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HAVING, in the three preceding books, fully stated what occurred
to us by way of answer to the treatise of Celsus, we now, reverend
Ambrosius, with prayer to God through Christ, offer this fourth book as
a reply to what follows. And we pray that words may be given us, as it
is written in the book of Jeremiah that the Lord said to the prophet:
"Behold, I have put My words in thy mouth as fire. See, I have set thee
this day over the nations, and over the kingdoms, to root out and to
pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, and to build and to
plant." (1) For we need words now which will root out of every wounded
soul the reproaches uttered against the truth by this treatise of
Celsus, or which proceed from opinions like his. And we need also
thoughts which will pull down all edifices based on false opinions, and
especially the edifice raised by Celsus in his work which resembles the
building of those who said "Come, let us build us a city, and a tower
whose top shall reach to heaven." (2) Yea, we even require a wisdom
which will throw down all high things that rise against the knowledge
of God, (3) and especially that height of arrogance which Celsus
displays against us. And in the next place, as we must not stop with
rooting out and pulling down the hindrances which have just been
mentioned, but must, in room of what has been rooted out, plant the
plants of "God's husbandry;" (4) mad in place of what has been pulled
down, rear up the building of God, and the temple of His glory,—we
must for that reason pray also to the Lord, who bestowed the gifts
named in the book of Jeremiah, that He may grant even to us words
adapted both for building up the (temple) of Christ, and for planting
the spiritual law, and the prophetic words referring to the same. (5)
And above all is it necessary to show, as against the assertions of
Celsus which follow those he has already made, that the prophecies
regarding Christ are true predictions. For, arraying himself at the
same time against both parties—against the Jews on the one hand, who
deny that the advent of Christ has taken place, but who expect it as
future, and against Christians on the other, who acknowledge that Jesus
is the Christ spoken of in prophecy—he makes the following statement:—
"But that certain Christians and (all) Jews should maintain, the
former that there has already descended, the latter that there will
descend, upon the earth a certain God, or Son of a God, who will make
the inhabitants of the earth righteous, (6) is a most shameless
assertion, and one the refutation of which does not need many words."
Now here he appears to pronounce correctly regarding not "certain" of
the Jews, but all of them, that they imagine that there is a certain
(God) who will descend upon the earth; and with regard to Christians,
that certain of them say that He has already come down. For he means
those who prove from the Jewish Scriptures that the advent of Christ
has already taken place, and he seems to know that there are certain
heretical sects which deny that Christ Jesus was predicted by the
prophets. In the preceding pages, however, we have already discussed,
to the best of our ability, the question of Christ having been the
subject of prophecy, and therefore, to avoid tautology, we do not
repeat much that might be advanced upon this head. Observe, now, that
if he had wished with a kind of apparent force (7) to subvert faith in
the prophetic writings, either with regard to the future or past advent
of Christ, he ought to have set forth the prophecies themselves which
we Christians and Jews quote in our discussions with each other. For in
this way he would have appeared to turn aside those who are carried
away by the plausible character (1) of the prophetic statements, as he
regards it, from assenting to their truth, and from believing, on
account of these prophecies, that Jesus is the Christ; whereas now,
being unable to answer the prophecies relating to Christ, or else not
knowing at all what are the prophecies relating to Him, he brings
forward no prophetic declaration, although there are countless numbers
which refer to Christ; but he thinks that he prefers an accusation
against the prophetic Scriptures, while he does not even state what he
himself would call their "plausible character!" He is not, however,
aware that it is not at all the Jews who say that Christ will descend
as a God, or the Son of a God, as we have shown in the foregoing pages.
And when he asserts that "he is said by us to have already come, but by
the Jews that his advent as Messiah (2) is still future," he appears by
the very charge to censure our statement as one that is most
shameless, and which needs no lengthened refutation.
And he continues: "What is the meaning of such a descent upon the
part of God?" not observing that, according to our teaching, the
meaning of the descent is pre-eminently to convert what are called in
the Gospel the lost "sheep of the house of Israel;" and secondly, to
take away from them, on account of their disobedience, what is called
the "kingdom of God," and to give to other husbandmen than the ancient
Jews, viz. to the Christians, who will render to God the fruits of His
kingdom in due season (each action being a "fruit of the kingdom"). (3)
We shall therefore, out of a greater number, select a few remarks by
way of answer to the question of Celsus, when he says, "What is the
meaning of such a descent upon the part of God?" And Celsus here
returns to himself an answer which would have been given neither by
Jews nor by us, when he asks, "Was it in order to learn what goes on
amongst men?" For not one of us asserts that it was in order to learn
what goes on amongst men that Christ entered into this life.
Immediately after, however, as if some would reply that it was "in
order to learn what goes on among men," he makes this objection to his
own statement: "Does he not know all things?" Then, as if we were to
answer that He does know all things, he raises a new question, saying,
"Then he does know, but does not make (men) better, nor is it possible
for him by means of his divine power to make (men) better." Now all
this on his part is silly talk; (4) for God, by means of His word,
which is continually passing from generation to generation into holy
souls, and constituting them friends of God and prophets, does improve
those who listen to His words; and by the coming of Christ He improves,
through the doctrine of Christianity, not those who are unwilling, but
those who have chosen the better life, and that which is pleasing to
God. I do not know, moreover, what kind of improvement Celsus wished to
take place when he raised the objection, asking, "Is it then not
possible for him, by means of his divine power, to make (men) better,
unless he send some one for that special purpose?" (5) Would he then
have the improvement to take place by God's filling the minds of men
with new ideas, removing at once the (inherent) wickedness, and
implanting virtue (in its stead)? (6) Another person now would inquire
whether this was not inconsistent or impossible in the very nature of
things; we, however, would say, "Grant it to be so, and let it be
possible." Where, then, is our free will? (7) and what credit is there
in assenting to the truth? or how is the rejection of what is false
praiseworthy? But even if it were once granted that such a course was
not only possible, but could be accomplished with propriety (by God),
why would not one rather inquire (asking a question like that of
Celsus) why it was not possible for God, by means of His divine power,
to create men who needed no improvement, but who were of themselves
virtuous and perfect, evil being altogether non-existent? These
questions may perplex ignorant and foolish individuals, but not him who
sees into the nature of things; for if you take away the spontaneity of
virtue, you destroy its essence. But it would need an entire treatise
to discuss these matters; and on this subject the Greeks have expressed
themselves at great length in their works on providence. They truly
would not say what Celsus has expressed in words, that "God knows (all
things) indeed, but does not make (men) better, nor is able to do so by
His divine power." We ourselves have spoken in many parts of our
writings on these points to the best of our ability, and the Holy
Scriptures have established the same to those who are able to
understand them.
The argument which Celsus employs against us and the Jews will be
turned against himself thus: My good sir, does the God who is over all
things know what takes place among men, or does He not know? Now if you
admit the existence of a God and of providence, as your treatise
indicates, He must of necessity know. And if He does know, why does He
not make (men) better? Is it obligatory, then, on us to defend God's
procedure in not making men better, although He knows their state, but
not equally binding on you, who do not distinctly show by your treatise
that you are an Epicurean, but pretend to recognise a providence, to
explain why God, although knowing all that takes place among men, does
not make them better, nor by divine power liberate all men from evil?
We are not ashamed, however, to say that God is constantly sending
(instructors) in order to make men better; for there are to be found
amongst men reasons (1) given by God which exhort them to enter on a
better life. But there are many diversities amongst those who serve
God, and they are few in number who are perfect and pure ambassadors of
the truth, and who produce a complete reformation, as did Moses and the
prophets. But above all these, great was the reformation effected by
Jesus, who desired to heal not only those who lived in one corner of
the world, but as far as in Him lay, men in every country, for He came
as the Saviour of all men.
The illustrious (2) Celsus, taking occasion I know not from what,
next raises an additional objection against us, as if we asserted that
"God Himself will come down to men." He imagines also that it follows
from this, that "He has left His own abode;" for he does not know the
power of God, and that "the Spirit of the Lord filleth the world, and
that which upholdeth all things hath knowledge of the voice." (3) Nor
is he able to understand the words, "Do I not fill heaven and earth?
saith the LORD." (4) Nor does he see that, according to the doctrine of
Christianity, we all "in Him live, and move, and have our being," (5)
as Paul also taught in his address to the Athenians; and therefore,
although the God of the universe should through His own power descend
with Jesus into the life of men, and although the Word which was in the
beginning with God, which is also God Himself, should come to us, He
does not give His place or vacate His own seat, so that one place
should be empty of Him, and another which did not formerly contain Him
be filled. But the power and divinity of God comes through him whom God
chooses, and resides in him in whom it finds a place, not changing its
situation, nor leaving its own place empty and filling another: for, in
speaking of His quitting one place and occupying another, we do not
mean such expressions to be taken logically; but we say that the soul
of the bad man, and of him who is overwhelmed in wickedness, is
abandoned by God, while we mean that the soul of him who wishes to live
virtuously, or of him who is making progress (in a virtuous life), or
who is already living conform-ably thereto, is filled with or becomes a
partaker of the Divine Spirit. It is not necessary, then, for the
descent of Christ, or for the coming of God to men, that He should
abandon a greater seat, and that things on earth should be changed, as
Celsus imagines when he says, "If you were to change a single one, even
the least, of things on earth, all things would be overturned and
disappear." And if we must speak of a change in any one by the
appearing of the power of God, and by the entrance of the word among
men, we shall not be reluctant to speak of changing from a wicked to a
virtuous, from a dissolute to a temperate, and from a superstitious to
a religious life, the person who has allowed the word of God to find
entrance into his soul.
But if you will have us to meet the most ridiculous among the
charges of Celsus, listen to him when he says: "Now God, being unknown
amongst men, and deeming himself on that account to have less than his
due, (6) would desire to make himself known, and to make trial both of
those who believe upon him and of those who do not, like those of
mankind who have recently come into the possession of riches, and who
make a display of their wealth; and thus they testify to an excessive
but very mortal ambition on the part of God." (7) We answer, then, that
God, not being known by wicked men, would desire to make Himself known,
not because He thinks that He meets with less than His due, but because
the knowledge of Him will free the possessor from unhappiness. Nay, not
even with the desire to try those who do or who do not believe upon
Him, does He, by His unspeakable and divine power, Himself take up His
abode in certain individuals, or send His Christ; but He does this in
order to liberate from all their wretchedness those who do believe upon
Him, and who accept His divinity, and that those who do not believe may
no longer have this as a ground of excuse, viz., that their unbelief is
the consequence of their not having heard the word of instruction. What
argument, then, proves that it follows from our views that God,
according to our representations, is "like those of mankind who have
recently come into the possession of riches, and who make a display of
their wealth?" For God makes no display towards us, from a desire that
we should understand and consider His pre-eminence; but desiring that
the blessedness which results from His being known by us should be
implanted in our souls, He brings it to pass through Christ, and His
ever-indwelling word, that we come to an intimate fellowship, with Him.
No mortal ambition, then, does the Christian doctrine testify as
existing on the part of God.
I do not know how it is, that after the foolish remarks which he
has made upon the subject which we have just been discussing, he should
add the following, that "God does not desire to make himself known for
his own sake, but because he wishes to bestow upon us the knowledge of
himself for the sake of our salvation, in order that those who accept
it may become virtuous and be saved, while those who do not accept may
be shown to be wicked and be punished." And yet, after making such a
statement, he raises a new objection, saying: "After so long a period
of time, (2) then, did God now bethink himself of making men live
righteous lives, (3) but neglect to do so before?" To which we answer,
that there never was a time when God did not wish to make men live
righteous lives; but He continually evinced His care for the
improvement of the rational animal, (4) by affording him occasions for
the exercise of virtue. For in every generation the wisdom of God,
passing into those souls which it ascertains to be holy, converts them
into friends and prophets of God. And there may be found in the sacred
book (the names of) those who in each generation were holy, and were
recipients of the Divine Spirit, and who strove to convert their
contemporaries so far as in their power.
And it is not matter of surprise that in certain generations
there have existed prophets who, in the reception of divine influence,
(5) surpassed, by means of their stronger and more powerful (religious)
life, other prophets who were their contemporaries, and others also who
lived before and after them. And so it is not at all wonderful that
there should also have been a time when something of surpassing
excellence (6) took up its abode among the human race, and which was
distinguished above all that preceded or even that followed. But there
is an element of profound mystery in the account of these things, and
one which is incapable of being received by the popular understanding.
And in order that these difficulties should be made to disappear, and
that the objections raised against the advent of Christ should be
answered—viz., that, "after so long a period of time, then, did God
now bethink himself of making men live righteous lives, but neglect to
do so before?"—it is necessary to touch upon the narrative of the
divisions (of the nations), and to make it evident why it was, that
"when the Most High divided the nations, when He separated the sons of
Adam, He set the bounds of the nations according to the number of the
angels of God, and the portion of the LORD was His people Jacob, Israel
the cord of His inheritance;" (7) and it will be necessary to state the
reason why the birth of each man took place within each particular
boundary, under him who obtained the boundary by lot, and how it
rightly happened that "the portion of the LORD was His people Jacob,
and Israel the cord of His inheritance," and why formerly the portion
of the LORD was His people Jacob, and Israel the cord of His
inheritance. But with respect to those who come after, it is said to
the Saviour by the Father, "Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the heathen
for Thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for Thy
possession." (8) For there are certain connected and related reasons,
bearing upon the different treatment of human souls, which are
difficult to state and to investigate. (9)
There came, then, although Celsus may not wish to admit it, after
the numerous prophets who were the reformers of that well-known Israel,
the Christ, the Reformer of the whole world, who did not need to employ
against men whips, and chains, and tortures, as was the case under the
former economy. For when the sower went forth to sow, the doctrine
sufficed to sow the word everywhere. But if there is a time coming
which will necessarily circumscribe the duration of the world, by
reason of its having had a beginning, and if there is to be an end to
the world, and after the end a just judgment of all things, it will be
incumbent on him who treats the declarations of the Gospels
philosophically, to establish these doctrines by arguments of all
kinds, not only derived directly from the sacred Scrip-tares, but also
by inferences deducible from them; while the more numerous and simpler
class of believers, and those who are unable to comprehend the many
varied aspects of the divine wisdom, must entrust themselves to God,
and to the Saviour of our race, and be contented with His "ipse dixit,"
(1) instead of this or any other demonstration whatever.
In the next place, Celsus, as is his custom having neither proved
nor established anything, proceeds to say, as if we talked of God in a
manner that was neither holy nor pious, that "it is perfectly manifest
that they babble about God in a way that is neither holy nor
reverential;" and he imagines that we do these things to excite the
astonishment of the ignorant, and that we do not speak the truth
regarding the necessity of punishments for those who have sinned. And
accordingly he likens us to those who "in the Bacchic mysteries
introduce phantoms and objects of terror." With respect to the
mysteries of Bacchus, whether there is any trustworthy (2) account of
them, or none that is such, let the Greeks tell, and let Celsus and his
boon-companions (3) listen. But we defend our own procedure, When we
say that our object is to reform the human race, either by the threats
of punishments which we are persuaded are necessary for the whole
world, (4) and which perhaps are not without use s to those who are to
endure them; or by the promises made to those who have lived virtuous
lives, and in which are contained the statements regarding the blessed
termination which is to be found in the kingdom of God, reserved for
those who are worthy of becoming His subjects.
After this, being desirous to show that it is nothing either
wonderful or new which we state regarding floods or conflagrations, but
that, from misunderstanding the accounts of these things which are
current among Greeks or barbarous nations, we have accorded our belief
to our own Scriptures when treating of them, he writes as follows: "The
belief has spread among them, from a misunderstanding of the accounts
of these occurrences, that after lengthened cycles of time, and the
returns and conjunctions of planets, conflagrations and floods are wont
to happen, and because after the last flood, which took place in the
time of Deucalion, the lapse of time, agreeably to the vicissitude of
all things, requires a conflagration and this made them give utterance
to the erroneous opinion that God will descend, bringing fire like a
torturer." Now in answer to this we say, that I do not understand how
Celsus, who has read a great deal, and who shows that he has perused
many histories, had not his attention arrested (6) by the antiquity of
Moses, who is related by certain Greek historians to have lived about
the time of Inachus the son of Phoroneus, and is acknowledged by the
Egyptians to be a man of great antiquity, as well as by those who have
studied the history of the Phoenicians. And any one who likes may
peruse the two books of Flavius Josephus on the antiquities of the
Jews, in order that he may see in what way Moses was more ancient than
those who asserted that floods and conflagrations take place in the
world after long intervals of time; which statement Celsus alleges the
Jews and Christians to have misunderstood, and, not comprehending what
was said about a conflagration, to have declared that "God will
descend, bringing fire like a torturer." (7)
Whether, then, there are cycles of time, and floods, or
conflagrations which occur periodically or not, and whether the
Scripture is aware of this, not only in many passages, but especially
where Solomon (8) says, "What is the thing which hath been? Even that
which shall be. And what is the thing which hath been done? Even that
which shall be done," (9) etc., etc., belongs not to the present
occasion to discuss. For it is sufficient only to observe, that Moses
and certain of the prophets, being men of very great antiquity, did not
receive from others the statements relating to the (future)
conflagration of the world; but, on the contrary (if we must attend to
the matter of time (10)), others rather misunderstanding them, and not
inquiring accurately into their statements, invented the fiction of the
same events recurring at certain intervals, and differing neither in
their essential nor accidental qualities. (11) But we do not refer
either the deluge or the conflagration to cycles and planetary periods;
but the cause of them we declare to be the extensive prevalence of
wickedness, (12) and its (consequent) removal by a deluge or a
conflagration. And if the voices of the prophets say that God "comes
down," who has said, "Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the LORD,"
(13) the term is used in a figurative sense. For God "comes down" from
His own height and greatness when He arranges the affairs of men, and
especially those of the wicked. And as custom leads men to say that
teachers "condescend" (1) to children, and wise men to those youths who
have just be-taken themselves to philosophy, not by "descending" in a
bodily manner; so, if God is said anywhere in the holy Scriptures to
"come down," it is understood as spoken in conformity with the usage
which so employs the word, and, in like manner also with the expression
"go Up." (2)
But as it is in mockery that Celsus says we speak of "God coming
down like a torturer bearing fire," and thus compels us unseasonably to
investigate words of deeper meaning, we shall make a few remarks,
sufficient to enable our hearers to form an idea (3) of the defence
which disposes of the ridicule of Celsus against us, and then we shall
turn to what follows. The divine word says that our God is "a consuming
fire," (4) and that "He draws rivers of fire before Him;" (5) nay, that
He even entereth in as "a refiner's fire, and as a fuller's herb," (6)
to purify His own people. But when He is said to be a "consuming fire,"
we inquire what are the things which are appropriate to be consumed by
God. And we assert that they are wickedness, and the works which result
from it, and which, being figuratively called "wood, hay, stubble," (7)
God consumes as a fire. The wicked man, accordingly, is said to build
up on the previously-laid foundation of reason, "wood, and hay, and
stubble." If, then, any one can show that these words were differently
understood by the writer, and can prove that the wicked man literally
(8) builds up "wood, or hay, or stubble," it is evident that the fire
must be understood to be material, and an object of sense. But if, on
the contrary, the works of the wicked man are spoken of figuratively
under the names of "wood, or hay, or stubble," why does it not at once
occur (to inquire) in what sense the word "fire" is to be taken, so
that "wood" of such a kind should be consumed? for (the Scripture)
says: "The fire will try each man's work of what sort it is. If any
man's work abide. which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a
reward. If any man's work be burned, he shall suffer loss." (9) But
what work can be spoken of in these words as being "burned," save all
that results from wickedness? Therefore our God is a "consuming fire"
in the sense in which we have taken the word; and thus He enters in as
a "refiner's fire," to refine the rational nature, which has been
filled with the lead of wickedness, and to free it from the other
impure materials, which adulterate the natural gold or silver, so to
speak, of the soul. (10) And, in like manner, "rivers of fire" are said
to be before God, who will thoroughly cleanse away the evil which is
intermingled throughout the whole soul. (11) But these remarks are
sufficient in answer to the assertion, "that thus they were made to
give expression to the erroneous opinion that God will come down
bearing fire like a torturer."
But let us look at what Celsus next with great ostentation
announces in the following fashion: "And again," he says, "let us
resume the subject from the beginning, with a larger array of proofs.
And I make no new statement, but say what has been long settled. God is
good, and beautiful, and blessed, and that in the best and most
beautiful degree. (12) But if he come down among men, he must undergo a
change, and a change from good to evil, from virtue to vice, from
happiness to misery, and from best to worst. Who, then, would make
choice of such a change? It is the nature of a mortal, indeed, to
undergo change and remoulding, but of an immortal to remain the same
and unaltered. God, then, could not admit of such a change." Now it
appears to me that the fitting answer has been returned to these
objections, when I have related what is called in Scripture the
"condescension" (13) of God to human affairs; for which purpose He did
not need to undergo a transformation, as Celsus thinks we assert, nor a
change from good to evil, nor from virtue to vice, nor from happiness
to misery, nor from best to worst. For, continuing unchangeable in His
essence, He condescends to human affairs by the economy of His
providence. (14) We show, accordingly, that the holy Scriptures
represent God as unchangeable, both by such words as "Thou art the
same," (15) and" I change not ;" (16) whereas the gods of Epicurus,
being composed of atoms, and, so far as their structure is concerned,
capable of dissolution, endeavour to throw off the atoms which contain
the elements of destruction. Nay, even the god of the Stoics, as being
corporeal, at one time has his whole essence composed of the guiding
principle (17) when the conflagration (of the world) takes place; and
at another, when a re-arrangement of things occurs, he again becomes
partly material.(1) For even the Stoics were unable distinctly to
comprehend the natural idea of God, as of a being altogether
incorruptible and simple, and uncompounded and indivisible.
