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CONTAINING AN ARGUMENT AGAINST HIS OPINION THAT MATTER IS ETERNAL.
[TRANSLATED BY DR. HOLMES.]
WE are accustomed, for the purpose of shortening argument,(1) to
lay down the rule against heretics of the lateness of their date.(2)
For in as far as by our rule, priority is given to the truth, which
also foretold that there would be heresies, in so far must all later
opinions be prejudged as heresies, being such as were, by the more
ancient rule of truth, predicted as (one day) to happen. Now, the
doctrine of Hermogenes has this(3) taint of novelty. He is, in
short,(4) a man living in the world at the present time; by his very
nature a heretic, and turbulent withal, who mistakes loquacity for
eloquence, and supposes impudence to be firmness, and judges it to be
the duty of a good conscience to speak ill of individuals.(5) Moreover,
he despises God's law in his painting,(6) maintaining repeated
marriages,(7) alleges the law of God in defence of lust,(8) and yet
despises it in respect of his art.(9) He falsities by a twofold
process—with his cautery and his pen.(10) He is a thorough adulterer,
both doctrinally and carnally, since he is rank indeed with the
contagion of your marriage-hacks,(11) and has also failed in cleaving
to the rule of faith as much as the apostle's own Hermogenes.(12)
However, never mind the man, when it is his doctrine which I question.
He does not appear to acknowledge any other Christ as Lord,(13) though
he holds Him in a different way; but by this difference in his faith he
really makes Him another being,—nay, he takes from Him everything
which is God, since he will not have it that He made all things of
nothing. For, turning away from Christians to the philosophers, from
the Church to the Academy and the Porch, he learned there from the
Stoics how to place Matter (on the same level) with the Lord, just as
if it too had existed ever both unborn and unmade, having no beginning
at all nor end, out of which, according to him,(14) the Lord afterwards
created all things.
Our very bad painter has coloured this his primary shade
absolutely without any light, with such arguments as these: He begins
with laying down the premiss,(15) that the Lord made all things either
out of Himself, or out of nothing, or out of something; in order that,
after he has shown that it was impossible for Him to have made them
either out of Himself or out of nothing, he might thence affirm the
residuary proposition that He made them out of something, and therefore
that that something was Matter. He could not have made all things, he
says, of Himself; because whatever things the Lord made of Himself
would have been parts of Himself; but(1) He is not dissoluble into
parts,(2), because, being the Lord, He is indivisible, and
unchangeable, and always the same. Besides, if He had made anything out
of Himself, it would have been something of Himself. Everything,
however, both which was made and which He made must be accounted
imperfect, because it was made of a part, and He made it of a part; or
if, again, it was a whole which He made, who is a whole Himself, He
must in that case have been at once both a whole, and yet not a whole;
because it behaved Him to be a whole, that He might produce Himself,(3)
and yet not a whole, that He might be produced out of Himself.(4) But
this is a most difficult position. For if He were in existence, He
could not be made, for He was in existence already; if, however, he
were not in existence He could not make, because He was a nonentity. He
maintains, moreover, that He who always exists, does not came into
existence,(5) but exists for ever and ever. He accordingly concludes
that He made nothing out of Himself, since He never passed into such a
condition(6) as made it possible for Him to make anything out of
Himself. In like manner, he contends that He could not have made all
things out of nothing—thus: He defines the Lord as a being who is
good, nay, very good, who must will to make things as good and
excellent as He is Himself; indeed it were impossible for Him either to
will or to make anything which was not good, nay, very good itself.
Therefore all things ought to have been made good and excellent by Him,
after His own condition. Experience shows,(7) however, that things
which are even evil were made by Him: not, of course, of His own will
and pleasure; because, if it had been of His own will and pleasure, He
would be sure to have made nothing unfitting or unworthy of Himself.
That, therefore, which He made not of His own will must be understood
to have been made from the fault of something, and that is from Matter,
without a doubt.
He adds also another point: that as God was always God, there was
never a time when God was not also Lord. But(8) it was in no way
possible for Him to be regarded as always Lord, in the same manner as
He had been always God, if there had not been always, in the previous
eternity,(9) a something of which He could be regarded as evermore the
Lord. So he concludes(10) that God always had Matter co-existent with
Himself as the Lord thereof. Now, this tissue(11) of his I shall at
once hasten to pull abroad. I have been willing to set it out in form
to this length, for the information of those who are unacquainted with
the subject, that they may know that his other arguments likewise need
only be(12) understood to be refuted. We affirm, then, that the name of
God always existed with Himself and in Himself—but not eternally so
the Lord. Because the condition of the one is not the same as that of
the other. God is the designation of the substance itself, that is, of
the Divinity; but Lord is (the name) not of substance, but of power. I
maintain that the substance existed always with its own name, which is
God; the title Lord was afterwards added, as the indication indeed(13)
of something accruing. For from the moment when those things began to
exist, over which the power of a Lord was to act, God, by the accession
of that power, both became Lord and received the name thereof. Because
God is in like manner a Father, and He is also a Judge; but He has not
always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His having always
been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the Son,
nor a Judge previous to sin. There was, however, a time when neither
sin existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was to
constitute the Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He
was not Lord previous to those things of which He was to be the Lord.
But He was only to become Lord at some future time: just as He became
the Father by the Son, and a Judge by sin, so also did He become Lord
by means of those things which He had made, in order that they might
serve Him. Do I seem to you to be weaving arguments,(14) Hermogenes?
how neatly does Scripture lend us its aid,(13) when it applies the two
titles to Him with a distinction, and reveals them each at its proper
time! For (the title ) God, indeed, which
always belonged to Him, it names at the very first: "In the
beginning God created the heaven and the earth;" (1) and as long as He
continued making, one after the other, those things of which He was to
be the Lord, it merely mentions God. "And God said," "and God made,"
"and Gad saw;" (2) but nowhere do we yet find the Lord. But when He
completed the whole creation, and especially man himself, who was
destined to understand His sovereignty in a way of special propriety,
He then is designated a Lord. Then also the Scripture added the name
Lord: "And the Lord God, Deus Dominus. took the man, whom He had
formed;"(4) "And the Lord God commanded Adam."(5) Thenceforth He, who
was previously God only, is the Lord, from the time of His having
something of which He might be the Lord. For to Himself He was always
God, but to all things was He only then God, when He became also Lord.
Therefore, in as far as (Hermogenes) shall suppose that Matter was
eternal, on the ground that the Lord was eternal, in so far will it be
evident that nothing existed, because it is plain that the Lord as such
did not always exist. Now I mean also, on my own part,(6) to add a
remark for the sake of ignorant persons, of whom Hermogenes is an
extreme instance,(7) and actually to retort against him his own
arguments.(8) For when he denies that Matter was born or made, I find
that, even on these terms, the title Lord is unsuitable to God in
respect of Matter, because it must have been free,(9) when by not
having a beginning it had not an author. The fact of its past existence
it owed to no one, so that it could be a subject to no one. Therefore
ever since God exercised His power over it, by creating (all things)
out of Matter, although it had all along experienced God as its Lord,
yet Matter does, after all, demonstrate that God did not exist in the
relation of Lord to it,(10) although all the while He was really so.
At this point, then, I shall begin to treat of Matter, how that,
(according to Hermogenes,)(12) God compares it with Himself as equally
unborn, equally unmade, equally eternal, set forth as being without a
beginning, without an end. For what other estimate's of God is there
than eternity? What other condition has eternity than to have ever
existed, and to exist yet for evermore by virtue of its privilege of
having neither beginning nor end? Now, since this is the property of
God, it will belong to God alone, whose property it is—of course(14)
on this ground, that if it can be ascribed to any other being, it will
no longer be the property of God, but will belong, along with Him, to
that being also to which it is ascribed. For "although there be that
are called gods" in name, "whether in heaven or in earth, yet to us
there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things;"(15) whence
the greater reason why, in our view,(16) that which is the property(17)
of God ought to be regarded as pertaining to God alone, and why (as I
have already said) that should cease to be such a property, when it is
shared by another being. Now, since He is God, it must necessarily be a
unique mark of this quality,(18) that it be confined to One. Else, what
will be unique and singular, if that is not which has nothing equal to
it? What will be principal, if that is not which is above all things,
before all things, and from which all things proceed? By possessing
these He is God alone, and by His sole possession of them He is One. If
another also shared in the possession, there would then be as many gods
as there were possessors of these attributes of God. Hermogenes,
therefore, introduces two gods: he introduces Matter as God's equal.
God, however, must be One, because that is God which is supreme; but
nothing else can be supreme than that which is unique; and that cannot
possibly be unique which has anything equal to it; and Matter will be
equal with God when it is held to be(19) eternal.
But God is God, and Matter is Matter. As if a mere difference in
their names prevented equality,(20) when an identity of condition is
claimed for them! Grant that their nature is different; assume, too,
that their form is not identical,—what matters it so long as their
absolute state have but one mode?(1) God is unborn; is not Matter also
unborn? God ever exists; is not Matter, too, ever existent? Both are
without beginning; both are without end; both are the authors of the
universe—both He who created it, and the Matter of which He made it.
For it is impossible that Matter should not be regarded as the
author(2) of all things, when the universe is composed of it. What
answer will he give? Will he say that Matter is not then comparable
with God as soon as(3) it has something belonging to God; since, by not
having total (divinity), it cannot correspond to the whole extent of
the comparison? But what more has he reserved for God, that he should
not seem to have accorded to Matter the full amount of the Deity?(4) He
says in reply, that even though this is the prerogative of Matter, both
the authority and the substance of God must remain intact, by virtue of
which He is regarded as the sole and prime Author, as well as the Lord
of all things. Truth, however, maintains the unity of God in such a way
as to insist that whatever belongs to God Himself belongs to Him alone.
For so will it belong to Himself if it belong to Him alone; and
therefore it will be impossible that another god should be admitted,
when it is permitted to no other being to possess anything of God.
Well, then, you say, we ourselves at that rate possess nothing of God.
