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<DATE>2008-02-04</DATE>
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<NAME>John Pas</NAME>
<RESP>MURP</RESP>
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<BIBNO T="oclc">11839211</BIBNO>
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<FRONT>
<DIV1 TYPE="title page">
<PB REF="1" MS="y">
<P>SCIRE / I <HI>tuum nihil e&s;t: OR,</HI> The AUTHORS <HI>DEFENCE</HI> OF The Vanity of DOGMATIZING; Again&s;t the EXCEPTIONS OF The Learned <HI>THO. ALBIUS</HI> In his Late SCIRI.</P>
<Q><P><HI>No doubt</HI> but <HI>ye</HI> are the Men, and Wi&s;dom &s;hall dye with you! <BIBL>Job.</BIBL></P></Q>
<P><HI>LONDON,</HI> Printed by <HI>E. C.</HI> for <HI>Henry Ever&s;den</HI> at the Grey-Hound in St. <HI>Pauls</HI>-Church-Yard, 1665.</P>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="apology">
<PB REF="2">
<HEAD><PB REF="2">
The AUTHORS APOLOGY FOR HIS STYLE.</HEAD>
<P>_IT may perhaps &s;eem to &s;ome incongruous, that my <HI>Reply</HI> is not written in the lan|guage of the <HI>Objections;</HI> and I &s;hould have thought &s;o too, had the <HI>Objections</HI> &s;poke the Language of my <HI>Di&s;cour&s;e.</HI> But &s;ince my A&s;&s;ail|ant takes the Liberty to recede from <HI>my</HI> Style, I know no rea&s;on obligeth me to humour <HI>his.</HI> And 'tis le&s;s improper for a Book to differ in fa&s;hion from ano|ther that oppo&s;eth it; than from <HI>that</HI> of which 'tis a part and vindication. And this An&s;wer were &s;uffici|ent for the &s;eeming <HI>impropriety:</HI> But yet I have Rea|&s;ons more con&s;iderable to excu&s;e it. I mu&s;t confe&s;s then, that by that time <HI>Sciri</HI> was extant, I was grown &s;o indifferent to tho&s;e matters, that I had
<PB REF="3">
much ado to per&s;wade my &s;elf to a Review of what I had written; and could have ben content to have left <HI>it</HI> without any other <HI>vindication,</HI> then what it could it &s;elf obtain from the <HI>good nature</HI> and <HI>ingenuity,</HI> of <HI>impartial</HI> peru&s;ers. And in this coldne&s;s of humor had without doubt de&s;erved <HI>it,</HI> but that my Book&s;el|ler importun'd me for another <HI>Edition:</HI> which re|que&s;t of his having con&s;ented to, I &s;aw my &s;elf under a nece&s;&s;ity of <HI>decorum</HI> to return &s;omething on an oc|ca&s;ion, in which <HI>&s;ilence</HI> perhaps might have been <HI>ill|manners</HI> to an ingenious and learned Adver&s;ary. But though the con&s;traint of the&s;e circum&s;tances over|came my aver&s;ne&s;s to writing any more on a &s;ubject, with which I thought I had done for ever; yet could it not prevail again&s;t the humour I had of troubling my &s;elf no more then needs in a bu&s;ine&s;s, to which I was <HI>driven,</HI> rather then <HI>inclined</HI> or <HI>per&s;waded.</HI> So that after I had re&s;olv'd an <HI>An&s;wer;</HI> it had been more difficult to have drawn my &s;elf to put it into any other <HI>dr&s;s,</HI> then what is mo&s;t <HI>ea&s;ie</HI> and <HI>familiar.</HI> Which yet was not the effect only of the <HI>indi&s;po&s;ition</HI> and <HI>lazine&s;s</HI> of my humour; but a dictate of my di&s;creti|on. For the truth is, I fore&s;aw the occa&s;ion would not engage me in any thing, that I could think worthy of the <HI>univer&s;al Language;</HI> except I &s;hould have written a <HI>Di&s;cour&s;e,</HI> and not an <HI>An&s;wer.</HI> Be&s;ides which, had I u&s;ed another <HI>&s;tyle</HI> I mu&s;t have been more diffu&s;e in reiterating what I had &s;aid in the
<PB REF="3">
oppo&s;ed <HI>E&s;&s;ay;</HI> otherwi&s;e tho&s;e that under&s;tood not <HI>Engli&s;h,</HI> had been uncapable of my <HI>ju&s;tification;</HI> and my &s;elf, and tho&s;e that do, nau&s;eated by the <HI>repeti|tion.</HI> The&s;e then were the chief rea&s;ons of my con|tinuing the Language I began with; which I con|fe&s;s I was the more ea&s;ily per&s;waded by, becau&s;e there are late great examples of like practice, who&s;e fa&s;hions 'tis no di&s;credit to imitate. And to all I might add, that I love not that my Di&s;cour&s;e &s;hould wear <HI>Lin&s;y-Wool&s;y.</HI></P>
</DIV1>
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<DIV1 TYPE="part">
<PB REF="4">
<HEAD><PB N="1" REF="4">
<HI>SCIRI,</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Sive Sceptices &amp; Scepticorum &agrave; Jure Di&s;putationis Exclu&s;io.</HEAD>
<DIV2 TYPE="section">
<HEAD>Remarques on the Title. <MILESTONE UNIT="G."></HEAD>
<P>_I Should never have thought my &s;elf concern'd in a Book, that wears &s;uch a Title; but that I found my Name in the fir&s;t page made an un|grateful adjunct: and the oppo&s;ing a di&s;cour&s;e I had publi&s;h't, profe&s;t the occa&s;ion, and mark it aim'd at. How unju&s;t 'tis to &s;ugge&s;t that I am a <HI>Sceptick,</HI> is I think clear enough from what I have &s;aid already, and &s;hall make more fully appear in the proce&s;s. And how little kindne&s;s I have for the di&s;puting way of procedure, I have publiquely declared. How proper then that part of the Title is in this application, any one may pa&s;s an ea&s;ie judgement. But to what purpo&s;e old <HI>Cato</HI> &s;tands there, with that <HI>in&s;tructive oracle</HI> in his mouth, which I <HI>remember</HI> ever &s;ince I <HI>cap't ver&s;es, Contra verbo&s;os:</HI> I was po&s;ed to conjecture. E&s;pecially &s;ince the in&s;ignificant prattle, and endle&s;s garrulity of the <HI>Philo|&s;ophy</HI>
<PB N="2" REF="5">
of the Schools, which this Gentleman &s;eems to vindi|cate, is none of the lea&s;t offences to tho&s;e whom, whither they will or no, he will have be <HI>Scepticks.</HI> In con&s;ideration of this, and &s;ome &s;uch other mi&s;applyed appellations, I thought that this learned Man had an other notion of <HI>Sceptick</HI> then was u&s;ual; and ca&s;ting mine eye over his late <HI>Purgation,</HI> pre|&s;ented to the <HI>Cardinals</HI> of the <HI>inqui&s;ition,</HI> I found that his <HI>Scepticks</HI> were &s;ome of the modern voluminous <HI><GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="2 letters">&s;puting Peripateticks,</HI> whom in that part of my Di&s;cour&s;e where I deal with the <HI>Ari&s;totelian Philo&s;ophy,</HI> I be&s;tow a particular <HI>Reflection</HI> on. The&s;e it &s;eems by the &s;olicitation of their complaints again&s;t his Writings had obtain'd a general con|demnation of them from the <HI>Pope</HI> and Con&s;i&s;tory of <HI>Car|dinals;</HI> whom therefore in his Appeal to the &s;aid <HI>Cardinals</HI> he accu&s;eth of <HI>ignorance, corruption</HI> of the <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> Do|ctrines, and tendency to <HI>Here&s;ie</HI> and <HI>Athei&s;m.</HI> And that the&s;e are the <HI>Scepticks</HI> of our Philo&s;opher, appears al&s;o from &s;everal pa&s;&s;ages both of the Praeface and Body of the Di|&s;cour&s;e I am rejoyning to. But then upon what account the celebrated <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> and the Author of the <HI>Vanity</HI> of <HI>Dogmatizing</HI> &s;hould be compri&s;ed under a common name with the&s;e, with whom they have &s;o little confederacy ei|ther in Doctrin or De&s;ign; I cannot yet find the lea&s;t ground for conjecture.</P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Junioribus Academicis.</HEAD>
<HEAD TYPE="sub">ET&s;i non dubitem validioribus &amp; magis opportunis auxiliis obviam itum e&s;&s;e <HI>exitiali</HI> illi <HI>Pyrrhonicae contagio,</HI> quod nova audere non ita pridem occaepit; ta|men, quia nil publici cauterii adactum ad ulous <HI>Glanvillanum</HI> jam biennio integro ae&s;tuofum audiveram,
<PB N="3" REF="5">
vi&s;um e&s;t filentibus potioribus ad meam infirmitatem devolutum e&s;&s;e onus, iniquitatem indi&s;ciplinatae illius calumniae Univer&s;o Philo&s;ophantium choro impo&s;itae, &s;i non avertere, certe aperire, &amp; plumis di&s;ertioribus lace|randam exponere.&mdash;<HI>Page 1.</HI></HEAD>
<P>UPon the &s;uppo&s;al then that I am a <HI>Sceptick,</HI> the lear|ned <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> Gentleman invades my <HI>harmle&s;s</HI> and <HI>peaceable E&s;&s;ay</HI> as a deadly <HI>Pyrrhonical</HI> contagion, and an enemy to <HI>Science.</HI> But with what ingenuity I am charg'd, with what I have &s;o frequently di&s;claim'd, I appeal to the profe&s;&s;ions of the Di&s;cour&s;e it &s;elf to evidence: which whether they are arguments of a <HI>Sceptical</HI> aim and temper, let the <HI>Dogmati&s;t</HI> judge between us. And though my <HI>Apology</HI> for <HI>Philo&s;o|phy</HI> may perhaps be defective in point of Judgement and Argument, for the clearing of what I undertook to vindi|cate; yet both the de&s;ign and menage of it, one would think, &s;hould have &s;ecured me from &s;u&s;picion of endea|vouring to di&s;courage <HI>Philo&s;ophical</HI> enquiries, by introducing a <HI>de&s;pair</HI> of <HI>Science.</HI> For on the contrary, one of my chief de&s;igns was, to remove that <HI>&s;loath</HI> and <HI>lazine&s;s</HI> which in the&s;e later ages hath <HI>cramp't</HI> endeavour, and made men con|tent to &s;it down with their &s;lender acqui&s;ts, as <HI>Certainties</HI> and <HI>Demon&s;trations</HI> which are &s;carce <HI>Probabilities.</HI> I de&s;ire it may be taken notice of once for all then, that I have nought to do with that &s;huffling Sect, that love to doubt eternally, and to que&s;tion all things. My profe&s;&s;ion is <HI>freedom</HI> of <HI>enquiry,</HI> and I own no more <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> then what is concluded in the <HI>Motto</HI> which the <HI>ROYAL SOCIETY</HI> have now adopted for theirs, <HI>NULLIUS IN VER|BA.</HI></P>
<P><PB N="4" REF="6">
So that there was no need of &s;o &s;olemn a warning to the <HI>Univer&s;ities</HI> again&s;t my innocent di&s;cour&s;e; who&s;e greate&s;t fault is, that 'tas been &s;o unhappy as to be mi&s;taken. For the <HI>Ulcus Glanvillanum</HI> (as my learned A&s;&s;ailant is plea&s;ed to call it) contains none of the &s;uppo&s;ed <HI>venome.</HI> Nor will it in&s;pire any but <HI>&s;upine</HI> and <HI>pa&s;sive</HI> tempers with any other <HI>&s;pirit</HI> then that of more diligent re&s;earch, and careful pur|&s;uits of nature. I am not therefore concern'd in the Que&s;ti|on our Author propounds to his junior <HI>Academicks</HI> to this purpo&s;e: Whether they would be &s;everely <HI>wi&s;e</HI> for the con|duct of their <HI>Manners</HI> and <HI>Religion,</HI> or enticingly <HI>Rhetori|cal,</HI> pleading for <HI>Ignorance</HI> and <HI>Uncertainty,</HI> and whi&s;tling their dependants into apparent <HI>precipices?</HI> Since one of the greate&s;t quarrels I have again&s;t <HI>Confident Opinion,</HI> is, that it renders the <HI>Dogmati&s;t conceited,</HI> not <HI>wi&s;e.</HI> And is &s;o far from being &s;erviceable to good <HI>manners,</HI> that it mi&s;chie|vou&s;ly corrupts them, &s;owring Mens &s;pirits with <HI>Envy, ill Nature,</HI> and <HI>Moro&s;ene&s;s;</HI> and mingling their Religion with <HI>Schi&s;m, bitrer Zeal,</HI> and <HI>Sedition:</HI> And the&s;e are wor&s;e <HI>pre|cipices</HI> then a mode&s;t and re&s;erv'd belief can betray Men in|to. To what follows within this period, I'le &s;ay no more, then that there's a <HI>Medium</HI> between being <HI>Blind</HI> and <HI>In|fallible.</HI> And <HI>vanitas Dogmatizandi,</HI> is not well explained by <HI>vera pollicendi.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Viro non ira&s;cor, qui magno ingenio &amp; eloquentiae cum annis maturandae flumine non vadando,&mdash;<HI>pag. 3.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IN this clau&s;e the learned Gentleman acknowledgeth my confe&s;sion of <HI>certainty</HI> in <HI>Faith,</HI> and hopes of <HI>Science</HI> from <HI>experiment;</HI> neither of which can con&s;i&s;t with a <HI>cri|minal</HI> and <HI>dangerous Sceptici&s;m:</HI> which yet he &s;eems not
<PB N="5" REF="6">
willing to have me free from, adding, that I point at one, as the ground of my expectation, whom this learned Man will have believed a Favourer of the Pyrrhonian <HI>Nihil Sciri:</HI> The per&s;on aim'd at in this Reflection, I conceive, is <HI>Des-Cartes;</HI> though I confe&s;s, I remember not that &s;entence mention'd in his writings; for after the propo&s;al of what might be expected from <HI>experiment</HI> and the progre&s;s of en|quiry, I adde, That <HI>tho&s;e that are acquainted with the fecun|dity of the</HI> Carte&s;ian <HI>Principles will di&s;pair of nothing.</HI> And if that great Man, po&s;&s;ibly one of the greate&s;t that ever was, mu&s;t be believed a <HI>Sceptick,</HI> who would not ambitiou&s;ly af|fect the title? And to give the <HI>Pyrrhonians</HI> one of the noble&s;t and happie&s;t wits that hath &s;hone upon the world, is to yield a greater advantage to their Cau&s;e, then would be done by a thou&s;and profe&s;t a&s;&s;ertions of it So that had I been guilty of &s;uch a Conce&s;&s;ion, I might thence more rea&s;onably have been judged a Favourer of the <HI>Scepticks,</HI> then by any thing I have writ again&s;t the <HI>Dogmati&s;ts.</HI> For I am apt to think, that Mankind is like to reap more advantage from the <HI>Igno|rance</HI> of <HI>Des Cartes,</HI> then perhaps from the greate&s;t part of the <HI>&s;cience</HI> was before him, and I cannot forbear pronoun|cing him the <HI>Pho&s;phoros</HI> of that clear and u&s;eful <HI>light,</HI> that begins to &s;pring in plentifully upon an awakened world. So that though the following <HI>expo&s;tulations</HI> are proper and &s;ea|&s;onable in reference to our Authors <HI>Peripatetical Scepticks,</HI> yet are they mo&s;t improper and injurious, if they have any a&s;pect on <HI>Des-Cartes,</HI> or tho&s;e that endeavour to promote that free and u&s;eful way of <HI>Philo&s;ophizing</HI> which he hath in&s;i&s;ted in. But I add no more on this occa&s;ion, becau&s;e 'tis po&s;&s;ible I have mi&s;taken the per&s;on intended by my A&s;|&s;ailant. However, if the Reflection be not directed to him, 'tis to the excellent <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus,</HI> who is pre&s;ently after intro|duced, under the Title of the <HI>Great Interpreter</HI> of <HI>Epicurus;</HI> who hath as little rea&s;on to be &s;u&s;pected of <HI>Criminal Sceptici&s;m,</HI> as the other. It is well known that the&s;e great
<PB N="6" REF="7">
men were <HI>Inquirers,</HI> and it becomes not &s;uch to be <HI>&s;wearers,</HI> nor is it therefore rea&s;onable to conclude them <HI>Scepticks.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Aliud offendiculum e&s;t complurium Modernorum effraenis impudentia, qui <HI>Ari&s;totelem&mdash;pag. 7.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> I Am glad to find my learned A&s;&s;ailant ju&s;tifying all my cen&s;ures of the Modern <HI>Ari&s;totelians;</HI> only he accu&s;eth them of one fault which I &s;eldom find among them, <HI>viz. mode&s;ty</HI> in propo&s;ing their opinions; which our Authour inveighs again&s;t as a <HI>criminal diffidence.</HI> But for my part I think the greate&s;t number of that &s;pirit can plead Not guilty to the accu&s;ation. And for tho&s;e of them that are le&s;s a&s;&s;ured in their &s;entiments, I &s;hould not reckon it among their crimes, to be wary and &s;paring of a&s;&s;ent in notions &s;o lubricous and uncertain, as are tho&s;e they deal in. Though I confe&s;s, to keep &s;uch voluminous ado about acknowledg'd <HI>uncertainties,</HI> is a very reprehen&s;ible <HI>vanity.</HI> And doubt|le&s;s the unprofitable toyes of the&s;e later <HI>Peripateticks,</HI> have offended many again&s;t that Philo&s;ophy. But whether mo&s;t of them are not the genuine derivations of the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> they claim to, may without difficulty be determin'd by any that will con&s;ider the natural <HI>flatulency</HI> of that <HI>aery &s;cheam</HI> of <HI>notions.</HI> And I think they have no great rea&s;on to pretend to <HI>ingenuity</HI> or <HI>judgement,</HI> that accu&s;e <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> for the faults of his Sectators. But from this la&s;t period of &s;ence, I de&s;ire chiefly it may be noted, that our learned Author pleads not for the Modern <HI>Ari&s;toteliani&s;m,</HI> which yet obtains in mo&s;t of the Schools of <HI>Chri&s;tendom:</HI> All the advantage I &s;hall make of which at pre&s;ent is to que&s;tion, Whether the re&s;euing men from an over fond value of &s;uch &s;mall wares, and the preventing the expence of time and
<PB N="7" REF="7">
pains upon &s;uch &s;olemn trifles, as our Philo&s;opher de&s;erved|ly calls them, be like to be a prejudice to their per&s;uits of more <HI>u&s;eful</HI> Knowledge, and the Furtherance of <HI>Science?</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 TYPE="section">
<HEAD>Vos modo novi palmites &s;urgentes in Vinum quod <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> laetificet corda hominum, memores quod&mdash;<HI>pag. 9.</HI></HEAD>
<P>THough I confe&s;s I have not &s;o great a value for the <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> learning, as &s;ome others; yet I am none of tho&s;e, that would di&s;&s;wade junior <HI>Academicks</HI> from the &s;tudy of that <HI>Philo&s;ophy.</HI> E&s;pecially, I think <HI>Ari&s;totles Logick</HI> and <HI>Rhetorick</HI> are to be acknowledg'd; though, I am not of the opinion of <HI>Averroes</HI> that he was the inventer of either. And doubtle&s;s that reverence and ob&s;ervance is due to the Statutes of tho&s;e <HI>Univer&s;ities</HI> that recommend this Author; yea and the <HI>Antiquity</HI> of that <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> (though it be far from being the <HI>antiente&s;t)</HI> will commend it to the Students of <HI>uni|ver&s;al</HI> learning. Be&s;ides, I would have nothing avoided or condemn'd till it be under&s;tood: And were I more an ene|my to that <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> then my A&s;&s;ailant can &s;uppo&s;e I am, yet &s;hould I not di&s;&s;wade the learning <HI>It;</HI> &s;ince <HI>primus &s;apientiae gradus, e&s;t fal&s;a intelligere.</HI> Only, I think, 'twould be very injurious to Knowledge, if <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;hould ingro&s;s men, and &s;hould his Placits be all receiv'd as the <HI>dictates</HI> of <HI>univer&s;al Rea&s;on.</HI> There are other <HI>Hypothe&s;eis</HI> more <HI>antient,</HI> and po&s;&s;iby more <HI>u&s;eful,</HI> that de&s;erve to be enquired into. And 'tis an enlargement and enobling the minds of men to acquaint them with the various <HI>Scheams</HI> in which things have been repre&s;ented. My de&s;ign was not then to di&s;courage any from inquiring into the <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> Doctrines, e&s;peci|ally as they are in their <HI>original:</HI> But to prevent mens &s;it|ting down for ever on his Compo&s;ures, and making
<PB N="8" REF="8">
his <HI>Placits</HI> the <HI>infallible mea&s;ures</HI> of <HI>Truth</HI> and <HI>Nature.</HI> Let <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> be <HI>&s;tudied</HI> then, but not <HI>adored.</HI> Let him have the <HI>fir&s;t</HI> of our Time, but not <HI>all;</HI> the advantage of <HI>prepo&s;&s;e&s;sion</HI> is great, which yet <HI>Free Philo&s;ophers</HI> I pre&s;ume will grant him; only let <HI>Pythagoras, Democri|tus, Plato,</HI> and the more antient <HI>Chaldaean</HI> wi&s;dom, have their turns to be inquired into, and let the great and il|lu&s;trious <HI>Moderns</HI> have <HI>theirs.</HI> 'Tis an unaccountable va|nity, to &s;pend all our time in raking into the &s;craps and imperfct remains of former ages, and to neglect the knowledge and clearer notices of our <HI>own,</HI> which (my Lord <HI>Bacon</HI> makes the <HI>third,</HI> but reckoning in the <HI>Aegypti|an)</HI> is the <HI>Fourth,</HI> and perhaps greate&s;t <HI>enquiry</HI> of <HI>Lear|ning.</HI> For <HI>many have gone to and fro, and Science is in|crea&s;ed.</HI></P>
<P>Methinks 'tis pity that &s;o many improveable wits as frequent the <HI>Univer&s;ities,</HI> &s;hould be hindred from enqui|ry; and tyed up to the writings of a &s;ingle Authour, from the knowledge of the Sentiments of the <HI>Philo&s;ophick</HI> world, and &s;tudying the more in&s;tructive volumn of the <HI>Univer&s;e.</HI> Doubtle&s;s, &s;ince the dayes of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> the face of things is alter'd, and new <HI>Phaenomena</HI> are di&s;clo|&s;ed, which his <HI>Hypothe&s;eis</HI> will no more &s;uit, then the <HI>Coats</HI> of Children will a body that is at <HI>full</HI> and <HI>advanced</HI> &s;tature. Be&s;ides, the greate&s;t &s;pirits of our dayes, proceed in another way of <HI>enquiry,</HI> which, if there were nothing in't but the <HI>fa&s;hion</HI> of the <HI>learning</HI> of the Age, it were however fit to be known by tho&s;e that lay any claim to ingenuity, and have lei&s;ure for &s;uch re&s;earches. And it &s;eems to me an unpardonable kind of <HI>&s;loath,</HI> (e&s;pecially in <HI>youth</HI> that u&s;eth to be <HI>bu&s;ie</HI> and <HI>inqui&s;itive)</HI> to be con|tentedly ignorant of tho&s;e great <HI>Theories</HI> that make &s;uch noi&s;e in the Age they live in; and to &s;pend all their time in <HI>that</HI> which will &s;ignifie little without the <HI>walls</HI> of a <HI>Colledge.</HI> For the wi&s;er world is of a differing
<PB N="9" REF="8">
opinion from our Philo&s;opher in the a&s;&s;ertion of this <HI>Para|graph, viz.</HI> that no progre&s;s can be made in <HI>Sciences</HI> with|out the <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> Grounds; and I think will hardly be brought to believe, <HI>That tho&s;e that have quitted tho&s;e foun|dations mu&s;t be alwayes to &s;eek for Principles, and nece&s;&s;ari|ly come &s;hort of Science.</HI> For to think that the Principles of any Man &s;hould be the only and <HI>infallible</HI> mea&s;ures of <HI>things,</HI> &s;eems a fond overvaluing credulity that hath nothing to warrant it. And he that phancies that all &s;ucceeding mankind cannot light upon <HI>Principles</HI> as happy and likely, as tho&s;e of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> but mu&s;t eternally <HI>de&s;pair</HI> of <HI>Science,</HI> if they proceed in any other way, then he hath pre&s;cribed them; hath no pretence for &s;o bold a judgment of <HI>Po&s;sibi|lities.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="part">
<PB REF="9">
<DIV2 N="1" TYPE="action">
<HEAD><PB N="11" REF="9">
ACTIO PRIMA.</HEAD>
<P>_SCep&s;in infaelici naturae abor&s;u antiquit&ugrave;s natam, <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> &amp; ip&s;iu&s;met pudore &egrave; linguis di&s;ertorum ubi diu habitaverat elatam, &amp; fidei Chri&s;tianae con&s;tanti&acirc; tumulatam, &agrave; vermium &amp; in&s;ecto|rum epulis raptam, magic&acirc; quadam oper&acirc; vivis re&s;ti|tuere conatus e&s;t Petrus Ga&s;&s;endus, acerrimae vir Sa|gacitatis, nitidae Eloquentiae, copio&s;ae facundiae, &s;uavi&s;si|morum morum, &amp; diligentiae admirandae. Idem (quod his omnibus majus e&s;t) Catholicae fidei tenaci&s;simus, &amp; nu&s;quam pravorum &aacute;ogmatum &s;u&s;pectus, c&ugrave;m tamen haec Sceptica infinitorum Errorum &amp; omnium Haere|&s;e&ocirc;n mater &s;it, &amp; illa ip&s;a &s;eductrix Philo&s;ophia, &amp; inanis fallacia, quam cavendam Apo&s;toli monitu do|cu&ecirc;re Sancti. Hanc vir ille, caetera magnus, in ex|ercitatione &s;u&acirc; paradox&acirc; adver&s;us Ari&s;totelae&ograve;s, non ut pri&ugrave;s tectam &amp; &s;cortorum more in tenebris vagantem, &s;ed effronti vultu &amp; fucat&acirc; form&acirc; turbis &amp; foro o&s;ten|tare au&s;us e&s;t.</P>
<P N="2">2. Illius exemplo, apud nos lingu&acirc; vernacul&acirc; ean|dem exornatam produxit <HI>Vanitatis Dogmatizandi</HI> Author; ip&s;e quoque &amp; ingenio pollens &amp; Eloquio. Neque enim &agrave; vulgaribus mentibus timenda &s;unt gran|dia
<PB N="12" REF="10">
infortunia. Haec mei laboris e&s;t occa&s;io; propo&s;i|tum ver&ograve;, &s;i lumen caelit&ugrave;s affluat &amp; vires calamo mini&s;tret, hanc cadaveream &s;cientiae aemulam in &s;ua &s;epulcreta compellere, &amp; inominatis dentibus roden|dam tradere. Agedum igitur, quae&s;iti nodum evol|vamus.</P>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> _THe <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> which the con&s;tancy of Chri&s;tiani|ty lay'd in it's <HI>Grave,</HI> I dare &s;ay the Illu&s;trious <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> would never have redeemed from <HI>thence.</HI> The <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> which con&s;i&s;ts in <HI>Free|dome</HI> of <HI>inquiry,</HI> that noble pen recommended, and adorned; but did not re&s;tore: for <HI>Campanella</HI> and the great <HI>Verulam</HI> were before him; yet, <HI>Avicenna</HI> and others of his &s;pirit among the <HI>Antient</HI> Peripateticks, were <HI>Free</HI> Philo&s;ophers. But what that <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> &s;hould be, that is con&s;i&s;tent with &s;o <HI>&s;harpe</HI> a <HI>wit,</HI> &s;o <HI>neat</HI> and <HI>copious</HI> an <HI>Eloquence,</HI> &s;uch <HI>&s;weet manners,</HI> and <HI>admirable diligence,</HI> &s;uch <HI>firmne&s;s</HI> and <HI>fledfa&s;tne&s;s</HI> in the <HI>Faith,</HI> and &s;o un&s;u&s;pected an <HI>Orthodoxie,</HI> as are a&s;cribed, and de&s;ervedly, to that great per&s;on: And yet be the &s;ource of infinite <HI>Errorus</HI> and <HI>Here&s;ies,</HI> that <HI>&s;edu|cing</HI> Philo&s;ophy and <HI>vain</HI> deceit, again&s;t which we have the Caveat of an Apo&s;tle; is beyond the reach of my con|jecture. And I am the more confounded when I am told, That this Mother of <HI>Here&s;ie,</HI> this <HI>vain</HI> deceit, is nothing but an endeavour to le&s;&s;en the impo&s;ing Authority of a vain|glorious Heathen, whom &s;ome excellent per&s;ons, both Fa|thers and Philo&s;ophers, have accu&s;ed, as one <HI>impious</HI> in <HI>Manners,</HI> and wor&s;e in <HI>Doctrine</HI> and <HI>Belief.</HI> A &s;uppre&s;&s;or of the more <HI>antient</HI> and more valuable <HI>Wi&s;dom:</HI> And one, that from a <HI>proud</HI> and <HI>in&s;olent Ta&s;&s;us</HI> contemned, and con|tinually quarrel'd with his betters: Yea, and who grew &s;o
<PB N="13" REF="10">