And with respect to His having descended among men, He was
"previously in the form of God;"(2) and through benevolence, divested
Himself (of His glory), that He might be capable of being received by
men. But He did not, I imagine, undergo any change from "good to evil,"
for "He did no sin;"(3) nor from "virtue to vice," for "He knew no
sin."(4) Nor did He pass from "happiness to misery," but He humbled
Himself, and nevertheless was blessed, even when His humiliation was
undergone in order to benefit our race. Nor was there any change in Him
from "best to worst," for how can goodness and benevolence be of "the
worst?" Is it befitting to say of the physician, who looks on dreadful
sights and handles unsightly objects in order to cure the sufferers,
that he passes from "good to evil," or from "virtue to vice," or from
"happiness to misery?" And yet the physician, in looking on dreadful
sights and handling unsightly objects, does not wholly escape the
possibility of being involved in the same fate. But He who heals the
wounds of our souls, through the word of God that is in Him, is Himself
incapable of admitting any wickedness. But if the immortal God—the
Word(5)—by assuming a mortal body and a human soul, appears to Celsus
to undergo a change and transformation, let him learn that the Word,
still remaining essentially the Word, suffers none of those things
which are suffered by the body or the soul; but, condescending
occasionally to (the weakness of) him who is unable to look upon the
splendours and brilliancy of Deity, He becomes as it were flesh,
speaking with a literal voice, until he who has received Him in such a
form is able, through being elevated in some slight degree by the
teaching of the Word, to gaze upon what is, so to speak, His real and
pre-eminent appearance.(6)
For there are different appearances, as it were, of the Word,
according as He shows Himself to each one of those who come to His
doctrine; and this in a manner corresponding to the condition of him
who is just becoming a disciple, or of him who has made a little
progress, or of him who has advanced further, or of him who has already
nearly attained to virtue, or who has even already attained it. And
hence it is not the case, as Celsus and those like him would have it,
that our God was transformed, and ascending the lofty mountain, showed
that His real appearance was something different, and far more
excellent than what those who remained below, and were unable to follow
Him on high, beheld. For those below did not possess eyes capable of
seeing the transformation of the Word into His glorious and more divine
condition. But with difficulty were they able to receive Him as He was;
so that it might be said of Him by those who were unable to behold His
more excellent nature: "We saw Him, and He had no form nor comeliness;
but His form was mean,(7) and inferior to that of the sons of men."(8)
And let these remarks be an answer to the suppositions of Celsus, who
does not understand the changes or transformations of Jesus, as related
in the histories, nor His mortal and immortal nature.(9)
But will not those narratives, especially when they are
understood in their proper sense, appear far more worthy of respect
than the story that Dionysus was deceived by the Titans, and expelled
from the throne of Jupiter, and torn in pieces by them, and his remains
being afterwards put together again, he returned as it were once more
to life, and ascended to heaven? Or are the Greeks at liberty to refer
such stories to the doctrine of the soul, and to interpret them
figuratively, while the door of a consistent explanation, and one
everywhere in accord and harmony with the writings of the Divine
Spirit, who had His abode in pure souls, is closed against us? Celsus,
then, is altogether ignorant of the purpose of our writings, and it is
therefore upon his own acceptation of them that he casts discredit, and
not upon their real meaning; whereas, if he had reflected on what is
appropriate(10) to a soul which is to enjoy an everlasting life, and on
the opinion which we are to form of its essence and principles, he
would not so have ridiculed the entrance of the immortal into a mortal
body, which took place not according to the metempsychosis of Plato,
but agreeably to another and higher view of things. And he would have
observed one "descent," distinguished by its great benevolence,
undertaken to convert (as the Scripture mystically terms them) the
"lost sheep of the house of Israel," which had strayed down from the
mountains, and to which the Shepherd is said in certain parables to
have gone down, leaving on the mountains those "which had not strayed."
But Celsus, lingering over matters which he does not understand,
leads us to be guilty of tautology, as we do not wish even in
appearance to leave any one of his objections unexamined. He proceeds,
accordingly, as follows: "God either really changes himself, as these
assert, into a mortal body, and the impossibility of that has been
already declared; Or else he does not undergo a change, but only causes
the beholders to imagine so, and thus deceives them, and is guilty of
falsehood. Now deceit and falsehood are nothing but evils, and would
only be employed as a medicine, either in the case of sick and lunatic
friends, with a view to their cure, or in that of enemies when one is
taking measures to escape danger. But no sick man or lunatic is a
friend of God, nor does God fear any one to such a degree as to shun
danger by leading him into error." Now the answer to these statements
might have respect partly to the nature of the Divine Word, who is God,
and partly to the soul of Jesus. As respects the nature of the Word, in
the same way as the quality of the food changes in the nurse into milk
with reference to the nature of the child, or is arranged by the
physician with a view to the good of his health in the case of a sick
man or (is specially) prepared for a stronger man, because he possesses
greater vigour, so does God appropriately change, in the case of each
individual, the power of the Word to which belongs the natural property
of nourishing the human soul. And to one is given, as the Scripture
terms it, "the sincere milk of the word;" and to another, who is
weaker, as it were, "herbs;" and to another who is full-grown, "strong
meat." And the Word does not, I imagine, prove false to His own nature,
in contributing nourishment to each one, according as he is capable of
receiving Him.(1) Nor does He mislead or prove false. But if one were
to take the change as referring to the soul of Jesus after it had
entered the body, we would inquire in what sense the term "change" is
used. For if it be meant to apply to its essence, such a supposition is
inadmissible, not only in relation to the soul of Jesus, but also to
the rational soul of any other being. And if it be alleged that it
suffers anything from the body when united with it, or from the place
to which it has come, then what inconvenience(2) can happen to the Word
who, in great benevolence, brought down a Saviour to the human
race?—seeing none of those who formerly professed to effect a cure
could accomplish so much as that soul showed it could do, by what it
performed, even by voluntarily descending to the level of human
destinies for the benefit of our race. And the Divine Word, well
knowing this, speaks to that effect in many passages of Scripture,
although it is sufficient at present to quote one testimony of Paul to
the following effect: "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ
Jesus; who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be
equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him
the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being
found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly
exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name."(3)
Others, then, may concede to Celsus that God does not undergo a
change, but leads the spectators to imagine that He does; whereas we
who are persuaded that the advent of Jesus among men was no mere
appearance, but a real manifestation, are not affected by this charge
of Celsus. We nevertheless will attempt a reply, because you assert,
Celsus, do you not, that it is sometimes allowable to employ deceit and
falsehood by way, as it were, of medicine?(4) Where, then, is the
absurdity, if such a saving result were to be accomplished, that some
such events should have taken place? For certain words, when savouring
of falsehood, produce upon such characters a corrective effect (like
the similar declarations of physicians to their patients), rather than
when spoken in the spirit of truth. This, however, must be our defence
against other opponents. For there is no absurdity in Him who healed
sick friends, healing the dear human race by means of such remedies as
He would not employ preferentially, but only according to
circumstances.(5) The human race, moreover, when in a state of mental
alienation, had to be cured by methods which the Word saw would aid in
bringing back those so afflicted to a sound state of mind. But Celsus
says also, that "one acts thus towards enemies when taking measures to
escape danger. But God does not fear any one, so as to escape danger by
leading into error those who conspire against him." Now it is
altogether unnecessary and absurd to answer a charge which is advanced
by no one against our Saviour. And we have already replied, when
answering other charges, to the statement that "no one who is either in
a state of sickness or mental alienation is a friend of God." For the
answer is, that such arrangements have been made, not for the sake of
those who, being already friends, afterwards fell sick or became
afflicted with mental disease, but in order that those who were still
enemies through sickness of the soul, and alienation of the natural
reason, might become the friends of God. For it is distinctly stated
that Jesus endured all things on behalf of sinners, that He might free
them from sin, and convert them to righteousness.
In the next place, as he represents the Jews accounting in a way
peculiar to themselves for their belief that the advent of Christ among
them is still in the future, and the Christians as maintaining in their
way that the coming of the Son of God into the life of men has already
taken place, let us, as far as we can, briefly consider these points.
According to Celsus, the Jews say that "(human) life, being filled with
all wickedness, needed one sent from God, that the wicked might be
punished, and all things purified in a manner analogous to the first
deluge which happened." And as the Christians are said to make
statements additional to this, it is evident that he alleges that they
admit these. Now, where is the absurdity in the coming of one who is,
on account of the prevailing flood of wickedness, to purify the world,
and to treat every one according to his deserts? For it is not in
keeping with the character of God that the diffusion of wickedness
should not cease, and all things be renewed. The Greeks, moreover, know
of the earth's being purified at certain times by a deluge or a fire,
as Plato, too, says somewhere to this effect: "And when the gods
overwhelm the earth, purifying it with water, some of them on the
mountains,"(1) etc., etc. Must it be said, then, that if the Greeks
make such assertions, they are to be deemed worthy of respect and
consideration, but that if we too maintain certain of these views,
which are quoted with approval by the Greeks, they cease to be
honourable? And yet they who care to attend to the connection and truth
of all our records, will endeavour to establish not only the antiquity
of the writers, but the venerable nature of their writings, and the
consistency of their several parts.
But I do not understand how he can imagine the overturning of the
tower (of Babel) to have happened with a similar object to that of the
deluge, which effected a purification of the earth, according to the
accounts both of Jews and Christians. For, in order that the narrative
contained in Genesis respecting the tower may be held to convey no
secret meaning, but, as Celsus supposes, may be taken as true to the
letter,(2) the event does not on such a view appear to have taken place
for the purpose of purifying the earth; unless, indeed, he imagines
that the so-called confusion of tongues is such a purificatory
process. But on this point, he who has the opportunity will treat more
seasonably when his object is to show not only what is the meaning of
the narrative in its historical connection, but what metaphorical
meaning may be deduced from it.(3) Seeing that he imagines, however,
that Moses, who wrote the account of the tower, and the confusion of
tongues, has perverted the story of the sons of Aloeus,(4) and referred
it to the tower, we must remark that I do not think any one prior to
the time of Homer s has mentioned the sons of Aloeus, while I am
persuaded that what is related about the tower has been recorded by
Moses as being much older not only than Homer, but even than the
invention of letters among the Greeks. Who, then, are the perverters of
each other's narratives? Whether do they who relate the story of the
Aloadae pervert the history of the time, or he who wrote the account of
the tower and the confusion of tongues the story of the Aloadae? Now to
impartial hearers Moses appears to be more ancient than Homer. The
destruction by fire, moreover, of Sodom and Gomorrah on account of
their sins, related by Moses in Genesis, is compared by Celsus to the
story of Phaethon,—all these statements of his resulting from one
blunder, viz., his not attending to the (greater) antiquity of
Moses.(6) For they who relate the story of Phaethon seem to be younger
even than Homer, who, again, is much younger than Moses. We do not
deny, then, that the purificatory fire and the destruction of the world
took place in order that evil might be swept away, and all things be
renewed; for we assert that we have learned these things from the
sacred books of the prophets. But since, as we have said in the
preceding pages, the prophets, in uttering many predictions regarding
future events, show that they have spoken the truth concerning many
things that are past, and thus give evidence of the indwelling of the
Divine Spirit, it is manifest that, with respect to things still
future, we should repose faith in them, or rather in the Divine Spirit
that is in them.
But, according to Celsus, "the Christians, making certain
additional statements to those of the Jews, assert that the Son of God
has been already sent on account of the sins of the Jews; and that the
Jews hating chastised Jesus, and given him gall to drink, have brought
upon themselves the divine wrath." And any one who likes may convict
this statement of falsehood, if it be not the case that the whole
Jewish nation was overthrown within one single generation after Jesus
had undergone these sufferings at their hands. For forty and two years,
I think, after the date of the crucifixion of Jesus, did the
destruction of Jerusalem take place. Now it has never been recorded,
since the Jewish nation began to exist, that they have been expelled
for so long a period from their venerable temple-worship(1) and
service, and enslaved by more powerful nations; for if at any time they
appeared to be abandoned because of their sins, they were
notwithstanding visited (by God),(2) and returned to their own country,
and recovered their possessions, and performed unhindered the
observances of their law. One fact, then, which proves that Jesus was
something divine and sacred,(3) is this, that Jews should have suffered
on His account now for a lengthened time calamities of such severity.
And we say with confidence that they will never be restored to their
former condition.(4) For they committed a crime of the most unhallowed
kind, in conspiring against the Saviour of the human race in that city
where they offered up to God a worship containing the symbols of mighty
mysteries. It accordingly behoved that city where Jesus underwent these
sufferings to perish utterly, and the Jewish nation to be overthrown,
and the invitation to happiness offered them by God to pass to
others,—the Christians, I mean, to whom has come the doctrine of a
pure and holy worship, and who have obtained new laws, in harmony with
the established constitution in all countries;(5) seeing those which
were formerly imposed, as on a single nation which was ruled by princes
of its own race and of similar manners,(6) could not now be observed in
all their entireness.
In the next place, ridiculing after his usual style the race of
Jews and Christians, he compares them all "to a flight of bats or to a
swarm of ants issuing out of their nest, or to frogs holding council in
a marsh, or to worms crawling together in the comer of a dunghill, and
quarrelling with one another as to which of them were the greater
sinners, and asserting that God shows and announces to us all things
beforehand; and that, abandoning the whole world, and the regions of
heaven,(7) and this great earth, he becomes a citizen(8) among us
alone, and to us alone makes his intimations, and does not cease
sending and inquiring, in what way we may be associated with him for
ever." And in his fictitious representation, he compares us to " worms
which assert that there is a God, and that immediately after him, we
who are made by him are altogether like unto God, and that all things
have been made subject to us,—earth, and water, and air, and
stars,—and that all things exist for our sake, and are ordained to be
subject to us." And, according to his representation, the worms—that
is, we ourselves—say that "now, since certain amongst us commit sin,
God will come or will send his Son to consume the wicked with fire,
that the rest of us may have eternal life with him." And to all this he
subjoins the remark, that "such wranglings would be more endurable
amongst worms and frogs than betwixt Jews and Christians."
In reply to these, we ask of those who accept such aspersions as
are scattered against us, Do you regard all men as a collection of
bats, or as frogs, or as worms, in consequence of the pre-eminence of
God? or do you not include the rest of mankind in this proposed
comparison, but on account of their possession of reason, and of the
established laws, treat them as men, while you hold cheap(9) Christians
and Jews, because their opinions are distasteful to you, and compare
them to the animals above mentioned? And whatever answer you may return
to our question, we shall reply by endeavouring to show that such
assertions are most unbecoming, whether spoken of all men in general,
or of us in particular. For, let it be supposed that you say justly
that all men, as compared with God, are (rightly) likened to these
worthless(10) animals, since their littleness is not at all to be
compared with the superiority of God, what then do you mean by
littleness? Answer me, good sirs. If you refer to littleness of body,
know that superiority and inferiority, if truth is to be judge, are not
determined by a bodily standard.(11) For, on such a view, vultures(12)
and elephants would be superior to us men; for they are larger, and
stronger, and longer-lived than we. But no sensible person would
maintain that these irrational creatures are superior to rational
beings, merely on account of their bodies: for the possession of reason
raises a rational being to a vast superiority over all irrational
creatures. Even the race of virtuous and blessed beings would admit
this, whether they are, as ye say, good demons, or, as we are
accustomed to call them, the angels of God, or any other natures
whatever superior to that of man, since the rational faculty within
them has been made perfect, and endowed with all virtuous qualities.(1)
But if you depreciate the littleness of man, not on account of
his body, but of his soul, regarding it as inferior to that of other
rational beings, and especially of those who are virtuous; and
inferior, because evil dwells in it,—why should those among Christians
who are wicked, and those among the Jews who lead sinful lives, be
termed a collection of bats, or ants, or worms, or frogs, rather than
those individuals among other nations who are guilty of
wickedness?—seeing, in this respect, any individual whatever,
especially if carried away by the tide of evil, is, in comparison with
the rest of mankind, a bat, and worm, and frog, and ant. And although a
man may be an orator like Demosthenes, yet, if stained with wickedness
like his,(2) and guilty of deeds proceeding, like his, from a wicked
nature; or an Antiphon, who was also considered to be indeed an orator,
yet who annihilated the doctrine of providence in his writings, which
were entitled Concerning Truth, like that discourse of Celsus,—such
individuals are notwithstanding worms, rolling in a comer of the
dung-heap of stupidity and ignorance. Indeed, whatever be the nature of
the rational faculty, it could not reasonably be compared to a worm,
because it possesses capabilities of virtue.(3) For these
adumbrations(4) towards virtue do not allow of those who possess the
power of acquiring it, and who are incapable of wholly losing its
seeds, to be likened to a worm. It appears, therefore, that neither can
men in general be deemed worms in comparison with God. For reason,
having its beginning in the reason of God, cannot allow of the rational
animal being considered wholly alien from Deity. Nor can those among
Christians and Jews who are wicked, and who, in truth, are neither
Christians nor Jews, be compared, more than other wicked men, to worms
rolling in a corner of a dunghill. And if the nature of reason will not
permit of such comparisons, it is manifest that we must not calumniate
human nature, which has been formed for virtue, even if it should sin
through ignorance, nor liken it to animals of the kind described.
But if it is on account of those opinions of the Christians and
Jews-which displease Celsus (and which he does not at all appear to
understand) that they are to be regarded as worms and ants, and the
rest of mankind as different, let us examine the acknowledged opinions
of Christians and Jews,(5) and compare them with those of the rest of
mankind, and see whether it will not appear to those who have once
admitted that certain men are worms and ants, that they are the worms
and ants and frogs who have fallen away from sound views of God, and,
under a vain appearance of piety,(6) worship either irrational animals,
or images, or other objects, the works of men's hands;(7) whereas, from
the beauty of such, they ought to admire the Maker of them, and worship
Him: while those are indeed men, and more honourable than men (if there
be anything that is so), who, in obedience to their reason, are able to
ascend from stocks and stones,(8) nay, even from what is reckoned the
most precious of all matter—silver and gold; and who ascend up also
from the beautiful things in the world to the Maker of all, and entrust
themselves to Him who alone is able to satisfy(9) all existing things,
and to overlook the thoughts of all, and to hear the prayers of all;
who send up their prayers to Him, and do all things as in the presence
of Him who beholds everything, and who are careful, as in the presence
of the Hearer of all things, to say nothing which might not with
propriety be reported to God. Will not such piety as this—which can be
overcome neither by labours, nor by the dangers of death, nor by
logical plausibilities(10)—be of no avail in preventing those who have
obtained it from being any longer compared to worms, even if they had
been so represented before their assumption of a piety so remarkable?
Will they who subdue that fierce longing for sexual pleasures which has
reduced the souls of many to a weak and feeble condition, and who
subdue it because they are persuaded that they cannot otherwise have
communion with God, unless they ascend to Him through the exercise of
temperance, appear to you to be the brothers of worms, and relatives of
ants, and to bear a likeness to frogs? What! is the brilliant quality
of justice, which keeps inviolate the rights common to our neighbour,
and our kindred, and which observes fairness, and benevolence, and
goodness, of no avail in saving him who practises it from being termed
a bird of the night? And are not they who wallow in dissoluteness, as
do the majority of mankind, and they who associate promiscuously with
common harlots, and who teach that such practices are not wholly
contrary to propriety, worms who roll in mire?—especially when they
are compared with those who have been taught not to take the "members
of Christ," and the body inhabited by the Word, and make them the
"members of a harlot;" and who have already learned that the body of
the rational being, as consecrated to the God of all things, is the
temple of the God whom they worship, becoming such from the pure
conceptions which they entertain of the Creator, and who also, being
careful not to corrupt the temple of God by unlawful pleasure; practise
temperance as constituting piety towards God!
And I have not yet spoken of the other evils which prevail
amongst men, from which even those who have the appearance of
philosophers are not speedily freed, for in philosophy there are many
pretenders. Nor do I say anything on the point that many such evils are
found to exist among those who are neither Jews nor Christians. Of a
truth, such evil practices do not at all prevail among Christians, if
you properly examine what constitutes a Christian. Or, if any persons
of that kind should be discovered, they are at least not to be found
among those who frequent the assemblies, and come to the public
prayers, without their being excluded from them, unless it should
happen, and that rarely, that some one individual of such a character
escapes notice in the crowd. We, then, are not worms who assemble
together; who take our stand against the Jews on those Scriptures which
they believe to be divine, and who show that He who was spoken of in
prophecy has come, and that they have been abandoned on account of the
greatness of their sins, and that we who have accepted the Word have
the highest hopes in God, both because of our faith in Him, and of His
ability to receive us into His communion pure from all evil and
wickedness of life. If a man, then, should call himself a Jew or a
Christian, he would not say without qualification that God had made the
whole world, and the vault of heaven(1) for us in particular. But if a
man is, as Jesus taught, pure in heart, and meek, and peaceful, and
cheerfully submits to dangers for the sake of his religion, such an one
might reasonably have confidence in God, and with a full apprehension
of the word contained in the prophecies, might say this also: "All
these things has God shown beforehand, and announced to us who believe."