But indeed we do, and shall continue to do—only it is from Him that we
receive it, and not from ourselves. For we shall be even gods, if we,
shall deserve to be among those of whom He declared, "I have said, Ye
are gods,"(5) and, "God standeth in the congregation of the gods."(6)
But this comes of His own grace, not from any property in us, because
it is He alone who can make gods. The property of Matter, however,
he(7) makes to be that which it has in common with God. Otherwise, if
it received from God the property which belongs to God,—I mean its
attribute(8) of eternity -one might then even suppose that it both
possesses an attribute in common with God, and yet at the same time is
not God. But what inconsistency is it for him(9) to allow that there is
a conjoint possession of an attribute with God, and also to wish that
what he does not refuse to Matter should be, after all, the exclusive
privilege of God!
He declares that God's attribute is still safe to Him, of being
the only God, and the First, and the Author of all things, and the
Lord of all things, and being incomparable to any—qualities which he
straightway ascribes to Matter also. He is God, to be sure. God shall
also attest the same; but He has also sworn sometimes by Himself, that
there is no other God like Him.(10) Hermogenes, however, will make Him
a liar. For Matter will be such a God as He—being unmade, unborn,
without beginning, and without end. God will say, "I am the first!"(11)
Yet how is He the first, when Matter is co-eternal with Him? Between
co-eternals and contemporaries there is no sequence of rank.(12) Is
then, Matter also the first? "I," says the Lord, "have stretched out
the heavens alone."(13) But indeed He was not alone, when that likewise
stretched them out, of which He made the expanse. When he asserts the
position that Matter was eternal, without any encroachment on the
condition of God, let him see to it that we do not in ridicule turn the
tables on him, that God similarly was eternal without any encroachment
on the condition of Matter—the condition of Both being still common to
Them. The position, therefore, remains unimpugned(14) both in the case
of Matter, that it did itself exist, only along with God; and that God
existed alone, but with Matter. It also was first with God, as God,
too, was first with it; it, however, is not comparable with God, as
God, too, is not to be compared with it; with God also it was the
Author (of all things), and with God their Sovereign. In this way he
proposes that God has something, and yet not the whole, of Matter. For
Him, accordingly, Hermogenes has reserved nothing which he had not
equally conferred on Matter, so that it is not Matter which is compared
with God, but rather God who is compared with Matter. Now, inasmuch as
those qualities which we claim as peculiar to God—to have always
existed, without a beginning, without an end, and to have been the
First, and Alone, and the Author of all things—are also compatible to
Matter, I want to know what property Matter possesses different and
alien from God, and hereby special to itself, by reason of which it is
incapable of being compared with God? That Being, in which occur(1) all
the properties of God, is sufficiently predetermined without any
further comparison.
When he contends that matter is less than God, and inferior to
Him, and therefore diverse from Him, and for the same reason not a fit
subject of comparison with Him, who is a greater and superior Being, I
meet him with this prescription, that what is eternal and unborn is
incapable of any diminution and inferiority, because it is simply this
which makes even God to be as great as He is, inferior and subject to
none—nay, greater and higher than all. For, just as all things which
are born, or which come to an end, and are therefore not eternal, do,
by reason of their exposure at once to an end and a beginning, admit of
qualities which are repugnant to God—I mean diminution and
inferiority, because they are born and made—so likewise God, for this
very reason, is unsusceptible of these accidents, because He is
absolutely unborn,(2) and also unmade. And yet such also is the
condition of Matter.(3) Therefore, of the two Beings which are eternal,
as being unborn and unmade—God and Matter—by reason of the identical
mode of their common condition (both of them equally possessing that
which admits neither of diminution nor subjection—that is, the
attribute of eternity), we affirm that neither of them is less or
greater than the other, neither of them is inferior or superior to the
other; but that they both stand on a par in greatness, on a par in
sublimity, and on the same level of that complete and perfect felicity
of which eternity is reckoned to consist. Now we must not resemble the
heathen in our opinions; for they, when constrained to acknowledge God,
insist on having other deities below Him. The Divinity, however, has no
degrees, because it is unique; and if it shall be found in Matter—as
being equally unborn and unmade and eternal—it must be resident in
both alike,(4) because in no case can it be inferior to itself. In what
way, then, will Hermogenes have the courage to draw distinctions; and
thus to subject matter to God, an eternal to the Eternal, an unborn to
the Unborn, an author to the Author? seeing that it dares to say, I
also am the first; I too am before all things; and I am that from which
all things proceed; equal we have been, together we have been—both
alike without beginning, without end; both alike without an Author,
without a God.(5) What God, then, is He who subjects me to a
contemporaneous, co-eternal power? If it be He who is called God, then
I myself, too, have my own (divine) name. Either I am God, or He is
Matter, because we both are that which neither of us is. Do you
suppose, therefore, that he(6) has not made Matter equal with God,
although, for-sooth, he pretends it to be inferior to Him?
Nay more,(7) he even prefers Matter to God, and rather subjects
God to it, when he will have it that God made all things out of Matter.
For if He drew His resources from it for the creation of the world,
Matter is already found to be the superior, inasmuch as it furnished
Him with the means of effecting His works; and God is thereby clearly
subjected to Matter, of which the substance was indispensable to Him.
For there is no one but requires that which he makes use of;(9) no one
but is subject to the thing which he requires, for the very purpose of
being able to make use of it. So, again, there is no one who, from
using what belongs to another, is not inferior to him of whose property
he makes use; and there is no one who imparts(10) of his own for
another's use, who is not in this respect superior to him to whose use
he lends his property. On this principle,(11) Matter self, no
doubt,(12) was not in want of God, but rather lent itself to God, who
was in want of it—rich and abundant and liberal as it was—to one who
was, I suppose, too small, and too weak, and too unskilful, to form
what He willed out of nothing. A grand service, verily,(13) did it
confer on God in giving Him means at the present time whereby He might
be known to be God, and be called Almighty —only that He is no longer
Almighty, since He is not powerful enough for this, to produce all
things out of nothing. To be sure,(14) Matter bestowed somewhat on
itself also—even to get its own self acknowledged with God as God's
co-equal, nay more, as His helper; only there is this drawback, that
Hermogenes is the only man that has found out this fact, besides the
philosophers—those patriarchs of all heresy.(1) For the prophets knew
nothing about it, nor the apostles thus far, nor, I suppose, even
Christ.
CHAP, IX.—SUNDRY INEVITABLE BUT INTOLERABLE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF HERMOGENES.
He cannot say that it was as its Lord that God employed Matter
for His creative works, for He could not have been the Lord of a
substance which was co-equal with Himself. Well, but perhaps it was a
title derived from the will of another,(2) which he enjoyed—a
precarious holding, and not a lordship,(3) and that to such a degree,
that(4) although Matter was evil, He yet endured to make use of an evil
substance, owing, of course, to the restraint of His own limited
power,(5) which made Him impotent to create out of nothing, not in
consequence of His power; for if, as God, He had at all possessed power
over Matter which He knew to be evil, He would first have converted it
into good—as its Lord and the good God— that so He might have a good
thing to make use of, instead of a bad one. But being undoubtedly good,
only not the Lord withal, He, by using such power(6) as He possessed,
showed the necessity He was under of yielding to the condition of
Matter, which He would have amended if He had been its Lord. Now this
is the answer which must be given to Hermogenes when he maintains that
it was by virtue of His Lordship that God used Matter—even of His
non-possession of any right to it, on the ground, of course, of His
not having Himself made it. Evil then, on your terms,(7) must proceed
from God Himself, since He is—I will not say the Author of evil,
because He did not form it, but—the permitter thereof, as having
dominion over it.(8) If indeed Matter shall prove not even to belong to
God at all, as being evil, it follows,(9) that when He made use of what
belonged to another, He used it either on a precarious title(10)
because He was in need of it, or else by violent possession because He
was stronger than it. For by three methods is the property of others
obtained,—by right, by permission, by violence; in other words, by
lordship, by a title derived from the will of another,(11) by force.
Now, as lordship is out of the question, Hermogenes must choose which
(of the other methods) is suitable to God. Did He, then, make all
things out of Matter, by permission, or by force? But, in truth, would
not God have more wisely determined that nothing at all should be
created, than that it should be created by the mere sufferance of
another, or by violence, and that, too, with(12) a substance which was
evil?
Even if Matter had been the perfection of good,(13) would it not
have been equally indecorous in Him to have thought of the property of
another, however good, (to effect His purpose by the help of it)? It
was, therefore, absurd enough for Him, in the interest of His own
glory, to have created the world in such a way as to betray His own
obligation to a substance which belonged to another—and that even not
good. Was He then, asks (Hermogenes), to make all things out of
nothing,that so evil things themselves might be attributed to His will?
Great, in all conscience,(14) must be the blindness of our heretics
which leaves them to argue in such a way that they either insist on the
belief of another God supremely good, on the ground of their thinking
the Creator to be the author of evil, or else they set up Matter with
the Creator, in order that they may derive evil from Matter, not from
the Creator. And yet there is absolutely no god at all that is free
from such a doubtful plight, so as to be able to avoid the appearance
even of being the author of evil, whosoever he is that—I will not say,
indeed, has made, but still—has permitted evil to be made by some
author or other, and from some source or other. Hermogenes, therefore,
ought to be told(15) at once, although we postpone to another place our
distinction concerning the mode of evil,(16) that even he has effected
no result by this device of his.(17) For observe how God is found to
be, if not the Author of, yet at any rate the conniver at,(18) evil,
inasmuch as He, with all His extreme goodness, endured evil in Matter
be- fore He created the world, although, as being good, and the enemy
of evil, He ought to have corrected it. For He either was able to
correct it, but was unwilling; or else was willing, but being a weak
God, was not able. If He was able and yet unwilling, He was Himself
evil, as having favoured evil; and thus He now opens Himself to the
charge of evil, because even if He did not create it yet still, since
it would not be existing if He had been against its existence, He must
Himself have then caused it to exist, when He refused to will its
non-existence. And what is more shameful than this? When He willed that
to be which He was Himself unwilling to create, He acted in fact
against His very self,(1) inasmuch as He was both willing that that
should exist which He was unwilling to make, and unwilling to make that
which He was willing should exist. As if what He willed was good, and
at the same time what he refused to be the Maker of was evil. What He
judged to be evil by not creating it, He also proclaimed to be good by
permitting it to exist. By bearing with evil as a good instead of
rather extirpating it, He proved Himself to be the promoter thereof;
criminally,(2) if through His own will—disgracefully, if through
necessity. God must either be the servant of evil or the friend
thereof, since He held converse with evil in Matter—nay, more,
effected His works out of the evil thereof.
