to &s;hew.</P>
<P>But if the plot &s;eem not deep enough laid, as &s;uppo&s;ing and ho|ping
at home &s;o many mon&s;ters, and vipers (though the fewerneed|ed,
the &s;ound partie of <HI>England</HI> and <HI>Scotland</HI> already di&s;tracted by
the <HI>Iri&s;h</HI> Rebellion to that end if not at fir&s;t rai&s;ed, yet &s;undrie waies
fomented by them) then perhaps to peice it from abroad; and by
cutting the banks of the kingdom to let in a deluge of forrein forces,
and &s;o yet further &s;ubdi&s;tract the remnant; if we conceive the Fleet
of <HI>Spaniards,</HI> &s;een not long &s;ince at the Downs, carried any my&s;te|rie,
or came not un&s;ent for, or moved not to no end, or <HI>Hull</HI> &s;o eat|ne&s;tly
made at, <HI>Newcastle, Port&s;mouth,</HI> &amp;c. &s;ignifie any thing; which
though intended to di&s;tract <HI>England,</HI> and ruine it, may rather (open|ing
our eyes, and di&s;abu&s;ing us) by Gods over-ruling unite it as in a
common cau&s;e again&s;t an univer&s;all and evident danger, not to
&s;peak now of other matters judicating the &s;ame. And they intend|ing
in <HI>England</HI> a government at di&s;cretion, and all made in all pro|babilitie,
or after the <HI>French</HI> fa&s;hion; if the middle &s;ort of people of
<HI>England,</HI> and Y comanry, of whom chiefly con&s;i&s;t the trained bands,
and wont to be a maine &s;trength of our victorious Armies, can by
no &s;ubtilties be drawn to their party, then by policy, or even plain
force to di&s;arme them, &s;u&s;pecting as they have good cau&s;e that
the&s;e, if once they be unhoodwinkt, will e&s;pecially oppo&s;e the
change as whereby they from being in the happie&s;t condition of
any of their rank perhaps in <HI>Europe,</HI> nay in the world (who here live
like men, and are wont to fight, or die like men in honour or de|fence
of their Countrey) might well be reduced to the termes of the
Pea&s;ants of <HI>France,</HI> of villenage, and &s;lavery: a fit recompence for
their danger and pains &s;hould they fight and labour to bring it in.
As for the &s;cum of the people they judge it either &s;encele&s;&s;e, or care|le&s;&s;e
of the publique, and de&s;iring a change, or ea&s;ily drawn, where
there is hope of greater &s;poil, and pillage. We may place &s;o much
the more below this &s;cum many of the greater &s;ort, that &s;tand for
the&s;e Malignants again&s;t the truth and right (every day more and
more p<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">in<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">y convincing them) and again&s;t their Countrey by how
much they owe to it more then the Ra&s;cality doth, yet appear to be
drawn with hope of &s;poil, and pillage in their degree and propor|tion
<PB N="27" REF="15">
as much or more then the Ra&s;cality it &s;elf.</P>
<P>But thought it be &s;o with the State, is our Religion in danger that
way al&s;o? why el&s;e are the Papi&s;ts &s;o active, &s;o bu&s;ie? is it onely
that they may be &s;laves? but in a politick way onely u&s;e may be
made of them, and of their power, without any intent to &s;ymbolize
with them in their religion, as &s;ometimes hath been done in other
Countreys. Be it &s;o (though it be not good to be prodigall and fa|cile
in our grants which our religion may pay for) yet taking it this
way, &s;o great a &s;ervice &s;o &s;ea&s;onable at &s;uch a pinch (when all good
Subjects, and judicious hone&s;t men fail them) received from the
Papi&s;t, mu&s;t draw on in way of gratefull acknowledgement, &s;ome
favour at lea&s;t &s;ome advantage, which cannot be but at as much dan|ger,
and di&s;advantage of the religion (not to in&s;i&s;t how hardly they
will lay down their Armes once taken up, and victorious, or the
King be able to make good his faith, or word). And are not they
the fitte&s;t and &s;ure&s;t meanes to con&s;erve a State, that have been
thought and found &s;uch for the acquiring? But be this as it may it is
clear, that can the Papi&s;t bring the matter to an ab&s;olute, and arbi|trary
government, and render the prerogative immen&s;e and even
divine, they gaine a maine point on our religion, for then between
them and the heaven of their de&s;ires, there were interpo&s;ed but the
turning of one will, and that one alreadie prepared, di&s;po&s;ed and in|clined
to them by &s;uch meritorious &s;upererogatory &s;ervice, and
further propitiated by the &s;o &s;trong interce&s;&s;ions (how &s;trong (to
&s;peak like tho&s;e we have to do with) when u&s;ed by her that may in
&s;omethings even command) our &s;overaigne Ladie <HI>Mary.</HI> (I had
rather &s;eem to &s;ome a little too much tyed to &s;ence onely, and to
the pre&s;ent times we yet live in, when I pre&s;umed to u&s;e that phra&s;e:
turn, or change of one will; then with others, by the ab&s;traction of
a potent imagination, found worthy to have been rapt into the glo|rie
of tho&s;e times, in &s;tead of change of will: to have u&s;ed a phra&s;e
or &s;ence &s;eeming to &s;uch more orthodox, terming it rather an ex|ternall
manife&s;tation and declaration onely to us here below of that
which was ever from the beginning prede&s;tinated internally &s;ince
in Gods no reall change nor &s;hadow of change) but the other way
a whole Parliament at lea&s;t mu&s;t be fir&s;t turned, and that in Diame|trall
oppo&s;ition with the Papi&s;t, and &s;hould forreign Force come in
by Port&s;mouth, Plymouth, or Falmouth (what if we adde <HI>Ireland?)</HI>
to induce Tyranny, Religion runs equall hazard with the State.