But since he has represented those whom he regards as worms,
viz., the Christians, as saying that "God, having abandoned the
heavenly regions, and despising this great earth, takes up His abode
amongst us alone, and to us alone makes His announcements, and ceases
not His messages and inquiries as to how we may become His associates
for ever," we have to answer that he attributes to us words which we
never uttered, seeing we both read and know that GOd loves all existing
things, and loathes(2) nothing which He has made, for He would not have
created anything in hatred. We have, moreover, read the declaration:
"And Thou sparest all things, because they ate Thine, O lover of souls.
For Thine incorruptible Spirit is in all. And therefore those also who
have fallen away for a little time Thou rebukest, and admonishest,
reminding them of their sins."(3) How can we assert that "God, leaving
the regions of heaven, and the whole world, and despising this great
earth, takes up His abode amongst us only," when we have found that all
thoughtful persons must say in their prayers, that "the earth is full
of the mercy of the LORD,"(4) and that "the mercy of the Lord is upon
all flesh;"(5) and that God, being good, "maketh His sun to arise upon
the evil and the good, and sendeth His rain upon the just and the
unjust;"(6) and that He encourages us to a similar course of action, in
order that we may become His sons, and teaches us to extend the
benefits which we enjoy, so far as in our power, to all men? For He
Himself is said to be the Saviour of all men, especially of them that
believe;(7) and His Christ to be the "propitiation for our sins, and
not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."(8) And
this, then, is our answer to the allegations of Celsus. Certain other
statements, in keeping with the character of the Jews, might be made by
some of that nation, but certainly not by the Christians, who have been
taught that "God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were
yet sinners, Christ died for us;"(9) and although "scarcely for a
righteous man will one die, yet peradventure for a good man some would
even dare to die."(1) But now is Jesus declared to have come for the
sake of sinners in all parts of the world (that they may forsake their
sin, and entrust themselves to God), being called also, agreeably to an
ancient custom of these Scriptures, the "Christ of God."
But Celsus perhaps has misunderstood certain of those whom he has
termed "worms," when they affirm that "God exists, and that we are next
to Him." And he acts like those who would find fault with an entire
sect of philosophers, on account of certain words uttered by some rash
youth who, after a three days' attendance upon the lectures of a
philosopher, should exalt himself above other people as inferior to
himself, and devoid of philosophy. For we know that there are many
creatures more honourable(2) than man; and we have read that "God
standeth in the congregation of gods,"(3) but of gods who are not
worshipped by the nations, "for all the gods of the nations are
idols."(4) We have read also, that "God, standing in the congregation
of the gods, judgeth among the gods."(5) We know, moreover, that
"though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or in earth
(as there be gods many and lords many), but to us there is one God, the
Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him; and one Lord Jesus
Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him."(6) And we know that in
this way the angels are superior to men; so that men, when made
perfect, become like the angels. "For in the resurrection they neither
marry nor are given in marriage, but the righteous are as the angels in
heaven,"(7) and also become "equal to the angels."(8) We know, too,
that in the arrangement of the universe there are certain beings termed
"thrones," and others "dominions," and others "powers," and others
"principalities;" and we see that we men, who are far inferior to
these, may entertain the hope that by a virtuous life, and by acting in
all things agreeably to reason, we may rise to a likeness with all
these. And, lastly, because "it doth not yet appear what we shall be;
but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like God, and shall
see Him as He is."(9) And if any one were to maintain what is asserted
by some (either by those who possess intelligence or who do not, but
have misconceived sound reason), that "God exists, and we are next to
Him," I would interpret the word "we," by using in its stead, "We who
act according to reason," or rather, "We virtuous, who act according to
reason."(10) For, in our opinion, the same virtue belongs to all the
blessed, so that the virtue of man and of God is identical.(11) And
therefore we are taught to become "perfect," as our Father in heaven is
perfect.(12) No good and virtuous man, then, is a "worm rolling in
filth," nor is a pious man an "ant," nor a righteous man a "frog;" nor
could one whose soul is enlightened with the bright light of truth be
reasonably likened to a "bird of the night."
It appears to me that Celsus has also misunderstood this
statement, "Let Us make man in Our image and likeness;"(13) and has
therefore represented the "worms" as saying that, being created by God,
we altogether resemble Him. If, however, he had known the difference
between man being created "in the image of God" and "after His
likeness," and that God is recorded to have said, "Let Us make man
after Our image and likeness," but that He made man "after the image"
of God, but not then also "after His likeness,"(14) he would not have
represented us as saying that "we are altogether like Him." Moreover,
we do not assert that the stars are subject to us; since the
resurrection which is called the "resurrection of the just," and which
is understood by wise men, is compared to the sun, and moon, and stars,
by him who said, "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of
the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from
another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead."(15)
Daniel also prophesied long ago regarding these things.(16) Celsus says
further, that we assert that "all things have been arranged so as to be
subject to us," having perhaps heard some of the intelligent among us
speaking to that effect, and perhaps also not understanding the saying,
that "he who is the greatest amongst us is the servant of all."(17) And
if the Greeks say, "Then sun and moon are the slaves of mortal
men,"(18) they express approval of the statement, and give an
explanation of its meaning; but since such a statement is either not
made at all by us, or is expressed in a different way, Celsus here too
falsely accuses us. Moreover, we who, according to Celsus, are "worms,"
are represented by him as saying that, "seeing some among us are guilty
of sin, God will come to us, or will send His own Son, that He may
consume the wicked, and that we other frogs may enjoy eternal life with
Him." Observe how this venerable philosopher, like a low buffoon,(1)
turns into ridicule and mockery, and a subject of laughter, the
announcement of a divine judgment, and of the punishment of the wicked,
and of the reward of the righteous; and subjoins to all this the
remark, that "such statements would be more endurable if made by worms
and flogs than by Christians and Jews who quarrel with one another!" We
shall not, however, imitate his example, nor say similar things
regarding those philosophers who profess to know the nature of all
things, and who discuss with each other the manner in which all things
were created, and how the heaven and earth originated, and all things
in them; and how the souls (of men), being either unbegotten, and not
created by God, are yet governed by Him, and pass from one body to
another;(2) or being formed at the same time with the body, exist for
ever or pass away. For instead of treating with respect and accepting
the intention of those who have devoted themselves to the investigation
of the truth, one might mockingly and revilingly say that such men were
"worms," who did not measure themselves by their comer of their
dung-heap in human life, and who accordingly gave forth their opinions
on matters of such importance as if they understood them, and who
strenuously assert that they have obtained a view of those things which
cannot be seen without a higher inspiration and a diviner power. "For
no man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in
him: even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of
God."(3) We are not, however, mad, nor do we compare such human wisdom
(I use the word "wisdom" in the common acceptation), which busies
itself not about the affairs of the multitude, but in the investigation
of truth, to the wrigglings of worms or any other such creatures; but
in the spirit of truth, we testify of certain Greek philosophers that
they knew God, seeing "He manifested Himself to them,"(4) although
"they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain
in their imaginations; and professing themselves to be wise, they
became foolish, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an
image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed
beasts, and creeping things."(5)
After this, wishing to prove that there is no difference between
Jews and Christians, and those animals previously enumerated by him, he
asserts that the Jews were "fugitives from Egypt, who never performed
anything worthy of note, and never were held in any reputation or
account."(6) Now, on the point of their not being fugitives, nor
Egyptians, but Hebrews who settled in Egypt, we have spoken in the
preceding pages. But if he thinks his statement, that "they were never
held in any reputation or account," to be proved, because no remarkable
event in their history is found recorded by the Greeks, we would
answer, that if one will examine their polity from its first beginning,
and the arrangement of their laws, he will find that they were men who
represented upon earth the shadow of a heavenly life, and that amongst
them God is recognised as nothing else, save He who is over all things,
and that amongst them no maker of images was permitted to enjoy the
rights of citizenship.(7) For neither painter nor image-maker existed
in their state, the law expelling all such from it; that there might be
no pretext for the construction of images,—an art which attracts the
attention of foolish men, and which drags down the eyes of the soul
from God to earth.(8) There was, accordingly, amongst them a law to the
following effect: "Do not transgress the law, and make to yourselves a
graven image, any likeness of male or female; either a likeness of any
one of the creatures that are upon the earth, or a likeness of any
winged fowl that flieth under the heaven, or a likeness of any creeping
thing that creepeth upon the earth, or a likeness of any of the fishes
which are in the waters under the earth."(9) The law, indeed, wished
them to have regard to the truth of each individual thing, and not to
form representations of things contrary to reality, feigning the
appearance merely of what was really male or really female, or the
nature of animals, or of birds, or of creeping things, or of fishes.
Venerable, too, and grand was this prohibition of theirs: "Lift not up
thine eyes unto heaven, lest, when thou seest the sun, and the moon,
and the stars, and all the host of heaven, thou shouldst be led astray
to worship them, and serve them."(10) And what a regime(11) was that
under which the whole nation was placed, and which rendered it
impossible for any effeminate person to appear in public;(12) and
worthy of admiration, too, was the arrangement by which harlots were
removed out of the state, those incentives to the passions of the
youth! Their courts of justice also were composed of men of the
strictest integrity, who, after having for a lengthened period set the
example of an unstained life, were entrusted with the duty of presiding
over the tribunals, and who, on account of the superhuman purity of
their character,(1) were said to be gods, in conformity with an ancient
Jewish usage of speech. Here was the spectacle of a whole nation
devoted to philosophy; and in order that there might be leisure to
listen to their sacred laws, the days termed "Sabbath," and the other
festivals which existed among them, were instituted. And why need I
speak of the orders of their priests and sacrifices, which contain
innumerable indications (of deeper truths) to those who wish to
ascertain the signification of things?
But since nothing belonging to human nature is permanent, this
polity also must gradually be corrupted and changed. And Providence,
having remodelled their venerable system where it needed to be changed,
so as to adapt it to men of all countries, gave to believers of all
nations, in place of the Jews, the venerable religion of Jesus, who,
being adorned not only with understanding, but also with a share of
divinity,(2) and having overthrown the doctrine regarding earthly
demons, who delight in frankincense, and blood, and in the exhalations
of sacrificial odours, and who, like the fabled Titans or Giants, drag
down men from thoughts of God; and having Himself disregarded their
plots, directed chiefly against the better class of men, enacted laws
which ensure happiness to those who live according to them, and who do
not flatter the demons by means of sacrifices, but altogether despise
them, through help of the word of God, which aids those who look
upwards to Him. And as it was the will of God that the doctrine of
Jesus should prevail amongst men, the demons could effect nothing,
although straining every nerve(3) to accomplish the destruction of
Christians; for they stirred up both princes, and senates, and rulers
in every place,—nay, even nations themselves, who did not perceive the
irrational and wicked procedure of the demons,—against the word, and
those who believed in it; yet, notwithstanding, the word of God, which
is more powerful than all other things, even when meeting with
opposition, deriving from the opposition, as it were, a means of
increase, advanced onwards, and won many souls, such being the will of
God. And we have offered these remarks by way of a necessary
digression. For we wished to answer the assertion of Celsus concerning
the Jews, that they were "fugitives from Egypt, and that these men,
beloved by God, never accomplished anything worthy of note." And
further, in answer to the statement that "they were never held in any
reputation or account," we say, that living apart as a "chosen nation
and a royal priesthood," and shunning intercourse with the many nations
around them, in order that their morals might escape corruption, they
enjoyed the protection of the divine power, neither coveting like the
most of mankind the acquisition of other kingdoms, nor yet being
abandoned so as to become, on account of their smallness, an easy
object of attack to others, and thus be altogether destroyed; and this
lasted so long as they were worthy of the divine protection. But when
it became necessary for them, as a nation wholly given to sin, to be
brought back by their sufferings to their God, they were abandoned (by
Him), sometimes for a longer, sometimes for a shorter period, until in
the time of the Romans, having committed the greatest of sins in
putting Jesus to death, they were completely deserted.
Immediately after this, Celsus, assailing the contents of the
first book of Moses, which is entitled "Genesis," asserts that "the
Jews accordingly endeavoured to derive their origin from the first race
of jugglers and deceivers,(4) appealing to the testimony of dark and
ambiguous words, whose meaning was veiled in obscurity, and which they
misinterpreted s to the unlearned and ignorant, and that, too, when
such a point had never been called in question during the long
preceding period." Now Celsus appears to me in these words to have
expressed very obscurely the meaning which he intended to convey. It is
probable, indeed, that his obscurity on this subject is intentional,
inasmuch as he saw the strength of the argument which establishes the
descent of the Jews from their ancestors; while again, on the other
hand, he wished not to appear ignorant that the question regarding the
Jews and their descent was one that could not be lightly disposed of.
It is certain, however, that the Jews trace their genealogy back to the
three fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And the names of these
individuals possess such efficacy, when united with the name of God,
that not only do those belonging to the nation employ in their prayers
to God, and in the exorcising of demons, the words, "God of Abraham,(6)
and God of Isaac, and God of Jacob," but so also do almost all those
who occupy themselves with incantations and magical rites. For there is
found in treatises on magic in many countries such an invocation of
God, and assumption of the divine name, as implies a familiar use of it
by these men in their dealings with demons. These facts, then—adduced
by Jews and Christians to prove the sacred character of Abraham, and
Isaac, and Jacob, the fathers of the Jewish race—appear to me not to
have been altogether unknown to Celsus, but not to have been distinctly
set forth by him, because he was unable to answer the argument which
might be founded on them.
For we inquire of all those who employ such invocations of God,
saying: Tell us, friends, who was Abraham, and what sort of person was
Isaac, and what power did Jacob possess, that the appellation "God,"
when joined with their name, could effect such wonders? And from whom
have you learned, or can you learn, the facts relating to these
individuals? And who has occupied himself with writing a history about
them, either directly magnifying these men by ascribing to them
mysterious powers, or hinting obscurely at their possession of certain
great and marvellous qualities, patent to those who are qualified to
see them?(1) And when, in answer to our inquiry, no one can show from
what history—whether Greek or Barbarian—or, if not a history, yet at
least from what mystical narrative,(2) the accounts of these men are
derived, we shall bring forward the book entitled "Genesis," which
contains the acts of these men, and the divine oracles addressed to
them, and will say, Does not the use by you of the names of these three
ancestors of the race, establishing in the clearest manner that effects
not to be lightly regarded are produced by the invocation of them,
evidence the divinity of the men?(3) And yet we know them from no other
source than the sacred books of the Jews! Moreover, the phrases, "the
God of Israel," and "the God of the Hebrews," and "the God who drowned
in the Red Sea the king of Egypt and the Egyptians," are formuloe(4)
frequently employed against demons and certain wicked powers. And we
learn the history of the names and their interpretation from those
Hebrews, who in their national literature and national tongue dwell
with pride upon these things, and explain their meaning. How, then,
should the Jews attempt to derive their origin from the first race of
those whom Celsus supposed to be jugglers and deceivers, and
shamelessly endeavour to trace themselves and their beginning back to
these?—whose names, being Hebrew, are an evidence to the Hebrews, who
have their sacred books written in the Hebrew language and letters,
that their nation is akin to these men. For up to the present time, the
Jewish names belonging to the Hebrew language were either taken from
their writings, or generally from words the meaning of which was made
known by the Hebrew language.
And let any one who peruses the treatise of Celsus observe
whether it does not convey some such insinuation as the above, when he
says: "And they attempted to derive their origin from the first race of
jugglers and deceivers, appealing to the testimony of dark and
ambiguous words, whose meaning was veiled in obscurity." For these
names are indeed obscure, and not within the comprehension and
knowledge of many, though not in our opinion of doubtful meaning, even
although assumed by those who are aliens to our religion; but as,
according to Celsus, they do not s convey any ambiguity, I am at a loss
to know why he has rejected them. And yet, if he had wished honestly to
overturn the genealogy which he deemed the Jews to have so shamelessly
arrogated, in boasting of Abraham and his descendants (as their
progenitors), he ought to have quoted all the passages bearing on the
subject; and, in the first place, to have advocated his cause with such
arguments as he thought likely to be convincing, and in the next to
have bravely(6) refuted, by means of what appeared to him to be the
true meaning, and by arguments in its favour, the errors existing on
the subject. But neither Celsus nor any one else will be able, by their
discussions regarding the nature of names employed for miraculous
purposes, to lay down the correct doctrine regarding them, and to
demonstrate that those men were to be lightly esteemed whose names
merely, not among their countrymen alone, but also amongst foreigners,
could accomplish (such results). He ought to have shown, moreover, how
we, in misinterpreting(7) the passages in which these names are found,
deceive our hearers, as he imagines, while he himself, who boasts that
he is not ignorant or unintelligent, gives the true interpretation of
them. And he hazarded the assertion,(1) in speaking of those names,
from which the Jews deduce their genealogies, that "never, during the
long antecedent period, has there been any dispute about these names,
but that at the present time the Jews dispute about them with certain
others," whom he does not mention. Now, let him who chooses show who
these are that dispute with the Jews, and who adduce even probable
arguments to show that Jews and Christians do not decide correctly on
the points relating to these names, but that there are others who have
discussed these questions with the greatest learning and accuracy. But
we are well assured that none can establish anything of the sort, it
being manifest that these names are derived from the Hebrew language,
which is found only among the Jews.
Celsus in the next place, producing from history other than that
of the divine record, those passages which bear upon the claims to
great antiquity put forth by many nations, as the Athenians, and
Egyptians, and Arcadians, and Phrygians, who assert that certain
individuals have existed among them who sprang from the earth, and who
each adduce proOfs of these assertions, says: "The Jews, then, leading
a grovelling life(2) in some comer of Palestine, and being a wholly
uneducated people, who had not heard that these matters had been
committed to verse long ago by Hesiod and innumerable other inspired
men, wove together some most incredible and insipid stories,(3) viz.,
that a certain man was formed by the hands of God, and had breathed
into him the breath of life, and that a woman was taken from his side,
and that God issued certain commands, and that a serpent opposed these,
and gained a victory over the commandments of God; thus relating
certain old wives' fables, and most impiously representing God as weak
at the very beginning (of things), and unable to convince even a single
human being whom He Himself had formed." By these instances, indeed,
this deeply read and learned Celsus, who accuses Jews and Christians of
ignorance and want of instruction, clearly evinces the accuracy of his
knowledge of the chronology of the respective historians, whether Greek
or Barbarian, since he imagines that Hesiod and the "innumerable"
others, whom he styles "inspired" men, are older than Moses and his
writings—that very Moses who is shown to be much older than the time
of the Trojan war! It is not the Jews, then, who have composed
incredible and insipid stories regarding the birth of man from the
earth, but these "inspired" men of Celsus, Hesiod and his other
"innumerable" companions, who, having neither learned nor heard of the
far older and most venerable accounts existing in Palestine, have
written such histories as their Theogonies, attributing, so far as in
their power, "generation" to their deities, and innumerable other
absurdities. And these are the writers whom Plato expels from his
"State" as being corrupters of the youth,(4)—Homer, viz., and those
who have composed poems of a similar description! Now it is evident
that Plato did not regard as "inspired" those men who had left behind
them such works. But perhaps it was from a desire to cast reproach upon
us, that this Epicurean Celsus, who is better able to judge than Plato
(if it be the same Celsus who composed two other books against the
Christians), called those individuals "inspired" whom he did not in
reality regard as such.
He charges us, moreover, with introducing "a man formed by the
hands of God," although the book of Genesis has made no mention of the
"hands" of God, either when relating the creation or the
"fashioning"(5) of the man; white it is Job and David who have used the
expression, "Thy hands have made me and fashioned me;"(6) with
reference to which it would need a lengthened discourse to point out
the sense in which these words were understood by those who used them,
both as regards the difference between "making" and "fashioning," and
also the "hands" of God. For those who do not understand these and
similar expressions in the sacred Scriptures, imagine that we attribute
to the God who is over all things a form(7) such as that of man; and
according to their conceptions, it follows that we consider the body of
God to be furnished with wings, since the Scriptures, literally
understood, attribute such appendages to God. The subject before us,
however, does not require us to interpret these expressions; for, in
our explanatory remarks upon the book of Genesis, these matters have
been made, to the best of our ability, a special subject of
investigation. Observe next the malignity(8) of Celsus in what follows.