far into this humour and contradiction that he would fre|quently un&s;ay and contradict his own A&s;&s;ertions. One, who&s;e credit grew up in the night of <HI>Barbari&s;m</HI> and <HI>Igno|rance;</HI> and who&s;e Principles are repugnant, many of them, to the <HI>nature</HI> of <HI>things,</HI> and the <HI>Fundamentals</HI> of <HI>Faith:</HI> I &s;ay, that an attempt to redeem the free&punc;born &s;pirits of Men, from an unworthy va&s;&s;allage to &s;o &s;tigmatiz'd an Autho|rity, &s;hould be to this Learned Man &s;o criminal and dan|gerous a bu&s;ine&s;s, is, I confe&s;s, to me, occa&s;ion of &s;ome &s;ur|pri&s;e and wonder And if this be the faulty <HI>Sceptici&s;m Ga&s;&s;endus,</HI> and the Author of the <HI>Vanity</HI> of <HI>Dogmatizing,</HI> are accu&s;ed of; let tho&s;e that have a mind to pa&s;s their cen&s;ure, make the wor&s;t they can of the <HI>Imputation.</HI> That <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> was no <HI>Sceptick</HI> in the <HI>old</HI> and <HI>common</HI> notion, is ap|parent from the voluminous pains he hath taken in the building up a <HI>Body</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> upon the <HI>Principles</HI> of <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Epicurus;</HI> and if he was not &s;o fond of the <HI>Principles</HI> he undertook to illu&s;trate, as to boa&s;t their <HI>cer|tainty;</HI> propo&s;ing them not in a <HI>confident</HI> and <HI>a&s;&s;ertive</HI> form, but as <HI>probabilities</HI> and <HI>Hypothe&s;eis:</HI> I &s;ee no rea&s;on why his <HI>mode&s;ty</HI> &s;hould be made his <HI>crime,</HI> and be &s;o &s;everely animadverted on.</P>
<P>Nor doth the Author of the impugned <HI>E&s;&s;ay</HI> yet &s;ee any cau&s;e to be a&s;hamed of having followed his example in an affair &s;o <HI>innocent;</HI> to &s;ay no more on't. And he cannot yet decern how that di&s;cour&s;e could yield an occa&s;ion to this learned Man of oppo&s;ing <HI>Sceptici&s;m,</HI> which he may lay in the du&s;t without concernment to the <HI>Vanity</HI> of <HI>Dog|matizing,</HI> or it's Author: who is no otherwi&s;e intere&s;ted in the Paragraphs that follow for the a&s;&s;erting <HI>Science,</HI> and oppo&s;ition of the <HI>Scepticks,</HI> but only to wi&s;h our Author his de&s;ired &s;ucce&s;s in the undertaking. I am not therefore concerned to take notice of any thing further, till the Second Section of the Fourth Action. For though po&s;&s;ibly in the intermediate di&s;cour&s;e, &s;ome things are &s;aid, which are not
<PB N="14" REF="11">
&s;o cogent, and other&s;ome which might appear obnoxious to one that would be quarrel&s;ome; yet becau&s;e I wi&s;h well to the de&s;ign, and attend not an <HI>a&s;&s;ault,</HI> but <HI>defence,</HI> I &s;hall pa&s;s all that without any other Remarque; but; that if this learned Gentleman had thought <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> and my &s;elf <HI>Scepticks</HI> in good earne&s;t, his proof which mu&s;t &s;uppo&s;e the <HI>certainty</HI> of &s;ome <HI>principles,</HI> had been <HI>precarious;</HI> or, if not, <HI>needle&s;s.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="2" TYPE="action">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> ACTIO QUARTA. <HI>Sect.</HI> 2.</HEAD>
<HEAD TYPE="sub">Ip&s;ae jam loquantur querelae, illae nempe quibus qua|tuor a tertio Capitula, cumulavit&mdash;<HI>pag. 51.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IT &s;eems the learned Gentleman had a de&s;ire to make an occa&s;ion to &s;olve the motion of the <HI>Sea,</HI> and <HI>Magnetick Attractions;</HI> &s;ince in my di&s;cour&s;e I gave him none, having only mention'd them as things I would not in&s;i&s;t on, and confe&s;t them better accounted for then <HI>le&s;s acknowledg'd My&s;teries.</HI> Whether the rea&s;on of the&s;e darke <HI>Phaenomena</HI> be well a&s;&s;igned by this Philo&s;opher; I'le not put my &s;elf upon the occa&s;ion of inquiring. That they are the <HI>certain</HI> and <HI>infallible</HI> cau&s;es, I &s;uppo&s;e this learned Man's mode&s;ty will not permit him to affirm; and if they are but confe&s;t <HI>probabilities,</HI> here's no oppo&s;ition to the <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> of the Author; which allowes ingenious and hopeful conjecture in re&s;olving the appearances of Nature: though he fears, few Accounts will amount to <HI>Certainties</HI> and <HI>Demon&s;tra|tions.</HI> So that though for mine own part I acquie&s;ce in the <HI>Carte&s;ian</HI> &s;olution of the&s;e <HI>Magnalia,</HI> as an Hypothe&s;is that may content one, that is not <HI>re&s;tle&s;ly</HI> and <HI>unrea&s;onably</HI> inqui|&s;itive:
<PB N="15" REF="11">
Yet even in that, when I would look deep, I de|&s;cern objections which perhaps will very difficulty be &s;a|tisfied: And which &s;peak tho&s;e ingenious offers to be but <HI>attempts,</HI> no ab&s;olute <HI>performances.</HI> And if this acute Philo&s;opher think the <HI>impul&s;e</HI> of the <HI>external Winds</HI> a &s;ufficient cau&s;e of the <HI>Flux</HI> and <HI>Reflux;</HI> I &s;hall not go about to di&s;turbe him in his &s;atisfactions. <HI>That will ea&s;e one Man's mind, that will leave an others re&s;tle&s;s.</HI> Only I cannot well apprehend how &s;o <HI>con&s;tant</HI> and <HI>regular</HI> an ef|fect as the <HI>motion</HI> of the <HI>Sea,</HI> &s;hould depend upon &s;o <HI>uncertain</HI> and <HI>proverbially incon&s;tant</HI> a cau&s;e as the winds are. Or, if there were no difficulty in <HI>that,</HI> yet the learned Author may plea&s;e to con&s;ider, that this is but the next cau&s;e of the <HI>Phaenomenon,</HI> the cau&s;e of which, perhaps, is more hardly a&s;&s;igneable then the other. And the nature and original of the winds, is, it may be, as ab&s;tru&s;e a Theory as any in Philo&s;ophy. For in a&s;&s;igning Cau&s;es, in the <HI>&s;econd</HI> or <HI>third,</HI> commonly we are lo&s;t and non|plu&s;t, which is no incon&s;iderable evidence of humane <HI>Igno|rance</HI> and <HI>Deficiency.</HI></P>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="5" TYPE="action">
<HEAD>ACTIO QUINTA. <HI>Sect.</HI> I. <MILESTONE UNIT="A."></HEAD>
<HEAD TYPE="sub">Tertio itaque eloquenti&s;simae di&s;&s;ertationis capite objicit ignorantiam illius rei quae noti&s;sima&mdash;<HI>pag. 57.</HI></HEAD>
<P>MY learned A&s;&s;ailant is now de&s;cended to the difficulties <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> I propounded, and judge not yet &s;atisfactorily ac|counted for; concerning which I affirm not, that they are doubts that cannot po&s;&s;ibly be unriddled; for this were to di&s;courage, and not to awaken inquiry: but that they have
<PB N="16" REF="12">
not yet been &s;ufficiently explain'd, or explicable by any yet extant Hypothe&s;is; a &s;ad argument of <HI>intellectual</HI> defici|ence, that after &s;o much talk and indeavour after <HI>Science,</HI> the whole world &s;hould yet be to &s;eek in matters they have the greate&s;t advantages of being acquainted with. I am not therefore an enemy to any E&s;&s;ayes can be made to|wards the explication of the difficulties propo&s;ed; but &s;hould heartily embrace any hopeful offers for the clearing of tho&s;e my&s;terious Theories. So that if this learned man propo&s;e any thing that may be probable; though it come not near the title of <HI>certainty</HI> or <HI>&s;cience:</HI> I have &s;o great a kindne&s;s for Ingenuity, and &s;uch a de&s;ire for the quieting my anxious and inquiring mind, that I &s;hall give it an en|tertainment not like the u&s;ual ones of angry Di&s;putants, who cannot endure any thing that proceeds from an Anta|goni&s;t; but &s;uch a one as may evidence, that Truth is wel|come to me, though it comes in a way of oppo&s;ition to the petty intere&s;t of mine opinions. To the bu&s;ine&s;s then,</P>
<P><HI>If to &s;uppo&s;e the &s;oul a di&s;tinct &s;ub&s;tance from the body and extrin&s;ically advenient,</HI> be a great Error in Philo&s;ophy, al|mo&s;t all the world hath hitherto been mi&s;taken: &s;o that if this Gentlemans opinion be true, he hath confirm'd the <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> I endeavor to promote. But if we enquire into the Philo&s;ophy of the <HI>Soul,</HI> as high as any accounts are given of it, we &s;hall find It's di&s;tinction from the body to have been the current belief of all the wi&s;er Ages. For,</P>
<P N="1">(1.) The highe&s;t times of who&s;e Doctrines we have any Hi&s;tory, believed it's <HI>Praeexi&s;tence,</HI> and therefore certainly a&s;&s;erted it's <HI>diver&s;ity</HI> and <HI>&s;ub&s;tantial di&s;tinction</HI> from the <HI>body</HI> it informs. Of which briefly. We have <HI>Praeexi&s;tence</HI> among the <HI>Chaldean</HI> Oracles,
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign">,</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q>
<PB N="17" REF="12">
And afterwards more clearly
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q>
And <HI>P&s;ellus</HI> in his Expo&s;ition of the <HI>Chaldean Theology,</HI> tells us, that according to their Doctrine <HI>Souls</HI> de&s;cended hither; <GAP DESC="foreign">. And again <HI>Zoroa&s;ter,</HI> &s;peaking of &s;ouls,
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q></P>
<P>Be&s;ides which (2.) <HI>Tri&s;megi&s;tus</HI> is expre&s;s in the a&s;&s;er|tion of the &s;ame Doctrine; of which a te&s;timony or two perhaps will not be impertinent. In his <HI>Minerva Mundi,</HI> he brings in <HI>God</HI> threatning tho&s;e he had placed in an happy condition of life and enjoyment, with bonds and im|pri&s;onment in ca&s;e of di&s;obedience. <GAP DESC="foreign">. And they tran&s;gre&s;&s;ing, he adds, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And in another place, a&s;&s;ignes this for the cau&s;e of their incarceration; <GAP DESC="foreign">.</P>
<P N="3">(3.) It was al&s;o the opinion of the ancient <HI>Jews,</HI> that Souls were fir&s;t created together, and re&s;ided in a place they call <HI>Golph,</HI> a <HI>Coele&s;tial region.</HI> Ad therefore 'tis &s;aid in the <HI>Mi&s;hna, Non aderit Filius</HI> David <HI>priu&s;quam ex|hau&s;tae fuerint univer&s;ae animae quae &s;unt in Golph.</HI> So that they believed all generations on <HI>earth</HI> to be &s;upplyed from that <HI>Promptuary</HI> and <HI>element</HI> of <HI>Soules</HI> in <HI>Heaven;</HI> whence they &s;uppo&s;ed them to de&s;cend by the <HI>North-Pole,</HI> and to a&s;cend by the <HI>South.</HI> Hence the &s;aying of the <HI>Cabbali&s;ts, Magnus Aquilo &s;caturigo Animarum.</HI> And probably that other <HI>Omne malum nobis ex Aquilone.</HI> From which tradition 'tis likely al&s;o <HI>Homer</HI> had this notion,</P>
<LG>
<PB N="18" REF="13">
<L>&mdash;<GAP DESC="foreign">,</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L>
</LG>
<P N="4">(4.) What was the opinion of <HI>Pythagoras, Plato,</HI> and the greate&s;t of the Greek Philo&s;ophers in this particular, is no|toriou&s;ly known to all men that know any thing of the&s;e matters. And I need no te&s;timonies in &s;o clear a bu&s;ine&s;s. It appears then from the allegations I have produced, that the mo&s;t valuable wi&s;dom of the antient world a&s;&s;erted a Doctrine which nece&s;&s;arily inferres and &s;uppo&s;eth their opi|nion of the Souls being <HI>a di&s;tinct &s;ub&s;tance from the body.</HI> Which al&s;o</P>
<P N="2">(2) Mu&s;t be &s;uppo&s;ed by all that believe it's <HI>natural Im|mortality.</HI> For <HI>&s;eparability</HI> is the greate&s;t argument of <HI>real di&s;tinction;</HI> e&s;pecially that, which the Schools call <HI>mutual.</HI> Now the <HI>Souls immortality</HI> is a truth that hath had an una|nimous reception from the better and wi&s;er world. The <HI>Aegyptians, Chaldaeans, A&s;&s;yrians, Indians, Jews, Greeks,</HI> and univer&s;ally all that ever had a name for wi&s;dom among the Antients, believed it. And what hath been the appre|hen&s;ion of latter ages, I need inform no body that is capable of judging in &s;uch inquiries. A <HI>Councel</HI> of the Church of <HI>Rome</HI> it &s;elf hath determin'd it, and recommended it's proof and demon&s;tration to all Chri&s;tian Philo&s;ophers. But what need of more? 'tis the belief of Sir <HI>K. Digby,</HI> and our <HI>Au|thors</HI> own. And how <HI>real &s;eparability</HI> can con&s;i&s;t with <HI>iden|tity</HI> and <HI>indi&s;tinction,</HI> I know no po&s;&s;ibility of apprehending. For that a thing can be <HI>&s;eparated</HI> from it <HI>&s;elf,</HI> can never be believed by any, but tho&s;e that make a Religion of <HI>ab&s;urdi|ties.</HI></P>
<P N="3"><PB N="19" REF="13">
(3.) The <HI>Sacred</HI> and <HI>Mo&s;aical</HI> Philo&s;ophy &s;uppo&s;eth the like <HI>real di&s;tinction;</HI> of which the expre&s;&s;ion of God's <HI>breathing into Adams no&s;trils the breath of life,</HI> is &s;ufficient evidence. Yea, and all the Arguments that are alledg'd to prove it's immediate <HI>creation,</HI> do &s;trongly conclude <HI>it</HI> an <HI>other &s;ub&s;tance</HI> from the <HI>body.</HI> Yea</P>
<P N="4">(4) <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> him&s;elf affirmes it; for &s;aith he, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And again, <GAP DESC="foreign">. El&s;ewhere, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And yet more clearly, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And once more, <GAP DESC="foreign">. Other te&s;ti|monies I could bring to like purpo&s;e, but the&s;e are &s;uffici|ent to evince that if <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> be con&s;i&s;tent with him&s;elf, he believed the real di&s;tinction I contend for; And his <HI>Peri|pateticks</HI> I'me &s;ure unanimou&s;ly affirm it. To all which if I can add Sir <HI>K. Digby</HI>'s opinion, I &s;hall bid fair for our Authors a&s;&s;ent to my <HI>conclu&s;ion,</HI> that 'twas <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s, and the <HI>Truth.</HI></P>
<P N="5">(5) Then, That noble and celebrated friend of our Au|thors, affirmes in his <HI>Immortality</HI> [that the <HI>&s;oul is a &s;ub|&s;tance, and a &s;ub&s;tance be&s;ides the body.]</HI> Yea, almo&s;t all that di&s;cour&s;e of his leans upon that &s;uppo&s;al. Yea</P>
<P N="6">(6) Our Philo&s;opher him&s;elf in his <HI>Peripatetical In&s;ti|tutions,</HI> affirms as much as ever I &s;uppo&s;ed. For he &s;aith that ['Tis mo&s;t evident that the <HI>mind</HI> is &s;omething of an other kind from <HI>Quantity</HI> and <HI>Matter,</HI> that 'tis noble and wholy oppo&s;ite to the nature of <HI>Quantity,</HI> that 'tis a <HI>&s;ub&s;tantial Principle</HI> of Man, and no <HI>mode</HI> or <HI>determination</HI> of <HI>divi&s;i|bility,</HI> and that there is nothing common to <HI>Body</HI> and <HI>Spirit.]</HI> Be&s;ides which, in the Fifth Book of the &s;ame <HI>In&s;titutions,</HI> he di&s;cour&s;es of the Souls <HI>&s;eparation</HI> from the <HI>body,</HI> and a&s;&s;erts it to be evident, that it peri&s;heth not with it; becau&s;e it hath actions that belong not to a <HI>body,</HI> but hath of it &s;elf the vertue of a <HI>being.</HI> And that it's power of exi&s;tence is not taken away when the body fails, the &s;oul being apart from
<PB N="20" REF="14">
and be&s;ides it. And that <HI>matter</HI> is not nece&s;&s;ary to the <HI>Souls exi&s;tence.</HI> Many other expre&s;&s;ions there are in that di&s;cour&s;e to like purpo&s;e, which &s;eem to &s;peak the <HI>Souls real di&s;tin|ction from the Body</HI> in as great variety of phra&s;e as <HI>diver&s;ity</HI> and <HI>di&s;tinction</HI> can be &s;poken. So that how &s;uch pa&s;&s;ages con&s;i&s;t with the doctrine of it's <HI>Identity</HI> with the <HI>body,</HI> I confe&s;s I am not <HI>Metaphy&s;ical</HI> enough to comprehend. And I believe very few el&s;e can perceive the con&s;i&s;tency be&s;ides this Philo&s;opher; who&s;e <HI>Metaphy&s;icks</HI> of <HI>whole</HI> and <HI>part,</HI> have yet been entertain'd by none that I know of; and therefore though this &s;hould be acknowledged a good ac|count, yet 'tis an Argument of the weakne&s;s of humane un|der&s;tanding that it hath not yet comprehended it.</P>
<P>I think by this time 'tis clear then, that the &s;uppo&s;ition of my procedure, the <HI>Souls di&s;tinction from the Body,</HI> is not peccant; except all the world, both <HI>Antient</HI> and <HI>Modern,</HI> hath been mi&s;taken, and our Author al&s;o: which if it be granted, 'tis an in&s;tance of what I plead for. If not, my &s;uppo&s;ition is good, and the emergent doubt unan&s;wer'd. And if our learned Author yet thinks it plain, that <HI>either Man is no being,</HI> or that the <HI>&s;oul and body are not two,</HI> I mu&s;t acknowledge &s;uch <HI>Palams</HI> to be the <HI>Dogmatizing</HI> I &s;uppo&s;e. And I am willing to put it upon the i&s;&s;ue, whether it be &s;o to any body el&s;e but this Philo&s;opher.</P>
<P>But (2) be&s;ides all this, it &s;eems to me very clear from the <HI>nature</HI> of the <HI>Things</HI> them&s;elves ab&s;tracting from <HI>Au|thority;</HI> That the <HI>Soul</HI> is <HI>a &s;ub&s;tance di&s;tinct from the body.</HI> For I think,</P>
<P N="1">(1) 'Tis &s;trongly concluded by the common Arguments that prove it <HI>immaterial;</HI> for <HI>perception,</HI> perception of <HI>&s;pi|rituals, univer&s;als</HI> and other <HI>ab&s;tracts</HI> from &s;en&s;e, as <HI>Mathe|matical lines, points, &s;uperficies, congenit notions, Logical, Metaphy&s;ical,</HI> and <HI>Moral&punc; &s;elf-reflection, Freedom, indifferen|cy</HI> and <HI>univer&s;ality</HI> of <HI>action:</HI> the&s;e, I &s;ay, are properties not at all competible to <HI>body</HI> or <HI>matter,</HI> though of never &s;o pure
<PB N="21" REF="14">
a mixture. Nor is it conceiveable how any of the&s;e &s;hould ari&s;e from <HI>modificaiions</HI> of <HI>quantity</HI> being of a diver&s;e kind from all the <HI>Phaenomena</HI> of <HI>motion</HI> But</P>
<P N="2">(2) If the &s;oul be not a di&s;tinct &s;ub&s;tance from the body, 'tis then a certain <HI>di&s;po&s;ition</HI> and <HI>modification</HI> of <HI>it;</HI> which this Gentteman in the 10 Le&s;&s;on of his <HI>In&s;titutions</HI> &s;eems to intimate, &s;aying, <HI>[That &s;ince the &s;oul is a certain affecti|on</HI>&mdash;which is introduced and expell'd by corporeal acti|on&mdash;] he thence inferrs &s;ome thing that is not to our purpo&s;e to relate. And if &s;o&punc; &s;ince all <HI>diver&s;ities</HI> in <HI>matter</HI> ari&s;e from <HI>motion</HI> and <HI>po&s;ition</HI> of <HI>parts,</HI> every different preception will require a different <HI>order</HI> and <HI>po&s;ition</HI> of the parts of the <HI>matter perceiving,</HI> which mu&s;t be obtained by motion. I demand then, when we pa&s;s from one con|ception to another, is the motion, the cau&s;e of this diver&s;ity, meerly <HI>ca&s;ual;</HI> or directed by &s;ome act of knowledge? The former, I &s;uppo&s;e, no Man in his wits will affirm; &s;ince then all our conceptions will be non-&s;en&s;e and confu&s;ion; <HI>chance</HI> being the cau&s;e of nothing that is <HI>orderly</HI> and <HI>regu|lar.</HI> If therefore there be a knowledge in us that directs the motions that form every di&s;tinct conception: I demand con|cerning that <HI>knowledge,</HI> Whether it be in like manner di|rected by &s;ome other, or is it the effect of meer <HI>ca&s;ual</HI> mo|tions? If the former, we mu&s;t run up in <HI>infinitum</HI> in our in|quiry: and the latter admits the alledged ab&s;urdities. There is no way then of defending the a&s;&s;ertion of the &s;ouls being <HI>matter,</HI> or any <HI>modification</HI> of it: but by affirming with Ma&s;ter <HI>Hobbs</HI> a <HI>certain connexion</HI> between all our <HI>thoughts,</HI> and a nece&s;&s;ary <HI>fate</HI> in all things: which who ever affirmes, will find difficulties enough in his a&s;&s;ertion to bring him to mine, That there's a <HI>Vanity</HI> in <HI>Dogmatizing,</HI> and <HI>Confidence</HI> is unrea&s;onable.</P>
<P>But of this I have had occa&s;ion to di&s;cour&s;e more in an other Treati&s;e, and I &s;hall not repeat what I have there written, or what others have &s;aid on the &s;ubject. E&s;pecially
<PB N="22" REF="15">
&s;ince perhaps this learned Gentleman will not think him&s;elf concern'd in the Proof of this Conclu&s;ion, he having in his writings a&s;&s;erted it. But whether he have not un&s;aid it a|gain in <HI>this,</HI> I appeal to any equal Decerner. And that the <HI>&s;oul</HI> &s;hould be a <HI>&s;ub&s;tance of another kind from mat|ter,</HI> that <HI>hath nothing common with it; a &s;ub&s;tance &s;eparable from all body, to which matter is not nece&s;&s;ary, and actually in the other &s;tate divided from it:</HI> (all which and more to like purpo&s;e our Author hath in &s;ome of his Books af|firmed;) and yet not be a <HI>di&s;tinct &s;ub&s;tance,</HI> but <HI>really</HI> the &s;ame with the <HI>body</HI> to which it is united; which he <HI>a&s;&s;erts</HI> in <HI>this;</HI> I &s;ay&punc; how the&s;e &s;o oppo&s;ite affirmations can be reconciled, I have either not wit, or not charity enough to help me to imagine. I know this Authors doctrine is, that there are no parts before <HI>&s;eparation</HI> and <HI>divi&s;ion,</HI> and therefore no <HI>real di&s;tinction.</HI> But whether things in their natures &s;o <HI>divers</HI> as <HI>body</HI> and <HI>&s;pirit,</HI> which almo&s;t in nothing, even according to this Philo&s;ophy, communicate; are not <HI>e&s;&s;entially</HI> divided, though not <HI>locally</HI> di&s;tant, I am willing to leave to the Readers judgment. And I would fain know whereupon the <HI>&s;eparability</HI> of the <HI>&s;oul</HI> and <HI>body</HI> is founded, if not upon the <HI>real di&s;tinction</HI> of their natures: &s;o that though this notion may be le&s;s obnoxious when it relates only to <HI>&s;ub&s;tances</HI> of the &s;ame <HI>kind,</HI> and quality; yet when it concerns tho&s;e that are &s;o <HI>e&s;&s;entially</HI> di&s;tinct, as <HI>body</HI> and <HI>&s;pirit,</HI> it &s;eems mo&s;t &s;trangely lyable. Yea though it &s;hould be &s;uppo&s;ed a Truth, yet it mu&s;t be acknowledged unconceiveable; which &s;ufficeth to &s;atisfie my Conclu&s;ion.</P>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Ne&abque; me terret di&s;tinctio (quae pueris philo&s;ophiam garrientibus in &s;acco parata e&s;t) Entis perfecti &amp; imper|fecti&mdash;<HI>pag. 58.</HI></HEAD>
<P><PB N="23" REF="15">
THe di&s;tinction of the Schools of a Being <HI>perfect</HI> and <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> <HI>imperfect,</HI> is not I think &s;o <HI>childi&s;h</HI> and <HI>impertinent</HI> as our Author would have believed. For though <HI>Ens Im|perfectum</HI> in the <HI>Metaphy&s;ical</HI> &s;ence, be non-&s;ence and a con|tradiction; yet in <HI>genere Phy&s;ico,</HI> as they &s;peak, 'tis no ab|&s;urdity: &s;ince a being may want &s;ome circum&s;tances of <HI>natural</HI> compleatne&s;s and perfection; and yet be <HI>Metaphy&s;i|cally</HI> compleat and perfect: &s;o that to affirm the <HI>&s;oul</HI> an <HI>imperfect Being</HI> nakedly in it &s;elf, is to &s;ay no more, then that 'twas made with a <HI>natural aptitude,</HI> and <HI>congruity</HI> to a <HI>body</HI> by union with which 'tis <HI>perfected</HI> and <HI>compleated,</HI> being then furni&s;h't with the requi&s;ites of its nature; which in like manner may be &s;aid of a <HI>body</HI> in humane form, <HI>viz.</HI> that 'tis defective and incompleat till it be furni&s;hed with the <HI>principle</HI> of Hu|mane actions, for which it was de&s;igned. So that there's no ab|&s;urdity in affirming, That a thing may be one in a <HI>Phy&s;iologi|cal</HI> and natural &s;en&s;e; and two in a <HI>Metaphy&s;ical;</HI> And &s;o out Philo&s;opher's <HI>inference</HI> is no <HI>&s;equel.</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="A."></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>2.</HI> Quando itaque petit, Unde Anima veniat? Repo|nendum e&s;t, An dubitet unde Homo veniat?&mdash;<HI>pag. 59.</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="G."></HEAD>
<P>THe Foundation of our learned Authors An&s;wers to the propo&s;ed difficulties being overthrown; and it being made &s;ecure enough, <HI>That the &s;oul is a di&s;tinct &s;ub&s;tance from the body;</HI> 'tis a pertinent and material enquiry to ask, whence the Soul is? And if our Philo&s;opher will call <HI>this</HI> the <HI>Man</HI> according to the <HI>Maxim,</HI> let the que&s;tion be pro|po&s;ed in his own phra&s;e, and there's no danger of an ab|&s;urdity.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<PB N="24" REF="16">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Ne&abque; Majorum quamtumvis Reverendorum me qua|tit Authoritas; non dico illorum qui&mdash;<HI>pag. 59.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IT &s;eems the learned Gentleman would fain reconcile the Authority of the <HI>Church</HI> a&s;&s;erting the <HI>Souls Creation</HI> to his main conclu&s;ion, that 'tis no <HI>di&s;tinct &s;ub&s;tance from the body;</HI> and to his inference thereupon, that 'tis improper and impertinent, to inquire <HI>whence It came.</HI> But whether what is &s;aid be a clear &s;alve or a &s;huffle, let it be determin'd by any equal judgment. For either by <HI>Homo quatenus in|tellectivus,</HI> our Author means &s;omething that is the <HI>&s;ame</HI> with the body; or really <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> and diver&s;e. If the for|mer, he hath not &s;atisfied the Authority of the <HI>Church,</HI> which affirms, the Soul as a <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> &s;ub&s;tance, to be the immedi|ate &s;ubject of <HI>Creation;</HI> founded upon that clear di&s;tincti|on in the in&s;pired writings [The body to the du&s;t, and the Soul to God that gave it.] But if he mean the latter, he hath not provided for his own a&s;&s;ertion and <HI>hypothe&s;is.</HI> Be|&s;ides (2.) If man as <HI>intellective</HI> be <HI>created,</HI> then either he means the <HI>whole</HI> man, or only <HI>that</HI> by which he's <HI>intel|lective;</HI> the former is again&s;t all &s;en&s;e and experience. And the latter overthrows all our Author's An&s;wers, with the Propo&s;ition upon which they are erected. For if there be &s;ome thing in man which is the &s;ubject of <HI>divine power</HI> and <HI>action;</HI> and &s;ome other thing that is the &s;ubject of <HI>natural production</HI> and <HI>generation;</HI> it &s;eems to me appa|rent that the&s;e mu&s;t be two things really di&s;tingui&s;h't. For the &s;ame thing cannot be <HI>created</HI> and <HI>naturally produced.</HI> For <HI>Creation</HI> &s;uppo&s;eth the <HI>production</HI> of the whole <HI>ex ni|hilo,</HI> both <HI>&s;ui &amp; &s;ubjecti</HI> (as the Schools phra&s;e it) with|out the co-operation of any thing with the divine &s;uper|lative