<PB N="28" REF="16">
And it may be, the Kings forces running lately with &s;o &s;trong bias
&s;o eagerly at <HI>Banbury, Warwicke, Coventry, &amp;c.</HI> e&s;teemed mo&s;t op|po&s;ite
indeed to the Papi&s;t, though perhaps not otherwi&s;e direct to
the fir&s;t, or maine mark for the pre&s;ent, of the&s;e Malignants, may
judicate and argue, without any &s;ophi&s;try, a pre&s;ent complication
of the di&s;ea&s;e, and the duplicity of the de&s;igne, and danger: or if
not a pre&s;ent e&s;&s;ence of a double di&s;ea&s;e, yet a dangerous maladie
now in being alreadie, but breaking out into a &s;ymptome more to
be taken heed of then the very di&s;ea&s;e, and depending on it: But
they object, our Religion is on the other hand more indangered by
Browni&s;me, Anabapti&s;me, &amp;c. &s;uppo&s;e this true, and that the&s;e
&s;hould get &s;trength, nay prevail with the Parliament (which it is
charged to promote upon as likely, as &s;trong, and even the &s;ame
grounds, as it is to affect the change of the Monarchy, yet as we
&s;aid of we know not what new form of government, &s;uppo&s;ing ri|diculou&s;ly
the Parliament did introduce it, it were ea&s;ily di&s;&s;olvible;
&s;o ob&s;cure Browni&s;me or Anabapti&s;me were much more ea&s;ily
ma&s;tered, and redre&s;&s;ed, then mo&s;t politick, potent, all over bearing
Papi&s;try, likely to be backed with forreigne force, which I think
none will &s;ay is to be feared from tho&s;e other &s;carce known, weak,
poore Sects, who&s;e ob&s;curity, and paucity, hides rather and exempts
from animadver&s;ion, and would the Parliament attempt this
(though we might ju&s;tly refu&s;e to di&s;pute with tho&s;e that denie
principles in this kingdoms policie, calling &s;till in que&s;tion the wi&s;|dom,
Ju&s;tice and honour of Parliaments) could it ever effect it
without the peoples concurring? Papi&s;try &s;o increa&s;ed at home, &s;o
countenanced might (if it doth not already with their good friends
help in <HI>Ireland,</HI> and el&s;ewhere hope to force entrance). How fooli&s;h
then is it for the people to fear that, which can never take effect,
unle&s;&s;e it &s;elf will have it &s;o? (I fall unawares upon the &s;ame an&s;wer
here u&s;ed before touching the &s;uppo&s;ed change of the State, becau&s;e
the fal&s;e grounds they would &s;eem to go on here, and there &s;eeming
the &s;ame) and if the whole kingdom or people will have it &s;o there
is no oppo&s;ing. But hath not the Parliament taken a voluntarie
Oath (be&s;ides &s;o many publique Prote&s;tations, and other obligati|ons
to us, the <HI>Scots,</HI> and the States of the Low Countreys) for the
maintenance of the Prote&s;tant Religion, which they are too wi&s;e,
and ju&s;t needle&s;ly to have done, and &s;o &s;hould they do otherwi&s;e to
incurre mo&s;t ju&s;tly univer&s;all falling of, or rather falling on them,
<PB N="29" REF="16">
had they had any intent ever to have done, as the&s;e would &s;eeme
to fear, to direct us here al&s;o from looking at the true fear and dan|ger,
nay to draw us with our own hands to pull it on us; we may &s;u|peradde,
that the voluntary oaths of &s;uch a multitude as the Parlia|ment
on whom no &s;u&s;pition at all can fa&s;ten, of inclining to that re|ligion,
which takes upon it to di&s;pence with oaths and equivocati|ons,
and thereby with the Law of God, Nature and Nations (which
intended to advance it, will by Gods ju&s;tice advance the ruine of it)
are better &s;ecurity, then our Malignants have or can give us on the
other &s;ide, the Antithe&s;is in each part inquired into duely as the
&s;ubject well de&s;erves.</P>
<P>But the&s;e men would here al&s;o take benefit of their own wrong,
according to their u&s;uall method (it may appear what corre&s;pon|dence,
or good intelligence the maine dangers of our Religion and
State &s;till hold mutually, or how they re&s;emble). Nece&s;&s;ity of the
State, nay of the very pre&s;ervation of it &s;elf (whereof the&s;e Ob|jectors
are manife&s;tly the authors) may ju&s;tly and too evidently
doth compell the Parliament to the &s;etling of Religion, (though
the end of policy and however fir&s;t in e&s;teeme and intention, yet
not &s;o in the time of execution alwayes) after the ordering of poli|tick
affairs; and in &s;uch de&s;perate times as the&s;e, not to do this, were
but a &s;acrifice without &s;alt, a fooli&s;h &s;uper&s;tition (like that of the
Jews, who would rather &s;it &s;till, and &s;o &s;uffer them&s;elves to be cut
in pieces by the capitall enemies of their State and Religion, (con|trary
to <HI>David</HI> who in nece&s;&s;itie &s;pared not the very Shewbread)
who maliciou&s;ly invaded them purpo&s;ely at &s;uch a time) then arme
or fight upon &s;uch nece&s;&s;itie on their Sabbath; Which they com|plain
the Parliament will not now do; which &s;hould it now, one
ruine might involve both Church and State both at once: yet hath
it not altogether, even &s;uch times notwith&s;tanding, left it &s;elf with|out
&s;ome te&s;timony of their good intentions herein, as particular
Acts or Orders of theirs do &s;hew to the world; but the attempts,
and facts of the Malignants, evident to all men apologize too well
for the Parliament in this point without any words from any man,
if we weigh the de&s;perate e&s;tate of publicke affaires well in the&s;e
times, cau&s;ed by the malice of the&s;e Mon&s;ters; which times forcing
us for a while to content our &s;elves with an implicite, or generall
faith, as touching the ordering, reforming, or &s;etling of other par|ticulars
concerning Religion, which cannot for the &s;aid nece&s;&s;arie
<PB N="30" REF="17">
rea&s;ons and the like&punc; be yet effected; yet we have, be&s;ides many o|ther
raducements obvious enough to confirm &s;uch implicite faith,
this al&s;o that of &s;uch ordering and &s;etling the&s;e matters, as is to be