But, after all,(3) by what proofs does Hermogenes persuade us
that Matter is evil? For it will be impossible for him not to call that
evil to which he imputes evil. Now we lay down this principle,(4) that
what is eternal cannot possibly admit of diminution and subjection, so
as to be considered inferior to another co-eternal Being. So that we
now affirm that evil is not even compatible with it,(5) since it is
incapable of subjection, from the fact that it cannot in any wise be
subject to any, because it is eternal. But inasmuch as, on other
grounds,(6) it is evident what is eternal as God is the highest good,
whereby also He alone is good—as being eternal, and therefore good—as
being God, how can evil be inherent in Matter, which (since it is
eternal) must needs be believed to be the highest good? Else if that
which is eternal prove to be also capable of evil, this (evil) will be
able to be also believed of God to His prejudice;(7) so that it is
without adequate reason that he has been so anxious(8) to remove evil
from God; since evil must be compatible with l an eternal Being, even
by being made compatible with Matter, as Hermogenes makes it. But, as
the argument now stands,(9) since what is eternal can be deemed evil,
the evil must prove to be invincible and insuperable, as being eternal;
and in that case(10) it will be in vain that we labour "to put away
evil from the midst of us;"(11) in that case, moreover, God vainly
gives us such a command and precept; nay more, in vain has God
appointed any judgment at all, when He means, indeed,(12) to inflict
punishment with injustice. But if, on the other hand, there is to be an
end of evil, when the chief thereof, the devil, shall "go away into the
fire which God hath prepared for him and his angels" (13)—having been
first "cast into the bottomless pit;"(14) when likewise "the
manifestation of the children of God"(15) shall have "delivered the
creature"(16) from evil, which had been "made subject to vanity;"(17)
when the cattle restored in the innocence and integrity of their
nature(18) shall be at peace(19) with the beasts of the field, when
also little children shall play with serpents;(20) when the Father
shall have put beneath the feet of His Son His enemies,(21) as being
the workers of evil,—if in this way an end is compatible with evil, it
must follow of necessary that a beginning is also compatible with it;
and Matter will turn out to have a beginning, by virtue of its having
also an end. For whatever things are set to the account of evil,(22)
have a compatibility with the condition of evil.
Come now, let us suppose Matter to be evil, nay, very evil, by
nature of course, just as we believe God to be good, even very good, in
like manner by nature. Now nature must be regarded as sure and fixed,
just as persistently fixed in evil in the case of Matter, as immoveable
and unchangeable in good in the case of God. Because, as is evident,(1)
if nature admits of change from evil to good in Matter, it can be
changed from good to evil in God. Here some man will say, Then will
"children not be raised up to Abraham from the stones?"(2) Will
"generations of vipers not bring forth the fruit of repentance?"(3) And
"children of wrath" fail to become sons of peace, if nature be
unchangeable? Your reference to such examples as these, my friend,(4)
is a thoughtless(5) one. For things which owe their existence to birth
such as stones and vipers and human beings—are not apposite to the
case of Matter, which is unborn; since their nature, by possessing a
beginning, may have also a termination. But bear in mind(6) that Matter
has once for all been determined to be eternal, as being unmade,
unborn, and therefore supposably of an unchangeable and incorruptible
nature; and this from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself, which he
alleges against us when he denies that God was able to make (anything)
of Himself, on the ground that what is eternal is incapable of change,
because it would lose—so the opinion runs(7)—what it once was, in
becoming by the change that which it was not, if it were not eternal.
But as for the Lord, who is also eternal, (he maintained) that He could
not be anything else than what He always is. Well, then, I will adopt
this definite opinion of his, and by means thereof refute him. I blame
Matter with a like censure, because out of it, evil though it be—nay,
very evil —good things have been created, nay, "very good" ones: "And
God saw that they were good, and God blessed them"(8)—because, of
course, of their very great goodness; certainly not because they were
evil, or very evil. Change is therefore admissible in Matter; and this
being the case, it has lost its condition of eternity; in short,(9) its
beauty is decayed in death.(10) Eternity, however, cannot be lost,
because it cannot be eternity, except by reason of its immunity from
loss. For the same reason also it is incapable of change, inasmuch as,
since it is eternity, it can by no means be changed.
Here the question will arise How creatures were made good out of
it," which were formed without any change at all?(12) How occurs the
seed of what is good, nay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very
evil? Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit,(13) since there
is no God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit,
since there is not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to
grant him that there is some germ of good in it, then there will be no
longer a uniform nature (pervading it), that is to say, one which is
evil throughout; but instead thereof (we now encounter) a double
nature, partly good and partly evil; and again the question will arise,
whether, in a subject which is good and evil, there could possibly have
been found a harmony for light and darkness, for sweet and bitter? So
again, if qualities so utterly diverse as good and evil have been able
to unite together,(14) and have imparted to Matter a double nature,
productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will absolutely(15)
good things be imputable to God, just as evil things are not ascribed
to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since they are
derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to God
neither gratitude for good things, nor grudge(16) for evil ones,
because He has produced no work of His own proper character.(17) From
which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been
subservient to Matter.
Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded
Him the opportunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the
creation of good creatures, as having detected(18) what was good in
matter—although this, too, be a discreditable supposition(19)—yet, at
any rate, when He produces evil likewise out of the same (Matter), He
is a servant to Matter, since, of course,(20) it is not of His own
accord that He produces this too, having nothing else that He can do
than to effect creation out of an evil stock(21)—unwillingly, no
doubt, as being good; of necessity, too, as being unwilling; and
as an act of servitude, because from necessity. Which, then, is the
worthier thought, that He created evil things of necessity, or of His
own accord? Because it was indeed of necessity that He created them, if
out of Matter; of His own accord, if out of nothing. For you are now
labouring in vain when you try to avoid making God the Author of evil
things; because, since He made all things of Matter, they will have to
be ascribed to Himself, who made them, just because(1) He made them.
Plainly the interest of the question, whence He made all things,
identifies itself with (the question), whether He made all things out
of nothing; and it matters not whence He made all things, so that He
made all things thence, whence most glory accrued to Him.(2) Now, more
glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own will than from one of
necessity; in other words, from a creation out of nothing, than from
one out of Matter. It is more worthy to believe that God is free, even
as the Author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power, whatever it be,
is more suited to Him than infirmity.(3) If we thus even admit that
matter had nothing good in it, but that the Lord produced whatever good
He did produce of His own power, then some other questions will with
equal reason arise. First, since there was no good at all in Matter, it
is clear that good was not made of Matter, on the express ground indeed
that Matter did not possess it. Next, if good was not made of Matter,
it must then have been made of God; if not of God, then it must have
been made of nothing.—For this is the alternative, on Hermogenes' own
showing.(4)
Now, if good was neither produced out of matter, since it was not
in it, evil as it was, nor out of God, since, according to the position
of Hermogenes, nothing could have been produced out of god, it will be
found that good was created out of nothing, inasmuch as it was formed
of none —neither of Matter nor of God. And if good was formed out of
nothing, why not evil too? Nay, if anything was formed out of nothing,
why not all things? Unless indeed it be that the divine might was
insufficient for the production of all things, though it produced a
something out of nothing. Or else if good proceeded from evil matter,
since it issued neither from nothing nor from God, it will follow that
it must have proceeded from the conversion of Matter contrary to that
unchangeable attribute which has been claimed for it, as an eternal
being.(5) Thus, in regard to the source whence good derived its
existence, Hermogenes will now have to deny the possibility of such.
But still it is necessary that (good) should proceed from some one of
those sources from which he has denied the very possibility of its
having been derived. Now if evil be denied to be of nothing for the
purpose of denying it to be the work of God, from whose will there
would be too much appearance of its being derived, and be alleged to
proceed from Matter, that it may be the property of that very thing of
whose substance it is assumed to be made, even here also, as I have
said, God will have to be regarded as the Author of evil; because,
whereas it had been His duty(6) to produce all good things out of
Matter, or rather good things simply, by His identical attribute of
power and will, He did yet not only not produce all good things, but
even (some) evil things—of course, either willing that the evil should
exist if He was able to cause their non-existence, or not being strong
enough to effect that all things should be good, if being desirous of
that result, He failed in the accomplishment thereof; since there can
be no difference whether it were by weakness or by will, that the Lord
proved to be the Author of evil. Else what was the reason that, after
creating good things, as if Himself good, He should have also produced
evil things, as if He failed in His goodness, since He did not confine
Himself to the production of things which were simply consistent with
Himself? What necessity was there, after the production of His proper
work, for His troubling Himself about Matter also by producing evil
likewise, in order to secure His being alone acknowledged as good from
His good, and at the same time(7) to prevent Matter being regarded as
evil from (created) evil? Good would have flourished much better if
evil had not blown upon it. For Hermogenes himself explodes the
arguments of sundry persons who contend that evil things were necessary
to impart lustre to the good, which must be understood from their
contrasts. This, therefore, was not the ground for the production of
evil; but if some other reason must be sought for the introduction
thereof, why could it not have been introduced even from nothing,(1)
since the very same reason would exculpate the Lord from the reproach
of being thought the author of evil, which now excuses the existence of
evil things, when He produces them out of Matter? And if there is this
excuse, then the question is completely(2) shut up in a corner, where
they are unwilling to find it, who, without examining into the reason
itself of evil, or distinguishing how they should either attribute it
to God or separate it from God, do in fact expose God to many most
unworthy calumnies.(3)
On the very threshoId,(4) then, of this doctrine,(5) which I
shall probably have to treat of elsewhere, I distinctly lay it down as
my position, that both good and evil must be ascribed either to God,
who made them out of Matter; or to Matter itself, out of which He made
them; or both one and the other to both of them together,(6) because
they are bound together—both He who created, and that out of which He
created; or (lastly) one to One and the other to the Other,(7) because
after Matter and God there is not a third. Now if both should prove to
belong to God, God evidently will be the author of evil; but God, as
being good, cannot be the author of evil. Again, if both are ascribed
to Matter, Matter will evidently be the very mother of good,(8) but
inasmuch as Matter is wholly evil, it cannot be the mother of good. But
if both one and the other should be thought to belong to Both together,
then in this case also Matter will be comparable with God; and both
will be equal, being on equal terms allied to evil as well as to good.