<PB N="25" REF="16">
power: whereas all <HI>generation,</HI> according to truth and the &s;ame Hypothe&s;is, at lea&s;t &s;uppo&s;eth one of them, and is perform'd by natural agents. And I think the ca&s;e is plain enough when 'tis brought to this, Whether the &s;ame thing can be produced of <HI>&s;omething</HI> and <HI>nothing,</HI> with created a&s;&s;i&s;tance, and without it? Since the <HI>Actions</HI> then are &s;o <HI>infinitely diver&s;e,</HI> I think I &s;hall not be reprehen&s;i|bly <HI>Dogmatical,</HI> in affirming the terms <HI>di&s;tinct.</HI> What the Gentleman &s;ays more, &s;eems to be involv'd, and looks like a de&s;igned eva&s;ion. And if <HI>[one action</HI> produceth a man, a Creature equivalent to a <HI>Bea&s;t</HI> and <HI>Angel]</HI> I demand, Whether this one action be <HI>divine</HI> or <HI>natural,</HI> from <HI>God</HI> or the <HI>generant?</HI> If the former, every <HI>man</HI> is as <HI>immediately created</HI> as the <HI>fir&s;t.</HI> And the latter quite excludes <HI>crea ion,</HI> and &s;uppo&s;eth God no otherwi&s;e to <HI>act</HI> in giving being to our Souls, then in each common production. 'Tis nece&s;&s;ary therefore that the terms produced be <HI>di&s;tinct,</HI> when the Actions whereby they are produced are &s;o va&s;tly <HI>diver&s;e;</HI> and that the Soul have an Origination different from the <HI>Formation</HI> of the <HI>body,</HI> of which 'tis more <HI>pertinent</HI> to <HI>in|quire,</HI> then <HI>ea&s;ie</HI> to return an <HI>An&s;wer.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>3.</HI> Ex h&acirc;c Veritate derivamur ad &s;equentes duos <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> nodos patenti&s;sim&egrave; &s;olvendos.&mdash;<HI>pag. 60.</HI></HEAD>
<P>IN <HI>this</HI> and the following <HI>Paragraphs</HI> our Author &s;uppo|&s;eth <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> his Doctrin of the <HI>identity</HI> of the <HI>&s;oul</HI> and <HI>body</HI> for an <HI>An&s;wer;</HI> And I think after what hath been &s;aid, I have as good rea&s;on to &s;uppo&s;e mine of the <HI>diver&s;ity</HI> for a <HI>re|ply.</HI> But how the <HI>definition</HI> of a <HI>Part</HI> enervates my enqui|ry, I cannot imagine, &s;ince if <HI>[Parts are, out of which by compo&s;ition are made one]</HI> And the <HI>body</HI> and <HI>&s;oul</HI> be &s;uppo&s;ed
<PB N="26" REF="17">
parts of the Man (which may well enough be allowed upon the account of what hath been &s;aid) I &s;ee not but why we may inquire, how the&s;e parts, who&s;e natures are &s;o different, can be compounded and united.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Currit idem Error in &s;equenti difficultate, quae lu|get ne&s;ciri quomodo Anima moveat corpus,&mdash;<HI>pag. 61.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> WHether my <HI>&s;uppo&s;al</HI> be an <HI>Error,</HI> we have &s;een al|ready; if it be not, our <HI>Philo&s;ophers An&s;wer</HI> is <HI>&s;o.</HI> And whither the implyed a&s;&s;ertion that the <HI>Soul</HI> moves not the body be not one, I appeal to any man, that under|&s;tands he hath any claim to &s;uch a being. For though ma|ny of our actions, and po&s;&s;ibly more then are &s;u&s;pected, may be allowed to be meer <HI>Mechanick</HI> motions; yet the experience of all the World atte&s;ts, that our <HI>wills deter|mine</HI> and <HI>excite</HI> not a few of our <HI>corporeal motions.</HI> What el&s;e means the <HI>di&s;tinction</HI> of the <HI>Schools</HI> of actions <HI>impe|rate</HI> and <HI>elicit?</HI> And how is it that we can <HI>&s;peak</HI> and <HI>move</HI> at plea&s;ure, and in &s;pight of all <HI>corporeal impul&s;e,</HI> de&s;i&s;t from <HI>external</HI> action! And if Man be a meer <HI>Mecha|nicks</HI> Engine, farewel <HI>Free-will, Virtue, Vice, Laws, Re|ligion, rewards</HI> and <HI>puni&s;hments.</HI> A <HI>clock</HI> were as capa|ble of the&s;e, according to our Philo&s;opher's <HI>Hypothe&s;is,</HI> as an <HI>humane Automaton.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Vere enim Unum membrum animatum movet aliud, &s;ed non aliqua &s;ub&s;tantia quae &s;it pura Anima&mdash;<HI>pag. 61.</HI></HEAD>
<P><PB N="27" REF="17">
&punc;TIs true, one <HI>animate member moves another,</HI> but the <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> <HI>motion</HI> mu&s;t &s;omewhere begin. And though tho&s;e which are <HI>purely corporeal</HI> in us are excited by <HI>material</HI> agents; yet others we find, which derive from an higher <HI>Principle, viz.</HI> a <HI>free</HI> and <HI>uncon&s;trained will.</HI> And it &s;eem &s;trange to me that men &s;hould be &s;o much in love with their pri|vate <HI>&s;peculations,</HI> as for their &s;akes to confront their <HI>own,</HI> and all the <HI>worlds experience.</HI> What follows, no body that I know, affirms, <HI>viz.</HI> [That a &s;ub&s;tance which is a pure <HI>Soul</HI> moves a member wherein there is none].</P>
<P>But to what concerns other <HI>Animals,</HI> the learned Author knows, that the <HI>Platoni&s;ts</HI> a&s;&s;ign them <HI>Souls in|dependent</HI> on their <HI>Bodies;</HI> and the <HI>Peripateticks,</HI> &s;ub&s;tan|tial <HI>Forms di&s;tinct</HI> from <HI>matter,</HI> which are the &s;ource and Principle of their Actions. So that according to either of the&s;e <HI>Hypothe&s;eis,</HI> the que&s;tion may as pertinently be pro|po&s;ed concerning <HI>their kind,</HI> as our <HI>own,</HI> and will be as difficultly an&s;wered. Indeed the excellent <HI>Mon&s;ieur Des-Cartes,</HI> and his followers that affirm, all <HI>bruit Actions</HI> to be <HI>Mechanical,</HI> are not concern'd in the inquiry. And if this be the belief of our Philo&s;opher, I'le not indeavour to di&s;turb his <HI>Hypothe&s;is.</HI> Only this I'le add to our purpo&s;e, That though we &s;uppo&s;e the <HI>Actions</HI> of <HI>Bea&s;ts</HI> to be <HI>fa|tal</HI> and <HI>material,</HI> yet there's no rea&s;on to infer the &s;ame of <HI>ours,</HI> &s;ince we <HI>feel</HI> it otherwi&s;e. And 'tis no very rea|&s;onable method of arguing, to conclude from an <HI>opinion</HI> of things we can but <HI>conjecture,</HI> to the <HI>denyal</HI> of things we <HI>certainly feel,</HI> and <HI>know.</HI> So that though, as our Au|thor in&s;inuates, there may perhaps be no kind of <HI>corporeal Actions</HI> in our &s;elves, which are not in bruits; yet 'tis not therefore nece&s;&s;ary to inferr, that they proceed from a like principle in both: much le&s;s that we &s;hould conclude, that none of our <HI>own actions</HI> are begun by a principle <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> from the <HI>body</HI> and <HI>immaterial;</HI> becau&s;e we believe that
<PB N="28" REF="18">
<HI>theirs</HI> are not &s;o. On the other &s;ide methinks the Argu|ment will be &s;tronger to inferr, That becau&s;e we <HI>feel</HI> a <HI>&s;ub&s;tance di&s;tinct</HI> from <HI>matter</HI> to be the cau&s;e of &s;ome of our <HI>motions;</HI> that therefore there may likely be an <HI>incorporeal</HI> &s;ub&s;tance that is the principle and &s;pring of &s;ome of <HI>theirs:</HI> And 'tis better to conclude from <HI>certainty</HI> to <HI>conjecture,</HI> then from <HI>conjecture</HI> again&s;t <HI>certainty.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>4.</HI> Ultimae, quas in hoc capitulo plangit, tenebrae collo|catae &s;unt in ignoranti&acirc; illius motus,&mdash;<HI>pag. 62.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THe difficulties about the <HI>direction</HI> of the <HI>Spirits</HI> con|cern not only <HI>Man,</HI> but all other <HI>Animals,</HI> &s;uppo&s;ing them to do any thing by a principle of <HI>Knowledge</HI> and <HI>Ani|madver&s;ion.</HI> Or, though we judge all their actions <HI>M cha|nical,</HI> yet the Account will be more difficultly rendred that way, then by &s;uppo&s;ing them to act by an <HI>animadver&s;ive</HI> principle. For how &s;uch an infinite variety of <HI>motions</HI> &s;hould be <HI>regularly</HI> menaged, and conducted in &s;uch a Wilderne&s;s of pa&s;&s;ages and di&s;tinct avennues by meer <HI>blind impellents</HI> and <HI>material</HI> conveyances, I have not the lea&s;t &s;hadow of conjecture. And though <HI>Des-Cartes</HI> hath made the be&s;t attempts in this kind of any hath yet appear'd in the <HI>Theory,</HI> yet there are <HI>Mechanical</HI> difficulties in the way of his So|lutions, which perhaps will never be well &s;atisfied. But our Philo&s;opher confe&s;&s;eth here the defect of his <HI>Anatomy;</HI> and though he thinks him&s;elf &s;ecure of the <HI>general</HI> Cau&s;e, yet the <HI>particular Direction</HI> he acknowledges <HI>wonderful,</HI> and not yet &s;ufficiently di&s;cover'd.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<PB N="29" REF="18">
<HEAD>Ver&ugrave;m Author ca&s;um proprium Homini con&s;tituere vi|detur, <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> o&s;tentans voluntatem &amp; forta&s;sis&mdash;<HI>pag. 63.</HI></HEAD>
<P>TO prove that the Will is not alwayes moved by &s;ome <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> precedent <HI>pa&s;&s;ion,</HI> and con&s;equently that the <HI>Soul</HI> is the <HI>immediate</HI> principle of &s;ome of our <HI>actions,</HI> I make this double offer:</P>
<P N="1">(1.) 'Tis clear from experience, that, though many of our <HI>volitions</HI> are <HI>motions</HI> from the <HI>Pa&s;sion,</HI> yet &s;ome of our <HI>Determinations</HI> are from the <HI>Under&s;tanding</HI> and <HI>immaterial</HI> Faculties. And &s;ometimes we &s;et our <HI>Wills</HI> to determine in things that are purely <HI>indifferent,</HI> to make tryal of our <HI>Liberty;</HI> when we find not the lea&s;t provocation or incite|ment to the action from any <HI>emotion</HI> of the <HI>body.</HI> And indeed to &s;uppo&s;e every action of the Will to depend upon a pre|vious <HI>Appetite</HI> or <HI>Pa&s;sion,</HI> is to de&s;troy our <HI>Liberty,</HI> and to inferr a <HI>Stoical Fatality</HI> with all the dangerous con&s;equences of that Doctrine&punc;</P>
<P N="2">(2.) Our Author's proof that there is no <HI>di&s;pa&s;sionate volition,</HI> is an in&s;inuation, that there is no Knowledge without an <HI>impul&s;e</HI> from the <HI>Phanta&s;ms;</HI> a Conclu&s;ion which may be ea&s;ily di&s;proved, by tho&s;e highly <HI>ab&s;tract Specula|tions</HI> which the mind of Man &s;ometimes entertains it &s;elf with, when it puts off all the cloathing of the <HI>Imagination,</HI> and rai&s;eth it &s;elf to a temper for tho&s;e noble enquiries a|bout <HI>God</HI> and <HI>Immaterials:</HI> And if there be no <HI>Intellect</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">, as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;peaks, for ought I know, we lo&s;e one of our chiefe&s;t Arguments for our <HI>Immortality:</HI> Be&s;ides which, I &s;uppo&s;e our learned Author will not think it for his credit, to be told, that he is in the very rode of the <HI>Hobbian Hypothe&s;is;</HI> which will clearly enough appear,
<PB N="30" REF="19">
if we con&s;ider the&s;e his A&s;&s;ertions; [That the <HI>Soul</HI> is no <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> &s;ub&s;tance from the <HI>Body,</HI> that it contributes nothing towards its motion; that our <HI>Wills</HI> are moved by prece|dent or <HI>pre&s;ent Pa&s;&s;ion,</HI> which doubtle&s;s is excited by &s;ome|thing that is not in our power; that all our <HI>Intellections</HI> are from <HI>Phanta&s;ms,</HI> and con&s;equently, nothing el&s;e but <HI>ele|vated &s;en&s;e,</HI> and that all both <HI>natural</HI> and <HI>free</HI> actions are performed by <HI>motions</HI> deriv'd from the <HI>heart]</HI> I &s;ay, who ever con&s;iders, how <HI>the&s;e</HI> &s;ymbolize, yea, and are one with the main Principles of that irreligious <HI>Philo&s;ophy,</HI> mu&s;t with|out an exce&s;s of Charity, &s;uppo&s;e our Philo&s;opher to have &s;haken hands with the <HI>Leviathan.</HI></P>
<P>Briefly then, 'tis confe&s;t, that the <HI>Mechanical</HI> way of con|veyance and direction of the <HI>Spirits</HI> in <HI>Animal performances</HI> is yet undi&s;cover'd, and that the channels and particular pa&s;|&s;ages of <HI>Mechanical</HI> motions (which all <HI>ours</HI> are &s;uppo&s;ed to be) is yet <HI>occult</HI> and <HI>manife&s;t.</HI> And though this Gen|tleman affirms, the <HI>Heart</HI> to be the Fountain of <HI>animate Operations,</HI> yet 'tis but an unapproved pre&s;umption; and the greate&s;t Ma&s;ter of <HI>Mechanicks</HI> that ever was, the Il|lu&s;trious <HI>Des-Cartes</HI> has deriv'd all the&s;e <HI>motions</HI> from the <HI>brain,</HI> in which he's follow'd by the greate&s;t part of profounde&s;t Speculators; &s;o that it &s;eems we are not <HI>certain</HI> of the <HI>fir&s;t &s;pring</HI> of the <HI>motions</HI> we enquire of; much le&s;s can we certainly determin the <HI>minutes</HI> and <HI>particula|rities</HI> of <HI>direction:</HI> and if any of our <HI>actions</HI> are deriv'd from our <HI>Souls,</HI> which our Author &s;eems unwilling to hear of, though I think I have made it &s;ufficiently evident, the <HI>difficulties</HI> I urg'd upon that <HI>&s;uppo&s;al</HI> have not had the lea&s;t <HI>offer</HI> towards <HI>&s;olution.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>5.</HI> Caput quartum <HI>Sen&s;ationis &amp; Memoriae</HI> in|explicabiles e&s;&s;e naturas objicit.&mdash;<HI>pag. 64.</HI></HEAD>
<P><PB N="31" REF="19">
I Am no further concern'd in the beginning of this <HI>Secti|on,</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> then to mind this learned Gentleman how different <HI>his</HI> apprehen&s;ion of <HI>Des-Cartes</HI> his <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> of the manner of <HI>Sen&s;e,</HI> is, from <HI>that</HI> of his ingenuous and applauded friend Sir <HI>K. Digby;</HI> who calls not his opinion a <HI>fan&s;tatical con|jecture,</HI> but thus Prefaces to the recital of his <HI>Hypothe&s;is. [Mon&s;ieur Des-Cartes,</HI> (who by his great and heroick at|tempts, and by &s;hewing mankind how to &s;teer and hus|band theit rea&s;on to the be&s;t advantage, hath left us no ex|cu&s;e of being ignorant of any thing that is worth the know|ing) explicating the nature of Sen&s;e&mdash;and then goes on to declare his opinion of this matter, which he concludes with this character; of a colour very diver&s;e from our Au|thor's [This then is the &s;um of <HI>Mon&s;ieur Des-Cartes</HI>'s Opi|nion, which he hath very finely expre&s;t with all the advan|tages that oppo&s;ite examples, &s;ignificant words and clear method, can give unto a witty Di&s;cour&s;e; which yet, is but a part of the commendations he de&s;erveth, for what he hath done on this particular: he is over and above all this, the fir&s;t I ever met with who hath publi&s;hed any concep|tions of this nature, whereby to make the <HI>Operations</HI> of <HI>Sen&s;e</HI> intelligible, Certainly, this prai&s;e will ever belong unto him that he hath given the fir&s;t hint of &s;peaking ground|edly, and to the purpo&s;e upon this Subject; and who&s;oever &s;hall carry it any further (as what important my&s;tery was ever born and perfected at one?) mu&s;t acknowledge to have deriv'd his light from him.] This is the cen&s;ure that excel|lent per&s;on gives of <HI>Des-Cartes,</HI> and his Opinion, which his dear Friend our Author, hath with &s;o much &s;everity reflected on. And the learned Knight profe&s;&s;eth him&s;elf of <HI>Des-Cartes</HI>'s mind in all the other circum&s;tances of this <HI>Hypothe&s;is,</HI> ex|cept the <HI>Subject</HI> of this <HI>Motion.</HI> So that I wonder that our Philo&s;opher &s;hould &s;o far forget him&s;elf, as to put &s;uch a
<PB N="32" REF="20">
&s;lurre upon the judgment of his admired Friend, by &s;peak|ing &s;o contemptuou&s;ly of a Notion that learned Man had &s;o much, and &s;o de&s;ervedly, applauded. What follows is al|ready an&s;wer'd.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Sed n&egrave; nihil novi dicat, calumniatur &s;en&s;u &s;olo non po&s;&s;e agno&s;ci quantitates rerum, di&s;tantias,&mdash;<HI>pag. 65.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> OUr Author in this Period, wonders at my <HI>A&s;&s;ertion,</HI> and I <HI>wonder</HI> as much at his <HI>wonder;</HI> which is not oc|ca&s;ioned by any affirmation of <HI>mine,</HI> but by a mi&s;take of his <HI>own:</HI> for my doubt (as plain as I could expre&s;s it) is, How, &s;ince there is nothing in the <HI>Brain,</HI> the <HI>&s;eat</HI> of <HI>Sen&s;e,</HI> to repre&s;ent <HI>external</HI> objects but <HI>motion,</HI> (for which I have the &s;uffrage of his noble friend, who&s;e method he profe&s;&s;eth to follow) how, I &s;ay, we &s;hould by <HI>that</HI> know <HI>figures, di&s;tances, magnitudes,</HI> and <HI>colours,</HI> things of ano|ther <HI>kind</HI> from <HI>motion;</HI> which therefore cannot repre&s;ent them, but by &s;ome <HI>knowledge</HI> in the <HI>Soul,</HI> which we are not aware of; and how the <HI>&s;cant</HI> and <HI>narrow</HI> images in the <HI>Brain</HI> &s;hould notifie the <HI>va&s;te&s;t</HI> objects, in their large dimen&s;ions, without &s;ome <HI>&s;ecret Inference</HI> and <HI>Geo|metry</HI> in the <HI>Soul,</HI> is unconceiveable: But what this Know|ledge is, we know not. This is the &s;en&s;e of the difficul|ty propos'd, which, how it is explicated by the <HI>Optical</HI> de|mon&s;trations the Gentleman talks of, the <HI>Opticks</HI> of my un|der&s;tanding cannot di&s;cover. For the re&s;t I dare venture it without an An&s;wer.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="6" TYPE="section">
<PB N="33" REF="20">
<HEAD><HI>6.</HI> Proximus in <HI>Memoriam</HI> labor expenditur. Illi|us <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> explanationem ut impo&s;sibilem declaret,&mdash;<HI>pag. 66.</HI></HEAD>
<HEAD TYPE="sub"><HI>7.</HI> Imprimis, dec&icirc;di &agrave; moventibus &s;en&s;um qua&s;dam ex|uvias &amp; corporis delibamenta, quoad tactum,&mdash;<HI>pag 68.</HI></HEAD>
<P>I Take not upon me to determin of <HI>Po&s;&s;ibilities;</HI> and there|fore <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> from the pre&s;ent ignorance of the nature of <HI>Memo|ry</HI> I infer not, that it will never be explained hereafter: Only I affirm, that no Hypothe&s;is extant hath yet made it <HI>ma|nife&s;t;</HI> which is &s;ufficient for my <HI>conclu&s;ion</HI> of the pre&s;ent <HI>nar|rowne&s;s</HI> of our <HI>Knowledge,</HI> though not of my A&s;&s;ailants of the <HI>impo&s;&s;ibility</HI> of enlarging it.</P>
<P>But our Philo&s;opher thinketh the nature of <HI>Memory</HI> &s;uf|ficiently explained already, and the account he gives is that of Sir <HI>K. Digby,</HI> which was one of the four that I examin'd in the Di&s;cour&s;e impugn'd. This is the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> which our Author hath adopted, and undertook the defence of; with what &s;ucce&s;s, we &s;hall di&s;cover when we have exa|min'd the <HI>An&s;wer</HI> he makes to my <HI>Impugnations.</HI> Which after a large recital of the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> he de&s;cends to in the ninth Section.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="9" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>9.</HI> Attamen, perturbat novum Naturae miratorem <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> multitudo objectorum cavis cerebri&mdash;<HI>pag. 72.</HI></HEAD>
<P>THe difficulty I urg'd again&s;t the <HI>Digbaean</HI> account of <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> the <HI>Memory,</HI> was, that 'tis inconceiveable how tho&s;e <HI>active particles,</HI> which are the <HI>images</HI> and <HI>repre&s;entations</HI>
<PB N="34" REF="21">
of things <HI>remembred,</HI> &s;hould keep their <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> and <HI>or|derly Situations</HI> without <HI>confu&s;ion</HI> or <HI>di&s;&s;ipation</HI> in a &s;ub|&s;tance wherein there is continual <HI>motion?</HI> to which the learned Gentleman returns; That 'tis as conceivable as how the <HI>Rays</HI> of <HI>Light</HI> &s;hould come in a <HI>direct line</HI> to the <HI>Eye;</HI> or how the <HI>Atomical Effluvia</HI> that continually flow from all bodies, e&s;pecially the <HI>Magnetical</HI> and <HI>Sym|pathetick,</HI> &s;hould find their way to the place they tend to. To this I rejoyn briefly, (1) what the Gentleman him&s;elf &s;ugge&s;ts, were <HI>an&s;wer</HI> &s;ufficient, that the multi|plying of difficulty doth not &s;olve <HI>it:</HI> For &s;uppo&s;ing the <HI>direction</HI> of the <HI>corpu&s;cles</HI> of <HI>light,</HI> and tho&s;e mention'd <HI>Effluvia,</HI> to be of a difficult apprehen&s;ion, as the <HI>conti|nuance</HI> and <HI>regularity</HI> of tho&s;e <HI>images</HI> in the Brain: yet this only argues another <HI>defect</HI> in our <HI>Knowledge,</HI> and &s;o is a new evidence of the <HI>truth</HI> of my General <HI>Conclu&s;ion.</HI> But (2) the propo&s;ed In&s;tances are far more accounta|ble then <HI>this</HI> before us. For, as to what concerns the <HI>light,</HI> &s;uppo&s;ing with <HI>Des Cartes</HI> (as is mo&s;t probable) that the action of <HI>Light</HI> con&s;i&s;ts in nothing but the <HI>conamen</HI> of the <HI>Aethereal matter,</HI> receding from the <HI>centre</HI> of its <HI>motion:</HI> The <HI>direct tendency</HI> of it to the Eye, is no difficulty worth con&s;idering, but as <HI>clear</HI> as the <HI>Light</HI> it &s;elf the &s;ubject of the enquiry; or, if the <HI>rays</HI> be <HI>Atomical &s;treams,</HI> and <HI>effluxes</HI> of the <HI>Sun,</HI> there is no more difficulty in this <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> neither, then in the direct <HI>&s;pouting</HI> of <HI>water</HI> out of a <HI>Pipe;</HI> yea no more, then in the beating of the <HI>waves</HI> again&s;t the &s;ides of a <HI>Ship,</HI> when it &s;wims in the <HI>Ocean.</HI> For there's an whole <HI>Sea</HI> of <HI>Atomes</HI> which derive from the <HI>Fountain illuminant,</HI> who&s;e cour&s;e can no more be diverted, by tho&s;e little bodies that &s;wim up and down in the air; then that of the <HI>Ocean</HI> can by tho&s;e <HI>Sands, Pe|bles, Fi&s;hes,</HI> and <HI>Rocks,</HI> that are mingled with the waters. And as for the other In&s;tances of <HI>corporeal Emi&s;&s;ions,</HI> it would require to be prov'd that they perform all tho&s;e
<PB N="35" REF="21">
feats that are a&s;crib'd to them: whereas perhaps it is more likely, that tho&s;e &s;trange operations are not <HI>Mechanical</HI> but <HI>Magical,</HI> being effected by the <HI>continuity</HI> of the great <HI>Spirit</HI> of <HI>Nature,</HI> which runs through all things: or how|ever, to &s;uppo&s;e this act of the <HI>Memory</HI> to be as clear as <HI>Magneti&s;me</HI> and <HI>Sympathies,</HI> will be no great advantage to the belief of its <HI>certain Intelligibility.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD>At ego ip&s;um &s;ic nodum &s;cindo. In majoribus ubi faci|lior <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> e&s;t experiendi facultas, pal&agrave;m e&s;t multa&mdash;<HI>pag. 73.</HI></HEAD>
<P>THat what our Author has an&s;wer'd in this Period, <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> &s;hould re&s;olve the difficulty, is to me as great a <HI>wonder,</HI> as the <HI>My&s;tery</HI> we are di&s;cour&s;ing of. And if the knot be cut, 'tis certainly by &s;ome <HI>occult</HI> and <HI>&s;ympathetick</HI> In&s;trument, for the <HI>gro&s;s</HI> of his An&s;wer comes not near it. The difficulty was; How the <HI>Images</HI> of &s;uch an infinite of Objects, as we <HI>remember,</HI> &s;hould be kept <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> with|out confu&s;ion, be brought forth when we have occa&s;ion, and remanded back again into their own cells when they have done the errant they were &s;ent for. To which our Author &s;aith no more, but to this purpo&s;e (if I under|&s;tand him) That if the Object &s;tays not on the <HI>Sen&s;e,</HI> it makes not impre&s;&s;ion enough to be <HI>remembred,</HI> but if it be repeated there, it leaves plenty enough of tho&s;e <HI>Images</HI> behind it to confirm and &s;trengthen the <HI>Knowledge</HI> of the <HI>Object:</HI> In which <HI>radicated Knowledge,</HI> if the <HI>Memory</HI> con&s;i&s;t, there would be no need of re&s;erving tho&s;e A|tomes in the Brain, or calling them forth upon occa&s;ion, as the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> &s;uppo&s;eth; or, if there be, the <HI>difficulty</HI> is untouched.</P>
<P><PB N="36" REF="22">
Be&s;ides all which, I might adde, that if the&s;e <HI>mate|rial Images</HI> are a &s;ufficient account of the <HI>Memory,</HI> how will our remembrance of <HI>Di&s;tances, Magnitudes, Relations, Words, Metaphy&s;ical Notions,</HI> and <HI>tho&s;e</HI> of <HI>Immaterials,</HI> which leave no &s;uch <HI>Idola,</HI> in the Brain, be accounted for? Let this Gentleman tell me how&mdash;<HI>Et erit mihi Magnus</HI>&mdash;</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="10" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>10.</HI> Pal&agrave;m e&s;t me in h&acirc;c Re&s;pon&s;ione <HI>Digbaeanam</HI> Methodum caeteris praetuli&s;&s;e. Ip&s;ius enim&mdash;<HI>pag. 74.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IF I am mi&s;taken in the Opinion of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in this matter, (1.) I err with the great body of his Com|mentators and followers; yea, and all the Schools in <HI>Chri|&s;tendom,</HI> who unanimou&s;ly concurr in the a&s;&s;ignment of the Doctrine of <HI>Intentional Species</HI> to their Ma&s;ter <HI>Ari|&s;totle;</HI> So that if all the <HI>Peripateticks</HI> hitherto have been &s;o gro&s;sly out in impo&s;ing an Opinion he never taught upon their <HI>ador'd Philo&s;opher,</HI> for ought I know, there is no &s;uch thing as the <HI>Ari&s;totelean Philo&s;ophy</HI> in the Uni|ver&s;ities of <HI>Europe:</HI> For the taking in, or denying the&s;e <HI>Intentional Species</HI> will make material and mighty alte|rations in the whole frame of the <HI>Hypothe&s;is;</HI> and I &s;ee not how the denial of them is con&s;i&s;tent with the <HI>Ari&s;to|telean</HI> Doctrine of <HI>Qualities</HI> and <HI>Forms.</HI> But (2.) If <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> taught the <HI>Digbaean Philo&s;ophy,</HI> as our Author &s;ayes, he taught the <HI>Atomical,</HI> which is notoriou&s;ly known to have been the way of <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Epicurus,</HI> which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> frequently and profe&s;&s;edly oppo&s;eth. That <HI>De|mocritus</HI> taught the Atomical Hypothe&s;is, we have the affirmative of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> to ju&s;tifie, <GAP DESC="foreign"> (&s;peaking of <HI>Leucippus</HI> and <HI>Democritus)</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">,