wi&s;hed, there is farre greater hope, and pre&s;umption <HI>(caeteris pari|bus)</HI>
from tho&s;e Divines, that preach and cry down the temporall
greatne&s;&s;e, pride, riches, avarice, &amp;c. of the Clergy, and &s;o all their
own hopes and preten&s;ions that way, and con&s;equently from the
Parliament, which we &s;ee countenanceth &s;uch men, then from the
contrary &s;ide: that profe&s;&s;ing likewi&s;e in a &s;peciall manner and de|gree,
mortification, contempt and renouncing of the world, and of
the glory, greatne&s;&s;e, and pomp of it, humility and the like (as
minding heavenly matters, and things above) as principles of the
Doctrine and Religion they pre&s;&s;e upon us, yet are not a&s;hamed to
appear to the world inve&s;ted (through various my&s;teries of iniqui|tie)
with &s;o great a &s;hare of what&s;oever the mo&s;t worldly men
(who&s;e highe&s;t contemplations a&s;cend not to the Moon) compo&s;e
their Trinity of, as may enable the&s;e men thus crucified, and dead
to the world by their own earthly power, greatne&s;&s;e, authoritie (not
to in&s;i&s;t on that kind which they have in our times, attempted to
render, in &s;ome points, or ca&s;es at lea&s;t, independent of the crown
and ab&s;olute; and which earthly greatne&s;&s;e, rather then the Parlia|ment
&s;hall que&s;tion, or regulate, they will que&s;tion and condemne
the Parliament, and advance a Civill Warre, or forreigne inva&s;ion,
to the evident danger of a generall ruine, and abomination of de&s;o|lation
of their Countrey, nay Church it &s;elf, which the&s;e hypocrites
would &s;eem to &s;tand for) as may enable them, I &s;ay, by their own
temporall potency (which in the hand of &s;uch men becomes more
dreadfull, then any &s;pirituall power they exerci&s;e) &s;ufficiently to
keep in awfull &s;ilence, if not to bring into a kind of Inqui&s;tion,
&s;uch as mo&s;t heretically &s;hall not captivate and &s;ubdue their under|&s;tanding
and rea&s;on under &s;o &s;trong a faith, as to beleeve, that the&s;e
chief ones (who ought to be mo&s;t eminent of all in practi&s;ing the
&s;aid principles of renouncing the world, humility, mortification,
&amp;c. which they recommend, command, and enjoyn, as Leaders
and Captains for all that &s;hould follow them on &s;o difficult &s;ervices)
can yet practice and pur&s;ue, I &s;ay, &s;o ardently, &s;o de&s;perately the
clean contrary, &s;o as if they would have others quit the world,
onely that them&s;elves might &s;ei&s;e <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">t; and yet thus by their deeds
drawing into &s;u&s;pition, doubt, im&s;pri&s;ion with multitudes of men,
<PB N="31" REF="17">
nay, even con&s;uting their Doctrine, not be a maine cau&s;e of the
mi&s;eries and calamities of the world, while&s;t deluges of &s;inne and
wickedne&s;&s;e, and pernicious con&s;equences breake in at this &s;o great
an overture of the faith, thus di&s;countenanced, and di&s;credited, and
even called in que&s;tion; will not many incline rather to beleeve,
that this practice, this doctrine, &s;o de&s;tructive one to the other, is
&s;owing their feilds with mingled &s;eed, wearing a garment mingled
with woollen and linnen, &s;o for bidden in the Mo&s;aike Law? That
&s;uch a ridiculous un&s;uitablenes between &s;uch profe&s;&s;ion &amp; doctrine,
&s;uch practi&s;e and deeds, is rather a mockery of the world. Will they
not like one <HI>Cicero</HI> &s;peaks of, wonder <HI>cur aru&s;pex videns ri&s;um teneret?</HI>
Though the <HI>Mahumetan</HI> &s;ect be gro&s;&s;e, and carnall, and the <HI>Mahu|metans</HI>
them&s;elves exceeding devout in their kinds, and &s;uper&s;titious,
having their Church-men in great reverence, diver&s;e of them rich
and pro&s;u&s;e otherwi&s;e in works they conceive any way pious and
charitable, and though otherwi&s;e the Nation very covetous, yet I
thinke it will not be ea&s;ie to &s;hew that their chiefe Church-men in
generall, in any temporall greatne&s;&s;e or riches, doe not much rather
re&s;emble the mendicant Orders among the Papi&s;ts (did they hold
them&s;elves to their Rules) then the Papi&s;ticall or our Prelates and
chiefe Clergy-men, who yet profe&s;&s;e them&s;elves Leaders in &s;o &s;piri|tuall,
&s;o heavenly, and &s;ublime, &s;o world-renouncing a way, faith
and doctrine. It is true the Turki&s;h Muphty or chiefe Prie&s;t, is by
the grand Turke, partly to plea&s;e the people, in &s;hew and &s;hadow
greatly honoured; not perhaps without a competency in revenue,
but I take it hereabouts their devotion of any note this way ends.
As for any temporall greatne&s;&s;e and riches the Me&s;aicall Clergie
might have, wee are taught, the&s;e were rather gro&s;&s;e and &s;en&s;ible
Types, then any thing el&s;e, of the &s;pirituall eminency, graces, en|dowments,
and power, that ought to &s;hine in the &s;ublime and hea|venly
Antitype; whence their true authoritie with the people and
reverence, and even veneration to their doctrine, places and per&s;ons
mu&s;t &s;low, con&s;erved, encrea&s;ed by ever con&s;tant and invincible re|jections
of the lea&s;t not nece&s;&s;ary temporall matter, if pre&s;&s;ed on
them, as an high di&s;honour, or affront offered to di&s;credit them,
a bribe to corrupt them in the execution of their Emba&s;&s;age, a baite
to entrap them and fru&s;trate the &s;ervice they are &s;ent about, a temp|tation
of pernicious con&s;equence, nay, of what the State may ad|judge
and a&s;&s;igne the Clergie as nece&s;&s;ary (if it might be) a vo<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">n|tary
<PB N="32" REF="18">
and ab&s;olute declining of part even of that (for I doubt not but
the State would appoint &s;uch a proportion, as might to duely morti|fied
and &s;pirituall men, afford matter for the honour of &s;uch a refu|&s;all
would undoubtedly adde &s;uch authoritie and reverent regard to