Matter, however, ought not to be compared with God, in order that it
may not make two gods. If, (lastly,) one be ascribed to One, and the
other to the Other—that is to say, let the good be God's, and the evil
belong to Matter—then, on the one hand, evil must not be ascribed to
God, nor, on the other hand, good to Matter. And God, moreover, by
making both good things and evil things out of Matter, creates them
along with it. This being the case, I cannot tell how Hermogenes(9) is
to escape from my conclusion; for he supposes that God cannot be the
author of evil, in what way soever He created evil out of Matter,
whether it was of His own will, or of necessity, or from the reason (of
the case). If, however, He is the author of evil, who was the actual
Creator, Matter being simply associated with Him by reason of its
furnishing Him with substance,(10) you now do away with the cause(11)
of your introducing Matter. For it is not the less true, that it is by
means of Matter that God shows Himself the author of evil, although
Matter has been assumed by you expressly to prevent God's seeming to be
the author of evil. Matter being therefore excluded, since the cause of
it is excluded, it remains that God without doubt, must have made all
things out of nothing. Whether evil things were amongst them we shall
see, when it shall be made clear what are evil things, and whether
those things are evil which you at present deem to be so. For it is
more worthy of God that He produced even these of His own will, by
producing them out of nothing, than from the predetermination of
another,(12) (which must have been the case) if He had produced them
out of Matter. It is liberty, not necessity, which suits the character
of God. I would much rather that He should have even willed to create
evil of Himself, than that He should have lacked ability to hinder its
creation.
This rule is required by the nature of the One-only God,(13) who
is One-only in no other way than as the sole God; and in no other way
sole, than as having nothing else (co-existent) with Him. So also He
will be first, because all things are after Him; and all things are
after Him, because all things are by Him; and all things are by Him,
because they are of nothing: so that reason coincides with the
Scripture, which says: "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who
hath been His counsellor? or with whom took He counsel? or who hath
shown to Him the way of wisdom and knowledge? Who hath first given to
Him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?"(1) Surely none! Because
there was present with Him no power, no material, no nature which
belonged to any other than Himself. But if it was with some (portion of
Matter)(2) that He effected His creation, He must have received from
that (Matter) itself both the design and the treatment of its order as
being "the way of wisdom and knowledge." For He had to operate
conformably with the quality of the thing, and according to the nature
of Matter, not according to His own will in consequence of which He
must have made(3) even evil things suitably to the nature not of
Himself, but of Matter.
If any material was necessary to God in the creation of the
world, as Hermogenes supposed, God had a far nobler and more suitable
one in His own wisdom(4)—one which was not to be gauged by the
writings of(5) philosophers, but to be learnt from the words or
prophets. This alone, indeed, knew the mind of the Lord. For "who
knoweth the things of God, and the things in God, but the Spirit, which
is in Him?"(6) Now His wisdom is that Spirit. This was His counsellor,
the very way of His wisdom and knowledge.(7) Of this He made all
things, making them through It, and making them with It. "When He
prepared the heavens," so says (the Scripture(8)), "I was present with
Him; and when He strengthened above the winds the lofty clouds, and
when He secured the fountains(9) which are under the heaven, I was
present, compacting these things(10) along with Him. I was He(11) in
whom He took delight; moreover, I daily rejoiced in His presence: for
He rejoiced when He had finished the world, and amongst the sons of
men did He show forth His pleasure."(12) Now, who would not rather
approve of(13) this as the fountain and origin of all things—of this
as, in very deed, the Matter of all Matter, not liable to any end,(14)
not diverse in condition, not restless in motion, not ungraceful in
form, but natural, and proper, and duly proportioned, and beautiful,
such truly as even God might well have required, who requires His own
and not another's? Indeed, as soon as He perceived It to be necessary
for His creation of the world, He immediately creates It, and
generates It in Himself. "The Lord," says the Scripture, "possessed(15)
me, the beginning of His ways for the creation of His works. Before the
worlds He rounded me; before He made the earth, before the mountains
were settled in their places; moreover, before the hills He generated
me, and prior to the depths was I begotten."(16) Let Hermogenes then
confess that the very Wisdom of God is declared to be born and created,
for the especial reason that we should not suppose that there is any
other being than God alone who is unbegotten and uncreated. For if
that, which from its being inherent in the Lord(17) was of Him and in
Him, was yet not without a beginning,—I mean(18) His wisdom, which was
then born and created, when in the thought of God It began to assume
motion(19) for the arrangement of His creative works,—how much more
impossible(20) is it that anything should have been without a beginning
which was extrinsic to the Lord!(21) But if this same Wisdom is the
Word of God, in the capacity(22) of Wisdom, and (as being He) without
whom nothing was made, just as also (nothing) was set in order without
Wisdom, how can it be that anything, except the Father, should be
older, and on this account indeed nobler, than the Son of God, the
only-begotten and first-begotten Word? Not to say that(23) what is
unbegotten is stronger than that which is born, and what is not made
more powerful than that which is made. Because that which did not
require a Maker to give it existence, will be much more elevated in
rank than that which had an author to bring it into being. On this
principle, then,(24) if evil is indeed unbegotten, whilst the Son of
God is begotten ("for," says God, "my heart hath emitted my most
excellent Word"(25)), I am not quite sure that evil may not be
introduced by good, the stronger by the weak, in the same way as the
unbegotten is by the begotten. Therefore on this ground Hermogenes puts
Matter even before God, by putting it before the Son. Because the Son
is the Word, and "the Word is God,"(1) and "I and my Father are
one."(2) But after all, perhaps,(3) the Son will patiently enough
submit to having that preferred before Him which (by Hermogenes), is
made equal to the Father !
But I shall appeal to the original document(4) of Moses, by help
of which they on the other side vainly endeavour to prop up their
conjectures, with the view, of course, of appearing to have the support
of that authority which is indispensable in such an inquiry. They have
found their opportunity, as is usual with heretics, in wresting the
plain meaning of certain words. For instance the very beginning,(5)
when God made the heaven and the earth, they will construe as if it
meant something substantial and embodied,(6) to be regarded as Matter.
We, however, insist on the proper signification of every word, and say
that principium means beginning,—being a term which is suitable to
represent things which begin to exist. For nothing which has come into
being is without a beginning, nor can this its commencement be at any
other moment than when it begins to have existence. Thus principium or
beginning, is simply a term of inception, not the name of a substance.
Now, inasmuch as the heaven and the earth are the principal works of
God, and since, by His making them first, He constituted them in an
especial manner the beginning of His creation, before all things else,
with good reason does the Scripture preface (its record of creation)
with the words," In the beginning God made the heaven and the
earth;"(7) just as it would have said, "At last God made the heaven and
the earth," if God had created these after all the rest. Now, if the
beginning is a substance, the end must also be material. No doubt, a
substantial thing(8) may be the beginning of some other thing which may
be formed out of it thus the clay is the beginning of the vessel. and
the seed is the beginning of the plant. But when we employ the word
beginning in this sense of origin, and not in that of order, we do not
omit to mention also the name of that particular thing which we regard
as the origin of the other. On the other hand,(9) if we were to make
such a statement as this, for example, "In the beginning the potter
made a basin or a water-jug," the word beginning will not here indicate
a material substance (for I have not mentioned the clay, which is the
beginning in this sense, but only the order of the work, meaning that
the potter made the basin and the jug first, before anything
else—intending afterwards to make the rest. It is, then, to the order
of the works that the word beginning has reference, not to the origin
of their substances. I might also explain this word beginning in
another way, which would not, however, be inapposite.(10) The Greek
term for beginning, which is arkh , admits the sense not only of
priority of order, but of power as well; whence princes and magistrates
are called arkontes .Therefore in this sense too, beginning may be
taken for princely authority and power. It was, indeed, in His
transcendent authority and power, that God made the heaven and the
earth.
But in proof that the Greek word means nothing else than
beginning, and that beginning admits of no other sense than the initial
one, we have that (Being)(11) even acknowledging such a beginning, who
says: "The Lord possessed(12) me, the beginning of His ways for the
creation of His works."(13) For since all things were made by the
Wisdom of God, it follows that, when God made both the heaven and the
earth in principio—that is to say, in the beginning—He made them in
His Wisdom. If, indeed, beginning had a material signification, the
Scripture would not have informed us that God made so and so in
principio, at the beginning, but rather ex principio, of the beginning;
for He would not have created in, but of, matter. When Wisdom, however,
was referred to, it was quite right to say, in the beginning. For it
was in Wisdom that He made all things at first, because by meditating
and arranging His plans therein,(14) He had in fact already done (the
work of creation); and if He had even intended to create out of matter,
He would yet have effected His creation when He previously medi- tated
on it and arranged it in His Wisdom, since It(1) was in fact the
beginning of His ways: this meditation and arrangement being the primal
operation of Wisdom, opening as it does the way to the works by the act
of meditation and thought.(2) This authority of Scripture I claim for
myself even from this circumstance, that whilst it shows me the God who
created, and the works He created, it does not in like manner reveal to
me the source from which He created. For since in every operation there
are three principal things, He who makes, and that which is made, and
that of which it is made, there must be three names mentioned in a
correct narrative of the operation — the person of the maker the sort
of thing which is made,(3) and the material of which it is formed. If
the material is not mentioned, while the work and the maker of the work
are both mentioned, it is manifest that He made the work out of
nothing. For if He had had anything to operate upon, it would have
been mentioned as well as (the other two particulars).(4) In
conclusion, I will apply the Gospel as a supplementary testimony to the
Old Testament. Now in this there is all the greater reason why there
should be shown the material (if there were any) out of which God made
all things, inasmuch as it is therein plainly revealed by whom He made
all things. "In the beginning was the Word"(5) — that is, the same
beginning, of course, in which God made the heaven and the earth(6) —
"and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made
by Him, and without Him nothing was made."(7) Now, since we have here
clearly told us who the Maker was, that is, God, and what He made, even
all things, and through whom He made them, even His Word, would not the
order of the narrative have required that the source out of which all
things were made by God through the Word should likewise be declared,
if they had been in fact made out of anything? What, therefore, did not
exist, the Scripture was unable to mention; and by not mentioning it,
it has given us a clear proof that there was no such thing: for if
there had been, the Scripture would have mentioned it.