<PB N="37" REF="22">
<GAP DESC="foreign">. And neerer to our purpo&s;e, that <HI>the&s;e</HI> &s;olved the way of <HI>Sen&s;ation,</HI> by <HI>ma|terial Images,</HI> we have from <HI>Plutarch;</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. This <HI>Hypothe|&s;is Ari&s;totle</HI> endeavours to confute; <GAP DESC="foreign">, &s;ayes he, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And again, <GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> then thought the Doctrine of <HI>Sen&s;ation</HI> by <HI>corporeal Images</HI> ab&s;urd in <HI>Democritus</HI> and <HI>Epicurus;</HI> and therefore certainly would not him&s;elf af|firm it; as he mu&s;t do on the &s;uppo&s;al of his having taught the &s;ame Hypothe&s;is with Sir <HI>K. Digby</HI> about the <HI>Memory,</HI> which is exactly the &s;ame with <HI>that</HI> of the&s;e <HI>Sages:</HI> For that learned Knight affirms, <HI>Sen&s;ation</HI> to be perform'd <HI>[by driving of &s;olid material bodies, exceeding little ones, that come from the Objects them&s;elves,</HI> (they are his own words) again&s;t that part of the brain where Knowledge re&s;ideth, which &s;ame bodies rebounding thence into certain cells of the Brain, perform the offices of the <HI>Memory]</HI> as he has largely di&s;cour&s;t upon the Subject. Sir <HI>K. Digby</HI> then pro|ceeds in the <HI>Corpu&s;cularian</HI> method which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> op|po&s;eth, and particularly in the bu&s;ine&s;s of <HI>Sen&s;ation;</HI> and con&s;equently cannot be of his belief in his <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> of the <HI>Memory,</HI> which the learned Knight gives account of by the &s;ame <HI>material Idola,</HI> which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> laught at. And doubtle&s;s the Memory is excited to action by the like In|&s;truments as are the <HI>external Sen&s;es,</HI> con&s;onantly to that of <HI>Plato</HI> in his <HI>Phaedo,</HI> &s;peaking of the Sen&s;es, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> him&s;elf <GAP DESC="foreign">. I think 'tis clear then that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Doctrine of the <HI>Memory</HI> is not the &s;ame with Sir <HI>K. Digby</HI>'s. And if I have been out in intitling the Opinion of <HI>Intentional Species</HI> to <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> my mi&s;take is the more <HI>venial,</HI> becau&s;e the
<PB N="38" REF="23">
whole Army of his mo&s;t devoted Sectators are deceived with me. But our Author is more reprehen&s;ible in <HI>his mi&s;take,</HI> if it be <HI>one;</HI> becau&s;e he's alone in his opinion. And an Error hath by &s;o much the more of guilt, as it hath of <HI>&s;ingularity</HI> and <HI>&s;elf-a&s;&s;urance.</HI> But whether this were <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Doctrine or not, I think 'tis not very ma|terial, &s;ince I make this none of the charges again&s;t him. If it be not <HI>his,</HI> 'tis the general Opinion of his Schools; and I have proved it an in&s;ufficient Account of the Faculty we are di&s;cour&s;ing of.</P>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="6" TYPE="action">
<HEAD>ACTIO SEXTA.</HEAD>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>1.</HI> Capite quinto formationis Corporum naturalium, Viventium prae&s;ertim, ob&s;curitatem intentat:&mdash;<HI>pag. 76.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> TWo methods it &s;eems our Philo&s;opher propo&s;eth, for the giving an account of the <HI>Formation</HI> of <HI>Animals;</HI> neither of which &s;eems to me a &s;ufficient &s;olution of the doubt attempted. For fir&s;t, he that &s;uppo&s;eth all the va&s;tly differing parts of a <HI>Worm</HI> or <HI>In&s;ect</HI> to be actually contain'd, though in <HI>myriate</HI> and <HI>indivi&s;ible proportions,</HI> in a drop of <HI>dew</HI> out of which they are &s;ometimes genera|ted, believes <HI>gratis,</HI> without any ground of his <HI>&s;uppo&s;al;</HI> and therefore will be very bold to a&s;&s;ert <HI>this</HI> the <HI>certain</HI> account of the <HI>Phaenomenon.</HI> (2.) If the <HI>Seed</HI> contain, though invi&s;ibly, all the <HI>parts</HI> of the <HI>Animal;</HI> then either in the &s;ame <HI>Site,</HI> and <HI>Po&s;ition,</HI> that they are found in in the compleated <HI>Body;</HI> or they lie there in a confu&s;ed huddle and mixture; the former, is contrary to all ex|perience, which a&s;&s;ures us, that the immediate matter
<PB N="39" REF="23">
of all <HI>generations</HI> is a certain <HI>fluid,</HI> and, as far as can be di&s;cern'd, an <HI>homogeneous</HI> &s;ub&s;tance. Now <HI>fluidity</HI> con&s;i&s;t|ing in the <HI>motion</HI> of the <HI>parts</HI> of the <HI>fluid body,</HI> as is te&s;ti|fied by Experience and the be&s;t <HI>Philo&s;ophy,</HI> the <HI>Seminal Parts</HI> can be of no &s;etled Form or Con&s;i&s;tence. And if the <HI>&s;econd</HI> be &s;uppo&s;ed, which doubtle&s;s is the truth, the dif|ficulty under debate will be unan&s;wer'd, <HI>(viz.)</HI> how &s;uch an Infinite of di&s;tinct Parts &s;hould be brought into their regular and orderly Po&s;itions without the guidance and con|duct of &s;ome <HI>knowing Agent;</HI> to fly to a <HI>fir&s;t Cau&s;e</HI> is <HI>Un|philo&s;ophical;</HI> and he that pretends a <HI>&s;econd,</HI> let him &s;hew <HI>it.</HI> And <HI>fortuitou&s;ly</HI> it cannot be: for <HI>Chance</HI> is the cau&s;e of no con&s;tant and regular Effect; and to &s;uppo&s;e an un|directed <HI>Motion</HI> to &s;huffle the&s;e fluid parts into the wonder|ful and exact form of an <HI>Animal,</HI> or any other regular bo|dy; is as likely, as that the divided <HI>Letters</HI> of an <HI>Alphabet</HI> &s;hould be <HI>accidentally</HI> jumbled into an elegant and polite Di&s;cour&s;e; which when once I &s;ee effected, I'le believe, that there wants nothing to the <HI>formation</HI> of the <HI>World</HI> and all bodies therein, but <HI>Matter</HI> and <HI>Motion.</HI> Some intelli|gent <HI>Principle</HI> then mu&s;t be &s;uppos'd to guide the&s;e <HI>Elemen|tary parts</HI> into their orderly <HI>&s;ituations.</HI> But <HI>what that</HI> is, who is't will determine?</P>
<P N="2">(2.) The Second Account al&s;o is too <HI>general,</HI> and flies very wide of my <HI>particular</HI> enquiry. For my <HI>Quaery</HI> is concerning the <HI>principle</HI> of the <HI>conduct</HI> of the parts of the various matter in tho&s;e rare and <HI>methodical</HI> Compo&s;ures; and our Philo&s;opher's <HI>An&s;wer</HI> concerns only the <HI>gro&s;s</HI> and <HI>material</HI> parts of the <HI>Compo&s;ition.</HI> And therefore little can be collected from the <HI>Chymical</HI> Proce&s;&s;es he &s;peaks of, for our purpo&s;e; and the <HI>Elementary Solutions</HI> mention'd, &s;ig|nifie nothing towards the accounting for the unerring exact|ne&s;s we find in <HI>Animal Formations.</HI> For all the&s;e being &s;up|pos'd, the matter is in the &s;ame circum&s;tances of difficulty as before; and this Gentleman's Solution &s;eems to me to
<PB N="40" REF="24">
&s;ignifie no more, then if a man &s;hould an&s;wer to one that that de&s;ires an account of the <HI>art</HI> and <HI>method</HI> of the <HI>motions</HI> of a <HI>Watch,</HI> or any other ingenious <HI>Automaton;</HI> that they are perform'd by <HI>Steel, Iron, Bra&s;s,</HI> or <HI>Silver,</HI> wherein the <HI>matter</HI> indeed of the work is declar'd, but not the <HI>artifice.</HI> And in the ca&s;e before us, I inquire of the <HI>principle</HI> of <HI>direction</HI> of tho&s;e <HI>intricate</HI> and <HI>methodical motions,</HI> and am an&s;wer'd with an account of the <HI>gro&s;s</HI> and <HI>material Ingre|dients.</HI> Nor is what follows of any whit more avail to the Solution pretended; for let the matter re&s;olve into parts <HI>dry, &s;ubtle,</HI> and <HI>liquid&punc;</HI> Let the <HI>dryer</HI> di&s;po&s;e them&s;elves into divers <HI>figures,</HI> and con&s;titute what Ve&s;&s;els our Philo|&s;opher is pleas'd to <HI>fancy;</HI> yet how from hence forward the <HI>infinite variety</HI> of the <HI>parts</HI> of an <HI>Animal</HI> will re&s;ult, will require &s;omething more to help us to conjecture.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>2.</HI> Haec qui mente comprehenderit, non plorabit <HI>Pla|&s;ticam</HI> vanum nomen e&s;&s;e &amp; vocem &s;ine re.&mdash;<HI>pag. 78.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THough by a clo&s;e and recondite &s;earch into the <HI>Semi|nalities</HI> of <HI>Plants,</HI> and <HI>Vegetables,</HI> the future proce&s;&s;es may be judg'd, as our Philo&s;opher a&s;&s;ures us; yet this only argues, that the grown parts were all contain'd pack't up in their Seeds and Berries; &s;o that in the growth and progre&s;s Nature did only di&s;play and unfold, what before was in the minute proportions more clo&s;ely laid together; Suppo&s;ing which, the main doubt &s;till remains un&s;atisfied, <HI>viz. How the&s;e SMALLER SEMINAL parts were &s;o order'd, and framed?</HI> And this <HI>Brachygraphy</HI> of Nature cannot be thought le&s;s difficult then it's <HI>Text.</HI> And, &s;econdly, what relates to <HI>Ani|mals</HI> we have &s;een already; for 'tis not likely, that the <HI>formed parts</HI> were ever <HI>actually</HI> contain'd in the <HI>&s;eed,</HI> out of which they were <HI>produced.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<PB N="41" REF="24">
<HEAD>Neque quemquam terreant artificum dicta, admiranti|um <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> ea quorum cau&s;as non intelligunt,&mdash;<HI>pag. 79.</HI></HEAD>
<P>I Might well wonder at the <HI>&s;pecifical uniformity</HI> of things, if <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> <HI>unguided matter</HI> were the only <HI>principle</HI> of their <HI>formati|on,</HI> again&s;t which <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> this doubt was rai&s;ed; and the <HI>variation</HI> from the <HI>kind</HI> which happens in <HI>&s;ome</HI> regions, would not be &s;o ob&s;ervable, as an <HI>identity</HI> in <HI>any.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>3.</HI> Eodem capitulo duas alias quae&s;tiones movet quas <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> ab&s;olut&egrave; inexplicabiles putat; Mihi contra&mdash;<HI>pag. 80.</HI></HEAD>
<P>IF the doubts I propo&s;e of the <HI>union</HI> of the <HI>Parts,</HI> and <HI>compo|&s;ition</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> of <HI>quantity, contain &s;carce any difficulty at all;</HI> our Phi|lo&s;opher is more lucky in his enquiries, then others that have dealt in tho&s;e <HI>Theories;</HI> mo&s;t men confe&s;&s;ing the perplexity of the mention'd <HI>Phaenomena,</HI> e&s;pecially of the latter. And the va&s;t <HI>diver&s;ity</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophers</HI> about <HI>it,</HI> te&s;tifies, that the &s;peculation of them is not of &s;o facile an explication. And 'tis &s;trange that the <HI>Ancients</HI> &s;hould keep &s;uch ado about an <HI>ea&s;ie</HI> Probleme, and the <HI>Moderns de&s;pair</HI> of a <HI>&s;olution,</HI> &s;o pretendedly obvious.</P>
<P>I will not differ with the learned Gentleman about the order of the que&s;tions, and grant, that they both &s;uppo&s;e <HI>actual parts</HI> in <HI>Quantity;</HI> which becau&s;e our Author denies, &amp; makes this the foundation of his An&s;wer to the&s;e, and &s;ome of my former propos'd difficulties, I mu&s;t be fain to prove it; which I at|tempt (1.) By giving &s;ome evidence of my <HI>Affirmative,</HI> and (2.) by &s;hewing the <HI>weakne&s;s</HI> and <HI>in&s;ufficiency</HI> of the grounds of the contrary A&s;&s;ertion.</P>
<P><PB N="42" REF="25">
For the fir&s;t then, That there are <HI>Actual parts</HI> in <HI>Quan|tity,</HI> I evince it by the&s;e con&s;iderations. (1.) The formal nature of <HI>Quantity</HI> is <HI>Exten&s;ion</HI> in the notion of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Schools; and <HI>Divi&s;ibility</HI> in the <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> of Sir <HI>Kenelm Digby,</HI> and our <HI>Authour;</HI> Both which &s;uppo&s;e <HI>parts,</HI> and <HI>parts actual:</HI> for to be <HI>extended,</HI> in the <HI>School phra&s;e,</HI> is to have <HI>partes extrapartes;</HI> and if the <HI>exten&s;ion</HI> be <HI>actual,</HI> the <HI>parts</HI> mu&s;t be <HI>&s;o:</HI> for it is not conceiveable how a thing can be <HI>extended,</HI> but by <HI>parts</HI> which are <HI>really di&s;tinct</HI> one from a|nother, though not <HI>&s;eparate:</HI> which &s;eems to me &s;o evident, that nothing can be &s;poken plainer; and I appeal in this matter to the common &s;en&s;e of all men. Nor can a thing be <HI>divided,</HI> except we &s;uppo&s;e the <HI>parts praeexi&s;tent</HI> in the <HI>di|vi&s;ible:</HI> for <HI>divi&s;ibility</HI> is founded upon <HI>real di&s;tinction,</HI> and 'tis impo&s;&s;ible to <HI>divide</HI> what is <HI>one</HI> without <HI>diver&s;ity.</HI> (2.) Ex|cept there are <HI>parts</HI> in <HI>quantity</HI> before <HI>divi&s;ion,</HI> there are <HI>none</HI> at all: for after they are divided they are no <HI>parts,</HI> but have a <HI>compleatne&s;s</HI> and <HI>integrality</HI> of their own, e&s;pecially if the &s;ub|ject were <HI>homogeneous.</HI> (3.) Except there are <HI>parts actually</HI> in <HI>quantity, contradictions</HI> may be verified <HI>de eodem,</HI> with all the other circum&s;tances, which the <HI>Metaphy&s;icks</HI> teach <HI>impo&s;sible.</HI> For the &s;ame body may be <HI>black</HI> and <HI>white, cold</HI> and <HI>hot, &s;een</HI> and not <HI>&s;een,</HI> and partake of all other mo&s;t contrary qualities. Which contradictions, and incon&s;i&s;tences cannot be accom|modated in the &s;ame &s;ubject, without &s;uppo&s;al of the con|tended-for <HI>diver&s;ity.</HI> Nor will the an&s;wer, which Sir <HI>K. Dig|by</HI> has provided for &s;uch <HI>Objections</HI> help the <HI>Hypothe&s;is, viz.</HI> [that it is not <HI>one part</HI> of the thing that &s;hews it &s;elf, and <HI>ano|ther</HI> that doth not, one that is <HI>hot,</HI> and another <HI>cold,</HI> &amp;c. But it is the &s;ame thing, &s;hewing it &s;elf according to one <HI>po&s;sibi|lity</HI> of <HI>divi&s;ion,</HI> and not another.] For fir&s;t, the&s;e <HI>di&s;tinct po&s;sibilities</HI> are founded upon <HI>di&s;tinct actualities,</HI> which are the parts I would have acknowledged. And &s;uch a capacity of receiving things &s;o different, cannot be in the &s;ame &s;ubject, without the &s;uppo&s;al of <HI>parts actually di&s;tinct</HI> and <HI>divers.</HI>
<PB N="43" REF="25">
(2.) The <HI>&s;ubjects</HI> of the&s;e <HI>contrary</HI> qualities are things <HI>actu|al:</HI> whereas <HI>po&s;sibilities</HI> are but <HI>Metaphy&s;ical notions.</HI> And the&s;e &s;ubjects are <HI>di&s;tinct,</HI> or <HI>contradictions</HI> will be reconcil'd <HI>de eodem;</HI> from which the inference &s;eems nece&s;&s;ary, that <HI>quantity</HI> hath <HI>parts,</HI> and <HI>parts actual,</HI> and <HI>di&s;tinct po&s;sibilities</HI> will not &s;alve the bu&s;ine&s;s. And (3.) why mu&s;t the common &s;peech of all mankinde be alter'd, and what all the world cals <HI>parts,</HI> be call'd <HI>po&s;sibilities</HI> of <HI>divi&s;ion?</HI> which yet if our Philo&s;opher will needs name <HI>&s;o,</HI> they being acknowledg'd <HI>di&s;tinct,</HI> and prov'd <HI>actual,</HI> or at lea&s;t founded immediately upon things that are <HI>&s;o;</HI> my que&s;tion will as well proceed this way as in the common one, <HI>viz.</HI> How the things that an|&s;wer to the&s;e <HI>di&s;tinct po&s;sibilities</HI> are <HI>united,</HI> and of what <HI>compounded?</HI></P>
<P>There is another An&s;wer which I find in our Authors <HI>Peripatetical In&s;titutions,</HI> the &s;um of which is, [That the <HI>contradictions</HI> have only a <HI>notional</HI> repugnance in the &s;ub|ject as 'tis in our under&s;tandings: and &s;ince the parts have a di&s;tinct being in our under&s;tanding, from thence 'tis that they are capable to &s;u&s;tain contradictions] which An&s;wer, if I under&s;tand, I have rea&s;on to wonder at: for certain|ly the <HI>Subject</HI> &s;u&s;tains the <HI>Contradictories</HI> as it is in <HI>re.</HI> And, I never heard of a notion <HI>black</HI> or <HI>white,</HI> but in a Metaphor; 'tis the <HI>real</HI> &s;ub&s;tance is the &s;ubject of the&s;e <HI>contrarieties;</HI> which were impo&s;&s;ible, if it had not <HI>divers realities</HI> an&s;wering to the <HI>qualities</HI> &s;o <HI>denominating.</HI> And therefore 'tis not the <HI>Under&s;tanding</HI> that makes the <HI>divers &s;ubjects</HI> of the&s;e <HI>Ac|cidents,</HI> as our Author &s;ugge&s;ts: but there <HI>being &s;uch</HI> is the ground that we <HI>&s;o</HI> apprehend them. I hope I need &s;ay no more then to e&s;tabli&s;h the &s;uppo&s;al of the difficulty un|der con&s;ideration, That there are <HI>parts actually</HI> in <HI>Quan|tity:</HI> only I am obliged by my propo&s;ed method to add further,</P>
<P N="2">(2.) That the grounds of the excellent Sir <HI>K. Digby,</HI> and our Author, on which they built their a&s;&s;erted <HI>Paradox,</HI>
<PB N="44" REF="26">
&s;eem to me very in&s;ufficient to &s;u&s;tain &s;o great a weight as leans upon them. The Rea&s;ons are (1.) <HI>Quantity</HI> is <HI>Divi&s;ibili|ty.</HI> (2.) <HI>Divi&s;ibility</HI> is <HI>capacity</HI> of <HI>Divi&s;ion.</HI> (3) What is only <HI>capable</HI> of <HI>divi&s;ion,</HI> is not <HI>actually divided.</HI> (4.) Quantity is not <HI>actually divided,</HI> and therefore hath no <HI>parts actually,</HI> To which in &s;hort,</P>
<P N="1">(1.) That <HI>Quantity</HI> is <HI>Divi&s;ibility,</HI> is <HI>pre&s;umed;</HI> but <HI>exten&s;ion</HI> is before it, in <HI>nature,</HI> and our <HI>conception,</HI> and is the received notion, though perhaps <HI>Impenetrability</HI> is the true&s;t. However (2.) even <HI>this</HI> &s;uppo&s;eth <HI>parts,</HI> and tho&s;e <HI>actual:</HI> For <HI>Divi&s;ion</HI> is but <HI>Solution</HI> of <HI>Union.</HI> And <HI>Union</HI> &s;uppo&s;eth <HI>Parts</HI> to be <HI>united.</HI> (3.) What is only capable of divi&s;ion in a <HI>Phy&s;iological</HI> and <HI>Mechanical</HI> len&s;e; may, yea and ought, to be <HI>divided</HI> in a <HI>Metaphy&s;ical.</HI> That is, they ought to be <HI>divers</HI> in their <HI>being,</HI> before they can be <HI>&s;eparate</HI> and <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> in their <HI>material</HI> bulk and quantity. For <HI>&s;eparabi|lity</HI> mu&s;t pre&s;uppo&s;e <HI>diver&s;ity.</HI> (4.) Though <HI>Quantity</HI> be not <HI>actually divided</HI> in one &s;en&s;e, 'tis in another: Every part having a di&s;tinct place and being of its own, though it doth not yet enjoy it <HI>&s;eparately</HI> and <HI>apart</HI> from others.</P>
<P>But (2.) it is pleaded again&s;t <HI>actual parts</HI> in <HI>Quantity,</HI> that if we admit them, we cannot &s;top till we come down to <HI>Indivi&s;ibles;</HI> of which to &s;uppo&s;e <HI>Quantity compo&s;ed,</HI> is &s;aid to be ab&s;urd and impo&s;&s;ible. In return to which, I grant the Inference, and have acknowledged the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> of <HI>Indivi&s;ibles</HI> to be full of &s;eeming incon&s;i&s;tencies; as is the other al&s;o: And therefore reckon both among the <HI>Un|conceiveables;</HI> of which there can be no greater Argument then their having driven &s;o great and &s;agacious wits upon &s;uch an A&s;&s;ertion, (to which out of reverence to the&s;e ce|lebrated per&s;ons, I &s;hall not affix an <HI>Epithete)</HI> again&s;t the evidence of our <HI>Sen&s;es,</HI> and the apprehen&s;ion of all the world: <HI>That there are no parts in quantity.</HI> But (2.) 'tis no good method of rea&s;oning, to deny what is <HI>plain</HI> and <HI>obvious,</HI> becau&s;e we cannot conceive what is <HI>ab&s;tru&s;e</HI> and
<PB N="45" REF="26">
<HI>difficult.</HI> And I think the A&s;&s;ertor cannot an&s;wer it to his &s;e|verer faculties, who affirms, there are no <HI>parts actually in quantity,</HI> again&s;t all his <HI>Sen&s;es</HI> and the <HI>univer&s;al &s;uffrage</HI> of <HI>Mankinde;</HI> becau&s;e he cannot untie the difficulties that emerge from the &s;uppo&s;al, that <HI>Bodies are compounded of Indivi&s;ibles;</HI> a nice and in tricate <HI>Theory.</HI> Yea how will our Author an&s;wer for the A&s;&s;ertion to his Ma&s;ter <HI>Ari|&s;totle?</HI> who &s;aith <GAP DESC="foreign">.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD>Argumenta a&s;&s;erentium <HI>partes actu</HI> vel Sen&s;um <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> citant, de quo nihil certius e&s;t qu&agrave;m&mdash;<HI>pag. 81.</HI></HEAD>
<P>I Believe the A&s;&s;ertors of <HI>Actual parts</HI> may well appeal <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> to the <HI>Sen&s;es,</HI> notwith&s;tanding what our Author, and the learned Knight have alledg'd to invalidate their evidence. For what though the <HI>&s;en&s;e</HI> di&s;covers not the <HI>di&s;tinct</HI> term of the <HI>hand</HI> or <HI>finger;</HI> Can it not therefore di&s;cern them to be <HI>di&s;tant</HI> and <HI>di&s;tingui&s;h't</HI> from the <HI>foot</HI> and <HI>toes?</HI> And is not this enough to ground the belief of their diver&s;ity? Can|not we di&s;tingui&s;h the <HI>motions</HI> of our <HI>parts;</HI> though we know not their fir&s;t &s;prings and exact beginnings? or di&s;cern a dif|ference between the <HI>apple</HI> and the <HI>twig</HI> it grows on; except we could &s;ee the point where one begins and the other end|eth? And whether an <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> is like to &s;tand, that is put to &s;uch poor &s;hifts to defend it &s;elf again&s;t the gro&s;&s;e&s;t of our faculties, I leave to be conjectured?</P>
<P>The &s;uppo&s;ition then of my <HI>doubts,</HI> being thus a&s;&s;erted and prov'd, we &s;ee yet but &s;mall hope to expect their So|lution. Or, if this be an <HI>aen&s;wer,</HI> t'is an evidence of our <HI>in|tellectual weakne&s;s,</HI> that all the world hath all this while been confounded about a <HI>plain Problem</HI> upon a <HI>fal&s;e</HI> &s;up|po&s;al.</P>
<P><PB N="46" REF="27">
The An&s;wer to my other difficulty about the <HI>union</HI> of the <HI>parts</HI> of <HI>quantity,</HI> is grounded al&s;o upon the pre&s;umption that there are <HI>actually none;</HI> which I think I have &s;ufficient|ly di&s;prov'd.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>5.</HI> Caput &s;extum totum motui Rotarum dedicatum e&s;t, neque &s;i credimus Authori de cujus&mdash;<HI>pag. 83.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> I Conclude not only that no <HI>part</HI> can <HI>move,</HI> but the <HI>whole mu&s;t;</HI> but al&s;o that in the <HI>circular motion</HI> of a <HI>wheel,</HI> it &s;eems that the <HI>motion</HI> of <HI>every part</HI> mu&s;t be <HI>praerequired</HI> to it &s;elf, which I think is clear enough in the <HI>inference,</HI> though the propo&s;ition <HI>inferred,</HI> be <HI>impo&s;&s;ible</HI> and <HI>ab&s;urd.</HI> And what inconvenience there is in this conclu&s;ion, that all the <HI>parts</HI> change their place at once, I have made &s;ufficiently evi|dent, in the place where the difficulty is urged. I confe&s;s in our Authors <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> that there are <HI>actually</HI> no <HI>parts</HI> in <HI>bodies,</HI> the <HI>doubt</HI> is <HI>none;</HI> and the whole matter will pa&s;s in|to words and air: but &s;uppo&s;ing that in <HI>quantity</HI> there are <HI>di&s;tinct realities,</HI> I think 'twill be hard to di&s;-incumber this trite <HI>Phaenomenon</HI> from the <HI>perplexities</HI> I mention'd.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Subjungit Author &s;ecundam difficultatem, quomodo in rot&acirc; circumvolut&acirc; viciniores centro partes&mdash;<HI>pag. 84.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> I Say again, however we find it in the event, while yet we con&s;ider the <HI>remote</HI> parts, moving <HI>&s;wifter</HI> then the <HI>cen|tral</HI> ones, in the <HI>&s;peculative</HI> notion, 'tis hard to conceive, but that the <HI>Line</HI> drawn from the <HI>Centre</HI> to the <HI>Circumfe|rence,</HI>
<PB N="47" REF="27">
&s;hould be <HI>inflected;</HI> &s;ince one point of the line re&s;ts while the other moves, which in the <HI>Theory</HI> &s;eems to argue a <HI>di&s;union,</HI> and con&s;equently an <HI>incurvation.</HI> So that though it be true in the <HI>experiment</HI> and event, yea and while we look upon the rea&s;on of the <HI>thing,</HI> in one po&s;ition; that the <HI>line</HI> would be made <HI>crooked,</HI> were it not for the <HI>unequal velocity</HI> of the <HI>parts;</HI> yet it appears as clear to rea&s;on, in another po&s;ture, that this <HI>inequality</HI> &s;hould <HI>inferre</HI> it. For if <HI>B</HI> move <HI>&s;wifter</HI> then <HI>A. A re&s;ts</HI> &s;ome in&s;tant while <HI>B</HI> is in motion. There's no motion, but where there's <HI>change</HI> of <HI>place,</HI> viz. of that place, in re&s;pect of which the body is &s;aid to move: The place in re&s;pect of which the body is &s;aid to move, is the next <HI>&s;uperficies</HI> that is con&s;idered as <HI>quie&s;cen'.</HI> And con&s;equently it &s;eems if <HI>B</HI> move any in|&s;tant, in which <HI>A</HI> doth not: it is proportionably to its mo|tion remov'd from <HI>that</HI> of <HI>A</HI> to which it was adjacent, and by con&s;equence one would expect it &s;hould be <HI>disjoyn'd,</HI> or <HI>inflected.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="6" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>6.</HI> Jactatum tandem experimentum capite alto in|greditur <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Author ille, prefatus audenti&s;seme&mdash;<HI>pag. 85.</HI></HEAD>