For the Scripture, speaking of the "fashioning"(9) of the man, says,
"And breathed into his face the breath of life, and the man became a
living soul."(10) Whereon Celsus, wishing maliciously to ridicule the
"inbreathing into his face of the breath of life," and not
understanding the sense in which the expression was employed, states
that "they composed a story that a man was fashioned by the hands of
God, and was inflated by breath blown into him,"(1) in order that,
taking the word" inflated" to be used in a similar way to the inflation
of skins, he might ridicule the statement, "He breathed into his face
the breath of life,"—terms which are used figuratively, and require to
be explained in order to show that God communicated to man of His
incorruptible Spirit; as it is said, "For Thine incorruptible Spirit is
in all things."(2)
In the next place, as it is his object to slander our Scriptures,
he ridicules the following statement: "And God caused a deep sleep to
fall upon Adam, and he slept: and He took one of his ribs, and closed
up the flesh instead thereof. And the rib, which He had taken from the
man, made He a woman,"(3) and so on; without quoting the words, which
would give the hearer the impression that they are spoken with a
figurative meaning. He would not even have it appear that the words
were used allegorically, although he says afterwards, that "the more
modest among Jews and Christians are ashamed of these things, and
endeavour to give them somehow an allegorical signification." Now we
might say to him, Are the statements of your "inspired" Hesiod, which
he makes regarding the woman in the form of a myth, to be explained
allegorically, in the sense that she was given by Jove to men as an
evil thing, and as a retribution for the theft of "the fire;"(4) while
that regarding the woman who was taken from the side of the man (after
he had been buried in deep slumber), and was formed by God, appears to
you to be related without any rational meaning and secret
signification?(5) But is it not uncandid, not to ridicule the former as
myths, but to admire them as philosophical ideas in a mythical dress,
and to treat with contempt(6) the latter, as offending the
understanding, and to declare that they are of no account? For if,
because of the mere phraseology, we are to find fault with what is
intended to have a secret meaning, see whether the following lines of
Hesiod, a man, as you say," inspired," are not better fitted to excite
laughter:—
"'Son of Iapetus!' with wrathful heart
Spake the cloud-gatherer: 'Oh, unmatched in art!
Exultest thou in this the flame retrieved,
And dost thou triumph in the god deceived?
But thou, with the posterity of man,
Shalt rue the fraud whence mightier ills began;
I will send evil for thy stealthy fire,
While all embrace it, and their bane desire.'
The sire, who rules the earth, and sways the pole,
Had said, and laughter fill'd his secret soul.
He bade the artist-god his best obey,
And mould with tempering waters ductile clay:
Infuse, as breathing life and form began,
The supple vigour, and the voice of man:
Her aspect fair as goddesses above,
A virgin's likeness, with the brows of love.
He bade Minerva teach the skill that dyes
The web with colours, as the shuttle flies;
He called the magic of Love's Queen to shed
A nameless grace around her courteous head;
Instil the wish that longs with restless aim,
And cares of dress that feed upon the frame:
Bade Hermes last implant the craft refined
Of artful manners, and a shameless mind.
He said; their king th' inferior powers obeyed:
The fictile likeness of a bashful maid
Rose from the temper'd earth, by Jove's behest,
Under the forming god; the zone and vest
Were clasp'd and folded by Minerva's hand:
The heaven-born graces, and persuasion bland
Deck'd her round limbs with chains of gold: the hours
Of loose locks twined her temples with spring flowers.
The whole attire Minerva's curious care
Form'd to her shape, and fitted to her air.
But in her breast the herald from above,
Full of the counsels of deep thundering Jove,
Wrought artful manners, wrought perfidious lies,
And speech that thrills the blood, and lulls the wise.
Her did th' interpreter of gods proclaim,
And named the woman with Pandora's name;
Since all the gods conferr'd their gifts, to charm,
For man's inventive race, this beauteous harm."(7)
Moreover, what is said also about the casket is fitted of itself to excite laughter; for example:—
"Whilome on earth the sons of men abode
From ills apart, and labour's irksome load,
And sore diseases, bringing age to man;
Now the sad life of mortals is a span.
The woman's hands a mighty casket bear;
She lifts the lid; she scatters griefs in air:
Alone, beneath the vessel s rims detained,
Hope still within th' unbroken cell remained,
Nor fled abroad; so will'd cloud-gatherer Jove:
The woman's hand had dropp'd the lid above."(8)
Now, to him who would give to these lines a grave allegorical meaning (whether any such meaning be contained in them or not), we would say: Are the Greeks alone at liberty to convey a philosophic meaning in a secret covering? or perhaps also the Egyptians, and those of the Barbarians who pride themselves upon their mysteries and the truth (which is concealed within them); while the Jews alone, with their lawgiver and historians, appear to you the most unintelligent of men? And is this the only nation which has not received a share of divine power, and which yet was so grandly instructed how to rise upwards to the uncreated nature of God, and to gaze on Him alone, and to expect from Him alone (the fulfilment of) their hopes?
But as Celsus makes a jest also of the serpent, as counteracting
the injunctions given by God to the man, taking the narrative to be an
old wife's fable,(1) and has purposely neither mentioned the
paradise(2) of God, nor stated that God is said to have planted it in
Eden towards the east, and that there afterwards sprang up from the
earth every tree that was beautiful to the sight, and good for food,
and the tree of life in the midst of the paradise, and the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, and the other statements which follow,
which might of themselves lead a candid reader to see that all these
things had not inappropriately an allegorical meaning, let us contrast
with this the words of Socrates regarding Eros in the Symposium of
Plato, and which are put in the mouth of Socrates as being more
appropriate than what was said regarding him by all the others at the
Symposium. The words of Plato are as follow: "When Aphrodite was born,
the gods held a banquet, and there was present, along with the others,
Porus the son of Metis. And after they had dined, Penia(3) came to beg
for something (seeing there was an entertainment), and she stood at the
gate. Porus meantime, having become intoxicated with the nectar (for
there was then no wine), went into the garden of Zeus, and, being heavy
with liquor, lay down to sleep. Penia accordingly formed a secret plot,
with a view of freeing herself from her condition of poverty,(4) to get
a child by Porus, and accordingly lay down beside him, and became
pregnant with Eros. And on this account Eros has become the follower
and attendant of Aphrodite, having been begotten on her birthday
feast,(5) and being at the same time by nature a lover of the
beautiful, because Aphrodite too is beautiful. Seeing, then, that Eros
is the son of Porus and Penia, the following is his condition.(6) In
the first place, he is always poor, and far from being delicate and
beautiful, as most persons imagine; but is withered, and sunburnt,(7)
and unshod, and without a home, sleeping always upon the ground, and
without a covering; lying in the open air beside gates, and on public
roads; possessing the nature of his mother, and dwelling continually
with indigence.(8) But, on the other hand, in conformity with the
character of his father, he is given to plotting against the beautiful
and the good, being courageous, and hasty, and vehement;(9) a keen(10)
hunter, perpet-ually devising contrivances; both much given to
forethought, and also fertile in resources;(11) acting like a
philosopher throughout the whole of his life; a terrible(12) sorcerer,
and dealer in drugs, and a sophist as well; neither immortal by nature
nor yet mortal, but on the same day, at one time he flourishes and
lives when he has plenty, and again at another time dies, and once more
is recalled to life through possessing the nature of his father. But
the supplies furnished to him are always gradually disappearing, so
that he is never at any time in want, nor yet rich; and, on the other
hand, he occupies an intermediate position between wisdom and
ignorance."(13) Now, if those who read these words were to imitate the
malignity of Celsus—which be it far from Christians to do!—they would
ridicule the myth, and would turn this great Plato into a subject of
jest; but if, on investigating in a philosophic spirit what is conveyed
in the dress of a myth, they should be able to discover the meaning of
Plato, (they will admire)(14) the manner in which he was able to
conceal, on account of the multitude, in the form of this myth, the
great ideas which presented themselves to him, and to speak in a
befitting manner to those who know how to ascertain from the myths the
true meaning of him who wove them together. Now I have brought forward
this myth occurring in the writings of Plato, because of the mention in
it of the garden of Zeus, which appears to bear some resemblance to the
paradise of God, and of the comparison between Penia and the serpent,
and the plot against Porus by Penia, which may be compared with the
plot of the serpent against the man. It is not very clear, indeed,
whether Plato fell in with these stories by chance, or whether, as some
think, meeting during his visit to Egypt with certain individuals who
philosophized on the Jewish mysteries, and learning some things from
them, he may have preserved a few of their ideas, and thrown others
aside, being careful not to offend the Greeks by a complete adoption of
all the points of the philosophy of the Jews, who were in bad repute
with the multitude, on account of the foreign character of their laws
and their peculiar polity. The present, however, is not the proper time
for explaining either the myth of Plato, or the story of the serpent
and the paradise of God, and all that is related to have taken place in
it, as in our exposition of the book of Genesis we have especially
occupied ourselves as we best could with these matters.
But as he asserts that "the Mosaic narrative most impiously
represents God as in a state of weakness from the very commencement (of
things), and as unable to gain over (to obedience) even one single man
whom He Himself had formed," we say in answer that the objection(1) is
much the same as if one were to find fault with the existence of evil,
which God has not been able to prevent even in the case of a single
individual, so that one man might be found from the very beginning of
things who was born into the world untainted by sin. For as those whose
business it is to defend the doctrine of providence do so by means of
arguments which are not to be despised,(2) so also the subjects of Adam
and his son will be philosophically dealt with by those who are aware
that in the Hebrew language Adam signifies man; and that in those parts
of the narrative which appear to refer to Adam as an individual, Moses
is discoursing upon the nature of man in general.(3) For "in Adam" (as
the Scripture(4) says) "all die," and were condemned in the likeness of
Adam's transgression, the word of God asserting this not so much of one
particular individual as of the whole human race. For in the connected
series of statements which appears to apply as to one particular
individual, the curse pronounced upon Adam is regarded as common to all
(the members of the race), and what was spoken with reference to the
woman is spoken of every woman without exception.(5) And the expulsion
of the man and woman from paradise, and their being clothed with tunics
of skins (which God, because of the transgression of men, made for
those who had sinned), contain a certain secret and mystical doctrine
(far transcending that of Plato) of the souls losing its wings,(6) and
being borne downwards to earth, until it can lay hold of some stable
resting-place.
After this he continues as follows: "They speak, in the next
place, of a deluge, and of a monstrous(7) ark, having within it all
things, and of a dove and a crow(8) as messengers, falsifying and
recklessly altering(9) the story of Deucalion; not expecting, I
suppose, that these things would come to light, but imagining that they
were inventing stories merely for young children." Now in these remarks
observe the hostility—so unbecoming a philosopher—displayed by this
man towards this very ancient Jewish narrative. For, not being able to
say anything against the history of the deluge, and not perceiving what
he might have urged against the ark and its dimensions,—viz., that,
according to the general opinion, which accepted the statements that it
was three hundred cubits in length, and fifty in breadth, and thirty in
height, it was impossible to maintain that it contained (all) the
animals that were upon the earth, fourteen specimens of every clean and
four of every unclean beast,—he merely termed it "monstrous,
containing all things within it." Now wherein was its "monstrous"
character, seeing it is related to have been a hundred years in
building, and to have had the three hundred cubits of its length and
the fifty of its breadth contracted, until the thirty cubits of its
height terminated in a top one cubit long and one cubit broad? Why
should we not rather admire a structure which resembled an extensive
city, if its measurements be taken to mean what they are capable of
meaning,(10) so that it was nine myriads of cubits long in the base,
and two thousand five hundred in breadth?(11) And why should we not
admire the design evinced in having it so compactly built, and rendered
capable of sustaining a tempest which caused a deluge? For it was not
daubed with pitch, or any material of that kind, but was securely
coated with bitumen. And is it not a subject of admiration, that by the
providential arrangement of God, the elements of all the races were
brought into it, that the earth might receive again the seeds of all
living things, while God made use of a most righteous man to be the
progenitor of those who were to be born after the deluge?
In order to show that he had read the book of Genesis, Celsus
rejects the story of the dove, although unable to adduce any reason
which might prove it to be a fiction. In the next place, as his habit
is, in order to put the narrative in a more ridiculous light, he
converts the "raven" into a "crow," and imagines that Moses so wrote,
having recklessly altered the accounts related of the Grecian
Deucalion; unless perhaps he regards the narrative as not having
proceeded from Moses, but from several individuals, as appears from his
employing the plural number in the expressions, "falsifying and
recklessly altering the story of Deucalion,"(12) as well as from the
words, "For they did not expect, I suppose, that these things would
come to light." But how should they, who gave their Scriptures to the
whale nation, not expect that they would come to light, and who
predicted, moreover, that this religion should be proclaimed to all
nations? Jesus declared, "The kingdom of God shall be taken from you,
and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof;"(1) and in
uttering these words to the Jews, what other meaning did He intend to
convey than this, viz., that He Himself should, through his divine
power, bring forth into light the whole of the Jewish Scriptures, which
contain the mysteries of the kingdom of God? If, then, they peruse the
Theogonies of the Greeks, and the stories about the twelve gods, they
impart to them an air of dignity, by investing them with an allegorical
signification; but when they wish to throw contempt upon our biblical
narratives, they assert that they are fables, clumsily invented for
infant children!
"Altogether absurd, and out of season,"(2) he continues, "is the
(account of the) begetting of children," where, although he has
mentioned no names, it is evident that he is referring to the history
of Abraham and Sarah. Cavilling also at the "conspiracies of the
brothers," he allies either to the story of Cain plotting against
Abel,(3) or, in addition, to that of Esau against Jacob;(4) and
(speaking) of "a father's sorrow," he probably refers to that of Isaac
on account of the absence of Jacob, and perhaps also to that of Jacob
because of Joseph having been sold into Egypt. And when relating the
"crafty procedure of mothers," I suppose he means the conduct of
Rebecca, who contrived that the blessing of Isaac should descend, not
upon Esau, but upon Jacob. Now if we assert that in all these cases God
interposed in a very marked degree,(5) what absurdity do we commit,
seeing we are persuaded that He never withdraws His providence(6) from
those who devote themselves to Him in an honourable and vigorous(7)
life? He ridicules, moreover, the acquisition of property made by Jacob
while living with Laban, not understanding to what these words refer:
"And those which had no spots were Laban's, and those which were
spotted were Jacob's;"(8) and he says that "God presented his sons with
asses, and sheep, and camels,"(9) and did not see that "all these
things happened unto them for ensamples, and were written for our sake,
upon whom the ends of the world are come."(10) The varying customs
(prevailing among the different nations) becoming famous,(11) are
regulated by the word of God, being given as a possession to him who is
figuratively termed Jacob. For those who become converts to Christ from
among the heathen, are indicated by the history of Laban and Jacob.
And erring widely from the meaning of Scripture, he says that
"God gave wells(12) also to the righteous." Now he did not observe that
the righteous do not construct cisterns,(13) but dig wells, seeking to
discover the inherent ground and source of potable blessings,(14)
inasmuch as they receive in a figurative sense the commandment which
enjoins, "Drink waters from your own vessels, and from your own wells
of fresh water. Let not your water be poured out beyond your own
fountain, but let it pass into your own streets. Let it belong to you
alone, and let no alien partake with thee."(15) Scripture frequently
makes use of the histories of real events, in order to present to view
more important truths, which are but obscurely intimated; and of this
kind are the narratives relating to the "wells," and to the
"marriages," and to the various acts of "sexual intercourse" recorded
of righteous persons, respecting which, however, it will be more
seasonable to offer an explanation in the exegetical writings referring
to those very passages. But that wells were constructed by righteous
men in the land of the Philistines, as related in the book of
Genesis,(16) is manifest from the wonderful wells which are shown at
Ascalon, and which are deserving of mention on account of their
structure, so foreign and peculiar compared with that of other wells.
Moreover, that both young women(17) and female servants are to be
understood metaphorically, is not our doctrine merely, but one which we
have received from the beginning from wise men, among whom a certain
one said, when exhorting his hearers to investigate the figurative
meaning: "Tell me, ye that read the law, do ye not hear the law? For it
is written that Abraham had two sons; the one by a bond maid, the other
by a free woman. But he who was of the bond woman was born after the
flesh; but he of the free woman was by promise. Which things are an
allegory: for these are the two covenants; the one from l the Mount
Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Agar."(1) And a little
after, "But Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us
all." And any one who will take up the Epistle to the Galatians may
learn how the passages relating to the "marriages," and the intercourse
with "the maid-servants," have been allegorized; the Scripture desiring
us to imitate not the literal acts of those who did these things, but
(as the apostles of Jesus are accustomed to call them) the spiritual.
And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth
displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed
even what is to their discredit,(2) and thus been led to accept the
other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse,
and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without
examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as "worse than
the crimes of Thyestes." The figurative signification of that passage
of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant
by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping
thence, when they said: "Look not behind thee, neither stay thou in all
the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest thou be
consumed;"(3) nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a
pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters
intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But
let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the
history. The nature of actions—good, bad, and indifferent—has been
investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such
investigators(4) lay down the principle that intention alone gives to
actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are
done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when
the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when
the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the
section relating to" things indifferent," that, strictly speaking, for
a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing
indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in
established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to
show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they
have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter,
the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the
question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his
daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the
extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among
the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential(5) sect of the
Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the
world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire
devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means
left of rekindling the flame(6) of human life lay in their father and
themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the
world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of
the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts
becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already
supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however,
that some have taken offence at the desire(7) of Lot's daughters, and
have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two
accursed nations—Moab and Ammon—have sprung from that unhallowed
intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly
approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as
blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it
admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on
its own merits.(8)
Celsus, moreover, sneers at the "hatred" of Esau (to which, I
suppose, he refers) against Jacob, although he was a man who, according
to the Scriptures, is acknowledged to have been wicked; and not clearly
stating the story of Simeon and Levi, who sallied out (on the
She-chemites) on account of the insult offered to their sister, who had
been violated by the son of the Shechemite king, he inveighs against
their conduct. And passing on, he speaks of" brothers selling (one
another)," alluding to the sons of Jacob; and of "a brother sold,"
Joseph to wit; and of "a father deceived," viz., Jacob, because he
entertained no suspicion of his sons when they showed him Joseph's coat
of many colours, but believed their statement, and mourned for his son,
who was a slave in Egypt, as if he were dead. And observe in what a
spirit of hatred and falsehood Celsus collects together the statements
of the sacred history; so that wherever it appeared to him to contain a
ground of accusation he produces the passage, but wherever there is any
exhibition of virtue worthy of mention— as when Joseph would not
gratify the lust of his mistress, refusing alike her allurements and
her threats—he does not even mention the circumstance! He should see,
indeed, that the conduct of Joseph was far superior to what is related
of Bellerophon,(1) since the former chose rather to be shut up in
prison than do violence to his virtue. For although he might have
offered a just defence against his accuser, he magnanimously remained
silent, entrusting his cause to God.
Celsus next, for form's sake,(2) and with great want of
precision, speaks of "the dreams of the chief butler and chief baker,
and of Pharaoh, and of the explanation of them, in consequence of which
Joseph was taken out of prison in order to be entrusted by Pharaoh with
the second place in Egypt." What absurdity, then, did the history
contain, looked at even in itself, that it should be adduced as matter
of accusation by this Celsus, who gave the title of True Discourse to a
treatise not containing doctrines, but full of charges against Jews and
Christians? He adds: "He who had been sold behaved kindly to his
brethren (who had sold him), when they were suffering from hunger, and
had been sent with their asses to purchase (provisions);" although he
has not related these occurrences (in his treatise). But he does
mention the circumstance of Joseph making himself known to his
brethren, although I know not with what view, or what absurdity he can
point out in such an occurrence; since it is impossible for Momus
himself, we might say, to find any reasonable fault with events which,
apart from their figurative meaning, present so much that is
attractive. He relates, further, that "Joseph, who had been sold as a
slave, was restored to liberty, and went up with a solemn procession to
his father's funeral," and thinks that the narrative furnishes matter
of accusation against us, as he makes the following remark: "By whom
(Joseph, namely) the illustrious and divine nation of the Jews, after
growing up in Egypt to be a multitude of people, was commanded to
sojourn somewhere beyond the limits of the kingdom, and to pasture
their flocks in districts of no repute." Now the words, "that they were
commanded to pasture their flocks in districts of no repute," are an
addition, proceeding from his own feelings of hatred; for he has not
shown that Goshen, the district of Egypt, is a place of no repute. The
exodus of the people from Egypt he calls a flight, not at all
remembering what is written in the book of Exodus regarding the
departure of the Hebrews from the land of Egypt. We have enumerated
these instances to show that what, literally considered, might appear
to furnish ground of accusation, Celsus has not succeeded in proving to
be either objectionable or foolish, having utterly failed to establish
the evil character, as he regards it, of our Scriptures.
In the next place, as if he had devoted himself solely to the
manifestation of his hatred and dislike of the Jewish and Christian
doctrine, he says: "The more modest of Jewish and Christian writers
give all these things an allegorical meaning;" and, "Because they are
ashamed of these things, they take refuge in allegory." Now one might
say to him, that if we must admit fables and fictions, whether written
with a concealed meaning or with any other object, to be shameful
narratives when taken in their literal acceptation,(3) of what
histories can this be said more truly than of the Grecian? In these
histories, gods who are sons castrate the gods who are their fathers,
and gods who are parents devour their own children, and a
goddess-mother gives to the "father of gods and men" a stone to swallow
instead of his own son, and a father has intercourse with his daughter,
and a wife binds her own husband, having as her allies in the work the
brother of the fettered god and his own daughter! But why should I
enumerate these absurd stories of the Greeks regarding their gods,
which are most shameful in themselves, even though invested with an
allegorical meaning? (Take the instance) where Chrysippus of Soli, who
is considered to be an ornament of the Stoic sect, on account of his
numerous and learned treatises, explains a picture at Samos, in which
Juno was represented as committing unspeakable abominations with
Jupiter. This reverend philosopher says in his treatises, that matter
receives the spermatic words(4) of the god, and retains them within
herself, in order to ornament the universe. For in the picture at
Samos Juno represents matter, and Jupiter god. Now it is on account of
these, and of countless other similar fables, that we would not even in
word call the God of all things Jupiter, or the sun Apollo, or the moon
Diana. But we offer to the Creator a worship which is pure, and speak
with religious respect of His noble works of creation, not
contaminating even in word the things of God; approving of the language
of Plato in the Philebus, who would not admit that pleasure was a
goddess, "so great is my reverence, Protarchus," he says, "for the very
names of the gods." We verily entertain such reverence for the name of
God, and for His noble works of creation, that we would not, even under
pretext of an allegorical meaning, admit any fable which might do
injury to the young.