them, and their doctrine, that men &s;eeing they &s;eek them not theirs,
nor will admit more of the world, then what is meerely nece&s;&s;ary
for them, for the di&s;charge of their places; you &s;hall di&s;cover a new
world: Men by &s;uch cour&s;es which will bring on doctrine propor|tionable,
will be &s;o moved that cutting off each in his proportion
greatly, even their own &s;uperfluous vanities, much more their &s;ins:
what our &s;pirituall men may &s;o have refu&s;ed, with infinite more by
others thus cut off, may be di&s;tributed among the poore, (be&s;ides
the benefit of &s;uch examples and doctrine, extending even to the&s;e:)
and &s;o univer&s;all charitie, reducing all to a ble&s;&s;ed kinde, if not of pa|ritie,
yet of proportion, leaving the lea&s;t in a tolerable mediocritie,
a golden age or primitive times may ri&s;e againe in the world.</P>
<P>But the way to this heaven is fir&s;t to goe by the gates of hell, as
through the Parliament the Kingdome is made at by the true ma|lignants,
&s;o through or under colour of a pretended malignant par|tie,
that &s;educeth or ruleth the Parliament, the Parliament or autho|ritie
and dignitie thereof is attaqued, but &s;ure this is propounded as
an article of faith, and to weake rea&s;on pa&s;t comprehen&s;ion how it
can well be: but how ever they are misbeleevers and hereticks that
pertinaciou&s;ly reject an article of faith, and with force to be pro|ceeded
again&s;t; yet force being found oft none of the be&s;t wayes to
extingui&s;h here&s;ie, but rather the canker &s;preaded and exa&s;perated
by rude handling, many have not and will not be deterred from ad|vancing
&s;uch as the&s;e, plaine or &s;tronger oppo&s;itions, if any of this
malignant partie propound any thing (as in all great a&s;&s;emblies &s;ome
mu&s;t breake the matter and begin) and the hou&s;e con&s;ent to the
propo&s;ition; it is now the act of the whole hou&s;e: if any propound
or &s;peake things that &s;eeme to others offen&s;ive, or to de&s;erve ani|madver&s;ion,
and yet the hou&s;e, or major part puni&s;h it not, they by
&s;uch connivence (for the&s;e men may be allowed to que&s;tion &s;till
principles, that the Parliament would doe di&s;honorably, and yet
come &s;hort of their malicious intents) make it al&s;o this way their
owne; and &s;o not the&s;e cen&s;ors, or any els but the Parliament, as a|bove
appeared, is to judge of the Parliament; but &s;uch cen&s;ors them|&s;elves
are to be condemned by the Parliament, for thus pre&s;uming
<PB N="33" REF="18">
or a&s;&s;uming to them&s;elves the &s;upreame power to judge; be&s;ides par|ticular
charges and articles again&s;t &s;uch were to be offered to the
Hou&s;e, the accu&s;ers and witne&s;&s;es to be produced and forth-com|ming,
that if they make not good their charges, the parties unju&s;tly
mole&s;ted and accu&s;ed, might have condigne reparations upon them;
and the Hou&s;e it &s;elfe &s;atisfaction, the publique &s;ervice thus cau&s;e|le&s;ly
interrupted, and the integritie of the Hou&s;e called in que&s;tion,
and the like, appertaining to ca&s;es of this nature. Such charges have
been promi&s;ed long &s;ince &s;hould &s;uddenly appeare again&s;t the accu|&s;ed
Members of the Parliament, and by them as Ju&s;tice earne&s;tly re|quired,
but appeare not all this while, not &s;o much as to the people
abroad, (though this were not the right way) which they &s;o &s;trive
to incen&s;e again&s;t the Parliament, but rather warre in &s;tead of them;
and &s;eeing &s;o many of the very Members of the Hou&s;es of Parlia|ment
are their enemies, falling off from them unju&s;tly (if none &s;uch
&s;till remaine among them) were things appearing unju&s;tifiable there
&s;aid or done (if it might &s;tand with the libertie and power of Parlia|ment
not to have libertie of &s;peech) it might ea&s;ily be made appeare
in particular to the world, and &s;o complaint be made to the Parlia|ment
thereof, if it were to any end to complaine there of that, which
hath already pa&s;&s;ed without puni&s;hment. But &s;eeing the Parliament
hath power (the ca&s;e &s;tanding as before hath been &s;hewed) to doe in
all things as they &s;ee cau&s;e; by good con&s;equence their &s;peeches ne|ce&s;&s;arily
preparing, di&s;cu&s;&s;ing, agitating, concluding what is &s;o to be
done, cannot be &s;ubject to any limitting, que&s;tioning, or accompt
abroad, nor in rea&s;on therefore are to be divulged in that &s;ence; this
being incompatible with &s;uch power. But then the&s;e haters of our
Law-makers and Lawes, &s;ay; Many of both Hou&s;es are away, and
&s;o the acts le&s;&s;e valid; but be the number remaining little, yet the
acts of the Major part of that number are &s;till good. For neither the
King that called them away, or countenanceth them that de&s;ert
their &s;tations, may ailedge this; nor the Members that voluntarily
(not upon tru&s;t in tho&s;e that remaine, or leave obteined) abandon
their places there and duties, are to take the benefit, either of their
owne wrong, whether negligence in &s;uch Members, or wor&s;e per|haps,
nor of their owne unworthine&s;&s;e, as Cowardi&s;e, to oppo&s;e
what they liked not: which feare (admitting &s;uch could be) argues
&s;till that they that feared were the le&s;&s;er number; though what nee|ded
they feare to &s;peake freely, a di&s;&s;enting le&s;&s;er number being or|dinary,
and &s;ometimes a very few, perhaps &s;carce enough to make a
<PB N="34" REF="19">
number, di&s;&s;enting openly from the re&s;t of the whole Hou&s;e with|out
any inconvenience? It being allowed for any to &s;peake their
minds whil&s;t a matter is in agitation before it be &s;ettled. If they &s;ay,
they goe away that they may not &s;eeme to allow what would pa&s;&s;e
though they were pre&s;ent: then the Major part concurres to what
is done by their owne confe&s;&s;ion, els why &s;tay they not to oppo&s;e it?