<P>SInce the publi&s;hing my Di&s;cour&s;e; I have met an in|genious <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> Account, among &s;ome excellent <HI>Geometrici|ans</HI> of this <HI>Probleme,</HI> which perhaps may &s;atisfie the <HI>dif|ficulty.</HI> The <HI>Account</HI> briefly is, That in <HI>volutation</HI> the whole <HI>circumference</HI> moves by a <HI>motion</HI> both <HI>progre&s;&s;ive</HI> and <HI>circular:</HI> But the <HI>centre</HI> by the <HI>progre&s;&s;ive</HI> only. And con&s;equently by how much the nearer the parts are to the <HI>centre</HI> the more they have of the <HI>progre&s;&s;ive motion,</HI> and the le&s;s of <HI>circulation.</HI> So that the <HI>little wheel</HI> in our <HI>ex|periment draws,</HI> and hath &s;o much more <HI>progre&s;&s;ion</HI> then
<PB N="48" REF="28">
the <HI>greater,</HI> as makes amends for it's <HI>defect</HI> of <HI>parts.</HI> Which <HI>&s;olution</HI> I'le acknowledge perfect, if two things an&s;wer experiment, which I have not yet had occa&s;ion to make tryal of; <HI>viz.</HI> (1.) Suppo&s;ing both <HI>wheels</HI> to be <HI>denticulated,</HI> the <HI>little wheel</HI> will with it's teeth de&s;cribe <HI>lines;</HI> and the great one <HI>with it's</HI> make <HI>points.</HI> And (2.) the di&s;proportion being augmented, &s;uppo&s;e to an hundred to one, the <HI>drawing</HI> of the <HI>le&s;&s;er wheel</HI> will be exceeding <HI>palpable,</HI> and di&s;coverable by the dulle&s;t &s;en&s;e. I &s;ay, if the&s;e circum&s;tances an&s;wer experiment; this dif|ficulty is for ought I know well accounted for. And I need add no more to this confe&s;&s;ion: For our Authors An&s;wer is either materially the &s;ame with this, or much le&s;s to purpo&s;e.</P>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="7" TYPE="action">
<HEAD>ACTIO SEPTIMA.</HEAD>
<DIV3 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>1.</HI> In &s;equentibus aliquot Capitulis &s;atis exqui&s;it&egrave; in|ve&s;tigat cau&s;as Errorum &amp; Ignorantiae&mdash;<HI>pag. 90.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THat the pre&s;ent Age abounds with <HI>pratling Ignorance,</HI> and <HI>vain &s;hews</HI> of <HI>Science fal&s;ly &s;o called,</HI> will not be denyed by one, who hath directed &s;ome indeavours a|gain&s;t them. And did I not deeply apprehend how much <HI>bold</HI> affirmers, and <HI>lazy</HI> Inqui&s;itors have prejudiced the ad|vance of <HI>true</HI> and <HI>&s;ub&s;tantial</HI> knowledge, I had never en|gaged again&s;t <HI>Dogmatizing</HI> and <HI>Peripatetick Philo&s;ophy.</HI> I wonder therefore that my learned A&s;&s;ailant &s;hould object my omi&s;&s;ion of the&s;e <HI>cau&s;es</HI> of <HI>Ignorance,</HI> which had the greate&s;t intere&s;t in drawing from me the Di&s;cour&s;e he oppo&s;eth; in which, I have largely in&s;i&s;ted on tho&s;e rea|&s;ons
<PB N="49" REF="28">
of the <HI>defect</HI> of <HI>Knowledge, viz.</HI> the <HI>depth</HI> of <HI>Truth,</HI> the <HI>praecipitancy</HI> of mens <HI>under&s;tandings,</HI> and <HI>aver&s;ne&s;s</HI> to <HI>deep</HI> &s;earch, and clo&s;e engagement of their mindes. Be|&s;ides which, I have profe&s;&s;edly attacqued the <HI>di&s;puting way</HI> of Inquiry, and the <HI>verbal emptine&s;s</HI> of the <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> of the Schools; which how guilty it is of laying a foundation for <HI>&s;loath</HI> and <HI>loquacity,</HI> is particularly made appear in the Di&s;cour&s;e I directed again&s;t it. And while the Schools of Learning are under the regency of that kind of Spirit, I fear little is to be expected from <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> but <HI>bold</HI> talk; and endle&s;s di&s;putes and quarrels. For what el&s;e can be the fruit of a <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> made up of <HI>occult Qualities, Sympa|thies, Entelechia's, Elements, Cele&s;tial Influences,</HI> and a|bundance other <HI>hard words</HI> and <HI>lazy generalities,</HI> but an arre&s;t of all ingenious and practical indeavour; and a <HI>Wil|derne&s;s</HI> of <HI>Opinions</HI> in&s;tead of <HI>certainty</HI> and <HI>Science?</HI> But thanks be to Providence, the World begins to emerge from this &s;tate of things, and to imploy it &s;elf in more deep and concerning Di&s;qui&s;itions; the i&s;&s;ue of which, we hope, will be a <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> fruitful in <HI>works,</HI> not in <HI>words,</HI> and &s;uch as may accommodate the u&s;e of <HI>Life,</HI> both <HI>natural</HI> and <HI>moral.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD>Te&s;tis mihi e&s;to Author qui &s;ub finem prioris Capitis <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> conqueritur de ob&s;curitate Speculationum,&mdash;<HI>pag 90.</HI></HEAD>
<P>HOw ju&s;tly the Author is made an in&s;tance and witne&s;s <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> of <HI>that,</HI> which, in the very Di&s;cour&s;e, by which only, I &s;uppo&s;e, he is known to our Philo&s;opher, he hath &s;o earne&s;tly witne&s;t again&s;t, which his &s;pirit is &s;o aver&s;e unto, which gave the occa&s;ion of the Di&s;pute be|tween us; I &s;ay, with what ju&s;tice I am made an in|&s;tance of <HI>that</HI> I have &s;o profe&s;&s;edly oppo&s;ed, let it be
<PB N="50" REF="29">
judg'd by any, that is not unrea&s;onably partial. 'Tis true, I complain of the <HI>ob&s;curity</HI> of <HI>Motion, Gravity, Light, Colours, Vi&s;ion,</HI> and <HI>Sounds;</HI> and yet am not ignorant of the Accounts Sir <HI>K. Digby,</HI> and other Philo&s;ophers both <HI>Antient</HI> and <HI>Modern,</HI> have given of the&s;e <HI>Phaenomena.</HI> My mind is anxious in &s;peculation, and hath engag'd me to look as far, as my capacity could reach, into the&s;e <HI>Theories;</HI> I could never content my &s;elf with &s;uperficial <HI>put&punc;offs;</HI> nor am I apt immediately to di&s;pair, if I find not pre&s;ent &s;a|tisfaction in my fir&s;t enquiries. I have with my be&s;t dili|gence examined the mo&s;t hopeful accounts are extant of the&s;e appearances, and yet mu&s;t profe&s;s, That though the fir&s;t &s;ight of their re&s;pective &s;olutions is <HI>plea&s;ant</HI> and <HI>en|couraging,</HI> and &s;eems to promi&s;e my mind a <HI>requiem;</HI> yet the longer I view the mo&s;t likely of the&s;e <HI>Hypothe&s;es,</HI> the more liable and obnoxious I apprehend them. Like <HI>Pictures</HI> they will not bear to be look't upon, but at a di&s;tance, and when I come neer, I ea&s;ily detect their imperfections. So that deep &s;earch di&s;covers more <HI>ignorance,</HI> then it <HI>cures;</HI> and <HI>confidence</HI> of <HI>Science</HI> &s;eems to be built upon a &s;light and &s;uperficial view of things; as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> him&s;elf hath &s;omewhere ob&s;erved, and every one el&s;e may, that will but take notice, that young talking <HI>Sophi&s;ters</HI> u&s;e to be far more a&s;&s;ured of their A&s;&s;ertions, then the deepe&s;t and mo&s;t exercis'd Philo&s;ophers.</P>
<P>I'le not di&s;parage the account given by the learned Sir <HI>K. Digby</HI> of the mention'd <HI>Phaenomena;</HI> they are to be acknowledg'd pretty, and ingenious: But yet I cannot think, that 'tis an argument of <HI>&s;hallowne&s;s</HI> and <HI>impatience</HI> in enquiry, not fully to acquie&s;ce in his <HI>Hypothe&s;es</HI> as <HI>infal|lible Solutions.</HI> I &s;uppo&s;e, that ingenious Philo&s;opher's own mode&s;ty and ju&s;tice will not &s;uffer him to own &s;uch a fond|ne&s;s for his notions, which I know he propo&s;eth, but as likely and convenient <HI>&s;uppo&s;als.</HI> I confe&s;s the mo&s;t &s;atis|faction. I any where meet with, is in the accounts of <HI>Des-Cartes,</HI>
<PB N="51" REF="29">
to whom Sir <HI>K. Digby</HI> him&s;elf bears this Te&s;timony, [That he hath &s;hown the World the way to <HI>Science,]</HI> And yet that great man, the excellence of who&s;e <HI>Philo&s;ophick</HI> genius and performances, the mo&s;t improv'd &s;pirits acknow|ledge, propounds his Principles but in the <HI>mode&s;t</HI> way of <HI>Hypothe&s;es,</HI> and pretends not to have explain'd things as they <HI>are,</HI> but as they <HI>may</HI> be. And I believe our Author will not reckon, him among the &s;light and talkative Phi|lo&s;ophers; which is &s;o far from being true, that &s;uch as love only to skim things, and have not the patience to keep their minds to a deep and clo&s;e attention, cannot with any face as much as <HI>pretend</HI> acquaintance with <HI>his Princi|ples;</HI> the comprehen&s;ion of which, will require the mo&s;t &s;evere meditation, and fix't engagement of the mind, of any <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> that is <HI>intelligible.</HI> Not, that this excellent per&s;on affects <HI>ob&s;curity</HI> either in <HI>Matter, Style,</HI> or <HI>Method,</HI> being indeed very per&s;picuous in all of them: but becau&s;e, his way is unu&s;ual, and his <HI>Principles</HI> &s;o <HI>coherent</HI> and clo&s;e|ly pack't together, that the letting fall any <HI>link</HI> of connexi|on, will &s;poil the <HI>dependance,</HI> and hinder the under&s;tand|ing of the &s;equel. But I return from this excur&s;ion. If all then mu&s;t be accounted <HI>impatient</HI> and <HI>&s;hallow</HI> Philo&s;o|phers, who acquie&s;ce not in the <HI>Digbaean Hypothe&s;es;</HI> all the learned <HI>Carte&s;ians, Platoni&s;ts,</HI> the whole &s;tock of the ingeni|ous recent Philo&s;ophers; yea and <HI>All,</HI> that follow not the way of Sir <HI>K. Digby,</HI> mu&s;t unavoidably fall under the &s;hame of the&s;e appellatives; and perhaps that <HI>great per&s;on</HI> him|&s;elf, who I dare &s;ay thinks not the <HI>light</HI> his <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> hath afforded the&s;e <HI>perplexing Speculations,</HI> to be &s;o <HI>clear,</HI> as to admit of no <HI>&s;hadow</HI> or <HI>ob&s;curity.</HI> What ever ha&s;te therefore tho&s;e di&s;cover, that will not be fully contented with the <HI>Principles</HI> in which our Philo&s;opher is &s;o well &s;atisfied, I am confident that a little reflection will inform him, that he hath betrayed <HI>&s;ome,</HI> in his cen&s;ure.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="2" TYPE="section">
<PB N="52" REF="30">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>2.</HI> Altera ab Authore no&s;tro neglecta Ignorantiae cau&s;a mihi apparet e&s;&s;e quidam &s;pecialis&mdash;<HI>pag. 91.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IF any are &s;o weak to affirm nothing can be demon&s;tra|ted, again&s;t which any thing <HI>is,</HI> or <HI>can be</HI> objected; let them an&s;wer for their A&s;&s;ertion, I am not to account for the mi&s;takes of others: And if there are tho&s;e who will not admit of <HI>certainty</HI> or <HI>evidence</HI> in a conclu&s;ion that any hath made a doubt of, as our Author intimates in the following <HI>Paragraph,</HI> I have as little to an&s;wer for their <HI>Sceptici&s;m</HI> and <HI>incredulity.</HI> For I never expect to &s;ee the world agree in any thing; and therefore I <HI>a&s;&s;ent</HI> where I &s;ee cau&s;e, and proportion the degree of my belief to that I have of evidence, without expecting the hopele&s;s en|couragement of a <HI>univer&s;al</HI> &s;uffrage. Though I confe&s;s, where <HI>deep</HI> and <HI>enquiring</HI> &s;pirits <HI>differ,</HI> I judge I have rea&s;on to be <HI>cautious,</HI> and to &s;u&s;pect <HI>uncertainty.</HI> Our Au|thor concludes with a reprehen&s;ion of tho&s;e endle&s;s talk|ers, the <HI>Modern Peripateticks,</HI> and their <HI>voluminous</HI> tri|fles, in which I di&s;&s;ent not from him: But pa&s;s from <HI>them</HI> to their Ma&s;ter <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> whom our Philo&s;opher un|dertakes to vindicate from my <HI>reflections;</HI> with what &s;uc|ce&s;s, will be the &s;ubject of our next enquiry.</P>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="8" TYPE="action">
<PB N="53" REF="30">
<HEAD>ACTIO OCTAVA.</HEAD>
<DIV3 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>1.</HI> Et jam defunctus labore imperato videor, ni&s;i <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> &s;umm&acirc; cum invidi&acirc; <HI>Ari&s;totelem</HI> omnibus&mdash;<HI>pag. 95.</HI></HEAD>
<P>OUr Author in this Paragraph is of a very different <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> apprehen&s;ion from all other <HI>Ari&s;totelians,</HI> if we'l believe <HI>Patritius,</HI> who &s;aith, <HI>Tritum vero jam e&s;t ac em|nium</HI> Ari&s;totelicorum <HI>a&s;&s;en&s;u comprobatum, nullam e&s;&s;e in</HI> Ari|&s;totelicis <HI>Libris Scientificam Demon&s;trationem.</HI> Our Philo&s;o|pher then denies all <HI>Science</HI> among the other <HI>Antients,</HI> and the re&s;t of the <HI>Ari&s;totelians</HI> allow <HI>none</HI> in <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> And if <HI>either</HI> be true, or <HI>both,</HI> 'tis an evidence again&s;t <HI>Dog|matizing,</HI> and fond doating upon <HI>Authorities.</HI></P>
<P>But this action is profe&s;&s;edly directed again&s;t <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus;</HI> &s;ome few of who&s;e charges again&s;t <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> our Author indeavours to defeat and di&s;able; which &s;hould he &s;ucceed in according to his de&s;ires, yet the far greater, and per|haps the more formidable number &s;tands unan&s;wer'd. Briefly then (1.) he excepts at <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI>'s animadverting on <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>manners,</HI> which he in&s;inuates, to be more like a <HI>crafty Orator,</HI> then a clo&s;e and <HI>&s;evere Philo&s;opher.</HI> To which in behalf of that excellent <HI>Neoterick,</HI> it may be rejoyn'd, That if <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> were <HI>vicious</HI> and <HI>immoral,</HI> there is much the le&s;s rea&s;on why we &s;hould revere his <HI>authori|ty:</HI> For <HI>truth</HI> and <HI>vertue</HI> u&s;e to dwell together; and <HI>the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wi&s;dom. Vice</HI> drowns the noble <HI>Idea's</HI> of the <HI>Soul,</HI> and fills the mind with tho&s;e foul &s;teams of the body, which are prejudicial to deep and worthy enquiries; &s;o that with all <HI>good men</HI> and <HI>true</HI>
<PB N="54" REF="31">
Philo&s;ophers 'twill not a little detract from the credit of <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>Intellectuals,</HI> if his <HI>Morals</HI> are acknowledg'd, or can be prov'd <HI>obnoxious.</HI> Whither the charge be <HI>ju&s;t</HI> or not, our Philo&s;opher makes no enquiry, which &s;eems a tacite con|fe&s;&s;ion of the <HI>truth</HI> of the accu&s;ation; and then I think he hath no rea&s;on to object the <HI>impropriety.</HI> After this re|mark he de&s;cends (2.) to &s;ome particular in&s;tances of <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI>'s <HI>charge,</HI> to as many of which, as I am concern'd in, I make this brief rejoynder: (1.) Then <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> ex|pre&s;ly makes God an <HI>Animal</HI> in the&s;e words <GAP DESC="foreign">. If he &s;ayes otherwi&s;e el&s;ewhere, 'tis only an argument of the incon&s;i&s;tency of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> not of the inju&s;tice of <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus.</HI></P>
<P N="2">(2.) That <HI>God acts by nece&s;&s;ity, Ari&s;totle</HI> clearly enough in&s;inuates in that conclu&s;ion of his <GAP DESC="foreign">, which is te&s;timony &s;uf|ficient of the truth of my charge; if <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> ac|cu&s;ed him of more, 'tis like he was able to make it good.</P>
<P N="3">(3.) That <HI>Ari&s;totle made the world eternal,</HI> our Au|thor allows me. But that hereby he prov'd him&s;elf the chief of all the <HI>Ethnick</HI> Philo&s;ophers, I cannot grant him &s;o ea&s;ily. For (1.) <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was not the fir&s;t in this A&s;|&s;ertion, but had it from <HI>Ocellus Lucanus;</HI> from whom al&s;o he tran&s;crib'd the Arguments he made u&s;e of to en|force it: Which yet (2.) are not &s;uch, as do &s;o highly commend his <HI>Philo&s;ophy,</HI> and faculty of arguing. He proves the <HI>World eternal</HI> then, becau&s;e the <HI>Heavens</HI> are <HI>&s;o;</HI> the A&s;&s;ertion of which he attempts by five Arguments: <HI>(viz.)</HI> (1.) From the Etymology of <HI>aether, viz. ab</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. (2.) From the <HI>&s;ilence</HI> of <HI>Hi&s;tory</HI> of any change or al|teration they have undergone. (3.) From the <HI>Opinion</HI> of the <HI>Antients.</HI> (4.) From the freedom of the <HI>Heavens</HI> from <HI>contrarieties.</HI> And (5.) from the <HI>eternity</HI> of the <HI>Cae|le&s;tial motions,</HI> which he proves with the <HI>eternity of time</HI>
<PB N="55" REF="31">
by rea&s;ons borrow'd from <HI>Ocellus,</HI> who was the Author of the main Argument. Now whoever affirms that &s;uch arguings as the&s;e &s;et <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;o much above all the more <HI>antient</HI> Philo&s;ophers, expre&s;&s;es more <HI>fondne&s;s</HI> towards <HI>him,</HI> then <HI>ju&s;tice</HI> to his <HI>betters.</HI> Nor can the comparative ex|cellency of his wit be any more rea&s;onably concluded from his allowing the <HI>natural inference</HI> of that acknowledg'd <HI>Principle, Ex nihilo nihil;</HI> which doubtle&s;s the Antients never meant in the <HI>general notion;</HI> but in a &s;en&s;e which re&s;train'd it to <HI>natural productions;</HI> el&s;e their A&s;&s;ertion of the <HI>Worlds beginning</HI> had been <HI>non&s;en&s;e</HI> and a <HI>contra|diction.</HI></P>
<P N="4">(4.) The learned Gentleman admires that we &s;hould charge <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> with the <HI>denyal</HI> of the <HI>Re&s;urrection</HI> of the dead; which though he acknowledges <HI>truly</HI> to be <HI>alledg'd;</HI> yet he thinks it <HI>unrea&s;onably objected,</HI> &s;ince he &s;uppo&s;es this doctrine only to be di&s;coverable by <HI>&s;upernatural light</HI> and <HI>revelation.</HI> To which briefly, (1.) Though the <HI>Re|&s;urrection</HI> in the <HI>particular circum&s;tances,</HI> in which <HI>Chri|&s;tianity</HI> hath cloathed it, be not known by our una&s;&s;i&s;ted faculties: Yet that the <HI>Soul</HI> &s;hall <HI>live,</HI> and <HI>live united</HI> to a <HI>Body</HI> in the <HI>other State,</HI> I think deducible from the meer <HI>principles</HI> of Nature: For the <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> of the <HI>Soul</HI> informs us, that <HI>it</HI> u&s;es <HI>matter</HI> in its <HI>highe&s;t</HI> operations, which is fair ground of conjecture, that it is alwayes united to &s;ome <HI>body.</HI> Be&s;ides which, it may be argued from the analogy of <HI>Nature,</HI> which u&s;eth not in other things, to leap from one <HI>extream</HI> unto another; And therefore 'tis not likely that the Soul &s;hould pa&s;s <HI>immediately,</HI> from the &s;tate of &s;o deep an <HI>immer&s;ion</HI> into the <HI>gro&s;s matter,</HI> to a condition of <HI>pure</HI> and <HI>ab&s;olute immateriality.</HI> To which may be further added, that, even according to the <HI>prin|ciples</HI> of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> there can be no <HI>Knowledge</HI> without <HI>Sen&s;e,</HI> nor <HI>Sen&s;e</HI> without <HI>corporeal Motion,</HI> which cannot well be <HI>perceiv'd</HI> by a being that is perfectly disjoyn'd
<PB N="56" REF="32">
from <HI>matter.</HI> Thus the principles of meer rea&s;on &s;ugge&s;t, that the <HI>Soul</HI> is joyn'd to <HI>another Body</HI> after its di&s;charge from the <HI>pre&s;ent.</HI> And (2.) others of the <HI>Greek</HI> Philo&s;o|phers, by the meer conduct of their natural <HI>light,</HI> believ'd it. The <HI>Academicks</HI> generally a&s;&s;ign'd <HI>Bodies</HI> to tho&s;e in the other &s;tate, and &s;uch as were &s;uitable to the regions of the World they re&s;ided in; and therefore <HI>Plato</HI> calls &s;ome of them <GAP DESC="foreign">. And to others of more inferior conditon he attributes <HI>Aerial</HI> bodies; yea, generally the <HI>Greeks</HI> appointed <HI>corporeal</HI> puni&s;hments for the wicked in their <HI>Acheron,</HI> and <HI>Cocytus,</HI> as <HI>Theocritus,</HI>
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q>
And <HI>Virgil,</HI>
<Q><L>&mdash;Aliis &s;ub gurgite va&s;to</L>
<L>Infectum eluitur &s;celus, aut exuritur igni.</L></Q>
But the bu&s;ine&s;s is &s;o well known that it needs no te&s;ti|mony; and from hence 'tis &s;ufficiently evident, that they believ'd the <HI>corporeal</HI> &s;tate of the Soul after its <HI>&s;eparation</HI> from this <HI>Terre&s;trial</HI> body: So that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s A&s;&s;ertion herein, is contrary both to the <HI>nature</HI> of the <HI>thing;</HI> and the belief of mo&s;t of his <HI>contemporaries;</HI> nay, and the mo&s;t venerable wi&s;dom that was before him. And indeed, what he taught of the Soul, is at the be&s;t <HI>uncertain,</HI> he u&s;ing the word <GAP DESC="foreign">, for the <HI>mind</HI> one while, and then for the <HI>phan|cy;</HI> applying it now to <HI>Angels,</HI> and at another time to <HI>Brutes;</HI> &s;o that none of his Sectators could ever tell what was his opinion about it.</P>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="9" TYPE="action">
<PB N="57" REF="32">
<HEAD>ACTIO NONA.</HEAD>
<DIV3 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>1.</HI> A <HI>Ga&s;&s;endo</HI> ad Authorem <HI>Vanitatis Dogmati|zandi</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> reducenda e&s;t oratio, po&s;tquam ip&s;e&mdash;<HI>pag. 104.</HI></HEAD>
<P>I Think <HI>&s;till</HI> that the <HI>Many</HI> are very incompetent Judges <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> of <HI>worth</HI> either in <HI>Men</HI> or <HI>things,</HI> admiring <HI>tra&s;h,</HI> and &s;lighting <HI>excellence;</HI> And 'tis my Lord <HI>Bacon</HI>'s Ob&s;ervation, which &s;ignifies much more with me; then all our learned Author has &s;aid in this Paragraph, <HI>viz.</HI> [I hat the <HI>lowe&s;t ver|tues</HI> are the &s;ubjects of the Peoples <HI>prai&s;e;</HI> the <HI>middle ones</HI> of their <HI>admiration;</HI> but the <HI>highe&s;t</HI> they have no <HI>&s;en&s;e</HI> at all of;] which &s;aying holds not only in <HI>Morals,</HI> but in all things el&s;e which the vulgar u&s;e to judge in: for they re|gard nothing, but what is like <HI>them&s;elves,</HI> that is, <HI>mean</HI> and <HI>trivial;</HI> which is the rea&s;on of that other Ob&s;ervation of the &s;ame great Philo&s;opher; <HI>That Time, like a River bears up what is light and chaffy, while the things that are more weighty and con&s;iderable, are lo&s;t at the bottom.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>2.</HI> Subjicit Author no&s;ter Sapientium arbitrio Peri|pateticam <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> e&s;&s;e vocum nihil &s;ignificantium&mdash;<HI>pag. 105.</HI></HEAD>
<P>THe excellent Lord <HI>Verulam</HI> is one of the <HI>wi&s;e</HI> men that <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> hath reprov'd the <HI>arbritrarine&s;s</HI> of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>words,</HI> particularly in his <HI>In&s;tauratio Magna,</HI> where he &s;aith, [I can|not a little marvel at the Philo&s;opher <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> that did
<PB N="58" REF="33">
proceed in &s;uch a &s;pirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity, not only to frame <HI>new words</HI> of <HI>Science at plea|&s;ure,</HI> but to confound and extingui&s;h all antient wi&s;dom] and his affected ob&s;curity, <HI>Patricius</HI> &s;ayes, All the <HI>Greeks</HI> confe&s;&s;ed; yea <HI>Themi&s;tius</HI> one of his great Sectators &s;ayes of him, <HI>Se, veluti &s;epiam a<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">ramento &s;uo &s;e&s;e occului&s;&s;e.</HI> And <HI>Simplicius</HI> another, writes thus in his <HI>Prolegomena</HI> to the Praedicaments: <GAP DESC="foreign">, Be&s;ides which clear te&s;timony the Author of the cen&s;ure prefixt to <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s works cited by <HI>Ga&s;|&s;endus</HI> after great prai&s;es of him, adds, <HI>Ingenium viri te|ctum &amp; callidum &amp; metu<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">ns reprehen&s;ionis,</HI> quod <HI>inhibebat eum, ne proferret interdum aperi&ograve;, quae &s;entiret; Ind&egrave; tam multa per ejus opera ob&s;cura &amp; ambigua.</HI> And again the forementioned <HI>Themi&s;tius, Cum pler&egrave;&abque; omnia</HI> Ari&s;totelis <HI>&s;cripta qua&s;i de compo&s;ito caligine quadam offu&s;a oppleta&abque; habeantur:</HI> like unto which is that, which <HI>Simplicius</HI> &s;ayes of him: In <HI>Acroamaticis dat&acirc; oper&acirc; ob&s;curus e&s;&s;e voluit.</HI> We &s;ee then who the wi&s;e Men are, that have accu&s;ed the <HI>ob|&s;curity</HI> of the <HI>Ari&s;totelean proce&s;&s;es.</HI> And that he was not &s;o clear from <HI>aequivocatiens</HI> as our Author &s;ugge&s;ts; I'le give but a double in&s;tance (1.) of his applying the foremention'd <GAP DESC="foreign"> to <HI>Bea&s;ts</HI> and <HI>Angels,</HI> to the <HI>Imagination</HI> and <HI>ab&s;tracted Intellect.</HI> And (2.) his calling <HI>God,</HI> the <HI>Quinte&s;sence, Form,</HI> the <HI>Soul,</HI> and <HI>Motion,</HI> by the common appellative of <GAP DESC="foreign"> To all which might be added, that 'tis an ar|gument that the <HI>Ari&s;totelean</HI> method was not &s;o clear and cautious, as our Author would have it believed; &s;ince his <HI>Commentators</HI> have been infinitely <HI>divided</HI> about his <HI>mean|ing:</HI> And our Author him&s;elf complains, That tho&s;e of the <HI>latter</HI> Schools have quite receded from his genuine doctrine, which either accu&s;es their <HI>ignorance,</HI> or his <HI>ob&s;curity.</HI> It appears then, that the <HI>wi&s;e Men</HI> I mention to have accu&s;ed <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>ambiguities</HI> and <HI>aequivocations</HI> were tho&s;e that un|der&s;tood