If Celsus had read the Scriptures in an impartial spirit, he
would not have said that "our writings are incapable of admitting an
allegorical meaning." For from the prophetic Scriptures, in which
historical events are recorded (not from the historical), it is
possible to be convinced that the historical portions also were written
with an allegorical purpose, and were most skilfully adapted not only
to the multitude of the simpler believers, but also to the few who are
able or willing to investigate matters in an intelligent spirit. If,
indeed, those writers at the present day who are deemed by Celsus the
"more modest of the Jews and Christians" were the (first) allegorical
interpreters of our Scriptures, he would have the appearance, perhaps,
of making a plausible allegation. But since the very fathers and
authors of the doctrines themselves give them an allegorical
signification, what other inference can be drawn than that they were
composed so as to be allegorically understood in their chief
signification?(1) And we shall adduce a few instances out of very many
to show that Celsus brings an empty charge against the Scriptures, when
he says "that they are incapable of admitting an allegorical meaning."
Paul, the apostle of Jesus, says: "It is written in the law, Thou shalt
not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God
take care for oxen? or saith He it altogether for our sakes? For our
sakes, no doubt, this is written, that he that plougheth should plough
in hope, and he that thresheth in hope of partaking."(2) And in another
passage the same Paul says: "For it is written, For this cause shall a
man leave his father and mother and shall be joined to his wife, and
they two shall be one flesh. This is a great mystery; but I speak
concerning Christ and the Church."(3) And again, in another place: "We
know that all our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through
the sea; and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud, and in the
sea."(4) Then, explaining the history relating to the manna, and that
referring to the miraculous issue of the water from the rock, he
continues as follows: "And they did all eat the same spiritual meat,
and did all drink the same spiritual drink. For they drank of that
spiritual Rock that followed them, and that Rock was Christ."(5) Asaph,
moreover, who, in showing the histories in Exodus and Numbers to be
full of difficulties and parables,(6) begins in the following manner,
as recorded in the book of Psalms, where he is about to make mention of
these things: "Give ear, O my people, to my law: incline your ears to
the words of my mouth. I will open my mouth in parables; I will utter
dark sayings of old, which we have heard and known, and our fathers
have told us."(7)
Moreover, if the law of Moses had contained nothing which was to
be understood as hating a secret meaning, the prophet would not have
said in his prayer to God, "Open Thou mine eyes, and I will behold
wondrous things out of Thy law;"(8) whereas he knew that there was a
veil of ignorance lying upon the heart of those who read but do not
understand the figurative meaning, which veil is taken away by the gift
of God, when He hears him who has done all that he can,(9) and who by
reason of habit has his senses exercised to distinguish between good
and evil, and who continually utters the prayer, "Open Thou mine eyes,
and I will behold wondrous things out of Thy law." And who is there
that, on reading of the dragon that lives in the Egyptian river,(10)
and of the fishes which lurk in his scales, or of the excrement of
Pharaoh which fills the mountains of Egypt,(11) is not led at once to
inquire who he is that fills the Egyptian mountains with his stinking
excrement, and what the Egyptian mountains are; and what the rivers in
Egypt are, of which the aforesaid Pharaoh boastfully says, "The rivers
are mine, and I have made them;"(10) and who the dragon is, and the
fishes in its scales,—and this so as to harmonize with the
interpretation to be given of the rivers? But why establish at greater
length what needs no demonstration? For to these things applies the
saying: "Who is wise, and he shall understand these things? or who is
prudent, and he shall know them?"(12) Now I have gone at some length
into the subject, because I wished to show the unsoundness of the
assertion of Celsus, that "the more modest among the Jews and
Christians endeavour somehow to give these stories an allegorical
signification, although some of them do not admit of this, but on the
contrary are exceedingly silly inventions." Much rather are the stories
of the Greeks not only very silly, but very impious inventions. For our
narratives keep expressly in view the multitude of simpler believers,
which was not done by those who invented the Grecian fables. And
therefore not without propriety does Plato expel from his state all
fables and poems of such a nature as those of which we have been
speaking.
Celsus appears to me to have heard that there are treatises in
existence which contain allegorical explanations of the law of Moses.
These however, he could not have read; for if he had he would not have
said: "The allegorical explanations, however, which have been devised
are much more shameful and absurd than the fables themselves, inasmuch
as they endeavour to unite with marvellous and altogether insensate
folly things which cannot at all be made to harmonize." He seems to
refer in these words to the works of Philo, or to those of still older
writers, such as Aristobulus. But I conjecture that Celsus has not read
their books, since it appears to me that in many passages they have so
successfully hit the meaning (of the sacred writers), that even Grecian
philosophers would have been captivated by their explanations; for in
their writings we find not only a polished style, but exquisite
thoughts and doctrines, and a rational use of what Celsus imagines to
be fables in the sacred writings. I know, moreover, that Numenius the
Pythagorean—a surpassingly excellent expounder of Plato, and who held
a foremost place as a teacher of the doctrines of Pythagoras—in many
of his works quotes from the writings of Moses and the prophets, and
applies to the passages in question a not improbable allegorical
meaning, as in his work called Epops, and in those which treat of
"Numbers" and of "Place." And in the third book of his dissertation on
The Good, he quotes also a narrative regarding Jesus—without, however,
mentioning His name—and gives it an allegorical signification, whether
successfully or the reverse I may state on another occasion. He relates
also the account respecting Moses, and Jannes, and Jambres.(1) But we
are not elated on account of this instance, though we express our
approval of Numenius, rather than of Celsus and other Greeks, because
he was willing to investigate our histories from a desire to acquire
knowledge, and was (duly) affected by them as narratives which were to
be allegorically understood, and which did not belong to the category
of foolish compositions.
After this, selecting from all the treatises which contain
allegorical explanations and interpretations, expressed in a language
and style not to be despised, the least important,(2) such as might
contribute, indeed, to strengthen the faith of the multitude of simple
believers, but were not adapted to impress those of more intelligent
mind, he continues: "Of such a nature do I know the work to be,
entitled Controversy between one Papiscus and Jason, which is fitted to
excite pity and hatred instead of laughter. It is not my purpose,
however, to confute the statements contained in such works; for their
fallacy is manifest to all, especially if any one will have the
patience to read the books themselves. Rather do I wish to show that
Nature teaches this, that God made nothing that is mortal, but that His
works, whatever they are, are immortal, and theirs mortal. And the
soul(3) is the work of God, while the nature of the body is different.
And in this respect there is no difference between the body of a bat,
or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man; for the matter(4) is the
same, and their corruptible part is alike." Nevertheless I could wish
that every one who heard Celsus declaiming and asserting that the
treatise entitled Controversy between Jason and Papiscus regarding
Christ was fitted to excite not laughter, but hatred, could fake the
work into his hands, and patiently listen to its contents; that,
finding in it nothing to excite hatred, he might condemn Celsus out of
the book itself. For if it be impartially perused, it will be found
that there is nothing to excite even laughter in a work in which a
Christian is described as conversing with a Jew on the subject of the
Jewish Scriptures, and proving that the predictions regarding Christ
fitly apply to Jesus; although the other disputant maintains the
discussion in no ignoble style, and in a manner not unbecoming the
character of a Jew.
I do not know, indeed, how he could conjoin things that do not
admit of union, and which cannot exist together at the same time in
human nature, in saying, as he did, that "the above treatise deserved
to be treated both with pity and hatred." For every one will admit that
he who is the object of pity is not at the same moment an object of
hatred, and that he who is the object of hatred is not at the same time
a subject of pity. Celsus, moreover, says that it was not his purpose
to refute such statements, because he thinks that their absurdity is
evident to all, and that, even before offering any logical refutation,
they will appear to be bad, and to merit both pity and hatred. But we
invite him who peruses this reply of ours to the charges of Celsus to
have patience, and to listen to our sacred writings themselves, and, as
far as possible, to form an opinion from their contents of the purpose
of the writers, and of their con- sciences and disposition of mind; for
he will discover that they are men who strenuously contend for what
they uphold, and that some of them show that the history which they
narrate is one which they have both seen and experienced,(1) which was
miraculous, and worthy of being recorded for the advantage of their
future hearers. Will any one indeed venture to say that it is not the
source and fountain of all blessing(2) (to men) to believe in the God
of all things, and to perform all our actions with the view of pleasing
Him in everything whatever, and not to entertain even a thought
unpleasing to Him, seeing that not only our words and deeds, but our
very thoughts, will be the subject of future judgment? And what other
arguments would more effectually lead human nature to adopt a virtuous
life, than the belief or opinion that the supreme God beholds all
things, not only what is said and done, but even what is thought by us?
And let any one who likes compare any other system which at the same
time converts and ameliorates, not merely one or two individuals, but,
as far as in it lies, countless numbers, that by the comparison of both
methods he may form a correct idea of the arguments which dispose to a
virtuous life.
But as in the words which I quoted from Celsus, which are a
paraphrase from the Timoeus, certain expressions occur, such as, "God
made nothing mortal, but immortal things alone, while mortal things are
the works of others, and the soul is a work of God, but the nature of
the body is different, and there is no difference between the body of a
man and that of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog; for the matter is
the same, and their corruptible part alike,"—let us discuss these
points for a little; and let us show that Celsus either does not
disclose his Epicurean opinions, or, as might be said by one person,
has exchanged them for better, or, as another might say, has nothing in
common save the name, with Celsus, the Epicurean. For he ought, in
giving expression to such opinions, and in proposing to contradict not
only us, but the by no means obscure sect of philosophers who are the
adherents of Zeno of Citium, to have proved that the bodies of animals
are not the work of God, and that the great skill displayed in their
construction did not proceed from the highest intelligence. And he
ought also, with regard to the countless diversities of plants, which
are regulated by an inherent, incomprehensible nature,(3) and which
have been created for the by no means despicable(4) use of man in
general, and of the animals which minister to man, whatever other
reasons may be adduced for their existence,(5) not only to have stated
his opinion, but also to have shown us that it was no perfect
intelligence which impressed these qualities upon the matter of plants.
And when he had once represented (various) divinities as the creators
of all the bodies, the soul alone being the work of God, why did not
he, who separated these great acts of creation, and apportioned them
among a plurality of creators, next demonstrate by some convincing
reason the existence of these diversities among divinities, some of
which construct the bodies of men, and others—those, say, of beasts of
burden, and others—those of wild animals? And he who saw that some
divinities were the creators of dragons, and of asps, and of basilisks,
and others of each plant and herb according to its species, ought to
have explained the causes of these diversities. For probably, had he
given himself carefully to the investigation of each particular point,
he would either have observed that it was one God who was the creator
of all, and who made each thing with a certain object and for a certain
reason; or if he had failed to observe this, he would have discovered
the answer which he ought to return to those who assert that
corruptibility is a thing indifferent in its nature; and that there was
no absurdity in a world which consists of diverse materials, being
formed by one architect, who constructed the different kinds of things
so as to secure the good of the whole. Or, finally, he ought to have
expressed no opinion at all on so important a doctrine, since he did
not intend to prove what he professed to demonstrate; unless, indeed,
he who censures others for professing a simple faith, would have us to
believe his mere assertions, although he gave out that he would not
merely assert, but would prove his assertions.
But I maintain that, if he had the patience (to use his own
expression) to listen to the writings of Moses and the prophets, he
would have had his attention arrested by the circumstance that the
expression "God made" is applied to heaven and earth, and to what is
called the firmament, and also to the lights and stars; and after
these, to the great fishes, and to every living thing among creeping
animals which the waters brought forth after their kinds, and to every
fowl of heaven after its kind; and after these, to the wild beasts of
the earth after their kind, and the beasts after their kind, and to
every creeping thing upon the earth after its kind; and last of all to
man. The expression "made," however, is not applied to other things;
but it is deemed sufficient to say regarding light, "And it was light;"
and regarding the one gathering together of all the waters that are
under the whole heaven, "It was so." And in like manner also, with
regard to what grew upon the earth, where it is said, "The earth
brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after its kind and after
its likeness, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in
itself, after its kind, upon the earth." He would have inquired,
moreover, whether the recorded commands of God respecting the coming
into existence of each part of the world were addressed to one thing or
to several;(1) and he would not lightly have charged with being
unintelligible, and as having no secret meaning, the accounts related
in these books, either by Moses, or, as we would say, by the Divine
Spirit speaking in Moses, from whom also he derived the power of
prophesying; since he "knew both the present, and the future, and the
past," in a higher degree than those priests who are alleged by the
poets to have possessed a knowledge of these things.
Moreover, since Celsus asserts that "the soul is the work of God,
but that the nature of body is different; and that in this respect
there is no difference between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a
frog, and that of a man, for the matter is the same, and their
corruptible part alike,"—we have to say in answer to this argument of
his, that if, since the same matter underlies the body of a bat, or of
a worm, or of a frog, or of a man, these bodies will differ in no
respect from one another, it is evident then that these bodies also
will differ in no respect from the sun, or the moon, or the stars, or
the sky, or any other thing which is called by the Greeks a god,
cognisable by the senses.(2) For the same matter, underlying all
bodies, is, properly speaking, without qualities and without form, and
derives its qualities from some (other) source, I know not whence,
since Celsus will have it that nothing corruptible can be the work of
God. Now the corruptible part of everything whatever, being produced
from the same underlying matter, must necessarily be the same, by
Celsus' own showing; unless, indeed, finding himself here hard
pressed, he should desert Plato, who makes the soul arise from a
certain bowl,(3) and take refuge with Aristotle and the Peripatetics,
who maintain that the ether is immaterial,(4) and consists of a fifth
nature, separate from the other four elements,(5) against which view
both the Platonists and the Stoics have nobly protested. And we too,
who are despised by Celsus, will contravene it, seeing we are required
to explain i and maintain the following statement of the prophet: The
heavens shall perish, but Thou remainest: and they all shall wax old as
a garment; and as a vesture shall Thou fold them up, and they shall be
changed: but Thou art the same."(6) These remarks, however, are
sufficient in reply to Celsus, when he asserts that "the soul is the
work of God, but that the nature of body is different;" for from his
argument it follows that there is no difference between the body of a
bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a heavenly(7) being.
See, then, whether we ought to yield to one who, holding such
opinions, calumniates the Christians, and thus abandon a doctrine which
explains the difference existing among bodies as due to the different
qualities, internal and external, which are implanted in them. For we,
too, know that there are "bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial;"
and that "the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the
terrestrial another;" and that even the glory of the celestial bodies
is not alike: for "one is the glory of the sun, and another the glory
of the stars;" and among the stars themselves, "one star differeth from
another star in glory."(8) And therefore, as those who expect the
resurrection of the dead, we assert that the qualities which are in
bodies undergo change: since some bodies, which are sown in corruption,
are raised in incorruption; and others, sown in dishonour, are raised
in glory; and others, again, sown in weakness, are raised in power; and
those which are sown natural bodies, are raised as spiritual.(9) That
the matter which underlies bodies is capable of receiving those
qualities which the Creator pleases to bestow, is a point which all of
us who accept the doctrine of providence firmly hold; so that, if God
so willed, one quality is at the present time implanted in this portion
of matter, and afterwards another of a different and better kind. But
since there are, from the beginning of the world, laws(10) established
for the purpose of regulating the changes of bodies, and which will
continue while the world lasts, I do not know whether, when a new and
different order of things has succeeded(1) after the destruction of the
world, and what our Scriptures call the end(2) (of the ages), it is not
wonderful that at the present time a snake should be formed out of a
dead man, growing, as the multitude affirm, out of the marrow of the
back,(3) and that a bee should spring from an ox, and a wasp from a
horse, and a beetle from an ass, and, generally, worms from the most of
bodies, Celsus, indeed, thinks that this can be shown to be the
consequence of none of these bodies being the work of God, and that
qualities (I know not whence it was so arranged that one should spring
out of another) are not the work of a divine intelligence, producing
the changes which occur in the qualities of matter.
But we have something more to say to Celsus, when he declares
that "the soul is the work of God, and that the nature of body is
different," and puts forward such an opinion not only without proof,
but even without clearly defining his meaning; for he did not make it
evident whether he meant that every soul is the work of God, or only
the rational soul. This, then, is what we have to say: If every soul is
the work of God, it is manifest that those of the meanest irrational
animals are God's work, so that the nature of all bodies is different
from that of the soul. He appears, however, in what follows, where he
says that "irrational animals are more beloved by God than we, and have
a purer knowledge of divinity," to maintain that not only is the soul
of man, but in a much greater degree that of irrational animals, the
work of God; for this follows from their being said to be more beloved
by God than we. Now if the rational soul alone be the work of God,
then, in the first place, he did not clearly indicate that such was his
opinion; and in the second place, this deduction follows from his
indefinite language regarding the soul—viz., whether not every one,
but only the rational, is the work of God—that neither is the nature
of all bodies different (from the soul). But if the nature of all
bodies be not different, although the body of each animal correspond to
its soul, it is evident that the body of that animal whose soul was the
work of God, would differ from the body of that animal in which dwells
a soul which was not the work of God. And so the assertion will be
false, that there is no difference between the body of a bat, or of a
worm, or of a frog, and that of a man.
For it would, indeed, be absurd that certain stones and buildings
should be regarded as more sacred or more profane than others,
according as they were constructed for the honour of God, or for the
reception of dishonourable and accursed persons;(4) while bodies should
not differ from bodies, according as they are inhabited by rational or
irrational beings, and according as these rational beings are the most
virtuous or most worthless of mankind. Such a principle of distinction,
indeed, has led some to deify the bodies of distinguished men,(5) as
having received a virtuous soul, and to reject and treat with dishonour
those of very wicked individuals. I do not maintain that such a
principle has been always soundly exercised, but that it had its origin
in a correct idea. Would a wise man, indeed, after the death of Anytus
and Socrates, think of burying the bodies of both with like honours?
And would he raise the same mound or tomb to the memory of both? These
instances we have adduced because of the language of Celsus, that "none
of these is the work of God" (where the words "of these" refer to the
body of a man or to the snakes which come out of the body and to that
of an ox, or of the bees which come from the body of an ox; and to that
of a horse or of an ass, and to the wasps which come from a horse, and
the beetles which proceed from an ass); for which reason we have been
obliged to return to the consideration of his statement, that "the soul
is the work of God, but that the nature of body is different."
He next proceeds to say, that "a common nature pervades all the
previously mentioned bodies, and one which goes and returns the same
amid recurring changes."(6) In answer to this it is evident from what
has been already said that not only does a common nature pervade those
bodies which have been previously enumerated, but the heavenly bodies
as well. And if this is the case, it is clear also that, according to
Celsus (although I do not know whether it is according to truth), it is
one nature which goes and returns the same through all bodies amid
recurring changes. It is evident also that this is the case in the
opinion of those who hold that the world is to perish; while those also
who hold the opposite view will endeavour to show, with out the
assumption of a fifth substance,(7) that in their judgment too it is
one nature "which goes and returns the same through all bodies amid
recurring changes." And thus, even that which is perishable remains in
order to undergo a change;(1) for the matter which underlies (all
things), while its properties perish, stir abides according to the
opinion of those who hold it to be uncreated. If, however, it can be
shown by any arguments not to be uncreated, but to have been created
for certain purposes, it is clear that it will not have the same nature
of permanency which it would possess on the hypothesis of being
uncreated. But it is not our object at present, in answering the
charges of Celsus, to discuss these questions of natural philosophy.
He maintains, moreover, that "no product of matter is immortal."
Now, in answer to this it may be said, that if no product of matter is
immortal, then either the whole world is immortal, and thus not a
product of matter, or it is not immortal. If, accordingly, the world is
immortal (which is agreeable to the view of those who say that the soul
alone is the work of God, and was produced from a certain bowl), let
Celsus show that the world was not produced from a matter devoid of
qualities, remembering his own assertion that "no product of matter is
immortal." If, however, the world is not immortal (seeing it is a
product of matter), but mortal, does it also perish, or does it not?
For if it perish, it will perish as being a work of God; and then, in
the event of the world perishing, what will become of the saul, which
is also a work of God? Let Celsus answer this! But if, perverting the
notion of immortality, he will assert that, although perishable, it is
immortal, because it does not really perish; that it is capable of
dying, but does not actually die,—it is evident that, according to
him, there will exist something which is at the same time mortal and
immortal, by being capable of both conditions; and that which does not
die will be mortal, and that which is not immortal by nature will be
termed in a peculiar sense immortal, because it does not die! According
to what distinction, then, in the meaning of words, will he maintain
that no product of matter is immortal? And thus you see that the ideas
contained in his writings, when closely examined and tested, are proved
not to be sound and incontrovertible.(2) And after making these
assertions he adds: "On this point these remarks are sufficient; and if
any one is capable of hearing and examining further, he will come to
know (the truth)." Let us, then, who in his opinion are unintelligent
individuals, see what will result from our being able to listen to him
for a little, and so continue our investigation.