If they &s;ay, &s;o many are gone without leave of the Hou&s;es, as put to|gether
would make the Major part, &s;uppo&s;ing this were true, either
&s;uch a Major part went away at once in a body, and then it was their
fault not to &s;tay; for then they being the Major part had prevailed;
or they went by little and little, and then &s;till it was a Major part of
the remainder that concurred to what was done, els it had not pa&s;|&s;ed:
and &s;o the acts &s;till good: If they fly to &s;ay that they who thus
de&s;erted the Hou&s;e out of feare, did it not as fearing the Parliament,
but the people; granting the&s;e men this, which is not their due, that
&s;uch had cau&s;e to feare the people, and that &s;uch ba&s;e feare, when as
they pretend, they were to &s;tand for the King, Countrey, Lawes, Li|berties,
Religion, and did not render them utterly unworthy their
places: it may be an&s;wered briefly; they that remained and carried
matters, might feare the King as much or more: but their cau&s;e was
noble and good; but the&s;e or the like Cavils will no more hood|winke
the people: their onely cour&s;e were to produce &s;ome pub|lique
act of Parliament, that might certifie the world, that the King
and both hou&s;es have long &s;ince unanimou&s;ly concurred to di&s;&s;olve
this Parliament; el&s;e Sophi&s;try will not carry it again&s;t the mani|fe&s;t
truth.</P>
<P>By the premi&s;&s;es or rather by diver&s;e excellent Tractates publi|&s;hed
by others to the &s;ame, or the like effect, I hope it is even as cleare
that the Parliament is and ought to be the &s;upreame Judge in pub|lique
matters now in que&s;tion in <HI>England,</HI> as what it is, it hath jud|ged
and ordered touching the&s;e things, by &s;o many publique orders,
declarations, and the like; and con&s;equently that rea&s;on wills that
they be &s;acred in our e&s;teeme, and punctually obeyed and executed,
and &s;o no need of warre: and who&s;oever goeth again&s;t rea&s;on and
truth, goeth again&s;t God him&s;elfe, who is <HI>Prima, &s;umma, pura ratio,</HI>
and it will concerne him nearely to looke to it, whether he be &s;tron|ger
then God: goeth again&s;t him&s;elfe if he be a man, and &s;hall fir&s;t
finde a civill warre in him&s;elfe, before he can cau&s;e it in his Countrey
upon &s;uch grounds, and for his Maje&s;tie he cannot as he is a King,
but judge that, that man thinks di&s;honourably of him, who goeth
<PB N="35" REF="19">
about to per&s;wade him, that, that can be for his good that is not for
the good of his Kingdome, and &s;o &s;ever what is &s;o excellently joy|ned;
or that the great Coun&s;ell of the Kingdome is not the onely,
at lea&s;t the very be&s;t, and the onely &s;ure and &s;ecuring way without
all doubt, for that Prince to follow that intends the publique good:
and which will ever a&s;&s;uredly concurre with him to that end: nor
in oppo&s;ing an arbitrary power, which ill men about him for their
owne private and wicked ends, would induce: Doth the Parliament
any thing but di&s;enable a Prince, or rather tho&s;e about him from do|ing
ill, or more properly from u&s;urping &s;uch power; which to what
end is it in a good Prince, which he will or can never reduce to act
or u&s;e: but the fal&s;e or pretended Mother of the childe, who would
have it divided, (whom the wi&s;dome of the King may di&s;cerne)
will whi&s;per, there is no thankes or glory to doe good, unle&s;&s;e he
might have done evill, and &s;o did good freely; &s;ince free will onely
merits (I beleeve they hold merits) it &s;eemes the&s;e malignants fet|ched
not this Doctrine from heaven; for there we may finde that
confirmation in grace in the Angels and ble&s;&s;ed &s;pirits of ju&s;t men,
whereby compleat free will, or the remaines of it (which free will
argues but imperfection and mutabilitie; power to &s;inne being but
impotency, and the King of Kings, God him&s;elfe, who is perfection
it &s;elfe, being above and without all power or po&s;&s;ibilitie of doing
any evill, yet, (rather therefore I &s;hould &s;ay) omnipotent in or for
good) that confirmation in grace, I &s;ay, by which free will is tran&s;|figured
and &s;ublimed into a &s;tate divine; and <HI>Po&s;&s;e non peccare,</HI> into
<HI>non po&s;&s;e peccare,</HI> is a tran&s;cendent ble&s;&s;ing, if not the very e&s;&s;ence of
cele&s;tiall beatitude; where the&s;e &s;ugge&s;t, &s;uch a condition is to be
declined, though with ruine of all: But how&s;oever the Divines of
our times may not allow the explication or application of this point,
we may hope his Maje&s;tie out of his Princely care of the good of his
people, though both him&s;elfe and it may beleeve well of his good
intents to that purpo&s;e, will be far from judging &s;uch a puntiglio of
arbitrary power (for however it may fill and tickle the phanta&s;ie,
yet deeply and duely penetrated into by judgement, it appeares to
re&s;olve even into no more (if a puntiglio be any thing) or lea&s;t it
might po&s;&s;ibly be thought, he would, or might have done evill, had
he not been re&s;treined from it (when he cannot violate &s;uch ju&s;t re|&s;trictions,
without fir&s;t doing the greate&s;t evill of all to the pub|lique)
from judging, I &s;ay, &s;uch a puntiglio a ju&s;t and &s;ufficient cau&s;e
to de&s;troy the people by a civill warre; when were this power in|deed
<PB N="36" REF="20">
ju&s;tly belonging to him, yet true love to his people might judge
it no other way u&s;efull, then to have the glory and thanks of relin|qui&s;hing
it voluntarily, lea&s;t otherwi&s;e the peoples good and &s;afetie
for a puntiglios &s;ake, or &s;atisfying a phanta&s;ie, or an humour of one
man, &s;hould depend on the turne or change of one mans will, when|&s;oever
it may happen, and more then this, great and noble minded
men, though no Chri&s;tians, have more then once done, when ha|ving
in their hands ab&s;olute power over their Countrey (not un|ju&s;tly
gotten) they have freely and of their owne accord given it up
ab&s;olutely, judging it &s;o be&s;t for their Countreys good, leaving it
even in full libertie, and &s;o living them&s;elves in, or rather under it,
but much higher in true glory and honour then ever. But though
&s;uch power is not here in his Maje&s;tie, he is yet not without meanes
in his hands, and a faire opportunitie to lay a tye not altogether un|like
on his people, and to exhibit freely great and publique munifi|cence
all at once, by a faire and voluntary relinqui&s;hing all conte&s;ta|tion
about it, while&s;t yet a malignant faction, preferring their pa&s;|&s;ions
before rea&s;on, and con&s;cience, before his honour and &s;afetie,
in&s;tigate and a&s;&s;i&s;t him as much as they can, or rather would make
him their in&s;trument to compa&s;&s;e it by an unnaturall pernicious ci|vill
warre, on whom the blame may ju&s;tly be laid, as they alone
would have gone away with the benefit.</P>
<P>By the&s;e and the like pa&s;&s;ages had beene, and even yet (&s;o it be
betimes taken) may be the way to the true arbitrary power indeed;
the peoples hearts (where God begins with man, as at the right end;
this is the divine Method) which draw all the re&s;t &s;weetly, which
the pretended fal&s;e ba&s;tard arbitrary power, could never by unju&s;t
violence effect: and thus by fairely quitting the pur&s;uite of the fal&s;e,
the true may be gained: a magnanimous Prince, that confides in
his owne vertue, will put him&s;elfe boldly and &s;ecurely on the free
wills of his Subjects. It is in manner a divine Charecter; <HI>Scire, &amp;
velle liberis hominibus imperare;</HI> to know how to temper and governe
free men, Gentlemen, Princes; and in &s;uch a condition God made
man, to &s;erve his glory be&s;t: and is it not a more glorious thing
when a Prince &s;hall by his great, proportionate, and heroike vertues,
render them at his devotion, and make them his voluntary &s;laves,
being otherwi&s;e free and noble, then if he found them made &s;laves
by the practi&s;e and vices of others, or &s;o made them &s;uch him&s;elfe.