<PB N="59" REF="33">
the <HI>Ari&s;totelean</HI> Doctrines, being &s;ome of them his mo&s;t genuine and ancient Interpreters; and not tho&s;e who are &s;o little acquainted with the matters of this <HI>Philo|&s;ophy,</HI> as to charge <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> with the faults of, I know not what, api&s;h <HI>Peripateticks,</HI> and <HI>Pyrrhonians.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>3.</HI> Pro&s;equitur deinde Actionem in Peripateticos per <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> dubia quaedam, quae illi clara non &s;unt,&mdash;<HI>pag. 107.</HI></HEAD>
<P>IN this Paragraph I can under&s;tand nothing proved, but <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> that a thing is <HI>po&s;sible to be</HI> before it is; which po&s;&s;ibi|lity our Author will have to be neither <HI>quid,</HI> nor <HI>quale,</HI> nor <HI>quantum:</HI> Though not ab&s;olutely <HI>nothing.</HI> And if this learned Gentleman take this <HI>po&s;&s;e</HI> of a thing for <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>materia prima,</HI> he mi&s;takes the <HI>Metaphy&s;ical,</HI> for the <HI>Phy|&s;ical matter:</HI> Or, if hereby he would only in&s;inuate, that the <HI>fir&s;t mater</HI> may be <HI>&s;omething,</HI> though neither <HI>quid, quale,</HI> nor <HI>quantum;</HI> the <HI>in&s;tance</HI> is too &s;hort for his <HI>con|clu&s;ion,</HI> &s;ince the <HI>po&s;&s;e</HI> of a thing before it is, is no <HI>real</HI> bee|ing, but an <HI>extrin&s;ecal denomination,</HI> and a <HI>mode</HI> of our <HI>conception.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>4.</HI> Duae aliae Voces mole&s;tae &s;unt Sceptico no&s;tro. Hae <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> &s;unt <HI>forma, &amp; educi de potenti&acirc; materiei&punc;&mdash;pag. 109.</HI></HEAD>
<P>I Call the <HI>Ari&s;totelean form</HI> an empty word, becau&s;e I <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> believe there's nothing <HI>real</HI> that an&s;wers it; All bodies are &s;ufficiently di&s;tingui&s;h'd by <HI>figure</HI> and po&s;ition of parts, and I &s;ee no nece&s;&s;ity to introduce &s;uch an <HI>arbitrary being;</HI>
<PB N="60" REF="34">
However, if our Author plea&s;es, let him call <HI>that</HI> by which things are di&s;tingui&s;h'd, their <HI>form:</HI> But if with <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> he will make this a <HI>&s;ub&s;tantial principle</HI> of things; I mu&s;t be excu&s;ed in a di&s;&s;ent to which my rea&s;on inforces me. And if his <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> be, that <HI>forms are accidents,</HI> (as it &s;eems, he &s;uppo&s;es, by the in&s;tances alledged) he recedes from his Ma&s;ter <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> who expre&s;ly makes his <HI>Form</HI> a <HI>Sub&s;tance.</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">, And again, <GAP DESC="foreign">.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>5.</HI> Quoad po&s;teriorem vocem, &s;eu <HI>educi de poten|ti&acirc;,</HI> videat Vir ingenio&s;us an illud quod&mdash;<HI>pag. 110.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THat which was brought out of the <HI>dark,</HI> was in <HI>it.</HI> And <HI>Cae&s;ar</HI> adds nothing to the <HI>Marble,</HI> but the <HI>Fi|gure;</HI> which is but a <HI>mode</HI> of <HI>Matter,</HI> and an&s;wers not our ca&s;e. But <HI>Forms</HI> are not &s;uppo&s;ed <HI>Praeexi&s;tent</HI> in the <HI>Matter</HI> from whence they were <HI>educed;</HI> and are <HI>Sub&s;tances really di&s;tingui&s;ht</HI> from it: which I have prov'd from <HI>Ari|&s;totle,</HI> and 'tis the &s;en&s;e of his <HI>Commentators,</HI> though it &s;eems 'tis not our <HI>Authors.</HI> I inquire then, are the&s;e <HI>Sub|&s;tantial Forms</HI> produced of <HI>&s;omething,</HI> or of <HI>nothing?</HI> An <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> will not allow the <HI>latter;</HI> for this were again&s;t the Maxime, <HI>Ex Nihilo Nihil,</HI> and a <HI>Creation.</HI> He affirms it produced of <HI>&s;omething</HI> then, and this <HI>&s;omething</HI> is <HI>Poten|tia Materia.</HI> I enquire further therefore, whether any thing of the <HI>Form</HI> did <HI>actually Praeexi&s;t</HI> in this <HI>Power</HI> of the <HI>Mat|ter,</HI> or not? If &s;o, all po&s;&s;ible <HI>Forms</HI> re&s;ide in the <HI>Subjects</HI> out of which they are <HI>educed,</HI> which is not con&s;onant to their Hypothe&s;is. If not, the <HI>latter</HI> part of the disjunction is confe&s;t; to avoid the &s;hame of which, they fly to <HI>&s;ubjective dependence:</HI> And this is the <HI>Potentia Materiae,</HI>
<PB N="61" REF="34">
they talk of; from which follow the ab&s;urdities I inferred. And this is the <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> of the <HI>Schools;</HI> and this the <HI>Pe|ripatetici&s;m</HI> I charge: If our Author &s;aith, it is not accord|ing to <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>Doctrine,</HI> let him di&s;pute it out with <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>followers;</HI> I charge it not on <HI>him,</HI> but on his <HI>Schooles,</HI> in which all the world can ju&s;tifie me.</P>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="10" TYPE="action">
<HEAD>ACTIO DECIMA.</HEAD>
<DIV3 N="1" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>1.</HI> Proxim&egrave; &s;agittant duas <HI>Ari&s;totelis</HI> Definitiones, <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> utramque exacti&s;simam &amp; quicquam in&mdash;<HI>pag. 112.</HI></HEAD>
<P>LEt <GAP DESC="foreign"> &s;ignifie as our Author would have it, <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> <HI>viz. That which remains of an Action, and is intro|duced by it.</HI> But I enquire then, (1.) Whether this In|terpretation be not <HI>arbitrary?</HI> I'me &s;ure the word in this &s;en&s;e is <HI>&s;o.</HI> (2.) <HI>Light</HI> is then <HI>&s;omething that remains of an operation:</HI> And this Explication notably helps the <HI>per|&s;picuity</HI> of the <HI>Definition,</HI> which is as good a one as that was lately given of a <HI>Thought</HI> in a <HI>Univer&s;ity Sermon,</HI> viz. <HI>A Repentine Pro&s;iliency jumping into Being.</HI> And if our Author's De&s;cription be all contain'd in <HI>Actus Per&s;picui&punc;</HI> I &s;hall need no more proof of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>ob&s;curity</HI> in this&punc; <HI>in&s;tance.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>2.</HI> Idem e&s;t reliquae Definitionis Vitium. E&s;t autem <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> ip&s;a Definitio, <HI>Motus e&s;t Actus entis&mdash;pag. 113.</HI></HEAD>
<P><PB N="62" REF="35">
<MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IF <GAP DESC="foreign">, in the definition of <HI>Motion</HI> &s;ignifie the <HI>Mode, whereby the &s;ubject is affected in the end of Action,</HI> ac|cording to our Author; with what congruity doth <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> then apply it to the Soul? except he thought it a <HI>mode</HI> of <HI>matter,</HI> and then our Philo&s;opher had no rea&s;on to &s;up|po&s;e he believed its <HI>Immortality;</HI> But whatever he concluded of this, he affirm'd it to be a <HI>Sub&s;tance,</HI> as in that pa&s;&s;age, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And <HI>Galen</HI> of him, <GAP DESC="foreign">.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>3.</HI> Nova calumnia Capite decimo &s;eptimo in&s;truitur adver&s;us <HI>Ari&s;totelem,</HI> tant&ograve; indigni&ugrave;s&mdash;<HI>pag. 115.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THat <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was not &s;o careful in di&s;tingui&s;hing the <HI>&s;ignification</HI> of <HI>words,</HI> as is pretended, we have evinced already: And it appears clearly enough from the la&s;t in&s;tance; In which things are <HI>coupled</HI> together by a <HI>common</HI> appellative that <HI>agree</HI> in <HI>nothing.</HI> And for the other mi&s;take this period chargeth me with, I an&s;wer; That if I take the <HI>Scepticks</HI> for <HI>Peripateticks,</HI> I hope our Philo&s;opher will henceforward ab&s;olve me from the &s;o often <HI>objected Sceptici&s;m.</HI> For according to our Author my <HI>Peripateticks</HI> are <HI>Scepticks,</HI> and <HI>he knows</HI> how much friend|&s;hip I have for <HI>tho&s;e.</HI> But whether they are <HI>Scepticks</HI> or not, they are <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s followers, if he have any in the Schools of <HI>Chri&s;tendom;</HI> And I leave them to ju&s;tifie the title they have a&s;&s;umed. It &s;ufficeth for me, that the genuine <HI>Ari&s;totelian method</HI> is a way of <HI>ob&s;curity and di&s;pute;</HI> for which, be&s;ides the in&s;tances I have given, I have alledged the clear te&s;timonies of his acknowledg'd
<PB N="63" REF="35">
Sectators. And if the modern <HI>Peripateticks</HI> can prove them|&s;elves <HI>Ari&s;totelians,</HI> we have a charge of &s;ufficient aggrava|tion from our Author again&s;t <HI>them</HI> al&s;o. For thus he cen|&s;ures them under the name of Scepticks <HI>[Scepticorum cona|tus e&s;&s;e vani&s;simos facile agno&s;co, illos parum de vocum u&s;u &s;ollicitos e&s;&s;e quo liberum &s;it iis qua&s;libet nugas vanitatis aut alterius lucri cau&s;a divendere, oratorculos vel magis ra|bulas, non Philo&s;ophos e&s;&s;e,</HI> Ari&s;totelicorum <HI>nomen a&s;&s;umere ut corrumpant juventutem, &amp; Di&s;cipulos po&s;t &s;e&s;e abducant; hos omnibus Scientiae &s;ectatoribus veluti pe&s;tem vitandos non inficior, neque quicquam ab iis &s;olidi expectandum e&s;&s;e.]</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>4.</HI> Confirmant fictam adver&s;us Philo&s;ophum actio|nem <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> ex ip&s;is Philo&s;ophi dictis &amp; ge&s;tis.&mdash;<HI>pag. 116.</HI></HEAD>
<P>IT &s;eems it was not only the <HI>ab&s;tractedne&s;s</HI> of the <HI>matter,</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> that rendred <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>Phy&s;iology</HI> &s;o difficult of compre|hen&s;ion, &s;ince our Author confe&s;&s;eth that &s;carce any un|der&s;tand it, but who are a&s;&s;i&s;ted by the <HI>Commentaries</HI> of the <HI>Ancients.</HI> And certainly all the <HI>Moderns</HI> had never rece|ded &s;o far from his <HI>&s;en&s;e,</HI> if his expre&s;&s;ions had not been <HI>ob&s;cure</HI> and <HI>involved,</HI> as well as his <HI>matter</HI> difficult. And for that which the learned Gentleman calls a more grievous and unhappy <HI>calumny:</HI> He confe&s;&s;eth it to be <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>In&s;truction</HI> to perfect his Scholars in the method of <HI>di&s;pu|ting,</HI> which is all I charge him with; And I think <HI>ambi|guity</HI> and <HI>ob&s;tinate garrulity</HI> in <HI>Controver&s;ies,</HI> which the Philo&s;opher &s;eems to advi&s;e them to, is a way of Di&s;puta|tion that will not much commend the <HI>Practi&s;ers,</HI> or <HI>In|&s;tructor.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="5" TYPE="section">
<PB N="64" REF="36">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>5.</HI> Merebatur haec actio in&s;tantias ex opere. Pre|mit Author tres (ex fide credo <HI>Ga&s;&s;endi&mdash;pag. 117.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THat I have done <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> no wrong in the fir&s;t in|&s;tance alledged, will appear to any one that will take the pains to peru&s;e the fir&s;t Chapter of his fir&s;t <HI>De Ce|lo.</HI> For attempting there the Proof of the <HI>perfection</HI> of <HI>bo|dies</HI> in order to the evincing <HI>that</HI> of the <HI>World,</HI> he doth it thus: The <HI>magnitude</HI> that is <HI>one</HI> way <HI>divi&s;ible,</HI> is a <HI>line; two,</HI> is a &s;uperficies; and what may <HI>three</HI> ways be divi|ded, is <HI>a Body.</HI> Be&s;ides which there is no other <HI>magnitude,</HI> for this rea&s;on <GAP DESC="foreign">, which he proves by a &s;aying of the <HI>Pythagoreans,</HI> and this Rea&s;on in Nature (if it be one) <HI>viz.</HI> becau&s;e the <HI>beginning, end,</HI> and <HI>middle,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> which al&s;o is confirmed by that I quoted from him: <GAP DESC="foreign">. And concludes, wherefore &s;ince <HI>All</HI> and <HI>perfect,</HI> differ not as to their form, <HI>Body</HI> will be the only <HI>perfect</HI> magnitude, and that for the rea&s;on I a&s;&s;ign'd from him, <GAP DESC="foreign">. This is the genuine te|nour of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s argument, and our Authors &s;en&s;e and <HI>interpretation</HI> &s;eems to me, (as I &s;uppo&s;e 'twill to any one el&s;e, who con&s;iderately compares it with the <HI>Text) forraign, arbitrary,</HI> and <HI>unnatural.</HI></P>
<P>As to the &s;econd In&s;tance, the learned Gentleman hath mi&s;taken the words of my charge. For if he plea&s;eth to look again into my Book, he will find, that I object no &s;uch con&s;equence to <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> as, That if there were more worlds then one, the <HI>Moon</HI> would fall to the <HI>Earth.</HI> But on the contrary, that the Earth would fall to that other
<PB N="65" REF="36">
World. So that our Authors ju&s;tification of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s ar|gument, <HI>viz. That he fixt the Centre of the World in the Earth,</HI> is a &s;trange one, and concludes the quite contrary to what <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> would inferre. And why the <HI>Moon</HI> &s;hould <HI>fall,</HI> upon the &s;uppo&s;itions, that the <HI>Earth</HI> is the <HI>Centre,</HI> and that there are other Worlds, (as our Author &s;ug|ge&s;ts) rather then as things are at pre&s;ent, I cannot conje|cture.</P>
<P>My Third In&s;tance of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>trifling,</HI> and <HI>incon&s;e|quent arguings,</HI> was; That he inferrs the <HI>Heavens</HI> to move towards the <HI>We&s;t,</HI> becau&s;e they move towards the more <HI>Honourable,</HI> and <HI>before</HI> is more honourable then <HI>af|ter.</HI> Which is clearly his con&s;equence in the 5. Chapter of his &s;econd <HI>De Coelo:</HI> For thus he argues, <GAP DESC="foreign">, <HI>Nature doth alwayes what is be&s;t.</HI> Now &s;aith he, as the motion which is upwards is more excellent then that which is downward, <GAP DESC="foreign">; <HI>&s;o in like manner is that which is</HI> forward <HI>more excellent then that which is</HI> back|ward. Thence he concludes this the rea&s;on why the Hea|vens move <HI>antror&s;um.</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. So that this &s;eems the &s;ub|&s;tance of the Inference; The <HI>Heavens</HI> move by a motion that is <HI>natural, Nature</HI> doth what is <HI>be&s;t, before</HI> is <HI>better</HI> then <HI>behind,</HI> and con&s;equently that way the Heavens <HI>move.</HI> The weakne&s;s of which argumentation con&s;i&s;ts in &s;uppo&s;ing, that tho&s;e variable re&s;pects of <HI>before,</HI> and <HI>after,</HI> are <HI>rea|lities</HI> in <HI>Nature,</HI> which is a <HI>poor</HI> vulgar conceit, ari&s;ing from the meere <HI>prejudice</HI> of <HI>mi&s;applyed Sen&s;ations,</HI> and ve|ry unbecomming a Philo&s;opher. And that this was the &s;uppo&s;al of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Argument, is confirmed by the margin of <HI>Pacius</HI>'s Edition, in which he hath given this ac|count of the contents of this period, <HI>Coelum movetur ad anteriorem partem, quia huju&s;modi motus e&s;t prae&s;tantior quam motus ad partem po&s;teriorem.</HI> Yea, when our Author him|&s;elf
<PB N="66" REF="37">
&s;aith in the Account he gives of the Argument, <HI>Mo|tum naturalem e&s;&s;e ad honorabilius, unde clare &s;equitur occi|dentem e&s;&s;e nobiliorem oriente,</HI> he hath given me all I have contended for.</P>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
<DIV2 N="11" TYPE="action">
<HEAD>ACTIO UNDECIMA.</HEAD>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Indignatur &s;ub finem Capituli, quod doctorum opera ita in Logicam, Phy&s;icam, &amp; Metaphy&s;icam&mdash;<HI>pag. 123.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> OUr Author confe&s;&s;eth the Schools neglect of the <HI>pro|fitable</HI> Doctrines of the <HI>Heavens, Meteors, Minerals,</HI> and <HI>Animals.</HI> But <HI>his Sceptici&s;m, viz.</HI> the pre&s;ent <HI>Peripa|tetici&s;m,</HI> is the cau&s;e. And this is <HI>that</HI> which I charge in the place animadverted on. So that I accu&s;e not <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI> here; but by name the modern Retainers to the Sta|gyrite: But whether the <HI>notionality</HI> and <HI>ob&s;curity</HI> of the <HI>Ari|&s;totelian</HI> method it &s;elf do not give occa&s;ion to the endle&s;s babble of tho&s;e reprehended <HI>Scepticks,</HI> I have already pa&s;t my conjecture.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="2" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>2.</HI> Capite decimo octavo arguit doctrinam Peripate|ticam, qua&s;i ad Phaenomena &s;alvanda&mdash;<HI>pag. 124.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> I Am not yet convinced, but that the <HI>Ari&s;totelian Phi|lo&s;ophy</HI> is <HI>in&s;ufficient</HI> for the <HI>Solution</HI> of the <HI>Phaenome|na;</HI> And yet que&s;tion not <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>endeavours</HI> in that kind, but his <HI>&s;ucce&s;s,</HI> upon what Accounts my Di&s;cour&s;e declareth.</P>
<P><PB N="67" REF="37">
I acknowledge the ingenuity of Sir <HI>Kenelm Digbye</HI>'s <HI>Hypo|the&s;eis:</HI> But cannot yet under&s;tand <HI>that</HI> to have been <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI>'s method. And I think our Author is one of the fir&s;t that a&s;&s;erts <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> to have taught the <HI>Corpu&s;cularian</HI> and <HI>Atomical Philo&s;ophy;</HI> for all the World hath hitherto taken <HI>his,</HI> to be the way of <HI>Qualities</HI> and <HI>Forms:</HI> Yea <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> mentions the <HI>Atomical Hypothe&s;is</HI> of <HI>Democritus</HI> in a way of di&s;&s;ent and profe&s;t oppo&s;ition; <GAP DESC="foreign"> which la&s;t pa&s;|&s;age is the main &s;ub&s;tance of the <HI>Corpu&s;cularian</HI> Philo&s;ophy. And el&s;ewhere he recites the &s;ame <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> from <HI>Leu|cippus</HI> and <HI>Democritus,</HI> to the &s;ame purpo&s;e; <GAP DESC="foreign">.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<HEAD>Urget adver&s;arius &s;y&s;tema coeli ab <HI>Ari&s;totele</HI> &s;e|qui&ugrave;s <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> e&s;&s;e con&s;titutum. Aperi accu&s;ationem.&mdash;<HI>pag. 125.</HI></HEAD>
<P>I Cannot &s;ee but that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> without Optick In&s;tru|ments, <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> the defect of which our Author thinks excu&s;eth his A&s;tronomy, might have di&s;covered the <HI>Motion</HI> of the <HI>Earth,</HI> and <HI>Fluidity</HI> of the <HI>Heavens,</HI> as well as the more antient wi&s;dom that believ'd them. He recites the former as the opinion of the <HI>Pythagoreans,</HI> but could not over|come the prejudice of &s;en&s;e again&s;t it. <GAP DESC="foreign">. And in another place hath a pro|fe&s;t redargution of this <HI>Pythagorean</HI> opinion. As for the <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> of the <HI>Fluidity</HI> of the <HI>Heavens,</HI> 'Tis &s;aid in the
<PB N="68" REF="38">
<HI>Jewi&s;h Gemara, Non orbes &s;ed in Coelo liquido moveri &s;i|dera, vetu&s;ti&s;sima Haebreorum &s;ententia e&s;t.</HI> And if <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI> had own'd a wit &s;o much more excellent then o|thers of the Antients, as our Author &s;omewhere intimates, I &s;ee not why he might not have received the&s;e Theories, as well as &s;ome of tho&s;e, to whom Optick Tubes were as much &s;trangers as to the Contriver of the Orbs. That the <HI>Chri&s;tian Doctrine</HI> teacheth the <HI>Motion</HI> of the <HI>Heavens</HI> by <HI>Intelligencies&punc;</HI> I cannot yet comprehend. And our Author cannot think it &s;o <HI>evident</HI> as to be believed without proof. Our <HI>Air</HI> according to the be&s;t computations can be made of the weight of the <HI>A&s;tmo&s;phear,</HI> reacheth not much above 50 miles upwards; and the <HI>thin Element</HI> there, is nothing to the <HI>&s;phear</HI> of <HI>Fire</HI> &s;uppo&s;ed under the <HI>concave</HI> of the <HI>Moon.</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="3" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>3.</HI> Caput decimum nonum exagitat <HI>Ari&s;totelis</HI> doctri|nam qua&s;i infaecundam &amp; &s;terilem.&mdash;<HI>pag. 126.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> IF it belong not to <HI>Philo&s;ophers</HI> to make <HI>Experiments;</HI> the noble Lord <HI>Bacon, Des Cartes,</HI> our Illu&s;trious <HI>Roy|al Society,</HI> and all <HI>experimental</HI> Philo&s;ophers, have been needle&s;ly imployed, and out of the way in their inquiries. And if we mu&s;t u&s;e no <HI>Experiments</HI> but tho&s;e that are made by ordinary <HI>Mechanicks</HI> without <HI>de&s;ign</HI> of <HI>Science,</HI> we &s;hall never make any great progre&s;s into the knowledg of the <HI>Magnalia;</HI> which are not known by the common methods of action. He that will erect a la&s;ting and &s;tate|ly <HI>Fabrick,</HI> mu&s;t have <HI>Stones</HI> digged from the <HI>Quarries,</HI> and not expect that the High-wayes &s;hould furni&s;h him.</P>
<P>What the&s;e common <HI>Ari&s;totelian Principles</HI> are, with|out which no account can be given of natural effects, our
<PB N="69" REF="38">
Author would do well to tell us. Some Principles indeed are nece&s;&s;ary, and without them nothing can be inquired or determin'd: But &s;uch are <HI>common</HI> to <HI>all Philo&s;ophers,</HI> and not <HI>peculiarly Ari&s;totle</HI>'s.</P>
<P>Tho&s;e that admit <HI>vacuities,</HI> think there can be no <HI>action</HI> without them; holding it impo&s;&s;ible there &s;hould be <HI>moti|on in ab&s;olute pleno;</HI> And we have but our Author's <HI>bare a&s;&s;ertion</HI> again&s;t <HI>their arguments.</HI></P>
<P>The <HI>Carte&s;ian vortices</HI> will &s;erve to account for the <HI>Phae|nomena,</HI> and teach a way of Theory not un&s;erviceable to <HI>experiment.</HI> And for the <HI>Salvo</HI> of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s credit in tho&s;e contradictory pa&s;&s;ages we meet in his Writings; <HI>viz.</HI> that <HI>they are the &s;ayings of others,</HI> it &s;eems to me an arbitrary &s;hift and eva&s;ion: Since we find them in his Di&s;cour&s;es without mention of any &s;uch matter. And if it be con|fe&s;t his cu&s;tom to in&s;ert <HI>forrein Doctrines</HI> and <HI>Sayings</HI> in|to his Works, without any intimation to di&s;tingui&s;h them from his <HI>own;</HI> who then can know when <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;peaks him&s;elf, or when he &s;peaks the words and &s;en&s;e of o|thers?</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="4" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>4.</HI> Caput vice&s;imum manife&s;tam reddit eminentiam <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> Peripatetices &s;upra reliquas Methodos&mdash;<HI>pag. 127.</HI></HEAD>
<P>IN that Chapter I impugn not <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s <HI>Philo&s;ophy,</HI> but <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> had concluded my <HI>Reflections</HI> in the former. <HI>Cau&s;ali|ties</HI> are fir&s;t found out by <HI>concomitancy,</HI> as I intimated. And our <HI>experience</HI> of the <HI>dependence</HI> of one, and <HI>indepen|dence</HI> of the other &s;hews which is the <HI>Effect,</HI> and which the <HI>Cau&s;e. Definitions</HI> cannot di&s;cover <HI>Cau&s;alities,</HI> for they are formed after the <HI>Cau&s;ality</HI> is known. So that in our Authors in&s;tance, a man cannot know <HI>heat</HI> to be the <HI>A|toms</HI>
<PB N="68" REF="39">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="69" REF="39">
<GAP DESC="duplicate" EXTENT="1 page">
<PB N="70" REF="40">
<HI>of Fire,</HI> till the <HI>concomitancy</HI> be known, and the <HI>ef|ficiency</HI> fir&s;t pre&s;umed. The que&s;tion is then, How <HI>heat</HI> is known to be the <HI>effect</HI> of <HI>Fire?</HI> our Author an&s;wers by it's <HI>definition.</HI> But how came it to be &s;o <HI>defined?</HI> The an|&s;wer mu&s;t be, by the <HI>concomitancy</HI> and <HI>dependence;</HI> for there's nothing el&s;e a&s;&s;ignable.</P>
<P>But who is our Authors <HI>Peripatetick</HI> that concludes <HI>heat</HI> to be the <HI>Atomes</HI> of <HI>Fire?</HI> And who that adorer of <HI>Des-Cartes</HI> that profe&s;&s;eth <HI>Sceptici&s;m?</HI></P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="5" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>5.</HI> Nihilo validius e&s;t Argumentum &agrave; varietate Opi|nionum Philo&s;ophantium ad impo&s;sibilitatem&mdash;<HI>pag. <GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="2 letters">9.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> I Urge no &s;uch argument as the <HI>variety</HI> of Philo&s;ophers <HI>Opinions</HI> again&s;t the po&s;&s;ibility of <HI>Science,</HI> but from the notion of the <HI>Dogmati&s;ts;</HI> that <HI>demon&s;tration</HI> &s;uppo&s;eth <HI>certainty,</HI> as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> him&s;elf affirms, <GAP DESC="foreign">; And <HI>certainty, impo&s;sibility</HI> of being otherwi&s;e; as <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI> proceeds, <GAP DESC="foreign">; I &s;ay, from hence I inferre 'tis &s;carce mode&s;t to conclude any thing <HI>&s;o</HI> a <HI>demon&s;tration,</HI> and con&s;equently, <HI>Science</HI> in their notion; The rea&s;on of my Inference is fully de|clared in my Di&s;cour&s;e, the lea&s;t view of which will be evidence enough of the widene&s;s of this an&s;wer.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 TYPE="section">