And to such a degree has the Holy Ghost made this the rule of His
Scripture, that whenever anything is made out of anything, He mentions
both the thing that is made and the thing of which it is made. "Let the
earth," says He, "bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the
fruit-tree yielding fruit after its kind, whose seed is in itself,
after its kind. And it was so. And the earth brought forth grass, and
herb yielding seed after its kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose
seed was in itself, after its kind."(1) And again: "And God said, Let
the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creatures that have life,
and fowl that may fly above the earth through the firmament of heaven.
And it was so. And God created great whales, and every living creature
that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their
kind."(2) Again afterwards: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth
the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and
beasts of the earth after their kind."(3) If therefore God, when
producing other things out of things which had been already made,
indicates them by the prophet, and tells us what He has produced from
such and such a source(4) (although we might ourselves suppose them to
be derived from some source or other, short of nothing;(5) since there
had already been created certain things, from which they might easily
seem to have been made); if the Holy Ghost took upon Himself so great a
concern for our instruction, that we might know from what everything
was produced,(6) would He not in like manner have kept us well informed
about both the heaven and the earth, by indicating to us what it was
that He made them of, if their original consisted of any material
substance, so that the more He seemed to have made them of nothing, the
less in fact was there as yet made, from which He could appear to have
made them? Therefore, just as He shows us the original out of which He
drew such things as were derived from a given source, so also with
regard to those things of which He does not point out whence He
produced them, He confirms (by that silence our assertion) that they
were produced out of nothing. "In the beginning," then, "God made the
heaven and the earth."(7) I revere(8) the fulness of His Scripture, in
which He manifests to me both the Creator and the creation. In the
gospel, moreover, I discover a Minister and Witness of the Creator,
even His Word.(9) But whether all things were made out of any
underlying Matter, I have as yet failed anywhere to find. Where such a
statement is written, Hermogenes' shop(10) must tell us. If it is
nowhere written, then let it fear the woe which impends on all who add
to or take away from the written word.(11)
But he draws an argument from the following words, where it is written: "And the earth was without form, and void."(12) For he resolves(13) the word earth into Matter, because that which is made out of it is the earth. And to the word was he gives the same direction, as if it pointed to what had always existed unbegotten and unmade. It was without form, moreover, and void, because he will have Matter to have existed shapeless and confused, and without the finish of a maker's hand.(14) Now these opinions of his I will refute singly; but first I wish to say to him, by way of general answer: We are of opinion that Matter is pointed at in these terms. But yet does the Scripture intimate that, because Matter was in existence before all, anything of like condition(15) was even formed out of it? Nothing of the kind. Matter might have had existence, if it so pleased — or rather if Hermogenes so pleased. It might, I say, have existed, and yet God might not have made anything out of it, either as it was unsuitable to Him to have required the aid of anything, or at least because He is not shown to have made anything out of Matter. Its existence must therefore be without a cause, you will say. Oh, no! certainly(16) not without cause. For even if the world were not made out of it, yet a heresy has been hatched therefrom; and a specially impudent one too, because it is not Matter which has produced the heresy, but the heresy has rather made Matter itself.
I now return to the several points(17) by means of which he
thought that Matter was signified. And first I will inquire about the
terms. For we read only of one of them Earth; the other, namely
Matter, we do not meet with. I ask, then, since Matter is not mentioned
in Scripture, how the term earth can be applied to it, which marks a
substance of another kind? There is all the greater need why mention
should also have been made of Matter, if this has acquired the further
sense of Earth, in order that I may be sure that Earth is one and the
same name as Matter, and so not claim the designation for merely one
substance, as the proper name thereof, and by which it is better known;
or else be unable (if I should feel the inclination), to apply it to
some particular species of Mater, instead, indeed,(1) of making it the
common term(2) of all Matter. For when a proper name does not exist for
that thing to which a common term is ascribed, the less apparent(3) is
the object to which it may be ascribed, the more capable will it be of
being applied to any other object whatever. Therefore, even supposing
that Hermogenes could show us the name(4) Matter, he is bound to prove
to us further, that the same object has the surname(5) Earth, in order
that he may claim for it both designations alike.
He accordingly maintains that there are two earths set before us
in the passage in question: one, which God made in the beginning; the
other being the Matter of which God made the world, and concerning
which it is said, "And the earth was without form, and void."(6) Of
course, if I were to ask, to which of the two earths the name earth is
best suited,(7) I shall be told that the earth which was made derived
the appellation from that of which it was made, on the ground that it
is more likely that the offspring should get its name from the
original, than the original from the offspring. This being the case,
another question presents itself to us, whether it is right and proper
that this earth which God made should have derived its name from that
out of which He made it? For I find from Hermogenes and the rest of the
Materialist heretics,(8) that while the one earth was indeed "without
form, and void," this one of ours obtained from God in an equal
degree(9) both form, and beauty, and symmetry; and therefore that the
earth which was created was a different thing from that out of which it
was created. Now, having become a different thing, it could not
possibly have shared with the other in its name, after it had declined
from its condition. If earth was the proper name of the (original)
Matter, this world of ours, which is not Matter, because it has become
another thing, is unfit to bear the name of earth, seeing that that
name belongs to something else, and is a stranger to its nature. But
(you will tell me) Matter which has undergone creation, that is, our
earth, had with its original a community of name no less than of kind.
By no means. For although the pitcher is formed out of the clay, I
shall no longer call it clay, but a pitcher; so likewise, although
electrum(10) is compounded of gold and silver, I shall yet not call it
either gold or silver, but electrum. When there is a departure from the
nature of any thing, there is likewise a relinquishment of its
name—with a propriety which is alike demanded by the designation and
the condition. How great a change indeed from the condition of that
earth, which is Matter, has come over this earth of ours, is plain even
from the fact that the latter has received this testimony to its
goodness in Genesis, "And God saw that it was good;"(11) while the
former, according to Hermogenes, is regarded as the origin and cause of
all evils. Lastly, if the one is Earth because the other is, why also
is the one not Matter as the other is? Indeed, by this rule both the
heaven and all creatures ought to have had the names of Earth and
Matter, since they all consist of Matter. I have said enough touching
the designation Earth, by which he will have it that Matter is
understood. This, as everybody knows, is the name of one of the
elements; for so we are taught by nature first, and afterwards by
Scripture, except it be that credence must be given to that Silenus who
talked so confidently in the presence of king Midas of another world,
according to the account of Theopompus. But the same author informs us
that there are also several gods.
We, however, have but one God, and but one earth too, which in
the beginning God made.(1) The Scripture, which at its very outset
proposes to run through the order thereof tells us as its first
information that it was created; it next proceeds to set forth what
sort of earth it was.(2) In like manner with respect to the heaven, it
informs us first of its creation—"In the beginning God made the
heaven:"(3) it then goes on to introduce its arrangement; how that God
both separated "the water which was below the firmament from that which
was above the firmament,"(4) and called the firmament heaven,(5)—the
very thing He had created in the beginning. Similarly it (afterwards)
treats of man: "And God created man, in the image of God made He
him."(6) It next reveals how He made him: "And (the Lord) God formed
man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the
breath of life; and man became a living soul."(7) Now this is
undoubtedly(8) the correct and fitting mode for the narrative. First
comes a prefatory statement, then follow the details in full;(9) first
the subject is named, then it is described.(10) How absurd is the other
view of the account,(11) when even before he(12) had premised any
mention of his subject, i.e. Matter, without even giving us its name,
he all on a sudden promulged its form and condition, describing to us
its quality before mentioning its existence,—pointing out the figure
of the thing formed, but concealing its name! But how much more
credible is our opinion, which holds that Scripture has only subjoined
the arrangement of the subject after it has first duly described its
formation and mentioned its name! Indeed, how full and complete(13) is
the meaning of these words: "In the beginning God created the heaven
and the earth; but(14) the earth was without form, and void,"(15)—the
very same earth, no doubt, which God made, and of which the Scripture
had been speaking at that very moment.(16) For that very "but"(17) is
inserted into the narrative like a clasp,(18) (in its function) of a
conjunctive particle, to connect the two sentences indissolubly
together: "But the earth." This word carries back the mind to that
earth of which mention had just been made, and binds the sense
thereunto.(19) Take away this "but," and the tie is loosened; so much
so that the passage, "But the earth was without form, and void," may
then seem to have been meant for any other earth.
But we shall show not only that this condition(27) agreed with
this earth of ours, but that it did not agree with that other (insisted
on by Hermogenes). For, inasmuch as pure Matter was thus subsistent
with God,(1) without the interposition indeed of any element at all
(because as yet there existed nothing but itself and God), it could not
of course have been invisible. Because, although Hermogenes contends
that darkness was inherent in the substance of Matter, a position which
we shall have to meet in its proper place,(2) yet darkness is visible
even to a human being (for the very fact that there is the darkness is
an evident one), much more is it so to God. If indeed it(3) had been
invisible, its quality would not have been by any means discoverable.
How, then, did Hermogenes find out(4) that that substance was "without
form," and confused and disordered, which, as being invisible, was not
palpable to his senses? If this mystery was revealed to him by God, he
ought to give us his proof. I want to know also, whether (the substance
in question) could have been described as "void." That certainly is
"void" which is imperfect. Equally certain is it, that nothing can be
imperfect but that which is made; it is imperfect when it is not fully
made.(5) Certainly, you admit. Matter, therefore, which was not made at
all, could not have been imperfect; and what was not imperfect was not
"void." Having no beginning, because it was not made, it was also
unsusceptible of any void-condition.(6) For this void-condition is an
accident of beginning. The earth, on the contrary, which was made, was
deservedly called "void." For as soon as it was made, it had the
condition of being imperfect, previous to its completion.