After these matters, then, he thinks that he can make us
acquainted in a few words with the questions regarding the nature of
evil, which have been variously discussed in many important treatises,
and which have received very opposite explanations. His words are:
"There neither were formerly, nor are there now, nor will there be
again, more or fewer evils in the world (than have always been). For
the nature of all things is one and the same, and the generation of
evils is always the same." He seems to have paraphrased these words
from the discussions in the Theoetetus, where Plato makes Socrates say:
"It is neither possible for evils to disappear from among men, nor for
them to become established among the gods," and so on. But he appears
to me not to have understood Plato correctly, although professing to
include all truth(3) in this one treatise, and giving to his own book
against us the title of A True Discourse. For the language in the
Timoeus, where it is said, "When the gods purify the earth with water,"
shows that the earth, when purified with water, contains less evil than
it did before its purification. And this assertion, that there at one
time were fewer evils in the world, is one which we make, in harmony
with the opinion of Plato, because of the language in the Theoetetus,
where he says that "evils cannot disappear from among men."(4)
I do not understand how Celsus, while admitting the existence of
Providence, at least so far as appears from the language of this book,
can say that there never existed (at any time) either more or fewer
evils, but, as it were, a fixed number; thus annihilating the beautiful
doctrine regarding the indefinite s nature of evil, and asserting that
evil, even in its own nature,(6) is infinite. Now it appears to follow
from the position, that there never have been, nor are now, nor ever
will be, more or fewer evils in the world; that as, according to the
view of those who hold the indestructibility of the world, the
equipoise of the elements is maintained by a Providence (which does not
permit one to gain the preponderance over the others, in order to
prevent the destruction of the world), so a kind of Providence
presides, as it were, over evils (the number of which is fixed),(7) to
prevent their being either increased or diminished! In other ways, too,
are the arguments of Celsus concerning evil confuted, by those
philosophers who have investigated the subjects of good and evil, and
who have proved also from history that in former times it was without
the city, and with their faces concealed by masks, that loose women
hired themselves to those who wanted them; that subsequently, becoming
more impudent, they laid aside their masks, though not being permitted
by the laws to enter the cities, they (still) remained without them,
until, as the dissoluteness of manners daily increased, they dared even
to enter the cities. Such accounts are given by Chrysippus in the
introduction to his work on Good and Evil. From this also it may be
seen that evils both increase and decrease, viz., that those
individuals who were called "Ambiguous"(1) used formerly to present
themselves openly to view, suffering and committing all shameful
things, while subserving the passions of those who frequented their
society; but recently they have been expelled by the authorities.(2)
And of countless evils which, owing to the spread of wickedness, have
made their appearance in human life, we may say that formerly they did
not exist. For the most ancient histories, which bring innumerable
other accusations against sinful men, know nothing of the perpetrators
of abominable(3) crimes.
And now, after these arguments, and others of a similar kind, how
can Celsus escape appearing in a ridiculous light, when he imagines
that there never has been in the past, nor will be in the future, a
greater or less number of evils? For although the nature of all things
is one and the same, it does not at all follow that the production of
evils is a constant quantity.(4) For although the nature of a certain
individual is one and the same, yet his mind, and his reason, and his
actions, are not always alike:(5) there being a time when he had not
yet attained to reason; and another, when, with the possession of
reason, he had become stained with wickedness, and when this increased
to a greater or less degree; and again, a time when he devoted himself
to virtue, and made greater or less progress therein, attaining
sometimes the very summit of perfection, through longer or shorter
periods of contemplation.(6) In like manner, we may make the same
assertion in a higher degree of the nature of the universe,(7) that
although it is one and the same in kind, yet neither do exactly the
same things, nor yet things that are similar, occur in it; for we
neither have invariably productive nor unproductive seasons, nor yet
periods of continuous rain or of drought. And so in the same way, with
regard to virtuous souls, there are neither appointed periods of
fertility nor of barrenness; and the same is the case with the greater
or less spread of evil. And those who desire to investigate all things
to the best of their ability, must keep in view this estimate of evils,
that their amount is not always the same, owing to the working of a
Providence which either preserves earthly things, or purges them by
means of floods and conflagrations; and effects this, perhaps, not
merely with reference to things on earth, but also to the whole
universe of things s I which stands in need of purification, when the
wickedness that is in it has become great.
After this Celsus continues: "It is not easy, indeed, for one who
is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, though it is
sufficient for the multitude to say that they do not proceed from God,
but cleave to matter, and have their abode among mortal things; while
the course(9) of mortal things being the same from beginning to end,
the same things must always, agreeably to the appointed cycles,(10)
recur in the past, present, and future." Celsus here observes that it
is not easy for one who is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of
evils, as if it were an easy matter for a philosopher to gain this
knowledge, while for one who is not a philosopher it was difficult,
though still possible, for such an one, although with great labour, to
attain it. Now, to this we say, that the origin of evils is a subject
which is not easy even for a philosopher to master, and that perhaps it
is impossible even for such to attain a clear understanding of it,
unless it be revealed to them by divine inspiration, both what evils
are, and how they originated, and how they shall be made to disappear.
But although ignorance of God is an evil, and one of the greatest of
these is not to know how God is to be served and worshipped, yet, as
even Celsus would admit, there are undoubtedly some philosophers who
have been ignorant of this, as is evident from the views of the
different philosophical sects; whereas, according to our judgment, no
one is capable of ascertaining the origin of evils who does not know
that it is wicked to suppose that piety is preserved uninjured amid the
laws that are established in different states, in conformity with the
generally prevailing ideas of government.(11) No one, moreover, who has
not heard what is related of him who is called "devil," and of his
"angels," and what he was before he became a devil, and how he became
such, and what was the cause of the simultaneous apostasy of those who
are termed his angels, will be able to ascertain the origin of evils.
But he who would attain to this knowledge must learn more accurately
the nature of demons, and know that they are not the work of God so far
as respects their demoniacal nature, but only in so far as they are
possessed of reason; and also what their origin was, so that they
became beings of such a nature, that while converted into demons, the
powers of their mind(1) remain. And if there be any topic of human
investigation which is difficult for our nature to grasp, certainly the
origin of evils may be considered to be such.
Celsus in the next place, as if he were able to tell certain
secrets regarding the origin of evils, but chose rather to keep
silence, and say only what was suitable to the multitude, continues as
follows: "It is sufficient to say to the multitude regarding the origin
of evils, that they do not proceed from God, but cleave to matter, and
dwell among mortal things." It is true, certainly, that evils do not
proceed from God; for according to Jeremiah, one of our prophets, it is
certain that "out of the mouth of the Most High proceedeth not evil and
good."(2) But to maintain that matter, dwelling among mortal things, is
the cause of evils, is in our opinion not true. For it is the mind of
each individual which is the cause of the evil which arises in him,
and this is evil (in the abstract);(3) while the actions which proceed
from it are wicked, and there is, to speak with accuracy, nothing else
in our view that is evil. I am aware, however, that this topic requires
very elaborate treatment, which (by the grace of Cod enlightening the
mind) may be successfully attempted by him who is deemed by God worthy
to attain the necessary knowledge on this subject.
I do not understand how Celsus should deem it of advantage, in
writing a treatise against us, to adopt an opinion which requires at
least much plausible reasoning to make it appear, as far as he can do
so, that "the course of mortal things is the same from beginning to
end, and that the same things must always, according to the appointed
cycles, recur in the past, present, and future." Now, if this be true,
our free-will is annihilated.(4) For if, in the revolution of mortal
things, the same events must perpetually occur in the past, present,
and future, according to the appointed cycles, it is clear that, of
necessity, Socrates will always be. a philosopher, and be condemned for
introducing strange gods and for corrupting the youth. And Anytus and
Melitus must always be his accusers, and the council of the Areopagus
must ever condemn him to death by hemlock. And in the same way,
according to the appointed cycles, Phalaris must always play the
tyrant, and Alexander of Pherae commit the same acts of cruelty, and
those condemned to the bull of Phalaris continually pour forth their
wailings from it. But if these things be granted, I do not see how our
free-will can be preserved, or how praise or blame can be administered
with propriety. We may say further to Celsus, in answer to such a view,
that "if the course of moral things be always the same from beginning
to end, and if, according to the appointed cycles, the same events must
always occur in the past, present, and future," then, according to the
appointed cycles, Moses must again come forth from Egypt with the
Jewish people, and Jesus again come to dwell in human life, and perform
the same actions which (according to this view) he has done not once,
but countless times, as the periods have revolved. Nay, Christians too
will be the same in the appointed cycles; and Celsus will again write
this treatise of his, which he has done innumerable times before.
Celsus, however, says that it is only "the course of mortal
things which, according to the appointed cycles, must always be the
same in the past, present, and future;" whereas the majority of the
Stoics maintain that this is the case not only with the course of
mortal, but also with that of immortal things, and of those whom they
regard as gods. For after the conflagration of the world,(5) which has
taken place countless times in the past, and will happen countless
times in the future, there has been, and will be, the same arrangement
of all things from the beginning to the end. The Stoics, indeed, in
endeavouring to parry, I don't know how, the objections raised to their
views, allege that as cycle after cycle returns, all men will be
altogether unchanged(6) from those who lived in former cycles; so that
Socrates will not live again, but one altogether like to Socrates, who
will marry a wife exactly like Xanthippe, and will be accused by men
exactly like Anytus and Melitus. I do not understand, however, how the
world is to be always the same, and one individual not different from
another, and yet the things in it not the same, though exactly alike.
But the main argument in answer to the statements of Celsus and of the
Stoics will be more appropriately investigated elsewhere, since on the
present occasion it is not consistent with the purpose we have in view
to expatiate on these points.
He continues to say that "neither have visible things(1) been
given to man (by God), but each individual thing comes into existence
and perishes for the sake of the safety of the whole passing agreeably
to the change, which I have already mentioned, from one thing to
another." It is unnecessary, however, to linger over the refutation of
these statements, which have been already refuted to the best of my
ability. And the following, too, has been answered, viz., that "there
will neither be more nor less good and evil among mortals." This point
also has been referred to, viz., that "God does not need to amend His
work afresh."(2) But it is not as a man who has imperfectly designed
some piece of workmanship, and executed it unskilfully, that God
administers correction to the world, in purifying it by a flood or by a
conflagration, but in order to prevent the tide of evil from rising to
a greater height; and, moreover, I am of opinion that it is at periods
which are precisely determined beforehand that He sweeps wickedness
away, so as to contribute to the good of the whole world.(3) If,
however, he should assert that, after the disappearance of evil, it
again comes into existence, such questions will have to be examined in
a special treatise.(4) It is, then, always in order to repair what has
become faulty s that God desires to amend His work afresh. For
although, in the creation of the world, all things had been arranged by
Him in the most beautiful and stable manner, He nevertheless needed to
exercise some healing power upon those who were labouring under the
disease of wickedness, and upon a whole world, which was polluted as it
were thereby. But nothing has been neglected by God, or will be
neglected by Him; for He does at each particular juncture what it
becomes Him to do in a perverted and changed world. And as a husbandman
performs different acts of husbandry upon the soil and its productions,
according to the varying seasons of the year, so God administers entire
ages of time, as if they were, so to speak, so many individual years,
performing during each one of them what is requisite with a reasonable
regard to the care of the world; and this, as it is truly understood by
God alone, so also is it accomplished by Him.
Celsus has made a statement regarding evils of the following
nature, viz., that "although a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is
by no means certain that it is so; for you do not know what is of
advantage to yourself, or to another, or to the whole world." Now this
assertion is made with a certain degree of caution;(6) and it hints
that the nature of evil is not wholly wicked, because that which may be
considered so in individual cases, may contain something which is of
advantage to the whole community. However, lest any one should mistake
my words, and find a pretence of wrongdoing, as if his wickedness were
profitable to the world, or at least might be so, we have to say, that
although God, who preserves the free-will of each individual, may make
use of the evil of the wicked for the administration of the world, so
disposing them as to conduce to the benefit of the whole; yet,
notwithstanding, such an individual is deserving of censure, and as
such has been appointed for a use, which is a subject of loathing to
each separate individual, although of advantage to the whole
community.(7) It is as if one were to say that in the case of a city, a
man who had committed certain crimes, and on account of these had been
condemned to serve in public works that were useful to the community,
did something that was of advantage to the entire city, while he
himself was engaged in an abominable task,(8) in which no one possessed
of moderate understanding would wish to be engaged. Paul also, the
apostle of Jesus, teaches us that even the very wicked will contribute
to the good of the whole, while in themselves they will be amongst the
vile, but that the most virtuous men, too, will be of the greatest
advantage to the world, and will therefore on that account occupy the
noblest position. His words are: "But in a great house there are not
only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and
some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge
himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the
Master's use, prepared unto every good work."(9) These remarks I have
thought it necessary to make in reply to the assertion, that "although
a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain that it
is so, for you do not know what is of advantage either to yourself or
to another," in order that no one may take occasion from what has been
said on the subject to commit sin, on the pretext that he will thus be
useful to the world.
But as, in what follows, Celsus, not understanding that the
language of Scripture regarding God is adapted to an anthropopathic
point of view,(1) ridicules those passages which speak of words of
anger addressed to the ungodly, and of threatenings directed against
sinners, we have to say that, as we ourselves, when talking with very
young children, do not aim at exerting our own power of eloquence,(2)
but, adapting ourselves to the weakness of our charge, both say and do
those thingS which may appear to us useful for the correction and
improvement of the children as children, so the word of God appears to
have dealt with the history, making the capacity of the hearers, and
the benefit which they were to receive, the standard of the
appropriateness of its announcements (regarding Him). And, generally,
with regard to such a style of speaking about God, we find in the book
of Deuteronomy the following: "The LORD thy God bare with your manners,
as a man would bear with the manners of his son."(3) It is, as it were,
assuming the manners of a man in order to secure the advantage of men
that the Scripture makes use of such expressions; for it would not have
been suitable to the condition of the multitude, that what God had to
say to them should be spoken by Him in a manner more befitting the
majesty of His own person. And yet he who is anxious to attain a true
understanding of holy Scripture, will discover the spiritual truths
which are spoken by it to those who are called "spiritual," by
comparing the meaning of what is addressed to those of weaker mind with
what is announced to such as are of acuter understanding, both meanings
being frequently found in the same passage by him who is capable of
comprehending it.
We speak, indeed, of the "wrath" of God. We do not, however,
assert that it indicates any "passion" on His part, but that it is
something which is asumed in order to discipline by stern means those
sinners who have committed many and grievous sins. For that which is
called God's "wrath," and "anger," is a means of discipline; and that
such a view is agreeable to Scripture, is evident from what is said in
the sixth Psalm, "O LORD, rebuke me not in Thine anger, neither chasten
me in Thy hot displeasure;"(4) and also in jeremiah. "O LORD, correct
me, but with judgment: not in Thine anger, lest Thou bring me to
nothing."(5) Any one, moreover, who reads in the second book of Kings
of the "wrath" of God, inducing David to number the people, and finds
from the first book of Chronicles that it was the devil who suggested
this measure, will, on comparing together the two statements, easily
see for what purpose the "wrath" is mentioned, of which "wrath," as the
Apostle Paul declares, all men are children: "We were by nature
children of wrath, even as others."(6) Moreover, that "wrath" is no
passion on the part of God, but that each one bringS it upon himself by
his sins, will be clear from the further statement of Paul: "Or
despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and
long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to
repentance? But after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up
unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the
righteous judgment of God." How, then, can any one treasure up for
himself "wrath" against a "day of wrath," if "wrath" be understood in
the sense of "passion?" or how can the "passion of wrath" be a help to
discipline? Besides, the Scripture, which tells us not to be angry at
all, and which says in the thirty-seventh Psalm, "Cease from anger, and
forsake wrath,"(7) and which commands us by the mouth of Paul to "put
off all these, anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy
communication,"(8) would not involve God in the same passion from which
it would have us to be altogether free. It is manifest, further, that
the language used regarding the wrath of God is to be understood
figuratively from what is related of His "sleep," from which, as if
awaking Him, the prophet says: "Awake, why sleepest Thou, Lord?"(9) and
again: "Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleep, and like a mighty man
that shouteth by reason of wine."(10) If, then, "sleep" must mean
something else, and not what the first acceptation of the word conveys,
why should not "wrath" also be understood in a similar way? The
"threatenings," again, are intimations of the (punishments) which are
to befall the wicked: for it is as if one were to call the words of a
physician "threats," when he tells his patients, "I will have to use
the knife, and apply cauteries, if you do not obey my prescriptions,
and regulate your diet and mode of life in such a way as I direct you."
It is no human passions, then, which we ascribe to God, nor impious
opinions which we entertain of Him; nor do we err when we present the
various narratives concerning Him, drawn from the Scriptures them-
selves, after careful comparison one with another. For those who are
wise ambassadors of the "word" have no other object in view than to
free as far as they can their hearers from weak opinions, and to endue
them with intelligence.
And as a sequel to his non-understanding of the statements
regarding the "wrath" of God, he continues: "Is it not ridiculous to
suppose that, whereas a man, who became angry with the Jews, slew them
all from the youth upwards, and burned their city (so powerless were
they to resist him), the mighty God, as they say, being angry, and
indignant, and uttering threats, should, (instead of punishing them,)
send His own Son, who endured the sufferings which He did?" If the
Jews, then, after the treatment which they dared to inflict upon Jesus,
perished with all their youth, and had their city consumed by fire,
they suffered this punishment in consequence of no other wrath than
that which they treasured up for themselves; for the judgment of God
against them, which was determined by the divine appointment, is termed
"wrath" agreeably to a traditional usage of the Hebrews. And what the
Son of the mighty God suffered, He suffered voluntarily for the
salvation of men, as has been stated to the best of my ability in the
preceding pages. He then continues: "But that I may speak not of the
Jews alone (for that is not my object), but of the whole of nature, as
I promised, I will bring out more clearly what has been already
stated." Now what modest man, on reading these words, and knowing the
weakness of humanity, would not be indignant at the offensive nature of
the promise to give an account of the "whole of nature," and at an
arrogance like that which prompted him to inscribe upon his book the
title which he ventured to give it (of a True Discourse)? But let us
see what he has to say regarding the "whole of nature," and what he is
to place "in a clearer light."
He next, in many words, blames us for asserting that God made all
things for the sake of man. Because from the history of animals, and
from the sagacity manifested by them, he would show that all things
came into existence not more for the sake of man than of the irrational
animals. And here he seems to me to speak in a similar manner to those
who, through dislike of their enemies, accuse them of the same things
for which their own friends are commended. For as, in the instance
referred to, hatred blinds these persons from seeing that they are
accusing their very dearest friends by the means through which they
think they are slandering their enemies; so in the same way, Celsus
also, becoming confused in his argument, does not see that he is
bringing a charge against the philosophers of the Porch, who, not
amiss, place man in the foremost rank, and rational nature in general
before irrational animals, and who maintain that Providence created all
things mainly on account of rational nature. Rational beings, then, as
being the principal ones, occupy the place, as it were, of children in
the womb, while irrational and soulless beings hold that of the
envelope which is created along with the child.(1) I think, too, that
as in cities the superintendents of the goods and market discharge
their duties for the sake of no other than human beings, while dogs and
other irrational animals have the benefit of the superabundance; so
Providence provides in a special manner for rational creatures; while
this l also follows, that irrational creatures likewise enjoy the
benefit of what is done for the sake of man. And as he is in error who
alleges that the superintendents of the markets(2) make provision in no
greater degree for men than for dogs, because dogs also get their share
of the goods; so in a far greater degree are Celsus and they who think
with him guilty of impiety towards the God who makes provision for
rational beings, in asserting that His arrangements are made in no
greater degree for the sustenance of human beings than for that of
plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns.