Thus a free people is a &s;trong motive and occa&s;ion to a Prince to
<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">ender them wholly his by extraordinary vertue; the fall of this
<PB N="37" REF="20">
emulous <HI>Carthage</HI> would &s;hake <HI>Rome,</HI> though in oppo&s;ition with it
and therefore the noble&s;t of the <HI>Romans</HI> be&s;t and mo&s;t wi&s;ely loving
<HI>Rome,</HI> for <HI>Romes</HI> good advi&s;ed <HI>Carthage</HI> &s;hould &s;tand. But rea&s;on
evinceth, that per&s;i&s;ting as he doth, he remaines &s;eque&s;tered from
all ju&s;t power and authoritie, as touching the matters in que&s;tion
between him and his Parliament, on the ju&s;tice and wi&s;dome where|of
he may &s;afely put him&s;elfe, &s;ecure, that they will not, nor can de|ve&s;t
him of any thing, that ju&s;tly belongs to him: onely rea&s;on and
right require, that it be left to the Parliament to be the Judge there|of,
without which power, the people and Kingdome cannot be &s;afe,
as &s;tands deduced. Monarchy thus tempered by libertie and prero|gative,
as it is remote from intrin&s;icke cau&s;es of di&s;&s;olution, &s;o from
externall. If a Prince governing at di&s;cretion invade it, the partie in
the goodly arbitrary government excluded by the di&s;temper of &s;uch
a State from the benefits of libertie (the partie, I &s;ay, for be a Prince
never &s;o ab&s;olute, yet his <HI>Mamaluks,</HI> his <HI>Militia,</HI> by who&s;e con&s;pi|racy
or tyranny he awes and en&s;laves the re&s;t, not onely equall for
the mo&s;t part in point of libertie, the Subjects of a free State, but ex|ceeding
them far in all licentiou&s;nes and tyrannizing, and en&s;laving
upon the matter the Prince him&s;elfe, as well as others, ju&s;tly lay on
his owne &s;houlders by Gods judgement, that which he makes or u|&s;eth
the&s;e as in&s;truments to lay unju&s;tly on the necks of his other.
Subjects, whom he ought to have protected: In&s;tances are frequent
of the Pretorian Cohorts or Legions tyranny on the Roman Em|perours,
of the Jani&s;aries on the great Turke, of the <HI>Mamaluks</HI> on
the Aegyptian Soldans) and rea&s;on &s;hews this danger is mo&s;t to be
feared, where a Prince hath a&s;&s;umed the peoples libertie by publique
oppre&s;&s;ion) I &s;ay, if the ab&s;olute Monarch invade the ju&s;tly tempe|red,
the oppre&s;&s;ed partie is not to be tru&s;ted, but to be kept under by
part of tho&s;e he will tru&s;t, (he can tru&s;t none &s;afely) as certaine ene|mies
at home; &s;o the power which he mu&s;t tru&s;t, doubly le&s;&s;ened:
the partie u&s;ed goeth faintly on the free Nation, for at be&s;t by bring|ing
their free neighbours (whence was the chiefe hope of a&s;&s;i&s;tance
for the recovering their owne libertie) into &s;ervitude, they &s;hould
but confirme and render remediles their owne &s;lavery, encrea&s;ing
the &s;trength of the oppre&s;&s;or, and likewi&s;e on the &s;ame rea&s;on re&s;i&s;t
le&s;&s;e, if invaded: Onely if the Prince will make accompt, or can be
content, or cannot avoid to be him&s;elfe an equall, a companion with
his Mamaluks <HI>(Facinus, quos in quinat, aequat)</HI> or rather to be tyran|nized
by them, and his honour, authoritie, name, per&s;on, to be
<PB N="38" REF="21">
made their in&s;trument again&s;t his people, he may tran&s;late the &s;aid
faintnes from them on him&s;elfe; though when all is done, they are
un&s;afely tru&s;ted who have before broken the great tye, that to their
Countrey; el&s;e he mu&s;t fly to forreigne helpe. But on the other &s;ide,
the free Subjects duely intere&s;&s;ed in the State, loving it, living like
men, defend, invade the other, nobly, couragiou&s;ly, as in heart, and
men of honour, and as oft for the good of the conquered; with
greater power, as univer&s;ally to be tru&s;ted. Not to in&s;i&s;t on riches,
the nerves of Warre, infinitly increa&s;ed by indu&s;try, &s;o encouraged
by indu&s;try, lo&s;t by &s;ervitude, but what needs more, or indeed &s;o
much, if any thing in a matter &s;o apparent? Wee now have beene
rapt &s;ufficiently into the goodly imaginary heaven, and the glory of
it, but with an hell of inextricable mi&s;eries to the Prince and people,
which the&s;e Gods of the infinite prerogative pretended, are rai&s;ing
for them&s;elves, through a government at will, but by &s;uch meanes
and in &s;uch manner, as &s;hews they beleeve, or hope for no other
heaven hereafter.</P>
<P>The&s;e things being thus, it mu&s;t follow, that tho&s;e that oppo&s;e the
Parliament, and in it the kingdom, in whom is the &s;upreame power,
as rea&s;on hath evinced &s;ince conte&s;tation hapning as now between
King and people, the people mu&s;t carry it, oppo&s;e their Countrey,
rea&s;on, right, and the truth, moved by defect of judgement, or wor&s;e
principles; converting them&s;elves and their power received from
their Countrey to enable them to &s;erve and defend it, to the ruine of
it, and of all that is precious to men of honour, and con&s;equently
that they are guiltie of their owne bloud, and of all the bloud and
mi&s;eries which this unnaturall mon&s;trous warre may cau&s;e (a means
&s;uitable indeed to the end they force them&s;elves to compa&s;&s;e:) nor
can unpartiall po&s;teritie judge of them otherwi&s;e, then as <HI>Parricidae
patriae,</HI> and <HI>damnatae memoriae,</HI> if all this be not of force with them to
de&s;cend deeply into them&s;elves, and to weigh whether they be in
&s;tate fit for death every moment, at lea&s;t they may deigne this la&s;t
motive the honour of a deep and &s;ad thought, or two, whether thus
ob&s;tinately per&s;i&s;ting, they contract not before God another way a
guilt to contribute or be acce&s;&s;ary to the endangering or perdition
of their owne, and innumerable &s;oules in another kinde, and more
directly, and highly, there being <HI>aliquid &s;acri in hoc morbo,</HI> and Reli|gion
&s;haring the hazard, as above&s;aid: but if the premi&s;&s;es have not
power to inferre thus much with them, yet I hope at lea&s;t they are