God, indeed, consummated all His works in a due order; at first
He paled them out,(7) as it were, in their unformed elements, and then
He arranged them(8) in their finished beauty. For He did not all at
once inundate light with the splendour of the sun, nor all at once
temper darkness with the moon's assuaging ray.(9) The heaven He did not
all at once bedeck(10) with constellations and stars, nor did He at
once fill the seas with their teeming monsters.(11) The earth itself He
did not endow with its varied fruitfulness all at once; but at first
He bestowed upon it being, and then He filled it, that it might not be
made in vain.(12) For thus says Isaiah: "He created it not in vain; He
formed it to be inhabited."(13) Therefore after it was made, and while
awaiting its perfect state,(14) it was "without form, and void:" "void"
indeed, from the very fact that it was without form (as being not yet
perfect to the sight, and at the same time unfurnished as yet with its
other qualities);(15) and "without form," because it was still covered
with waters, as if with the rampart of its fecundating moisture,(16) by
which is produced our flesh, in a form allied with its own. For to this
purport does David say:(17) "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness
thereof; the world, and all that dwell therein: He hath rounded it upon
the seas, and on the streams hath He established it." It was when the
waters were withdrawn into their hollow abysses that the dry land
became conspicuous,(19) which was hitherto covered with its watery
envelope. Then it forthwith becomes "visible," (20) God saying, "Let
the water be gathered together into one mass,(21) and let the dry land
appear."(22) "Appear," says He, not "be made." It had been already
made, only in its invisible condition it was then waiting(23) to
appear. "Dry," because it was about to become such by its severance
from the moisture, but yet "land." "And God called the dry land
Earth,"(24) not Matter. And so, when it afterwards attains its
perfection, it ceases to be accounted void, when God declares, "Let the
earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed after its kind, and
cording to its likeness, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, whose seed
is in itself, after its kind."(25) Again: "Let the earth bring forth
the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping things, and
beasts of the earth, after their kind."(26) Thus the divine Scripture
accomplished its full order. For to that, which it had at first
described as "without form (invisible) and void," it gave both
visibility and completion. Now no other Matter was "without form
(invisible) and void." Henceforth, then, Matter will have to be visible
and complete. So that I must(1) see Matter, since it has become
visible. I must likewise recognize it as a completed thing, so as to be
able to gather from it the herb bearing seed, and the tree yielding
fruit, and that living creatures, made out of it, may minister to my
need. Matter, however, is nowhere,(2) but the Earth is here, confessed
to my view. I see it, I enjoy it, ever since it ceased to be "without
form (invisible), and void." Concerning it most certainly did Isaiah
speak when he said, "Thus saith the Lord that created the heavens, He
was the God that formed the earth, and made it."(3) The same earth for
certain did He form, which He also made. Now how did He form(4) it? Of
course by saying, "Let the dry land appear."(5) Why does He command it
to appear, if it were not previously invisible? firs purpose was also,
that He might thus prevent His having made it in vain, by rendering it
visible, and so fit for use. And thus, throughout, proofs arise to us
that this earth which we inhabit is the very same which was both
created and formed(6) by God, and that none other was "Without form,
and void," than that which had been created and formed. It therefore
follows that the sentence, "Now the earth was without form, and void,"
applies to that same earth which God mentioned separately along with
the heaven.(7)
The following words will in like manner apparently corroborate
the conjecture of Hermogenes, "And darkness was upon the face of the
deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the water;(8) as if
these blended(9) substances, presented us with arguments for his
massive pile of Matter.(10) Now, so discriminating an enumeration of
certain and distinct elements (as we have in this passage), which
severally designates" darkness," "the deep" "the Spirit of God," "the
waters," forbids the inference that anything confused or (from such
confusion) uncertain is meant. Still more, when He ascribed to them
their own places,(11) "darkness on the face of the deep," "the Spirit
upon the face of the waters," He repudiated all confusion in the
substances; and by demonstrating their separate position,(12) He
demonstrated also their distinction. Most absurd, indeed, would it be
that Matter, which is introduced to our view as "without form," should
have its "formless" condition maintained by so many words indicative of
form,(13) without any intimation of what that confused body(14) is,
which must of course be supposed to be unique,(15) since it is without
form.(16) For that which is without form is uniform; but even(17) that
which is without form, when it is blended together(18) from various
component parts,(19) must necessarily have one outward appearance;(20)
and it has not any appearance, until it has the one appearance (which
comes) from many parts combined.(21) Now Matter either had those
specific parts(22) within itself, from the words indicative of which it
had to be understood—I mean "darkness," and "the deep," and "the
Spirit," and "the waters"—or it had them not. If it had them, how is
it introduced as being "without form?"(23) If it had them not, how does
it become known?(24)
But this circumstance, too, will be caught at, that Scripture
meant to indicate of the heaven only, and this earth of yours,(25) that
God made it in the beginning, while nothing of the kind is said of the
above-mentioned specific parts;(26) and therefore that these, which are
not described as having been made, appertain to unformed Matter. To
this point(27) also we must give an answer. Holy I Scripture would be
sufficiently explicit, if it had declared that the heaven and the
earth, as the very highest works of creation, were made by God,
possessing of course their own special appurtenances,(28) which might
be understood to be implied in these highest works themselves. Now the
appurtenances of the heaven and the earth, made then in the beginning,
were the darkness and the deep, and the spirit, and the waters. For the
depth and the darkness underlay the earth. Since the deep was under the
earth, and the darkness was over the deep, undoubtedly both the
darkness and the deep were under the earth. Below the heaven, too, lay
the spirit(1) and the waters. For since the waters were over the earth,
which they covered, whilst the spirit was over the waters, both the
spirit and the waters were alike over the earth. Now that which is over
the earth, is of course under the heaven. And even as the earth brooded
over the deep and the darkness, so also did the heaven brood over the
spirit and the waters, and embrace them. Nor, indeed, is there any
novelty in mentioning only that which contains, as pertaining to the
whole,(2) and understanding that which is contained as included in it,
in its character of a portion.(3) Suppose now I should say the city
built a theatre and a circus, but the stage(4) was of such and such a
kind, and the statues were on the canal, and the obelisk was reared
above them all, would it follow that, because I did not distinctly
state that these specific things (5) were made by the city, they were
therefore not made by it along with the circus and the theatre? Did I
not, indeed, refrain from specially mentioning the formation of these
particular things because they were implied in the things which I had
already said were made, and might be understood to be inherent in the
things in which they were contained? But this example may be an idle
one as being derived from a human circumstance; I will take another,
which has the authority of Scripture itself. It says that "God made man
of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life, and man became a living soul."(6) Now, although it here mentions
the nostrils,(7) it does not say that they were made by God; so again
it speaks of skin(8) and bones, and flesh and eyes, and sweat and
blood, in subsequent passages,(9) and yet it never intimated that they
had been created by God. What will Hermogenes have to answer? That the
human limbs must belong to Matter, because they are not specially
mentioned as objects of creation? Or are they included in the formation
of man? In like manner, the deep and the darkness, and the spirit and
the waters, were as members of the heaven and the earth. For in the
bodies the limbs were made, in the bodies the limbs too were mentioned.
No element but what is a member of that element in which it is
contained. But all elements are contained in the heaven and the earth.
This is the answer I should give in defence of the Scripture
before us, for seeming here to set forth(10) the formation of the
heaven and the earth, as if (they were) the sole bodies made. It could
not but know that there were those who would at once in the bodies
understand their several members also, and therefore it employed this
concise mode of speech. But, at the same time, it foresaw that there
would be stupid and crafty men, who, after paltering with the virtual
meaning,(11) would require for the several members a word descriptive
of their formation too. It is therefore because of such persons, that
Scripture in other passages teaches us of the creation of the
individual parts. You have Wisdom saying, "But before the depths was I
brought forth,"(12) in order that you may believe that the depths were
also "brought forth"—that is, created—just as we create sons also,
though we "bring them forth." It matters not whether the depth was made
or born, so that a beginning be accorded to it, which however would not
be, if it were subjoined(13) to matter. Of darkness, indeed, the Lord
Himself by Isaiah says, "I formed the light, and I created
darkness."(14) Of the wind(15) also Amos says, "He that strengtheneth
the thunder,(16) and createth the wind, and declareth His Christ(16)
unto men;"(17) thus showing that that wind was created which was
reckoned with the formation of the earth, which was wafted over the
waters, balancing and refreshing and animating all things: not (as some
suppose) meaning God Himself by the spirit,(18) on the ground that "God
is a Spirit,"(19) because the waters would not be able to bear up their
Lord; but He speaks of that spirit of which the winds consist, as He
says by Isaiah, "Because my spirit went forth from me, and I made every
blast."(20) In like manner the same Wisdom says of the waters, "Also
when He made the fountains strong, things which(1) are under the sky, I
was fashioning(2) them along with Him."(3) Now, when we prove that
these particular things were created by God, although they are only
mentioned in Genesis, without any intimation of their having been made,
we shall perhaps receive from the other side the reply, that these were
made, it is true,(4) but out of Matter, since the very statement of
Moses, "And darkness was on the face of the deep, and the spirit of God
moved on the face of the waters,"(5) refers to Matter, as indeed do all
those other Scriptures here and there,(6) which demonstrate that the
separate parts were made out of Matter. It must follow, then,(7) that
as earth consisted of earth, so also depth consisted of depth, and
darkness of darkness, and the wind and waters of wind and waters. And,
as we said above,(8) Matter could not have been without form, since it
had specific parts, which were formed out of it—although as separate
things(9)—unless, indeed, they were not separate, but were the very
same with those out of which they came. For it is really impossible
that those specific things, which are set forth under the same names,
should have been diverse; because in that case(10) the operation of God
might seem to be useless,(11) if it made things which existed already;
since that alone would be a creation,(12) when things came into being,
which had not been (previously) made. Therefore, to conclude, either
Moses then pointed to Matter when he wrote the words: "And darkness was
on the face of the deep, and the spirit of God moved on the face of the
waters;" or else, inasmuch as these specific parts of creation are
afterwards shown in other passages to have been made by God, they ought
to have been with equal explicitness(13) shown to have been made out of
the Matter which, according to you, Moses had previously mentioned;(14)
or else, finally, if Moses pointed to those specific parts, and not to
Matter, I want to know where Matter has been pointed out at all.