For, in the first place, he is of opinion that "thunders, and
lightnings, and rains are not the works of God,"—thus showing more
clearly at last his Epicurean leanings; and in the second place, that
"even if one were to grant that these were the works of God, they are
brought into existence not more for the support of us who are human
beings, than for that of plants, and trees, and herbs, and
thorns,"—maintaining, like a true Epicurean, that these things are the
product of chance, and not the work of Providence. For if these things
are of no more use to us than to plants, and trees, and herbs, and
thorns, it is evident either that they do not proceed from Providence
at all, or from a providence which does not provide for us in a greater
degree than for trees, and herbs, and thorns. Now, either of these
suppositions is impious in itself, and it would be foolish to refute
such statements by answering any one who brought against us the charge
of impiety; for it is manifest to every one, from what has been said,
who is the person guilty of impiety. In the next place, he adds:
"Although you may say that these things, viz., plants, and trees, and
herbs, and thorns, grow for the use of men, why will you maintain that
they grow for the use of men rather than for that of the most savage of
irrational animals?" Let Celsus then say distinctly that the great
diversity among the products of the earth is not the work of
Providence, but that a certain fortuitous concurrence of atoms(1) gave
birth to qualities so diverse, and that it was owing to chance that so
many kinds of plants, and trees, and herbs resemble one another, and
that no disposing reason gave existence to them,(2) and that they do
not derive their origin from an understanding that is beyond all
admiration. We Christians, however, who are devoted to the worship of
the only God, who created these things, feel grateful for them to Him
who made them, because not only for us, but also (on our account) for
the animals which are subject to us, He has prepared such a home,(3)
seeing "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the
service of man, that He may bring forth food out of the earth, and wine
that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine,
and bread which strengtheneth man's heart."(4) But that He should have
provided food even for the most savage animals is not matter of
surprise, for these very animals are said by some who have
philosophized (upon the subject) to have been created for the purpose
of affording exercise to the rational creature. And one of our own wise
men says somewhere: "Do not say, What is this? or Wherefore is that?
for all things have been made for their uses. And do not say, What is
this? or Wherefore is that? for everything shall be sought out in its
season."(5)
After this, Celsus, desirous of maintaining that Providence
created the products of the earth, not more on our account than on that
of the most savage animals, thus proceeds: "We indeed by labour and
suffering earn a scanty and toilsome subsistence,(6) while all things
are produced for them without their sowing and ploughing." He does not
observe that God, wishing to exercise the human understanding in all
countries (that it might not remain idle and unacquainted with the
arts), created man a being full of wants,(7) in order that by virtue of
his very needy condition he might be compelled to be the inventor of
arts, some of which minister to his subsistence, and others to his
protection. For it was better that those who would not have sought out
divine things, nor engaged in the study of philosophy, should be placed
in a condition of want, in order that they might employ their
understanding in the invention of the arts, than that they should
altogether neglect the cul-tivation of their minds, because their
condition was one of abundance. The want of the necessaries of human
life led to the invention on the one hand of the art of husbandry, on
the other to that of the cultivation of the vine; again, to the art of
gardening, and the arts of carpentry and smithwork, by means of which
were formed the tools required for the arts which minister to the
support of life. The want of covering, again, introduced the art of
weaving, which followed that of wool-carding and spinning; and again,
that of house-building: and thus the intelligence of men ascended even
to the art of architecture. The want of necessaries caused the products
also of other places to be conveyed, by means of the arts of sailing
and pilotage,(8) to those who were without them; so that even on that
account one might admire the Providence which made the rational being
subject to want in a far higher degree than the irrational animals, and
yet all with a view to his advantage. For the irrational animals have
their food provided for them, because there is not in them even an
impulse(9) towards the invention of the arts. They have, besides, a
natural covering; for they are provided either with hair, or wings, or
scales, or shells. Let the above, then, be our answer to the assertions
of Celsus, when he says that "we indeed by labour and suffering earn a
scanty and toilsome subsistence, while all things are produced for them
without their sowing and ploughing."
In the next place, forgetting that his object is to accuse both
Jews and Christians, he quotes against himself an iambic verse of
Euripides, which is opposed to his view, and, joining issue with the
words, charges them with being an erroneous statement. His words are as
follow: "But if you will quote the saying of Euripides, that
'The Sun and Night are to mortals slaves,'(10)
why should they be so in a greater degree to us than to ants and flies? For the night is created for them in order that they may rest, and the day that they may see and resume their work." Now it is undoubted, that not only have certain of the Jews and Christians declared that the sun and the heavenly bodies(11) are our servants; but he also has said this, who, according to some, is the philosopher of the stage,(1) and who was a hearer of the lectures on the philosophy of nature delivered by Anaxagoras. But this man asserts that all things in the world are subject to all rational beings,—one rational nature being taken to represent all, On the principle of a part standing for the whole;(2) which, again, clearly appears from the verse:—
"The Sun and Night are to mortals slaves."
Perhaps the tragic poet meant the day when he said the sun, inasmuch as it is the cause of the day,—teaching that those things which most need the day and night are the things which are under the moon, and other things in a less degree than those which are upon the earth. Day and night, then, are subject to mortals, being created for the sake of rational beings. And if ants and flies, which labour by day and rest by night, have, besides, the benefit of those things which were created for the sake of men, we must not say that day and night were brought into being for the sake of ants and flies, nor must we suppose that they were created for the sake of nothing, but, agreeably to the design of Providence, were formed for the sake of man.
He next proceeds further to object against himself(3) what is
said on behalf of man, viz., that the irrational animals were created
on his account, saying: "If one were to call us the lords of the animal
creation because we hunt the other animals and live upon their flesh,
we would say, Why were not we rather created on their account, since
they hunt and devour us? Nay, we require nets and weapons, and the
assistance of many persons, along with dogs, when engaged in the chase;
while they are immediately and spontaneously provided by nature with
weapons which easily bring us under their power." And here we may
observe, that the gift of understanding has been bestowed upon us as a
mighty aid, far superior to any weapon which wild beasts may seem to
possess. We, indeed, who are far weaker in bodily strength than the
beasts, and shorter in stature than some of them, yet by means of our
understanding obtain the mastery, and capture the huge elephants. We
subdue by our gentle treatment those animals whose nature it is to be
tamed, while with those whose nature is different, or which do not
appear likely to be of use to us when tamed, we take such precautionary
measures, that when we desire it, we keep such wild beasts shut up; and
when we need the flesh of their bodies for food, we slaughter them, as
we do those beasts which are not of a savage nature. The Creator, then,
has constituted all things the servants of the rational being and of
his natural understanding. For some purposes we require dogs, say as
guardians of our sheep-folds, or of our cattle-yards, or goat-pastures,
or of our dwellings; and for other purposes we need oxen, as for
agriculture; and for others, again, we make use of those which bear the
yoke, or beasts of burden. And so it may be said that the race of
lions, and bears, and leopards, and wild boars, and such like, has been
given to us in order to call into exercise the elements of the manly
character that exists within us.
In the next place, in answer to the human race, who perceive
their own superiority, which far exceeds that of the irrational
animals, he says: "With respect to your assertion, that God gave you
the power to capture wild beasts, and to make your own use of them, we
would say that, in all probability, before cities were built, and arts
invented, and societies such as now exist were formed, and weapons and
nets employed, men were generally caught and devoured by wild beasts,
while wild beasts were very seldom captured by men." Now, in reference
to this, observe that although men catch wild beasts, and wild beasts
make prey of men, there is a great difference between the case of such
as by means of their understanding obtain the mastery over those whose
superiority consists in their savage and cruel nature, and that of
those who do not make use of their understanding to secure their safety
from injury by wild beasts. But when Celsus gays, "before cities were
built, and arts invented, and societies such as now exist were formed,"
he appears to have forgotten what he had before said, that "the world
was uncreated and incorruptible, and that it was only the things on
earth which underwent deluges and conflagrations, and that all these
things did not happen at the same time." Now let if be granted that
these admissions on his part are entirely in harmony with our views,
though not at all with him and his statements made above; yet what does
it all avail to prove that in the beginning men were mostly captured
and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were never caught by
men? For, since the world was created in conformity with the will of
Providence, and God presided over the universe of things, it was
necessary that the elements(4) of the human race should at the
commencement of its existence be placed under some protection of the
higher powers, so that there might be formed from the beginning a union
of the divine nature with that of men. And the poet of Ascra,
perceiving this, sings:—
"For common then were banquets, and common were seats,
Alike to immortal gods and mortal men."(1)
Those holy Scriptures, moreover, which bear the name of Moses,
introduce the first men as hearing divine voices and oracles, and
beholding sometimes the angels of God coming to visit them.(2) For it
was probable that in the beginning of the world's existence human
nature would be assisted to a greater degree (than afterwards), until
progress had been made towards the attainment of understanding and the
other virtues, and the invention of the arts, and they should thus be
able to maintain life of themselves, and no longer stand in need of
superintendents, and of those to guide them who do so with a miraculous
manifestation of the means which subserve the will of God. Now it
follows from this, that it is false that "in the beginning men were
captured and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were very
seldom caught by men." And from this, too, it is evident that the
following statement of Celsus is untrue, that "in this way God rather
subjected men to wild beasts." For God did not subject men to wild
beasts, but gave wild beasts to be a prey to the understanding of man,
and to the arts, which are directed against them, and which are the
product of the understanding. For it was not without the help of God(3)
that men desired for themselves the means of protection against wild
beasts, and of securing the mastery over them.
Our noble opponent, however, not observing how many philosophers
there are who admit the existence of Providence, and who hold that
Providence created all things for the sake of rational beings,
overturns as far as he can those doctrines which are of use in showing
the harmony that prevails in these matters between Christianity and
philosophy; nor does he see how great is the injury done to religion
from accepting the statement that before God there is no difference
between a man and an ant or a bee, but proceeds to add, that "if men
appear to be superior to irrational animals on this account, that they
have built cities, and make use of a political constitution, and forms
of government, and sovereignties,(4) this is to say nothing to the
purpose, for ants and bees do the same. Bees, indeed, have a sovereign,
who has followers and attendants; and there occur among them wars and
victories, and slaughterings of the vanquished,(5) and cities and
suburbs, and a succession of labours, and judgments passed upon the
idle and the wicked; for the drones are driven away and punished." Now
here he did not observe the difference that exists between what is done
after reason and consideration, and what is the result of an irrational
nature, and is purely mechanical. For the origin of these things is not
explained by the existence of any rational principle in those who make
them, because they do not possess any such principle; but the most
ancient Being, who is also the Son of God, and the King of all things
that exist, has created an irrational nature, which, as being
irrational, acts as a help to those who are deemed worthy of reason.
Cities, accordingly, were established among men, with many arts and
well-arranged laws; while constitutions, and governments, and
sovereignties among men are either such as are properly so termed, and
which exemplify certain virtuous tendencies and workings, or they are
those which are improperly so called, and which were devised, so far as
could be done, in imitation of the former: for it was by contemplating
these that the most successful legislators established the best
constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties. None of these
things, however, can be found among irrational animals, although Celsus
may transfer rational names, and arrangements which belong to rational
beings, as cities and constitutions, and rulers and sovereignties, even
to ants and bees; in respect to which matters, however, ants and bees
merit no approval, because they do not act from reflection. But we
ought to admire the divine nature, which extended even to irrational
animals the capacity, as it were, of imitating rational beings, perhaps
with a view of putting rational beings to shame; so that by looking
upon ants, for instance, they might become more industrious and more
thrifty in the management of their goods; while, by considering the
bees, they might place themselves in subjection to their Ruler, and
take their respective parts in those constitutional duties which are of
use in ensuring the safety of cities.
Perhaps also the so-called wars among the bees convey instruction
as to the manner in which wars, if ever there arise a necessity for
them, should be waged in a just and orderly way among men. But the bees
have no cities or suburbs; while their hives and hexagonal cells, and
succession of labours, are for the sake of men, who require honey for
many purposes, both for cure of disordered bodies, and as a pure
article of food. Nor ought we to compare the proceedings taken by the
bees against the drones with the judgments and punishments inflicted on
the idle and wicked in cities. But, as I formerly said, we ought on the
one hand in these things to admire the divine nature, and on the other
to express our admiration of man, who is capable of considering and
admiring all things (as co-operating with Providence), and who executes
not merely the works which are determined by the providence of God, but
also those which are the consequences of his own foresight.
After Celsus has finished speaking of the bees, in order to
depreciate (as far as he can) the cities, and constitutions, and
governments, and sovereignties not only of us Christians, but of all
mankind, as well as the wars which men undertake on behalf of their
native countries, he proceeds, by way of digression, to pass a eulogy
upon the ants, in order that, while praising them, he may compare the
measures which men take to secure their subsistence with those adopted
by these insects,(1) and so evince his contempt for the forethought
which makes provision for winter, as being nothing higher than the
irrational providence of the ants, as he regards it. it. Now might not
some of the more simple-minded, and such as know not how to look into
the nature of all things, be turned away (so far, at least, as Celsus
could accomplish it) from helping those who are weighed down with the
burdens (of life), and from sharing their toils, when he says of the
ants, that "they help one another with their loads, when they see one
of their number toiling under them?" For he who needs to be disciplined
by the word, but who does not at all understand(2) its voice, will say:
"Since, then, there is no difference between us and the ants, even when
we help those who are weary with bearing their heavy burdens, why
should we continue to do so to no purpose?" And would not the ants, as
being irrational creature, be greatly puffed up, and think highly of
themselves, because their works were compared to those of men? while
men, on the other hand, who by means of their reason are enabled to
hear how their philanthropy(3) towards others is contemned, would be
injured, so far as could be effected by Celsus and his arguments: for
he does not perceive that, while he wishes to turn away from
Christianity those who read his treatise, he turns away also the
sympathy of those who are not Christians from those who bear the
heaviest burdens (of life). Whereas, had he been a philosopher, who was
capable of perceiving the good which men may do each other, he ought,
in addition to not removing along with Christianity the blessings which
are found amongst men, to have lent his aid to co-operate (if he had it
in his power) with those principles of excellence which are common to
Christianity and the rest of mankind. Moreover, even if the ants set
apart in a place by themselves those grains which sprout forth, that
they may not swell into bud, but may continue throughout the year as
their food, this is not to be deemed as evidence of the existence of
reason among ants, but as the work of the universal mother, Nature,
which adorned even irrational animals, so that even the most
insignificant is not omitted, but bears traces of the reason implanted
in it by nature. Unless, indeed, by these assertions Celsus means
obscurely to intimate (for in many instances he would like to adopt
Platonic ideas) that all souls are of the same species, and that there
is no difference between that of a man and those of ants and bees,
which is the act of one who would bring down the soul from the vault of
heaven, and cause it to enter not only a human body, but that of an
animal. Christians, however, will not yield their assent to such
opinions: for they have been instructed before now that the human soul
was created in the image of God; and they see that it is impossible for
a nature fashioned in the divine image to have its (original) features
altogether obliterated, and to assume others, formed after I know not
what likeness of irrational animals.
And since he asserts that, "when ants die, the survivors set
apart a special place (for their interment), and that their ancestral
sepulchres such a place is," we have to answer, that the greater the
laudations which he heaps upon irrational animals, so much the more
does he magnify (although against his will) the work of that reason
which arranged all things in order, and points out the skill(4) which
exists among men, and which is capable of adorning by its reason even
the gifts which are bestowed by nature on the irrational creation. But
why do I say "irrational," since Celsus is of opinion that these
animals, which, agreeably to the common ideas of all men, are termed
irrational, are not really so? Nor does he regard the ants as devoid of
reason, who professed to speak of "universal nature," and who boasted
of his truthfulness in the inscription of his book. For, speaking of
the ants conversing with one another, he uses the following language:
"And when they meet one another they enter into conversation, for which
reason they never mistake their way; consequently they possess a full
endowment of reason, and some common ideas on certain general subjects,
and a voice by which they express themselves regarding accidental
things."(1) Now conversation between one man and another is carried on
by means of a voice, which gives expression to the meaning intended,
and which also gives utterances concerning what are called "accidental
things;" but to say that this was the case with ants would be a most
ridiculous assertion.
He is not ashamed, moreover, to say, in addition to these
statements (that the unseemly character(2) of his opinions may be
manifest to those who will live after him): "Come now, if one were to
look down from heaven upon earth, in what respect would our actions
appear to differ from those of ants and bees?" Now does he who,
according to his own supposition, looks from heaven upon the
proceedings of men and ants, look upon their bodies alone, and not
rather have regard to the controlling reason which is called into
action by reflection;(3) while, on the other hand, the guiding
principle of the latter is irrational, and set in motion irrationally
by impulse and fancy, in conjunction with a certain natural
apparatus?(4) But it is absurd to suppose that he who looks from heaven
upon earthly things would desire to look from such a distance upon the
bodies of men and ants, and would not rather consider the nature of the
guiding principles, and the source of impulses, whether that be
rational or irrational. And if he once look upon the source of all
impulses, it is manifest that he would behold also the difference which
exists, and the superiority of man, not only over ants, but even over
elephants. For he who looks from heaven will see among irrational
creatures, however large their bodies, no other principle(5) than, so
to speak, irrationality;(6) while amongst rational beings he will
discover reason, the common possession of men, and of divine and
heavenly beings, and perhaps of the Supreme God Himself, on account of
which man is said to have been created in the image of God, for the
image of the Supreme God is his reason.(7)
Immediately after this, as if doing his utmost to reduce the
human race to a still lower position, and to bring them to the level of
the irrational animals, and desiring to omit not a single circumstance
related of the latter which manifests their greatness, he declares that
"in certain individuals among the irrational creation there exists the
power of sorcery;" so that even in this particular men cannot specially
pride themselves, nor wish to arrogate a superiority over irrational
creatures. And the following are his words: "If, however, men entertain
lofty notions because of their possessing the power of sorcery, yet
even in that respect are serpents and eagles their superiors in wisdom;
for they are acquainted with many prophylactics against persons and
diseases, and also with the virtues of certain stones which help to
preserve their young. If men, however, fall in with these, they think
that they have gained a wonderful possession." Now, in the first place,
I know not why he should designate as sorcery the knowledge of natural
prophylactics displayed by animals,—whether that knowledge be the
result of experience, or of some natural power of apprehension;(8) for
the term "sorcery" has by usage been assigned to something else.
Perhaps, indeed, he wishes quietly, as an Epicurean, to censure the
entire use of such arts, as resting only on the professions of
sorcerers. However, let it be granted him that men do pride themselves
greatly upon the knowledge of such arts, whether they are sorcerers or
not: how can serpents be in this respect wiser than men, when they make
use of the well-known fennel(9) to sharpen their power of vision and to
produce rapidity of movement, having obtained this natural power not
from the exercise of reflection, but from the constitution of their
body,(10) while men do not, like serpents, arrive at such knowledge
merely by nature, but partly by experiment, partly by reason, and
sometimes by reflection and knowledge? So, if eagles, too, in order to
preserve their young in the nest, carry thither the eagle-stone(11)
when they have discovered it, how does it appear that they are wise,
and more intelligent than men, who find out by the exercise of their
reflective powers and of their understanding what has been bestowed by
nature upon eagles as a gift?
Let it be granted, however, that there are other prophylactics
against poisons known to animals: what does that avail to prove that it
is not nature, but reason, which leads to the discovery of such things
among them? For if reason were the discoverer, this one thing (or, if
you will, one or two more things) would not be (exclusive(12) of all
others) the sole discovery made by serpents, and some other thing the
sole discovery of the eagle, and so on with the rest of the animals;
but as many discoveries would have been made amongst them as among men.
But now it is manifest from the determinate inclination of the nature
of each animal towards certain kinds of help, that they possess neither
wisdom nor reason, but a natural constitutional tendency implanted by
the Logos(1) towards such things in order to ensure the preservation of
the animal. And, indeed, if I wished to join issue with Celsus in these
matters, I might quote the words of Solomon from the book of Proverbs,
which run thus: "There be four things which are little upon the earth,
but these are wiser than the wise: The ants are a people not strong,
yet they prepare their meat in the summer; the conies(2) are but a
feeble folk, yet make they their houses in the rocks; the locusts have
no king, yet go they forth in order at one command; and the spotted
lizard,(3) though leaning upon its hands, and being easily captured,
dwelleth in kings' fortresses."(4) I do not quote these words, however,
as taking them in their literal signification, but, agreeably to the
title of the book (for it is inscribed "Proverbs"), I investigate them
as containing a secret meaning. For it is the custom of these writers
(of Scripture) to distribute into many classes those writings which
express one sense when taken literally,(5) but which convey a different
signification as their hidden meaning; and one of these kinds of
writing is "Proverbs." And for this reason, in our Gospels too, is our
Saviour described as saying: "These things have I spoken to you in
proverbs, but the time cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in
proverbs."(6) It is not, then, the visible ants which are "wiser even
than the wise," but they who are indicated as such under the
"proverbial" style of expression. And such must be our conclusion
regarding the rest of the animal creation, although Celsus regards the
books of the Jews and Christians as exceedingly simple and
commonplace,(7) and imagines that those who give them an allegorical
interpretation do violence to the meaning of the writers. By what we
have said, then, let it appear that Celsus calumniates us in vain, and
let his assertions that serpents and eagles are wiser than men also
receive their refutation.
And wishing to show at greater length that even the thoughts of
God entertained by the human race are not superior to those of all
other mortal creatures, but that certain of the irrational animals are
capable of thinking about Him regarding whom opinions so discordant
have existed among the most acute of mankind—Greeks and Barbarians—he
continues: "If, because man has been able to grasp the idea of God, he
is deemed superior to the other animals, let those who hold this
opinion know that this capacity will be claimed by many of the other
animals; and with good reason: for what would any one maintain to be
more divine than the power of foreknowing and predicting future events?
Men accordingly acquire the art from the other animals, and especially
from birds. And those who listen to the indications furnished by them,
become possessed of the gift of prophecy. If, then, birds, and the
other prophetic animals, which are enabled by the gift of God to
foreknow events, instruct us by means of signs, so much the nearer do
they seem to be to the society of God, and to be endowed with greater
wisdom, and to be more beloved by Him. The more intelligent of men,
moreover, say that the animals hold meetings which are more sacred than
our assemblies, and that they know what is said at these meetings, and
show that in reality they possess this knowledge, when, having
previously stated that the birds have declared their intention of
departing to some particular place, and of doing this thing or the
other, the truth of their assertions is established by the departure of
the birds to the place in question, and by their doing what was
foretold. And no race of animals appears to be more observant of oaths
than the elephants are, or to show greater devotion to divine things;
and this, I presume, solely because they have some knowledge of God."