<PB N="71" REF="40">
<HEAD>Sub finem Capitis a&s;&s;umit nihil &s;ciri po&s;&s;e ni&s;i in pri|mas <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> cau&s;as re&s;olvatur. Unde diluxi&s;se&mdash;<HI>pag. 131.</HI></HEAD>
<P>WHen I affirm nothing can be known but by a <HI>re&s;o|lution</HI> of things into their <HI>fir&s;t cau&s;es,</HI> I mean the <HI>Mechanical,</HI> not <HI>Metaphy&s;ical:</HI> For I am of opinion with the excellent Lord <HI>Verulam;</HI> That <HI>Natural Theory</HI> hath been very much hindered, and corrupted by <HI>Metaphy&s;ical</HI> admixtures; And this is a con&s;iderable fault of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> and his <HI>Sectators.</HI> Some general notices indeed are nece&s;&s;a|ry to direct us in particular re&s;earches, but then they mu&s;t be &s;uch as are concluded from <HI>induction</HI> in particulars; and perhaps the in&s;tances our Philo&s;opher alledges to &s;hew the nece&s;&s;ity of Metaphy&s;icks to Phy&s;iology will be better determin'd and accounted for in the way of <HI>experiment,</HI> then <HI>notion;</HI> and I think our Author's <HI>Metaphy&s;ical</HI> argu|ment again&s;t a <HI>Vacuum,</HI> (the exploding of which he thinks &s;o nece&s;&s;ary for the e&s;tabli&s;hment of a grounded <HI>Philo&s;ophy)</HI> I think, I &s;ay, his argument is a <HI>Sophi&s;m,</HI> who&s;e greate&s;t force lies in the <HI>&s;carcity</HI> of <HI>words</HI> and <HI>defect</HI> in <HI>language:</HI> For this is the &s;um of the pre&s;umed demon&s;tration. A <HI>Vacuum</HI> is <HI>imaginary &s;pace; Imaginary &s;pace</HI> is <HI>nothing real,</HI> and tho&s;e bodies are together, that have nothing between them: If the middle of which Propo&s;itions be denyed, the argu|ment comes to nothing; and it may without ab&s;urdity be affirmed, that though <HI>&s;pace</HI> have not the nature of any of the beings that are in our <HI>praedicaments,</HI> yet 'tis &s;omething <HI>real</HI> and not meerly <HI>imaginary:</HI> For the <HI>notion</HI> of <HI>&s;pace</HI> &s;trikes &s;o clo&s;e to our minds, that we cannot conceive, but that 'tis <HI>infinite</HI> and <HI>eternal, viz.</HI> is <HI>every where,</HI> and has <HI>been alwayes;</HI> and therefore has a kind of being, that is no <HI>arbitrary</HI> figment; Though &s;uch a one, for the
<PB N="72" REF="41">
expre&s;&s;ing of which our words are defective: We &s;ee then, how this pretended <HI>Metaphy&s;ical impo&s;sibility</HI> may be an|&s;wered; For though &s;uppo&s;ing a <HI>Vacuum</HI> there be <HI>nihil cor|poris</HI> between the bodies di&s;tant, yet is there <HI>aliquid &s;patii,</HI> which is &s;ufficient to avoid the <HI>contradiction;</HI> &s;o that there may be a <HI>vacuum,</HI> notwith&s;tanding our Author's <HI>Metaphy|&s;icks:</HI> Yea, that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> him&s;elf a&s;&s;erted it, though I know he has oppo&s;ed it al&s;o, is affirmed by <HI>Aetius</HI> in the&s;e words, <GAP DESC="foreign">. And again, <GAP DESC="foreign">; and there &s;eems a &s;trong nece&s;&s;ity that there &s;hould be one, &s;ince it looks like an impo&s;&s;ibility that there &s;hould be <HI>mo|tion</HI> in <HI>pleno,</HI> or at lea&s;t that any thing &s;hould be moved, but that all the World mu&s;t be moved with it; which I alledge only to &s;hew, that <HI>Metaphy&s;icks</HI> may both ways be urged almo&s;t for any thing, and that all matters of noti|on are double-handed. And if we mu&s;t determine nothing in <HI>Phy&s;iology</HI> till <HI>Metaphy&s;icks</HI> have concluded it; for ought I know we &s;hall be at an eternal lo&s;s, and never fix on any thing. And by this method of mingling <HI>Metaphy&s;icks</HI> with <HI>Natural Philo&s;ophy,</HI> we &s;hall fill plain Theories with infinite intricacy and di&s;pute. Indeed, the impatient mind of Man, as my Lord <HI>Bacon</HI> ob&s;erves, is too apt to fly to <HI>general conclu&s;ions;</HI> and more aver&s;e to the way of <HI>expe|riment</HI> and <HI>induction,</HI> which he thought the only method for the e&s;tabli&s;hing of a &s;olid and grounded Theory: In which there is none has more happily &s;ucceeded then the Phi|lo&s;opher <HI>Des-Cartes,</HI> who&s;e Philo&s;ophy is not a <HI>pre&s;cribed form how things &s;hould be made,</HI> as our Author injuriou&s;ly &s;ugge&s;ts, but profe&s;&s;es it &s;elf only an <HI>Hypothe&s;is</HI> how they <HI>may be,</HI> and how by &s;uch Principles the <HI>Phaenomena</HI> may be &s;alved: And the <HI>Mechanicks</HI> of <HI>Des-Cartes</HI> are much more likely methods for the expounding Nature, then the <HI>Metaphy&s;icks</HI> of <HI>Ari&s;totle;</HI> Which his own Sectators have confe&s;t a meer <HI>rhap&s;ody</HI> and confu&s;ed ramble of they knew
<PB N="73" REF="41">
not what: Yea, and 'tis doubtful whither they are not the &s;purious i&s;&s;ue of &s;ome more modern Author, &s;ince <HI>Diogenes Laertius,</HI> who u&s;es to give a full and faithful Catalogue of the Writings of Philo&s;ophers, hath omitted this out of the Works of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> and <HI>Philoponus</HI> affirms that Book writ|ten by <HI>Pa&s;icrates Rhodius.</HI> And if &s;o, <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> will lo&s;e the credit of <HI>demon&s;tration</HI> in <HI>Metaphy&s;icks,</HI> with which our Author hath inve&s;ted him.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="7" TYPE="section">
<HEAD><HI>7.</HI> Sequens Capitulum laborat illo Errore quem <HI>Ari|&s;toteles</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="A."> &s;aepius &amp; detexit &amp; confutavit:&mdash;<HI>pag 132.</HI></HEAD>
<P><HI>IMperfect knowledge,</HI> according to the notion of the <HI>Dog|mati&s;ts,</HI> <MILESTONE UNIT="G."> is not <HI>Science,</HI> but <HI>Opinion. Scire,</HI> our Author knows, is <HI>per cau&s;as Scire;</HI> and the conditions of tho&s;e Cau&s;es are that they be <HI>true, immediate,</HI> and <HI>nece&s;&s;ary;</HI> This is <HI>perfect Knowledge,</HI> this is the <HI>Science</HI> the Dogmati&s;t pre|tends to; and to <HI>this</HI> according to his own Maxime, <HI>every thing that is mu&s;t contribute,</HI> as my Di&s;cour&s;e declareth. Nor do our Philo&s;ophers In&s;tances weaken my Conclu&s;ion; for they relate to another kind of <HI>Knowledge, viz.</HI> that of the <HI>Exi&s;tence,</HI> not of the <HI>Nature</HI> of things; which <HI>latter</HI> is that which I am treating of; and the <HI>knowledge</HI> of the <HI>be|ing</HI> of a thing, as is its object, is a <HI>&s;imple act,</HI> and con&s;equent|ly, to this, a <HI>&s;ingle</HI> evidence is &s;ufficient: But the <HI>compre|hen&s;ion</HI> of the <HI>nature,</HI> like the thing it &s;elf, is <HI>complex,</HI> and requires the knowledge of the things of which 'tis con&s;tituted. What is added within this Paragraph about two Per&s;ons, &s;ee|ing the &s;ame object in the &s;ame circum&s;tances of &s;entiment, is our Author's bare <HI>a&s;&s;ertion,</HI> again&s;t my <HI>proof</HI> of the con|trary: And the la&s;t period is built upon the fore&punc;mentioned mi&s;take of my de&s;ign and intentions.</P>
</DIV3>
<DIV3 N="8" TYPE="section">
<PB N="74" REF="42">
<HEAD><MILESTONE UNIT="A."> <HI>8.</HI> Attamen Academicus no&s;ter non dubitat generatim dogmatic&egrave; procedentibus affingere quaevis&mdash;<HI>pag. 134.</HI></HEAD>
<P><MILESTONE UNIT="G."> THe Learned Gentleman is now di&s;cended to my <HI>Mo|ral Con&s;iderations</HI> again&s;t <HI>Confident Opinion:</HI> His re|flections on the two fir&s;t of which are built upon the &s;uppo|&s;al of my being a <HI>Sceptick,</HI> which charge I think I've &s;uffi|ciently di&s;abled. The <HI>truth</HI> of my <HI>Third</HI> Accu&s;ation is con|fe&s;t, but the <HI>guilt,</HI> not acknowledged; &s;ince that which ex|cites men to endle&s;s <HI>bawlings,</HI> and <HI>altercations; Schi&s;ms, He|re&s;ies,</HI> and <HI>Rebellions,</HI> by the vehemencies of <HI>Di&s;pute,</HI> is it &s;eems with our Author no more <HI>noxious</HI> and <HI>criminal,</HI> then the <HI>Sun</HI> that &s;tirrs men up to their work in the morn|ing, by the importunity of it's beams. To the <HI>Fourth ab|&s;urdity</HI> of Dogmatizing, our Philo&s;opher al&s;o gives a kind reception; and it &s;eems can be content with a <HI>Confidence</HI> that accu&s;eth all the World of <HI>Ignorance.</HI> But whether be the more <HI>mode&s;t,</HI> the <HI>Dogmati&s;t</HI> that chargeth all that are not of his mind as <HI>Ignorants;</HI> or the <HI>Sceptick</HI> that involves him&s;elf al&s;o in the common reproach, let them di&s;pute it out when they will, I have nothing to do with their Quar|rel. In the <HI>la&s;t</HI> I'me agreed with our Author in the <HI>Truth</HI> of his a&s;&s;ertion, That <HI>Science inlargeth Mens mindes;</HI> but cannot acknowledge the <HI>pertinency.</HI> For he could &s;carce have named things more oppo&s;ite then <HI>Confidence</HI> and <HI>Science. Science</HI> indeed <HI>inlargeth:</HI> But there's a <HI>Knowledge</HI> that only <HI>puffeth up.</HI> And I'me of <HI>Solomon</HI>'s Opinion, That 'tis the <HI>Fool that rageth and is confident.</HI> Our Author concludes as he began, in the &s;uppo&s;ition that I am a <HI>Sceptick,</HI> and in this I'me <HI>certain</HI> he is mi&s;taken; <HI>And</HI> will be <HI>Dogmatical</HI> in affirming, that I am <HI>none.</HI></P>
<P><PB N="75" REF="42">
THus have I concluded my <HI>Reply</HI> with a <HI>Brevity,</HI> that &s;hews I am not fond of an occa&s;ion of <HI>Di&s;puting;</HI> and a <HI>Carele&s;ne&s;s,</HI> that will witne&s;s the little delight I have in matters that are not of very <HI>material &s;peculation.</HI> The truth is, I dropt the&s;e <HI>Reflections</HI> with &s;uch a <HI>dulne&s;s</HI> and <HI>in|activity</HI> of humor: That when my pen had traced <HI>one peri|od,</HI> it was <HI>indifferent</HI> whether it began <HI>another.</HI> And I re|member not an <HI>heat</HI> in the whole performance. For I felt no concernment to defend a Di&s;cour&s;e, which perhaps I had le&s;s kindne&s;s for then one, who hath profe&s;&s;edly oppo&s;ed it. Not to mention the other rea&s;ons of my <HI>coldne&s;s</HI> and <HI>indifference</HI> in this Action. And though I have &s;till a quick re&s;entment of the <HI>Vanity</HI> of <HI>confiding</HI> in <HI>Opinions,</HI> and po&s;|&s;ibly could with an humor brisk enough have rea&s;&s;ailed the &s;pirit of <HI>proud</HI> and <HI>unrea&s;onable pre&s;umption;</HI> Yet I hitherto &s;ee no nece&s;&s;ity of adding more to what I have &s;aid on the Subject: And the Reflections that engaged my Pen, have made me but few new occa&s;ions. So that looking on my im|pugned Di&s;cour&s;e as too <HI>incon&s;iderable</HI> for a Subject of <HI>Pub|lick Vindication,</HI> and meeting but little opportunity for <HI>ge|neral</HI> and <HI>di&s;cur&s;ive notion</HI> in <HI>that</HI> which oppo&s;ed it; I was, I profe&s;s, &s;ometimes more inclined to have throwne away <HI>the&s;e &s;heets</HI> among the <HI>rubbi&s;h</HI> of my Papers, then to permit them thus to &s;hew them&s;elves to the <HI>Publique.</HI> But my <HI>Civility</HI> to this Learned Man obliged me to &s;ome <HI>An&s;wer,</HI> and what|ever I apprehend of it otherwi&s;e, my <HI>lazine&s;s</HI> or my <HI>judge|ment</HI> made me think <HI>this</HI> &s;ufficient for that &s;ervice. What others will judge of it I am <HI>ignorant</HI> and <HI>carele&s;s,</HI> and am &s;ufficiently &s;atisfied with this, that I think it <HI>pertinent,</HI> and that I have <HI>fini&s;h't</HI> it.</P>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
</DIV3>
</DIV2>
</DIV1>
<DIV1 TYPE="letter">
<PB REF="43">
<LETTER>
<HEAD><PB N="77" REF="43">
A LETTER To a <HI>FRIEND</HI> CONCERNING ARISTOTLE.</HEAD>
<OPENER><SALUTE>SIR,</SALUTE></OPENER>
<P>_I Am very Sen&s;ible how <HI>bold</HI> and <HI>ad|venturous</HI> a thing it is, for Men of pri|vate condition to oppo&s;e what <HI>cu&s;tom</HI> and great <HI>names</HI> have render'd <HI>venera|ble.</HI> And though I am &s;till of opinion&punc; that a <HI>lazie acquie&s;cence</HI> in the di&s;co|veries of any <HI>Single</HI> Author, how <HI>great</HI> and <HI>augu&s;t</HI> &s;oever, be a di&s;advantage to the <HI>encrea&s;e</HI> of <HI>knowledge;</HI> yet I think it not <HI>wi&s;e</HI> in every Man that hath only a naked rea&s;on to a&s;&s;i&s;t him, to confront &s;uch <HI>celebrated Authorities.</HI> Upon which account I acknow|ledge &s;ome <HI>juvenile heat</HI> and <HI>praecipitancy</HI> in tho&s;e <HI>reflections</HI> your <HI>friend&s;hip</HI> has animadverted on. Which, be&s;ides the
<PB N="78" REF="44">
pardon young pens may expect from tho&s;e who are not un|rea&s;onably &s;evere, hath a claim to your candour upon o|ther con&s;iderations, which I intend this Paper &s;hall acquaint you with. In order to which, I &s;uppo&s;e I need not tell you, that 'twas no <HI>enmity</HI> to the <HI>learning</HI> of the <HI>Univer&s;i|ties,</HI> which with all duty I acknowledge, that drew my pen upon the <HI>Sage</HI> their <HI>con&s;titutions</HI> have made <HI>textuary.</HI> You know me too well, to think I de&s;igned any thing again&s;t the <HI>appointments</HI> and <HI>purpo&s;es</HI> of our pious Ance&s;tors in tho&s;e <HI>venerable nur&s;eries</HI> of <HI>Piety</HI> and <HI>Learning.</HI> I too well ap|prehend the danger of &s;uch <HI>Innovations</HI> in an Age &s;o prone to <HI>fancies</HI> and <HI>di&s;&s;ettlements.</HI> In which nothing how|&s;oever worthy and &s;acred, has been able to defend it &s;elf again&s;t the <HI>rude</HI> hands of <HI>proud,</HI> becau&s;e <HI>Succe&s;&s;eful violence</HI> guilded with the <HI>plunder'd</HI> titles of <HI>Reformation</HI> and <HI>Religi|on.</HI> I'le a&s;&s;ure you then, though I had been &s;o <HI>fond</HI> and <HI>unwi&s;e</HI> to engage in a de&s;ign &s;o unlikely in the <HI>undertaker;</HI> I &s;hould never have been &s;o <HI>di&s;ingenious</HI> and <HI>undutiful</HI> as to form a project &s;o <HI>inconvenient</HI> and <HI>hazardous</HI> in the <HI>event,</HI> as to di&s;courage young Students from a method of Studies the <HI>Con&s;titutions</HI> of the place they live in have en|joyn'd them: Which indeed, con&s;idering the circum&s;tances wherein things &s;tand, 'tis in a manner nece&s;&s;ary they &s;hould be vers'd in; &s;ince that <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> is wrought into the <HI>cur|rent Theology</HI> of <HI>Europe:</HI> which therefore would not be comprehended without an in&s;ight into tho&s;e <HI>Hypothe&s;es.</HI> Nor can a Man make a rea&s;onable <HI>choice</HI> of his <HI>Principles,</HI> except he have &s;ome knowledge of <HI>all</HI> that offer them&s;elves <HI>Candidates</HI> for his favour: and a Wi&s;e Man's belief is not <HI>chance,</HI> but <HI>election;</HI> be&s;ides which, it <HI>enlarges</HI> and <HI>en|nobles</HI> the Minds of Men to furni&s;h them with <HI>variety</HI> of <HI>conception,</HI> and takes them off from doating on the beloved <HI>Conclu&s;ions</HI> of their <HI>private</HI> and <HI>narrow</HI> Principles. I blame not therefore the u&s;e of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in the <HI>Univer&s;ities</HI> among the <HI>Junior Students,</HI> though I cannot approve the &s;treightne&s;s
<PB N="79" REF="44">
and &s;loath of <HI>Elder Dijudicants,</HI> from whom more generous temper might be expected, then to &s;it down in a contented de&s;pair of any further progre&s;s into Science, than has been made by their <HI>Idolized Sophy;</HI> and depriving them&s;elves and all this World of their Liberty in <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> by a <HI>Sacra|mental adherence</HI> to an <HI>Heathen Authority.</HI> And I confe&s;s, 'twas this <HI>pedantry</HI> and <HI>boyi&s;hne&s;s</HI> of <HI>humor</HI> that drew from me tho&s;e <HI>reflections</HI> I directed again&s;t <HI>Ari&s;totle.</HI> Which perhaps you'le think not &s;o cen&s;urable an action when you con&s;ider,</P>
<P N="1">(1.) That whatever <HI>fondne&s;s</HI> the&s;e <HI>latter ages</HI> have expre&s;s'd towards <HI>him,</HI> the pious <HI>Fathers</HI> of the <HI>fir&s;t</HI> and <HI>pure&s;t times</HI> of <HI>Chri&s;tianity,</HI> own'd for him no &s;uch <HI>regard</HI> and <HI>veneration;</HI> but frequently reprehended <HI>him</HI> with a <HI>keen</HI> and <HI>impartial &s;everity.</HI> And if we may believe the learned and indu&s;trious <HI>Patricius [Multos &ecirc; Patribus habuit oppugnatores, Celebratorem neminem.] Clemens Alex. Epi|phanius,</HI> and <HI>Nazianzen</HI> accu&s;e him of <HI>impiety</HI> again&s;t <HI>God</HI> and <HI>Religion; Lactantius</HI> of <HI>Contradiction</HI> and <HI>incon|&s;i&s;tency; Ju&s;tin Martyr</HI> profe&s;&s;edly wrote a Book again&s;t <HI>him;</HI> S. <HI>Ba&s;il</HI> reprehends his <HI>Ethicks;</HI> and <HI>Origen</HI> &s;et's <HI>Epicurus</HI> be|fore him. <HI>Theodoret</HI> accu&s;es him for denying <HI>Providence</HI> below the <HI>Moon.</HI> And 'tis notoriou&s;ly known that <HI>Platoni&s;m</HI> was the <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> of the <HI>fir&s;t Chri&s;tian Centuries</HI> when <HI>A|ri&s;totle</HI> was not much regarded. Yea as the excellent <HI>Ga&s;|&s;endus</HI> has ob&s;erv'd, in the flouri&s;hing times of <HI>Rome</HI> and <HI>Athens,</HI> the <HI>Academicks</HI> and <HI>Stoicks;</HI> and <HI>Laertius</HI> &s;ayes in <HI>his,</HI> the <HI>Epicureans,</HI> were the only valued <HI>Sects</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophers,</HI> while the <HI>Peripateticks</HI> were but little ac|counted of. Yea <HI>Cicero, Pliny, Quintilian</HI> that had other|wi&s;e the greate&s;t e&s;teem of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> prefer'd <HI>Plato</HI> before him. And I find</P>
<P N="2">(2.) Not that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> had &s;uch an <HI>exce&s;s</HI> of <HI>re&s;pect</HI> and <HI>wor&s;hip,</HI> till after <HI>Barbari&s;m</HI> had overrun <HI>Rome</HI> and <HI>Athens.</HI> For when the <HI>Empire</HI> began to emerge
<PB N="80" REF="45">
from that <HI>black night</HI> of <HI>Ignorance</HI> which had with it's <HI>rude Conquerours</HI> invaded it; <HI>Averroes</HI> and &s;ome others of the <HI>Arabian Interpreters</HI> chanced to light upon the <HI>re|mains</HI> of this <HI>Philo&s;opher,</HI> which they tran&s;lated into the language of the <HI>Moors,</HI> and as 'tis u&s;ual for Men to dignifie what they have be&s;towed pains upon, e&s;pecially if it be <HI>rare</HI> and <HI>new;</HI> the&s;e <HI>fir&s;t Interpreters</HI> would not fail to celebrate the <HI>Author,</HI> that they might reconcile credit to <HI>their</HI> Wri|tings upon him, and recommend their own <HI>elucubrations.</HI> And therefore <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;hall be the <HI>prime</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophers,</HI> that they may be <HI>next</HI> him. In&s;omuch that his <HI>Redeemer A|verroes</HI> arriv'd to that <HI>Vanity</HI> in <HI>Commendation</HI> as to affirm, that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> invented <HI>Logick, Divinity</HI> and <HI>Phy&s;iology;</HI> ne|ver &s;poke any thing without &s;trong rea&s;on, and that there was nothing <HI>defective</HI> or <HI>&s;uperfluous</HI> in his <HI>Writings,</HI> but all things in the mo&s;t full and perfect order; and that no er|rour had been found in his Compo&s;ures: which <HI>Commen|dations</HI> coming down to the <HI>Latines,</HI> with the Books they celebrated, and <HI>they</HI> having no other <HI>Philo&s;opher,</HI> but <HI>A|ri&s;totle,</HI> nor <HI>Interpreter,</HI> but his <HI>Idolater Averroes,</HI> greedily &s;wallowed both the <HI>Books</HI> and the <HI>Character</HI> together, making <HI>&s;acred Text</HI> of the <HI>Writings</HI> of the Author, and <HI>Axioms</HI> of the <HI>Commendations</HI> of the Interpreter. For the <HI>mighty cry</HI> of the fir&s;t <HI>admirers,</HI> a&s;&s;i&s;ted by the <HI>Ignorance</HI> of tho&s;e times, and the natural temper that is in Men to revere the fir&s;t Author that plea&s;es them, bore down others to an a&s;|&s;ent to tho&s;e applau&s;es; and being at la&s;t by the <HI>School|men</HI> mingled with <HI>Divinity,</HI> and by others adopted into o|ther faculties, grew in a manner <HI>Sacred</HI> and <HI>Univer&s;al. Ari&s;totle</HI> became an <HI>Oracle,</HI> his <HI>placits</HI> were enacted <HI>Laws,</HI> and his <HI>dixit</HI> an <HI>unque&s;tionable argument;</HI> and thus was the <HI>rea&s;oning</HI> World de&s;poil'd of that <HI>freedom</HI> which is the pri|viledge of Humane Nature, and &s;ubjected to a <HI>forreign Au|thority,</HI> that could lay no rea&s;onable claim to their re&s;pect or ob&s;ervance. So that the e&s;teem of the <HI>Ari&s;totelean Phi|lo&s;ophy</HI>
<PB N="81" REF="45">
having been &s;o <HI>&s;mall</HI> in the <HI>be&s;t</HI> and <HI>wi&s;e&s;t</HI> times, and having &s;prung up to this bulk by <HI>accidental occa&s;ions</HI> in the latter and <HI>le&s;s cultivated</HI> ages, I cannot yet think it &s;o <HI>pia|cular</HI> to que&s;tion the duene&s;s of tho&s;e <HI>&s;uperlative</HI> prai&s;es are be&s;towed upon him in <HI>the&s;e,</HI> wherein Mankind &s;eems awaken'd to enquire into the <HI>World</HI> of <HI>things,</HI> not of <HI>Words,</HI> and is re&s;olv'd no longer to court <HI>Names,</HI> but <HI>Nature.</HI> And you'le &s;ee le&s;s rea&s;on for your di&s;plea&s;ure again&s;t that en|gagement of mine, when I &s;hall have told you</P>
<P><HI>Thirdly,</HI> That 'tis very <HI>doubtful</HI> whether tho&s;e Writings that go under his <HI>Name,</HI> are <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s or <HI>not.</HI> For be&s;ides that the antient <HI>Greek Interpreters</HI> have alwayes made this <HI>Quaery</HI> in the beginning of their <HI>Expo&s;itions, Whether the Books they were about to expound were</HI> Ari&s;totle<HI>'s;</HI> be&s;ides this &s;u&s;picion I &s;ay, &s;everal very learned men have profe&s;|&s;edly undertook to prove the <HI>uncertainty</HI> of all his Writings, among whom are <HI>Picus, Patricius,</HI> and <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus,</HI> and from the&s;e Author's I'le give you a brief account of this matter. (Fir&s;t) then <HI>Theophra&s;tus, Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Scholar, wrote &s;eve|ral things that had the &s;ame title with tho&s;e we pre&s;ume are <HI>his:</HI> And who then can tell whether they were wrote by <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> or <HI>Theophra&s;tus?</HI> to &s;ay <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Works are di&s;coverable by their <HI>&s;tyle,</HI> is to pre&s;ume the que&s;tion, <HI>That &s;ome are known to be his:</HI> which being &s;uppo&s;ed, the enquirer may notwith&s;tanding be deceived in his judgment, &s;ince learned Men in the &s;ame age are often delighted with the &s;ame mode of writing, e&s;pecially the <HI>Scholars</HI> of any great <HI>Author</HI> u&s;e to imitate the <HI>Way</HI> and <HI>Method</HI> of their <HI>Ma&s;ters;</HI> yea and <HI>diver&s;ity</HI> of <HI>Age</HI> and <HI>Matter</HI> make's them &s;ometimes differ more in their <HI>Styles</HI> from <HI>them&s;elves,</HI> than others do from <HI>them.</HI> At lea&s;t (Secondly) <HI>Theophra&s;tus</HI> had great advantages of <HI>adding, altering,</HI> and <HI>mingling Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Works as he plea&s;ed: He him&s;elf putting forth few Books while he lived, but leaving them in the hands of this his great Scholar and Sectator. And 'tis the ob&s;ervation of
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<HI>Strabo</HI> and <HI>Plutarch</HI> that the fir&s;t <HI>Peripateticks</HI> had few or none of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s Writings among them; upon which ac|count impo&s;tures and forgeries might be more &s;ecurely practiced. Be&s;ides which, (Thirdly) <HI>Theophra&s;tus</HI> him&s;elf did not <HI>publi&s;h</HI> the&s;e <HI>Writings,</HI> but left them in the hands of <HI>Neleus,</HI> as is te&s;tified by <HI>Plutarch</HI> and <HI>Athenaeus.</HI> Now this <HI>Neleus</HI> of two Copies which he kept of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s wri|tings, &s;old <HI>one</HI> to <HI>Ptolomy</HI> for the famous <HI>Library</HI> at <HI>Alexan|dria;</HI> the other he kept him&s;elf and left with his Po&s;teri|ty; who, as <HI>Strabo</HI> te&s;tifies, diligent &s;earch being made by the <HI>Attalick</HI> Kings after Books to furni&s;h the <HI>Library</HI> at <HI>Pergamus,</HI> hid them in a pit underground about 160. years till they were almo&s;t &s;poil'd with <HI>moths</HI> and <HI>rottene&s;s,</HI> and after &s;old them to <HI>Apellicon Tejus</HI> an <HI>Athenian,</HI> who got them tran&s;cribed and &s;upplyed in tho&s;e places in which they had been impair'd by their concealment, but as <HI>Strabo</HI> &s;ays <HI>arbitrarily,</HI> and at a venture; in&s;omuch that the Tran&s;cripts were full of errour and incurable defects. At length <HI>Sylla</HI> taking <HI>Athens,</HI> this Library of <HI>Apellicon,</HI> in which were the Writings of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> was tran&s;ported to <HI>Rome,</HI> as is te&s;tified by <HI>Plutarch,</HI> and <HI>there</HI> fell into the hands of <HI>Tyran|nio Grammaticus</HI> under whom they contracted new and wor&s;e errors. From him they pa&s;s to <HI>Andronicus Rhodius</HI> who di&s;tributed them into the order we now find them in, <HI>adding</HI> and <HI>altering</HI> as he plea&s;ed. After him, <HI>Picus</HI> &s;ays the contending <HI>Peripateticks</HI> &s;till <HI>mended</HI> what they <HI>under&s;tood</HI> not; and every man as he fancyed. All which circum&s;tances are more than &s;u&s;picions of much <HI>forgery</HI> and <HI>corruption</HI> in <HI>Ari&s;to|tle</HI>'s Compo&s;ures. Yea, if that be true which <HI>Marius Nizolius</HI> a&s;&s;erts, and largely endeavours to prove, that mo&s;t of the Books of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> that are extant are but <HI>Epitomes</HI> and <HI>Compendiums</HI> drawn up by <HI>Nicomachus</HI> of his Father's wri|tings, 'twill be another evidence again&s;t their Authority. To which I add (4.) What has been ob&s;erved by the fore|cited Learned Men, that <HI>Diogenes Laertius,</HI> who lived when