But although Hermogenes finds it amongst his own colourable
pretences(15) (for it was not in his power to discover it in the
Scriptures of God), it is enough for us, both that it is certain that
all things were made by God, and that there is no certainty whatever
that they were made out of Matter. And even if Matter had previously
existed, we must have believed that it had been really made by God,
since we maintained (no less) when we held the rule of faith to be,(16)
that nothing except God was uncreated.(17) Up to this point there is
room for controversy, until Matter is brought to the test of the
Scriptures, and fails to make good its case.(18) The conclusion of the
whole is this: I find that there was nothing made, except out of
nothing; because that which I find was made, I know did not once exist.
Whatever(19) was made out of something, has its origin in something
made: for instance, out of the ground was made the grass, and the
fruit, and the cattle, and the form of man himself; so from the waters
were produced the animals which swim and fly. The original fabrics(20)
out of which such creatures were produced I may call their
materials,(21) but then even these were created by God.
Besides,(22) the belief that everything was made from nothing
will be impressed upon us by that ultimate dispensation of God which
will bring back all things to nothing. For "the very heaven shall be
rolled together as a scroll;'"(23) nay, it shall come to nothing along
with the earth itself, with which it was made in the beginning. "Heaven
and earth shall pass away,"(24) says He. "The first heaven and the
first earth passed away,"(25) "and there was found no place for
them,"(26) because, of course, that which comes to an
end loses locality. In like manner David says, "The heavens, the
works of Thine hands, shall themselves perish. For even as a vesture
shall He change them, and they shall be changed."(1) Now to be changed
is to fall from that primitive state which they lose whilst undergoing
the change. "And the stars too shall fall from heaven, even as a
fig-tree casteth her green figs when she is i shaken of a mighty
wind."(3) "The mountains shall melt like wax at the presence of the
Lord;"(4) that is, "when He riseth to shake terribly the earth."(5)
"But I will dry up the pools;"(6) and "they shall seek water, and they
shall find none."(7) Even" the sea shall be no more."(8) Now if any
person should go so far as to suppose that all these passages ought to
be spiritually interpreted, he will yet be unable to deprive them of
the true accomplishment of those issues which must come to pass just as
they have been written For all figures of speech necessarily arise out
of real things, not out of chimerical ones; t because nothing is
capable of imparting anything of its own for a similitude, except it
actually be that very thing which it imparts in the similitude. I
return therefore to the principle(9) which defines that all things
which have come from nothing shall return at last to nothing. For God
would not have made any perishable thing out of what was eternal, that
is to say, out of Matter; neither out of greater things would He have
created inferior ones, to whose character it would be more agreeable to
produce greater things out of inferior ones,—in other words, what is
eternal out of what is perishable. This is the promise He makes even to
our flesh, and it has been His will to deposit within us this pledge of
His own virtue and power, in order that we may believe o that He has
actually(10) awakened the universe out of nothing, as if it had been
steeped in death,(11) in the sense, of course, of its previous
non-existence for the purpose of its e coming into existence.(12)
As regards all other points touching Matter, although there is no necessity why we should treat of them (for our first point was the manifest proof of its existence), we must for all that pursue our discussion just as if it did exist, in order that its non-existence may be the more apparent, when these other points concerning it prove inconsistent with each other, and in order at the same time that Hermogenes may acknowledge his own contradictory positions. Matter, says he, at first sight seems to us to be incorporeal; but when examined by the light of right reason, it is found to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal. What is this right reason of yours,(13) which declares nothing right, that is, nothing certain? For, if I mistake not, everything must of necessity be either corporeal or incorporeal (although I may for the moment(14) allow that there is a certain incorporeality in even substantial things,(15) although their very substance is the body of particular things); at all events, after the corporeal and the incorporeal there is no third state. But if it be contended(16) that there is a third state discovered by this right reason of Hermogenes, which makes Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal, (I ask,) Where is it? what sort of thing is it? what is it called? what is its description? what is it understood to be? This only has his reason declared, that Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.
But see what a contradiction he next advances(17) (or perhaps
some other reason(18) occurs to him), when he declares that Matter(18)
partly corporeal and partly incorporeal. Then must Matter be considered
(to embrace) both conditions, in order that it may not have either? For
it will be corporeal, and incorporeal in spite of(19) the declaration
of that antithesis,(20) which is plainly above giving any reason for
its opinion, just as that "other reason" also was. Now, by the
corporeal part of Matter, he means that of which bodies are created;
but by the incorporeal part of Matter, he means its uncreated(1)
motion. If, says he, Matter were simply a body, there would appear to
be in it nothing incorporeal, that is, (no) motion; if, on the other
hand, it had been wholly incorporeal no body could be formed out of it.
What a peculiarly right(2) reason have we here! Only if you make your
sketches as right as you make your reason, Hermogenes, no painter would
be more stupid(3) than yourself. For who is going to allow you to
reckon motion as a moiety of Matter, seeing that it is not a
substantial thing, because it is not corporeal, but an accident (if
indeed it be even that) of a substance and a body? Just as action is,
and impulsion, just as a slip is, or a fall, so is motion. When
anything moves even of itself, its motion is the result of impulse;(5)
but certainly it is no part of its substance in your sense,(6) when you
make motion the incorporeal part of matter. All things, indeed,(7) have
motion—either of themselves as animals, or of others as inanimate
things; but yet we should not say that either a man or a stone was both
corporeal and incorporeal because they had both a body and motion: we
should say rather that all things have one form of simple(8)
corporeality, which is the essential quality(9) of substance. If any
incorporeal incidents accrue to them, as actions, or passions, or
functions,(10) or desires, we do not reckon these parts as of the
things. How then does he contrive to assign an integral portion of
Matter to motion, which does not pertain to substance, but to a certain
condition(11) of substance? Is not this incontrovertible?(12) Suppose
you had taken it into your head(13) to represent matter as immoveable,
would then the immobility seem to you to be a moiety of its form?
Certainly not. Neither, in like manner, could motion. But I shall be at
liberty to speak of motion elsewhere.(14)
I see now that you are coming back again to that reason,
which has been in the habit of declaring to you nothing in the way of
certainty. For just as you introduce to our notice Matter as being
neither corporeal nor incorporeal, so you allege of it that it is
neither good nor evil; and you say, whilst arguing further on it in the
same strain: "If it were good, seeing that it had ever been so, it
would not require the arrangement of itself by God;(15) if it were
naturally evil, it would not have admitted of a change(16) for the
better, nor would God have ever applied to such a nature any attempt at
arrangement of it, for His labour would have been in vain." Such are
your words, which it would have been well if you had remembered in
other passages also, so as to have avoided any contradiction of them.
As, however, we have already treated to some extent of this ambiguity
of good and evil touching Matter, I will now reply to the only
proposition and argument of yours which we have before us. I shall not
stop to repeat my opinion, that it was your bounden duty to have said
for certain that Matter was either good or bad, or in some third
condition; but (I must observe)that you have not here even kept to the
statement which you chose to make before. Indeed, you retract what you
declared—that Matter is neither good nor evil; because you imply that
it is evil when you say, "If it were good, it would not require to be
set in order by God;" so again, when you add, "If it were naturally
evil, it would not admit of any change for the better," you seem to
intimate(17) that it is good. And so you attribute to it a close
relation(18) to good and evil, although you declared it neither good
nor evil. With a view, however, to re lute the argument whereby you
thought you were going to clinch your proposition, I here contend: If
Matter had always been good, why should it not have still wanted a
change for the better? Does that which is good never desire, never
wish, never feel able to advance, so as to change its good for a
better? And in like manner, if Matter had been by nature evil, why
might it not have been changed by God as the more powerful Being, as
able to convert the nature of stones into children of Abraham?(19)
Surely by such means you not only compare the Lord with Matter, but you
even put Him below(20) it, since you affirm that(21) the nature of
Matter could not possibly be brought under control by Him, and trained
to something better. But although you are here disinclined to allow
that Matter is by nature evil, yet in another passage you will deny
having made such an admission.(1)
My observations touching the site(2) of Matter, as also
concerning its mode(3) have one and the same object in view—to meet
and refute your perverse positions. You put Matter below God, and thus,
of course, you assign a place to it below God. Therefore Matter is
local.(4) Now, if it is local, it is within locality; if within
locality, it is bounded(5) by the place within which it is; if it is
bounded, it has an outline,(6) which (painter as you are in your
special vocation) you know is the boundary to every object susceptible
of outline. Matter, therefore, cannot be infinite, which, since it is
in space, is bounded by space; and being thus determinable by space, it
is susceptible of an outline. You, however, make it infinite, when you
say: "It is on this account infinite, because it is always existent."
And if any of your disciples should choose to meet us by declaring your
meaning to be that Matter is infinite in time, not in its corporeal
mass,(7) still what follows will show that (you mean) corporeal
infinity to be an attribute of Matter, that it is in respect of bulk
immense and un-circumscribed. "Wherefore," say you, "it is not
fabricated as a whole, but in its parts."(8) In bulk, therefore, is it
infinite, not in time. And you contradict yourself(9) when you make
Matter infinite in bulk, and at the same time ascribe place to it,
including it within space and local outline. But yet at the same time I
cannot tell why God should not have entirely formed it,(10) unless it
be because He was either impotent or envious. I want therefore to know
the moiety of that which was not wholly formed (by God), in order that
I may understand what kind of thing the entirety was. It was only right
that God should have made it known as a model of antiquity,(11) to set
off the glory of His work.
Well, now, since it seems to you to be the correcter thing,(12)
let Matter be circumscribed(13) by means of changes and displacements;
let it also be capable of comprehension, since (as you say)it is used
as material by God,(14) on the ground of its being convertible,
mutable, and separable. For its changes, you say, show it to be
inseparable. And here you have swerved from your own lines(15) which
you prescribed respecting the person of God when you laid down the rule
that God made it not out of His own self, because it was not possible
for Him to become divided(16) seeing that He is eternal and abiding for
ever, and therefore unchangeable and indivisible. Since Matter too is
estimated by the same eternity, having neither beginning nor end, it
will be unsusceptible of division, of change, for the same reason that
God also is. Since it is associated with Him in the joint possession of
eternity, it must needs share with Him also the powers, the laws, and
the conditions of eternity. In like manner, when you say, "All things
simultaneously throughout the universe(17) possess portions of it,(18)
that so the whole may be ascertained from(19) its parts," you of course
mean to indicate those parts which were produced out of it, and which
are now visible to us. How then is this possession (of Matter)by all
things throughout the universe effected—that is, of course, from the
very beginning(20)—when the things which are now visible to us are
different in their condition(21) from what they were in the beginning?