See here now how he at once lays hold of, and brings forward as
acknowledged facts, questions which are the subject of dispute among
those philosophers, not only among the Greeks, but also among the
Barbarians, who have either discovered or learned from certain demons
some things about birds of augury and other animals, by which certain
prophetic intimations are said to be made to men. For, in the first
place, it has been disputed whether there is an art of augury, and, in
general, a method of divination by animals, or not. And, in the second
place, they who admit that there is an art of divination by birds, are
not agreed about the manner of the divination; since some maintain that
it is from certain demons or gods of divination s that the animals
receive their impulses to action—the birds to flights and sounds of
different kinds, and the other animals to movements of one sort or
another. Others, again, believe that their souls are more divine in
their nature, and fitted to operations of that kind, which is a most
incredible supposition.
Celsus, however, seeing he wished to prove by the foregoing
statements that the irrational animals are more divine and intelligent
than human beings, ought to have established at greater length the
actual existence of such an art of divination, and in the next place
have energetically undertaken its defence, and effectually refuted the
arguments of those who would annihilate such arts of divination, and
have overturned in a convincing manner also the arguments of those who
say that it is from demons or from gods that animals receive the
movements which lead them to divination, and to have proved in the next
place that the soul of irrational animals is more divine than that of
man. For, had he done so, and manifested a philosophical spirit in
dealing with such things, we should to the best of our power have met
his confident assertions, refuting in the first place the allegation
that irrational animals are wiser than men, and showing the falsity of
the statement that they have ideas of God more sacred than ours, and
that they hold among themselves certain sacred assemblies. But now, on
the contrary, he who accuses us because we believe in the Supreme God,
requires us to believe that the souls of birds entertain ideas of God
more divine and distinct than those of men. Yet if this is true, the
birds have clearer ideas of God than Celsus himself; and it is not
matter of surprise that it should be so with him, who so greatly
depreciates human beings. Nay, so far as Celsus can make it appear, the
birds possess grander and more divine ideas than, I do not say we
Christians do, or than the Jews, who use the same Scriptures with
ourselves, but even than are possessed by the theologians among the
Greeks, for they were only human beings. According to Celsus, indeed,
the tribe of birds that practise divination, forsooth, understand the
nature of the Divine Being better than Pherecydes, and Pythagoras, and
Socrates and Plato! We ought then to go to the birds as our teachers,
in order that as, according to the view of Celsus, they instruct us by
their power of divination in the knowledge of future events, so also
they may free men from doubts regarding the Divine Being, by imparting
to them the clear ideas which they have obtained respecting Him! It
follows, accordingly, that Celsus, who regards birds as superior to
men, ought to employ them as his instructors, and not one of the Greek
philosophers.
But we have a few remarks to make, out of a larger number, in
answer to these statements of Celsus, that we may show the ingratitude
towards his Maker which is involved in his holding these false
opinions.(1) For Celsus, although a man, and "being in honour,"(2) does
not possess understanding, and therefore he did not compare himself
with the birds and the other irrational animals, which he regards as
capable of divining; but yielding to them the foremost place, he
lowered himself, and as far as he could the whole human race with him
(as entertaining lower and inferior views of God than the irrational
animals), beneath the Egyptians, who worship irrational animals as
divinities. Let the principal point of investigation, however, be this:
whether there actually is or not an art of divination, by means of
birds and other living things believed to have such power. For the
arguments which tend to establish either view are not to be despised.
On the one hand, it is pressed upon us not to admit such an art, lest
the rational being should abandon the divine oracles, and betake
himself to birds; and on the other, there is the energetic testimony of
many, that numerous individuals have been saved from the greatest
dangers by putting their trust in divination by birds. For the present,
however, let it be granted that an art of divination does exist, in
order that I may in this way show to those who are prejudiced on the
subject, that if this be admitted, the superiority of man over
irrational animals, even over those that are endowed with power of
divination, is great, and beyond all reach of comparison with the
latter. We have then to say, that if there was in them any divine
nature capable of foretelling future events, and so rich (in that
knowledge) as out of its superabundance to make them known to any man
who wished to know them, it is manifest that they would know what
concerned themselves far sooner (than what concerned others); and had
they possessed this knowledge, they would have been upon their guard
against flying to any particular place Where men had planted snares and
nets to catch them, or where archers took aim and shot at them in their
flight. And especially, were eagles aware beforehand of the designs
formed against their young, either by serpents crawling up to their
nests and destroying them, or by men who take them for their amusement,
or for any other useful purpose or service, they would not have placed
their young in a spot where they were to be attacked; and, in general,
not one of these animals would have been captured by men, because they
were more divine and intelligent than they.
But besides, if birds of augury converse with one another,(1) as
Celsus maintains they do, the prophetic birds having a divine nature,
and the other rational animals also ideas of the divinity and
foreknowledge of future events; and if they had communicated this
knowledge to others, the sparrow mentioned in Homer would not have
built her nest in the spot where a serpent was to devour her and her
young ones, nor would the serpent in the writings of the same poet have
failed to take precautions against being captured by the eagle. For
this wonderful poet says, in his poem regarding the former:—
"A mighty dragon shot, of dire portent;
From Jove himself the dreadful sign was sent.
Straight to the tree his sanguine spires he rolled,
And curled around in many a winding fold.
The topmost branch a mother-bird possessed;
Eight callow infants filled the mossy nest;
Herself the ninth: the serpent, as he hung,
Stretched his black jaws, and crashed the dying young;
While hovering near, with miserable moan,
The drooping mother wailed her children gone.
The mother last, as round the nest she flew,
Seized by the beating wing, the monster slew:
Nor long survived: to marble turned, he stands
A lasting prodigy on Aulis' sands.
Such was the will of Jove; and hence we dare
Trust in his omen, and support the war."(2)
And regarding the second—the bird—the poet says:—
"Jove's bird on sounding pinions beat the skies;
A bleeding serpent of enormous size,
His talons twined; alive, and curling round,
He stung the bird, whose throat received the wound.
Mad with the smart, he drops the fatal prey,
In airy circles wings his painful way,
Floats on the winds, and rends the heaven with cries;
Amidst the host, the fallen serpent lies.
They, pale with terror, mark its spires unrolled,
And Jove's portent with beating hearts behold."(3)
Did the eagle, then, possess the power of divination, and the serpent (since this animal also is made use of by the augurs) not? But as this distinction can be easily refuted, cannot the assertion that both were capable of divination be refuted also? For if the serpent had possessed this knowledge, would not he have been on his guard against suffering what he did from the eagle? And innumerable other instances of a similar character may be found, to show that animals do not possess a prophetic soul, but that, according to the poet and the majority of mankind, it is the "Olympian himself who sent him to the light." And it is with a symbolical meaning(4) that Apollo employs the hawks as his messenger, for the hawk(6) is called the "swift messenger of Apollo."(7)
In my opinion, however, it is certain wicked demons, and, so to
speak, of the race of Titans or Giants, who have been guilty of impiety
towards the true God, and towards the angels in heaven, and who have
fallen from it, and who haunt the denser parts of bodies, and frequent
unclean places upon earth, and who, possessing some power of
distinguishing future events, because they are without bodies of
earthly material, engage in an employment of this kind, and desiring to
lead the human race away from the true God, secretly enter the bodies
of the more rapacious and savage and wicked of animals, and stir them
up to do whatever they choose, and at whatever time they choose: either
turning the fancies of these animals to make flights and movements of
various kinds, in order that men may be caught by the divining power
that is in the irrational animals, and neglect to seek after the God
who contains all things; or to search after the pure worship of God,
but allow their reasoning powers to grovel on the earth, and amongst
birds and serpents, and even foxes and wolves. For it has been observed
by those who are skilled in such matters, that the clearest
prognostications are obtained from animals of this kind; because the
demons cannot act so effectively in the milder sort of animals as they
can in these, in consequence of the similarity between them in point of
wickedness; and yet it is not wickedness, but something like
wickedness,(8) which exist in these animals.
For which reason, whatever else there may be in the writings of
Moses which excites my wonder, I would say that the following is worthy
of admiration, viz. that Moses, having observed the varying natures of
animals, and having either learned from God what was peculiar to them,
and to the demons which are kindred to each of the animals, or having
himself ascertained these things by his own wisdom, has, in arranging
the different kinds of animals, pronounced all those which are supposed
by the Egyptians and the rest of mankind to possess the power of
divination to be unclean, and, as a general rule, all that are not of
that class to be clean. And amongst the unclean animals mentioned by
Moses are the wolf, and fox, and serpent, and eagle, and hawk, and such
like. And, generally speaking, you will find that not only in the law,
but also in the prophets, these animals are employed as examples of all
that is most wicked; and that a wolf or a fox is never mentioned for a
good purpose. Each species of demon, consequently, would seem to
possess a certain affinity with a certain species of animal. And as
among men there are some who are stronger than others, and this not at
all owing to their moral character, so, in the same way, some demons
will be more powerful in things indifferent than others;(1) and one
class of them employs one kind of animal for the purpose of deluding
men, in accordance with the will of him who is called in our Scriptures
the "prince of this world," while others predict future events by means
of another kind of animal. Observe, moreover, to what a pitch of
wickedness the demons proceed, so that they even assume the bodies of
weasels in order to reveal the future! And now, consider with yourself
whether it is better to accept the belief that it is the Supreme God
and His Son who stir up the birds and the other living creatures to
divination, or that those who stir up these creatures, and not human
beings (although they are present before them), are wicked, and, as
they are called by our Scriptures, unclean demons.
But if the soul of birds is to be esteemed divine because future
events are predicted by them, why should we not rather maintain, that
when omens(2) are accepted by men, the souls of those are divine
through which the omens are heard? Accordingly, among such would be
ranked the female slave mentioned in Homer, who ground the corn, when
she said regarding the suitors:—
"For the very last time, now, will they sup here."(3)
This slave, then, was divine, while the great Ulysses, the friend of Homer's Pallas Athene, was not divine, but understanding the words spoken by this "divine" grinder of corn as an omen, rejoiced, as the poet says:—
"The divine Ulysses rejoiced at the omen."(4) Observe, now, as
the birds are possessed of a divine soul, and are capable of perceiving
God, or, as Celsus says, the gods, it is clear that when we men also
sneeze, we do so in consequence of a kind of divinity that is within
us, and which imparts a prophetic power to our soul. For this belief is
testified by many witnesses, and therefore the poet also says:—
"And while he prayed, he sneezed."(5) And Penelope,
too, said:— "Perceiv'st thou not that at every word my son did
sneeze?"(6)
The true God, however, neither employs irrational animals, nor
any individuals whom chance may offer,(7) to convey a knowledge of the
future; but, on the contrary, the most pure and holy of human souls,
whom He inspires and endows with prophetic power. And therefore,
whatever else in the Mosaic writings may excite our wonder, the
following must be considered as fitted to do so: "Ye shall not practise
augury, nor observe the flight of birds;"(8) and in another place: "For
the nations whom the LORD thy God will destroy from before thy face,
shall listen to omens and divinations; but as for thee, the LORD thy
God has not suffered thee to do so."(9) And he adds: "A prophet shall
the LORD your God raise up unto you from among your brethren."(10) On
one occasion, moreover, God, wishing by means of an augur to turn away
(His people) from the practice of divination, caused the spirit that
was in the augur to speak as follows: "For there is no enchantment in
Jacob, nor is there divination in Israel. In due time will it be
declared to Jacob and Israel what the Lord will do."(11) And now, we
who knew these and similar sayings wish to observe this precept with
the mystical meaning, viz., "Keep thy heart with all diligence,"(12)
that nothing of a demoniacal nature may enter into our minds, or any
spirit of our adversaries turn our imagination whither it chooses. But
we pray that the light of the knowledge of the glory of God may shine
in our hearts, and that the Spirit of God may dwell in our
imaginations, and lead them to contemplate the things of God; for "as
many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God."(13)
We ought to take note, however, that the power of foreknowing the
future is by no means a proof of divinity; for in itself it is a thing
indifferent, and is found occurring amongst both good and bad.
Physicians, at any rate, by means of their professional skill foreknow
certain things, although their character may happen to be bad. And in
the same way also pilots, although perhaps wicked men, are able to
foretell the signs(14) (of good or bad weather), and the approach of
violent tempests of wind, and atmospheric changes,(15) because they
gather this knowledge from experience and observation, although I do
not suppose that on that account any one would term them "gods" if
their characters happened to be bad. The assertion, then, of Celsus is
false, when he says: "What could be called more divine than the power
of foreknowing and foretelling the future?" And so also is this, that
"many of the animals claim to have ideas of God;" for none of the
irrational animals possess any idea of God. And wholly false, too, is
his assertion, that "the irrational animals are nearer the society of
God (than men)," when even men who are still in a state of wickedness,
however great their progress in knowledge, are far removed from that
society. It is, then, those alone who are truly wise and sincerely
religious who are nearer to God's society; such persons as were our
prophets, and Moses, to the latter of whom, on account of his exceeding
purity, the Scripture said: "Moses alone shall come near the LORD, but
the rest shall not come nigh."(1)
How impious, indeed, is the assertion of this man, who charges us
with impiety, that "not only are the irrational animals wiser than the
human race, but that they are more beloved by God (than they)!" And who
would not be repelled (by horror) from paying any attention to a man
who declared that a serpent, and a fox, and a wolf, and an eagle, and a
hawk, were more beloved by God than the human race? For it follows from
his maintaining such a position, that if these animals be more beloved
by God than human beings, it is manifest that they are dearer to God
than Socrates, and Plato, and Pythagoras, and Pherecydes, and those
theologians whose praises he had sung a little before. And one might
address him with the prayer: "If these animals be dearer to God than
men, may you be beloved of God along with them, and be made like to
those whom you consider as dearer to Him than human beings!" And let no
one suppose that such a prayer is meant as an imprecation; for who
would not pray to resemble in all respects those whom he believes to be
dearer to God than others, in order that he, like them, may enjoy the
divine love? And as Celsus is desirous to show that the assemblies of
the irrational animals are more sacred than ours, he ascribes the
statement to that effect not to any ordinary individuals, but to
persons of intelligence. Yet it is the virtuous alone who are truly
wise, for no wicked man is so. He speaks, accordingly, in the following
style: "Intelligent men say that these animals hold assemblies which
are more sacred than ours, and that they know what is spoken at them,
and actually prove that they are not without such knowledge, when they
mention beforehand that the birds have
announced their intention of departing to a particular place, or of doing this thing or that, and then show that they have departed to the place in question, and have done the particular thing which was foretold." Now, truly, no person of intelligence ever related such things; nor did any wise man ever say that the assemblies of the irrational animals were more sacred than those of men. But if, for the purpose of examining (the soundness of) his statements, we look to their consequences, it is evident that, in his opinion, the assemblies of the irrational animals are more sacred than those of the venerable Pherecydes, and Pythagoras, and Socrates, and Plato, and of philosophers in general; which assertion is not only incongruous(2) in itself, but full of absurdity. In order that we may believe, however, that certain individuals do learn from the indistinct sound of birds that they are about to take their departure, and do this thing or that, and announce these things beforehand, we would say that this information is imparted to men by demons by means of signs, with the view of having men deceived by demons, and having their understanding dragged down from God and heaven to earth, and to places lower still.
I do not know, moreover, how Celsus could hear of the elephants'
(fidelity to) oaths, and of their great devotedness to our God, and of
the knowledge which they possess of Him. For I know many wonderful
things which are related of the nature of this animal, and of its
gentle disposition. But I am not aware that any one has spoken of its
observance of oaths; unless indeed to its gentle disposition, and its
observance of compacts, so to speak, when once concluded between it and
man, he give the name of keeping its oath, which statement also in
itself is false. For although rarely, yet sometimes it has been
recorded that, after their apparent tameness, they have broken out
against men in the most savage manner, and have committed murder, and
have been on that account condemned to death, because no longer of any
use. And seeing that after this, in order to establish (as he thinks he
does) that the stork is more pious than any human being, he adduces the
accounts which are narrated regarding that creature's display of filial
affection(3) in bringing food to its parents for their support, we have
to say in reply, that this is done by the storks, not from a regard to
what is proper, nor from reflection, but from a natural instinct; the
nature which formed them being desirous to show an instance among the
irrational animals which might put men to shame, in the matter of
exhibiting their gratitude to their parents. And if Celsus had known
how great the difference is between acting in this way from reason, and
from an irrational natural impulse, he would not have said that storks
are more pious than human beings. But further, Celsus, as still
contending for the piety of the irrational creation, quotes the
instance of the Arabian bird the phoenix, which after many years
repairs to Egypt, and bears thither its parent, when dead and buried in
a ball of myrrh, and deposits its body in the Temple of the Sun. Now
this story is indeed recorded, and, if it be true,(1) it is possible
that it may occur in consequence of some provision of nature; divine
providence freely displaying to human beings, by the differences which
exist among living things, the variety of constitution which prevails
in the world, and which extends even to birds, and in harmony with
which He has brought into existence one creature, the only one of its
kind, in order that by it men may be led to admire, not the creature,
but Him who created it.
In addition to all that he has already said, Celsus subjoins the
following: "All things, accordingly, were not made for man, any more
than they were made for lions, or eagles, or dolphins, but that this
world, as being God's work, might be perfect and entire in all
respects. For this reason all things have been adjusted, not with
reference to each other, but with regard to their bearing upon the
whole.(2) And God takes care of the whole, and (His) providence will
never forsake it; and it does not become worse; nor does God after a
time bring it back to himself; nor is He angry on account of men any
more than on account of apes or flies; nor does He threaten these
beings, each one of which has received its appointed lot in its proper
place."
Let us then briefly reply to these statements. I think, indeed, that I have shown in the preceding pages that all things were created for man, and every rational being, and that it was chiefly for the sake of the rational creature that the creation took place. Celsus, indeed, may say that this was done not more for man than for lions, or the other creatures which he mentions; but we maintain that the Creator did not form these things for lions, or eagles, or dolphins, but all for the sake of the rational creature, and "in order that this world, as being God's work, might be perfect and complete in all things." For to this sentiment we must yield our assent as being well said. And God takes care, not, as Celsus supposes, merely of the whole, but beyond the whole, in a special degree of every rational being. Nor will Providence ever abandon the whole; for although it should become more wicked, owing to the sin of the rational being, which is a portion of the whole, He makes arrangements to purify it, and after a time to bring back the whole to Himself. Moreover, He is not angry with apes or flies; but on human beings, as those who have transgressed the laws of nature, He sends judgments and chastisements, and threatens them by the mouth of the prophets, and by the Saviour who came to visit the whole human race, that those who hear the threatenings may be converted by them, while those who neglect these calls to conversion may deservedly suffer those punishments which it becomes God, in conformity with that will of His which acts for the advantage of the whole, to inflict upon those who need such painful discipline and correction. But as our fourth book has now attained sufficient dimensions, we shall here terminate our discourse. And may God grant, through His Son, who is God the Word, and Wisdom, and Truth, and Righteousness, and everything else which the sacred Scriptures when speaking of God call Him, that we may make a good beginning of the fifth book, to the benefit of our readers, and may bring it to a successful conclusion, with the aid of His word abiding in our soul. ELUCIDATION.
(Stated in obscure terms, with advantage, p. 495.)
TURN back to the Second Apology of Justin (cap. ix.), "Eternal
punishment not a mere threat;"(1) also to Clement (Stromata, iv. cap.
xxiv.), "the reason and end of divine punishments."(2) Now compare
Gieseler(3) (vol. i. p. 212) for what he so sweepingly asserts. And on
the doctrine of Origen, let me quote a very learned and on such points
a most capable judge, the late erudite and pious half-Gallican Dr.
Pusey. He says:—
"Celsus and Origen are both witnesses that Christians believed in
the eternity of punishment. Celsus, to weaken the force of the argument
from the sufferings which the martyrs underwent sooner than abjure
Christianity, tells Origen that heathen priests taught the same
doctrine of eternal punishment as the Christians, and that the only
question was, which was right.(4)
"Origen answers, 'I should say that the truth lies with those who
are able to induce their hearers to live as men convinced of the truth
of what they have heard. Jews and Christians have been thus affected by
the doctrines which they hold about the world to come, the rewards of
the righteous, and the punishments of the wicked. Who have been moved
in this way, in regard to eternal punishments, by the teaching of
heathen priests and mystagogues?'
"Origen's answer acknowledges that the doctrine of eternal
punishment had been taught to Christians, that One [Christ] had taught
it, and that it had produced the effects He had [in view] in teaching
it; viz., to set Christians to strive with all their might to conquer
the sin which produced it."(5)
On this most painful subject my natural feelings are much with
Canon Farrar; but, after lifelong application to the subject, I must
think Dr. Pusey holds with his Master, Christ. I feel willing to leave
it all with Him who died for sinners, and the cross shuts my mouth.
"Herein is love;" and I cannot dictate to such love, from my limited
mind, and capacity, and knowledge of His universe. Here let "every
thought be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ." Let us
sacrifice "imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself," and
leave our Master alike supreme in our affections and over our
intellectual powers. He merits such subjection. Let us preach His
words, and leave Him to explain them when He shall "condemn every
tongue that shall rise against Him in judgment."
Let me also refer to Bledsoe's most solemn and searching reply to
John Foster; also to his answer to Lord Kames's effort to help the Lord
out of a supposed difficulty.(6) I am sorry that Tillotson exposed
himself to a witty retort by the same author, in these words: "If the
Almighty really undertook to deceive the world for its own good, it is
a pity He did not take the precaution to prevent the archbishop from
detecting the cheat, ... not suffering his secret to get into the
possession of one who has so indiscreetly published it." The awful
importance of the subject, and the recently awakened interest in its
discussion, have led me to enlarge this annotation.