not &s;o irrationall, &s;o extravagant, as that the&s;e men can truely be|leeve,
<PB N="39" REF="21">
that they are onely to be confuted, and tho&s;e that maintaine
&s;uch tenents to be in&s;tructed by a civill warre: but if folly and de|fect
of that rea&s;on that &s;hould governe men, or a violent forcing,
tyrannizing, and en&s;laving their rea&s;on and con&s;cience by enormous
and mon&s;trous pa&s;&s;ions, and &s;innes, the two originall cau&s;es of &s;la|very,
be by no art to be &s;evered from the&s;e men, but they mu&s;t and
will by &s;till per&s;i&s;ting apply the&s;e two &s;aid generall cau&s;es of &s;ervi|tude,
particularly and expre&s;ly, or in a &s;peciall manner now to draw
it upon them, it is not unlikely mo&s;t of them, and their po&s;teritie and
friends may finde, and prove the effect as in&s;eperable from the cau|&s;es
thus redoubled and enforced, as the cau&s;es from them&s;elves,
&s;hould they be &s;o unhappy as to carry what they by &s;uch meanes &s;o
pur&s;ue: and however &s;ome dequoy indulgence may be u&s;ed towards
them, to draw others, till all be in the power of the principall malig|nants
(the like we may &s;ay of their cunning enforcing them&s;elves
not yet to declare all the depth of their malicious intentions towards
tho&s;e they di&s;arme, or any way get within their power, u&s;ing them
as &s;taiking hor&s;es, till by &s;eeming for the pre&s;ent to leave the&s;e in a
tolerable condition, they may make others &s;tand out le&s;&s;e re&s;olutely
or warily, and &s;o drawing &s;till to them, make all &s;ure at la&s;t, and at
their di&s;cretion (though even while&s;t matters are yet dubious, the
infernall are of malice, hate, crueltie, jealou&s;ie, and the like, which
is in their hearts, &s;ometimes cannot but fla&s;h out in divers enormous
words, or acts) &s;uch pre&s;ent indulgence, I &s;ay, notwith&s;tanding of
the malignant partie, let not the&s;e men thinke that it having all once
at its di&s;po&s;e, and made &s;ure, will judge it may &s;ecurely repo&s;e on
&s;uch of the Nation, as have violated wittingly &amp; willingly the grea|te&s;t
tye on earth, by being traytors to their Countrey, or on tho&s;e
that loving their Countrey, have been violently or fraudulently di&s;|armed,
or on them that not intending the di&s;&s;ervice of their Coun|trey,
but &s;educed by &s;pecious pretences, have voluntarily a&s;&s;i&s;ted the
malignant partie, when time and plaine experience &s;hall have di&s;a|bu&s;ed
the&s;e two &s;orts, and afford meanes of redeeming their Coun|trey
and them&s;elves, will not the malignants rather have recour&s;e to
forreigne protection, or forces (an u&s;uall refuge of an arbitrary, or
tyrannicall government, e&s;pecially &s;ucceeding and having u&s;urped
libertie of the Subject, as above&s;aid) under colour of being guards,
garri&s;ons, auxiliary forces, joyned in league, or the like; as <HI>France</HI>
u&s;eth the <HI>Switzers,</HI> (the <HI>French</HI> Nation for&s;ooth not populous or
warlike enough;) It is true, the <HI>Spaniard,</HI> though not governing at
<PB N="40" REF="22">
di&s;cretion as the <HI>French</HI> u&s;eth the <HI>Switzers</HI> al&s;o, but not upon jea|lou&s;ie
and diffidence of their own people (for ought I find) as <HI>France</HI>
doth, but for want of men or &s;ome other rea&s;on of State, and may
not many &s;trangers already here al&s;o be imployed; then may the&s;e
Zelots of the Malignants &s;hare largely in contributing to the wages
of their forreigne Ma&s;ters, and be put to maintain their own &s;ervi|tude
(as they &s;tood to bring it in) with all their power. But God be
prai&s;ed, the&s;e men unle&s;&s;e they &s;peedily come in and make their
peace, are on the point rather of falling under the &s;word of Ju&s;tice
in the hand of the Parliament: and it is not to be doubted, but God
him&s;elf whom they have by &s;undrie pa&s;&s;ages too notorious (if we
may &s;o &s;peak) made a party again&s;t them&s;elves, the&s;e Athei&s;ts
belike thinking he is grown old, and impotent, and cannot drown
the&s;e Egyptians in a red &s;ea of their own blood, if they with dia|bolicall
ob&s;tinacie go on as <HI>Lucian</HI> that old Athei&s;t &s;aid of the Pa|gan
gods in his time, becau&s;e they begot no more &s;ons and daugh|ters,
will re&s;i&s;t, and defend him&s;elf, and his (were humane meanes
wanting) again&s;t the&s;e publique oppre&s;&s;ors of the people in inten|tion
and endeavour, which they ought to expo&s;e their lives to de|fend,
and protect.</P>
<P>And for tho&s;e that &s;tand alreadie for that Palladium of their Re|ligion
and Countrey, the Parliament, as they are herein duely &s;en|&s;ible
of them&s;elves and honour, &s;o out of the &s;ame feeling, they can|not
but &s;o lively ardently and &s;peedily concurre with all their power
(if need require) when all their fortunes, and all that is dear to &s;uch
men lie at &s;take (and which now nobly and bravely a&s;&s;erted and
vindicated, may for ever be &s;ecured, and the roots of dangers pluckt
up) that the <HI>Scots</HI> a&s;&s;i&s;tance be not the &s;econd time needed (though
in all pre&s;umption readie) it being the common cau&s;e) to our ex|ceeding
charge, nay di&s;honour, as if others were more apprehen&s;ive
of our honour then our &s;elves, and we needed others to protect or
defend our Liberty, or take and manage our quarrels. And now
how&s;oever we may not &s;hare in the putting a period to the di&s;orders
of the State, yet let us think of doing it to this di&s;ordered di&s;cour&s;e,
wherein though there may not appeare manife&s;tly one continued
beaten tracke of coherent pa&s;&s;ages, to bring you readily to the
truth: yet I hope you have incountred a few points here, and there,
not indirect, nor impertinent thereto; like Po&s;ts of direction for
Travellers, at each miles end, in &s;ome of our Engli&s;h de&s;erts, to
give you ayme that you may hold the right way: or rather like
<PB N="41" REF="22">
race po&s;ts quickly to be run over, le&s;t it might &s;eem to pretend it