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mo&s;t of the <HI>Antient Authors</HI> might be &s;een, who was ve|ry indu&s;trious in the &s;earch of <HI>Antiquities,</HI> and who peru&s;ed above two hundred Authors in order to the compiling of his <HI>Hi&s;tory,</HI> forty of which had profe&s;&s;edly wrote the <HI>lives</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophers;</HI> yet this <HI>Diogenes</HI> hath omitted all we have now extant of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s works except <HI>nine, viz. duo de Plantis, Phy&s;iogn. Categoriae, de Interpret. Mechan. Contra Xenophanem; Contra Gorgiam &amp; Zenonem.</HI> Yea and <HI>Pa|tricius</HI> gives &s;ufficient rea&s;on why all the&s;e but the four la&s;t &s;hould be &s;u&s;pected al&s;o. Now why &s;o many forged pieces were a&s;cribed to <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> three rea&s;ons are given by <HI>Am|monius. viz.</HI> (1.) Becau&s;e there were &s;everal others of his name <HI>(Diogenes Laertius</HI> &s;ayes eight) by rea&s;on of which 'twas an ea&s;ie matter to &s;helter the mean and contemptible products of others under his name and authority. (2.) Becau&s;e &s;everal of his <HI>Di&s;ciples</HI> wrote Books on the &s;ame Subjects, and with the &s;ame Titles with their <HI>Ma&s;ter.</HI> (3.) There being great rewards propos'd by <HI>Ptolomy</HI> to tho&s;e that brought in any con&s;iderable Author's to his <HI>Library,</HI> &s;everal out of a covetous de&s;ign to enrich them&s;elves by the for|gery, in&s;cribed other Writings by the Name of <HI>this Phi|lo&s;opher,</HI> to render them more <HI>currant</HI> and <HI>vendible.</HI> So that there were 40. Books of <HI>Analyticks</HI> a&s;cribed to <HI>Ari|&s;totle</HI> in <HI>Ptolomy</HI>'s <HI>Library,</HI> when as he wrote but four; and two <HI>de Categoriis,</HI> when he wrote but <HI>one.</HI> It appears then that the Books of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> are of very <HI>uncertain</HI> and <HI>&s;u&s;pici|ous authority.</HI> Yea, and though his Writings were never &s;o un|&s;u&s;pect and certain in the main, yet no man can be a&s;&s;ur'd in particular what is <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI>'s in them and what not, they having met with &s;uch hard u&s;age as we mention'd. Yea, the Books them&s;elves give notorious evidence of tho&s;e abu&s;es in the <HI>confu&s;ions, inver&s;ions, contradictions, tautologies, defects, ab|ruptne&s;s,</HI> and other gro&s;s <HI>imperfections</HI> they abound with. Upon the account of which <HI>Ga&s;&s;endus</HI> &s;ayes, he thought <HI>A|ri&s;totle</HI> a greater Man than to be the Author of &s;uch <HI>mean</HI>
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and <HI>obnoxious</HI> writings. But however, whether the&s;e are <HI>ge|nuine</HI> or not, they contain the <HI>Ari&s;toteliani&s;m</HI> of the pre&s;ent <HI>Peripatetick</HI> Schools, and if tho&s;e works are none of his, there's le&s;s rea&s;on why we &s;hould fall down before the &Egr;&PHgr;&EEgr; of an <HI>uncertain Authority.</HI> Be&s;ides which, I mu&s;t con|fe&s;s</P>
<P><HI>Fourthly,</HI> That the reverence I have to the more <HI>antient Sages,</HI> which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> frequently <HI>traduced,</HI> and unworthily <HI>abu&s;ed,</HI> animated me to more Severity again&s;t <HI>him,</HI> than upon another occa&s;ion had perhaps been &s;o <HI>pardonable</HI> and <HI>becoming.</HI> And that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> dealt &s;o <HI>invidiou&s;ly</HI> with the Philo&s;ophers were before him, will not need much proof to one, that is but indifferently acquainted with his writings. The great Lord <HI>Bacon</HI> hath particularly charged him with this unworthine&s;s in his excellent <HI>Advancement of Learning,</HI> wherein he &s;ays, that <HI>[Ari&s;totle</HI> as though he had been of the race of the <HI>Ottomans,</HI> thought he could not reign, except the fir&s;t thing he did, he kill'd all his Bre|thren.] And el&s;ewhere in the &s;ame Di&s;cour&s;e [I cannot a little marvel at the Philo&s;opher <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> that proceed|ed in &s;uch a &s;pirit of difference and contradiction to all <HI>Antiquity,</HI> undertaking not only to frame new words of Science at plea&s;ure, but to confound and extingui&s;h all the <HI>antient Wi&s;dom,</HI> in&s;omuch that he never names any <HI>Antient</HI> Author, but to confute or reprove him] con&s;o|nant whereunto are the ob&s;ervations of <HI>Patricius</HI> that he carpes at the <HI>Antients</HI> by name in more than 250 places, and without name in more than 1000. he reprehends 46 <HI>Philo&s;ophers</HI> of worth, be&s;ides <HI>Poets</HI> and <HI>Rhetoricians,</HI> and mo&s;t of all &s;pent his &s;pleen upon his excellent and vene|rable Ma&s;ter <HI>Plato,</HI> whom in above 60 places by name he hath contradicted. And as <HI>Plato</HI> oppo&s;ed all the <HI>So|phi&s;ters,</HI> and but two <HI>Philo&s;ophers,</HI> viz. <HI>Anaxagoras</HI> and <HI>He|raclitus;</HI> &s;o <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> that he might be oppo&s;ite to him in, <HI>this</HI> al&s;o, oppos'd all the <HI>Philo&s;ophers,</HI> and but two <HI>Sophi&s;ters</HI>
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viz. <HI>Protagoras</HI> and <HI>Gorgias.</HI> Yea, and not only <HI>a&s;&s;aulted</HI> them with his <HI>arguments,</HI> but <HI>per&s;ecuted</HI> them by his <HI>reproaches,</HI> calling the <HI>Philo&s;ophy</HI> of <HI>Empedocles,</HI> and all the Antients <HI>Stut|tering; Xenocrates,</HI> and <HI>Meli&s;&s;us, Ru&s;ticks; Anaxagoras, &s;im|ple</HI> and <HI>incon&s;iderate;</HI> yea, and all of them in an heap, as <HI>Patri|cius</HI> te&s;tifies, <HI>gro&s;s Ignorants, Fools</HI> and <HI>Madmen.</HI> How fit then think you is it that the World &s;hould now be obliged to &s;o <HI>tender</HI> and <HI>awful</HI> a re&s;pect to the <HI>Libeller</HI> of the mo&s;t Venera|ble <HI>Sages,</HI> as that it &s;hould be a crime next <HI>Here&s;ie</HI> to endea|vour, though never &s;o <HI>mode&s;tly,</HI> to weaken his <HI>textuary</HI> and <HI>u&s;urp'd authority?</HI> and how ju&s;t think you is your charge of my <HI>Reflections</HI> as a piece of <HI>irreverence</HI> to <HI>An|tiquity?</HI> when my <HI>veneration</HI> of the greater <HI>Antiquity</HI> ex|torted from me tho&s;e &s;trictures again&s;t the <HI>proud Antago|ni&s;t</HI> of all the <HI>ancient</HI> and more <HI>valuable Wi&s;dom?</HI> of who&s;e unworthy and di&s;ingenuous u&s;age of the <HI>Elder Phi|lo&s;ophers,</HI> I'le pre&s;ent you among many with &s;ome parti|cular in&s;tances, that mo&s;t ea&s;ily offer them&s;elves to my <HI>pen</HI> and <HI>memory.</HI> Briefly then, he accu&s;es <HI>Zeno</HI> for making <HI>God</HI> a <HI>Body,</HI> becau&s;e he call'd him a <HI>Sphear</HI> in a <HI>Metaphor.</HI> He &s;ayes of <HI>Parmenides</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> that he made hot and cold Principles, and yet in two long Chap|ters falls upon him as making all things one. The&s;e two Principles of <HI>Parmenides Ari&s;totle</HI> interprets of <HI>Fire</HI> and <HI>Earth,</HI> when 'tis clear enough that the Philo&s;ophers meant Light and Darkne&s;s.</P>
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q>
<P>He &s;ays of <HI>Parmenides</HI> and <HI>Meli&s;&s;us,</HI> that they denyed all <HI>ge|neration</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. And yet in a|nother place, having it &s;eems forgot this charge, <GAP DESC="foreign">. He accu&s;ed <HI>Empe|docles</HI> for con&s;tituting the <HI>Soul</HI> of <HI>Elements,</HI> for which he
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took occa&s;ion from that ver&s;e of his
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L></Q>
When as the <HI>Elements</HI> he means are not <HI>corporeal,</HI> as <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> would &s;ugge&s;t to force an ab&s;urdity on that <HI>Philo&s;opher,</HI> but <HI>Intellectual</HI> ones, as <HI>Simplicius</HI> one of his own <HI>Interpreters</HI> expounds <HI>Empedocles.</HI> He bla&s;phemes <HI>Anaxagoras</HI>'s <HI>Mind</HI> in the&s;e words <GAP DESC="foreign">. And yet after gives excellent attributes to that <HI>Mind</HI> of <HI>Anaxagoras.</HI> He accu&s;es the <HI>Pythagoreans</HI> of making <HI>Numbers</HI> the <HI>Principles</HI> of <HI>things;</HI> when as 'tis evident that <HI>Numbers</HI> were intended by <HI>Pythagoras,</HI> but as <HI>Symbolical repre&s;entations</HI> of them, which &s;erv'd him but for the &s;ame purpo&s;es the <HI>Hieroglyphicks</HI> did the <HI>Aegypti|ans,</HI> from whom that Sage had his <HI>Method</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophy;</HI> as <HI>Philoponus</HI> him&s;elf confe&s;&s;ingly affirms, <GAP DESC="foreign">&punc; But of all the Philo&s;ophers he quarrel'd with, there was none he pur&s;ued with &s;o much <HI>gall</HI> and <HI>animo&s;ity,</HI> as his incomparable <HI>Ma&s;ter Plato,</HI> whom he not only <HI>in&s;olently</HI> oppo&s;ed and <HI>ingrate|fully</HI> thru&s;t out of his School while he lived, but with a &s;evere pen <HI>per&s;ecuted</HI> his very <HI>a&s;hes,</HI> and followed him with injuries beyond the <HI>grave.</HI> And all for no other rea&s;on, but becau&s;e that Venerable old Man reproved his <HI>evil life,</HI> and preferr'd the better de&s;erving <HI>Speucippus, Xenocrates,</HI> and <HI>Amyclas</HI> before him. The particular in&s;tances of tho&s;e ungrateful abu&s;es are too numerous to be in&s;i&s;ted on; there|fore I &s;hall only pitch my ob&s;ervation on <HI>Plato</HI>'s Doctrine of <HI>Idea</HI>'s which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in all his Books inveigh's again&s;t, and hath render'd <HI>ridiculous</HI> among his credulous Sectators. Concerning which you may plea&s;e to take notice, that this Opinion was not originally <HI>Plato</HI>'s, though <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> charge him as the Author, but was the Doctrine of the <HI>Pythagoreans, Aegyptians</HI> and <HI>Chaldaeans.</HI> We have it in <HI>Timaeus Locrus</HI> the <HI>Pythagorean,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. And before him <HI>Tri&s;megi&s;tus,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">
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<GAP DESC="foreign">. But originally this Doctrine of <HI>Idea</HI>'s was <HI>Chaldaean,</HI> for which I offer you the en&s;uing Te&s;timonies which will al&s;o clear the <HI>antient</HI> &s;en&s;e and nature of tho&s;e <HI>Idea's.</HI> We have them then in the <HI>Oracles</HI> of <HI>Zoroa&s;ter,</HI>
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign"></L>
<L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q>
And again,
<Q><L><GAP DESC="foreign">.</L></Q>
And the&s;e <HI>Idea</HI>'s, by which we may under&s;tand their natures, he calls <GAP DESC="foreign">. Briefly then, the <HI>Chal|daeans</HI> by their <HI>Idea's</HI> under&s;tood the <HI>forms</HI> of things as they were in their <HI>Archetypa Mente,</HI> which an&s;wers to the <HI>eternal</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> in the <HI>Chri&s;tian Trinity.</HI> They called them al&s;o <GAP DESC="foreign">, as they were in this <HI>primaeval Mind.</HI> In the <HI>Soul</HI> of the <HI>World</HI> they call'd them <GAP DESC="foreign">, in <HI>Nature,</HI> they were <HI>Seeds;</HI> and in <HI>Matter, Forms.</HI> Thus therefore; In the <HI>Seeds</HI> of all things there is <HI>heat;</HI> in that, <HI>Spirit;</HI> in this, <HI>Nature</HI> which depends on the <HI>Univer&s;al Soul,</HI> and that on <HI>God,</HI> in whom 'tis <HI>Jynx</HI> or <HI>Idea.</HI> This was the <HI>Chaldaean notion</HI> of <HI>Idea's,</HI> and this was the <HI>Platonical;</HI> which how un|like it is the <HI>Chimaera</HI> of <HI>Univer&s;al ab&s;tract notions, Ari&s;totle</HI> and his <HI>Peripateticks</HI> fal&s;ly affix upon the <HI>Divine Philo&s;opher,</HI> is of ea&s;ie apprehen&s;ion. So that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in his impugnati|on of the <HI>Platonical Idea's,</HI> fights again&s;t <HI>notions</HI> of his own <HI>creating,</HI> and no <HI>a&s;&s;ertions</HI> of his <HI>Venerable Ma&s;ter.</HI> And I mu&s;t confe&s;s the reverence I have for that <HI>Excellent Sage</HI> and his <HI>Philo&s;ophy,</HI> le&s;&s;ens my e&s;teem of <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> and <HI>his.</HI> Which I cannot without &s;ome regret behold &s;o <HI>Sacred</HI> in <HI>Chri&s;tendom,</HI> while the incomparable <HI>Prince</HI> of <HI>Philo&s;ophers</HI> with his <HI>divine Theories</HI> &s;eems to be <HI>neglected</HI> and <HI>forgotten;</HI> e&s;pecially &s;ince this latter is &s;o con&s;onant in his <HI>Dogmata</HI> to the <HI>principles</HI> of <HI>Chri&s;tianity,</HI> and the other &s;o <HI>oppo&s;ite</HI> to
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mo&s;t the <HI>articles</HI> of our <HI>belief</HI> in <HI>his.</HI> Of which <HI>Patricius</HI> has pre&s;ented the World with a large Catalogue of In|&s;tances, and I'le offer you a few of them. <HI>Plato</HI> affirms <HI>God</HI> to be <HI>one; Ari&s;totle</HI> make's one <HI>fir&s;t mover,</HI> but 56 other <HI>Gods movers</HI> of the <HI>Orbs. Plato</HI> own's <HI>God</HI> under the <HI>notion</HI> of the <HI>Father;</HI> which <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> no where acknowledges. <HI>Plato,</HI> that <HI>God</HI> is the <HI>Supreme Wi&s;dom; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that he is <HI>ignorant</HI> of <HI>particulars. Plato,</HI> that <HI>God</HI> is <HI>Omnipotent; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that he can <HI>do</HI> nothing, but <HI>move</HI> the <HI>Heavens. Plato,</HI> that <HI>God</HI> made the <HI>World; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that the <HI>World</HI> is <HI>uncreated,</HI> and <HI>eternal. Plato,</HI> that <HI>God</HI> made the <HI>World</HI> of <HI>nothing; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that <HI>of nothing is made nothing. Plato</HI> that <HI>God</HI> is <HI>free</HI> from all <HI>body; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that he's <HI>tyed</HI> to the <HI>fir&s;t Orb. Plato,</HI> that <HI>Pro|vidence</HI> is over all things; <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> that 'tis <HI>confin'd</HI> to the <HI>Heavens. Plato,</HI> that <HI>God governs</HI> the <HI>Univer&s;e; Ari&s;totle,</HI> not <HI>God,</HI> but <HI>Nature, Chance,</HI> and <HI>Fortune. Plato,</HI> that <HI>God crea|ted</HI> the <HI>Soul; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that 'tis the <HI>Act of the body. Plato,</HI> that the <HI>happine&s;s</HI> of a Man is in his <HI>likene&s;s</HI> to <HI>God; Ari&s;totle,</HI> that a Man is <HI>happy</HI> in the <HI>goods</HI> of <HI>Fortune. Plato,</HI> there will come one that &s;hall teach us to <HI>pray,</HI> a <HI>prophecy</HI> of our <HI>Saviour. Ari&s;totle, prayers</HI> are in <HI>vain,</HI> becau&s;e <HI>God knows not particulars. Plato,</HI> that after death <HI>good</HI> Men &s;hall enjoy <HI>God. Ari&s;totle,</HI> no <HI>plea&s;ure</HI> after this <HI>life. Plato,</HI> the Souls of the wicked &s;hall be puni&s;h't after death; <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> they &s;hall <HI>peri&s;h</HI> with the <HI>body,</HI> and &s;uffer nothing. <HI>Plato,</HI> the <HI>dead</HI> &s;hall <HI>ri&s;e. Ari&s;totle, &agrave; privatione ad habitum. Plato</HI> that the <HI>Soul</HI> and <HI>Body</HI> of the wicked &s;hall be puni&s;h't in <HI>Hell. Ari|&s;totle</HI> knew no &s;uch matter. The&s;e are &s;ome in&s;tances among many, of the divine temper of the <HI>Platonical Philo&s;ophy,</HI> and the impiety of the <HI>Ari&s;totelian;</HI> for a further account of which I referre you to the fore-mentioned learned Author. So that I doubt not, but when you have duly con&s;ider'd the mat|ter, you'l judge tho&s;e <HI>Reflections</HI> the effects of a laudable zeal for <HI>Antiquity,</HI> and what is more <HI>&s;acred, Truth.</HI> To which I adde</P>
<P N="5"><PB N="89" REF="49">
(5.) That the <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> was not the <HI>antient</HI> Philo&s;o|phy, but the <HI>Corpu&s;cularian</HI> and <HI>Atomical,</HI> which to the great hinderance of Science lay long buryed in <HI>neglect</HI> and <HI>oblivion,</HI> but hath in the&s;e latter Ages been again re&s;tored to the <HI>light</HI> and it's de&s;erv'd <HI>repute</HI> and <HI>value.</HI> And that the <HI>Atomical Hypothe&s;is</HI> was the <HI>Fir&s;t</HI> and mo&s;t <HI>Antient,</HI> of which there is any memory in <HI>Phy&s;iology,</HI> is notoriou&s;ly known to all, that know the Age of <HI>Democritus;</HI> who was one of tho&s;e Four <HI>Sages</HI> that brought the learning of the <HI>Aegyptians</HI> among the <HI>Grecians; Orpheus</HI> bringing in <HI>The|ology; Thales</HI> the <HI>Mathematicks;</HI> our <HI>Democritus, natural Philo&s;ophy;</HI> and <HI>Pythagoras</HI> all <HI>Three,</HI> with the <HI>Moral.</HI> Now the learning of the <HI>Aegyptians</HI> came from the <HI>Chal|daeans,</HI> and was convey'd to <HI>them,</HI> as &s;ome learned Men affirm, by <HI>Abraham,</HI> who was of kin to <HI>Zoroa&s;ter</HI> the great <HI>Chaldaean Legi&s;latour</HI> and <HI>Philo&s;opher;</HI> which <HI>Zoroa&s;ter</HI> lived 290 years after the <HI>Flood,</HI> and as <HI>Pliny</HI> &s;aith, was the Schollar of <HI>Azonaces,</HI> whom <HI>Antiqu&aacute;ries</HI> affirm to have been of the Schoole of <HI>Sem</HI> and <HI>Heber.</HI> The <HI>Atomical Philo&s;ophy</HI> then coming from the <HI>Aegyptians</HI> to the <HI>Grecians,</HI> and from the <HI>Chaldaeans</HI> to <HI>them;</HI> is without doubt of the mo&s;t <HI>venerable Antiquity;</HI> and the <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> a very <HI>novelty</HI> in compare with that <HI>grey Hypothe&s;is:</HI> at the be&s;t, a <HI>degeneracy</HI> and <HI>corruption</HI> of the mo&s;t <HI>antient Wi&s;dom.</HI> Yea, and 'tis the complaint of &s;everal learned Men, which who|ever knows any thing of <HI>Ari&s;totles Sectators</HI> will ju&s;tifie, That the Modern <HI>Peripateticks</HI> have as farr receded from <HI>his</HI> &s;en&s;e, as from the <HI>Truth</HI> of <HI>Things.</HI> For it hath been the Fa&s;hion of his <HI>Interpreters</HI> both <HI>Greeks, Latins,</HI> and <HI>Arabians,</HI> to form whole Doctrines from <HI>catches</HI> and <HI>&s;craps</HI> of &s;entences, without attending to the <HI>analogy</HI> and <HI>main &s;cope</HI> of his Writings. From which method of <HI>interpreta|tion</HI> hath proceeded a <HI>&s;purious medly</HI> of <HI>nice, &s;pino&s;e</HI> and <HI>u&s;ele&s;s notions,</HI> that is but little of kin to <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> or <HI>nature.</HI> So that whatever of genuine <HI>Ari&s;totelian</HI> is in tho&s;e <HI>works</HI>
<PB N="90" REF="50">
that bare <HI>his</HI> name; There's little of <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> in his <HI>Schools.</HI> And 'tis no indignity to <HI>Antiquity</HI> or the <HI>Stagy|rite,</HI> to oppo&s;e the <HI>corruption</HI> and <HI>abu&s;e</HI> of <HI>both.</HI> And to endeavour to re&s;tore the <HI>Antients</HI> to their ju&s;t <HI>e&s;timation,</HI> which hath been u&s;urp't from them by a <HI>modern</HI> and <HI>&s;purious</HI> Learning. And though I grudge not <HI>Ari&s;totles</HI> e&s;teem while it is not prejudicial to the re&s;pect we owe his <HI>Betters;</HI> yet I regret that exce&s;&s;ive and undue <HI>veneration</HI> which fondly &s;ets him &s;o much above all the more valuable Antients. And I'le propo&s;e it to your judgment</P>
<P N="6">(6.) Whether 'twas likely that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was &s;o farr be|yond other <HI>Philo&s;ophers</HI> in his <HI>Intellectuals,</HI> as the&s;e latter Ages have pre&s;umed, when he came &s;o farr &s;hort of mo&s;t of them in his <HI>Morals?</HI> I believe there's a near connection between <HI>Truth</HI> and <HI>Goodne&s;s,</HI> and there's a <HI>ta&s;te</HI> in the <HI>&s;oul</HI> whereby it reli&s;heth <HI>Truth,</HI> as the <HI>Palate Meats;</HI> which <HI>&s;ence</HI> and <HI>gu&s;to vice depraves</HI> and <HI>vi<GAP DESC="illegible" EXTENT="1 letter">iates.</HI> So that though <HI>Witt</HI> may make the <HI>Vicious, cunning Sophi&s;ters,</HI> and <HI>&s;ubtile Athei&s;ts,</HI> yet I doubt &s;eldom the be&s;t and mo&s;t exerci&s;ed <HI>Philo&s;ophers.</HI> Now what the Ancients have related of <HI>Ari&s;totle's man|ners,</HI> I'le pre&s;ent you in an In&s;tance or two, and di&s;mi&s;s this di&s;plea&s;ing &s;ubject. <HI>Suidas</HI> then accu&s;eth him of <HI>Sodomy</HI> with <HI>Hermias, Ae&s;chriones, Palephatus,</HI> and <HI>Abydenus;</HI> St. <HI>Jerome</HI> of <HI>Drunkenne&s;s: Lycus</HI> and <HI>Ari&s;tocles,</HI> two of his own di&s;ciples, charge him with <HI>Avarice: Aelian</HI> of <HI>Cavelling, Loquacity, Scoffing,</HI> and <HI>Ingratitude;</HI> of which la&s;t, there are two notorious in&s;tances in his u&s;age of <HI>Alexander</HI> and <HI>Plato.</HI> How he u&s;ed his <HI>venerable Ma&s;ter,</HI> I have already noted. And what return he made to the kindne&s;&s;es of his <HI>Glorious Schollar,</HI> you may &s;ee in the&s;e few words from <HI>Arrian,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. And to &s;um up much in one, <HI>Timaeus</HI> the Hi&s;torian in <HI>Suidas</HI> gives this Account of him, That he was <HI>forward, impudent, &s;aucy, unwi&s;e, indocile,</HI> and <HI>hatefully glutinous,</HI> or in the
<PB N="91" REF="50">
words of <HI>Suidas,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. But to conclude the&s;e ungrateful remarques, <HI>Plutarch</HI> makes him a <HI>Traytor</HI> to <HI>Alexander;</HI> and <HI>Eu&s;ebius</HI> to his <HI>Countrey.</HI> And being at la&s;t bani&s;ht for his <HI>impiety,</HI> He made him&s;elf away by poy&s;on, according to the Te&s;timony of <HI>Laertius.</HI> Thus then you &s;ee an ill <HI>Character</HI> of <HI>Ari&s;to|tle's manners</HI> from <HI>di&s;intere&s;&s;ed</HI> Authorities; on con&s;idera|tion of which, 'tis to me matter of &s;ome wonder, that the <HI>memory</HI> of the <HI>Vitious</HI> &s;hould be &s;o <HI>ble&s;&s;ed,</HI> and his <HI>autho|rity</HI> &s;o irreproveable. Unto all which may be added.</P>
<P><HI>(La&s;tly)</HI> That there is le&s;s rea&s;on that <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> &s;hould be valued beyond all others that have had a name for wi&s;dom, if we con&s;ider, that he borrowed almo&s;t all he writ from the more <HI>antient Philo&s;ophers,</HI> though he had not the inge|nuity and gratitude to acknowledge it: Particularly from <HI>Architas</HI> and <HI>Ocellus,</HI> tran&s;cribing them word for word in many places, e&s;pecially the latter; and yet never as much as mention'd him in all his writings. And I think you a&s;cribe more to <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> then is his due when you call him the <HI>INVENTOUR</HI> of <HI>SCIENCES;</HI> for we owe that honour to others of the <HI>Antients;</HI> particularly to <HI>Zeno</HI> the Invention of <HI>Logick,</HI> and of <HI>Rhetorick</HI> to <HI>Empedocles,</HI> accor|ding to his own Te&s;timony in <HI>Laertius,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign"> (&s;peaking of <HI>Zeno)</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">. <HI>Perictione</HI> a <HI>Pythagorean</HI> woman writ <HI>Metaphy&s;icks&punc;</HI> before <HI>Ari&s;totle. Stobaeus</HI> in his <HI>Morals</HI> hath a <HI>Fragment</HI> of her Book <HI>de Sapientia,</HI> of which &s;he declares the &s;ubject in the&s;e words, <GAP DESC="foreign">. Be&s;ides whom <HI>Plato, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Pythagoras,</HI> the <HI>Aegyptians, Tri&s;megi&s;tus,</HI> and before all, the <HI>Chaldeans</HI> writ of this <HI>Science,</HI> long before <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> was extant. And, <HI>Democritus</HI> brought <HI>natural Philo&s;ophy,</HI> as did <HI>Pytha|goras</HI>
<PB N="92" REF="51">
the <HI>Moral,</HI> from the <HI>Aegyptians,</HI> before the <HI>Stagyrit&egrave;</HI> was an <HI>Infant.</HI> And for the <HI>Mathematicks,</HI> they were &s;tudied in <HI>Aegypt,</HI> before <HI>He</HI> was born in <HI>Greece,</HI> <GAP DESC="foreign">, is his own confe&s;&s;ion.</P>
<P>Thus then you &s;ee Sir, we are not &s;o much beholden to <HI>Ari&s;totle,</HI> as mo&s;t men have pre&s;umed. And perhaps by this time you may be convinc't that we have no rea&s;on &s;o <HI>pa&s;sionately</HI> to revere his <HI>Authority.</HI> But whither you are, or not, I am not much concerned, being willing to leave all men to the liberty of their own &s;entiments. It &s;ufficeth for my purpo&s;e, that I have given you &s;ome of the grounds of my di&s;&s;atisfactions in <HI>Ari&s;totle</HI> and his <HI>Hypothe|&s;eis.</HI> If you are convinced, at the bar of your judgment, I am ju&s;tified; if you are not, your <HI>di&s;&s;ent</HI> I pre&s;ume is <HI>ra|tional,</HI> and when I have &s;een your <HI>rea&s;ons,</HI> I &s;hall either be more di&s;po&s;ed to your apprehen&s;ions, or be more con|firm'd in the ju&s;tice and rea&s;onablene&s;s of mine own. To which I'le add no more, but my de&s;ires of your pardon of this voluminous trouble, and acceptance of the affectionate regards of</P>
<CLOSER><SALUTE>SIR,</SALUTE> <SIGNED>Your Humble Servant
J. G.</SIGNED></CLOSER>
</LETTER>
<TRAILER>FINIS.</TRAILER>
</DIV1>
</BODY>
</TEXT>
</EEBO>
</ETS>