You say that Matter was reformed for the betters(22)—from a
worse condition, of course; and thus you would make the better a copy
of the worse. Everything was in confusion, but now it is reduced to
order; and would you also say, that out of order, disorder is produced?
No one thing is the exact mirror(1) of another thing; that is to say,
it is not its co-equal. Nobody ever found himself in a barber's
looking-glass look like an ass(2) instead of a man; unless it be he who
supposes that unformed and shapeless Matter answers to Matter which is
now arranged and beautified in the fabric of the world. What is there
now that is without form in the world, what was there once that was
formed(3) in Matter, that the world is the mirror of Matter? Since the
world is known among the Greeks by a term denoting ornament,(4) how can
it present the image of unadorned(5) Matter, in such a way that you can
say the whole is known by its parts? To that whole will certainly
belong even the portion which has not yet become formed; and you have
already declared that the whole of Matter was not used as material in
the creation.(6) It follows, then, that this rude, and confused, and
unarranged portion cannot be recognized in the polished, and distinct
and well-arranged parts of creation, which indeed can hardly with
propriety be called parts of Matter, since they have quit-ted(7) its
condition, by being separated from it in the transformation they have
undergone.
I come back to the point of motion,(8) that I may show how
slippery you are at every step. Motion in Matter was disordered, and
confused, and turbulent. This is why you apply to it the comparison of
a boiler of hot water surging over. Now how is it, that in another
passage another sort of motion is affirmed by you? For when you want to
represent Matter as neither good nor evil, you say: "Matter, which is
the substratum (of creation)(9) possessing as it does motion in an
equable impulse,(10) tends in no very great degree either to good or to
evil." Now if it had this equable impulse, it could not be turbulent,
nor be like the boiling water of the caldron; it would rather be even
and regular, oscillating indeed of its own accord between good and
evil, but yet not prone or tending to either side. It would swing, as
the phrase is, in a just and exact balance. Now this is not unrest;
this is not turbulence or inconstancy;" but rather the regularity, and
evenness, and exactitude of a motion, inclining to neither side. If it
oscillated this way and that way, and inclined rather to one particular
side, it would plainly in that case merit the reproach of unevenness,
and inequality, and turbulence. Moreover, although the motion of Matter
was not prone either to good or to evil, it would still, of course,
oscillate between good and evil; so that from this circumstance too it
is obvious that Matter is contained within certain limits,(12) because
its motion, while prone to neither good nor evil, since it had no
natural bent either way, oscillated from either between both, and
therefore was contained within the limits of the two. But you, in fact,
place both good and evil in a local habitation,(13) when you assert
that motion in Matter inclined to neither of them. For Matter which was
local,(14) when inclining neither hither nor thither, inclined not to
the places in which good and evil were. But when you assign locality to
good and evil, you make them corporeal by making them local, since
those things which have local space must needs first have bodily
substance. In fact,(15) incorporeal things could not have any locality
of their own except in a body, when they have access to a body.(16) But
when Matter inclined not to good and evil, it was as corporeal or local
essences that it did not incline to them. You err, therefore, when you
will have it that good and evil are substances. For you make substances
of the things to which you assign locality;(17) but you assign locality
when you keep motion in Matter poised equally distant from both
sides.(18)
You have thrown out all your views loosely and at random,(19) in
order that it might not be apparent, by too close a proximity, how
contrary they are to one another. I, however, mean to gather them
together and compare them. You allege that motion in Matter is without
regularity,(1) and you go on to say that Matter aims at a shapeless
condition, and I then, in another passage, that it desires to be set in
order by God. Does that, then, which affects to be without form, want
to be put into shape? Or does that which wants to be put into shape,
affect to be without form? You are unwilling that God should seem to be
equal to Matter; and then again you say that it has a common condition
· with God. "For [t is impossible," you say, "if it has nothing in
common with God, that it can be set in order by Him." But if it had
anything in common with God, it did not want to be set in order for
being, forsooth, a part of the Deity through a community of condition;
or else even God was susceptible of being set in order(3) by Matter, by
His having Himself something in common with it. And now you herein
subject God to necessity, since there was in Matter something on
account of which He gave it form. You make it, however, a common
attribute of both of them, that they set themselves in motion by
themselves, and that they are ever in motion. What less do you ascribe
to Matter than to God? There will be found all through a fellowship of
divinity in this freedom and perpetuity of motion.
Only in God motion is regular, in Matter irregular.(5) In both,
however, there is equally the attribute of Deity—both alike having
free and eternal motion. At the same time, you assign more to Matter,
to which belonged the privilege of thus moving itself in a way not
allowed to God.
On the subject of motion I would make this further remark.
Following the simile of the boiling caldron, you say that motion in
Matter, before it was regulated, was confused,(6) restless,
incomprehensible by reason of excess in the commotion.(7) Then again
you go on to say, "But it waited for the regulation(8) of God, and kept
its irregular motion incomprehensible, owing to the tardiness of its
irregular motion." Just before you ascribe commotion, here tardiness,
to motion. Now observe how many slips you make respecting the nature of
Matter. In a former passage(9) you say, "If Matter were naturally evil,
it would not have admitted of a change for the better; nor would God
have ever applied to it any attempt at arrangement, for His labour
would have been in vain." You therefore concluded your two opinions,
that Matter was not by nature evil, and that its nature was incapable
of being changed by God; and then, forgetting them, you afterwards drew
this inference: "But when it received adjustment from God, and was
reduced to order,(10) it relinquished its nature." Now, inasmuch as it
was transformed to good, it was of course transformed from evil; and if
by God's setting it in order it relinquished(11) the nature of evil, it
follows that its nature came to an end;(12) now its nature was evil
before the adjustment, but after the transformation it might have
relinquished that nature.
But it remains that I should show also how you make God work. You
are plainly enough at variance with the philosophers; but neither are
you in accord with the prophets. The Stoics maintain that God pervaded
Matter, just as honey the honeycomb. You, however, affirm that it is
not by pervading Matter that God makes the world, but simply by
appearing, and approaching it, just as beauty affects(13) a thing by
simply appearing, and a loadstone by approaching it. Now what
similarity is there in God forming the world, and beauty wounding a
soul, or a magnet attracting iron? For even if God appeared to Matter,
He yet did not wound it, as beauty does the soul; if, again, He
approached it, He yet did not cohere to it, as the magnet does to the
iron. Suppose, however, that your examples are suitable ones. Then, of
course,(14) it was by appearing and approaching to Matter that God made
the world, and He made it when He appeared and when He approached to
it. Therefore, since He had not made it before then? He had neither
appeared nor approached to it. Now, by whom can it be believed that God
had not appeared to Matter—of the same nature as it even was owing to
its eternity? Or that He had been at a distance from it—even He whom
we believe to be existent everywhere, and everywhere apparent; whose
praises all things chant, even inanimate things and things incorporeal,
ac- cording to (the prophet) Daniel?(1) How immense the place, where
God kept Himself so far aloof from Matter as to have neither appeared
nor approached to it before the creation of the world! I suppose He
journeyed to it from a long distance, as soon as He washed to appear
and approach to it.
But it is not thus that the prophets and the apostles have told
us that the world was made by God merely appearing and approaching
Matter. They did not even mention any Matter, but (said) that Wisdom
was first set up, the beginning of His ways, for His works.(2) Then
that the Word was produced, "through whom all things were made, and
without whom nothing was made."(3) Indeed, "by the Word of the Lord
were the heavens made, and all their hosts by the breath of His
mouth."(4) He is the Lord's right hand,(5) indeed His two bands, by
which He worked and constructed the universe. " For," says He, "the
heavens are the works of Thine hands,"(6) wherewith "He hath meted out
the heaven, and the earth with a span."(7) Do not be willing so to
cover God with flattery, as to contend that He produced by His mere
appearance and simple approach so many vast substances, instead of
rather forming them by His own energies. For this is proved by Jeremiah
when he says, "God hath made the earth by His power, He hath
established the world by His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heaven
by His understanding."(8) These are the energies by the stress of which
He made this universe.(9) His glory is greater if He laboured. At
length on the seventh day He rested from His works. Both one and the
other were after His manner. If, on the contrary,(10) He made this
world simply by appearing and approaching it, did He, on the completion
of His work, cease to appear and approach it any more. Nay rather,(11)
God began to appear more conspicuously and to be everywhere
accessible(12) from the time when the world was made. You see,
therefore, how all things consist by the operation of that God who
"made the earth by His power, who established the world by His wisdom,
and stretched out the heaven by His understanding;" not appearing
merely, nor approaching, but applying the almighty efforts of His mind,
His wisdom, His power, His understanding, His word, His Spirit, His
might. Now these things were not necessary to Him, if He had been
perfect by simply appearing and approaching. They are, however, His
"invisible things," which, according to the apostle, "are from the
creation of the world clearly seen by the things that are made;(13)
they are no parts of a nondescript(14) Matter, but they are the
sensible(15) evidences of Himself. "For who hath known the mind of the
Lord,"(16) of which (the apostle) exclaims: "O the depth of the riches
both of His wisdom and knowledge! how unsearchable are His judgments,
and His ways past finding out! "(17) Now what clearer truth do these
words indicate, than that all things were made out of nothing? They are
incapable of being found out or investigated, except by God alone.
Otherwise, if they were traceable or discoverable in Matter, they would
be capable of investigation. Therefore, in as far as it has become
evident that Matter had no prior existence (even from this
circumstance, that it is impossible(18) for it to have had such an
existence as is assigned to it), in so far is it proved that all things
were made by God out of nothing. It must be admitted, however,(19)
that Hermogenes, by describing for Matter a condition like his
own—irregular, confused, turbulent, of a doubtful and precipate and
fervid impulse—has displayed a specimen of his own art, and painted
his own portrait.
IV.