&s;elf worthy to hold you long. And you may the rather pa&s;&s;e by the
imperfections in regard while&s;t it was endeavoured to have ordered
and compleated it, and to make all yet clearer, the Antiparliamen|tary
partie hath &s;o in the interim, unmasked it &s;elf in &s;ight of
the world, and given &s;uch atte&s;tation in plain matter of fact (a
&s;tronger te&s;timony then <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">u<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter"> of the mouth of the adver&s;arie) to the
pro&s;pective and next to prophetick prudence and Judgement of the
Parliament, &s;o long &s;ince having penetrated and &s;hined on the &s;e|cret
corners of their de&s;ignes, and deeds of darkne&s;&s;e, and expo&s;ed
them to view that there is little need of any further light, and the
defect is rather <GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="2 letters">w in tho&s;e who &s;hut their eyes, that they may not
&s;ee it. We &s;ee already our Laws manife&s;tly conculcated by force
and violence, our liberties, properties, lives expo&s;ed to the furie and
malice of the&s;e de&s;perate Malignants (for which violence they can|not
plead their pre&s;ent nece&s;&s;itie, if being grounded and depending
on their oppugning the Parliament unju&s;t in it &s;elf as hath been
&s;hewed): the danger of our Religion and con&s;equently of the Re|ligion
abroad, from tho&s;e, that having none, would bring in &s;uch,
as may be&s;t &s;uite with their pernicious purpo&s;es, and from the re&s;t
of old in direct oppo&s;ition with it, on all which they are carried
with &s;uch de&s;perate ardour and violent fury, as their utmo&s;t and la&s;t
attempt, that having fir&s;t in a due method indeed u&s;ed all machina|tions
to vilifie and difanull the authoritie and very e&s;&s;ence of the
Parliament, the onely rampart of <HI>Englands</HI> happine&s;&s;e, and traver&s;e
to their de&s;ignes, though God and good men have herein repul&s;t
them, yet they cannot temper them&s;elves, from breaking out into
&s;uch effects as all the world &s;ees, nor brook any delay from &s;ei&s;ing
what part they can meet with of the de&s;igned prey, till they may
with le&s;&s;e danger of repri&s;all do it; but it is high time now to leave
words and writing: therefore let us endeavour to conclude this
Tractate, almo&s;t as indige&s;ted and troubled as the times (like that
offer of that poore Countrey man, that when the great King <HI>Ar|taxerxes</HI>
pa&s;&s;ed by, having nothing el&s;e to pre&s;ent him, before whom
none mu&s;t appear emptie handed, ran to a little troubled water, and
thence offered the King what his hand onely could contain; but
the troubled pre&s;ent coming from a clear and good intention, and
native heartie ingenuitie, met with a &s;erene, magnanimous, and re|gal
acceptance) but let us conclude with a point of Judgement not
altogether &s;o weak as hitherto may have appeared; for I would end
<PB N="42" REF="23">
at lea&s;t well and leave you with a good relli&s;h (though I appear to
begin this point al&s;o but ill) which is, that having above received it
as a &s;acred truth and ground, that no rea&s;on &s;hall ever &s;hake, that
the wi&s;dom, and Ju&s;tice of a Parliament freely, duely, and lawfully
elected is no way to be called in que&s;tion or doubt, but to be a&s;&s;ured|ly
beleeved and confided in, &s;ecurely repo&s;ed upon and held &s;acred
and inviolable by all that heartily love <HI>Englands</HI> happine&s;&s;e: I will
take heed at la&s;t to be found not fa&s;t and true to my grounds, and
ends, by pre&s;uming (as &s;ome particular private men have done in
their we<GAP DESC="illegible" RESP="OXF" EXTENT="1 letter">l otherwi&s;e under&s;tood di&s;cour&s;es) to offer up any advice
(were I otherwi&s;e able) or coun&s;ell to the wi&s;dom, or exhortation
or per&s;wa&s;ion to the Ju&s;tice of it; and thus my be&s;t is but a negative,
a privative, or a nothing: but onely yet upon the whole, inferring
or enforcing ju&s;tly by the power of truth; That it is the part of all
hone&s;t men, men of honour that love their Countrey to obey the
Parliament (taken in that notion our ca&s;e pre&s;ents) punctually, to
&s;erve it faithfully, and zealou&s;ly; to love it with that kind of love,
which is <HI>morte fortior,</HI> to vindicate, a&s;&s;ert, maintain, propugne, clear
the authority and &s;afetie of it, as a true collection of all that is or
can be mo&s;t deare, precious, and &s;acred to, and with &s;uch men, to
joyn unanimou&s;ly in the clearing <HI>England</HI> once again of Wolves,
the&s;e man-wolves, if reducible by no rea&s;on, and not to loo&s;e their
&s;hare of contributing to &s;uch a work; above all ardently to &s;olicite
and pre&s;&s;e the divine Maje&s;tie to in&s;pire, protect, ble&s;&s;e, this Con|gregation
of Princes, this <HI>multitudinem Con&s;iliariorum in quibus e&s;t
&s;alus,</HI> and in it our Countrey and all. I conclude this di&s;cour&s;e,
wherein I have &s;poken my heart, which nothing, but a lively and
deare apprehen&s;ion of the imminent and extreame danger of my
Countrey, forced from &s;o unfit a man; rai&s;ing &s;o violent but natu|rall
and ju&s;t a pa&s;&s;ion, as brake the &s;trings of a tongue ever before
tyed (and perhaps ever fit to have been &s;o you may &s;ay), like that
&s;onne of <HI>Croe&s;us</HI> who before, or born dumbe, yet &s;eeing his Father
in the very point of being &s;lain, &s;o naturall a pa&s;&s;ion &s;upplying the
place and power of nature, or rather &s;tronger then it, forcing and
clearing all impediments turning dumbne&s;&s;e it &s;elf into a &s;trong
vociferation; he cried out aloud: Oh man kill not <HI>Croe&s;us,</HI> and &s;o
notifying him &s;aved him. I need not fear you think &s;o well of me,
as that you would not remember that a &s;imilitude doth not hold
throughout, and to the la&s;t, &s;hould I not put you in mind &s;olemnly
it doth not.</P>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
</BODY>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
